

Special Articles

Jews, Nazis, and Civil Liberties

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UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF THE 1970's it could be argued that the concern of some Jewish community leaders for the position of Jews in the United States was exaggerated. Antisemitism had largely disappeared in the years following World War II. Reaction to the atrocities of the Nazi era was such that even mildly antisemitic public utterances came to be viewed as unacceptable. The civic status of American Jews seemed more secure than ever before.

This "Golden Age" in American Jewish life has come to an end. American Jews have been experiencing a growing anxiety over various developments in the last decade, including the growth of Black Power, the emergence of quotas in employment and education, and the growth of Arab influence in the United States. The political climate of the country is clearly changing; there appears to be a growing indifference to Jewish concerns. Jews see themselves faced with new threats to their security.

Adding to the renewed sense of insecurity has been the much publicized activities of neo-Nazi groups, activities which the Jewish community has been unable to halt. While few in number,¹ the Nazis, evoking nightmarish memories of the Holocaust, have sent a shudder through American Jewry.

The progenitor of Nazism as we know it in the United States today is the American Nazi party, founded in 1959 by George Lincoln Rockwell. From his national headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, Rockwell controlled a small, but active, organization with units in Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston, Dallas and elsewhere. By the time of his assassination by a disgruntled Nazi party member in August 1967, Rockwell had become the "Fuehrer" of American Nazism.

Following Rockwell's death, a brief but intense leadership struggle took place, with a Milwaukee native, Matt Koehl, emerging as the head of the National Socialist White Peoples' party. (This name had been selected by Rockwell prior to his assassination as being more American and therefore more acceptable.) In 1970 several former Rockwell aides broke away from Koehl to form their own local Nazi groups. Among these men were Allen

¹Total Nazi membership in the United States in 1977 was between 1,500 and 2,000. There were probably no more than 20 activists each in Chicago and San Francisco. See Milton Ellerin, "Intergroup Relations," *AJYB*, Vol. 79, 1979, p. 117.

Lee Vincent, who founded the National Socialist White Workers party (NSWWP) in San Francisco, and Frank Collin, who organized the National Socialist Party of America (NSPA) near Marquette Park, on Chicago's South Side. In the spring of 1977, it was Collin and Vincent who orchestrated the American Nazi movement's most publicized activities, when the former announced plans for a Nazi march through the predominantly Jewish suburb of Skokie, Illinois and the latter opened a Nazi bookstore across the street from a synagogue in San Francisco.

This article will focus on events in Skokie and San Francisco. In both cities the immediate targets of Nazi provocation were groups of Jewish survivors who had settled in the United States in the aftermath of the Holocaust. These Jews viewed the reappearance of the swastika in their midst as a direct threat to both American democracy and Jewish survival. Jews throughout the United States were outraged by the Nazi activities.

Events in Skokie and San Francisco, as well as other manifestations of neo-Nazism, have posed a painful dilemma for the American Jewish community. On the one hand, there has been a growing consensus among American Jews that Nazism, in any form, must not be allowed to reassert itself, and that the earlier Jewish communal strategy of ignoring the activities of virulently antisemitic groups is inappropriate and outdated. "Never Again" is no longer the slogan of the militant Jewish Defense League alone; as a response to the growing Holocaust consciousness of American Jewry, it is becoming the anti-Nazi rallying cry of the organized Jewish community as a whole.

On the other hand, American Jews have traditionally been staunch supporters of civil liberties, including the right to free speech and expression. In a major public opinion study conducted in 1954, Samuel Stouffer found that Jews were far more supportive of civil liberties than were members of other religious or ethnic groups.² This continues to be the case today, as both Everett Carll Ladd, Jr.³ and Alan Fisher⁴ have noted. The civil libertarian propensities of American Jews have resulted in a disproportionate Jewish involvement in the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), an organization traditionally committed to protecting and defending the First Amendment rights of all groups, including American Nazis.⁵

²Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (Garden City, 1955), p. 143. See also Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews* (Glencoe, 1956), pp. 187-190.

³Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., "Jewish Life in the United States: Social and Political Values," paper delivered at YIVO Institute for Jewish Research Colloquium, New York City, May 28-29, 1978, pp. 31-32.

⁴Alan Fisher, "Continuity and Erosion of Jewish Liberalism," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, December 1976, pp. 330-334.

⁵Various explanations have been put forward to account for Jewish support for civil liberties. Some have pointed to Jewish religious values derived from biblical and talmudic antecedents

In the public debate over defending the rights of Nazis, many American Jews have been torn between their commitment to the principle of unfettered freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment, and their anguished memory of the Holocaust. This has led them to rethink the meaning of the First Amendment, and the extent of their support of the ACLU. The First Amendment, many Jews now maintain, is not absolute. The public display of the swastika in a community of Holocaust survivors, they assert, constitutes a provocative act that goes far beyond the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. During the past two years, thousands of American Jews have resigned in protest from the ACLU.

The anger of many Jews over the ACLU role in Skokie cannot be separated from their unhappiness with the general drift of ACLU policy in the last decade—a drift characterized by growing politicization, radical liberalism, and indifference to Jewish concerns. Whereas in the past most Jews supported liberal causes, including free speech for Nazis, even when they seemed to threaten Jewish interests and security, this is no longer the case.

SKOKIE AND SAN FRANCISCO

Skokie

On April 27, 1977 the Illinois chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union agreed to go to court on behalf of Frank Collin, who was seeking to organize a Nazi march through the predominantly Jewish suburb of Skokie. Attorneys for the Village of Skokie had just filed a petition against Collin in the Cook County Circuit Court requesting an injunction to prevent him from organizing the march. Collin claimed that his constitutional rights were being threatened and asked the ACLU to aid him in his legal defense.

A month earlier Collin and his followers had written to the Village of Skokie Park District seeking permission to hold a public rally in the Village park. The trustees of the Park District wrote back informing the Nazis that an insurance requirement for a rally was in force; Collin would have to produce \$350,000 in insurance before a permit to hold the rally could be obtained. Since the Nazis were unable to pay this insurance requirement,

as the source. Charles S. Liebman has suggested that Jewish liberalism in general, and the Jewish commitment to civil liberties in particular, is rooted "in the search for a universalistic ethic to which a Jew can adhere but which is seemingly irrelevant to specific Jewish concerns . . ." See Charles Liebman, *The Ambivalent American Jew* (Philadelphia, 1973), pp. 135-159.

the permit was refused. To protest the Skokie Park District's requirement of insurance for permits, Collin announced that he and his followers planned to march down the streets of Skokie in full Nazi attire.

Skokie, a middle-class community north of Chicago, has a population of 69,000, approximately 40,000 of whom are Jews. Of these 40,000, about 7,000 are estimated to be Holocaust survivors. It has been said that there are more former concentration camp inmates living in Skokie than in any other single community in the United States. Thus, as Chicago Congressman Abner Mikva pointed out,⁶ Skokie is more than a village which happens to be a part of suburban America. Its uniqueness lies not so much in its claim to be the world's largest village, but in the fact that it is a "sanctuary for thousands of Jewish Americans who still bear the scars of Hitler's Germany." For many of these people, the sense of community that they have been able to share has provided important emotional security.

It is not surprising that the ACLU defense of the Nazis aroused a strong reaction among the Jewish residents of Skokie. Frank Collin freely admitted that he and his followers deliberately chose to march "where our concept of white power is most opposed." In doing so, the Nazis hoped to precipitate a violent counter-demonstration, thus making themselves martyrs, and generating wide media attention. Collin compared his strategy to that of the civil rights protestors of the 1960's. Others have noted a similarity between this tactic and that of Great Britain's National Front, which deliberately targeted London's heavily Jewish East End as the site for antisemitic rallies. A spokesman for the Jewish United Fund and Welfare Federation of Metropolitan Chicago (JUF) called the Nazi plan "a deliberate and calculated" affront to the Jewish community of Chicago, an undisguised effort to provoke a violent confrontation. The residents of Skokie filed suit in Circuit Court to obtain an injunction against Collin, contending that even a few jack-booted storm troopers waving swastika flags in their streets threatened imminent violence.

The legal battle⁷ over the proposed Nazi march in Skokie—initially scheduled for May 1 and subsequently rescheduled for July 4—officially began on April 28, 1977, when Circuit Court Judge Joseph M. Wosik imposed an injunction banning the march. On April 29 the Appellate Court

⁶Abner Mikva, "Skokie is Different," *Moment*, June 1978, p. 43.

⁷The narrative of events in Skokie is developed from a number of sources: Marc Stern, "The Dilemma of Skokie: Protecting Civil Liberties or Curbing the Nazis?" *Research Report*, Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, August 1978, pp. 3-6; David Hamlin, "Swastikas and Survivors: Inside the Skokie-Nazi Free Speech Case," *Civil Liberties Review*, March-April 1978, pp. 8-33; and selected Jewish Telegraphic Agency *Daily News Bulletins*, 1977 and 1978.

of Illinois rejected the Nazi petition to temporarily lift the injunction while Collin and his followers, with the aid of the ACLU, endeavored to appeal the legality of the ban in the courts.

While the ACLU appeal on behalf of the Nazis with regard to the Skokie injunction was pending, the Village of Skokie enacted three new ordinances designed to insure that the Nazis would not be able to march regardless of the outcome of the case. One ordinance required a permit, issued by Village officials, for street or sidewalk parades. In order to obtain such a permit, the applicant had to provide 30 days advance notice and payment of \$350,000 in liability insurance against any possible damage. A second ordinance banned the public display of symbols offensive to the community and political rallies or parades in which participants wore "military style" uniforms. A third ordinance banned the dissemination of literature which might "incite or promote hatred against persons of Jewish faith or ancestry" or against persons of any other race or religion, or which in any way constituted "group libel." Once again the ACLU entered the case on the side of the Nazis.

During the same period, Skokie resident Sol Goldstein instituted, with the legal assistance of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, a class action suit seeking a permanent injunction against the Nazis, claiming that he and his fellow Holocaust survivors in the community would suffer "severe emotional distress" and "psychic" harm if the march were held. Goldstein's attorney, Jerome Torshen, argued that "menticide" could create emotional damage every bit as injurious as physical assault. The ACLU, again representing the Nazis, demanded that Goldstein's suit be dismissed, on the grounds that if speech or other expression that was emotionally painful to individuals or abhorrent to the majority were suppressed little would be left of the freedom of expression protected under the First Amendment.⁸ While the Illinois Supreme Court subsequently ordered, without the benefit of full written or oral arguments, the dismissal of the Goldstein class action suit, it stayed the order so as to allow Goldstein time to petition the United States Supreme Court for a review of the decision.⁹ The Nazis, announcing that they would not march until all legal obstacles had been eliminated, then called off their July 4 demonstration.

Prior to the cancellation of the Nazi rally, the organized Jewish community of metropolitan Chicago had begun to organize itself to combat the Nazis. A special Sub-Committee on Individual Liberty and Jewish Security of the Public Affairs Committee (PAC) of JUF was established to formulate a community response. The chairman of the sub-committee was Sol

⁸Stern, *loc. cit.*, p. 3.

⁹The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently refused to review the Illinois Supreme Court's dismissal, thus upholding the lower court's decision in the Goldstein suit.

Goldstein, who, in addition to having instituted the above-mentioned class action suit, was a former president of the Skokie Holocaust Survivors Association. "There is no room in my backyard for such a demonstration," stated Goldstein. "I went through the Holocaust . . . and I thought the war was the end of the Nazi movement." Goldstein and his neighbors in Skokie, active in the newly-formed PAC sub-committee, argued that the First Amendment "can only be stretched so far." Nazism, he stated, "is an idea the whole civilized world has condemned. When the First Amendment was introduced, they never thought of such a thing as genocide."¹⁰ During the next year, Goldstein and his neighbors played a prominent role in Jewish communal decision-making vis-à-vis the Nazis.

With the threatened July 4 Nazi march called off, PAC, in an effort to reduce tensions, cancelled a scheduled counter-demonstration at a Jewish community center in Skokie. Against the wishes of the PAC leadership, however, the militant Jewish Defense League (JDL) went ahead with its own plans to hold a protest rally in Skokie on July 4. Speaking at the rally, Rabbi Meir Kahane, the JDL leader, exhorted a crowd of about 400 to "kill Nazis now." The JDL held its rally in the parking lot of the Jewish Community Center after having been refused permission to use the building. Sol Goldstein denounced the JDL for stirring up fears that the Nazis would eventually win their ongoing court battle to march. Rabbi Lawrence Montrose of the Skokie Central Traditional Congregation, the unofficial chaplain of the Village's death camp survivors, agreed with Goldstein, stating that, although he wanted to confront the Nazis with a "good strong protest," he was opposed to the violent tactics of the Jewish Defense League. By their actions, Montrose argued, the JDL made it more difficult to forge unity within the Jewish community and to form an anti-Nazi coalition with non-Jewish groups.

The court battle over the Nazis' right to march in Skokie continued for more than a year—through June 1978. On March 17, 1978 Judge Bernard M. Decker of the Federal District Court in Chicago ordered a 45-day ban on the proposed march, to allow Skokie officials time to appeal his earlier ruling holding the three anti-Nazi ordinances unconstitutional. On April 2 the Federal Court of Appeals in Chicago upheld the Decker ruling prohibiting the Nazis from marching before May. However, on April 6 the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court decision and set aside the 45-day stay, stating that there was no reason for such a postponement since it intended to decide promptly on the constitutionality of the three Skokie ordinances. On May 22 the Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Skokie ordinances were unconstitutional. Skokie officials then appealed the ruling

¹⁰Kathryn McIntyre, "One Man's War with Nazis," *US Magazine*, April 18, 1978, p. 56.

to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, on June 12, turned down the Village's request for an indefinite postponement of the June 25 march. At the same time, two anti-Nazi bills that had been introduced in the Illinois State Legislature were defeated in the House after being passed in the Senate. The march in Skokie, it seemed, would go on.

On May 31 the Village of Skokie Council had issued a permit to PAC to stage a counter-demonstration in Skokie on June 25. Plans were announced for providing facilities for 50,000 demonstrators. PAC allocated \$100,000 to underwrite expenses, including the hiring of staff to administer and coordinate all related activities in Skokie. Eugene DuBow, on leave from his position as midwest regional director of the American Jewish Committee, became the coordinator of the project, working closely with Goldstein and members of the PAC sub-committee. Goldstein announced that after discussions with Skokie officials, PAC had accepted the athletic field of Niles Township East as the site for the Jewish community's counter-demonstration.

A broad-based coalition of Jewish and non-Jewish groups made plans to participate in the demonstration. The American Federation of Jewish Fighters, Camp Inmates and Nazi Victims announced that it would send busloads of its members to Skokie; it publicly urged other Jewish organizations to do likewise. Marvin Morrison, executive director of the New York department of the Jewish War Veterans, sent mailgrams to 100,000 JWV members urging them to be in Skokie on June 25. Congressmen from both major parties announced their intention to join in the anti-Nazi march. Support was also received from labor, veteran, and ethnic groups, among them Polish Catholic army veterans who had fought against the Nazis in World War II. An *ad hoc* coalition of 43 Chicago-area ethnic groups including Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians, announced strong support for the anti-Nazi demonstration. Julian E. Kulas, local Ukrainian community leader and spokesman for the coalition, announced that it would stand by the Jews of Skokie "in order to make it crystal clear that Nazism is a threat not only to Jews but to all Americans."¹¹

The 25-member planning committee coordinating "Project Skokie" included James Rottman, director of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and several Christian clergymen from the Skokie area. The committee issued a call to religious leaders to support the march and to condemn Nazism as contrary to the Judaeo-Christian tradition and the ideals of American democracy. Sister Ann Gillen, executive director of the National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry, convened a meeting of Chicago-area Catholic leaders that pledged "persistent action" against the

¹¹Chicago *Sun Times*, June 20, 1978, p. 12.

Nazis in Chicago and elsewhere. An editorial in the April issue of *St. Anthony's Messenger*, a national Catholic magazine, urged Christians throughout the United States to don the yellow Star of David that Jews had been forced to wear during the Nazi era, as a way of protesting the march. Groups of evangelical Christians planned to travel to Skokie to join the protest as well.

A few days before the June 25 Nazi march, Collin announced that his group was cancelling its planned demonstration in Skokie and would march instead in the racially-mixed area of Marquette Park. This change in strategy was attributable, ostensibly, to a ruling by a federal judge ordering the Chicago Park District to allow the Nazis to hold a rally in Marquette Park without being forced to pay the \$60,000 liability insurance—reduced from an earlier \$350,000—required by the district. Marquette Park, Collin now claimed, had been his original target area all along. "My overall goal always was Marquette Park, speaking to my own white people rather than a mob of howling creatures in the streets of Skokie." Few believed him, however, assuming rather that the Nazis had been scared away by the specter of 50,000 counter-demonstrators. PAC called off its counter-demonstration shortly after the Nazis announced cancellation of their plans. When the Nazi rally was held in Marquette Park on July 9, anti-Nazi demonstrators, largely unorganized, were kept two blocks away, and no violence erupted.

San Francisco

Five days before the beginning of Passover, 1977, Rabbi Theodore Alexander of Congregation B'nai Emunah, a small synagogue composed mainly of Holocaust survivors, in the predominantly middle-class Sunset district of San Francisco, arrived at his office to find that a Nazi bookstore had opened across the street. To mark the opening of the store, named after Hitler confidante Rudolf Hess, the Nazis erected a swastika in front of the building and displayed a picture of Hess, other Nazi insignia, and anti-Jewish posters in the store window. Several days later an angry crowd of Jews armed with sledgehammers and crowbars ransacked and destroyed the bookstore. A few hours later, five stained glass windows at Congregation B'nai Emunah were smashed, apparently as an act of retaliation. Morris Weiss, a Holocaust survivor, and his son Allan were subsequently arrested for leading the assault on the Nazi store.

The bookstore incident was by no means the first in which local Nazis were the cause of public confrontation and controversy. Since early 1974 the San Francisco chapter of the National Socialist White People's Party, of which Alan Vincent was the leader, had been disrupting public meetings of the San Francisco Board of Education. The Nazis had organized several

rallies at public sites at which virulently antisemitic literature was distributed. Moreover, a local *cause célèbre* had developed around Sandra Silva, an avowed Nazi who was employed as a clerk-typist in the San Francisco Police Department.

On one side of the debate in the Silva case was the ACLU, supported by San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto, which strongly defended Silva's constitutional right to "maintain her belief" without jeopardizing her job. On the other side were a number of Jewish and Black groups, led by Jewish city supervisor Quentin Kopp,¹² which argued that Silva's anti-democratic beliefs did conflict with the performance of her job. At first, the possibility was raised that she might be dismissed on the basis of her Nazi ideology alone. But that debate ended when the San Francisco Civil Service Commission came to Silva's defense, stating that her party affiliation did not interfere with her performance at work.¹³

A subsequent public furor developed over the question whether Silva had violated a Civil Service residency law requiring city employees to live in the city and might, therefore, be subject to dismissal. This was the argument of Supervisor Kopp, who claimed that he had hard evidence from several sources, including a private investigator, that Silva had been living in San Mateo. Kopp asked the Civil Service Commission to institute dismissal proceedings against her. Following Kopp's request, the ACLU came to Silva's defense. Ruth Jacobs, an attorney with the local ACLU and the wife of radical author-activist Paul Jacobs, charged that Kopp was raising a totally irrelevant issue—i.e., the residency rule—"in an attempt to deprive Silva of her right to free speech under the First Amendment." The ACLU maintained that Silva was "temporarily" residing with her parents in San Mateo and was therefore not in violation of the city's residency requirement. "If Kopp feels that she should be fired because of political beliefs," suggested Jacobs, "it is his privilege to pursue that unlawful course. But he should not use the dubious device of questioning her residency. What Kopp is attempting through this investigation is to punish Miss Silva, by having her fired, for exercising her First Amendment rights."¹⁴ In response, Kopp charged that the ACLU had "smeared me in exactly the fashion used by Joe McCarthy 20 years ago by ascribing false motives to my actions," and that "the ACLU's statement showed a lack of knowledge of the city's residency law and how it applies to Miss Silva . . . I'm not depriving her

¹²Kopp is a former member of the ACLU. He resigned in protest over the organization's growing politicization. Interview with Quentin Kopp, April 24, 1978.

¹³New York *Times*, August 4, 1974, p. 37.

¹⁴San Francisco *Examiner*, July 16, 1974, p. 1.

of free speech, but acting in response to complaints from constituents who believe the [residency] law should be enforced."¹⁵

The opening of the Rudolf Hess bookstore, housed ironically in a building owned by a Jewish survivor of Auschwitz, caused great public outrage. "San Francisco is one of the nation's most tolerant cities," editorialized the San Francisco *Examiner*, "but a terminal point was reached when a group of American Nazis tried to revive Hitlerism with all its horrors . . . The ransacking and burning of the store was inevitable . . ."¹⁶ Reacting to the incident, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors unanimously passed a resolution urging the introduction of a bill in the state legislature to outlaw public display of the swastika and the wearing of Nazi uniforms. (Three years earlier, the Board of Supervisors had failed in an attempt to ban the wearing of a Nazi uniform in public. See below pp. 22-3.) Introduced by Supervisor Dianne Feinstein (who in November 1978 became mayor), the resolution stated: "The Board of Supervisors is of the opinion that the wearing of the Nazi uniform and the display of the Nazi swastika will continue to provoke acts of violence and fear for the public safety."¹⁷ Supervisor Feinstein went further in voicing public sympathy for those who destroyed the bookstore: "I conceivably could have done the same thing if it had been in my neighborhood," she said. "In Nazi Germany the same things existed and people laughed. Then suddenly the Nazis were in power."¹⁸ Feinstein's sentiments were echoed in statements by Rabbi Alexander and other leaders of the Jewish community. "I've heard that it would impair the right of free speech and the right of free assembly," noted Rabbi Alexander in urging passage of the bill. "I've heard it should not be voted and should not be passed . . . But when they dispense hate against other Americans, that can no longer fall under the right of free expression. It becomes an entirely different story. It is no longer political. It becomes incitement to hatred and murder."¹⁹

With the help of the Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC), the landlord of the building housing the bookstore obtained legal counsel to have the Nazis evicted. The basis of the eviction order was misrepresentation, and they were given until April 15 to vacate the premises. At the same time, friends of the Weiss family hired attorney Ephraim Margolin to represent Morris and Allan Weiss.²⁰ (They also organized a legal defense fund, the Sunset Anti-Fascist Committee, to raise the money needed to

¹⁵San Francisco *Chronicle*, July 18, 1974, p. 3.

¹⁶San Francisco *Examiner*, April 5, 1977, p. 26.

¹⁷San Francisco *Jewish Bulletin*, May 13, 1977, p. 5.

¹⁸San Francisco *Examiner*, April 5, 1977, p. 5.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰The charges against the Weisses were subsequently dropped.

cover the Weisses' court expenses.) The choice of Margolin as the Weisses' counsel was significant, since he, a graduate of the Hebrew University and Yale Law School, had become one of the leading civil liberties attorneys in the city. As chairman of the Legal Committee of the Northern California chapter of the ACLU, Margolin had impeccable credentials in the civil liberties field. At the same time, he was an important figure in the organized Jewish community—an officer of the American Jewish Congress, JCRC, Bureau of Jewish Education, and Jewish Welfare Federation.

Adding to the anger in the San Francisco Jewish community over the bookstore incident was the insensitivity shown in some quarters as to the meaning of Nazism. A local television station, in a broadcast editorial about the bookstore confrontation, stated that the "anti-Nazis," i.e., those Jews who had attacked the bookstore, "exhibited a mentality as ruthless and primitive as the one they were attacking." "In that fashion," noted Earl Raab, the director of JCRC, "was the calculated demolition of millions of people equated with the minor property damage done by some of its angry victims. Even those who most disapproved of the trashing knew that there was something pathological about that equation as the main burden of a T.V. editorial."²¹ In a televised rebuttal to the station's editorial, noted attorney and JCRC chairman Mathew Weinberg argued that trashing of the bookstore "was not an organized action; it was a spontaneous act of rage against Nazi symbols by relatives of those who were tortured and killed under the aegis of those symbols. I do not defend violence, even against property . . . But to turn the bookstore episode into a primary attack against the principles of Nazi butchery is a strange inversion of values and an affront to our common sense. But more than that, the editorial was a depressing sign that we have forgotten the horror which led America to fight a bloody war."²²

During the same period, Jewish leaders in San Francisco met with the management of a different local television station to protest another Nazi-related incident. While being interviewed by the station, Nazi party chief Vincent stated that at certain times during the year, American Jews "commit their blood sacrifice" and "Christian children begin to disappear from the streets." The station received a large quantity of mail criticizing its editorial judgement in allowing the infamous "blood libel" to go unchallenged on public television. "By what measure of editorial judgement," asked one Jewish communal leader, "had this hoary and gratuitous slander

²¹Earl Raab, "The Insensitives—'Neutral' on Anti-Semitism," *Midstream*, August-September, 1978, p. 59.

²²Mathew Weinberg, "Rebuttal," editorial on "Freedom of Speech," May 4-5, 1977, transcribed and reprinted by KGO-T.V., San Francisco.

been allowed to remain in this filmed interview?" The station management's explanation, that there was no "malicious intent" on its part, and that it was merely being "neutral" in reporting the opinions of newsworthy individuals, seemed to many Jews to represent precisely the kind of indifference to antisemitism that made it possible for Nazi activity to continue.

Throughout 1977 and 1978, much time was spent by the San Francisco Jewish Community Relations Council in discussing ways of counteracting Nazi activity while, at the same time, protecting First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly. A lawyer's committee began to examine possible legislation which might limit Nazi activity and propaganda in a number of specific situations. In January 1978 a community-wide Committee for Continuing Education Against Nazism was organized under the auspices of the San Francisco Conference on Religion, Race and Social Concerns. The committee was headed by San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and included Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clergy, as well as civic and business leaders.

FREE SPEECH AND THE NAZIS

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peacefully to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances." The First Amendment, however, is by no means absolute; it has never been so interpreted by a majority of the United States Supreme Court. The view that the Constitution does not protect all forms of speech was most powerfully expressed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in his now classic dictum that "the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater." Over the past six decades a substantial body of legal opinion has developed which stresses that those forms of speech and public expression that are "provocative" or injurious can indeed be restricted. Thus, Professor Philip B. Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School, in supporting the constitutionality of Skokie's position vis-à-vis the Nazis, has observed that "no one denies the value of protecting the right to speak. But this does not mean that all speech is protected speech or that the context of the speech is irrelevant to the protection required to be afforded by the State."²³ Indeed, in at least one instance even the ACLU has refused to uphold the rights of Nazis to absolute freedom of speech. In May 1978 the Houston, Texas ACLU chapter voted not to aid

²³Quoted in Mikva, *loc. cit.*, p. 46.

a Nazi group whose recorded telephone message had been cut off by a court injunction. The message had offered a \$5,000 bounty for "every non-white killed during an attack on a white person." "Offering a bounty or a tangible incentive for murder," commented ACLU executive director Aryeh Neier, "is not protected by the First Amendment."²⁴

The precedent cited most authoritatively by the courts on this matter is the landmark case of *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire* (1942). As Justice Murphy stated on behalf of the unanimous court:

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words—those which by their utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may derive from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.²⁵

Legal precedent for the restriction of provocative and defamatory speech can similarly be found in the 1951 opinion of Justice Robert Jackson in the case of *Kunz v. New York*: Kunz, a Baptist minister, had been convicted and fined for holding a religious meeting on the streets of New York without a permit. Pointing out that Kunz's public meetings had included attacks on Catholics and Jews, Jackson argued that "to blanket hateful and hate-stirring attacks on races and faiths under the protections for freedom of speech may be a noble innovation. On the other hand, it may be a quixotic tilt at windmills which belittles great principles of liberty." It made "a world of difference," Jackson maintained, that Kunz had been speaking in street meetings, since that posed the question whether New York was required to place its streets at his service "to hurl insults at the passerby." Jackson suggested that this case fell within the "fighting words" doctrine of the *Chaplinsky* case.²⁶

The legal debate over Skokie has centered around the doctrine of "fighting words" first enunciated in *Chaplinsky*.²⁷ Opposition to the Nazi march has been based on the fact that the Village of Skokie is heavily Jewish, with a substantial number of "survivors," and that a Nazi march through its streets would thus be a deliberate effort to utter "fighting

²⁴Interview with Aryeh Neier, April 5, 1978.

²⁵*Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*, 1942. For an interesting discussion of the *Chaplinsky* ruling see Hadley Arkes, "Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups," in Philip B. Kurland (ed.), *Free Speech and Association: The Supreme Court and the First Amendment* (Chicago, 1975), pp. 414–22.

²⁶David Fellman, "Constitutional Rights of Association," in Philip B. Kurland, *Ibid.*, p. 44.

²⁷See Aryeh Neier, *Defending My Enemy* (New York, 1979), *passim*.

words" and provoke public disorder. Many Jews who agreed with the ACLU on the question of freedom of speech generally—even for Nazis and other antisemites—differed over the proposed march in Skokie. In their opinion, a parade by uniformed stormtroopers, complete with jackboots and swastika armbands, was nothing short of a direct provocation, and thus was excluded from the protective umbrella of the First Amendment.

In July 1977, the Illinois Appellate Court invoked the "fighting words" doctrine to uphold the local injunction barring the Nazi march. "The swastika," the court declared, "is a personal affront to every member of the Jewish faith. It calls to mind the nearly consummated genocide of their people committed within memory by those who used the swastika as their symbol . . . The epithets of racial and religious hatred are not protected speech." Thus, the public display of the swastika, in the view of the Illinois Court, constituted "symbolic speech," which, being the equivalent of "fighting words," could legitimately be curtailed. The ACLU, arguing that the Appellate Court based its decision on a "novel" and entirely unwarranted interpretation of the *Chaplinsky* case, appealed on behalf of the Nazis first to the Illinois Supreme Court and then to the U.S. Supreme Court for a stay of injunction. The swastika, it maintained, is "symbolic speech" just as fully protected by the First Amendment as the wearing of black arm bands during the Vietnam war. The state, the ACLU claimed, does not have the power to decide which symbols are permissible and which are not. In taking this position, the ACLU was following the direction of the Supreme Court in recent years, as a majority of the Court had attempted to narrow the interpretation of *Chaplinsky* by suggesting that there is no way to effectively distinguish between forms of speech—real or symbolic—that are provocative or injurious and those that are neutral or inoffensive. In its 1971 decision in *Cohen v. California*, and in subsequent rulings, the Supreme Court made it more difficult to uphold anti-Nazi municipal ordinances on grounds of "provocative" speech.

The judges who ruled in favor of the Nazis indicated that it was the "burden" of the Skokie residents to avoid "the offensive symbol if they can do so without unreasonable inconvenience." Presumably, then, it would be the responsibility of the Holocaust survivors living in Skokie to stay indoors while the Nazis marched through their village. At the very least they would have to avoid the City Hall area around which the march would be centered. The "burden" of the Holocaust survivors in San Francisco, whose B'nai Emunah synagogue was directly across the street from the Nazi bookstore, would be much greater; they could avoid the public display of the swastika in their midst only by ceasing to attend the synagogue. Would

such "inconveniences," some wondered, not constitute an infringement of Jewish civil rights?²⁸

The Supreme Court and ACLU opinion that the swastika is "symbolic speech" deserving of protection under the First Amendment was challenged on a variety of grounds. For years the ACLU has argued that the best test of truth is the power of an idea to get itself accepted in the marketplace of ideas. Yet, one may ask, as have George Will, Hadley Arkes, and other critics of the ACLU position, what unresolved issue exists in the marketplace of ideas that the Nazis may help to settle. "If we restrict the speech of Nazis," Arkes has asked, "is it conceivable that we may shield ourselves from ideas that may turn out one day to be valid? Is it possible, for example, that a convincing case could yet be made for genocide if people were given a bit more time to develop the argument?"²⁹ George Will maintains that the marketplace is not a good place to test truth, since it "measures preferences (popularity), not truth. Liberals say all ideas have an equal right to compete in the market. But the right to compete implies the right to win. So the logic of liberalism is that it is better to be ruled by Nazis than to restrict them."³⁰

Those who oppose the ACLU position maintain that the organization's First Amendment rights of Nazis is a betrayal of its basic civil liberties function. "The overriding purpose of the ACLU," argued Florida State University economist Abba P. Lerner in a letter to the *New York Times*, "is to promote and defend a democratic social order in which freedom of speech is secure. If this purpose comes into conflict with the freedom of speech directed at destroying such a social order, their obligation is surely to protect the social order of free speech rather than the free speech of its destroyers."³¹ Through its staunch defense of the Nazis, these critics assert, the ACLU is helping to undermine the cause of civil liberties and liberal democracy itself. "The irony," notes Arkes, "is that the ACLU sees itself as defending at this moment the freedom of a minority, but the principles on which it mounts that defense would cut the ground out from under constitutional government itself and, in that sense, would also imperil the freedom of all minorities."

Some of those opposing the ACLU position point out that the Nazis do not merely insist on their right to advocate freely the denial of freedom to others but anticipate, and receive, free legal assistance in support of their

²⁸This point is made by Marie Syrkin in "Sadat, Skokie and Cosmos 954," *Midstream*, March 1978, pp. 65-66.

²⁹Hadley Arkes, "Marching Through Skokie," *National Review*, May 12, 1978, p. 593.

³⁰George F. Will, "Nazis: Outside the Constitution," *Washington Post*, February 2, 1978, p. A19.

³¹*New York Times*, March 20, 1978, p. 20.

right to do so. Those taking this position concede that the Nazis have a right to march, but maintain that the ACLU, given its limited resources, should not provide the Nazis with free legal representation. The ACLU, they point out, turns away a number of cases in which civil liberties have been denied simply because it is unable to find the lawyers to handle them and unable to pay the costs of the litigation. Why, therefore, permit any part of the ACLU's scarce funds to be wasted on the Nazis? As one such critic of the ACLU position, labor union leader Victor Gotbaum, has put it: "If you want to ask me if Nazis ought to march through Skokie, I'd say 'Yes,' but if you ask me if the ACLU . . . should put its resources to work for them, I say, 'No.'"³²

In a reply to a letter by Aryeh Neier in the *New York Jewish Week*, one writer stated: "I cannot agree that it is not 'a clear and present danger' for demonstrators to deliberately provoke an outraged people into violence. It is far too much to expect Jews sensitive to the Nazi Holocaust to react dispassionately to an organized Nazi provocation in a Jewish neighborhood, just as it would be too much to expect the people of Harlem to be judicious about an organized anti-Black provocation in their area. Shouldn't there be a distinction in law and law-enforcement between demonstrators for realization of constitutional rights and demonstrators who seek to destroy constitutional rights for others?"³³ Most American Jews clearly thought there should. Thus, by 1978 the search for an effective anti-Nazi legal strategy was well under way. In both San Francisco and Chicago, lawyers' committees were formed within the Jewish community to explore possible group libel legislation or other legal action that might limit Nazi activity in a number of specific situations. At the May 1978 annual meeting of the American Jewish Committee, Hadley Arkes made an eloquent plea for the desirability of enacting group libel legislation aimed at the Nazis. He sat down to a standing ovation, a far different response from that he would have received from a comparable audience in the 1960's. Maynard Wishner, the AJC Board of Governors chairman, echoed the changing sentiments of many members when he observed: "This proposed march represents an obscenity. Saying 'We aren't finished with you' or 'Hitler was right' goes beyond the pale of what we should expect under the First Amendment."³⁴ There was a similar shift of opinion within the American Jewish Congress. In 1960 the Congress had agreed that Nazis should be permitted to hold a rally in New York City. In 1978 the Congress, "after long and heated

³²Quoted in Fred Ferretti, "The Buck Stops With Gotbaum," *New York Times Magazine*, June 4, 1978, p. 89.

³³Phineas Stone, *New York Jewish Week*, August 7, 1977, p. 14.

³⁴Maynard Wishner, "American Nazis and the First Amendment," *Sh'ma*, May 27, 1977, p. 136.

internal discussion," urged the U.S. Supreme Court to prohibit Nazis from marching through Skokie wearing Nazi uniforms "which identify them as implementing the evil objectives of Hitlerism."³⁵

THE CRISIS WITHIN THE ACLU

The ACLU's decision to defend Chicago Nazi leader Frank Collin resulted in the most serious crisis in the organization's history, a crisis from which, some believe, it may never recover.³⁶ ACLU officials indicate that 40,000 members, out of a total membership of 250,000, resigned from the organization in 1977. In 1978 there were additional heavy membership losses. The resulting financial pinch led to a 15 per cent cut in the national ACLU staff, and a corresponding cut on the local level.

Not surprisingly, the loss of membership and income was most dramatic in the Chicago area. David Hamlin, executive director of the ACLU's Illinois affiliate, stated in August 1977: "We've projected that we'll lose 25 per cent of our Illinois membership and our financial support because of this Nazi-Skokie case." It is safe to assume that the majority of those resigning from the ACLU were Jews.³⁷

During 1977 and 1978, ACLU staff officials made a concerted effort to broaden support for their position on Skokie within the Jewish community. Executive Director Aryeh Neier, while freely admitting his lack of involvement in Jewish affairs, spoke with pride of his Jewish background and reminded audiences that he and his parents had been refugees from the Nazis. National Chairman Norman Dorsen, a Jewish professor of law at

³⁵Stern, *loc. cit.*, p. 6, and American Jewish Congress press release, Feb. 2, 1978, p. 1.

³⁶Jim Mann, "Hard Times for the ACLU," *The New Republic*, April 15, 1978, pp. 12-15. The decline in ACLU membership since 1976 is not attributable solely to the Skokie controversy. A good many ACLU members were outraged by the organization's decision to defend Ku Klux Klan members stationed at the Marine Corps base at Camp Pendleton, California, after they were attacked by a group of Black marines in November 1976. See J. Anthony Lukas, "The ACLU Against Itself," *New York Times Magazine*, July 9, 1978, p. 11.

³⁷Not all groups in the Jewish community thought it wise for Jews to disassociate themselves. The Union of American Hebrew Congregation's Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism stated that "one can disagree strongly with the approach of the ACLU, but it would be destructive of our deepest Jewish interests to contribute to the weakening and undermining of the ACLU on the American scene." This position was also supported by the Central Conference of American Rabbis, the Reform rabbinic group. See Albert Vorspan, memo on "Skokie," Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, June 15, 1978. The UAHC position is further developed in its "Working Paper on Skokie," on file at the Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, New York City.

New York University, presented the ACLU case to the Domestic Affairs Commission of the American Jewish Committee. Neier, Dorsen and other ACLU leaders indicated that the angry Jewish response to the ACLU role in Skokie took them by surprise, since the organization had a long-standing policy of defending freedom of speech for Nazis.

Why did Jews, both within and outside the organization, react so strongly to the ACLU role in Skokie? Certainly the crucial factor was the burgeoning Holocaust consciousness of American Jews; the feeling that, no matter what, Nazism must never again be permitted to lift its head. At the same time, Jewish anger over the ACLU defense of the Nazis has to be seen in the context of a growing Jewish disillusionment with the general drift of the organization's policies.

Until the early 1960's the ACLU was a relatively small (45,000 members) organization, heavily concentrated in New York and devoted primarily to filing *amicus curiae* briefs in free speech and other First Amendment cases. Since that time, however, the Union has been transformed into a "mass organization with a large professional staff, involved in a wide range of concerns, of which fundamental civil liberties issues such as free speech and free assembly are only a small part."³⁸ It was the Vietnam war that first thrust the organization into the political and social arena. When Dr. Benjamin Spock was indicted for counseling draft evasion, the national ACLU Board agreed to take the case, although a number of members voiced concern that such a step would result in the organization's defending Spock's politics, rather than his civil liberties. In 1970 Aryeh Neier was elected executive director as the "candidate of the left"; he was responsible for pushing the organization in a more political direction.³⁹ Following the Cambodian invasion and the Kent State incident the ACLU, under Neier's direction, passed a resolution calling for the "immediate termination" of the war, a popular political stance that won the organization thousands of new members. In 1973, after an acrimonious internal debate, the ACLU became the first major national organization to call for Richard Nixon's impeachment. By the mid-1970's the politicization of the ACLU had, in many respects, become the salient feature of its organizational life.

Jewish involvement in the ACLU had been conspicuous and consistent since the organization's founding in 1920.⁴⁰ Among those playing a direct

³⁸Mann, *loc. cit.*, p. 13. See also Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., "Politics and the ACLU," *Commentary*, December 1971, pp. 50-58.

³⁹J. Anthony Lukas, *loc. cit.*, p. 20.

⁴⁰In recounting the history of the ACLU, Roger Baldwin, the guiding spirit behind the organization, stated that he could not "remember a time from when [he] first began when there was not a very strong Jewish presence" in the ACLU. See Interview with Roger Baldwin, November 16, 1973, p. 16, on file at William E. Wiener Oral History Collection, American Jewish Committee.

role in establishing the ACLU were Felix Frankfurter, Stephen Wise, and Arthur Garfield Hayes. Louis Marshall, while not a card-carrying member, argued several cases on the ACLU's behalf during the 1920's, as did his law partner Samuel Untermyer. Morris Ernst, who was instrumental in organizing both the American Newspaper Guild and National Lawyer's Guild during the 1930's, served as ACLU general counsel for many years. In 1937, when the ACLU first engaged in the legal defense of Nazis, it was Ernst and Hays who urged Mayor La Guardia of New York to approve the use of city property for a Nazi meeting. Hays also aided the attorney for the (Nazi) Friends of New Germany in court proceedings appealing a prohibition of meetings by that group in New Jersey. In 1955 Osmond K. Fraenkel, who had assisted Ernst in preparing the defense for the Scottsboro case, became general counsel to the ACLU. In the 1960's and 1970's Aryeh Neier played a crucial role in the organization. Many staff attorneys and affiliate executives, including David Goldberger in Chicago and David Fishlow and Ruth Jacobs in San Francisco, are Jewish. When Neier resigned as executive director in October 1978, Ira Glasser, a New Yorker, running against Marvin Schacter of Los Angeles, was elected to succeed him.

Despite the large number of Jews in leadership positions in the ACLU during the latter half of the 1960's and throughout the 1970's, the organization manifested a cold indifference to the concerns of the Jewish community. Neier and his Jewish colleagues were representative of a "new politics" oriented group of civil rights attorneys and social policy experts for whom the ethnic concerns of Jews—whether the welfare of the State of Israel, or the institutional needs of the Jewish community, or just the protective comfort of political representation—were at best a peripheral matter. The focus of their attention was the political agenda and rhetoric of the New Left, Black Power and the Third World. Thus, it is not surprising that on issue after issue, between 1966 and 1978, the ACLU took a stand that was seen by many as being inimicable to Jewish interests. The ACLU, for example, supported the proposal by the Lindsay administration in New York City to establish a civilian review board for the police department. During the New York City teachers' strike, the organization backed demands by Black militants for community control of the schools. The ACLU came to the defense of the openly anti-Jewish Black Panthers in their confrontations with the police. Finally, the ACLU opposed Marco De Funis and Alan Bakke in their suits charging reverse discrimination.

Against the background of the ACLU's drift to the left and its indifference to the Jewish communal agenda, the organization's defense of the

Nazis appeared to many Jews as the final insult. Small wonder that the ACLU suffered significant membership losses.

COMBATting THE NAZIS: THE LEGISLATIVE FRONT

In Jewish communal circles throughout the United States much effort has been made over the past few years to develop a legal strategy to combat Nazism in America. The enactment of effective anti-Nazi legislation, however, has proved to be no simple matter. Indeed, the inability to pass such legislation has been a source of frustration and concern to Jewish communal leaders.

The experience in San Francisco offers insight into the difficulties that arise in attempting to combat Nazis by legal means.⁴¹ During the early months of 1974, as was noted above, Nazi party members began to sit in on public meetings of the city's Board of Education. Despite the heated objections of Jews and Blacks in the audience, to whom the Nazi uniform symbolized both racism and genocide, there was no legal way to halt Nazis. As an official statement of the San Francisco Human Rights Commission issued at the time put it: "The Board of Education must let anyone enter the hall when there is a public meeting in session . . . The Board of Education must let anyone speak . . . The City of San Francisco and San Franciscans detest the Nazis, but we must allow them to speak, within the limits of the First Amendment. The courts would force us to let them speak, if we did not, and the courts would be right."⁴² The problem posed by the presence of the Nazis at the Board of Education meetings was similarly articulated by the Jewish Community Relations Council: "The presence of that [Nazi] symbol at the Board of Education meeting is disgusting and disturbing to all of us. It is also frustrating in the extreme because there is no way to ban the presence of these individuals from a public meeting without destroying our most basic principle of liberty, and therefore handing a great victory to the Nazis . . ."⁴³

After consulting with Jewish communal leaders, supervisors Quentin Kopp and Robert Mendelsohn proposed a new municipal ordinance which would have made it illegal to wear the uniform or insignia of the Nazi party

⁴¹The discussion which follows is based on David G. Dalin, *Public Affairs and the Jewish Community: The Changing Political World of San Francisco Jews*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University, 1977, pp. 152-155.

⁴²San Francisco *Jewish Bulletin*, January 25, 1974, p. 1.

⁴³*Ibid.*

in public. The proposed ordinance, however, while enjoying widespread popular support, both within the Jewish and the general community, never became law. On May 20 City Attorney O'Connor advised the Board of Supervisors that it could not legally outlaw the wearing of Nazi, or any other, uniforms in public. The United States Supreme Court, he indicated, had in the past consistently ruled that the wearing of political symbols is "symbolic speech" protected by the free speech provisions of the First Amendment. In 1969, for example, the Court ruled (*Tinker v. Des Moines*) that students could not be prevented from wearing black armbands to school in order to protest the Vietnam war. In 1960 a Miami ordinance prohibiting the wearing of Nazi (or Communist) uniforms in public places was struck down by a state court.

In the wake of O'Connor's advisory opinion, the Board's State and National Affairs Committee called upon the state legislature to deal with the matter. During the next three years, however, the legislature in Sacramento failed to enact any anti-Nazi legislation. Hence, at the time of the opening of the Rudolf Hess bookstore in 1977 there was still no legal way to ban the public display of Nazi symbols. It was in response to this legislative void that Supervisor Dianne Feinstein, as was noted above, introduced a new resolution urging the legislature to bar the display of the swastika and the wearing of the Nazi uniform in public. In co-sponsoring this resolution, Supervisor Mendelsohn said that the display of Nazi symbols and uniforms "provokes acts of violence and threatens the public peace." Mendelsohn and the other supervisors, however, expressed doubt about the proposal's chances of being enacted as state law. This in fact proved to be the case.

One other unsuccessful effort at passing anti-Nazi legislation in San Francisco is worth noting. In early 1978 it was revealed that the Nazis were holding meetings at the Wawona Clubhouse, a rented public facility in the city-owned Sigmund Stern Grove. The JCRC issued a statement protesting "the private use of public facilities by Nazi groups, which exclude people on the basis of race and religion." On the basis of a municipal ordinance requiring that there be no discrimination in the rental of city property, Supervisor Kopp sought to evict the Nazis. The City Attorney, backed by the ACLU, ruled in March, however, that the ordinance in question did not apply to the Nazis, because of an amendment stating that rentals of less than 30 days a year would be exempt from the law's provisions. The Jewish community's efforts to combat Nazi activity were thus once again thwarted.

In Chicago the Jewish community has found itself similarly powerless to enact anti-Nazi legislation. Illinois State Senators John Nimrod and Howard Carroll introduced two bills in May 1978; one would have empowered local officials to deny parade permits for demonstrations which might result in defamation of a group because of race, creed, color, or religion; the other

would have allowed for the rejection of parade permits if there were "reasonable apprehension" about violence occurring as a result of the display of "quasi-military" uniforms.⁴⁴ The first bill, by making group defamation criminally punishable, might have served as a model for similar laws in other states. Illinois, it should be noted, had first enacted group libel legislation in 1917 (it was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1952 in a five-to-four decision), but the law had been repealed in 1964.

After the Illinois State Senate adopted the two bills, the state's Assembly Judiciary Committee met to consider the matter. Spokesmen for Skokie's Jewish community, including Rabbi Laurence Montrose and Erna Gans, president of the B'nai B'rith Korczak Lodge in Skokie, testified on the bill's behalf. They urged the legislators to speak out by passing the statutes, just as the residents of Skokie had spoken out by resisting the Nazi demonstration. Joel Sprayregen, a prominent Chicago civil liberties attorney, who had been a staff counsel for the ACLU in the early 1960's and had subsequently served for several years as a member of its board of directors, testified in favor of the proposed bills, while ACLU executive director Aryeh Neier testified in opposition. Following the Sprayregen-Neier debate, the committee voted. To the shock of the many Holocaust survivors in attendance, the anti-Nazi bills were soundly defeated; the Judiciary Committee voted fifteen to five against the group libel bill and sixteen to four against the bill introduced by Carroll. Chicago's Jewish community viewed the defeat of the bills as a moral victory for the Nazis, who called a press conference to celebrate the legislature's inaction.⁴⁵

In Milwaukee efforts at enacting anti-Nazi legislation met with similar results. The Brennan ordinance, patterned on the Illinois bill prohibiting group defamation, won the support of the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors but was subsequently defeated in the Common Council of the City of Milwaukee. In the view of political observers, the ordinance's defeat was largely due to the efforts of the Wisconsin chapter of the ACLU, which vigorously defended the Nazis' constitutional rights.⁴⁶

⁴⁴JTA *Daily News Bulletin*. May 30, 1978, p. 4.

⁴⁵Neier, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-65.

⁴⁶Zvi Deutsch, "Milwaukee Jews Counter Nazi Threat," *Jewish Currents*. September 1977, p. 6.

COMBATting THE NAZIS: THE EDUCATIONAL FRONT

As legislative efforts to combat neo-Nazism proved increasingly ineffective, American Jewry turned its attention to the educational front. There was growing support within the Jewish community for the introduction of Holocaust study courses on both the high school and university levels. During the 1977-78 school year, such courses were in fact mandated in the New York City and Philadelphia school systems. Jews were concerned that the history of the Holocaust was little understood by young people, since most social studies texts and curricula avoided the subject. One survey of the 45 most widely-used high school, social studies textbooks revealed that 15 "omitted any mention of the Nazi persecution of Jews and 22 glossed over the facts."⁴⁷

In April 1977 the San Francisco Conference on Religion, Race and Social Concerns, an interfaith social action group coordinated by JCRC associate director Rita Semel, announced the formation of a city-wide committee for "community education" against Nazism. A cross-section of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clergy and civic leaders, including Mayor George Moscone and Supervisors Kopp and Feinstein, agreed to join the committee, whose purpose would be "to focus on educating the public on what is behind the headlines . . . why Nazism is and should be anathema to a democratic society and why the fight against its ideology must be broadened and strengthened." Plans called for the inservice training of teachers, as well as "education for the general public" through the showing of movies such as "Judgment at Nuremberg." "The teaching of social studies," noted Semel, "has changed so that World War II is barely mentioned in many courses now. And we're now in the fourth generation. Not only haven't the kids lived through World War II, many of the teachers haven't either."⁴⁸

Public education concerning Nazism took a significant step forward in April 1978 when NBC televised "Holocaust," a nine-hour, prime-time special dealing with Jewish fate under the Nazis. Jewish and Christian organizations, as well as NBC, developed a variety of discussion guides targeted for different audiences, to be utilized in conjunction with the show. Under the auspices of the National Jewish Welfare Board, 15 Jewish agencies joined together in preparing a "Holocaust Program Package" designed "to transform this TV special into a 'multi-media' educational tool for use in formal and informal Jewish educational settings."⁴⁹ The National

⁴⁷Judith Herschlag Muffs, "US Teaching on the Holocaust," *Patterns of Prejudice*, May-June 1977, p. 29.

⁴⁸San Francisco *Examiner*, April 7, 1977, p. 4.

⁴⁹"Materials for NBC-TV Holocaust Series," National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council memo, February 24, 1978, p. 2.

Council of Churches, in cooperation with the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the American Jewish Committee, produced a four-page interreligious study and discussion guide for use by churches throughout the country. NBC developed its own discussion guide, which it distributed, through its 217 affiliated stations, free of charge to public schools across the nation.

The National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council asked its constituent agencies to utilize "every possible channel to the non-Jewish community" to encourage public viewing of "Holocaust." In some cities cooperative efforts were undertaken by local NBC affiliates and Jewish community relations councils in arranging a pre-screening of the program for various religious, ethnic, and civic leaders. NJCRAC also encouraged its constituent agencies to organize follow-up programs to "Holocaust" and intergroup dialogues on various aspects of the Holocaust and contemporary neo-Nazism. "We are attempting," one NJCRAC leader noted, "to teach the lessons of the Holocaust to our non-Jewish neighbors. If we cannot stop Nazi appearances, if we must endure the anguish, must we not use every possible means to fasten the general public's attention onto the principles for which the Nazis stand?"⁵⁰

THE LESSONS OF SKOKIE

The threatened Nazi march through Skokie represented a radically new experience for many American Jews, especially those under the age of 35. As Eugene DuBow, organizer of the planned PAC counter-demonstration, noted, it had been many years since American Jewry was faced with the prospect of a major Nazi demonstration in an area heavily populated by Jews. The planned Nazi march in Skokie forced many Jews to weigh their commitment to civil liberties against their concern for Jewish security and abhorrence of Nazism.

There were Jews in Skokie who had the gnawing feeling that history was repeating itself, that Nazism was once again on the rise. "There are the echoes of history rumbling through your mind and ticking off similarities and parallels that are all too uncomfortable," said one Skokie resident. "Absurd analogies you say? Hitler started off small, bluffed and got what he wanted by promoting ideas contrary to what the vast majority of people and countries believed. He radicalized antisemitism. So has Collin. Hitler used the law to promote his 'rights' until he was in a position of power to

⁵⁰Theodore R. Mann, address delivered at NJCRAC plenary session, Tucson, Arizona, January 22-23, 1978, p. 5.

have his will alone become law. So has Collin. His violence of words, deed and symbols are protected."⁵¹ There was a determination in the Skokie Jewish community, and among Jews throughout the United States, not to sit idly by in the face of Nazi threats.

This was a much different communal response from that of the 1960's, when the policy of the organized Jewish community had been one of "quarantine," i.e., to ignore most Nazi incidents in the hope that the Nazis, bereft of publicity and media attention, would disappear.⁵² By 1978 leaders of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council were seriously reconsidering the wisdom of the quarantine approach. "I am troubled by our 1963 conclusion that public protests against Nazi appearances merely provide them with increased publicity and bolster their image of martyred heroes," stated NJCRAC chairman Theodore Mann. "It seems to me curiously outdated . . . The concept of quarantine as the general rule seems to be an anachronism." On the contrary, Mann argued, "Jewish leadership should be able to fashion a counter-demonstration or protest march or meeting, with signs and literature and releases to the media depicting the bestial acts of Nazi Germany, which would provide both an outlet for Jewish anguish and a lesson for our neighbors as to what the swastika really means."⁵³ A shift from quietism toward communal activism vis-à-vis the Nazis was apparent in San Francisco, where JCRC urged the "organized Jewish community to speak out vociferously and take prompt and militant action against the Nazis in any way that will hurt the Nazi cause."⁵⁴ A reporter noted that in Skokie "Jews, who normally would be appalled at the thought of taking to the streets, now are thinking the unthinkable."⁵⁵

Sol Goldstein, chairman of the PAC Committee on American and Jewish Security, maintained that it was the determination of thousands of people to confront the Nazis that had scared them off. Goldstein emphasized that he regarded Skokie as only "one battlefield" of a much larger "war." "This battlefield gained a victory. But the war is not over . . . We will come to any place the Nazis will appear." The lesson of Skokie, Goldstein maintained, was that the Nazis would back down "when confronted by a determined American public."⁵⁶ In commenting on the cancellation of the Nazi

⁵¹Arthur J. Sabin, "Skokie," *Sh'ma*, September 15, 1978, p. 163.

⁵²The "quarantine" strategy was first developed in the 1940's. See S. Andhill Fineberg, "Checkmate for Rabble-Rousers," *Commentary*, September 1946, pp. 220-26 and S. Andhill Fineberg, *Deflating the Professional Bigot* (New York, 1960), pp. 8-10.

⁵³Theodore R. Mann, address delivered at NJCRAC plenary session, Tucson, Arizona, *loc. cit.*, p. 5. NJCRAC memo to member agencies, February 24, 1978.

⁵⁴*How to Prevent Nazism*, discussion guide, Jewish Community Relations Council, San Francisco, 1978, p. 49.

⁵⁵San Francisco *Examiner*, June 26, 1977.

⁵⁶*JTA Daily News Bulletin*, June 27, 1978, p. 4.

march, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council chairman Theodore Mann noted: "The important lesson of Skokie is that the Jewish survivors of the Nazi death camps found that they were not alone as they were 40 years ago."³⁷

Skokie's Holocaust survivors had the satisfaction of having kept the Nazis out of their community. Their active opposition helped educate a generation that had grown up with only a dim awareness of what Nazism was all about. "Sure, the Nazis have gotten publicity because of our opposition," said Korczak B'nai B'rith lodge president Erna Gans, "but we've also raised the consciousness of the American people. Schools are beginning to teach courses on the Holocaust. People from around the country are standing with us. When I talk to groups, they all want to know what they can do to keep Nazism from happening here."³⁸

³⁷Theodore R. Mann, NJCRAC plenary address, *op. cit.*

³⁸Quoted in John J. Camper, *loc. cit.*, p. 34.

Trends in Jewish Philanthropy

by STEVEN MARTIN COHEN

N EARLY TWO DECADES HAVE PASSED since Marshall Sklare first questioned whether support for Jewish philanthropic giving in the United States was deep and secure.¹ Sklare noted that the charitable drives of Jewish federations (central philanthropic agencies) in the largest communities enlisted the support of no more than a third of Jewish households. Moreover, significant variations in per capita giving from one locale to another implied important differences in the strength of local campaigns. Bemoaning the lack of hard data on various aspects of Jewish philanthropy, Sklare wrote: "None of the leading Jewish fund-raising institutions . . . has done so much as the most rudimentary market research concerning either the financial status of non-givers or the proportion of disposable income being contributed by donors."²

Since the time that Sklare wrote, several federations have conducted potentially valuable community surveys. Two such surveys—the 1965 and 1975 Boston studies³—are especially useful in answering questions about the past (and, by inference, the future) of American Jewish giving, because they include detailed, virtually identical questions on philanthropic behavior. Secondary analyses of the 1975 data set have already led to the tentative

Note: The critical comments of Samuel C. Heilman, Harold Himmelfarb, Bernard Reisman, Paul Ritterband, and Marshall Sklare are deeply appreciated. The Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston made the data available. The research was supported by PSC-BHE Research Award #13031 from the City University of New York Research Foundation. Neither agency bears any responsibility for the interpretations contained herein.

¹Marshall Sklare, "The Future of Jewish Giving," *Commentary*, November 1962, pp. 416–426. For a more pessimistic view, see Milton Goldin, *Why They Give: American Jews and Their Philanthropies* (New York, 1977). For background on American Jewish philanthropy, see Harry J. Lurie, *A Heritage Affirmed* (Philadelphia, 1961); Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry* (Philadelphia, 1976); the June 1977 issue of *Moment*; Marc Lee Raphael, "Jewish Philanthropy and Communal Democracy: In Pursuit of a Phantom," *Response*, Fall 1977, pp. 55–65; S.P. Goldberg, "Jewish Communal Services: Programs and Finances," *AJYB*, Vol. 78, 1978, pp. 172–221; and Charles S. Liebman, "Leadership and Decision-making in a Jewish Federation: The New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies," *AJYB*, Vol. 79, 1979, pp. 3–76.

²*Ibid.*, p. 420.

³Morris Axelrod, Floyd T. Fowler, Jr., and Arnold Gurin, *A Community Survey for Long Range Planning: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston, 1967) and Floyd J. Fowler, *1975 Community: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston, 1977).

conclusion that Jewish philanthropic support is likely to decline.⁴ This article, analysing results from both the 1965 and 1975 surveys, builds upon and extends the earlier analyses.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JEWISH PHILANTHROPY

Support for Jewish philanthropy is crucial to the financial well-being of a wide variety of beneficiaries: local health and welfare services, camps, Jewish community centers, Jewish schools and supportive services, cultural institutions, national agencies, and, not least, social services in Israel. At the same time, Jewish charitable giving, particularly to the centralized drives of federations, constitutes an important social act in that it affirms the individual's ties to the community.⁵ The frequency and generosity of giving, then, have implications which go far beyond the financial security of particular agencies. A strong philanthropic campaign reflects a coherent and well-integrated Jewish community. A weak campaign implies a partial unraveling of the ties that bind Jews together.

The social nature of Jewish charitable giving is reflected in the various fund-raising techniques employed by professional fund-raisers. Most preferred is the face-to-face solicitation.⁶ This technique involves pairing a carefully chosen solicitor with a potential donor; often the solicitor and donor are friends or business associates. The solicitor seeks maximal prior knowledge of the prospect's family background, Jewish interests, and financial means, and brings this information to bear in a highly personalized plea for funds. Another effective fund-raising technique which relies on the social bonds between identified Jews is the testimonial dinner. Here, business colleagues or members of a synagogue or Jewish organization are exhorted to purchase tickets to a reception and publicly pledge donations in honor of a prominent individual. Often, face-to-face solicitation of more affluent and generous givers precedes the dinner, the expectation being that they will serve as pace-setters for less wealthy or less dedicated donors. In recent years, members of an elite philanthropic group, the National UJA

⁴Steven Martin Cohen, "Will Jews Keep Giving? Prospects for the Jewish Charitable Community," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service*, Autumn 1978, pp. 59-71; Paul Ritterband and Steven Martin Cohen, "Will the Well Run Dry? The Future of Jewish Giving in America," *Response*, Summer 1979, pp. 9-16.

⁵For the social function of charitable giving in a modern Orthodox synagogue, see Samuel C. Heilman, "The Gift of Alms: Face-to-Face Almsgiving among Orthodox Jews," *Urban Life and Culture*, January 1975, pp. 371-395.

⁶Aryeh Neshet, "Aryeh Neshet, Solicitor-General," *Moment*, June 1977, pp. 27-30, 60-62.

Young Leadership Cabinet (YLC), have taken to making "full financial disclosure" in a group setting. At their annual retreat, YLC members rise individually to describe their incomes and assets, propose a donation, and accept encouragement from friends and colleagues to attain even greater heights of generosity. That this method has proved to be phenomenally effective in generating contributions testifies to Jewish philanthropy's highly social nature.

An understanding of the social dimension of Jewish philanthropy is further enhanced when we note that the multitudinous solicitations of American Jewish donors grow out of a highly elaborate social apparatus. This apparatus is coordinated by professionals who maintain and mobilize a series of interlocking, hierarchically structured networks of lay leaders centered around different loci. Thus, the most prominent givers comprise a continent-wide network. They, in turn, are among the leaders of local networks centered around particular industries, trades, synagogues, Jewish organizations, or residential neighborhoods. These networks are, of course, critical for fund-raising. Equally important, however, they serve as pools from which Jewish communal organizations of every type can draw lay leaders.⁷ In addition, the fund-raising apparatus generates a multiplicity of overlapping leadership circles in the Jewish community, thus serving to unite potentially competing factions.⁸

One final aspect of Jewish philanthropy's social dimension that merits attention is its impact in the political sphere. The ability of the organized Jewish community to raise millions of dollars annually cannot help but make a profound impression on political leaders and elected officials. For policy makers, these funds are a tangible measure of the Jewish community's cohesion and the degree of its support for the State of Israel and other Jewish concerns.

In sum, it is clear that the vitality of Jewish philanthropy is crucial to American Jewry in several ways: in terms of social coherence, leadership recruitment, institutional coordination, political impact, and, most obviously, the financial security of beneficiary agencies. Questions about the future of Jewish giving, then, are in reality questions about the future of organized Jewry.

⁷Yohanon Manor and Gabriel Sheffer, "L'United Jewish Appeal ou la Métamorphose du Don," *Revue Française Sociologie*, Summer 1977, pp. 3-24.

⁸*Ibid.*

REASONS FOR PESSIMISM

The pessimistic outlook for Jewish giving is based, in the first instance, on what has been happening in terms of the actual dollar amounts collected. From the mid-1960's through the mid-1970's, the annual federation campaigns in the United States raised almost steadily-increasing sums of money. The 1965 nationwide total reached \$131 million; in 1974, following the Yom Kippur War, that sum amounted to a record \$660 million. In 1975, however, the total amount raised nationwide plummeted to \$475 million; it has remained there ever since, even as inflation has eroded the purchasing power of the charitable dollar. The most recent estimate compiled by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds places the 1978 total at \$480-485 million.

The experience in Boston mirrors that in the nation as a whole. In 1965 \$5.3 million was raised; in 1975 the amount was \$13.2 million. Then stagnation set in; between 1976 and 1978 collections rose by only one million dollars. In fiscal 1979, a year of nearly double digit inflation, there was a \$200,000 decline to \$14 million.

Adding to the pessimistic outlook for Jewish philanthropy are certain observed trends which seem to distinguish today's younger Jews. First, and most simply, they may well be less attached to the Jewish community (however it is defined) than their elders were when they were young. They belong to a later generation, and Jews who are generationally removed from the immigrant heritage, like members of other ethnic groups, less frequently undertake expressions of religious or ethnic attachment such as Jewish charitable giving.⁹ Secondly, younger Jews have been shifting away from those occupations that have been characteristic for federation stalwarts;

⁹Among various American ethnic groups, generation relates directly with several measures of assimilation: friendship and inter-ethnic marriage (See Harold J. Abramson, *Ethnic Diversity in Catholic America*, New York, 1973; Steven Martin Cohen, *Patterns of Interethnic Marriage and Friendship in the United States*, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1974; and Richard D. Alba, "Social Assimilation Among American Catholic National-Origin Groups," *American Sociological Review*, December 1976, pp. 637-653); residence outside areas of ethnic concentration (Stanley Lieberson, *Ethnic Patterns in American Cities*, New York, 1963); lower levels of in-group solidarity sentiments (Cohen, *Patterns of Interethnic Marriage*, *op. cit.*); and less distinctive political orientations (Steven Martin Cohen and Robert E. Kapsis, "Religion, Ethnicity, and Party Affiliation in the United States: Evidence from Pooled Electoral Surveys, 1968-1972," *Social Forces*, December 1977, pp. 657-663).

With reference to Jews specifically, see Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community* (New Jersey, 1968); Axelrod et al., *op. cit.*; Fowler, *op. cit.*; Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier* (New York, 1967); Harold Himmelfarb, "The Interaction Effect of Parents, Spouse and Schooling: Comparing the Impact of Jewish and Catholic Schools," *The Sociological Quarterly*, Autumn 1977, pp. 464-477; and Harold Himmelfarb, "The Study of American Jewish Identification: How It is Defined, Measured, Obtained, Sustained, and Lost," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, forthcoming, 1980.

they are entering the salaried professions rather than becoming independent entrepreneurs.¹⁰ The resulting shifts in type of work (from business to professions) and sources of income (from self-employed to salaried) mean that younger Jews will less often enter the pool of potential multi-millionaires, that group which has most generously supported federation drives in the past. The shift in source of income also means that a smaller fraction of total family income (even if it remains at a high level) will be of the disposable variety. One need not be overly cynical to realize that self-employed entrepreneurs have a greater ability to hide their income from the Internal Revenue Service than do most salaried professionals.

The shift in type of work to the professions also means that less social and economic pressure can be brought to bear on potential contributors. For people in business, charitable giving publically symbolizes success to their peers. As such, they make donations in part to enhance their social esteem. Moreover, when a business person is solicited by a customer, a gift's size can influence his or her commercial prospects. For professionals such as social workers, teachers, or other public employees, however, federation giving entails fewer potential rewards or punishments. A salaried professional's reputation is less firmly tied to public demonstrations of material success. His or her livelihood is not as often dependent on the good will of customers; those in a position to influence a professional's career—principals, editors, supervisors—are constrained by professional norms from making advancement contingent upon acceptable levels of charitable giving. Moreover, certain professions—particularly law, medicine, and college teaching—can become a way of life and thus successfully compete with ethnicity as a basis for self-definition.¹¹ As a result, individuals in these

¹⁰Sidney Goldstein writes that data pertaining to "future trends in Jewish occupational composition . . . point to a continuing increase in the proportion of Jews engaged in professional work, and to either stability or actual decline for the managerial and proprietor group." See "American Jewry: A Demographic Analysis," in David Sidorsky (ed.), *The Future of the Jewish Community in America*, (Philadelphia, 1973), p. 118.

¹¹See Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970). In his study of interreligious marriage, Fred Sherrow writes: "Intellectuals have been described as forming a kind of society of their own, even akin to an ethnic community. Thus not only do they reject the significance of such statuses as religion or ethnic origin in their behavior, but they may have little need for such identities, having developed surrogates for them" (Fred Sherrow, *Patterns of Religious Inter-marriage Among American College Graduates*, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971, pp. 142-143). On this point Sherrow cites Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York, 1964) and J. Wilensky and J. Ladinsky, "From Community to Occupational Group: Structural Assimilation Among Professors, Lawyers, and Engineers," *American Sociological Review*, August 1967, pp. 541-561. See also Andrew Greeley, *Why Can't They Be Like Us?* (New York, 1971), especially pp. 120-134; and Steven Martin Cohen, "Sociological Determinants of Interethnic Marriage and Friendship," *Social Forces*, June 1977, pp. 997-1010.

professions may feel less of a need to link themselves to the Jewish community through charitable giving.

Evidence of changes in the Jewish family adds to the pessimism regarding the future of Jewish philanthropy. We know that life cycle affects virtually all forms of voluntary participation.¹² Jewish communal participation, in particular, may be heightened by marriage and is almost certainly increased by the presence of children in the home.¹³ At the same time, reliable information about American population trends and impressions about Jewish participation in those trends suggest an increase in what may be termed "alternative" Jewish households: singles, childless couples, and divorced or separated individuals. If the active Jewish community does, in fact, consist disproportionately of those in more conventional households (couples who now have or have raised children, as well as the widowed), and these households are diminishing in number, then Jewish giving will eventually suffer.

A number of trends, then, lead to the expectation that today's younger Jews will emerge less dedicated donors than their counterparts in the past. To test the validity of this expectation, as well as to determine the precise effects of diminishing Jewishness, occupational shift, and the decline of the conventional family on Jewish philanthropy, we turn to an analysis of the Boston data.

DATA AND MEASURES

This study is based on a secondary analysis of two random sample surveys of Jews residing in the Boston metropolitan area. The University of Massachusetts Survey Research Center conducted the surveys on behalf of the Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston. The data were collected in face-to-face interviews, totalling 1,569 in 1965 and 932 in 1975. Respondents were chosen in two ways. First, a large number were randomly selected from a master list of Jews known to the organized Jewish community. Due to cost considerations, a much smaller number of Jews were located via a random area sampling procedure. Since the latter group represented a proportion of the universe larger than their proportion in the sample, weighting procedures were used which had the effect of multiplying those respondents not found on the master list.

¹²David Knoke and Randall Thomson, "Voluntary Association Membership Trends and the Family Life Cycle," *Social Forces*, September 1977, pp. 45-65.

¹³Himmelfarb, "The Study of American Jewish Identification," *loc. cit.*, and Sklare and Greenblum, *op. cit.*

The special characteristics of Boston's Jews affect the extent to which observations from these data can be generalized to the rest of American Jewry. Greater Boston's Jewish population of 180,000 in the middle 1970's placed it sixth behind New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Miami.¹⁴ The total amount (\$13 million) contributed to its annual federation campaign in 1975 (Combined Jewish Philanthropies) was similar to that given in comparably-sized communities (e.g., Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, Miami, and San Francisco). As in other metropolitan areas, substantial numbers of Jews have left Boston's central city neighborhoods for the suburbs over the last two decades. An extensive and well-established Jewish institutional infrastructure, as well as a very large number of colleges and universities, distinguish Boston from other cities. As a corollary, Boston Jewry is disproportionately young. In order to adjust for the tremendous increase in the number of students and other young people between 1965 and 1975, the 1975 survey was weighted so that its age distribution replicated that of the earlier survey.

The analysis below focuses on two aspects of giving. First, did the respondent's household contribute to the CJP campaign during the last 12 months? Second, how much did the household contribute to all Jewish causes aside from synagogue-related expenses?

To assess the importance of Jewish orientation in influencing philanthropic behavior, the full range of Jewish identificational items available in both data sets were canvassed. Interestingly, in this sphere, behavior is a much more potent predictor of giving than are attitudes about such matters as the importance of a Jewish education, a preference for Jewish friends and neighbors, hypothetical reactions to an intermarriage in the family, and the salience of the State of Israel. Thus, the Jewishness scale used in this study awards two points if the respondent attends religious services during the high holidays or more often; two points for those who perform at least two of the following rituals: take part in a Passover Seder, light Sabbath candles, keep kosher at home; and one point if the respondent belongs to a Jewish organization. This index will be referred to as the Jewish Activities scale.

Consistent with the rationale advanced above, two aspects of occupation were taken into account: source of income (self-employed or salaried) and type of work (professional or non-professional). Cross-classifying these two aspects yields four distinct occupational categories.

Preliminary analysis of several types of households yielded three clusters. First, there are the conventional households: married couples with children living at home or those with grown children. At the other extreme in terms

¹⁴Alvin Chenkin, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1976," *AJYB*, Vol. 77, 1977, pp. 229-239.

of philanthropic behavior are three household types which can be grouped under the alternative rubric: singles; divorced or separated individuals; and married couples without children. The widowed, a third category, are treated separately since their philanthropic patterns differ from those of the other two groups.

Since about a third of the sample refused to provide information on family income, income was estimated for those respondents by using prediction equations employing education, occupation, and monthly housing costs. Somewhat different equations were used in the two surveys. Since inflation accounted for a large growth in income between 1965 and 1975, both income and the amount contributed to Jewish charity in 1965 were multiplied by 2.395, a factor which was chosen so as to make identical the 1965 and 1975 mean incomes of mature individuals, i.e., those over 30.

Age, the critical independent variable, is that of the male adult member of the household, or that of the female adult if no male is present. Alternative measures, such as averaging male and female ages or giving precedence to the age of the female, resulted in more modest relationships with the dependent variables.

Finally, it should be noted that the household and not the individual is the unit of analysis.

FINDINGS

Age, Period, and Cohort Effects

Table 1, which reports levels of philanthropic activity by age and period, lends itself to three types of comparisons, each of which yields different sorts of inferences. First, we can read the table vertically and examine changes in philanthropic behavior by age while holding period constant. Such a comparison, in conjunction with other comparisons and information, would permit inferences about age or life-cycle effects—how does philanthropic activity rise or fall as people get older? Second, we can read the columns diagonally, from upper left to lower right, to trace various birth cohorts, learning about one of many types of period effects. Of course, each birth cohort not only passes into a new period of history, it also ages by ten years. Inferred period effects, therefore, have to take into account probable age effects. Finally, we can supplement both sorts of comparisons with a horizontal reading of the table to infer cohort effects, i.e., differences in philanthropic behavior arising out of differences in time of birth and socialization. Since there is no clear-cut method for unraveling age, period, and cohort effects, the wisest course is to attempt to achieve a comprehensive

Table 1
Philanthropic Behavior by Age, 1965 and 1975

Age at Time of Survey	Per Cent			Amount Given ^a			Givers Only ^b		
	1965	1975	Rate ^c	1965	1975	Rate	1965	1975	Rate
20-29	17	12	.71	23	53	2.30	80	321	4.01
30-39	64	25	.39	236	268	1.14	362	607	1.68
40-49	70	46	.66	302	252	.83	453	392	.87
50-59	72	61	.85	413	211	.51	618	282	.46
60+	61	53	.87	247	198	.80	474	326	.69
Total	60	43	.72	263	205	.78	463	367	.80

a. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue, in constant (1975) dollars.

b. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue, in constant (1975) dollars, excluding those who gave less than \$25.

c. "Rate" is the retention rate, the 1975 entry divided by the adjoining 1965 entry for the same age group.

understanding of the data, informed by an intelligent use of side information.¹⁵

Examining the frequency of giving to the CJP campaign (irrespective of amount donated), we can reasonably infer the broad contours of an age or life-cycle effect. People in their 20's are consistently infrequent contributors. The rate of giving rises until the upper 50's, when it takes a downward turn. It is important to note, however, that there are considerable differences in the age contours of the two samples. In 1965, giving rises sharply (by age 30) to a plateau and largely remains there, whereas in 1975 giving in the 20's starts out quite low (a 12 per cent rate) and rises only gradually in each succeeding cohort, until it peaks in the 50's age group.

There are two plausible explanations for the divergent contours, with very different implications for the future of Jewish philanthropy. The more benign explanation suggests that, for some reason, by 1975 only middle-aged and elderly Jews regarded charitable giving as normative. Thus, although fewer young Jews contributed, as compared with 1965, the overall frequency of donations is likely to remain stable, since they can be expected to increase their rate of giving as they age. Alternately, it is possible that

¹⁵For an excellent discussion of the need to resolve the ambiguities in cohort data by applying informed theory to the analysis, see Norval Glenn, *Cohort Analysis* (Beverly Hills, 1977).

the younger cohorts who began to mature between 1965 and 1975 are permanently less inclined to give than their predecessors. In other words, frequent giving is characteristic of only certain birth cohorts (according to these data, those born earlier than 1935).

Diagonal and horizontal comparisons lend support to the birth cohort, as opposed to the age explanation. Diagonally we find that all cohorts but one (the youngest group in 1965) experienced declines in frequency of giving from 1965 to 1975. The youngest group's rate increased from 17 to 25 per cent, but did so only slightly because powerful aging effects barely won out over period and cohort effects. If those in their 20's in 1965 had replicated the behavior of the group ten years older in that year, they would have risen to a 64 per cent level rather than a 25 per cent rate.

A horizontal comparison of each 1975 age group with its predecessor in 1965 is also revealing. We may divide the 1975 rates by the 1965 rates to derive, in effect, a rate of retention. A retention rate of 2.00 would mean that giving doubled for that group over the ten-year interval; a rate of retention of .50 would mean that the frequency was cut in half. Interestingly, the rate of retention is highest among the oldest Jews, and through age 30 declines steadily cohort by cohort. The only reason the retention rate is so high (.71) among those in their 20's is that the base rate of 17 per cent in 1965 is so low to begin with. In other words, the decline in overall frequency of giving between 1965 and 1975 is most directly attributable to declines among the youngest age groups, precisely those Jews whose behavior is most important in terms of the future of Jewish giving.

When we turn to the amounts given to all Jewish causes, a very different picture emerges. Apparently, while younger Jews give less frequently than their predecessors, they contribute much more generously when they do. Retention rates of total dollars given are highest for the youngest groups and decline through age 59, before turning slightly upward for the elderly. (The latter phenomenon is attributable in part to a rather low 1965 base for those 60 and older.) The inference of a shrinking but far more generous donor base is even more clearly supported when we consider only those who made a meaningful (\$25 or more per year) contribution. The "givers-only" columns in Table 1 show that the youngest group in 1975 is four times as generous as its predecessor, while the 30-39 group in 1975 is one and two-thirds times as generous as its 1965 counterpart. All other groups are less forthcoming in 1975 than were their predecessors.

The 1965-75 period witnessed changes not only in the rate and extent of Jewish philanthropy, but also in the distribution of those characteristics which influence charitable behavior. Table 2 reports trends in household type, occupation, income, and Jewish orientation.

With reference to household type, "alternative" families are found most frequently in the youngest age category, decline as one moves up the age

Table 2
Distributions of Household and Occupational Types; Mean Family Income
(in constant 1975 dollars) and Jewish Activities by Age, 1965 and 1975

Age	1965					1975				
	20-9	30-9	40-9	50-9	60+	20-9	30-9	40-9	50-9	60+
Household Types (%)										
Alternative ^a	63	18	8	14	19	89	40	12	13	18
Conventional ^b	35	79	86	78	53	11	60	85	83	54
Widowed	2	3	6	8	28	0	0	3	4	28
Occupational Types (%)										
Self-employed Pros	2	11	8	7	12	4	36	28	22	20
Entrepreneurs	5	22	31	36	45	8	17	19	39	30
Salaried Pros	59	35	12	16	8	44	33	24	14	14
Non-pro. Workers	34	31	48	41	35	45	27	42	36	47
Retirees ^c	0	0	0	(5)	(47)	0	0	0	(2)	(51)
Mean Family Income (in \$1,000)										
	18	35	36	32	19	13	37	35	35	17
Mean Jewish Activities										
	3.6	3.9	4.2	4.2	4.2	3.0	3.1	3.9	3.8	3.8

a. Singles, childless married couples, and divorced and separated who have not remarried.

b. Married couples with children living at home or who have raised children, now away from home.

c. Retirees are excluded from occupational computations.

ladder, and turn slightly upward in the older years as unmarried divorcé(e)s accumulate. Widows and widowers, of course, are concentrated in the later years. Conventional families peak in the 40-59 age range and trail off somewhat above age 60. Most critically, the number of alternative households has grown considerably between 1965 and 1975. In 1965, 63 per cent of family heads in their 20's were living in alternative homes, while in 1975, 89 per cent do so. Among those aged 30-39, the figure for alternative households increases from 18 per cent in 1965 to 40 per cent in 1975, owing largely to a later marrying age and a decline in the birthrate.

The 1965 and 1975 data sets employed different coding schemes for occupation, and it may well be that the latter set is more accurate. In fact, the data for 1975 more clearly illustrate occupational patterns which have been thought to characterize American Jewry in recent years. Reading from older to younger groups, we find a steady growth (through age 30) in the

proportion of salaried and self-employed professionals. Commensurately, there is a nearly consistent decline in the percentage of self-employed non-professionals (largely entrepreneurs) and a wavering in the proportion of salaried nonprofessionals (workers). The youngest group, 20–29 in age, must be treated with caution since so many of its members have not yet entered their chosen careers; presumably they will end up confirming the trend toward the professions. The 1965 data show the same patterns, although somewhat less clearly. In short, there is irrefutable evidence of a movement toward the professions and away from entrepreneurship, and a lesser trend toward salaried jobs as opposed to self-employment.

Since the 1965 income figures were multiplied by 2.395, it is not surprising that the two surveys show roughly the same age contours with respect to income. Income is lowest at the oldest and youngest extremes and is at a high plateau between ages 30 and 59. Interestingly, the youngest group's income in 1965 is higher in constant dollars than that of its 1975 counterpart. This finding is consistent with the presumed tendency of the latter to study longer for a professional career and to marry later, actions which would have the effect of postponing high income levels.

Finally, the Jewish Activities index reveals life-cycle, period, and cohort effects. The two surveys display some similarity in their age contours: low Jewish Activity in the 20's and relatively high activity after the age of 40. This pattern is similar to the contour for frequency of giving. However, the leap to a higher plateau of Jewish Activities takes place largely among the 30–39 age group in 1965 and is postponed until the ages 40–49 in the 1975 survey. This finding would seem to indicate a cohort effect: younger Jews in 1975 may well be inherently "less Jewish" on the whole than their elders. While every age group in 1975 reports fewer Jewish Activity means than similarly aged counterparts in 1965, the declines are unevenly distributed: they are smaller (between .3 and .4) for the older (above 40) groups and larger (.6 and .8) for the younger groups.

Younger Jews in 1975 are, then, distinguished from their elders and predecessors in that they more frequently live in alternative households, more often pursue professional careers, and perform fewer Jewish Activities. It is not only the distribution of these characteristics among Jews that has been changing, however, but also the relationship between each trait and charitable activity.

The Growing Importance of Jewishness

Federations were established by the Jewish social elite in various metropolitan areas during the early 20th century. In many communities, New York being a prime example, somewhat assimilated, wealthy Jews of German background were the most active philanthropists. Their aim was

to assure that the very foreign, indigent, East European immigrants who were arriving in the United States in large numbers quickly acculturated and moved out of poverty, thus avoiding any embarrassment to their more established coreligionists. While East Europeans eventually replaced German Jews as federation stalwarts, Jewish philanthropic giving remained for many years largely the province of affluent and relatively assimilated Jews. As a result, informed observers held a somewhat accurate stereotype of the Jewish philanthropist: he or she was active in Jewish public affairs but uninvolved in private Jewish behaviors.

In recent years a new group of philanthropists is thought to have replaced the old-line activists, a group motivated less by a sense of *noblesse oblige* than by particularistic religio-ethnic concerns. Thus, Charles Liebman found that the members of New York Federation's most powerful lay body (the Distribution Committee) in 1978 had higher levels of Jewish education, synagogue membership, and survivalist religio-ethnic attitudes than their 1968 predecessors.¹⁶ If a parallel situation were to obtain among Boston Jewry's mass donor base as well, one would expect certain trends to emerge in the survey data. In 1965 private Jewish behaviors should have a limited impact on giving, while public Jewish involvement should significantly influence charitable activity. In 1975, on the other hand, the association of private behaviors with giving should show a marked increase.

Table 3 presents mean rates of CJP donations and annual amounts given by the various items and subindices which make up the Jewish Activities scale. Adjoining the main columns are difference scores, i.e., the difference in giving behavior found by subtracting the scores of the least Jewish category from the most Jewish category in each instance. Thus we can compare the effect, for instance, of having a seder, or lighting Sabbath candles, or keeping kosher in three ways: across years (the most critical comparison), across types of giving behavior (rate and amount), and across activities.

In terms of private and semi-private Jewish behaviors (the three rituals and synagogue attendance, but not organizational membership) we find a consistent pattern: both forms of Jewishness have a much greater impact on giving in 1975 than in 1965. Thus, those performing all three rituals in 1965 were only 11 per cent more likely to give to the CJP than those performing none (interestingly, they were *less* likely to give than those performing two rituals); by 1975, the impact had grown five times to a total of 56 per cent. Similarly, the amount given (in constant dollars) grew from a difference score of \$108 to \$375. With one exception (the impact of total rituals on the amount given) the growth in impact of rituals and service

¹⁶Liebman, *op. cit.*

Table 3
 Philanthropic Behavior by Jewish Activities Items and Indices, 1965 and 1975

	<u>Per Cent Giving to CJP</u>				<u>Amount Given^a</u>			
	<u>1965</u>	<u>Dif.^b</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>Dif.</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>Dif.</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>Dif.</u>
Take part in a Seder?								
Yes	62		51		284		240	
No	46	16	10	41	97	187	36	204
Light Sabbath candles?								
Yes	63		51		274		280	
No	55	8	38	13	236	38	135	145
Keep Kosher at home?								
Yes	60		57		195		345	
No	60	0	41	16	248	-89	174	171
Sum of above rituals								
3	59		64		196		401	
2	68		45		333		225	
1	55		48		284		171	
0	47	11	8	56	88	108	36	375
Synagogue attendance ^c								
4+	65		60		345		340	
3	56		52		210		177	
0-2	56	9	23	37	155	190	91	241
Jewish organization memberships								
3+	86		65		750		517	
2	78		53		479		240	
1	55		48		126		180	
0	50	36	31	34	120	630	101	416

a. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue, in constant (1975) dollars.

b. Difference in philanthropic behavior between highest and lowest categories of items or indices.

c. Synagogue attendance: 4+ = more often than high holidays; 3 = high holidays; 0-2 = less often than high holidays or never.

attendance upon giving is due to a decline in donations among the less Jewishly active respondents rather than an increase in charity among those most actively committed to Jewish life. It would appear, then, that philanthropic activity is becoming increasingly confined to those Jews who regularly act out their Jewishness; they maintain traditional levels of giving even as growing numbers of less-involved Jews turn away from philanthropy.

While the impact of rituals and service attendance on both the frequency and amount of giving grew significantly between 1965 and 1975, the impact of organizational involvement was of a different sort. In terms of the rate of giving, the influence of organizational membership was largely stable (declining slightly from 36 to 34 per cent), while in terms of the amount given there was a noticeable decline (from \$630 to \$416). What these data may indicate is that Jewish role specialization is coming to an end. In the past those Jews who were privately religious may not have been very likely to join fraternal organizations or agency boards. At the same time, those who were communally active (and hence likely to give to a communal charitable drive) were not drawn from the most ritually observant sectors of the Jewish community. By 1975, however, the less observant Jews (measured by ritual performance and synagogue attendance) had largely dropped out of organized Jewish life. Consistent with this notion, the various subindices of Jewish Activity display only weak correlations in 1965, but are significantly stronger in 1975 (data not shown). At the present time, then, only those Jews who are committed to living a Jewish life in the private sphere will be likely to express a commitment to Jewish life in the public (communal) sphere.

The changing overall impact of rituals, synagogue attendance, and organizational membership can be understood via an eta correlation ratio, a summary statistic which indicates the influence of the Jewish Activities index on charitable behavior (Table 4).

The correlation ratios essentially confirm the tabular results reported in Table 3. Examining the second row (with controls for the three other independent variables), we find barely any net relationship between Jewish Activities and charitable behavior in 1965 ($\eta^2 = .13$ and $.11$). In 1975 the comparable relationships between Jewish Activities and giving is much stronger ($\eta^2 = .31$ and $.18$ respectively).

The increasing impact of Jewish Activities on charitable behavior does not bode well for the future of Jewish philanthropy. The proportion of Jewishly involved Jews is declining, while the growing segment of relatively assimilated Jews is giving less frequently and generously than its counterparts in the past.

Table 4
Effects of Jewish Activities upon Philanthropic Behavior, 1965 and 1975

	Per Cent Giving to CJP ^a		Amount Given ^b	
	1965	1975	1965	1975
<u>Controls</u>				
None	.23	.39	.20	.24
Age, house- hold & income	.13	.31	.11	.18

a. Entries in the first row are etas, or correlation ratios. Entries in the second row are betas. Both are derived from Multiple Classification Analysis.

b. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue, in constant (1975) dollars.

Occupational Shift

It was suggested above that charitable behavior should be greater among the self-employed than among the salaried, and greater among those in business than in the professions. Moreover, it was argued that the number of professionals is increasing while the proportion of entrepreneurs is declining. The validity of the above hypotheses remains to be examined.

Table 5 reports frequency of giving and average amounts donated by occupational categories in 1965 and 1975. Since both income and age are related to occupation, controls for these variables are introduced.

The data for 1965 largely support the conventional wisdom regarding differential charitable behavior by occupations. Without controls, we find high rates of giving among the self-employed (81 per cent) and much less frequent giving among salaried non-professionals (60 per cent), salaried professionals (47 per cent), and the retired (40 per cent). These relationships are narrowed somewhat when income and age are held constant (eta, the overall measure of effect, declines from .32 to .18), but the self-employed still lead other occupational groups. In terms of amounts given, the entrepreneurs are most generous (\$563 per household per year), followed, rather distantly, by self-employed professionals (\$297) and the others. Controls for income and age significantly narrow occupational differences as eta drops from .24 to .10. Relative to their age and income, retirees are as generous as entrepreneurs, who are only slightly more forthcoming than salaried professionals and workers. Interestingly, given their income and, to a lesser

Table 5
 Philanthropic Behavior by Occupation, Controlling for Age and Income,
 1965 and 1975

<u>Controls</u>	<u>Per Cent Giving to CJP</u>		<u>Amount Given^a</u>	
	<u>None</u>	<u>Age, Inc.</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Age, Inc.</u>
1965				
Self-employed pros	81	71	297	164
Entrepreneurs	81	69	563	327
Salaried professionals	47	58	219	285
Non-pro. Workers	60	62	130	222
Retired	40	46	122	324
Eta	.32	.18	.24	.10
1975				
Self-employed pros	50	52	530	384
Entrepreneurs	53	46	261	145
Salaried professionals	43	55	161	227
Non-pro. Workers	34	37	136	215
Retired	45	28	91	88
Eta	.15	.19	.26	.16

a. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue, in constant (1975) dollars.

extent, their age, self-employed professionals emerge, in 1965, as the least generous occupational group.

The patterns in 1975 deviate from those in 1965. Once again, without controls the self-employed are the most frequent donors, although only by a small margin. Holding age and income constant, however, self-employed and salaried professionals are the most frequent givers, again by a small margin. Turning to amounts given, we find very high giving among self-employed professionals, amounts that are reduced but remain substantial when income and age are taken into account. Far behind in second place are entrepreneurs. They are about half as generous as self-employed professionals; with controls for age and income they emerge as less charitable than any other non-retired occupational group.

This finding is indeed propitious: self-employed professionals—one of the two growing occupational categories—are apparently fairly frequent donors and, even more importantly, very generous donors. This finding may be peculiar to Boston insofar as the CJP has expended much effort to raise

funds among the community's affluent attorneys, a group which makes up a large percentage of the self-employed professionals. Analysis reveals that lawyers are indeed the most generous professionals in the sample, with physicians being the least generous. Even if the Boston findings in this case are not applicable to the rest of the country, they certainly do point to the potential effectiveness of philanthropic campaigns focused on key occupational groups.

Gross categories of the character of work (professional versus non-professional) seem to bear little relationship to the frequency or generosity of giving. The nature of income—both its amount and its disposability as indicated by self-employed or salaried status—seems to be the key factor in mediating occupation's influence on the charitable act.

While self-employed professionals may well be replacing self-employed business people as larger than average donors, their replacement value is limited in two ways. First, the growth increase in the number of self-employed professionals is not as large as the decline in the number of entrepreneurs. The salaried professions are claiming many of those who in previous periods might have gone into business. Second, the data do not embrace people capable of the very highest levels of giving. Fund-raisers report that "superdonors", who are quite rare but extremely crucial to successful campaigns, are invariably drawn from the most affluent business sectors. Thus, while self-employed professionals can perhaps replace entrepreneurs in the second or third echelon of donors, they cannot replenish the thinning ranks of multimillionaire philanthropists.

Alternative Households

The three groups making up the alternative household type—singles, childless married couples, and divorced or separated people—score low on the Jewish Activities scale (data not shown). The reasons for this pattern probably have to do with the Jewish community's family-centeredness. The unmarried and couples without children apparently find little need to become participants in the organized Jewish community until children are born. At that point, parents may become more concerned with ritual observance in the home and may affiliate with a synagogue in order to send their children to religious school. This involvement, in turn, brings the family into a Jewish orbit where it is subject to pressure to support Jewish causes. Divorcé(e)s (with or without children) are as remote from the Jewish community as are singles and non-parents. Those without children apparently feel little need to affiliate; those with children, while making frequent use of such federation services as day-care centers and summer camps, apparently have little time available for voluntary organizations.

These general patterns are portrayed in Table 6, which reports philanthropic behavior for three household categories.

In both 1965 and 1975 alternative households are the least frequent and least generous donors. In 1965 they donated slightly more than half as often as conventional families (37 as against 70 per cent). In 1975 the absolute difference in rates is about the same, but alternative giving is now less than half as frequent as in conventional households (20 as opposed to 52 per cent). Since alternative households tend to be younger and less affluent than conventional households, we need controls for income and age to obtain the net effect of household type on giving. Taking this into account, we find that in 1965 an original difference between alternative and conventional households of 33 percentage points in the giving rate is reduced to 14 points (51 as against 65 per cent); in 1975 the reduction is less dramatic—from 32 to 19 percentage points (30 as opposed to 49 per cent).

Similar patterns are manifested in terms of the amounts given. In both years, large initial differences in amounts given are explained by differences in age and income. Once these controls are introduced, the difference in 1965 between alternative and conventional households shrinks to a mere \$54 (\$267 as against \$213); in 1975 the difference stands at \$140 (\$245 as against \$105).

Table 6
Philanthropic Behavior by Household Type, Controlling for Age and Income,
1965 and 1975.

<u>Controls</u>	<u>Per Cent Giving to CJP</u>		<u>Amount Given^a</u>	
	<u>None</u>	<u>Age, Inc.</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Age, Inc.</u>
1965				
Alternative ^b	37	51	90	213
Conventional	70	65	339	267
Widowed	46	48	134	332
Eta	.28	.14	.15	.04
1975				
Alternative	20	30	72	105
Conventional	52	49	273	245
Widowed	52	45	165	265
Eta	.29	.17	.18	.13

a. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue.

b. See Table 2 for household type definitions.

Widows and widowers display quite different patterns. In 1965 their giving frequency places them near the alternative households; ten years later, their giving rates approximate that of conventional families. In both years, widow(er)s' contributions are rather small; in light of their reduced income, however, they emerge when controls are introduced as the most generous group.

We have already seen how alternative households grew in number between 1965 and 1975. Now we learn, based on the Jewish Activities scale (not shown), that such households have moved further away from the Jewish community in general and, as demonstrated in Table 6, from philanthropic behavior in particular. The growing estrangement of alternative households from organized Jewry reflects recently developed institutional supports for singles, childless couples, and the divorced. These people can now find many individuals like themselves with whom to associate; they expect and demand greater acceptance of their household status as normative; they may even regard that status as permanent rather than transitory. Members of alternative households, then, are in no great need of the support of the conventional community, and are less likely to seek to emulate the behavior of conventional households.

The Diminishing Importance of Income

The simultaneous impact of the four predictors—age, occupation, income, and Jewish Activities—on giving can be understood by means of regression equations. The standardized regression coefficients (and *etas*) in Table 7 report the net impact of each predictor on the dependent variable controlling simultaneously for the three other determinants of charitable giving. (Since the impact of household type, once age and income are taken into account, is largely mediated via Jewish Activities, the former is excluded from the integrative analysis presented here.)

Looking first at frequency of CJP giving, we find that income and age are the most important determinants of giving in 1965, with Jewish Activities and occupation displaying smaller but nearly equivalent effects. In 1975 the picture is very different: while age retains its potency, income no longer has any effect on the likelihood of giving; Jewish Activities have become as important as age; and occupation retains a slight but noticeable effect. On the amount given side, we note that in 1965 only income has any appreciable impact on the size of charitable contributions. In 1975 income's influence has diminished while that of Jewish Activities has increased somewhat.

Another way to understand income's changing impact on giving is to consider the unstandardized coefficients (in parentheses) which report the net increase in the dependent variable per thousand dollar increase in income. Thus, in 1965 every \$1,000 in income (in 1975 dollars) means a ½

Table 7
 Regressions of Philanthropic Behaviors upon Age, Income, Occupation, and Jewish Activities, 1965 and 1975

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	
	Gave to CJP ^a	Amount given ^b
1965		
Age	.28	.14
Income	.25 (.005)	.56 (17.31)
Occupation	.15	.09
Jewish Activities	.14	.11
R	.505	.570
R ²	.255	.324
1975		
Age	.32	.12
Income	.00 (.00)	.43 (9.62)
Occupation	.15	.14
Jewish Activities	.31	.18
R	.490	.486
R ²	.240	.235

a. Entries are eta/beta coefficients reported using Multiple Classification Analysis. Entries in parentheses are unstandardized coefficients indicating net unit change in the dependent variable per \$1,000 change in income.

b. Amount given to all Jewish causes except those connected with the synagogue.

per cent increase in the likelihood of making a CJP contribution; in 1975 income has no effect on the likelihood of giving. In 1965 every \$1,000 means a \$17.31 increase in the size of annual contributions to all Jewish causes. By 1975 income's net impact is reduced by almost one-half to \$9.62.

The diminishing influence of income and the growing importance of Jewishness reflect a changing rationale for Jewish philanthropy. Whereas in the past philanthropic giving was undertaken as a way of symbolizing economic success and securing social standing, today it is much more a reflection of Jewish commitment. Third- and fourth-generation Jews feel little need to display their wealth or shore up their social standing. Moreover, the breakdown of social barriers against Jewish entry into formerly non-Jewish social circles makes it more likely that they will contribute to non-Jewish charitable causes.

While the act of giving is unaffected by income and very much influenced by Jewishness in 1975, the opposite pattern holds true in terms of the

amount given: income retains a major impact on the size of contributions while the influence of Jewishness is much smaller. Putting things crudely, it appears that deciding whether to give is a Jewish decision; deciding what to give is an economic one.

CONCLUSION

This study was initiated to test the validity of a pessimistic prognosis of the future of Jewish philanthropy. This view has been largely borne out by the data, but the picture is far from one-sided. Today's younger Jews are indeed less likely to contribute to organized Jewish philanthropy, but when they give they are more generous than their elders or predecessors.

Several factors underlie these trends. First, today's younger Jews are less Jewishly involved than their predecessors of ten years ago. At the same time, Jewish activity has become a more important predictor of charitable behavior. Second, the decline in Jewishness is itself explained by a shift away from conventional households, toward alternative households. Not only have the latter become much more numerous among the under-40 group, they have moved further away from the Jewish community in general and from Jewish philanthropic giving in particular. Third, Jews are less often entering the business world and are more frequently becoming self-employed and salaried professionals. The shift toward the professions is apparently less consequential than the shift toward salaried occupations. Relatively fewer Jews in the future will amass large fortunes. Also, fewer will have the incentive of the self-employed to contribute to philanthropy of any sort. Fourth, the wealthy can no longer be expected to serve as philanthropic stalwarts. Jewish philanthropy has become less elitist (in financial terms) than in the past.

It is clear that Jewish involvement has become philanthropy's capital stock, and that that stock is badly in need of replenishment. The self-interest of federations, then, requires that they seek to improve Jewish socialization. Moreover, since the Jewishly identified segment of the community is increasingly important in terms of Jewish charitable giving, federations might well want to adopt policies which conform more closely to its values and outlook.

The decline of conventional families, coupled with their importance for the charitable campaigns, implies that federations have an interest in promoting policies favorable to marriage, marital happiness, and fertility. However, given that long-term demographic trends have classically resisted manipulation by public policy, federations will have to address themselves to the growth of singles, childless couples, and the divorced in more immediate terms. Federations can decide to focus on the needs of alternative

families and make efforts to better incorporate them into the Jewish community or they can focus fund-raising efforts on those families who have the greatest propensity to give, i.e., conventional households.

The changing Jewish occupational picture implies that fund-raising mechanisms which in the past were constructed around business circles should be replicated in the future around the professions. Indeed, Boston's CJP, as well as other federations, have shifted their organizing efforts to the professions with some apparent success. The declining number of self-employed Jews, however, poses a much greater, if not insurmountable, challenge to professional fund-raisers, since salaried status implies not only lower incomes, but less disposable income as well.

The broadening base of philanthropic support could well mean that the classical preponderance of a small number of wealthy families in each community's philanthropic circle may not obtain in the future. Federation leadership may pass to individuals of more moderate means who have a relatively strong commitment to Jewish life. Indeed, this process appears to be already underway.

Whether these trends will continue, whether policies will be enacted to deal with them, and, if so, whether they will have the desired effects remains, of course, to be seen. What is certain is that fewer donors and decreased giving would have far-reaching implications for the future of American Jewry. Such an eventuality would mean not only weakened financial support for Jewish agencies, but, in addition, lessened unity within the Jewish community, poorer recruitment of lay leaders for all aspects of organizational life, and, quite possibly, diminished Jewish political influence.

Israelis in the United States: Motives, Attitudes, and Intentions

by DOV ELIZUR

ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES are nations of immigrants. At the same time, both countries have experienced considerable emigration. Of the 13,000 Jews who arrived in Palestine in 1926, for example, more than half left; in 1927 emigration, for the first time, exceeded immigration.¹ Recent studies indicate that in certain periods as many as one third of the immigrants to the United States re-emigrated.² While studies of migration have focused mainly on the adjustment problems of immigrants, recent literature has begun to take note of the movement of emigrants back to their countries of origin. Appleyard and Richmond have investigated British emigrants returning to the United Kingdom from Australia and Canada;³ Cerase has studied Italians returning from the United States;⁴ Engel has examined Americans returning from Israel;⁵ and Toren has focused on Israelis returning from the United States and France.⁶

The growing number of Israelis residing abroad is of special significance, because Israel is a small country and its existence depends on a steadily increasing population. Since the inception of the Jewish State, Israeli society has been subjected to unprecedented psychological pressure from the

Note: The author is grateful to Esther Fleishman, Joan Lewis, Miriam Berman, and Shaul Fox for kind cooperation and help; to the Institute of Industrial Relations, the University of California, Berkeley for technical assistance; to the Israeli consulates and student's organizations; to all others who contributed by providing addresses of Israelis living in the U.S.; and to all the Israelis who participated in the study by responding to the questions.

¹Golda Meir, *My Life* (New York, 1976), p. 82.

²A. Antonovsky and A.D. Katz, *From the Golden to the Promised Land*, (Darby, 1979), p. 15; T.J. Samuel, "Migrations of Canadians to the U.S.A.: The Causes," *International Migration*, 1969, pp. 106-116.

³R.T. Appleyard, *British Emigration to Australia* (Canberra, 1964), and A.B. Richmond, "Demographic and Family Characteristics of British Immigrants Returning from Canada," *International Migration*, 1966, pp. 21-27.

⁴F. P. Cerase, "Expectations and Reality: A Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy," *International Migration Review*, 1974, pp. 245-262.

⁵G. Engel, "Comparison Between Americans Living in Israel and Those Who Returned to America," *The Journal of Psychology*, 1970, 74, pp. 195-204; 75, pp. 243-251; 76, 117-123.

⁶N. Toren, *Characteristics, Motives for Returning, and Intentions to Stay of Returning Israeli Citizens* (Jerusalem, 1974).

outside. Tension has also resulted from the inter-ethnic strain of the Israeli melting-pot. Thus, some Israelis going abroad want nothing more than to relax; many others, however, have the aim of acquiring education or professional skills, of improving their economic situation, or of exploring life abroad.

Emigration from Israel is frequently stigmatized as unpatriotic; it evokes negative sentiments and even hostility on the part of government officials and the general public. While immigrants who come to Israel are described as *olim* ("going up"), those leaving the country are labelled *yordim* ("going down"). Yet, with a growing number of Israelis residing abroad, the social stigma of being a *yored* has significantly lessened.

Because Israeli emigrants constitute a significant sub-ethnic group among Jews in various countries, including the United States, Canada, South Africa, and parts of Europe, it is possible to investigate their motives, attitudes, and intentions with regard to the choice of a country of residence. The present study, based on data collected from two samples of Israelis residing in the United States, analyzes their reasons for going abroad, their sense of identity (Jewish, Israeli, and American), and their considerations both for and against returning to Israel.

Estimates of the extent of the *yeridah* phenomenon vary. According to official statistics, over 300,000 Israeli citizens are residing abroad.⁷ The number of Israelis travelling outside the country is growing from year to year, as is the case in most Western nations. This, however, reflects a rise in the standard of living rather than a migratory trend. In the period 1950-54, when about 30,000 people left the country each year, the difference between the number of departing and returning residents was an average of 11,000, or 37 per cent. In the period 1975-77, when the number of departing residents each year was between 288,000 and 333,000, the difference between those departing and those returning was an average of 14,000, or between 4 and 5 per cent.⁸ Despite an enormous increase in population and in the number of departing residents, the proportion and even the absolute number of emigrants was lower in the early 1970's than in the 1950's.

In order to study emigration from Israel, it is necessary to define the population. While it is possible to ask people directly what their intentions are, this method has limited utility. Some departing Israelis have not given any thought to migrating; others have not yet come to a definite decision. Even Israelis who plan to emigrate will probably feel uncomfortable in admitting their intentions. Experience has shown, moreover, that

⁷*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1978, pp. 126-127.

⁸Z. Rabbi, "Emigration from Israel, 1948-1977," *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1978, No. 5, pp. 83-96.

declarations of intention are not very reliable; many people who declare their intention to emigrate eventually return.⁹

Various scholars have suggested that an emigrant be defined as a person who changes his or her place of residence and stays there one year or more.¹⁰ This definition, which is employed in United Nations reports on migration, was found to be suitable for the present study. Since "Israelis residing abroad" is more precise than *yordim* or "emigrants", the former term will usually be applied in the following discussion.

THE SAMPLE

The analysis in this study is based on two random samples: a group of 378 Israelis residing in the U.S. for 5 years or more, interviewed in 1972, and a group of 188 Israelis residing in the U.S. for one year or more, interviewed in 1977.¹¹ The samples were derived from lists provided by Israeli consulates, Israeli student organizations (excluding active students), and other sources. Additional names were obtained through a "snowball" effect, i.e., each respondent was asked to provide names of other Israelis known to him. A questionnaire designed for self-administration was mailed to the subjects. The response rate was about 27 per cent in both samples. While the samples may not be representative of the total population of Israelis residing in the U.S. (difficulties were encountered, for example, in reaching cab drivers), they provide some basis for understanding the group.

Sixty-five per cent of all respondents were male; 55 per cent were single when they arrived in the U.S.; 1 per cent were widowed or divorced. At the time of the investigation, 70 per cent were already married; 27 per cent had remained single and 3 per cent were divorced. In the 1977 sample, 29 per cent of the spouses were born in the U.S.; in the 1972 sample the figure was 24 per cent. Eight per cent of the spouses in the 1977 sample were of non-Jewish origin, as compared with 2 per cent in the 1972 sample. The average age of the 1977 sample was lower than that of the 1972 sample: 61 per cent of the 1977 sample were between 25 and 34 years of age; 68 per cent of the 1972 sample were in the 30-49 age group. About one-third of the 1972 sample and about half of the 1977 sample had higher education.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 84.

¹⁰W. Petersen, "Migration, Social Aspects," *The International Encyclopedia for the Social Sciences*, 10. (Glencoe, 1968), pp. 186-292.

¹¹The 1972 sample is examined in D. Elizur and M. Elizur, *The Long Way Back: Attitudes of Israelis Residing in the U.S. and in France Toward Returning to Israel*, (Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, 1974).

Seventy-four per cent of all respondents were of Ashkenazic background. In terms of religious outlook, in the 1972 sample 29 per cent were Orthodox, 54 per cent traditional, and 18 per cent secular; in the 1977 sample the figures were 16, 56, and 28 per cent, respectively. Sixty per cent of the 1977 sample were born in Israel, while only 40 per cent of the 1972 sample were Israeli-born. This finding supports the contention of many observers that a growing number of *sabras* (Jews born in Israel) are moving abroad.

THE FINDINGS

Motives for Going Abroad

In the past, leaving one's country and going overseas often resulted in a complete break with the country of origin. Technological developments in transportation and communication, however, have considerably altered this situation; travel abroad today need not involve a severing of ties. Nonetheless, migration overseas is still a difficult and risky proposition, and requires strong motivation.

The decision to leave one's home country usually ripens gradually and is the result of a variety of considerations. The scholarly literature on the subject tends to place particular stress on economic factors. What, then, are the considerations motivating Israelis to emigrate? Are there discernible differences between the two population samples in this regard?

Table I
Motives for Moving Abroad
(By Percentage)

<u>Content</u>	<u>Sample</u>	<u>Extent of Influence</u>					<u>Total</u>
		<u>Very Great</u>	<u>Great</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>Little</u>	<u>None</u>	
1. Level of Income	1977	9	7	16	10	58	100
	1972	19	14	19	10	38	100
2. Standard of living	1977	6	7	18	22	47	100
	1972	15	14	21	10	40	100
3. Quality of life	1977	9	14	16	14	48	100
	1972	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. Chances for suitable employment	1977	18	9	9	10	55	100
	1972	23	16	11	9	41	100

5. Chances of acceptance at university	1977	37	6	3	6	48	100
	1972	22	7	5	2	64	100
6. Children's education	1977	1	1	5	3	91	100
	1972	6	7	5	1	81	100
7. Desire to join family	1977	10	3	5	6	76	100
	1972	15	5	7	5	68	100
8. Chances for professional development	1977	30	15	9	9	38	100
	1972*	18	11	8	3	60	100
9. Children's future	1977	2	3	5	4	86	100
	1972	10	7	5	3	76	100
10. Desire to utilize abilities	1977	28	19	9	5	38	100
	1972	20	13	16	7	45	100
11. Professional training	1977	42	10	10	3	34	100
	1972	18	11	8	3	60	100
12. Spouse's wish	1977	18	4	9	6	63	100
	1972	15	6	6	5	69	100
13. Tax policy	1977	15	4	11	9	62	100
	1972	13	5	11	5	66	100
14. Bureaucracy	1977	26	8	10	8	48	100
	1972	17	7	12	8	56	100
15. Desire to see foreign countries	1977	20	11	26	12	30	100
	1972	8	10	21	9	52	100

*In the 1972 sample, the words "and scholarships" were included in this question.

The data presented in Table I indicate that emigration is motivated in the main by considerations related to personal development, i.e., the desire for higher education, the utilization of talent and knowledge, and professional advancement. Additional factors are the quest for suitable employment, higher income, and a higher standard of living. Personal development is emphasized to a greater extent in the 1977 sample than in the 1972 sample; a remarkably lower percentage of the former group claim to have been influenced by direct material considerations. A desire to see foreign countries also seems to be an increasingly important factor; somewhat more than one in five in the 1977 sample mention this factor, while less than one in ten in the 1972 group do so.

Social Contacts

The study examined various patterns of social interaction which may occur among Israelis who have emigrated to the United States. The following directions were observed: ties may be limited to contact with other Israelis; social relations may be established with the local Jewish community; social contact may be established with non-Jews.

The data in Table II indicate that a larger proportion of the 1977 sample maintain contacts with other Israelis (56 per cent as against only 42 per cent in the 1972 sample). About the same proportion of the 1977 and 1972 samples establish contact with local Jews (53 and 57 per cent, respectively). The extent of contact with non-Jews, however, is strikingly different in the two samples; in 1972, about one in five reported having extensive contact, while one in three report having none; in 1977 one in three report having extensive contact and one in ten report having none. The tendency toward assimilation is also indicated by the growing number of intermarriages between Israelis and non-Jews. While only 2 per cent of the 1972 sample reported having non-Jewish spouses, 8 per cent of the 1977 sample do.

Table II
Extent of Social Contact
(By Percentage)

	<u>Sample</u>	<u>Extent of Social Contact</u>				<u>Total</u>
		<u>Very Much</u>	<u>Much</u>	<u>Little</u>	<u>None</u>	
With Israelis	1972	11	31	51	7	100
	1977	17	39	43	2	100
With local Jews	1972	18	39	38	6	100
	1977	13	40	42	5	100
With non-Jews	1972	2	20	50	29	100
	1977	7	26	57	10	100

Table III provides additional data on the social ties established by Israeli emigrants. A positive relationship exists between social contacts established with other Israelis and with local Jews. Similarly, there is a positive relationship between contact with local Jews and with non-Jews. There is, however, no relationship between ties forged with Israelis and with non-Jews. In terms of the relationship between social contact and the intention to return to Israel, there is a clear negative correlation between

ties established with local Jews and non-Jews and the intention to return to Israel. Social contact with Israelis is not significantly related to intention to return to Israel.

Table III
Relation Between Social Contact and Intention to Return to Israel
Coefficients of Weak Monotonicity*
The 1977 Sample, N=188.
(Decimals Omitted)

	Israelis	Local Jews	Non- Jews	Intention
1. Social contact with Israelis	—	29	01	04
2. Social contact with local Jews	29	—	25	-39
3. Social contact with non-Jews	01	25	—	-36
4. Intention to return to Israel	04	-39	-36	—

*Guttman's weak monotonicity coefficients were used as the measure of correlation. These coefficients vary from +1.00 to -1.00 and indicate the extent to which values of one item increase (decrease) monotonically with increases in another item, without specifying the exact nature of the regression function.

Identity

Emigration to a new country necessitates re-orientation; it involves adjustment to a different language, culture, and way of life. During the initial period of adjustment the emigrant must ask himself: Who am I? How will I present myself to others? With whom shall I associate? In working out answers to these questions, the individual determines his relationship to the new social environment. Future plans will be affected by the identity thus established.

Israelis residing in the United States can assume any of three identities: Israeli, Jewish, American. A set of items dealing with these identities was included in the 1977 study. The data reveal that 99 per cent of the respondents consider themselves to be part of the Jewish people; 96 per cent feel good about their Jewishness; and 92 per cent present themselves to others as Jews. Similarly, 91 per cent of the respondents consider themselves part of Israeli society; 94 per cent feel good about being Israelis; and 81 per cent present themselves as Israelis to others. On the other hand, 35 per cent of the respondents consider themselves to be part of American society; 22 per

cent feel good about being American; and 10 per cent present themselves as Americans to others.

Jewish identity is always tied to other ethnic identities. A relatively strong link may be expected to exist between Jewish and Israeli identity, since the past and values of both are virtually the same. Thus, the majority of the subjects whom Simon Herman¹² studied saw their Jewishness and Israeliness as being interrelated. In the present study each identity was dealt with separately. The relation between the various identities could be analyzed, however, by calculating the correlation coefficients. The relations between Jewish, Israeli, and American identity are presented in Table IV. Jewish and Israeli identity are, indeed, positively related to each other, while American identity is negatively related to both Israeli and Jewish identity.¹³

Table IV
Relations Between Jewish, Israeli, and American Identity
Coefficients of Weak Monotonicity*
The 1977 Sample, N=188
(Decimals Omitted)

	American	Jewish	Israeli	Intention to Return
1. American	—			
2. Jewish	-19	—		
3. Israeli	-47	51	—	
4. Intention to return to Israel	-76	35	72	—

*Guttman's weak monotonicity coefficients were used as the measure of correlation. These coefficients vary from +1.00 to -1.00 and indicate the extent to which values of one item increase (decrease) monotonically with increases in another item, without specifying the exact nature of the regression function.

Intention to Return to Israel

What are the intentions of Israelis residing in the U.S. in terms of returning to Israel?

Data in Table V indicate that 84 per cent of the respondents are in favor of returning. Only a small percentage, however, have clear plans of returning to Israel in the near future.

¹²S.N. Herman, *Israelis and Jews*. (New York, 1970), p. 44.

¹³This confirms S. N. Herman's finding in *American Students in Israel*. (New York, 1970).

Table V
 Intention to Return to Israel
 (By Percentage)

	Sample <u>1977</u>	Sample <u>1972</u>
Are you thinking of returning to Israel?	(N=184)	(N=372)
Definitely yes	40	37
Probably yes	40	42
Probably no	16	18
Definitely no	4	3
To what extent do you have clear plans about returning to Israel?	(N=183)	(N=362)
Very clear	20	7
Clear	21	15
Not very clear	29	46
Unclear	31	32
If you are thinking of returning to Israel, when do you think this might be?	(N=184)	(N=366)
One year	16	5
2-3 years	18	13
4-5 years	21	5
Hope to return but do not know when	35	56
Not thinking of returning	9	11
Are you for or against returning to Israel?	(N=170)	(N=357)
Very much in favor	33	37
In favor	51	47
Against	13	14
Very much against	3	1

The relation between expressed intention to return to Israel and other variables was examined. One would expect that the considerations involved in the decision to return to Israel after living abroad would be somewhat similar to those involved in the initial decision to leave. The passage of time, however, will have brought about changes: people have grown older; singles may have married (frequently to spouses born in the host country); families

may have increased in size; and social and professional ties have probably been established. These factors will have an impact on the decision.

As seen in Table VI, factors which encourage respondents to return to Israel include love for the homeland, the desire to live in a Jewish society, the wish to join other family members, and the children's education and future. The latter two considerations are particularly important for the 1977 sample. Factors deterring the respondents from returning to Israel are bureaucracy, tax policy, and level of income.

Data in Table VII indicate that the perception and presentation of oneself as an Israeli are positively related to the intention to return to Israel. On the other hand, the perception and presentation of oneself as an American are negatively related to the intention to return. The perceived attitudes of referents, especially those of spouses and close friends, have a strong impact on the decision to return. Opportunities for obtaining suitable work in Israel positively influence the decision. Time spent abroad has a negative impact. Use of Hebrew in the home is positively related to the intention to return.

Religious observance is positively (coefficient of 0.24) related to the intention to return to Israel. The majority of *sabras* of Western origin have definite plans to return, while the majority of the other groups do not.

Some scholars maintain that dissatisfaction and frustration are basic determinants of the decision to migrate.¹⁴ Thus it is of interest to compare the attitudes of respondents toward various aspects of life in Israel and in the U.S., and to analyze the relations between satisfaction and the intention to return to Israel.

Table VIII indicates that relatively more respondents are satisfied with their work and general situation in the United States than in Israel. It is their social life in the U.S. which compares unfavorably with that in Israel. Analysis of the relationship between the various aspects of satisfaction shows that satisfaction with the general situation is closely tied to work satisfaction in the U.S. and social satisfaction in Israel.

From Table IX it is clear that the intention to return to Israel is positively related to satisfaction in Israel and dissatisfaction in the United States.

CONCLUSION

The literature on migration stresses the importance of economic factors in the decision to go abroad. The sample of Israelis who were examined in this study, however, placed greater stress on factors related to personal development—opportunities for higher education, professional training,

¹⁴S.N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants*, (London, 1954).

Table VI
 Considerations for Returning to Israel
 (By Percentage)

Content	Sample	Extent of Attraction					Total
		Attracts very much	Attracts	Neither attracts nor deters	Deters	Deters very much	
1. Love for homeland	1977	61	25	14	—	—	100
	1972	60	33	6	—	—	100
2. Wish to join the family	1977	50	25	23	—	2	100
	1972	35	32	28	3	2	100
3. Children's education	1977	47	28	21	2	1	100
	1972	31	25	34	7	2	100
4. Desire to live in Jewish society	1977	42	34	22	1	1	100
	1972	46	34	18	1	1	100
5. Children's future	1977	42	25	24	3	5	100
	1972	37	26	31	2	4	100
6. Spouse's wish	1977	14	17	48	9	11	100
	1972	13	21	44	12	10	100
7. Quality of life	1977	10	27	27	17	19	100
	1972	—	—	—	—	—	—
8. Utilize ability and knowledge	1977	10	14	45	16	15	100
	1972	6	13	60	12	9	100
9. Chances for suitable employment	1977	6	15	41	18	19	100
	1972	2	7	46	27	17	100
10. Chances for professional development	1977	5	9	46	20	20	100
	1972	2	8	63	14	14	100
11. Standard of living	1977	2	3	58	24	13	100
	1972	3	4	46	31	16	100
12. Professional training	1977	1	2	56	25	16	100
	1972	1	2	76	13	7	100
13. Level of income	1977	—	1	46	34	19	100
	1972	2	1	41	35	21	100
14. Tax policy	1977	—	—	32	28	39	100
	1972	1	1	40	31	28	100
15. Bureaucracy	1977	—	1	19	29	49	100
	1972	1	—	38	29	32	100

Table VII
 Items Related with the Intention to Return to Israel
 Coefficients of weak monotonicity*
 (Decimals Omitted)

	Sample	
	1977	1972
<i>1. Identity</i>		
Considers himself part of Israeli society	72	78
Presents himself as Israeli	70	—
Considers himself part of American society	-76	—
Presents himself as American	-79	—
Considers himself part of the Jewish people	35	—
<i>2. Attitudes of referents</i>		
Family considers him to be an Israeli	55	—
Colleagues consider him to be an Israeli	65	—
Friends consider him to be an Israeli	71	—
Spouse is in favor of returning to Israel	88	66
<i>3. Hebrew</i>		
Speaks Hebrew at home	69	38
Listens to Hebrew broadcasts	52	20
Reads Israeli newspapers	55	43
<i>4. Considerations related to children and family</i>		
Future of children attracts to return	72	57
Education of children attracts to return	63	45
Wish of spouse attracts to return	69	64
Wish to join the family attracts to return	60	46
Chances of getting suitable work attracts to return	55	29
Children attending Jewish school	52	—
Spouse non-Jewish	-54	—
<i>5. Dissatisfaction abroad</i>		
Not feeling at home	84	50
Dissatisfaction with social life	57	—
Dissatisfaction with general conditions	37	—
<i>6. Background characteristics</i>		
Time spent abroad	-67	—
Income	-48	—

*Guttman's weak monotonicity coefficients were used as the measure of correlation. These coefficients vary from +1.00 to -1.00 and indicate the extent to which values of one item increase (decrease) monotonically with increases in another item, without specifying the exact nature of the regression function.

Table IX
 Relations between Satisfaction and Intention to Return to Israel
 Coefficients of weak monotonicity*
 1977 Sample, N = 188
 (Decimals Omitted)

Area of Satisfaction	Satisfaction in the US			Satisfaction in Israel		
	Work	General situation	Children's education	General situation	Children's education	Social life
1. Work	—			—		
2. General situation	80	—		34	—	
3. Children's education	62	48	—	75	55	—
4. Social life	37	52	62	42	58	25
5. Intention to return	-26	-37	-33	40	31	29

*Guttman's weak monotonicity coefficients were used as the measure of correlation. These coefficients vary from +1.00 to -1.00 and indicate the extent to which values of one item increase (decrease) monotonically with increases in another item, without specifying the exact nature of the regression function.

and the utilization of talent, as well as the desire to experience life in other countries. Thus, the motives of Israelis coming to the United States are more of a pull than a push nature. A number of scholars have argued that if migration is caused by pull factors, the chance of return migration is likely to be high.¹⁵

In the past, emigration from Israel was stigmatized as unpatriotic and evoked negative responses. Recently, however, Israeli authorities have changed their approach. Having become aware that Israelis residing abroad constitute a potential pool of immigrants, they have employed various means to encourage them to return. Assistance in finding employment and housing, customs reductions, and loans for travel expenses are among the benefits to which returning Israelis are entitled. Judging by the data in this study, it would appear wise for Israeli authorities not to limit their efforts to providing support for those Israelis who have made a decision to return. Israelis residing abroad should be encouraged to maintain their Israeli and Jewish identities—to read Israeli newspapers, listen to Hebrew-language broadcasts, and send their children to Jewish schools. While this cannot guarantee that Israeli emigrants will feel the need to return to Israel, it may considerably increase the chances.

¹⁵Everett S. Lee, "A Theory of Migration," *Demography*, 1966, pp. 47–57, and Samuel, *loc. cit.*