

C H A P T E R I X

REFLECTIONS, AND APPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL ACTION

In this report, the authors have sought to isolate the main psychological and sociological attributes which might explain the intolerance manifested by the veterans. Our conclusions have led toward emphasizing the factors of subjective deprivation, downward social mobility, anxiety, and the absence of adequate control of hostile discharge against ethnic minorities. An approach such as that of this study has its limitations and leaves certain areas untouched which as yet cannot be fully investigated by means of the scientific methods (such as statistical analysis) that were applied throughout the study. This chapter attempts to round out the report through further speculation based on the data collected in the study.

All generalizations which have appeared in previous chapters must be evaluated as deriving from a particular though significant sample of men living within a particular social structure. In this chapter, the authors wish to do more than simply evaluate their findings in terms of social scientific standards. The point has been reached where some suggestion must be made as to the application of those findings to social action.

In the planning and analysis of this study the authors have utilized the theory and observations of dynamic psychology and of sociological analysis. There is little point in raising the question of which system is most adequate for explaining ethnic intolerance. It is clear enough from the findings that either system alone would have been inadequate. It is hoped that the present study—among others—may perhaps supply the basis for further theoretical developments in the integration of these now separate bodies of theory.

The personality structures of the men in the sample were to a large degree formed under the impact of existing society. If ethnic intolerance is rooted in the intolerant individual's personality, then we must ask ourselves what in this society shapes personality in such a way that

ethnic intolerance seems a frequent, if not a favorite outlet for hostility. While it is not true, as the Marxist maintains, that ethnic intolerance is a consequence of the capitalist system, ethnic intolerance occurring within a capitalist society will nevertheless be deeply influenced in character by that society.

It may once more be stressed that intolerance is always an outlet for hostility, but that it depends for its intensity on the degree of hostility accumulated, and on the strength of the controls which restrain it. While hostility against outgroups is probably as old as society, the particular form in which hostility occurs is particular to the society in which it appears. Although anti-Semitism has been present in slave societies, feudal societies, capitalist societies, and recently too in communist society, it appears in each case to have been a different social phenomenon. What is historically permanent in anti-Semitism, for example, is only that members of a particular religious or ethnic group have been persecuted. The German-Jewish scientist, banker, physician, or laborer whom Hitler persecuted was as different from the medieval Jewish ghetto pawnbroker as was the German SS man from the German peasant or master craftsman who persecuted Jews in the Middle Ages. And as different as they were from one another, so also were their persecutions. Their differences originated in the different forms of society in which they lived—societies which shaped their personalities, outlooks, motives, and actions, which aroused their hostility, created frustration, and controlled its discharge. Hence their motives in persecuting the Jews were equally different, and equally rooted in the structure of their society.

In this book only that type of ethnic intolerance is analyzed which is prevalent in the urban centers of modern western society. Since the particular form in which it appears is an outgrowth of that society, it must be intimately connected with it, although it may still originate in each individual's personal frustrations, anxieties, hostilities, and so on. Two examples may serve to illustrate.

In a slave society in which one ethnic group rules another, the ruling group does more than simply tolerate the life—and even to some degree the well-being—of the discriminated group. The presence of this group is not only desired, it is vital to the working of society, and the latter, in case of need, must assure itself by warfare of securing new slaves. Some remnants of the attitudes originating in the needs of a slave society might account in part for observations made in the second chapter of this book. In that chapter it was mentioned that while the very intolerant men asked for the deportation of Jews, almost none of them requested

deportation of Negroes, but requested instead that they be kept in their "place." The reason may well be that the Negro, although discriminated against, is nevertheless experienced as an important member of society, or at least as a person who serves a useful function. If the Negro were to leave, it would be left to the white man to perform those less desirable tasks which are now relegated to the Negro. Thus ethnic intolerance in its modern form was unthinkable in a society whose ethnic outgroups actually provided the economic base, as in a slave society. As a matter of fact, there are many ways in which modern ethnic intolerance tends to reestablish settings which were characteristic of slave society—the Negro must know and keep in his "place"; the Jew and members of other inferior races must labor in the concentration camp.

Ethnic intolerance as a social phenomenon takes on markedly different aspects depending on the social structure in which it occurs, and can be comprehended only when viewed in the context of that society. The example of medieval anti-Semitism may serve as an additional illustration. Jewish persecution in the Middle Ages charged the Jews with enjoying ill-begotten wealth—and the desire to gain, through plundering their riches, was an important incentive. But in medieval anti-Semitism, these seemed only random phenomena. What seemed to excite real ire in the populace was that the Jews refused to be saved, thus reviving and enforcing in the Christians repressed doubts about their own salvation. (Without firsthand knowledge, all statements about the inner psychological processes of individuals who lived during the medieval period must remain conjecture. Still it might be reasonable to assume that his id, superego, and ego served similar functions in the psychological apparatus, but were differently constituted than those of modern man. Cleanliness was considered vain, if not unhealthy; the content of the superego was ordained by the Church; and the priest and the Church provided the most powerful superego representation. The superego had no need to evoke symbols of self-respect or individual conscience for restraining ego and id—the fear of hell and damnation were much more powerful incentives. Moreover, the ego was not confronted with an abundance of choices, and a relatively weak ego sufficed for mastering the tasks of life. Life activities were more rigidly organized and less subject to freedom of choice than they are today and the ego was less taxed in its need to synthesize opposing tendencies. Which of these tendencies, and in which ways they might be satisfied was more or less ordered by rules and tradition.)

It seems reasonable to assume that the ego of medieval man was at

least as much concerned with saving his immortal soul as it was with making his temporal life successful. It is difficult to decide where his individual superego began, and where the Church and its teaching served him in its stead. Even the true medieval heretics (St. John of the Cross, etc.) bowed to the authority of popes, of whose individual shortcomings they were not unaware.¹

What the individual during the Middle Ages appears to have feared most was not loss in status or economic security, but loss of grace. Much as he might have cherished the former, it was far more important, and a much greater threat, to fear damnation and the loss of eternal life. But it was not always easy to live by the rules of the superego-Church. (That the Church permitted considerable id gratification may be disregarded for the purpose of this discussion.) The id pressed for a gratification that was not always sanctioned by the Church, so that the ego and individualized superego may often have joined forces in doubting salvation through religious conformity. Such doubts had to be done away with, had to be persecuted and extinguished. They were the greatest threat to the individual's integration. One way to eliminate this threat was to project the conflict onto the Jews. In the Middle Ages, the most frequent accusation made against Jews, and the one which aroused the greatest hatred, was that they had desecrated the host. Closely related was the other accusation that they had committed ritual murders, used children they had killed to say a black mass.

The example of the Marannos (Spanish Jews converted to Catholicism) shows that these accusations reflected a very probable origin of anti-Semitism at that time, namely the Christian's fear of being a bad Catholic (more so, at least, than modern accusations indicate the real reasons for modern anti-Semitism). These Spanish Jews were notoriously wealthy as well as culturally and politically influential, and aside from religious accusations, their wealth, too, was held against them.² Still a change of religion put an end to their persecution, provided they really meant it. As soon as Spanish Jews became Catholics, they were not only permitted

¹ Thus the superego which forced them to take a stand against the temporary Church was not strong enough to assert its absolute independence. On the other hand, the Protestant reformers, and their forerunners from Wycliffe on, seem to have had more individualized superegos which permitted them to supplement faith with their own observations in taking a stand against Church and pope. But in this sense they were rather precursors of modern man than typically medieval and once the reforms they inaugurated were established, modern times had begun.

² The modern accusation of clannishness (the one most frequently used by the men in the sample) was absent in medieval anti-Semitism, probably because the modern sense of isolation and the fear of alienation were not then prevalent.

to retain status and wealth, but were frequently known to increase in both.

In modern times when religious appeals have been introduced as a basis for the persecution of Jews, they have nearly always fallen flat.³ Religious fear, or such inner conflicts as are based on it, is just no longer important enough to motivate large masses. Again and again ritual murder stories have been circulated, but have never been widely believed, or at least not in urban centers. The only places where they were lent some credence and led to persecutions were in eastern Europe, where economic, political, and religious organization was still very similar to that of the Middle Ages (the last time in the notorious Beilis case of 1911). Religious conversion which protected Spanish Jews was ultimately of little help to Jews in Germany. Thus although in the two examples, the German and the Spanish, both religious and economic accusations were used, the religious was more basic in the Middle Ages, while it is insignificant in modern times. On the other hand, the economic accusation seems all-important in modern times. The racial issue raised in National Socialist Germany seems but a return to the Middle Ages with racialism taking the place of religion. But into this new "religion" one cannot be "admitted"—the infidel, the man of a lower race, must be extinguished.

While the ethos of medieval society was largely religious, that of the men studied was largely economic. By and large, the latter considered income as the main status-providing factor. Security itself was experienced mainly as economic—as job or income security—and even those men who valued intellectual achievement viewed it chiefly as an economic asset.

The men strove little for religious salvation, but they certainly wished for economic security which was even more important to them than higher income, as some of them stated themselves. But economic security is not easily achieved in a competitive society. Moreover, the notion is widespread that in a competitive society everyone can better his status if he tries hard enough. This, of course, puts an added psychological burden on the man who does not even achieve an occupational position which he thinks will assure his economic well-being. In addition to not attaining needed security, he also experiences a blow to his self-esteem.

Thus the person who experiences a lowering of income is doubly deprived. He is dissatisfied with himself and in addition must fear for his economic welfare. Frustration therefore accumulates and presses for

³ Throughout the interviews when reasons for the dislike of Jews were mentioned, references to religion were almost totally absent.

discharge in those men who experience downward mobility. To such men, ethnic discrimination offers a convenient outlet. But the fourth chapter has shown that it was not only those who experienced a lowering of economic status who were prejudiced, but also those who were stationary in that respect, although there was a significant difference in the intensity of intolerance between these two groups. In terms of existing society even the men whose status was unchanged had reason to be fearful, although they needed, in general, to be less anxious than those on the downgrade. The no-mobility group had failed to live up to the challenge that one better oneself which is inherent in competitive society. Although many social scientists would agree that to remain stationary in our society often indicates that a man has made good in competition, such an attitude is not yet part of the economic ethos. Therefore such men are not really at peace; their self-esteem, too, is threatened, though considerably less so than that of a member of the downwardly mobile group. Thus, among other reasons, even the stationary group took advantage of ethnic discrimination as a channel for the discharge of accumulated hostility. On the other hand, the upwardly mobile group, for their part, had gained enough courage from recent successes to feel they might weather a future depression which they, too, nevertheless feared.

Early in the book (Chapter III) it was mentioned that among the group studied there seemed to be a tendency to select the Jews as the group on whom to project those superego demands making for conflict within the individual, and that the character of anti-Semitism was strongly influenced by such projections. The intolerant men felt that the Jews were successful in those areas where they themselves had failed to make good. Their superegos—in line with the economic ethos of society—required that they increase their earnings and rise in the hierarchy of status. Against these demands, which they could not fulfill, the stationary and particularly the downwardly mobile group defended their egos by pointing to the Jews. It was the Jews, they claimed, who exercised undue control, possessed the money, and thus prevented their own success.

But these same groups among the sample were also the ones who were considerably more intolerant of Negroes than were the men who had risen economically. They could hardly accuse the Negroes of controlling them and thus blocking their advance, nor could they accuse them of possessing the money. Moreover, it has been pointed out that unacceptable id tendencies were most frequently projected onto Negroes, and these tendencies were certainly not required by the social ethos. If the specific form of intolerance in a given society is a function of that social

structure and if the character of modern anti-Semitism is conditioned by the structure of modern society, the same must also hold true for intolerance toward the Negro. While the economic and social ethos which was evident among the sample generally required that a man should work hard, earn good money, and in that way better his status, by the same token it rejected tendencies toward laziness, lack of orderliness and cleanliness, unreliability, immorality, and loss of property through neglect.⁴

The type of accusations directed against the Negroes and the manner in which individual tendencies are projected onto that group are highly influenced by social mores. These mores decree which tendencies are unacceptable and which must be integrated and, if that is not possible, which must be eliminated. Those men who had risen occupationally (and to some degree those who had remained stationary) seem to have felt they had complied with the social ethos and thus felt less threatened by their instinctual desires. With their achievement they showed both the world and themselves that their rejected id tendencies interfered in no way with their doing their "duty." Their wish to "take things easy" was obviously no hindrance to their well-being and therefore implied considerably less of a threat to their integration than it did to the no-mobility or downwardly mobile groups. In this connection it might also be mentioned that members of the sample were part of the age group of which occupational improvement is even more expected than of younger or older men—the first being considered beginners, the latter definitely settled. The veterans studied were men enjoying their "best" years—those years, according to prevalent notions, which should be used to climb in the social hierarchy.

Obviously a man who is convinced that his stationary, or even downward socioeconomic position is only temporary can view his position with greater equanimity than one who is more or less convinced it is permanent. He will be able to maintain his integration despite superego pressure for greater achievement. On the other hand, a person who views his occupational potential with pessimism, who fears that an impending change in the business cycle will lead to a loss of his present earning power, will be unable to integrate his superego's pressure and less able to permit himself even those id gratifications which someone more relatively secure can afford to enjoy with ease.

The degree to which a person is haunted by fear depends in good

⁴The accusation that the presence of Negroes depreciates the value of property usually carries the definite connotation that such depreciation is due to willful neglect. To lose money or to occasion depreciation through chance rarely arouses the disgust which is created by supposedly willful negligence.

measure on what he feels is expected of him, either by himself or by others. Perhaps in the Middle Ages the man who felt sure he was saved was relatively free from fear and could therefore integrate the comparatively small amounts of aggression he might otherwise have discharged in ethnic hostility. On the other hand, by persecuting the unbelievers the man who feared his damnation might have tried to demonstrate to himself, to others—and, he may have hoped, to God—that he was not as bad a Christian as he feared. He, too, might have been persecuting another “doubting” man so that he might temporarily forget his own doubts. At the same time such persecution allowed him to discharge some of the hostility which was partially created by his fear of damnation, a fear which arose from his doubts. According to this study, many fears now related to intolerance are of an economic nature, hence can be approached rationally and, perhaps, dissolved. In many ways the situation is better in modern times, where few fears are related to the inaccessible supernatural. There are still ways to demonstrate to a person that he may feel secure about his economic future—or there would be if a constant increase in earning power, and success in competition were no longer a feature of economic security—while there was no way, in the Middle Ages, of assuring a man of salvation. Of course, this holds true only in so far as, and as long as the economic system with its vastness, complexity, and lack of individual responsibility or comprehension of the consequences of economic actions is not experienced by the individual as equally incomprehensible and overpowering as the supernatural appeared to the man of the Middle Ages.

THE INDIVIDUAL

After so much has been said about the economic concomitants of intolerance it should again be stressed that the comparison of objective army experiences and their subjective evaluation (Chapter V) has shown that objective reality seemed comparatively less important in shaping interethnic attitudes than the personal frame of reference within which objective reality is experienced. Despite the insecurities of the present day, quite a number of the veterans had egos which were adequate enough to master economic anxieties so that they were not forced to evaluate past, present, and future experiences as deprivational. They were relatively free of fear and found it possible to be optimistic even in adverse circumstances (combat, threat of depression, etc.). Such optimism and the self-confidence and self-respect which go with it, as

well as the parallel ability to control hostility, all originate in fortunate childhood experiences. Positive relationships to parents and other members of the primary group and sufficient gratification of instinctual needs during childhood seem to equip a child with sufficient emotional strength to grow into an adult who feels able to master the difficulties of contemporary life.⁵ Thus, in more than one way, anxiety about the future and the discharge of aggression in hostile action is a two-generation problem. The individual who has experienced even relative security in childhood will probably have acquired a personality structure which permits him to weather even relatively great frustrations and insecurities without experiencing them as a threat to his personal integration. He will not need to bolster his integration through the mechanism of projection, or the explosive and irrational discharge of hostility against members of an outgroup. On the other hand, a child born into a family which experiences actual deprivation during the child's most formative years will, in addition to actual deprivation, most probably be raised in an atmosphere of emotional insecurity. He will be unable to view his life experiences optimistically and thus every positive experience will lose much of its reassuring, ego-strengthening value. Conversely, every negative experience will seem according to expectation and thus even more deprivational and overpowering.⁶

⁵ Clinical observations of severely disturbed children permit several interesting inferences on the consequences of actual and emotional deprivation during infancy and childhood. Children who on initial examination showed comparable degrees of disturbance, nevertheless showed marked differences in improvement during psychiatric treatment, depending chiefly on their past life experiences. Children who had suffered severe actual deprivation because they had been raised in submarginal families or in orphanages soon improved markedly. The abundant gratification of instinctual and interpersonal needs, as provided by the new environment, during treatment—they lived in a psychiatric institution—permitted them to modify their outlook on life quite rapidly. They learned soon enough that past deprivations were only one of many possible kinds of experiences and realized that life has more to offer than they had once thought. Hence, they did their best to adjust to it. On the other hand, children of well-to-do families who had always enjoyed abundance with regard to food and shelter—children who, as a matter of fact, had often been resentfully "overprotected" and in whose case "good" care covered up for intense rejection—these children took very much longer to conceive of the gratification offered at the treatment institution as anything desirable. Clinically speaking, their task was much more complex when compared to that of the "orphans." It was easier for the economically deprived children to change their outlook on life once—contrary to previous expectations—abundant gratification was regularly available. The same offer, and even its acceptance, remained ungratifying to the emotionally deprived children of well-to-do parents. Such offerings and whatever else was done for them were evaluated in terms of their old, pessimistic frame of reference and were, hence, of no positive value.

⁶ In Germany, it was not the middle-aged group of men who had served in the first World War, and many of whom had experienced great losses in the after-war years, who furnished Hitler with his most ardent followers, although the leader himself and his officers came from that group. The bulk of the middle-aged men, despite the

Viewed as a two-generation problem, most of the men in the sample were not second generation in terms of insecurity. They were born into relatively stable and, relatively speaking, more secure families and were well out of their most formative years before the depression hit their parents. During their own infancy, many of their parents had been very optimistic about the economic future. The impact of the depression shook some of the men while they were adolescents, both physically, in terms of lowered family income, and emotionally, due to parental fears and insecurity. Those who were already somewhat insecure due to previous experiences probably became fixed in their insecurity and pessimism; and they were the ones who became the more intolerant adults.

In this study an effort was made to establish the association between intolerance and isolated social, economic, and psychological factors; but the results should not be misconstrued as implying that these factors per se account for intolerance. On the contrary, they are only varying attributes of a total Gestalt, formed by the individual's total personality and the social structure in which he finds himself. The interplay between personality structure and those forces originating in the social field seemed to condition the presence, the absence, and the nature of intolerance.

Thus if the personality is very strong, or if, for particular personal reasons, the individual is strongly committed to tolerance or intolerance, the influence of the social field in respect to tolerance or intolerance is relatively small. The weaker the personality, the stronger becomes the influence of the social field. On the basis of a purely psychological hypothesis, namely that ethnic intolerance is nothing but a cathartic outlet for hostility, it might be assumed that catharsis could be effected by dis-

downward mobility they had generally experienced, manned the *Reichsbanner* and the *Stahlhelm* (the liberal and the conservative military organizations) and not the SS. In part, this can be explained by the fact that they had, in their childhood, experienced the relative stability which characterized Germany at the turn of the century; most of their families had in fact improved in economic status during those years.

The sons of these men had been infants when their fathers were away at war. Their early childhood was often characterized by instability; food had been scarce, and their mothers, in addition to worrying about their husbands, had been working in war factories to keep the family going. They were still boys or had grown into early adolescence when their own and their parents' hopes for a better life after the war were terribly shattered by inflation, deflation, and unemployment. As young men in the Thirties, they could not believe they would ever be able to secure a decent life for themselves through their own efforts. Therefore they had to rely on a strong "leader," a father figure, to give them the emotional and economic security which their own fathers had been unable to provide. They had also to discharge the frustrations and hostility which had accumulated over a long period of insecurity and suffering, if they wished to retain their tenuous integration. Explosive action against minorities was then a convenient outlet.

charging all hostility against a single group and that all other available groups could then go free. This study seems to show (and the combination of anti-Negro, anti-Jewish, and anti-Catholic feeling in certain southern areas seems to corroborate it) that the singling out of one group for hostile discharge seems to be ruled out by the social context.

The difference between anti-Jewish and anti-Negro attitudes, as it emerged in this study, also belies the assumption that ethnic intolerance is purely psychological in origin and hence beyond the reach of social reform. On the other hand, the association of intolerance with subjective rather than objective deprivation speaks against its purely social origin. Nor can the argument be accepted that ethnic intolerance cannot be dispensed with as an outlet for hostility. Hostility is continuously accumulating in the anxious and the insecure, and cannot be discharged in single or infrequent explosions. With rare exceptions it is not possible to discharge the accumulation of years of hostility, particularly if it did not originate in a particular person whose death or removal alone might yield a cathartic relief. Violent outbursts of ethnic intolerance are still so relatively rare, and provide so few of the intolerant men with direct or vicarious outlet, that the rationalization of the need for ethnic discrimination seems untenable. Moreover, it should be realized that while ethnic hostility only rarely provides full outlet for hostility, it frequently adds to already existing frustrations. Compared to the underlying hostility toward Jews and Negroes which some of the subjects revealed, the outlets of verbal animosity and an occasional physical aggression of little consequence seemed quite insufficient. On the other hand, a mental preoccupation with the hated minority together with a felt inability to do anything about it seemed to add more to the frustration of the very intolerant than it gave outlet for hostility.⁷ For these reasons it does not seem true that ethnic hostility is incorrigible because it originates in the hostile personality and is needed as an outlet. Less hostility and less continuous frustration would accumulate if the intolerant person were forced to recognize once and for all that this outlet was no longer available. Some intolerant men would have to find other outlets, but many others would learn to integrate those hostile tendencies which they now try forever and in vain to discharge against ethnic minorities.

⁷ In seeking to understand prejudice, tolerant persons who reject ethnic hostility for valid reasons, as well as ethnic minorities who suffer from discrimination, often fail to realize that intolerant persons labor under an undischarged hostility which accumulates in them precisely because they are prejudiced. They experience constant frustration since they feel unable to do anything about a minority which they experience as a threat.

On the other hand, it seems invalid to argue that intolerant personality structures can no longer be changed and that similar changes in the future could be achieved only through a different form of personality formation.

The German example has certainly shown that radical changes in the social order produced deep-reaching if not necessarily permanent or desirable changes in the personality, although one must admit that it seems easier to disintegrate personality structure than to influence it toward higher integration.⁸ Nevertheless, it is untrue to assume that nothing can be done about an existing generation and that all hopes for tolerance must rest with the future. Clinical experience also demonstrates that considerably greater and more permanently effective in producing modifications of personality structure than the extreme methods of National Socialism are those modifications of the environment which make it reassuring, secure, comprehensible, and thus manageable for the young individual. Such environments and their gentle but powerful challenge to identify with persons offering gratification and, therefore, to restrain hostility, produce changes in personality which are far-reaching indeed. This they do partly by reducing frustrations which derive from the environment, and partly by providing amply for all needs which can be satisfied. Under such conditions, little additional hostility is created, and existing or developing controls and powers of integration prove sufficient to contain it.⁹ As one of many indications, it suggests that environmental changes may well be able to produce changes in personality structure and hence in intolerance.

As long as there are personality structures which remain poorly integrated—first because of upbringing and later because of too much tension created by insecurity and frustration—and as long as the individual's upbringing prevents him from acquiring adequate controls, for so long will society have to offer outlets for the discharge of hostility. On the other hand, as long as society continues to permit or to condone such hostile discharge, the individual will not be forced to integrate his hostilities, or to control them.

⁸ For example, see Bettelheim, B.: "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 38: 417-452, 1943.

⁹ Even outside of deliberately planned environments, significant changes in personality structure due to changes in environment are constantly being observed. Among the most obvious but dramatic instances are the immigrants to this country who experienced far-reaching changes in personality during the process of adjusting to a socially and culturally different setting.

TOWARD THE FUTURE

The highest degrees of association established in this study were those between intolerance on the one hand and feelings of deprivation and downward social mobility on the other. The deprivations so highly associated with intolerance were not by and large of a predominantly private nature, such as having fallen out with one's family or being unable to have children, but ones very closely related to adverse economic experiences, or a fear of their recurrence.

Social mobility, in this study, has been measured by occupational position. Future changes in the industrial and administrative organization of our economy will partially determine new patterns of mobility. Of particular relevance will be those changes which result in the displacement of occupational groups. These trends, of course, are difficult to measure and hazardous to predict. To date, for example, there has been more speculation than data on the displacement of the middle classes. If such displacement were a fact, it would be extremely significant, not only for interethnic relations of the future but for political stability in general. Even more important is the contention that a general trend is developing toward the limitation of upward mobility in our society, although the picture in this respect is still confused, and far from being definite.

Economic apprehensions felt by men in the sample were shown to exist even before the actual onset of an economic depression. A sizable number of the veterans were beset by such anxieties during a period of high-level employment (at the time of the interview). While democratically minded individuals and organizations are well aware that another depression is likely to increase intolerance, they are not equally aware that rational appeals for tolerance which operate within the context of existing apprehensions are not likely to have lasting effects. These observations become even more pointed when one considers those findings in the study which indicate that even a shift from low to moderate apprehension about unemployment (let alone actual unemployment) may considerably increase the frequency and intensity of ethnic intolerance (see p. 80).

The economic goals of social action are thus clear: an adjusted annual wage to do away with fears of seasonal unemployment, stabilization of employment, and an extension of social security. In the absence of comprehensive and successful attempts to move in that direction, it remains doubtful whether programs oriented specifically toward interethnic issues are at all relevant for changing ethnic relations. But even if this economic program were to be carried out, it would remain insufficient unless a

change in the economic ethos took place at the same time. Self-respect and respect for the community must be divorced from upward social mobility, and continuous incitement by the media of mass communication toward the acquisition of new and more expensive commodities (as the tangible symbols of social status) must decrease. Otherwise, new desires are being constantly created which must as constantly be satisfied or lead to new frustration.

Perhaps more relevant, therefore, and open for immediate consideration is the evaluation of mobility and occupational status by the individual and by society. In terms of future planning, it might seem desirable to teach greater acceptance of the facts of occupational status and opportunity as they now exist in the United States, and social consensus ought to be built within that framework. Of course, downward mobility cannot and should not be made acceptable. But values concerned with occupational status which are a function of unbridled aspirations leave much to be desired. It is relevant, in this context, that intolerance was also rather concentrated in that small minority whose rate of upward mobility was higher than the "norm" for the sample. These men were more strongly motivated than the rest, in terms of social mobility—and they were more intolerant. In a democratic society, the goal of indoctrination cannot well be mere acceptance of one's occupational status. But education in relative values, an emphasis on the greater desirability of interpersonal, emotional, and cultural values may be highly in order. They may prove, in the final analysis, to be more satisfactory—given the minimum basis of an adequate standard of living—than unending competition. Moreover, these cultural values are more likely to entail demands for the integration of hostility than does the competitive spirit. If such goals seem utopian, then in a democratic society the demand should at least be raised that the mass media of communication reappraise the overwhelming emphasis on the glorification of high and unattainable occupational status and its associated values.¹⁰

Of course, the acceptance of one's occupational status, and the effort to gain self-esteem and a sense of personal worth in other than the economic sphere will be possible only if the individual feels assured of his economic position. In this connection it should not be overlooked that the intolerant men tended to reject the controlling institutions of society and also tended to fear unemployment, war, and so on. One may wonder if

¹⁰ One movie devoted to combatting anti-Semitism can hardly counteract the effects of countless others which raise the aspirations of its audience beyond any level they are likely to attain.

their attitudes toward societal institutions would have been as rejecting if they could have relied on society, through its institutions, to alleviate their economic fears.

The social and economic goals outlined above, although probably attainable without fundamental changes in the social structure, seem remote at the moment. That they seem far distant should not discourage one from looking toward social action as a principal means of alleviating intolerance. However, as a basis for social action designed to reduce ethnic intolerance, it should be recalled that the hypothesis linking tolerance to the submission to (if not acceptance of) the institutions of social control tended to be confirmed. Moreover, with the exception of the most intolerant, the vast majority of the veterans studied were ready and willing to obey law and order. Although the outspokenly intolerant men demanded more restrictive legislation, they too, by and large, were ready to abide by the law of the land. The greater overall degree of intolerance toward Negroes merely underscores this observation: anti-Semitism is less acceptable and is therefore less common. If the majority of the population, like the majority of the sample, submit to external control, then the task at hand is to change the complexion of these external controls as they relate to interethnic practices.

Among the sample, true independence of judgment on political, economic, religious, and social matters seemed as rare as in matters of ethnic relations. There, too, the men tended to follow the prevailing prejudices of their group. It was not as though ethnic relations was the only area of personal interaction which was comparatively less accessible to rational control. Such behavior has probably been typical for broad masses of the population at all times. The absence of integrated patterns in dealing with ethnic problems is nothing unique. Just as patterns of tolerance and intolerance seemed somewhat generalized in so far as those more tolerant of the Jews also tended to be more tolerant of the Negroes, so also, the patterns of revolt and control seemed also to be more or less generalized. Those men who were better able to control themselves, or more ready to accept or to submit to external control, did so not only with regard to tolerance, but also with regard to many other areas of social interaction.

With the waning of the influence of the church, the family, and other traditional forces, the legal system and its supporting institutions stand out as a basic symbol of external control. Even the dominant elements of the business community make every effort to perpetuate their group norms through the legal system. Of equal importance are the courts and

the local police system which are accepted as the personalization of certain aspects of the law. Over and above all these institutions stands the growing power of the state with its external control of the individual in most of his public and much of his private activities. The growth of state power arises from the declining ability of the various segments of industrialized society to regulate themselves. The state thereby becomes a basic source of norms and operates its power to a significant degree through legal channels. Thus the law and the courts stand within our legal system as an immediate focal point for changing some of the basic norms of interpersonal contact outside the primary group, including those of interethnic relations. This is especially significant for those members of society who rely mainly on external authority for the source of their norms.¹¹ Litigation in 1948 over restrictive covenants clearly indicates some of the potentialities of this source of change.

The legal alteration of norms and their interpretation by the courts does not of course imply that legal decisions will establish the basis for a new consensus on interethnic relations. The long-range effects of abolishing restrictive covenants are not at all certain, for legal norms are essentially negative and minimal in import. The ability of the southern states to circumvent the white primary decisions of the Supreme Court stands as a classic example. But in a legalistic society such as ours, the legal decision is still a basic and powerful weapon for social change.

How new laws, or the new and different interpretation of existing laws are received, depends largely on how the people are prepared for such changes. On the whole, the educational system (like the law) has tended to reflect rather than to set the norms of our society. Recently, though, there have been signs of dissatisfaction with this situation and some tendencies toward greater initiative can be observed. There is little doubt that at present, education provides the most hopeful long-term approach for changing interethnic relations—though not necessarily education which takes the form of exhortation. But education which supplies only factual information will be of little value, unless there already exists in the person to be educated a frame of mind which permits him to accept this information in line with the intentions of the educator. For example, statements as to the basic similarity of whites and Negroes will be of no value—and may even create the boomerang of greater resistance—to the person who feels that nothing is more basic than outer appearance, ac-

¹¹ According to the observations of a social scientist who did group educational work with juvenile offenders in the 1947 interracial housing riots, the argument which most impressed the young rock-throwers of South Chicago was what the Supreme Court had to say about equal rights in the protection of property.

ceptance by society, or economic success. His own experience tells him that in the question of basic characteristics the Negro is obviously different; his skin is dark, he is not accepted in society, and is notoriously handicapped in economic affairs. The argument that personality characteristics which the educator has in mind, such as willingness to serve others or to live by correct moral values, are equally common among white people and Negroes will have little strength if the values of the intolerant are based chiefly or solely on economic success. The argument will only convince him that the educator does not understand what is really important, and this conviction—defensive as it may be—will prompt him to discount all further statements by the educator.

Education for better ethnic relations must reach deeper levels than can be touched by factual information. Education for ethnic tolerance must influence "basic" personality traits, such as tendencies to view life experiences as rewarding rather than deprivational. This can best be achieved when the influence of such education makes itself felt during the process of personality formation. In considering the latter, we have moved to some degree from the area of social institutions to that of psychological influences originating in the private sphere. Education as a formal social institution and an influence on the young seems thus to stand between society at large and the individual just ready to enter society from the shelter of the family group.

Education for tolerance must reach the child before he is of school age since that is the age during which the rudimentary personality is first formed and those tendencies first developed which become more rigid as the individual approaches the age of maturity.

In our society, generally speaking, the hostile discharge of tension is not too rigorously inhibited. Individuals do what they can to free themselves of their tensions through discharge unless, during their formative years, they have acquired the ability to store, or to integrate them. Moreover, only a limited amount of the excess tension which can neither be stored nor integrated is discharged into socially acceptable channels, and of this, the most frequently chosen form is that of interpersonal hostility. (It should be stressed that interethnic hostility is a borderland between socially acceptable and unacceptable means of discharging hostility interpersonally.) Hence to promote the tendency to restrain discharge of hostility only if it is directed in socially unacceptable channels is dangerous from the point of view of tolerance, since it is society which predicates what is socially acceptable. Once society has decreed that interethnic hostility is acceptable—instead of overlooking, denying, or

condoning it—then tension will be freely discharged into interethnic hostility, as was demonstrated by the German example and by wartime attitudes toward the Nisei. Tolerant attitudes will be assured only if the vast majority of the population tends to deal with their tensions by storage or integration rather than by discharge.

The formation of such tendencies, one way or another, takes place in early childhood, during the age of personality formation. At this age the child receives the imprint of early experiences and his patterns of interpersonal relationships are prepared for the future. As an adult, he may copy or recreate the interpersonal patterns experienced during childhood or he may prefer those of an opposite nature in a reaction-formation against unpleasant early experiences; or finally he may combine these and other reactions into still another pattern. At this early age, when the techniques of relationships are acquired, the young child is also encountering all those difficulties which are connected with exploring and understanding the outer world, and of learning to master his inner tensions. These problems, and many others simultaneously experienced, can be eased, and the tensions created by them reduced to a manageable level, if the child feels sufficiently protected by gratifying—and hence most reassuring—interpersonal relationships. Only then will the child learn to recognize that he can master his own inner tensions by integration, and that hostile discharge is not only unnecessary but also undesirable, since it interferes with a highly valued interpersonal relationship to a parent. On the other hand, if this relationship is not gratifying, there is little reason for learning control and the child first manifests hostility toward his parent and later toward others. Eventually, under the latter conditions, immediate hostile discharge may be established as the preferred relief for inner difficulties.¹²

¹² Prevalent attitudes held by many parents who fear their children may not succeed in this competitive society, run directly counter to sound psychological behavior. The small boy who runs to his mother because he has been hurt in a street fight is often sent back without the comfort he asked for and is told to go back and stand his ground. Actually, because of his defeat, he has already been swamped by unmasterable tension, which he expressed in his tears, and has come to his mother to help him in integrating these tensions; i.e., his behavior, in effect, seems to say: "I have been defeated, but you, through your action, can show me this was not an important defeat, since you, the most important person in the world, remain unaffected by it. If you show me that this was an unimportant event, I'll be able to integrate my tension." The mother who sends her son back to fight, forces him into hostile discharge of a tension which is now truly beyond his ability to master, since rejection by the mother, or at least the absence of her protection, is now added to the initial defeat. This is only one example of how the child's natural tendencies toward integration (which he realizes is the safer way, since he does not know whether aggressiveness may not lead to a more serious defeat) are thwarted and he is directed back toward hostile discharge of his tensions against others.

The individual who has learned in his childhood that emotional difficulties can be relieved through gratifying interpersonal relationships within the family circle will in all likelihood grow into a mature person who will seek and find relief in the sphere of his private relations from the tensions accumulating in the outside world. Moreover, he is probably an individual who as a child has experienced respect by those around him. Therefore, later in life, he will rely less for his self-respect on the whims and favors of foremen, or on promotions handed down by the boss. Since he finds self-assurance within himself and his family, economic and political dependency on outsiders will be less of a threat and hence create fewer tensions.¹³ Finally, he will probably be able to seek gratification for his self-esteem in self-chosen activities of a cultural or social nature in which he can engage in relative independence of what others may think.

By contrast, an individual who has not been able to develop a well-integrated personality will take advantage of any opportunity which offers itself for the hostile discharge of tension, since discharge he must have. He will be intolerant of those groups against whom hostility may safely be directed, including ethnic minorities; the evidence of this and other studies indicates that propaganda for tolerance of itself will remain largely ineffectual in changing the basic patterns of his behavior. Economic, political, and interpersonal insecurities, lack of self-respect, and the absence of meaningful life activities will continue to create unmanageable tensions. Those tensions created through insecurity in interpersonal relationships are themselves a major factor in intolerance. No interpersonal relationship, including love, can withstand the destructive consequences of inadequate controls. Modern life invariably creates tensions, and if they are discharged against the love partner, love is soon destroyed and frustration in the most private sphere adds its weight to all others.

¹³ The question may be raised as to how such a personality structure would affect a democracy. Would it make for greater autonomy and independence of judgment (and therefore an active and responsible electorate) or would satisfaction with life in the private sphere foster indifference to public affairs (and therefore a citizenry easily manipulated for good or for ill)? Such people might tend to remain unexcited by societal issues which they would consider in a matter-of-fact fashion. On the other hand, their self-respect and sense of justice would force them—possibly despite an initial hesitation to enter the political arena—to fight for the autonomy of the individual, that is, against regimentation or injustice, and for democracy. In this fight they would be more effective than those who are motivated—and handicapped—by anxiety or social resentment. In any event, we have not yet known a society of wholly autonomous individuals, so that all speculation on this question remains hazardous.

Tolerance propaganda, if at all effective, may persuade an individual to abandon one outlet for hostility. But while this may result in the protection of a particular minority, the matter does not end there. If the new ways of discharging tensions are not more desirable from a social point of view, then the efforts of the tolerance propaganda have been wasted. Moreover, mere changes in outlet are easily reversible. A temporary end to the flow of tolerance propaganda, less watchfulness on the part of controlling institutions, an increase in intolerance propaganda, or simply an increase in the tensions which press for discharge, may all undo such tenuous redirection of hostility. But even redirection is difficult to achieve, since the discrimination of each minority serves its particular function in the psychic economy of the intolerant. (See Chapters III and VIII for a discussion of this problem.)

A more important social objective seems to be to eliminate the psychological need to discharge hostility. In this connection the ego-bolstering aspects of ethnic discrimination should not be overlooked. To some degree, it is also this element which makes it attractive even to well-educated persons and to polite society. By the same token, ethnic intolerance becomes acceptable to men whose integration would forbid them to project unacceptable tendencies onto minorities, or to those who would never accuse minorities of behavior which is either common to all men or the result of discrimination. While these men do not necessarily discriminate against members of the minority, they enjoy a vague feeling of superiority, for ethnic discrimination seems to indicate there are others below them. In the case of the actively intolerant person, this feeling is often initially developed out of an unconscious fear of social inferiority. Nothing outrages an individual more than efforts to convince him of his equality with the discriminated group, because they deprive him of the mechanism he has developed for retaining self-respect and without which he cannot maintain his integration. Against such threats he must defend himself as best he can.¹⁴

¹⁴ The behavior of SS guards in German concentration camps tended to follow such patterns. If prisoners of an "inferior" race, particularly Jews, groveled before an SS guard they succeeded only in arousing his disgust. After having made sport of such prisoners, he often exterminated them soon enough. Feeling superior to people so obviously inferior was no boon to his self-respect. If, on the other hand, such prisoners made him feel their actual superiority, or showed him up in his ignorance, he became violently angry because he was being deprived of his much-needed feeling of superiority. Such prisoners were often killed on the spot. But a prisoner who showed through his behavior that he was a man of some value—who without fawning or arrogance accepted the SS guard as his superior in a matter-of-fact way—was as safe as any person could be in a concentration camp. As a matter of fact, with individual guards, such a Jewish prisoner often fared much better than a too subservient German pris-

The problem of mitigating interethnic hostility from the point of view of the individual's personality-formation reduces itself to a twofold approach: the provision of more adequate discharge of tension and the development of more integrated personalities. Persons of more adequate integration would not only be able to manage relatively large amounts of tension, but their ego strength and self-esteem would no longer depend on vicarious, external support. These suggestions parallel those mentioned earlier, in the field of social action. Ethnic tolerance presupposes a societal structure which generates less tension in the individual, which controls their discharge more adequately, and which, most important of all, permits the development of integrated personalities of adequate ego strength. This it does by not confronting individuals with unattainable or contradictory goals, and by not creating desires which can rarely be satisfied.

The less reliable of these two psychological approaches is the provision of more adequate outlets for the discharge of tension. Present-day society, and particularly the mores of the group studied, approves in the main of only one such outlet: successful competition. The less likely the chances grow for success, the more this once possible outlet turns into a source of additional tension. True, there is another mode of discharging tension which is also accepted by society, namely discharge through motility. Biogenetically speaking this is the first form of discharge, and in the temper tantrum the young child uses it to explode all unmasterable tension. As the individual grows up, the integrative tendencies of the ego no longer permit such random motility and it is sublimated into sports and similar activities. Unfortunately, even in sports, where the only purpose should be discharge of tension through motility, competition creeps in, which brings additional tensions to all but the winners. Moreover, the conception of sports as a direct participation activity is too often replaced by that of passive observation by the spectator.¹⁵ The professionalization

oner. (A German prisoner who displayed his superiority over an SS guard wrote his own death warrant no less than a Jew.) The reason was that only a man who showed his worth and nevertheless accepted the SS man's superiority—a man who knew his place and kept it—only such a man could provide the SS guard with the emotional experience he needed for maintaining his self-respect. Only then could the guard enjoy the conviction that he was actually superior to a man in whose case such superiority really meant something.

¹⁵ In this way the temper tantrum as a total experience of screaming and moving is then separated into the moving of the performers and the shouting of the spectators, which offers little enough relief to any of the latter. (With the growing popularity of television, currently most valued for the transmission of sporting events, the role of the spectator is even further reduced. Without the support of the crowds at the stadium a man would perhaps feel foolish rooting enthusiastically in his own parlor.)

of performers discourages the public at large from personal efforts, which often seem ludicrous to the individual when compared to those of the performing expert. Even more basic from the point of view of relief through motility is the increasing mechanization of the modern factory system. The endless repetition of movements in a mechanical way creates more tension than can safely be discharged through their means.¹⁶

According to psychoanalytical theory, the main adult avenue for the discharge of tension is that of interpersonally gratifying sexual relations.¹⁷ The same body of theories maintains that anxiety (which was found to be strongly associated with intolerance) is a direct or indirect consequence of inhibited sexuality. It may seem doubtful, in a society as complex as ours and with its countless sources of anxiety, whether all tensions can actually be discharged in sexual activity. But there seems little doubt that if two people enjoy a mutually gratifying sexual relationship, under normal circumstances the remaining tensions can be integrated with relatively greater ease.

Even the most adequate provisions for the discharge of tension into socially acceptable channels will not do away with the hostility which underlies ethnic intolerance, but might go a long way toward mitigating its more violent features. Propaganda and planning for direct rather than vicarious discharge of tensions through motility seems feasible and might provide some relief of those forces which otherwise press for interpersonal discharge. More difficult to approach or to modify are patterns of sexual discharge. Sexual activities, however, which are accompanied by feelings of guilt or anxiety often create more tensions than they relieve. There seems little doubt that the dissemination of adequate information about contemporary sexual practices might tend to decrease anxiety in those who for personal reasons prefer to engage in nongenital, nonheterosexual, or extramarital sexual activities. Such decrease in anxiety may be

¹⁶ Before the era of mechanization, occupations such as farming used to provide almost unlimited possibilities for the discharge of tension through motility, except that the hard labor then required precluded any relief. Thus while modern conveniences, for the first time in the history of technology, have provided relief from exhaustion, technology itself deprives work of nearly all its potentials for discharge of tension. In addition, it creates new and formerly unknown tensions through the blow to their self-respect which human beings experience when they are degraded to perform with the regularity and repetitiousness of a tool.

¹⁷ The qualification "interpersonally gratifying" should be emphasized. Frequently it is assumed that sexual discharge in itself constitutes release. This is by no means so. Intercourse frequently has an aggressive rather than a benign meaning and is little concerned with seeking the partner's permanent love through gratifying his sexual desires. Sexual relations entered mainly for the purpose of demonstrating one's superiority, or of testing one's virility, will provide neither partner with total release from tension and may well create additional anxiety or hostility.

achieved by showing such individuals that they are not alone in their deviation, and indirectly by perhaps leading to a more tolerant attitude in those who as vocation or avocation persecute the deviate individual.

Perhaps more fruitful in the elimination of ethnic intolerance would be efforts leading toward more integrated personalities. The discharge of tension depends mainly on societal factors, and can easily be interfered with by society; recent history has demonstrated how rapidly such societal changes can now be engineered. But the individual's ability to integrate his tensions is relatively independent of societal interference. That requires fundamental changes in the structure of the personality of the individual. On the basis of our present knowledge such changes can hardly be achieved in the mature individual, at least not short of psychotherapy, and even that is successful only in selected cases. Hence to attack ethnic intolerance from the point of view of personality formation seems to require social action that will insure that the personalities of the next generation are so structured that they have a maximum ability to integrate tensions and are ready and able to discharge the remainder in ways that are not harmful to outgroups. The building up of such personalities must begin at birth and must continue through adolescence; as a point of departure there is little doubt that the most important task would be to influence those who mould the child in his earliest, most formative years. This is obviously not the place for a treatise on child rearing. It should be repeated, however, that the men who recalled their childhood as having been happy tended to be the most tolerant.

In our society, an increasing number of parents are genuinely interested in problems of child rearing. The educator does not need to go after such parents, they seek him out if they have any hope that he will relieve their anxieties about whether they are bringing their children up properly and whether they are good parents. More and more parents, for example, are discarding the rigid feeding schedules imposed by so-called experts, for more flexible behavior in which they follow the natural leads given by the child. As a result, both parent and child derive much gratification from the change. The parents have thus freed themselves of a prejudice which interfered with their enjoying their children, and the child is protected from a source of possibly permanent anxiety.¹⁸ Parents who permit the child to regulate his life according to his own rhythm of

¹⁸ Of course when other experts continually threaten the parent through the means of mass communication by inferring that unless he gives his child this or that new food preparation the child's health will not be what it should, then the parent who cannot afford buying all new items on the market is thrown into anxiety which affects his relation to his child.

growth and intellectual development have made great strides toward developing integrated personalities in their children. They are also learning to eliminate the threatening "wait till father comes home" attitude which destroyed the optimistic hope in many children that their next life experience would be a pleasant one.

These examples may show that even without centrally planned and directed efforts, progress in child rearing is being made toward the development of more integrated persons. If society does not thwart these efforts by increasing the tensions to be integrated even faster than the efforts to shape more integrated personalities are proceeding, then the modern methods of child rearing will produce some effects. But these changes in child rearing must truly reach the large masses of the population if such an end is to be accomplished.

In any case it seems simpler, and more feasible, to influence parental attitudes toward children, when compared with the efforts needed for assuring a stable economy free from the fear of war and unemployment.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that efforts to modify parental attitudes will remain ineffectual in their most important aspects if they proceed outside of direct interpersonal context. Interpersonal techniques are not learned from books, or by listening to radio performances, nor even by listening to lectures. Interpersonal relations by definition are two-way relations either between student and teacher or among students themselves. Techniques applied according to the best prescriptions only mechanize mother-child relations instead of vitalizing them unless these techniques have been acquired through a process of living.¹⁹

¹⁹ Discussion groups for expectant mothers and mothers of small children have proved quite successful in modifying their attitudes. They had to be congenial groups, and had to meet regularly for many months. Only then could what was initially just the prescription of a so-called expert become a mutually gratifying process of living. In one such group a recurrent anxiety of the mothers was the fear that their babies were not eating enough. It was only with reluctance that they accepted the advice of the group leader who suggested that whatever the eating habits of their children might be, forcing them to eat much, or what were considered vitally needed fares, would not produce the desired effect, and that being less fearful might prove more successful. But at first, forcing the child to eat was only exchanged for tense watching to see whether he would eat when he was not being forced. Only after some of the general fears connected with bringing up children had been worked through—particularly after such fears as whether the mother would be recognized as a good mother by her husband, her own mother, or her mother-in-law were repeatedly discussed—did it become possible to return to the mother's basic fear about the child's health. Then it was also possible to deal with her fear more realistically, by asking, for example, what the child's weight was, and how it related to norms of weight. The amusement of the group as a whole increased when, month after month, mothers admitted that their "noneating" babies were either perfectly normal in weight or a bit over the norm. The mutual interest of mothers in this group for one another's problems was a demonstration that the interpersonal techniques they had acquired at the meetings were being immediately applied in life situations.

These remarks in brief outline can do no more than indicate the direction in which efforts to combat ethnic intolerance might be guided. They seem far too tentative to be formally summarized, as though they were recommendations which should follow with logical stringency from the objective data and the critical evaluations forming the bulk of this report. This study, in the end, was but an investigation of existing attitudes, and not one of plans for future policy in interethnic relations.

It is our conviction that better ethnic relations are possible within our society, and that modern education, particularly the education of the small child, could be so improved that fewer of them would need to mature into intolerant adults. If we bring our children up wisely they will not only be happier, but will also be able to live more successfully with one another. That it seems possible to raise a generation which will be relatively free of ethnic intolerance is not only a hope, but a real possibility, and hence a great challenge.

Man's best hope is still the next generation. But the challenge of controlling personality development should not be used for a diversion of efforts from a comprehensive and immediate program of social reform. If we succeed in achieving both social reform and education for personal integration, we shall not only have better ethnic relations, but also a better society. The one cannot be had without the other.