

CHAPTER V

POLITICO-ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND GROUP MEMBERSHIPS IN RELATION TO ETHNOCENTRISM

Daniel J. Levinson

A. INTRODUCTION

That political and economic forces play a vital role in the development of ethnocentrism, in both its institutional and individual psychological forms, is no longer questioned by social scientists or even by most laymen. In modern industrial societies ethnocentric ideology has been utilized by a great variety of sociopolitical movements which can be broadly characterized as fascist, prefascist, reactionary, imperialistic, chauvinistic. It is not within the scope of the present research to investigate directly the social movements and structures—monopoly, the concentration of power and wealth, labor unions, changing government functions, the declining middle class, and so on—which are crucial for the elimination of ethnocentrism or for its further development in such forms as war and rigid socioeconomic stratification. We are concerned, however, with the ideologies of these social groupings, with the organization of ideologies in the individual, and with some of the factors responsible for these broad ideological patterns.¹

What patterns of politico-economic ideology are related to ethnocentric and anti-ethnocentric “group relations” ideology? There is good reason to believe that the “right-left” dimension politically is correlated with ethnocentrism. Fascism, which represents the most extreme right-wing political and economic structure and ideology, is also the most virulent antidemocratic form of ethnocentrism. The emphasis in ethnocentrism on a static, rigid stratification of groups finds its politico-economic analogue in the fascist

¹ Since the term “ideology” has acquired many negative connotations, particularly in the realm of political thought, we wish again to emphasize that this concept is used here in a purely descriptive sense: “ideology” refers to an “organized system of opinions, values, and attitudes.” Any body of social thought may, in this sense, be called an ideology, whether it is true or false, beneficial or harmful, democratic or undemocratic.

corporate state. Conversely, left-wing, socialistic ideology stresses the elimination of economic classes (that is, of social stratification based on unequal distribution of economic power) as a condition for the complete removal of stratification and outgroup exploitation.

While fascist and socialist-communist (Marxist) ideologies represent the extreme right and left, respectively, with regard to political economy and group relations, neither point of view has as yet found much active, open support on the American political scene. The focus of the present study was, therefore, on liberalism and conservatism, the currently prevalent left- and right-wing political ideologies—with an eye, to be sure, on their potential polarization to the more extreme left and right.

There is considerable evidence suggesting a psychological affinity between conservatism and ethnocentrism, liberalism and anti-ethnocentrism. In a preliminary study by Levinson and Sanford (71) anti-Semitism correlated significantly with opposition to labor unions and socialistic institutions (socialized medicine, government ownership of utilities, etc.). Also, Republicans were, on the average, more anti-Semitic than Democrats. The researches of Newcomb (91), Lenz (67, 68), Murphy and Likert (84), Edwards, Stagner, and others (63) have yielded similar results. Unpublished data from the present study indicate that both conservatism and ethnocentrism are significantly correlated with support of the un-American Activities Committee, Hearst, the American Legion, and militarization (postwar increases in our army and navy).

The right-left dimension (reactionary-fascist, conservative, liberal, socialist-communist) is, of course, an extremely complex one. Crucial qualitative differences can be found not only among various degrees of left-ness or right-ness, but also among various ideological camps falling at approximately the same point on the right or left. Furthermore, there exists today a great deal of ideological heterodoxy, not to speak of simple confusion, so that a cutting across of formal political categories may be expected in many individuals.

Despite these complicating factors an attempt was made, by means of an opinion-attitude scale similar to those discussed previously, to measure politico-economic ideology along a liberalism-conservatism dimension. We shall be concerned, in the sections which follow, with the construction of this scale and the results obtained; with the relation of ethnocentric ideology to politico-economic ideology, and with the relation of ethnocentrism to membership in various political and economic groupings. In addition to these quantified group results, systematic but nonquantified observations on the political views of ethnocentric and nonethnocentric subjects, as expressed in the interviews, will be presented later (Chapter XVII).

B. CONSTRUCTION OF THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC CONSERVATISM (PEC) SCALE

Quantitative study began with the construction of a politico-economic conservatism (PEC) scale, on which a high score would represent extreme conservatism, a low score, extreme liberalism. The procedure followed was similar to that used in constructing the Anti-Semitism and Ethnocentrism scales (Chapters III, IV). The PEC scale differs from the others in having positive as well as negative items and in lacking formal subscales. The same method of scaling was used and similar rules of item formulation were followed. As in the case of the other scales, a preliminary analysis of major trends within this ideological area was made. This analysis was intended to provide the basis both for the formulation of widely inclusive scale items and for the interpretation of individual patterns of response.

1. SOME MAJOR TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM²

No attempt was made, in the construction of the PEC scale, to cover all the forms in which conservatism and liberalism are currently expressed. The main focus was, rather, on some of the more underlying—and therefore more stable—ideological trends which appear to characterize conservatism and liberalism as *contrasting approaches* to politico-economic problems. While specific issues such as the OPA, rent control, Dumbarton Oaks, the TVA are always changing, most issues as they arise find liberals and conservatives taking opposing stands. The problem was to get behind the specific issues, to move, so to speak, from a purely political to a more psychological level, as a means of differentiating these two broad patterns of social thought.

Conservatism and liberalism appeared to differ markedly with regard to the following ideological trends. (These trends are conceived as interrelated and as separable only for the purposes of analysis; indeed, one principle of item formulation was that each item should, whenever possible, express more than one underlying trend.)

a. *SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN Status Quo.* Perhaps the definitive component of conservatism is an attachment, on the surface at least, to “things as they are,” to the prevailing social organization and ways. Related to the idea that “what is, is right,” is a tendency to idealize existing authority and to regard the “American Way” as working very well. Social problems tend either to be ignored or to be attributed to extraneous influences rather than to defects intrinsic in the existing social structure. One way of rationalizing

² It is symptomatic of the present political situation that terms like “liberalism” and “conservatism” are given numerous definitions and are used as shibboleths rather than as aids in description or analysis. We have therefore tried to make our meanings as explicit as possible.

chronic problems is to make them "natural"; for example, "Depressions are like occasional headaches and stomach aches; it's natural for even the healthiest society to have them once in a while" (Item 5). Or, as a prominent ultra-conservative radio commentator observed recently: "There is nothing wrong with our American system. It is as good as it ever was, but we must do all we can in the New Year to get rid of the charlatans, fakers and agitators who are responsible for so many problems." It is clear from the other speeches of this commentator that his "charlatans" are for the most part leaders of the labor movement or of liberal political groupings—men who, in his eyes, threaten the existing order. The following scale item expresses a similar idea, namely, that personal maturity requires conformity and the overcoming of "rebellious" tendencies: "Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down" (Item 27).

To be "liberal," on the other hand, one must be able actively to criticize existing authority. The criticisms may take various forms, ranging from mild reforms (e.g., extension of government controls over business) to complete overthrow of the *status quo*. As noted above, the scale attempts mainly to distinguish the political right and left rather than to identify the numerous varieties of left- and right-wing ideology.

b. RESISTANCE TO SOCIAL CHANGE. Another aspect of traditionalism is the tendency to oppose innovations or alterations of existing politico-economic forms. If things are basically good now, then any change is likely to be for the worse. Underlying resistance to change is sometimes expressed in the form of an emphasis on caution and an antipathy to being "extreme." For example: "The best way to solve social problems is to stick close to the middle of the road, to move slowly and to avoid extremes" (Item 15).

The opposition to change is often rationalized by an elaborate mythology of human nature according to which psychological man and capitalist social order are ideally suited to each other. According to this view, liberals are "utopian dreamers" who do not see man as he really is. Man is conceived as governed by economic self-interest and the profit motive. "In general, full economic security is harmful; most men would not work if they didn't need the money for eating and living" (Item 61). Major social problems such as war and depression are regarded primarily as expressions of human nature rather than as products of the existing social structure. The person who wants to change the social structure is, therefore, either an impractical idealist or an agitator making trouble in order to gain his own selfish ends. In short, basic improvement of our politico-economic forms is not possible, man being what he is, and social change is therefore undesirable.

c. SUPPORT OF CONSERVATIVE VALUES. As in the other areas of ideology, values play a central role in organizing and giving meaning to the total pattern of politico-economic ideology. One of the primary value systems underlying conservative ideology is concerned with practicality, ambition, and

upward class mobility. Success tends to be measured in financial terms, and business is accorded very high prestige as an occupation. These values are reflected in the raising and indoctrination of children, who "should learn early in life the value of a dollar" (Item 1). They are also expressed in the selection of men who represent models of success: "Whether one likes them or not, one has to admire men like Henry Ford or J. P. Morgan, who overcame all competition on the road to success" (Item 71).

The values for practicality and rugged competitiveness stand in rather marked contrast to other, psychologically related, values for charity and community service. On the one hand, it is assumed that "most people get pretty much what they deserve" (Item 78), that ability will find its socio-economic rewards, and that those who end up on the low end of the social ladder—since they did not have what it takes—are hardly to be pitied. On the other hand, our religious tradition is one of charity and tolerance; if one cannot excuse the poor, one can at least soften their plight—with Christmas parties, Thanksgiving bazaars, orphanages, and the like. Industrialists like Carnegie and Rockefeller are examples of this combination of weekday toughness and Sunday charity, which Item 8 was intended to measure: "Every adult should find time or money for some worthy service organization (charity, medical aid, etc.) as the best way of aiding his fellow man."

From the "liberal" point of view charity is mainly a soothing of conscience and a means of maintaining an unjust state of affairs. The causes of poverty are seen, not in the innate stupidity of the poor, but in the politico-economic organization which, by virtue of its concentration of economic power, creates poverty as a symptom. And the answer is seen, not in ineffectual though often well-intentioned charity, but in the elimination of poverty through modification of its societal causes.

It would appear, then, that liberals tend to view social problems as symptoms of the underlying social structure, while conservatives view them as results of individual incompetence or immorality. This difference is expressed also in the evaluation of political candidates. Conservative politicians tend to base their election campaigns largely on qualities of personal character and moral standing. To be a good family man and a leading figure in the community are judged more important than to know social science or to understand the actual politico-economic problems of the community. A district attorney or a businessman has a great initial advantage over a college professor or a labor leader. In short, political problems tend to be seen in moral rather than sociological terms. Item 22 was intended to measure this trend. "A political candidate, to be worth voting for, must first and foremost have a good character, one that will fight inefficiency, graft and vice." The liberal alternative is not to reject "good character," but to make it secondary, in political affairs, to the understanding of issues and the desire to do what is best for the most people.

d. IDEAS REGARDING THE BALANCE OF POWER AMONG BUSINESS, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT. This is the most technical and the most confused aspect of contemporary political thought. The confusion has multiple causes: the fact that most Americans are, politically, relatively uneducated and uninformed; the very technicality and abstractness of the basic issues involved; the factionalism in both major political parties as well as in the minority left- and right-wing groups; American antipolitical, anti-intellectual tradition; and so on. The semantic confusion is especially great. Thus, "laissez-faire," originally a characteristic of liberalism, is nowadays called "conservatism." Because of this confusion, it is necessary to make explicit the conception of conservatism used here, and to contrast it with other viewpoints.

Conservatism is taken to mean traditional economic laissez-faire individualism, according to which our economic life is conceived in terms of the free (unregulated) competition of individual entrepreneurs. Business, accorded such great prestige by conservative values, is regarded as deserving great social power in relation to labor and government. Unions are regarded as threatening, power-seeking, interfering with the traditional functions of management, and promoting radical changes. Unions are likely to be accepted only when their actual power is less than that of business: this means virtual elimination of the right to strike, of a voice in determining company policy, and of political functions—in short, of the possibility of changing to any significant degree the existing balance of politico-economic power. A liberal viewpoint regarding unions is expressed in Item 68: "Labor unions should become stronger by being politically active and by publishing labor newspapers to be read by the general public."

Conservative ideology has traditionally urged that the economic functions of government be minimized. Fear of government power (like union power) is emphasized, and great concern is expressed for the freedom of the individual, particularly the individual businessman. (The issue here is greatly complicated by the fact that our economy has changed from a large number of competing entrepreneurs to a small number of powerful economic units; more about this will be said in Subsection 5.) For example, "It is a fundamental American tradition that the individual must remain free of government interference, free to make money and spend it as he likes" (Item 63). This way of thinking assumes that the individual has "freedom" economically to the extent that there are no government restrictions on him; it overlooks the fact that economic freedom for most people today is limited to the greatest degree by economic forces originating in business monopoly. The attempt to minimize government functioning extends also to the sphere of social security, socialized medicine, and various other programs designed to help the "common man."

There are numerous patterns of left-wing ideology regarding these issues. What characterizes the left and distinguishes it from the right is the desire

for a change, slight or great, in the balance of power. Support for slight change is exemplified by New Deal liberalism, which would increase the functions of government so as to reduce the power of business, increase the power of labor, and diminish somewhat the extreme class differences that now exist. The more extreme left-wing ("radical") ideologies support more basic changes in the politico-economic structure; their thesis is that capitalism, no matter how it is modified by reforms, must necessarily produce social problems such as depression, war, and mass poverty. What they want is not merely controls on business, but nationalization of industry, planned production, and production for use rather than for profit. Only when the process of production is organized on a socialist basis, they argue, can there be true economic democracy, equality of management and labor, and a high national standard of living.

This is not the place to consider in detail the differences among the various left-wing or the various right-wing ideologies. The PEC scale attempted to measure only a general right-left dimension (with the hope that the individual's pattern of response might reveal more precisely the nature of his liberalism or conservatism). It was intended that a high score should indicate a high degree of the above-mentioned trends: support of the *status quo* and particularly of business; support of conservative values; desire to maintain a balance of power in which business is dominant, labor subordinate, and the economic functions of government minimized; and resistance to social change. Conversely, a low score was intended to reflect support of trends common to most left-of-center viewpoints: opposition to the *status quo*; a tendency to think in sociological rather than moral-hereditarian terms; a tendency to identify with labor and the "common man" and to oppose the power of business; support for extension of the political and economic functions of government. Further differentiation of various liberal and conservative patterns can be attempted after the empirical findings have been presented.

2. THE INITIAL PEC SCALE (FORM 78)

The Form 78 PEC Scale is presented in Table 1(V). Eleven of the 16 items took the "conservative" position, so that agreement was given a high score (+3 = 7 points, -3 = 1 point); on the five "liberal" items the scoring was reversed. The items were, as can be seen from the numbering, distributed randomly throughout the 78-item series. The questionnaire was administered in the spring of 1945 to three groups at the University of California: Public Speaking Class Women (N = 140) and Men (N = 52), and Adult Extension Psychology Class Women (N = 40); and to a group of 63 Professional Women (teachers, nurses, social workers).³

³ For a more detailed discussion of the groups and the sampling problems involved in Form 78 as well as in the later forms, see Chapter IV (Ethnocentrism).

TABLE I (V)

THE INITIAL POLITICO-ECONOMIC CONSERVATISM SCALE (FORM 78)

1. A child should learn early in life the value of a dollar and the importance of ambition, efficiency, and determination.
5. Depressions are like occasional headaches and stomach aches; it's natural for even the healthiest society to have them once in awhile.
8. Every adult should find time or money for some worthy service organization (charity, medical aid, etc.) as the best way of aiding his fellow man.
13. The businessman, the manufacturer, the practical man—these are of much greater value to society than the intellectual, the artist, the theorist.
15. The best way to solve social problems is to stick close to the middle of the road, to move slowly and to avoid extremes.
22. A political candidate, to be worth voting for, must first and foremost have a good character, one that will fight inefficiency, graft, and vice.
27. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.
- 36.^a It is the responsibility of the entire society, through its government, to guarantee everyone adequate housing, income, and leisure.
- 44.^a The only way to provide adequate medical care for the entire population is through some program of socialized medicine.
- 52.^a It is essential after the war to maintain or increase the income taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals.
61. In general, full economic security is harmful; most men wouldn't work if they didn't need the money for eating and living.
63. It is a fundamental American tradition that the individual must remain free of government interference, free to make money and spend it as he likes.
- 68.^a Labor unions should become stronger by being politically active and by publishing labor newspapers to be read by the general public.
71. Whether one likes them or not, one has to admire men like Henry Ford or J. P. Morgan, who overcame all competition on the road to success.
- 76.^a The government must play an even greater part in the economic and business life of the nation after the war than it has before.
78. Character, honesty, and ability will tell in the long run; most people get pretty much what they deserve.

^a These five items are "liberal," the others are "conservative." A high score is given for agreement with the conservative items, disagreement with the liberal items.

The reliability data for the PEC scale are given in Table 2 (V). The average reliability of .73 is considerably lower than those of the Anti-Semitism and Ethnocentrism scales (.8-.9); while inadequate for the precise measurement of the individual, this reliability is sufficient for the present purposes of group comparison and correlation with other measures. There are probably several major reasons for the relatively low reliability values. Several items may not have worked out as planned, because of either poor formulation or erroneous guiding hypotheses; this possibility is investigated in the item analysis below. It is also possible that the absence of extreme scorers is due in part to a real constriction in the "range of talent"—something that would tend to lower the obtained reliability—rather than to the intrinsic unreliability of the scale. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the

TABLE 2 (V)
 RELIABILITY OF THE PEC SCALE (FORM 78)

Property	Group ^a				Over-all ^b
	A	B	C	D	
Reliability	.74	.64	.72	.81	.73
Mean (total)	4.30	4.18	4.29	3.91	4.17
Mean (odd half)	4.39	4.23	4.34	3.96	4.23
Mean (even half)	4.24	4.12	4.26	3.85	4.11
S.D. (total)	.81	.75	.83	1.10	.87
S.D. (odd half)	.96	.88	.86	1.28	1.00
S.D. (even half)	.86	.84	.96	1.09	.94
Range	1.5-5.9	2.3-6.0	1.6-5.6	1.5-6.4	1.5-6.4

^aThe four groups are:

Group A: U.C. Public Speaking Class Women (N = 140)

Group B: U.C. Public Speaking Class Men (N = 52)

Group C: U.C. Extension Psychology Class Women (N = 40)

Group D: Professional Women (N = 63)

^bIn obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.

Professional Women, probably the most heterogeneous of the four groups, had the highest reliability (.81) as well as the largest Standard Deviation and range. Finally, and most basic, is the likelihood that American political thinking shows an actual lack of consistency and pattern. The lack of extreme scorers may thus reflect an ideological reality, namely the absence of a well-developed and articulate political left and political right in contemporary America. To the extent that this is true, it is doubtful that any scale measuring diverse trends in politico-economic ideology could obtain an average reliability of much over .80.

It is interesting that for all groups the PEC means were almost a point higher than the A-S and E means, and that once again the Professional Women were significantly lower than the others. Thus, while the *rank order* of conservatism is similar to that of ethnocentrism, the general *level* of conservatism is considerably higher. People are, so to speak, more conservative than ethnocentric, at least as measured by these scales. The relation of conservatism to ethnocentrism will be considered more fully below (Section C).

An item analysis was made according to the procedure described in Chapter III. Table 3(V) presents the item means and Discriminatory Powers for the Form 78 PEC scale. The average D. P. of 2.14 is, like the reliability, lower than the corresponding values obtained from the previous scales. The low

TABLE 3 (V)
 MEANS AND DISCRIMINATORY POWERS OF THE PEC SCALE ITEMS (FORM 78)^a

No.	Item	Group A		Group B		Group C		Group D		Over-all ^b		Rank D.P.
		Mean	D.P.	Mean	D.P.	Mean	D.P.	Mean	D.P.	Mean	D.P.	
1.	(Value of dollar)	6.20	1.69	5.94	0.81	6.25	0.88	6.02	1.27	6.10	1.16	(15)
5.	(Depressions)	3.23	2.09	3.75	1.86	3.40	3.36	2.95	3.73	3.33	2.76	(4.5)
8.	(Charity)	5.66	1.35	5.06	1.17	5.73	1.18	5.37	2.20	5.46	1.48	(14)
13.	(Businessmen, artists)	2.24	1.73	2.54	1.25	2.05	1.94	2.32	1.87	2.29	1.70	(12)
15.	(Middle of the road)	4.03	2.60	4.44	2.45	4.60	2.71	4.32	3.86	4.35	2.90	(2)
22.	(Political candidate)	6.44	0.31	6.17	0.39	6.50	-0.03	6.41	0.60	6.38	0.32	(16)
27.	(Rebellious ideas)	3.71	2.90	3.62	2.05	4.30	2.06	3.83	4.33	3.86	2.84	(3)
36.	(Gov't. responsibility)	3.46	2.73	3.35	2.41	3.65	3.82	2.43	3.07	3.22	3.01	(1)
44.	(Socialized medicine)	2.49	1.64	2.58	1.72	2.45	1.39	1.98	2.00	2.38	1.69	(13)
52.	(Taxes, corporations)	3.73	2.02	3.69	2.58	3.78	1.76	3.43	2.80	3.66	2.29	(9)
61.	(Economic security)	4.19	2.05	3.94	2.44	3.78	2.85	3.10	3.40	3.75	2.68	(6)
63.	(Gov't. interference)	4.11	1.81	3.95	1.34	4.43	2.02	3.56	4.40	4.01	2.39	(7)
68.	(Unions stronger)	5.11	2.36	4.83	1.75	4.48	1.74	3.90	3.33	4.58	2.30	(8)
71.	(Ford, Morgan)	5.42	1.89	5.21	1.67	5.45	1.46	5.13	3.00	5.30	2.00	(10)
76.	(Gov't. activity)	3.69	2.32	3.35	4.07	3.05	1.11	3.21	3.53	3.32	2.76	(4.5)
78.	(Ability will tell)	5.14	1.96	4.42	1.52	4.80	2.74	4.62	1.73	4.74	1.99	(11)
	Mean per item	4.30	1.97	4.18	1.84	4.29	1.94	3.91	2.82	4.17	2.14	

^aThe four groups are: Group A, U.C. Public Speaking Class Women (N = 140); Group B, U.C. Public Speaking Class Men (N = 52); Group C, U.C. Extension Psychology Class Women (N = 40); Group D, Professional Women (N = 63).

^bIn obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.

average D. P. (and thus the low reliability) is not due to the counterbalancing of several very good items by several very poor ones; the best item has a D. P. of 3.0—not extremely high by previous standards—and the values diminish very gradually. It is noteworthy that the best items deal with a variety of trends: acceptance of depressions as natural (Item 5); values for the “middle of the road” and slow social change (Item 15); and for conformity to existing authority (Item 27); and “liberal” items supporting economic security, increased government functioning, and unions (Items 36, 61, 68, 76).

Of the seven items with the lowest D. P.'s, six had means greater than 5.3 or less than 2.4; that is, these items tended to evoke almost uniform responses of agreement or of disagreement. (None of the 9 best items had such extreme means.) In view of the greatly reduced variability of response to these items, the D. P.'s are more significant than they at first appear. Only the lowest D. P. of 0.32 (for Item 22) can be considered clearly insignificant. For the other low D. P. items the difference between the high and low quartiles is statistically significant. For a given item the difference is not that one quartile consistently agrees while the other disagrees; it lies rather in the fact that one quartile consistently obtains an extreme score while the other tends to be more neutral in its stand. Thus, with regard to the importance of teaching a child the value of a dollar (Item 1), the extreme conservatives most frequently responded with a +3, while the extreme liberals tended to respond +1, a difference in emphasis rather than an actual opposition. There were four such items (1, 8, 22, 71), all dealing with conventional values, on which very few subjects made extremely low scores, and two (13, 44) on which there were few high scores. Some of these items were reformulated in the succeeding form of the scale, with the intention of eliminating possible ambiguities and thus increasing the D. P.'s. The possibility remains, of course, that the relative uniformity of response to these items reflects an actual uniformity of belief on the part of these groups of subjects.

Since most of the 78 items in this series are agreed with by the high scorers on the various scales (A-S, E, PEC, F), disagreed with by the low scorers, the question of a mechanical “set” to agree or to disagree may be raised. For instance, once an individual gets set consistently to disagree, is he not likely to continue disagreeing regardless of the content of the items? The “set” factor was considered, and found to play a negligible role, in the previous scales. By way of further evidence, we may consider the five “liberal” items, that is, those which tend to be agreed with by individuals who usually disagree with the other items. The 5 rank D. P.'s range from 1 to 13, and average 7.1, or slightly better than the scale average of 8.5. Furthermore, the extreme liberals tended, as noted above, to agree even with some of the “conservative” items. The great variability of the item means is also a sign of selective response to each item. It seems safe to conclude that set is not a

major determinant of response, although it may enter as a minor complicating factor.

The item means in Table 3(V) are also worthy of note. The highest means are on items expressing conventional values (1, 8, 22, 71). The very high mean (6.38), as well as the negligible D. P., on Item 22 is probably due in part to inadequate formulation; but also to the actual tendency of most Americans to regard the good politician as a fighter against vice rather than as one who understands the political and economic problems of democratic government. In contrast to this, the two "conventional values" items which discriminated very well and whose means were near the neutral point of 4.0 are particularly important. These items, 15 (Middle of the road) and 27 (Rebellious ideas), seem to reflect a primary personality trend underlying ideological conservatism, namely the surface acceptance of authority and the overcoming of rebellious tendencies. It seems possible that the rebellious tendencies have not actually been outgrown but have rather been inhibited, so that the emphasis on conformity now serves as a defense against underlying hostility toward accepted authority. This hypothesis, which arose previously in the case of the ethnocentrists' uncritical submission to ingroup authority, will be considered in detail in the chapters which follow.

Among the more directly ideological items, the highest mean, 4.58, was made on Item 68 (Unions stronger). This result may indicate a fear of union strength, and perhaps a sense of alienation from the working class, among numerous middle-class individuals who are "liberal" with respect to the other political trends expressed in the scale. For example, the means on the several items (36, 44, 52, 61, 76) dealing with social security and extension of government functions are all well below 4.0, indicating considerable support for the liberal viewpoint.

The low means on the "government" items raise another question: Why do many individuals who are otherwise conservative support an increase in government activity? In some cases this inconsistency probably reflects ideological confusion or the beginnings of change from right to left or vice versa. However, this apparent contradiction may reflect something much more basic, namely a shift from traditional laissez-faire conservatism, whose economic unit was the individual competitive businessman, to a new type of conservatism whose economic unit is organized big business. As was pointed out earlier in this chapter, the assumption of liberalism-conservatism as a simple quantitative dimension holds only in the most general sense. It was for this reason, among others, that the theory guiding scale construction was presented in some detail. It is possible, then, for an individual to make a moderately high rather than a very high score, not because of any true liberal tendency, but because of a change in the nature of his conservatism. He is now willing to extend the functions of government for reasons that are the opposite of liberal, for he conceives of government as a tool of busi-

ness rather than as a means of controlling corporate capital and of preventing concentrations of economic power. We shall return again to this question after considering the relation between the PEC and E scales.

3. THE SECOND PEC SCALE (FORM 60)

In Form 60 the PEC Scale (see Table 4(V)) was shortened to 14 items, and numerous changes were made in content and wording. Items 27 and 60,

TABLE 4 (V)
THE SECOND FORM OF THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC
CONSERVATISM (PEC) SCALE (FORM 60)

- 4.^a Labor unions should become stronger and have more influence generally.
- 9.^a Most government controls over business should continue after the war.
13. America may not be perfect, but the American Way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society.
- 15.^a If America had more men like Henry Wallace in office, we would get along much better.
- 20.^a The artist and the professor are of just as much value to society as the businessman and the manufacturer.
26. It would be dangerous for the U. S. to cooperate too closely with Russia.
27. The best political candidate to vote for is the one whose greatest interest is in fighting vice and graft.
- 31.^a No one should be allowed to earn more than \$25,000 a year.
- 37.^a It is up to the government to make sure that everyone has a secure job and a good standard of living.
- 43.^a The government should own and operate all public utilities (transportation, gas and electric, railroads, etc.).
- 48.^a Depressions can be prevented by proper government planning.
- 54.^a Poverty could be almost entirely done away with if we made certain basic changes in our social and economic system.
56. Men like Henry Ford or J. P. Morgan, who overcome all competition on the road to success, are models for all young people to admire and imitate.
60. In general, the best way of aiding our fellow men is to give time or money to some worthy charity.

^a These nine items are "liberal," the other five are "conservative." A high score is given for agreement with the conservative items, disagreement with the liberal items.

referring to political candidates and the importance of charity, respectively, are reformulations of items that were unsuccessful in Form 78; the present formulations are, presumably, more clear-cut expressions of the trends initially hypothesized. Two items which worked relatively well in Form 78, numbers 27 (Rebellious ideas) and 61 (Security is bad), were placed in the Form 60 F scale (see Chapter VII) because they seemed on theoretical grounds to fit better there.

Several totally new items have been added. Item 13 (The American Way) was taken from the Form 78 E scale (see Chapter IV); it is transitional between conservatism and ethnocentrism in that it expresses both conservative

support of the politico-economic *status quo* and ethnocentric idealization of the ingroup. Taken literally, however, it seemed to fall more within the sphere of political ideology. Correlational analysis is required before this item can properly be placed within one scale or the other.

Three of the new items provide vivid reminders of the speed of historical change. Item 15 (Wallace) was formulated when the confirmation of Henry Wallace as Secretary of Commerce was the issue of the day. Item 26 (Russia) reflected the atmosphere of the initial postwar period, when cooperation rather than containment was the prevailing attitude toward Russia. Item 31 referred to President Roosevelt's wartime suggestion of a \$25,000 limit on yearly incomes. It will be noted that the Form 60 scale contains fewer generalizations and more concrete references to specific issues than did Form 78.

Form 60 was administered in the summer of 1945 to several groups which were combined for statistical purposes as follows. (a) University of Oregon Student Women ($N = 47$), undergraduate students attending summer session courses in psychology. (b) Combined University of Oregon and University of California Student Women ($N = 54$), the Oregon group being obtained too late to be included in (a); the California group was a summer session education class containing mostly teachers and others of above college age. (c) University of Oregon and University of California Student Men ($N = 57$), from the same classes as the (b) women. (d) Oregon Service Club Men ($N = 68$), obtained at luncheon meetings of service clubs (Kiwanis, Lions, Rotary).⁴

The last three groupings received the total Form 60 questionnaire in one sitting. However, the first group of Oregon Student Women received the questionnaire in two parts, A and B. Part A included the F scale and half of PEC, while Part B contained the E scale and the remaining half of PEC. The purpose of this division was to help determine whether the presence of the E items had any effect on the responses to the F items; the results will be discussed in Chapter VII.

The reliability data for the Form 60 PEC Scale are presented in Table 5(V). The average reliability of .70 is substantially the same as that of .73 for the initial form, and indicates that the changes in wording and content did not improve this property of the scale. The fact that the reliabilities, S. D.'s, and ranges vary so little among these four groups, as well as among those taking the first form (Form 78), suggests that a scale of this length and this degree of inclusiveness can hardly be expected to obtain an average reliability greater than .7-.8. The main reason for the relatively low reliability of PEC, as compared with E, appears to lie in the fact that political ideology is intrinsically less organized and less consistent in the individual today than is ideology concerning group relations.

Once again the group means on PEC are significantly higher than those on

⁴For a discussion of the sampling problems involved, see Chapter IV.

TABLE 5 (V)
RELIABILITY OF THE PEC SCALE (FORM 60)

Property	Group ^a				Over-all ^b
	I	II	III	IV	
Reliability	.73	.69	.69	.70	.70
Mean (total)	3.72	3.82	3.77	4.40	3.92 ^d
Mean (odd half)	3.86(A) ^c	3.60	3.55	4.06	3.74 ^d
Mean (even half)	3.58(B) ^c	4.03	3.99	4.68	4.23 ^d
S.D. (total)	.90		.80	.92	
S.D. (odd half)	.97(A) ^c		.78	.95	
S.D. (even half)	1.02(B) ^c		1.05	1.14	
Range	1.2-5.6	1.0-5.5	1.2-5.0	1.6-6.1	1.0-6.1

^aThe four groups are:

Group I: University of Oregon Student Women (N = 47)

Group II: University of Oregon and University of California Student Women (N = 54)

Group III: University of Oregon and University of California Student Men (N = 57)

Group IV: Oregon Service Club Men (N = 68)

^bIn obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.

^cThe signs (A) and (B) refer to the two parts of the questionnaire given to Group I; half of PEC was in part (A), the other half in part (B). The reliability for this group is based on the correlation between the A and B halves.

^dThe Over-all mean (odd) (even), and S.D. (odd) (even) include only the three groups taking the total form since the (A) and (B) halves of the split form do not correspond to the odd and even halves of the total form.

E (Chapter IV), suggesting that the level of conservatism is higher than the level of ethnocentrism. Again, the rank order of group means on PEC tends to follow that on E, with the Service Club Men being significantly more conservative (beyond the 1 per cent level) than the combined university groups. These facts would lead us to expect a significant correlation between PEC and E (see Section C). While the Service Club Men are quite conservative on the average (mean of 4.4), the lowest score being 1.6, this group can by no means be considered ideologically homogeneous; indeed, it shows about the same degree of internal variability (range and S. D.) as do the other groups. We are given another warning against stereotyping in thinking about groups and about group memberships as determinants of ideology. This is not to say that service clubs are not "conservative groups" in terms of actual policy. Rather, it would appear that group policy and leadership, in this case

at least, reflect the average degree of conservatism, the conservative tradition, and frequently the immediate business interests of the group. However, to say that such-and-such is a conservative group, in terms of actual policy, is not necessarily to imply that all members are strongly conservative. Similarly, not all individuals who call themselves "New Deal Democrats" are thoroughly liberal in their personal ideologies; not all Catholics support the political program of the policy-makers of the Catholic Church; and so on. This is one of the main problems in bringing together the psychological and the sociological approaches; it is an especially great problem for that theory of social psychology which regards the individual adult as merely a product or sum of his various group memberships.

The data on item analysis are presented in Table 6(V). The over-all D. P. of 2.08 is almost identical with that of 2.14 on the initial PEC scale, as might be expected from the similar reliabilities. The best items deal for the most part with government functioning; ownership of utilities, controls over business, limitations on income. Item 4 (Unions) worked out relatively well (rank order 6) despite its having the highest over-all mean, 5.35; even in the university groups the mean did not fall below 5.0. Item 15 (Wallace) came out similarly; it had the third best D. P. despite a mean of 5.00. Other items with D. P.'s of over 2.0 include 13 (American Way), 54 (Poverty), and 56 (Ford and Morgan).

The five poorest items are also of some interest. Three of these, 20 (Artists, businessmen), 27 (Political candidate), and 60 (Charity), are reformulations of poor items in Form 78. Almost none of these subjects disagreed with the idea that the artist and professor are as important as the businessmen, although the liberals agreed more emphatically than the conservatives (the difference being statistically significant only in the Service Club Men). The D. P. of 1.06 on Item 27, while statistically significant, indicates considerable overlap between the high and low quartiles. Further exploratory research is required in order to determine possible differences between liberals and conservatives with respect to underlying imagery of "the good political candidate." Item 48 (Depressions) is an example of not leaving well enough alone. In the initial form this item had a D. P. rank of 4.5; in this form, after drastic revision, its rank was 12. Both the mean and D. P. on Item 26 (Dangerous to cooperate with Russia) are somewhat surprising. The mean of 2.57 indicates that very few individuals agreed with this item. The D. P. of 1.60 is more significant than it at first appears, because of the low mean, but it shows that even conservatives were divided on the Russian issue at the close of the war. This is shown most dramatically by the Service Club Men who, although strongly conservative on most domestic issues, obtained on the Russian item a mean of 2.51 and a D. P. of .93. How and why slight support has, within less than two years, changed to bitter antagonism, is a problem beyond the scope of the present study.

TABLE 6 (V)
 MEANS AND DISCRIMINATORY POWERS OF THE PEC SCALE ITEMS (FORM 60)^a

No.	Item	Group I		Group II		Group III		Group IV		Over-all ^b		
		Mean	D.P.	Mean	D.P.	Mean	D.P.	Mean	D.P.	Mean	D.P.	Rank
4.	(Unions)	5.43	2.65	5.06	2.64	5.26	1.60	5.65	2.76	5.35	2.41	(6)
9.	(Gov't. controls)	4.43	3.54	4.81	2.26	4.39	2.94	5.87	2.82	4.88	2.89	(2)
13.	(American Way)	4.15	1.97	4.91	2.22	3.77	3.08	4.68	2.16	4.38	2.36	(7)
15.	(Wallace)	4.79	3.00	4.72	2.64	4.65	2.33	5.84	2.51	5.00	2.62	(3)
20.	(Artists and professors)	1.17	0.03	1.22	0.38	1.51	0.14	1.87	1.15	1.44	0.41	(14)
26.	(Russia)	2.94	2.49	2.54	1.47	2.30	1.52	2.51	0.93	2.57	1.60	(10.5)
27.	(Political candidate)	4.00	0.74	3.30	0.34	3.44	1.19	3.21	1.99	3.49	1.06	(13)
31.	(\$25,000/yr.)	4.51	2.22	4.74	1.98	5.17	3.42	5.56	2.12	5.00	2.44	(5)
37.	(Gov't. and jobs)	4.21	2.46	4.72	3.72	4.67	1.27	5.38	2.99	4.74	2.61	(4)
43.	(Utilities)	4.47	3.94	4.93	2.77	4.61	3.48	5.82	3.23	4.96	3.36	(1)
48.	(Depressions)	2.87	1.90	2.76	0.85	3.09	1.30	4.41	1.94	3.28	1.50	(12)
54.	(Poverty)	4.02	2.69	3.63	2.02	4.21	1.86	4.31	2.38	4.04	2.24	(8)
56.	(Ford, Morgan)	2.77	1.13	3.22	2.12	3.00	1.75	3.34	3.13	3.08	2.03	(9)
60.	(Charity)	2.38	1.54	2.87	1.73	2.47	0.91	2.88	2.22	2.65	1.60	(10.5)
	Mean per item	3.72	2.16	3.82	1.94	3.77	1.91	4.40	2.31	3.92	2.08	

^aGroup I: University of Oregon Student Women (N = 47)

Group II: University of Oregon and University of California Student Women (N = 54)

Group III: University of Oregon and University of California Student Men (N = 57)

Group IV: Oregon Service Club Men (N = 68)

^bIn obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.

These groups are more conservative on specific issues than the over-all scale mean of 3.92 indicates. The over-all means on the items (4, 9, 15, 31, 37, 43) dealing with unions, business, and government functions range from 4.74 to 5.35, and these items are also the most discriminating. It would appear, then, that with regard to what is most definitive in liberalism and conservatism—mainly ideas regarding power relations among labor, business, and government—the liberal position is as yet less crystallized and less militantly held than is the conservative position. There is some question as to how far these results can be generalized beyond the present sample.⁵ They are, however, in general accord with numerous other findings and observations regarding the contemporary political scene. What is more difficult, and also more important, to gauge is the psychological *potential* for future ideological development in various directions in the face of changing political and economic conditions. Perhaps the other components of political ideology, when systematically measured and psychologically understood, would provide a basis for the solution of this problem.

4. THE THIRD PEC SCALE (FORMS 45 AND 40)

The construction of Forms 45 and 40 was, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, influenced greatly by considerations of practicality and of administrative expediency. In view of these considerations, and in order to make room for the inclusion of other material, the PEC scale was cut literally to the bone. It was identical in both forms of the questionnaire and contained only five items—not enough to obtain an adequate measure of reliability, and hardly enough to be called a “scale.” The reasoning behind the use of a five-item E scale was discussed and criticized in Chapter IV; the same criticisms apply to the present PEC scale. It appears now that it would have been wiser to have used a 10-item form; the short form used did, however, make possible the comparison of various groups and the study of relationships between this scale and the others.

The Form 45-40 PEC scale is presented in Table 7(V). It will be seen that the five items were not selected solely on statistical grounds; rather an attempt was made to include items whose D. P.'s were above a minimal level and, more important, which covered as many as possible of the ideological trends previously discussed. The first four items are taken, with occasional slight revisions, from Form 60. Item 17 (Economic security), has a history of transiency; originally in the Form 78 PEC scale, it was moved to the F scale in Form 60 (see Chapter VII); it has been returned to PEC in an attempt to rid the F scale of all items which might be connected fairly directly with

⁵ The representativeness of this sample with respect to political party and other group memberships will be considered later in this chapter (Section E). That the university groups are not unusually conservative is suggested by the fact that E-scale means are relatively low in comparison with other middle-class groups (see Chapter IV). Their PEC means can be compared with those for the groups taking Forms 45 and 40, below.

TABLE 7 (V)
THE THIRD FORM OF THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC CONSERVATISM
(PEC) SCALE (FORMS 45-40)

- 3.^a Labor unions should become stronger and have more influence generally.
7. America may not be perfect, but the American Way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society.
- 11.^a Most government controls over business should be continued even though the war is over.
14. Men like Henry Ford or J. P. Morgan, who overcame all competition on the road to success, are models for all young people to admire and imitate.
17. In general, full economic security is bad; most men wouldn't work if they didn't need the money for eating and living.

^a These items are "liberal," the others are "conservative." A high score is given for agreement with the conservative items, disagreement with the liberal items.

existing ideologies regarding politico-economic or minority groups. Item 17, as well as several others, might be included in any of several scales; proper placement must ultimately be based on statistical analysis.

Forms 45 and 40 were administered late in 1945 and in the first part of 1946. The sampling methods and problems, as well as the composition of the groups and their combination for statistical purposes, have been discussed in Chapter IV. It will suffice here to list the groups comprising this sample.

The Form 45 sample contains four groups: (a) Extension Testing Class (adult) Women (N = 59) at the University of California; (b) San Quentin Men (N = 110), inmates at the California State Prison; (c) and (d) Psychiatric Clinic Women (N = 71) and Men (N = 50), mostly outpatients at a community clinic in San Francisco.

The following groups are included in the Form 40 sample: (e) George Washington University Women (N = 132), members of day and evening classes in psychology; (f) California Service Club Men (N = 63), obtained at luncheon meetings of San Francisco Bay Area Kiwanis and Rotary clubs; (g) and (h) Middle-Class Men (N = 69) and Women (N = 154), members of various local groups such as church, P. T. A., women's clubs, etc.; (i) and (j) Working-Class Men (N = 61) and Women (N = 53), members of local groups such as United Electrical Workers Union, Warehousemen's Union (I. L. W. U.), California Labor School, etc.; (k) and (l) Los Angeles Men (N = 117) and Women (N = 130), a heterogeneous but largely middle-class sample of various local groups in Los Angeles. Data on some of the subgroupings within these statistical units will be considered in Section E, below.

In addition, there were two groups which were given both Forms 45 and 40. First, the School for Merchant Marine Officers (to be referred to as "Maritime School") (N = 343), half of which was given Form 45, the other half Form 40, the two halves being equated for intelligence (AGCT), time in school, and planned function as officer (deck or engine). Second, veterans

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TABLE 8 (V)

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF PEC SCALE SCORES FOR
GROUPS TAKING FORMS 45 AND 40

Group	Statistical Property					
	N	Mean	Rank	S.D.	Mean E _A	Rank
<i>a. Groups taking Form 45</i>						
Extension Testing Class						
Women	59	4.33	(4)	1.28	3.77	(12)
San Quentin Men	110	4.68 ^a	(2)	0.96	5.33	(1)
Psychiatric Clinic Women	71	4.12	(11)	1.53	4.23	(5)
Psychiatric Clinic Men	50	4.14 ^a	(10)	1.40	3.92	(7.5)
Over-all ^b	290	4.32		1.29	4.31	
<i>b. Groups taking Form 40</i>						
George Washington						
University Women	132	4.30	(6.5)	1.13	4.04	(6)
California Service Club						
Men	63	4.83	(1)	1.31	4.31	(4)
Middle-Class Men	69	4.30	(6.5)	1.52	3.89	(10)
Middle-Class Women	154	4.26	(8)	1.62	3.64	(14)
Working-Class Men	61	3.39	(13)	1.58	3.92	(7.5)
Working-Class Women	53	3.25	(14)	1.53	3.91	(9)
Los Angeles Men	117	3.91	(12)	1.49	3.82	(11)
Los Angeles Women	130	4.16	(9)	1.41	3.71	(13)
Over-all ^b	779	4.05		1.45	3.91	
<i>c. Groups taking both forms</i>						
Maritime School Men						
Form 45	179	4.31)	(5)	{1.08	4.95	(2)
Form 40	164	4.32)				
Employment Service Men						
Veterans						
Form 45	51	4.35)	(3)	{1.28	4.43	(3)
Form 40	55	4.37)				
Over-all ^b	449	4.34		1.18	4.69	
<i>d. Totals for all groups</i>						
	1518	4.19		1.37	4.13	

^aThe use of two forms for the Psychiatric Clinic groups complicated the PEC scale results somewhat. The data above are based on 45 women and 29 men taking the Form 45 PEC scale. For the remaining 26 women taking the Form 60 PEC scale (14 items) the mean was 4.05, and for 21 men the mean was 4.04. For the combined 47 men and women taking this scale, the reliability was .77 and the Standard Deviation was 1.05-- values comparable to those of the other groups taking Form 60.

^bIn obtaining the over-all values, the individual group means were not weighted by N.

coming for vocational guidance to the U.S. Employment Service over a period of several months, the first 51 receiving Form 45, the next 55, Form 40. This procedure had mainly to do with determining possible effects of the presence of certain E items on the F-scale responses and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VII.

In view of the shortness of the PEC scale, no reliabilities were computed. However, means and S. D.'s were obtained for each group and are given in Table 8 (V). The group means appear to fall into three main levels of magnitude. The two most conservative groups are the California Service Club Men (4.83) and the San Quentin Men (4.68). At an intermediate level, with PEC means of 3.91 to 4.37 (significantly lower than the first level and higher than the third) is the bulk of the total sample: University groups, Psychiatric Clinic Patients, the Middle-Class and Los Angeles groups. Finally, the most liberal groups—although the means of 3.25 and 3.39 are far from extreme, and the variability within each group is large—are the Working-Class Men and Women.

That the Service Club Men make the highest mean is not so much a new discovery as a partial indication that the scale provides a valid measure of conservatism. The program and tradition of these groups are fairly explicit in their support of numerous trends in conservative ideology. It will be recalled that similar results were found with the Oregon Service Club Men (Form 60). Once again, however, we must emphasize the variability within this and the other groups.

The great conservatism of the San Quentin Men may come as a surprise to those who conceive of criminals as conscious foes of the social order and to those who assume a psychological affinity between criminality and radicalism. It might have been expected that those who violate prevailing laws regarding property and morality would tend to oppose the prevailing social ideology and social authority. Yet this does not appear to be the case. Criminals accept the basic premises of the capitalistic system while at the same time engaging in a pseudorebellion against the formal rules and technicalities. The criminal does not oppose the principles of rugged individualism; he simply carries them *ad absurdum*. The San Quentin material and the relation of criminality to antidemocracy are considered further in Chapter XXI.

The problem of class differences in conservatism is raised by the fact that the Working-Class Men and Women make a significantly lower PEC mean than do the Middle-Class Men and Women and the Los Angeles group (which is largely middle class). There are several reasons for questioning whether these differences can be generalized to the broad middle- and working-class populations. For one thing, the Working-Class group shows a distinct sampling bias in a liberal direction: almost half the members of this group are from the United Electrical Workers (C.I.O.), a militant union, or from the California Labor School, a strongly left-wing institution. The

Middle-Class groups are more varied and probably more representative in membership. Furthermore, several groups with PEC means similar to those of the Middle-Class groups contain a large proportion of working-class individuals; these groups are the San Quentin Men (almost entirely working class), the Psychiatric Clinic Patients, and the Maritime School and Employment Service Veteran Men. In view of the intergroup as well as the intragroup variability, it seems safe to conclude that over-all class differences in political ideology are not extremely large, and that individual and group differences within each class are so great that they become the primary problem requiring explanation. How does it happen, for example, that the same working-class background produces a law-abiding conservative worker, a politically conservative criminal, a company union leader, a C.I.O. leader, a Communist? Why does one middle-class individual join a service club while another becomes a supporter of Henry Wallace? Why is it that some, perhaps most, workers identify with the middle class or with the economic *status quo*, and some individuals with middle-class background identify with what they conceive to be the true interests of the working class? These may be not so much questions of actual class or group *membership* as questions of class or group *identification*—and “identification” is a psychological variable. An individual, in making his social identification, is determining not only his ideology, but also what he is to be like as a person. We shall have occasion to consider further, in the chapters that follow, the deeper emotional trends that help to determine the individual’s group memberships and identifications.

How close is the relation between conservatism and ethnocentrism in the various groups studied? A means for obtaining a preliminary answer to this question is to compare group means on PEC and on E (see Table 8(V)). Since most groups took the short E_A scale, the E_A means were used even for those groups which took the total E_{AB} scale (see Chapter IV). The rank-order correlation between the PEC means and E_A means for the fourteen groups was $+0.50$, indicating a statistically significant but not very close relationship. In general, as the degree of group conservatism increases, the degree of ethnocentrism also increases. The four groups with conspicuously high E_A means are the San Quentin Men (5.33), the Maritime School Men (4.95), the Employment Service Men Veterans (4.43), and the California Service Club Men (4.31). These groups ranked 2, 5, 3, and 1, respectively, on PEC. No groups were conspicuously low on E, the eight lowest groups having no means within the fairly narrow range of 3.64–3.92; the most liberal groups were among the least ethnocentric. The over-all E_A mean was 4.13, almost identical to the over-all PEC mean of 4.19. (The E_{AB} mean is somewhat lower, partly because of sampling differences and partly because the E_B items—four on Jews and one on Negroes—had lower means.)

The correlation of ranks does not, however, tell the whole story. Many groups made a significantly higher mean on PEC than on E, or *vice versa*.

Whether the group mean on PEC is higher than on E, or lower, seems to depend in large measure on the socioeconomic class of the group: the predominantly middle-class groups tend to be lower on E than on PEC, while the working-class groups are, it appears, more ethnocentric than conservative. Consider the middle-class groups: the PEC and E means, respectively, for the Extension Testing Class Women are 4.33 and 3.77; for the George Washington University Women, 4.30 and 4.04, for the California Service Club Men, 4.83 and 4.31; and similarly for the Middle-Class and Los Angeles Men and Women. Only one of these PEC-E differences is below the 5 per cent level of statistical significance. It will be recalled that in the Form 78 and Form 60 samples, largely middle class, the level of conservatism was greater than the level of ethnocentrism. The opposite trend is found in the working-class (or marginal middle-class) groups. Thus the PEC and E means, respectively, are: for the San Quentin Men, 4.68 and 5.33; Working-Class Men, 3.39 and 3.92; Working-Class Women, 3.25 and 3.91; Maritime School Men, 4.32 and 4.95; Employment Service Men Veterans, 4.36 and 4.43. This leaves only the Psychiatric Clinic Men and Women, who are heterogeneous with respect to class and whose PEC and E means differ only slightly (0.1-0.2).

Several factors—not mutually exclusive—may help to explain these class differences. First, open prejudice is more accepted on a verbal level in the working class than in the middle class. The higher E means of the former may therefore reflect, in part, the verbal atmosphere rather than a difference in basic outgroup hostility. (This factor would not hold for the pro-ingroup items.) Then there is the previously discussed “pseudodemocratic façade,” which is more characteristic of the middle than of the working class, and which the E-scale items probably only partially circumvented. Also, certain trends in liberal ideology may appeal to some workers not on a truly liberal basis but on a “class-ethnocentric” basis which is an aspect of general ethnocentrism. For example, some workers are strongly pronoun and resentful of “bosses,” yet at the same time are anti-Negro, anti-foreigner, and conservative regarding many political issues.

All in all, the group data lead us to investigate further the relationship between ethnocentrism and conservatism, with an eye both to what makes the correlation relatively high and to what keeps it from being higher. These problems will be pursued further when we consider the correlations between the PEC and E scales, and the psychological connection between conservatism and ethnocentrism in the individual. But first we must complete the presentation of the PEC-scale data.

Table 9(V) gives a summary of the item analysis of the Form 45-40 PEC scale. Data for the men and the women are summarized separately. The over-all mean for the women, 4.07, is significantly lower than that of 4.25 for the men. The women were also, as noted in Chapter IV, slightly but sig-

TABLE 9 (V)

MEANS AND DISCRIMINATORY POWERS OF THE PEC SCALE ITEMS
(FORMS 40 AND 45)

No.	Item	MEN'S GROUPS ^a (N 869) ^b			WOMEN'S GROUPS ^c (N 573) ^d		
		Mean	D.P.	Rank	Mean	D.P.	Rank
3.	(Labor unions)	4.51	3.16	(4)	4.67	3.49	(4)
7.	(American Way)	4.90	3.33	(3)	4.57	3.98	(1)
11.	(Government controls)	4.19	3.08	(5)	3.92	2.97	(5)
14.	(Ford and Morgán)	3.75	3.58	(1)	3.56	3.90	(2)
17.	(Economic security)	3.93	3.46	(2)	3.62	3.77	(3)
Mean per item ^e		4.25	3.32		4.07	3.62	

^aThe individual groups of men in this sample are as follows: San Quentin Men Prisoners (N = 110). Employment Service Men Veterans (N = 106). Maritime School Men (N = 343). California Service Club Men (N = 63). Middle-Class Men (N = 69). Working-Class Men (N = 61). Los Angeles Men (N = 117).

^bThe over-all N for the PEC scale (men) is 100 less than that for the E scale because two groups were omitted: (1) Of the 50 Psychiatric Clinic Men, only 29 took the regular Form 45; the others took a form equated for E and F, but not for PEC. Because of the small N, no PEC scale analysis was made on this group. (2) The 50 Working-Class Men and Women were used as a statistical group for analysis on the E scale because additional data on the total E scale were desired; but their F and PEC scales were not analyzed statistically.

^cThe individual groups of women in this sample are as follows: Extension Testing Class Women (N = 59). George Washington University Women Students (N = 132). Psychiatric Clinic Women (N = 45). Middle-Class Women (N = 154). Working-Class Women (N = 53). Los Angeles Women (N = 130).

^dThis N is 26 less than the over-all N for women on the E and F scales because only 45 of the 71 Psychiatric Clinic Women took the regular Form 45. The remaining 26 took a form which was equated to Form 45 for E and F, but not for PEC.

^eIn obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.

nificantly less ethnocentric than the men. This may, however, be a difference in the sample rather than in the total population, since we have no female groups comparable to the high-scoring San Quentin, Service Club, and Maritime School male groups. Moreover, as shown in Table 8(V), for all comparable sex groups (Psychiatric Clinic, Middle Class, Working Class, Los Angeles) the means for men and women are almost identical. Since the sampling methods used were not primarily designed to determine the average intensity of any opinions or attitudes in broader populations, it is perhaps safest not to draw inferences about the total male and female population. It

can be said, however, that for groups of the general type represented here, no sex differences of practical significance seem to exist; and that differences *among* male groups and *among* female groups are much greater than the differences *between* males and females.

The male and female subsamples are also very similar with regard to means and D. P.'s on the individual items. While the scale mean was lower in women, the relative standing of the item means was almost identical for the two sexes, the rank-order correlation being .90. Women were more conservative than men on only one item (unions). A similar relation holds also for the D. P.'s, the rank-order correlation being .70.

The general level of D. P.'s would, other things being equal, be slightly greater for a 5-item than for a 14-item scale, since each item contributes more to the total score. Therefore, the average D. P. of 3.4-3.5 for Forms 45 and 40 is comparable or slightly superior to that of 2.1 for Forms 78 and 60. All of the present items seem statistically adequate. Item 11 (Government controls over business) had the lowest D. P., but in view of the greater success of the "government function" items in earlier forms, improvement should not be difficult. While the five items can hardly claim to be considered a "scale," they show sufficient internal consistency so that one may meaningfully speak of "total PEC score" and one may determine the relations between this and various other measures.

The level of internal consistency of the PEC scale is indicated also by a correlational analysis made on a group of 517 University of California women students.⁶ A mean r of +0.26 was found between each item and the sum of the remaining items, the range of r 's being +0.10 to +0.33. The rank order of these items, according to the size of the item's correlation with the sum of the others, was identical to the rank order of item D. P.'s for the combined women's groups above (Table 9(V)). The correlations among individual items averaged +0.14, the range being +0.02 to +0.30. The highest correlation, 0.30, was between Item 7 (American Way ideal) and Item 14 (Ford and Morgan). Only three r 's were below .10 (the 1 per cent level of significance), and all of them involved Item 11 (Government controls). These correlations, while far below those for the E scale, indicate that the PEC scale meets the minimum requirements for its present uses, and that a scale of 20 or 30 such items might, without loss of breadth, achieve a reliability in the neighborhood of .8.

5. DISCUSSION: SOME PATTERNS OF CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM

The reliability and internal consistency of the PEC scales suggest, on the one hand, that liberalism and conservatism are relatively organized and measurable patterns of current politico-economic thought; and, on the other

⁶ The group and procedure are discussed more fully in Chapters IV and VII.

hand, that within each of these broad patterns there is considerable subpatterning, inconsistency, and simple ignorance. To ignore either the relative generality or the relative inconsistency would, it seems, lead to serious misunderstanding of the problem. More detailed exploration of the nature and deeper psychological meaning of these ideological trends, as expressed in the interviews, will be made in Chapter XVII, following presentation of the clinical material. However, at this point we ought briefly to consider, on the basis of the scale data and of some individual patterns of scale response, certain variations within liberalism and within conservatism.

Liberalism was conceived not as a single, unitary attitude, but as an ideological system containing a number of trends or components. The reliability and internal consistency of the initial forms of the scale show that these trends are interrelated significantly but imperfectly in the individual. The prototypic "liberal" is, according to our guiding conception, an individual who actively seeks progressive social change, who can be militantly critical (though not necessarily totally rejective) of the present *status quo*, who opposes or de-emphasizes numerous conservative values and beliefs regarding business success, rugged individualism, human nature, and the like, and who would diminish the power of business by increasing the power of labor and the economic functions of government.

It is clear, however, that many individuals who are generally liberal do not exhibit some of the above trends. While some of the inconsistency—perhaps the largest part—is due to confusion resulting from lacks and distortions in the press and other media of mass communication, part of it seems also to reflect deep-lying emotional trends of considerable intensity and resistance to change. The individual's pattern of thought, whatever its content, reflects his personality and is not merely an aggregate of opinions picked up helter-skelter from the ideological environment.

One variant, particularly common in the groups tested, might be called the *politically pacifistic* liberal. The guiding idea here seems to be fear of concentration of social power. This individual, who feels keenly the injustice of the present social order and who sympathizes with labor and other subordinate groups, nevertheless cannot militantly support their strivings for greater power. He feels that "powerful unions are as dangerous as powerful business." He is prone to emphasize the idea that unions are no longer weak in relation to organized industry, and he is likely therefore to accept, in one form or another, the conservative argument that unions are all right but their power must be limited. He would like to decrease the power of business but finds difficulty in directly opposing it—"we might, after all, be as bad as they are." He believes in extending the economic functions of government, perhaps even in some degree of nationalization of industry, but fear of government power often leads him to oppose liberal measures or to

support halfway measures which accomplish little. Opposed to force, he tends to confuse force with militancy and to be indecisive, critical of both sides, overly compromising, inept at political action, shocked by the realities of political affairs. He is likely to make a middle rather than low score on the PEC scale, not out of true conservatism but rather out of inhibited liberalism; he has, one might say, a "liberal" utopia but he cannot fight for the social changes necessary to realize it. Critical of things as they are, yet afraid of change—hating to submit, yet unable to rebel—he cannot actively support the *status quo*, but he can do little to oppose it.

We were not able to attempt a quantitative study of various types of left-wing ideology. In addition to militant and politically pacifistic liberalism, we should also have been interested in determining the existence and nature of other patterns such as "disillusioned liberalism," "stereotyped (ticket) liberalism," "revolutionary socialism," and so on. Some leads for future study derived from the interview material are presented in Chapter XIX.

The political right requires similar differentiation and study. The prototypic "conservative," in terms of the present scale, is one who supports the *status quo* and resists changes in existing politico-economic power arrangements, who supports conservative values and traditions, who believes that labor is properly subordinate to employer or management, and who wishes to minimize the economic functions of government in order that individual businessmen can, in free and equal competition, provide goods of maximum quality at minimum cost to the consumer.

While this "traditional conservative" *ideology* is not uncommon today, the actual politico-economic *situation* has changed considerably from the one, of fifty or more years ago, to which the ideology refers. The individual small businessman or entrepreneur is no longer the primary economic unit; big business and group management have replaced the individual employer; the production process is more complex, organized, and impersonal; specialization and mechanization threaten the individuality and the job satisfaction of worker and manager. As both labor and industry become more organized and more clear-cut social forces, the role of government becomes increasingly an issue. The traditional conservative is in a dilemma. Shall he oppose the monopolistic trend of big business and want a return to rugged individualistic competition, with government having few economic functions (*laissez-faire* conservatism)? Shall he favor increased government functioning as a means of preventing monopolistic practices, even though it mean increasing the power of labor (move toward liberalism)? Or shall he, basing everything on his allegiance to the symbol "business," want government to be a force in the service of business as opposed to labor (move toward fascism)? Most conservatives seem still to be in the process of ideological adjustment along these and other lines. Much research re-

mains to be done concerning new patterns of conservatism and concerning the psychological dispositions making some individuals more receptive to one pattern, others to another.

It is proposed, then, that the PEC scale results can best be understood in terms of both general and specific factors. The general factors—over-all liberalism and conservatism—account for the significant reliability or consistency obtained, while the specific variations within the left and the right prevent the scale from attaining higher statistical standards.

C. THE RELATION BETWEEN ETHNOCENTRISM AND CONSERVATISM

The correlations of the Anti-Semitism and Ethnocentrism scales with the PEC scale are presented in Table 10(V). The correlations range in value from .14 for the San Quentin Men to .86 for the Working-Class Women, but they fall for the most part at the level of .5–.6. Of the 29 correlation coefficients obtained, there are only 4 below .40, 5 above .70. These correlations of individual scores are consistent with the rank-order correlation of .50 between the group means on PEC and E (Forms 45 and 40).

The data in Table 10 (V) indicate that PEC is less closely related to A-S than to the other components of E. Thus, in Form 78, PEC correlates significantly higher with E (exclusive of A-S) than with A-S (.59 to .43). In Form 60, where 4 of the 12 E-scale items deal with A-S, the average r is .52, midway between the two for Form 78. The results for the two groups taking both Forms 45 and 40 (Maritime School Men and Employment Service Men Veterans) show the same thing: PEC correlates higher with E_A than with E_{A+B} (.60 to .49, and .41 to .38). It will be recalled that E_A contains no A-S items, while 4 of the 5 E_B items refer to Jews. Finally, the highest PEC-E correlations were obtained on Form 40, which contained only E_A . The average r of .66 on Form 40 is especially significant in view of the brevity of the two scales (5 items each). The explanation would seem to lie in the fact that these items represent the most general trends in their respective ideologies: in PEC, support of the *status quo* and conservative values; in E, generalized ingroup idealization and outgroup rejection. It is probably in broad trends such as these that conservatism and ethnocentrism overlap the most, because these ideological trends are rooted in the same deep-lying emotional dispositions (see Chapter VII). The specific factors which lower the correlation of A-S with PEC constitute an important problem for future research.

There appear to be no consistent sex or class differences in the E-PEC correlation. In the University, Middle-Class and Working-Class groups (with presumably comparable male and female samples in each), the value of r is about 0.1 lower for men than for women; but in the Los Angeles group this trend is reversed, while in the Psychiatric Clinic Patients the difference is

TABLE 10 (V)

CORRELATIONS OF THE A-S AND E SCALES WITH THE PEC SCALE (ALL FORMS)

	N	Correlation	
		E: PEC	A-S: PEC
A. Groups taking Form 78:			
Public Speaking Class Women	140	.52	.49
Public Speaking Class Men	52	.55	.32
Extension Psychology Class Women	40	.52	.23
Professional Women	63	.76	.69
Mean r^a	295	.59	.43
B. Groups taking Form 60:^b			
University of Oregon Student Women	47	.48	
University of Oregon and University of California Student Women	54	.62	
University of Oregon and University of California Student Men	57	.48	
Oregon Service Club Men	68	.52	
Mean r^a	226	.52	
C. Groups taking Form 45:^c			
Extension Testing Class Women	59	.60	
San Quentin Men	110	.14	
Psychiatric Clinic Women	71	.53 ^d	
Psychiatric Clinic Men	50	.55 ^d	
Working-Class Men and Women	50	.75	
Mean r^a	340	.51	
D. Groups taking Form 40:^c			
George Washington University Women	132	.48	
California Service Club Men	63	.64	
Middle-Class Men	69	.67	
Middle-Class Women	154	.76	
Working-Class Men	61	.74	
Working-Class Women	53	.86	
Los Angeles Men	117	.61	
Los Angeles Women	130	.52	
Mean r^a	779	.66	
E. Groups taking Forms 40 and 45:			
Employment Service Men Veterans			
(Form 40)	55	.60 ^e	
(Form 45)	51	.49	
Maritime School Men (Form 40)	164	.41 ^e	
(Form 45)	179	.38	
Mean r^a	449	.47	
Mean r for all groups taking Forms 40 and 45	1568	.57	

^aIn obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted by N, and Z_r was not used.

^bIt will be recalled that in Form 60 the E scale contained 4 A-S items, there being no separate A-S scale.

^cPEC is correlated with E_A in groups taking Form 40, with total E_{A+B} scale in groups taking Form 45.

^dFor the PEC scale in the Psychiatric Clinic groups, the number of women was 45, the number of men 29, due to a substitution of forms.

^eThese correlations are based on the E_A scores of subjects taking Form 45 as well as those taking Form 40.

negligible. The same holds for class differences: in the Working-Class Men and Women the correlations are very high (.74 and .86), but in other groups which draw heavily upon the working class, notably San Quentin and the Maritime School, the correlations are very low (.14 and .4). The reasons for the variations in the size of r seem to lie more in the specific nature of the group than in its sex or class status. It is interesting in this connection that two groups in which the E-PEC correlation was very high, the Working Class Men (.74) and Women (.86) also had the two lowest PEC means (see Table 8(V)). We may hypothesize that the E-PEC correlation will be highest when, other things such as the S. D. being equal, the group contains a sizeable minority of strong liberals. Judging from some of the other groups, the number of strong conservatives has less influence on the correlation. We shall return to this question shortly.

The general level of the E-PEC correlations demonstrates that ethnocentrism and conservatism, as measured by the present scales, are significantly but imperfectly related.⁷ In everyday terms, we may say that conservatives are, on the average, significantly more ethnocentric than liberals are. The more conservative an individual is, the greater the likelihood that he is ethnocentric—but this is a probability and not a certainty. Since the existence of an affinity between these ideological patterns has often been observed previously, the present correlations are perhaps less a startling discovery than an indication of the validity of the scales. To those who have been unaware of the E-PEC relationship, the significance of the correlations must be stressed. To those who tend to equate conservatism and ethnocentrism as psychological trends in the individual, it must be pointed out that the correlations are far from perfect. Even with a much more reliable measure of PEC, the correlation with E could hardly average over .70—a value inadequate for predictive purposes. It becomes necessary, then, to understand what produces the close association between these ideological patterns in the individual, as well as what systematic factors—apart from ignorance or misinformation—make the E-PEC correlation less than 1.0.

A theoretical basis for the close tie between conservatism and ethnocentrism is suggested by certain similarities in their major underlying trends. Support of the prevailing politico-economic ideology and authority is, apparently, often a part of the generalized ethnocentric tendency to submit to accepted authority in all areas of social life. Similarly, ethnocentric rejection of outgroups is expressed in the politico-economic sphere by resistance to social change and by the tendency to subsume progressive political ideologies under the general heading of "foreign" outgroups and ideas (threats to in-group authority). The interconnection between the two ideologies and the difficulty of separating them even for purposes of study are revealed by a

⁷ These results are, on the whole, consistent with those of the other studies mentioned at the start of this chapter.

number of scale items. For example: "America may not be perfect, but the American Way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society." To support this idea is, it would seem, to express both politico-economic conservatism and the ingroup idealization so characteristic of ethnocentrism. The item, "The worst danger to real Americanism during the last 50 years has come from foreign ideas and agitators," is another example of politicalized ethnocentrism: again we find moral stereotyping and externalization of blame for social problems onto the threatening outgroup.

There are also theoretical reasons for expecting a relationship between liberalism and anti-ethnocentrism. Both tend to involve a critical attitude toward prevailing authorities and traditions. The identification with the masses (workers, "the common man," "the weak and downtrodden") so often a central theme in left-wing political ideology, finds expression also in opposition to ethnocentrism and outgroup suppression. Indeed, the formation of leftist political views in youth often begins with a sense of the injustice of anti-Semitism or anti-Negroism; when sympathetic imagery of subordinate groups is extended to include the working class, the transition from "group relations" to "politico-economic" ideology has begun. The further development of liberal-radical views is ordinarily based on imagery and attitudes identical to those underlying anti-ethnocentric ideology: opposition to hierarchy and to dominance-submission, removal of class and group barriers, emphasis on equalitarian interaction, and so on.

We have also to consider the "correlation-lowering" factors. Why, in view of the theoretical argument above, is the E-PEC correlation not higher? The present data suggest, but are not adequate to test, several hypotheses. The correlation charts (scattergrams) for each sample reveal that extreme liberals (low scorers on PEC) are for the most part low as well on E. But the "middles" on PEC are extremely diversified with respect to standing on E. It is possible that the group which is low on E but middle on PEC consists largely of the "politically pacifistic" liberals discussed previously. Practically none of the subjects were low on PEC and high on E (ethnocentric liberals); such individuals would, however, be well worth intensive study.

The high scorers on PEC are more variable on E than are the low scorers. While most of those high on PEC are also high on E, a considerable number are middle and a small but consistent percentage low on E (nonethnocentric conservatives). In other words, strong political liberalism is a pretty good indicator of anti-ethnocentrism, but political conservatism is less consistently related to ethnocentrism.

In attempting to explain the variability of conservatives with respect to ethnocentrism, we are reminded of the distinction between "genuine" and "pseudo-" previously drawn with respect to patriotism and traditional-conventional values (Chapter IV). One can be politically conservative, just as one can be patriotic (in the sense of firm attachment to American culture

and tradition), without being ethnocentric. We should like to use the term "*genuine conservative*" to refer to the individual with this broad pattern of thought. He is "genuine" because, whatever the merits of his political views, he is seriously concerned with fostering what is most vital in the American democratic tradition. He believes, for example, in the crucial importance of the profit motive and in the necessity of economic insecurity; but he wants the best man to win no matter what his social background. He is resistant to social change, but he can be seriously critical of the national and political ingroups and—what is more important—he is relatively free of the rigidity and deep-lying hostility characteristic of ethnocentrism.

The ethnocentric conservative is the *pseudoconservative*, for he betrays in his ethnocentrism a tendency antithetical to democratic values and tradition. He is the E-PEC "correlation raiser" because, as discussed above, his politico-economic views are based on the same underlying trends—submission to authority, unconscious handling of hostility toward authority by means of displacement and projection onto outgroups, and so on—as his ethnocentrism. It is indeed paradoxical that the greatest psychological potential for antidemocratic change should come from those who claim to represent democratic tradition. For the pseudoconservatives are the pseudo-democrats, and their needs dispose them to the use of force and oppression in order to protect a mythical "Americanism" which bears no resemblance to what is most vital in American history.

An additional hypothesis may be proposed regarding individuals high on E but middle on PEC. These may well be pseudoconservatives who have kept up with changes in the actual politico-economic situation by making changes in traditional (individualistic) conservative ideology. They emphasize competitiveness as a value, yet they support the concentration of economic power in big business—the greatest single threat at present to the individual competing businessman. They emphasize economic mobility and the "Horatio Alger" myth, yet they support numerous forms of discrimination that put severe limitations on the mobility of large sections of the population. They may also believe in extending the economic functions of government, not for humanitarian reasons but as a means of limiting the power of labor and other groups.

This is not merely a "modern conservatism." It is, rather, a totally new direction: away from individualism and equality of opportunity, and toward a rigidly stratified society in which there is a minimum of economic mobility and in which the "right" groups are in power, the outgroups subordinate. Perhaps the term "reactionary" fits this ideology best. Ultimately it is fascism. While certainly not a *necessary* sequel to laissez-faire conservatism, it can be regarded as a possible (and not uncommon) distortion of conservatism—a distortion which retains certain surface similarities but which changes the basic structure into the antithesis of the original. Since most

Americans are "middle on PEC," it becomes crucial to understand the psychological dispositions which help to determine new ideological directions in the individual.

The above distinction regarding ideological patterns within the political left and right are presented as hypotheses to help explain the scale results.⁸ If these hypotheses are not borne out, others will be needed. For it is clear that political ideologies do not fall neatly along a simple liberalism-conservatism dimension; that the relation between ethnocentrism and "conservatism" is extremely complex; and that the individual's receptivity to political ideology, as to "group relations" ideology, is based to a large extent on deeplying personality trends.

D. VALIDATION BY CASE STUDIES: THE RESPONSES OF MACK AND LARRY ON THE PEC SCALE

In an attempt to judge the validity of the PEC scale we may here, as in Chapters III and IV, compare the scale responses of Mack and Larry and consider them in relation to material from their interviews (Chapter II). The PEC-scale scores of these two subjects, the group mean, and the D. P. for each of the 16 PEC items included in Form 78 are shown in Table 11(V).

TABLE 11 (V)

RESPONSES OF MACK AND LARRY ON THE PEC SCALE

No.	Item	Mack	Larry	Group ^a	Group ^a
				Mean	D. P.
1.	(Value of dollar)	6	7	6.10	1.16
5.	(Depressions)	5	1	3.33	2.76
8.	(Charity)	3	7	5.46	1.48
13.	(Businessmen, artists)	1	1	2.29	1.70
15.	(Middle of the road)	7	5	4.35	2.90
22.	(Political candidate)	7	7	6.38	0.32
27.	(Rebellious ideas)	5	6	3.86	2.84
36.	(Gov't. responsibility)	2	1	3.22	3.01
44.	(Socialized medicine)	2	6	2.38	1.69
52.	(Taxes, corporations)	2	3	3.66	2.29
61.	(Economic security)	6	6	3.75	2.68
63.	(Gov't. interference)	5	1	4.01	2.39
68.	(Unions stronger)	6	2	4.58	2.30
71.	(Ford, Morgan)	7	6	5.30	2.00
76.	(Gov't. activity)	2	2	3.32	2.76
78.	(Ability will tell)	7	6	4.74	1.99
Mean per item		4.56	4.19	4.17	2.14

^aThe group means and D.P.'s are based on all four groups taking Form 78.

⁸Further hypotheses, plus supporting evidence, are presented in Chapter XVII, which deals with the interview material.

The two men are much more similar in their PEC-scale scores than was the case with their A-S and E scores. Larry's mean score, 4.19, is at the group mean and Mack's, 4.56, is not very far above. When the group of Public Speaking Men to which these subjects belonged is considered by itself, Mack is just inside the high quartile, Larry is just below it. On 11 of the 16 items the scores of the two men do not differ by more than one point. Attention to the individual items, however, shows that the similarities are confined to certain areas of politico-economic ideology; in other areas there are sharp differences.

Mack and Larry are most similar in their consistent support of general conventional-conservative values. Both agree, usually rather strongly, with Items 1 (Value of a dollar), 15 (Middle of the road), 22 (Political candidate), 27 (Rebellious ideas), 71 (Ford, Morgan), and 78 (Ability will tell). This seems to be in keeping with the interviews, in which both men expressed the usual conservative criticisms of the New Deal. Both men, it appears, accept the view that a man's getting ahead depends most of all upon his living according to the values of thrift, determination, work, honesty, conformity, and the like.

Examination of the scores on other items, however, indicates that Mack and Larry differ with respect to the context in which their conservative values occur. For Mack the context appears to be one of upward social mobility on a class-ingroup basis, for Larry it appears to be one of nineteenth-century liberalism. This seems to be expressed in their wide disagreement on Items 5 (Depression) and 68 (Unions stronger). Mack's belief that depressions are "only natural" can be interpreted as an expression of the broader idea that, in the nature of things, the benefits to be had in our society are insufficient to go around and that it is no more than proper that the major portion of them should go to the "right people," that is, to an ingroup. This ingroup does not seem to include organized labor (Item 68) nor the various minority groups which he rejected in his responses on the E scale. This would appear to be another manifestation of Mack's tendency, so marked in his interview, to make rigid ingroup-outgroup distinctions in his thinking about politico-economic matters as well as about social relations generally. For Larry, on the other hand, the value for getting ahead does not exclude the possibility of various other kinds of people getting ahead, for he seems to be thinking in terms of an expanding economy in which working men can have a strong role (Item 68) and in which depressions are unnecessary (Item 5). The absence of any ingroup-outgroup distinction, and optimism with respect to the possibilities of economic abundance were outstanding features of Larry's interview.

Neither man shows the usual conservative opposition to the government's participation in the economic life of the nation: for Items 36 (Government responsibility), 44 (Socialized medicine), 52 (Taxes, corporations), 63 (Gov-

ernment interference), and 76 (Government activity) the two men have the same low mean score of 2.60. Their reasons, however, seem to be different. When the responses to the total scale are considered, it appears that Mack deviates from true, laissez-faire conservatism by taking a stand further to the political right. The fact that he rejects labor unions and believes in the inevitability of depressions suggests that the strong central control which he favors is not to have as its function economic planning to benefit all of the people; rather, it seems, he is thinking of rule by an ingroup from which the majority of the population would be excluded. That he does reject the majority of the population has been seen in his responses to the E scale. When it is considered that he is antigovernment only when it comes to interference with the individual's freedom "to make money and spend it as he likes" (Item 63) we are led to the conclusion that his idea of central control is a combination of government and the most powerful business interests. Thus it appears that Mack comes as close as he can, within the confines of the 16-item PEC scale, to expressing that pattern of pseudoconservatism which emerged from the analysis of his interview.

Larry, on the other hand, deviates from the usual conservative position by moving further to the left. Not only does he insist upon the social obligations of government (Items 36 and 76) but he would accept limitations upon the profits of individuals and corporations (Items 52 and 63). These views can be reconciled with his strong conservative values and pro-business sentiments, it seems, only by means of the belief that there is plenty for all, that it is the task of government to see to it that no one has too little or too much, and that this situation will permit people who, like himself, are willing to work hard, to get as much as they really need without causing others to suffer.

It would appear from this analysis, and from the analysis of Mack's and Larry's interviews in Chapter II, that the difference of 0.37 in their PEC-scale means is not great enough to represent the actual distance between them on a right vs. left dimension of politico-economic ideology. However, as the discussion in the preceding section has shown, the differences between pseudoconservatism, which we find in Mack, and genuine conservatism as represented by Larry are qualitative as well as quantitative, and it is to the credit of the PEC scale that it pointed out these differences while indicating at the same time that Mack is somewhat more extreme in a quantitative sense.

E. THE RELATION BETWEEN ETHNOCENTRISM AND MEMBERSHIP IN VARIOUS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GROUPINGS

We have considered in previous sections the nature of political ideologies as measured by the PEC scales, and the relation of these ideologies to ethnocentrism. The data also revealed numerous group differences in degree of

ethnocentrism. It was therefore natural to ask next: How do various political and economic groupings differ with respect to ethnocentrism? Information on such groupings (political party preference, parents' preference, organization memberships, income level, etc.) was obtained on the front page of the questionnaire, so that it was possible to compute the mean (average) E score for each group.⁹

We may consider first the relation between ethnocentrism and political group preference.

Political group preference was determined by means of several questions. First: "What political party or group do you like best?" Second: "How do you feel about each of these political groups? Democrats (Anti-New Deal), Democrats (New Deal), Willkie-type Republicans, Traditional Republicans." In each case the subject was asked to check one of four choices: agree much, agree, disagree, disagree much. On the basis of his pattern of response to these questions, each subject was assigned a single "group preference" by two raters working together (semi-independent judgments). Each subject could be placed with relative ease into one or another of the following categories: (1) "Total" Democrats (supporting both factions within the party); (2) Anti-New Deal Democrats; (3) New Deal Democrats; (4) Willkie Republicans; (5) Traditional Republicans; (6) "Total" Republicans (supporting both factions); (7) New Deal Democrats, Willkie Republicans (supporting these two groupings and opposing the others, without indicating specific party preference; (8) Communists; (9) Socialists; (10) P.A.C. (National Citizens and C.I.O. Political Action Committee); (11) Undecided (wrote in "undecided" to first question, omitted the second); (12) Anti-all parties; (13) None, nonpartisan (gave this answer to first question, omitted the second); (14) Self-contradictory (e.g., supported Traditional Republicans and New Deal Democrats, gave no over-all party preference); (15) Blank.

Table 12(V) gives the number of cases (N) and the average A-S or E score for each political grouping, as well as for each sample tested and for the group of samples taking each form of the questionnaire. It is thus possible to compare, say, the New Deal Democrats in one sample with the other political groupings in that sample, or with the over-all totals for all New Dealers tested, or with the over-all totals for all subjects tested.¹⁰

The N's and means in the bottom row (horizontal) may be examined first. The ratio of Democrats (columns 1-3) to Republicans (columns 4-5) is roughly 10 to 7, a value which approximates the registration figures in the 1944 California elections. However, the proportion of New Deal Democrats and of "combined liberal groups" (column 17) is unduly large. It seems safe to conclude that the present sample shows a slight but significant bias

⁹ It would have been an important additional validation of the PEC scales to show differences among these groups with respect to PEC. Unfortunately, limitations of time prevented this further step.

¹⁰ It will be noted that group-membership data was not statisticized for several of the groups tested (approximately one-third of the total N), due to time limitations. However, the groups in Table 12(V) appear to be a fairly representative selection of the total sample.

in a liberal direction—a sampling factor which tends to lower the over-all E mean.

The various groupings appeared to fall into two clearly differentiated categories on the basis of average degree of ethnocentrism. First, the “*conservative*” category (column 16: Total Democrats, Anti-New Deal Democrats, Traditional Republicans, Total Republicans), with E means ranging from 4.17 to 4.72 and averaging 4.39. Second, the “*liberal*” category (New Deal Democrats, Willkie Republicans, New Deal-Willkie combined, Communists, Socialists, P.A.C.), with E means ranging from 1.25 to 3.60 and averaging 3.41. The difference of 0.98 between the liberal and conservative categories is statistically very significant (far above the 1 per cent level).¹¹

The rank order of the individual groupings, in terms of E mean, is similar to their rank order on a right-left political dimension. The traditional wings of the Democratic and Republican parties are the most conservative as well as the most ethnocentric (E means of 4.2 to 4.7). The New Deal Democrats and the Willkie Republicans, representing in the main a slightly left-of-center political position, have a similar stand on ethnocentrism (means of 3.6 and 3.5). Interestingly enough, those who support both the New Deal and Willkie, without making an over-all party choice, have a much lower E mean of 2.4—an indication perhaps that greater political sophistication in liberals is accompanied by greater militancy regarding democratic group relations. The Socialists (those who gave this as their party preference, regardless of their views on the other groupings) were similar to the previous group with a mean of 2.6. The most militantly anti-ethnocentric groups were the P.A.C. and the Communists, with E means of 2.0 and 1.25 respectively.

The great difference between the “liberal” and “conservative” categories, as well as the rank order of the individual groupings, offer important evidence for the validity of the E scale and the E-PEC correlations reported above. The relationship between ethnocentrism and liberal-conservative group membership is very similar to that between ethnocentrism and liberal-conservative ideology in the individual. There is, on the average, a systematic relation between E, PEC, and political group preference, to the extent of a correlation of approximately .5.

Once again, both the group trend and the individual differences must be emphasized. The relationships, though significant, are far from perfect. There is, for one thing, considerable individual variability within each group—

¹¹ Critical ratios have not been computed for the various group differences discussed here. The following rules of thumb may be used in estimating the significance of the differences: Assume that the Standard Deviation for any grouping is equal to the S. D. for the sample containing it. This estimate is a maximal one so that any errors will tend to lower spuriously the value of the C. R. obtained. For groups with N's of about 50 each, differences of 0.6 are likely to be significant at the 5 percent level; when the N's are 100, a difference of 0.4 is adequate. These approximate standards hold for all tables in this section. An additional argument for the significance of these differences is their relative consistency from group to group.

TABLE 12 (V)
 MEAN A-S OR E SCORES^a FOR GROUPS SHOWING VARIOUS OVER-ALL POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCES

Group	1. "Total" Democrat		2. Anti-New Deal Democrat		3. New Deal Democrat		4. Wilkie Republican		5. Traditional Republican		6. Total Republican		7. New Deal Democrat, Wilkie Republican		8. Communist	
	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean
<i>Groups taking Form 78:</i>																
U. C. Public Speaking Class Women	6	3.63	4	3.83	28	3.11	39	3.00	13	4.19	34	3.66	0	--	0	--
U. C. Public Speaking Class Men	0	--	3	5.07	17	3.25	11	3.33	4	4.18	6	3.88	8	2.10	0	--
Extension Psychology Class Women	1	3.80	6	3.70	11	2.57	7	3.39	4	3.30	2	5.35	0	--	0	--
Professional Women	0	--	1	6.00	30	2.06	12	3.43	3	2.63	8	3.43	0	--	0	--
Totals	7	3.66	14	4.19	86	2.70	69	3.17	24	3.84	50	3.72	8	2.10	0	--
<i>Groups taking Form 60:</i>																
Univ. of Oregon Student Women	2	3.32	2	3.24	14	2.73	6	3.14	4	4.46	13	4.28	3	2.77	0	--
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Women	3	4.59	4	4.15	19	2.95	9	3.26	1	2.49	14	3.24	2	2.37	0	--
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Men	2	2.78	2	3.07	12	2.95	9	2.08	6	3.45	10	3.67	7	2.32	0	--
Totals	7	3.71	8	3.70	45	2.88	24	2.79	11	3.73	37	3.72	12	2.44	0	--
<i>Groups taking Form 45:</i>																
Maritime School Men	17	4.41	16	4.49	74	4.32	12	3.88	13	5.08	12	4.54	3	3.23	1	1.30
Psychiatric Clinic Men	6	4.12	0	--	20	3.97	2	3.55	7	4.27	3	3.70	1	1.30	1	1.30
Psychiatric Clinic Women	7	4.74	3	4.07	26	3.51	2	4.20	5	4.54	5	3.28	2	1.80	1	1.00
San Quentin Men ^b	19	4.44	5	4.74	45	4.60	6	4.83	3	5.90	3	4.50	0	--	0	--
Totals	30	4.43	19	4.42	120	4.08	16	3.88	25	4.74	20	4.10	6	2.43	3	1.20
<i>Groups taking Form 40:</i>																
Geo. Washington Univ. Women	13	4.37	17	4.86	44	3.83	5	3.48	9	5.49	14	4.14	1	3.80	0	--
Maritime School Men	21	5.10	15	5.11	69	4.95	4	3.85	5	4.84	15	5.60	2	5.80	0	--
Middle-Class Women	0	--	4	3.35	43	2.76	28	4.36	11	6.00	32	4.51	10	1.50	2	1.10
Middle-Class Men	4	6.30	0	--	16	2.51	9	4.07	10	4.34	10	4.96	3	2.73	1	1.20
Working-Class Men	8	4.52	0	--	25	3.70	1	4.20	0	--	3	4.87	2	3.70	3	1.40
Totals	46	4.90	36	4.79	197	3.86	47	4.17	35	5.63	74	4.73	18	2.56	6	1.27
Over-all totals	90	4.55	77	4.48	448	3.60	156	3.49	95	4.72	181	4.17	44	2.43	9	1.25

^aThe following scales were used in the various forms: Form 78: A-S scale (10 items); Form 60: E scale (12 items); Form 45: E scale (10 items); Form 40: E scale (5 items).

^bThe San Quentin group was not included in obtaining the totals. The means for this group were so much larger than those of the others, for reasons which seemed to have little to do with party preference, that their inclusion would distort the over-all picture.

ing, and there is much variation in group mean from one sample to the next. The New Deal Democrats, for example, obtained E means ranging from 2.06 to 4.95 in the various samples tested. Moreover, political preference is much more closely related to ethnocentrism in some groups than in others. In the middle-class groups the relation is much closer than in working-class groups such as the Maritime School Men or San Quentin Men. Indeed, the San Quentin data were so atypical that they were not included in the over-all totals; for further discussion see Chapter XXI. The great variability obtained is a warning against stereotypy in thinking about groups. Members

9. Socialist		10. P. A. C.		11. Undecided		12. Anti-all parties		13. None, nonpartisan		14. Self-contradictory		15. Blank		16. Combined conservative groups: 1, 2, 5, 6		17. Combined liberal groups: 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10		N Mean S. D.		
2	1.15	0	--	4	3.05	0	--	8	2.88	0	--	2	3.70	(57)	3.79	(69)	2.99	140	3.32	1.43
3	3.67	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--	(13)	4.25	(39)	3.07	52	3.34	1.48
0	--	0	--	2	5.15	0	--	4	2.30	0	--	5	4.24	(13)	3.84	(18)	2.89	42	3.40	1.36
2	1.40	0	--	2	2.25	0	--	3	2.40	0	--	2	1.65	(12)	3.44	(44)	2.40	63	2.57	1.37
7	2.30	0	--	8	3.38	0	--	15	2.63	0	--	9	3.54	(95)	3.82	(170)	2.85	297	3.18	1.46
1	1.16	0	--	0	--	0	--	2	3.74	0	--	0	--	(21)	4.13	(24)	2.77	47	3.42	1.38
1	1.83	0	--	0	--	0	--	1	4.57	0	--	0	--	(22)	3.56	(31)	2.97	54	3.24	1.29
2	3.03	0	--	0	--	0	--	7	3.17	0	--	0	--	(20)	3.45	(30)	2.55	57	2.93	1.25
4	2.26	0	--	0	--	0	--	10	3.42	0	--	0	--	(63)	3.71	(85)	2.76	158	3.18	1.31
3	3.20	0	--	7	4.86	1	3.30	0	--	13	4.47	6	4.35	(58)	4.61	(93)	4.16	178	4.36	1.60
2	1.65	0	--	3	2.40	2	2.70	0	--	2	4.05	1	4.60	(16)	4.11	(26)	3.55	50	3.67	1.59
1	1.80	1	1.00	5	3.34	5	3.20	0	--	2	3.65	6	4.57	(30)	4.23	(33)	3.25	71	3.65	1.60
1	2.80	0	--	7	4.64	5	4.52	0	--	4	3.05	12	5.11	(30)	4.64	(52)	4.59	110	4.61	1.28
6	2.45	1	1.00	15	3.86	8	3.09	0	--	17	4.32	13	4.47	(94)	4.44	(152)	3.86	299	4.07	1.63
1	2.80	3	1.13	9	3.04	0	--	12	3.93	0	--	4	4.30	(53)	4.66	(54)	3.63	132	4.04	1.58
1	5.60	1	3.40	10	5.28	5	5.64	0	--	10	5.44	6	4.60	(56)	5.21	(77)	4.90	164	5.08	1.76
3	2.07	2	2.40	1	2.80	2	3.70	9	2.51	4	5.15	3	4.73	(47)	4.76	(88)	3.06	154	3.64	1.96
1	5.98	2	1.00	2	3.50	2	4.80	7	4.57	1	1.20	1	1.20	(24)	4.92	(32)	2.94	69	3.89	2.08
4	2.45	2	3.90	1	5.00	0	--	5	4.56	2	5.50	3	3.47	(11)	4.62	(37)	3.40	59	3.83	1.72
10	3.02	10	2.14	23	4.13	9	5.02	33	3.78	17	5.13	17	4.11	(191)	4.88	(288)	3.69	578	4.19	1.90
27	2.60	11	2.04	46	3.91	17	4.11	58	3.42	34	4.73	39	4.10	(443)	4.39	(695)	3.41	1332	3.82	

^cN for several of the present groups is different, by one or two subjects from the N given for the same groups in Tables 1-11 (V). If an N in Tables 12-20 (V) is smaller than the N for the corresponding group in Tables 1-11 (V), it is because one or two subjects who responded to the PEC scale left blank the whole of page 1 of the questionnaire. In one instance (Extension Class Women), two more subjects were available for the analysis of group membership than for the analysis of scale responses; their questionnaires came in late, after the statistics on scale responses were completed, but still in time to figure in the analysis of group memberships.

of any given political group are not "all alike"; and the fact that an individual belongs to a particular political group is, in most cases, an insufficient basis for predicting his standing on E.

These intra- and intergroup variations suggest that group membership is not in itself the major determinant of ideology in the individual. It would appear, rather, that different individuals support a political group for different reasons, and that we must understand why an individual *chooses* to support one group rather than another one. It is incorrect, or at least inadequate, to say that an individual is prejudiced *because* he is an Anti-New Deal

Democrat. He may be an Anti-New Dealer because he was ethnocentric to start with, or, more likely, both the ideology and the group membership must be explained in terms of more basic psychological and social factors. Consideration of these factors may help to explain why some anti-New Deal Democrats are not ethnocentric, and why some New Dealers are.

What of those who profess no preference for any political group (Table 12 (V), columns 11-15)? The results for these groups are difficult to interpret, but they are suggestive for further inquiry. Four of these groups, the "undecided," "against all parties," "self-contradictory" and "blank," with means of 3.9 to 4.7, are above the over-all mean of 3.8, while those who consider themselves "nonpartisan" are relatively low on E, with a mean of 3.4. Perhaps the most general conclusion to be drawn is that political confusion and indifference, as well as opposition to "politics," are associated with greater-than-average ethnocentrism. Since these subjects constitute some 10-15 per cent of the present sample, and at least that percentage of the American population, they merit more thorough study.

It was possible indirectly to approach the question of parental influence on subject's ideology by asking for the political party preference of father and of mother. In Table 13(V) the subjects are arranged in groups according to father's political party preference, and the E mean for each group is shown.¹² The offspring of Republicans are, on the average, slightly less ethnocentric than the offspring of Democrats, the E means being 3.41 and 3.68, respectively. Assuming an S. D. of 1.5 for each group, this difference is significant at the 5 per cent level.

These data suggest what everyday observation has often seemed to indicate, namely, that people do not necessarily believe what their parents tell them. This hypothesis is neither original nor profound—although we believe that it has profound implications for the understanding of the formation of ideology. It contradicts another commonly held theory, namely that one learns mainly by *imitation*. The "imitation" theory expects a high correlation between parents' ideology and offspring's ideology, on the assumption that one "naturally" (that is, imitatively) takes over parental ideology relatively intact. The present data, however, as well as those of many previous studies, e.g., those discussed by Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb (85), suggest that the formation of ideology in the individual is a selective, dynamic process, in which any ideological pressure from the environment will be accepted or rejected on the basis of the needs and strivings of the individual. Approaching ideological learning in this way, we ask, for example: What kinds of personalities take over intact the views of their parents or other

¹² Similar data were obtained in terms of mothers' political preference. These data are not presented here since identical trends were revealed. A theoretical reason for focusing on the father is that politics in the United States seems still to be largely a "paternal" concern, just as religion is for the most part the function of the mother in the home.

TABLE 13 (V)

MEAN A-S OR E SCORES^a FOR GROUPS WHOSE FATHERS HAVE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCES

Group	Political Preference of Father												Over-all				
	Democrat		Republican		Socialist		Communist		Other		None		Blank		Mean	S. D.	
	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean			
<i>Groups taking Form 78:</i>																	
U.C. Public Speaking Class Women	48	3.12	80	3.53	1	5.90	0	--	0	--	4	2.73	7	2.34	140	3.32	1.43
U.C. Public Speaking Class Men	20	3.59	26	3.45	0	--	1	2.30	0	--	2	2.50	3	1.77	52	3.34	1.48
Extension Psychology Class Women	17	3.25	19	3.64	0	--	0	--	1	1.30	0	--	5	3.36	42	3.40	1.36
Professional Women	16	2.12	30	2.56	1	2.40	0	--	0	--	1	1.10	15	3.20	63	2.57	1.37
Totals:	101	3.08	155	3.34	2	4.15	1	2.30	1	1.30	7	2.43	30	2.88	297	3.18	1.46
<i>Groups taking Form 60:</i>																	
Univ. of Oregon Student Women	18	2.93	24	3.74					2	2.53	0	--	3	4.40	47	3.42	1.38
California Student Women	19	3.39	28	3.19					3	3.32	0	--	4	2.80	54	3.24	1.29
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Men	21	3.24	27	2.88					2	1.41	2	2.16	5	3.20	57	2.93	1.25
Totals:	58	3.19	79	3.25					7	2.55	2	2.16	12	3.37	158	3.18	1.31
<i>Groups taking Form 45:</i>																	
Maritime School Men	95	4.39	42	4.16	2	4.70					7	4.23	32	4.51	178	4.36	1.60
Psychiatric Clinic Men	20	4.10	21	3.26	1	2.70					1	5.00	7	3.60	50	3.67	1.59
Psychiatric Clinic Women	31	4.06	23	3.27							1	1.70	16	3.53	71	3.65	1.60
Totals:	146	4.28	86	3.70	3	4.03					9	4.03	55	4.11	299	4.07	1.63
Over-all totals:	305	3.68	320	3.41	5	4.08	1	2.30	8	2.39	18	3.20	97	3.64	754	3.53	--

^aThe following scales were used in the various forms: Form 78: A-S Scale (10 items)
 Form 60: E Scale (12 items)
 Form 45: E Scale (10 items)

authorities and under what psychological conditions do we find various forms of change or rebellion?

Questions such as those above were raised by the tendency for Republican fathers (presumably more ethnocentric) to have less ethnocentric offspring than did the Democratic fathers. This suggested the hypothesis that "disagreement with father" is related to anti-ethnocentrism, regardless of father's political views (see also Levinson and Sanford (71); Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb (85)). The hypothesis was tested by comparing subject's and father's political preference. The results are presented in Table 14(V). The group of subjects whose political preference was the same as their fathers', regardless of party, had a much higher mean (4.05) than the group of subjects who differed from their fathers (mean of 3.04). The difference is extremely significant; indeed, it is almost identical with the difference between groups based on liberal vs. conservative party preference (Table 12(V)). In other words, *a person's standing on E can be predicted as closely on the basis of his agreement or disagreement with his father's political party preference (without knowing subject's or father's politics) as it can on the basis of the subject's actual party preference.*¹³ This is important indirect evidence in favor of hypotheses raised previously (Chapters III and IV), namely, that ethnocentrists tend to be submissive to ingroup authority, anti-ethnocentrists to be critical or rebellious, and that the family is the first and prototypic ingroup. The individual's relation to parental authority, particularly his disposition to be submissive or critically independent, appears to be a basic personality trend which partially determines his political party preference and his ideology about group relations.

Data on the average degree of ethnocentrism in various organizations taking Form 40 are presented in Table 15(V). The low-scoring groups, with E means of 1.20 to 2.41, are the Labor School men and women, the League of Women Voters, and the Unitarian Church. It is interesting that the working-class Labor School members have an E mean which is considerably higher than that for the middle-class members (2.4 to 1.2), and slightly higher than that for the (middle-class) League of Women Voters and the Unitarian Church. Apparently the middle-class leftists have identified not only with the working class (in their political ideology) but also with subordinate groups generally. There is, however, some likelihood that working-class individuals may support left-wing political groups without a full acceptance of the underlying social ideology; that is to say, they may

¹³ The difference would probably have been even greater had we known the fathers' party-faction preference rather than the simple party preference. Thus, all New Deal Democratic subjects who gave father's preference as "Democrat" were grouped under "same preference as father." It is likely, however, that in many of these cases the father was an anti-New Deal Democrat and that thus a real difference between father and son—one which we should expect to accompany lower E scores—was concealed. This inadequacy in measurement makes the obtained differences all the more impressive.

TABLE 14 (V)

MEAN A-S OR E SCORES^a FOR GROUPS SHOWING VARIOUS RELATIONS BETWEEN SUBJECT'S AND FATHER'S POLITICAL PREFERENCE

	Relation between Subject's and Father's Political Preference						Relation between Subject's and Father's Political Preference						Over-all					
	Same			Different			F None			F Has			F Blank			Both None of Blank		
	N	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.
<i>Groups taking Form 78:</i>																		
U.C. Public Speaking Class Women	99	3.49	1.9	3.10	2	2.50	11	3.07		6	2.25	3	2.93			140	3.32	1.43
U.C. Public Speaking Class Men	37	3.63	1.2	2.76	2	2.50	0	----		1	1.50	0	----			52	3.34	1.49
Extension Psychology Class Women	21	3.51	9	2.99	0	----	7	3.61		3	2.73	2	4.30			42	3.40	1.36
Professional Women	24	2.59	23	2.16	1	1.10	2	2.35		9	3.92	4	2.30			63	2.57	1.37
Totals:	181	3.40	63	2.68	5	2.20	20	3.19		19	3.08	9	2.96			297	3.18	1.46
<i>Groups taking Form 60:</i>																		
University of Oregon Student Women	29	3.70	13	2.45	0	----	0	----		3	4.62	2	3.74			47	3.42	1.38
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Women	33	3.48	18	2.81	0	----	0	----		2	2.45	1	4.57			54	3.24	1.29
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Men	29	3.07	13	2.67	2	2.16	7	3.17		6	2.85	0	----			57	2.93	1.25
Totals:	91	3.42	44	2.66	2	2.61	7	3.17		11	3.26	3	4.01			158	3.18	1.31
<i>Groups taking Form 45:</i>																		
Maritime School Men	107	4.32	20	4.16	4	4.58	14	4.49		20	4.51	13	4.52			178	4.36	1.60
Psychiatric Clinic Men	24	4.08	12	3.15	1	5.00	6	2.90		5	3.46	2	3.95			50	3.67	1.59
Psychiatric Clinic Women	27	4.29	18	2.80	1	1.70	9	3.86		7	3.39	9	3.63			71	3.65	1.60
San Quentin Men ^b	53	4.62	8	4.86	5	4.18	13	4.01		16	4.60	15	5.10			110	4.61	1.28
Totals:	158	4.28	50	3.43	6	4.17	29	3.96		32	4.10	24	4.14			299	4.07	1.63
<i>Groups taking Form 40:</i>																		
George Washington University Student Women	78	4.28	12	3.85	6	3.33	13	3.66		10	3.86	13	3.62			132	4.04	1.58
Maritime School Men	94	5.17	26	4.64	3	5.07	22	5.41		14	4.86	5	4.80			164	5.08	1.76
Middle-Class Women	71	3.88	47	2.90	1	1.60	9	3.09		16	4.94	10	3.98			159	3.64	1.96
Middle-Class Men	34	4.75	19	2.07	0	----	9	3.82		3	3.80	4	5.50			63	3.89	2.08
Working-Class Men	22	4.26	17	2.71	0	----	4	5.20		9	4.09	7	4.06			59	3.83	1.72
Totals:	299	4.52	121	3.21	10	3.68	57	4.38		52	4.50	39	4.14			578	4.19	1.90
Over-all totals:	729	4.05	278	3.04	23	3.39	113	3.99		114	4.03	75	3.79			1332	3.82	----

^aThe following scales were used in the various forms:
 Form 78: A-S Scale (10 items) Form 45: E Scale (10 items)
 Form 60: E Scale (12 items) Form 40: E Scale (5 items)
^bThe San Quentin group was not included in the over-all total.

engage in liberal group activity more on the basis of economic self-interest than on that of a complete anti-ethnocentric point of view. This is also shown by the fact that the members of the United Electrical Workers, a militant C.I.O. union, had an E mean of 3.45, a value slightly higher than that (3.12) for the Parent-Teachers' Association group containing mostly middle-class members with a relatively high education level. These results suggest that union membership and college education are in themselves important forces, but by no means guarantees, against ethnocentrism. The basic question, it

TABLE 15 (V)
MEAN E SCORE FOR VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN
THE FORM 40 SAMPLE

<u>Middle-Class Women</u>			
<u>Group:</u>		<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>
1. Parent-Teachers' Association		46	3.13
2. Labor School (middle-class membership)		11	1.20
3. Suburban Church Group		29	5.23
4. Unitarian Church Group		15	2.32
5. League of Women Voters		17	2.06
6. Upper Middle-Class Women's Club		36	5.05
Over-all totals		154	3.64
Standard Deviation			1.96
<u>Middle-Class Men</u>			
<u>Group:</u>		<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>
1. Labor School (middle-class membership)		9	1.27
2. Parent-Teachers' Association		29	3.12
3. Suburban Church Group		31	5.38
Over-all totals		69	3.89
Standard Deviation			2.08
<u>Working-Class Men</u>			
<u>Group:</u>		<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>
1. United Electrical Workers (CIO) (old members)		12	3.45
2. Labor School		15	2.41
3. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (CIO) (new members)		26	4.60
4. United Seamen's Service		8	4.74
Over-all totals		61	3.83
Standard Deviation			1.72

would seem, is whether the individual has been able to assimilate the broader democratic ideology supplied by the group environment—and here again we find wide individual differences in receptiveness to democratic thinking.

That the union has been at least partially successful in its educative effort

is suggested by the fact that the New Members Class of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (I.L.W.U.) has an E mean of 4.60 (Table 15(V)). Because of the small number of cases, the large difference of 1.15 between the new I.L.W.U. members and the old U.E.W. members is probably not statistically significant; but if it should be borne out in further studies, it would indicate that certain unions, at least, are doing a great deal to combat ethnocentrism.

The highest scoring groups, with E means of 5.05 to 5.38 (significantly higher than any other middle-class groups), are the Suburban Church men and women,¹⁴ and the Upper Middle-Class Women's Club. Since neither of these groups is organized primarily or explicitly on the basis of ethnocentric ideology, their relative uniformity in this respect supports the hypothesis that ethnocentrism is correlated with patterns of ideology in other areas. The striking difference of 3.0 points between the E means of the Unitarian and Suburban Churches suggests that similar differences might well be found in the content of their religious ideologies; but these issues must await consideration of the over-all material on religion (Chapter VI). Similarly, what characterizes the Women's Club as compared, for example, with the League of Women Voters, is not its actual class or educational level, but psychological trends such as upper-class identification, upward economic mobility, conservative values, and the like. Moreover, it is not likely that membership in the group caused deep-lying personality trends such as these in the members, but rather that individuals with such dispositions gravitate toward this group—or, indeed, organize it in the first place—rather than toward the League of Women Voters or the Oakland Labor School. While no intensive case studies could be obtained from the Women's Club, because of resistance to such "investigation," the relation of the above and similar trends to ethnocentrism was studied in other groups and is reported in the chapters which follow.

Mean E scores for the various maritime unions, as represented in the Maritime School, are presented in Table 15(V). These results should probably be regarded as suggestive rather than conclusive, in view of the small N in each group and the fact that this sample is above the maritime union average in intelligence (AGCT score) and educational level, and probably in class level and economic aspiration. Among the well-represented unions, the lowest E mean (4.12) is made by the National Maritime Union (C.I.O.), which is also the most militantly left-wing. The most ethnocentric of the larger groups are the Sailor's Union of the Pacific (A.F.L.) and the Sailor's International Union (A.F.L.), with means of 4.97 and 4.81 respectively; both of these unions tend to be politically conservative and to be strongly anti-

¹⁴ This interdenominational church is in a small town near Berkeley, California. It has several suburban features: it contains a number of small industries; many residents commute to Berkeley and San Francisco, and it is not culturally or economically isolated.

C.I.O. and anti-Communist. The Marine Firemen, Oilers and Wipers (Independent), with a mean of 4.24 is only slightly higher than the National Maritime Union; that this finding is valid is suggested by the fact that the M.F.O.W. actively joined with the C.I.O. a few years ago during a period of waterfront labor-management strife.

When the various union groups are combined into major categories, the following order is obtained (from most to least ethnocentric): blank or "none" (4.94), combined A.F.L. (4.79), combined C.I.O. (4.41), and combined Independent (4.30). While union membership, particularly in a C.I.O. or independent union, appears to play a significant role in decreasing ethnocentrism, there is clearly much that remains to be done. The National Maritime Union, for example, can take pride in having the lowest of the obtained means, but the value of 4.12 indicates only a 50-50 balance around the neutral point—still a long way from the democratic principles of its educational program and its constitutional regulations. It would be of considerable social as well as theoretical significance to understand why intensive anti-prejudice programs such as that of the N.M.U. are not more successful, and to determine how they might be improved.

The Form 40 data in Table 16(V) differ from the Form 45 data in two important respects: the over-all E mean is higher (5.08 to 4.34), and the differences among the various unions are smaller. The differences are due in part to the fact that the Form 45 data are based on the 10-item E_{AB} scale, while Form 40 contained the 5-item E_A scale. The E_A mean for the Form 45 sample was 4.82 (Chapter IV, Table 17, C), a value slightly but not significantly lower than the Form 40 E_A mean of 5.08. However, the Form 45 E_B subscale (of which four items deal with anti-Semitism) had a mean of only 3.85, and the E_A - E_B correlation, corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula, was only .73. It would appear, then, that the two samples are similar with respect to the opinions and attitudes in E_A (Negroes, foreigners, zootsuiters, patriotism). Moreover, the greater interunion differences on Form 45 than on Form 40 are probably due to the E_B items in Form 45; that is, the unions differ more with respect to anti-Semitism than with respect to other forms of prejudice. For example, the N.M.U. mean for Form 45 is 3.76, conspicuously lower than the sample mean of 4.34; but the N.M.U. Form 40 mean of 4.87 is only slightly lower than the sample mean of 5.08. While sampling differences and other uncontrolled factors probably influenced these results, the possibility is raised that the N.M.U. educational program has been less successful in combating some forms of prejudice (E_A) than others (E_B).¹⁵

Our attempts to determine income-class level and background of the subjects were relatively unsuccessful for several reasons. It was not possible to

¹⁵ Had time permitted, it would have been worthwhile to obtain separate E_A and E_B means for each union group in the Form 45 sample, and to compare these with the Form 40 data.

TABLE 16 (V)

MEAN E SCORE FOR GROUPS HAVING VARIOUS MARITIME
UNION AFFILIATIONS^a
(Maritime School Sample)

Union	Form 45 ^b		Form 40 ^b		Over-all	
	N	Mean E _{AB}	N	Mean E _A	N	Mean
1. Sailor's Union of the Pacific (AFL)	26	4.79	26	5.15	52	4.97
2. Sailor's International Union (AFL)	20	4.52	12	5.30	32	4.81
3. "AFL" only	7	4.10	9	4.26	16	4.19
4. Marine Firemen, Oilers, Wipers (Independent)	16	4.11	23	4.34	39	4.24
5. Master Mates and Pilots (Independent)	0	----	1	6.80	1	6.80
6. Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association (CIO)	2	3.85	4	5.95	6	5.25
7. National Maritime Union (CIO)	29	3.76	14	4.87	43	4.12
8. "CIO" only	8	4.88	7	5.00	15	4.93
9. "Union" only	17	4.07	12	5.43	29	4.64
10. Combined AFL (1,2,3)	(53)	4.60	(47)	5.02	(100)	4.79
11. Combined CIO (6,7,8)	(39)	3.99	(25)	5.08	(64)	4.41
12. Combined Independent (4,5)	(16)	4.11	(24)	4.44	(40)	4.30
13. All Unions Combined (1-9)	(125)	4.27	(108)	4.95	(233)	4.58
14. Combined "None" and Blank	(53)	4.55	(56)	5.31	(109)	4.94
15. "None"	17	4.89	21	5.25	38	5.08
16. Blank	36	4.38	35	5.35	71	4.85
Over-all totals	178	4.34	164	5.08	342	4.70
Standard Deviation		1.60		1.76		

^aThese data are based on answers to the question: "What groups or organizations do you belong to (union, political, fraternal, etc.)?" In administering the questionnaire, it was stressed that the men should record their union affiliation.

^bAs discussed in Chapter IV, the Maritime School population was divided into two roughly equated halves, one of which received Form 45, the other Form 40.

ask the number of questions required to give an adequate index of socio-economic class level. Also, the several questions included were often left blank, out of defensiveness or lack of knowledge (e.g., of father's or husband's income). Many subjects had no current income, due to momentary unemployment or to student or military status. Income had in some cases increased during the war period without a corresponding increase in actual class level. For these and other reasons, the data below must be interpreted only tentatively and with great care.

Table 17(V) presents mean E scores for groups based on present income.

TABLE 17 (V)
 MEAN E SCORES^a FOR GROUPS WHO HAVE VARIOUS PRESENT YEARLY INCOMES^b

Group	Present Income												Over-all							
	Below \$2,000		\$2,000-2,900		\$3,000-3,900		\$4,000-4,900		\$5,000-10,000		Above \$10,000		Blank		None		Mean S. D.			
	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean
Groups taking Form 60:																				
Univ. of Oregon Student Women	13	3.21	15	3.87	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--	11	3.14	8	3.29	47	3.42	1.38	
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Women	11	3.15	23	3.27	15	3.28	0	--	1	1.74	0	--	4	3.55	0	--	54	3.63	1.29	
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Men	14	2.91	10	3.06	16	2.83	5	3.42	4	2.26	0	--	4	3.59	4	2.53	57	2.93	1.25	
Totals:	38	3.08	48	3.41	31	2.99	5	3.42	5	2.16	0	--	19	3.32	12	3.04	158	3.18	1.31	
Groups taking Form 45:																				
Psychiatric Clinic Men	6	2.90	14	3.58	9	4.07	1	4.60	2	4.00	1	3.70	8	3.28	9	4.08	50	3.67	1.59	
Psychiatric Clinic Women	12	3.51	4	3.03	3	4.37	0	--	0	--	0	--	27	3.20	25	4.21	71	3.65	1.60	
Totals:	18	3.31	18	3.46	12	4.14	1	4.60	2	4.00	1	3.70	35	3.22	34	4.17	121	3.66	1.62	
Groups taking Form 40:																				
Middle-Class Women	22	2.80	19	3.00	8	2.92	1	1.00	3	3.27	1	6.40	17	3.42	83	4.13	154	3.64	1.96	
Middle-Class Men	11	4.49	3	4.87	9	4.04	12	4.27	25	2.89	1	4.00	0	--	8	5.10	69	3.89	2.08	
Working-Class Men	7	4.20	26	4.11	8	2.80	7	2.71	3	4.67	0	--	1	4.80	7	4.20	59	3.83	1.72	
Totals:	40	3.51	48	3.72	25	3.29	20	3.56	31	3.10	2	5.20	18	3.50	98	4.21	282	3.74	2.10	
Over-all totals:	96	3.30	114	3.55	68	3.30	26	3.57	38	3.02	3	4.70	72	3.32	144	4.10	561	3.57	--	

^aThe following scales were used in the various forms: Form 60: E Scale (12 items)
 Form 45: E Scale (10 items)
 Form 40: E Scale (5 items)

^bThese groupings are based on answers to the following question: "What is your present income (to nearest \$500 per year) _____."

It will be noted that some 25 per cent of the total sample reported "no income," while 13 per cent left the question blank. The majority of reported incomes were below \$3,000 per year, only three individuals reporting incomes of over \$10,000. Among the incomes below \$5,000 there are no appreciable differences in E mean (3.30 to 3.57), and no consistent trend of increase or decrease. However, the \$5,000-\$10,000 group has a conspicuously low E mean of 3.02, while the "above \$10,000" group is highest in ethnocentrism, with a mean of 4.70. The large but heterogeneous group—mostly women—with no income is also relatively high on E (4.10). Among the Working-Class Men (Form 40), E mean decreases as income increases up to \$5,000, after which the E mean goes up again. Among the Middle-Class Men (Form 40) and the University of Oregon and University of California Student Men (Form 60), on the other hand, the \$5,000-\$10,000 group is by far the lowest on E. Thus, *there is no simple relation between income and ethnocentrism*, and the relation between income and ideology may well be different for the middle class as compared with the working class. It is of some interest that in the two groups of nonstudent women (Psychiatric Clinic and Middle Class) those with no income were considerably more ethnocentric on the average than those with some income. The lower E mean in women who work may be due to their economic position; it is more likely, however, that the personality trends which lead to nonethnocentrism tend to produce also the willingness or desire to have gainful work.

It seemed that *expected* income might yield a better measure of economic aspirations (and perhaps of class identification) than did present income. The mean E scores for groups divided on the basis of expected income (ten years from now) are presented in Table 18 (V). The two largest groups are those expecting \$5,000-\$10,000 and \$3,000-\$3,900, in that order. The over-all totals for all samples combined show that E mean gradually increases as expected income increases. However, the data for individual samples reveal a more complex state of affairs. The E mean for the three highest income groupings (\$4,000 and above) is greater than that for the low income groupings mainly because the ethnocentric Maritime School samples (Forms 45 and 40) form the bulk (50-70 per cent) of these groupings. It will be noted that within each Maritime School sample there is no clear-cut relationship between expected income and E mean. Similarly, there are no consistent trends in the other samples. Thus, for Form 78 the \$4,000-\$10,000 levels are slightly but not significantly more ethnocentric than the lower levels, but the lowest E mean is for the "above \$10,000" level. For Form 60, on the other hand, the variations in E mean are small (2.97 to 3.34) and unrelated to income. Differences among samples are, therefore, much greater than differences among actual or expected income levels.¹⁶ These results have little if any bearing

¹⁶ Similar negative results were obtained in preliminary (unpublished) studies of E in relation to *desired* income.

TABLE 18 (V)

MEAN A-S OR E SCORES^a FOR GROUPS HAVING VARIOUS LEVELS
OF EXPECTED YEARLY INCOME

Group	Expected Income			
	Below \$2,000		\$2,000- 2,900	
	N	Mean	N	Mean
<i>Groups taking Form 78:</i>				
U.C. Public Speaking Class Women	6	3.08	26	2.99
U.C. Public Speaking Class Men	0	----	5	3.74
Extension Psychology Class Women	0	----	4	3.80
Professional Women	14	2.91	11	2.65
Totals:	20	2.97	46	3.06
<i>Groups taking Form 60:</i>				
University of Oregon Student Women	2	2.99	9	3.27
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Women	6	3.90	9	3.30
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Men	2	1.99	2	3.07
Totals:	10	3.34	20	3.27
<i>Groups taking Form 45:</i>				
Maritime School Men	3	5.17	9	4.16
Psychiatric Clinic Men	0	----	3	3.30
Totals	3	5.17	12	3.94
<i>Group taking Form 40:</i>				
Maritime School Men	1	5.20	16	5.22
Over-all totals:	34	3.34	94	3.37

on the theory that *economic forces* play a basic role in creating a setting for the development of ethnocentrism; but they provide evidence against the hypothesis that economic level and economic motives *per se* operate as major *psychological forces* impelling the individual in an ethnocentric or anti-ethnocentric direction.

A further hypothesis to be considered is that prejudice is determined by the economic level of the parents. Stated most simply: "A person growing up in a rich family is more likely to be prejudiced than one growing up in a middle- or low-income family." In order to make a partial test of this hypothesis, a question regarding father's income was included in the questionnaire, and the mean A-S or E score was obtained for groups representing several income levels. The data are presented in Table 19(V). The number of cases

		Expected Income												
\$3,000- 3,900		\$4,000- 4,900		\$5,000- 10,000		Above \$10,000		Blank		None		Over-all		
N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	S.D.
21	3.18	6	4.32	11	3.62	0	----	56	3.45	14	3.11	140	3.32	1.43
9	3.00	10	3.52	22	3.55	1	1.20	5	2.76	0	----	52	3.34	1.48
4	2.10	1	3.80	4	2.35	0	----	29	3.66	0	----	42	3.40	1.36
14	2.84	3	2.07	4	2.10	3	3.07	14	2.04	0	----	63	2.57	1.37
48	2.95	20.	3.56	41	3.31	4	2.60	104	3.28	14	3.11	297	3.18	1.46
6	3.54	1	2.66	1	2.82	0	----	19	3.50	9	3.55	47	3.42	1.38
16	2.91	4	4.03	3	1.91	0	----	8	3.71	8	2.95	54	3.24	1.29
12	2.75	7	2.70	24	3.12	4	3.03	6	3.03	0	----	57	2.93	1.25
34	2.97	12	3.14	28	2.98	4	3.03	33	3.47	17	3.27	158	3.18	1.31
27	4.57	14	4.52	70	4.46	12	4.38	2	3.95	41	3.98	178	4.36	1.60
8	3.59	3	4.73	10	3.45	1	3.40	0	----	25	3.70	50	3.67	1.59
35	4.34	17	4.55	80	4.34	13	4.30	2	3.95	66	3.87	228	4.20	1.62
28	5.23	20	5.05	44	5.06	10	5.60	0	----	45	4.84	164	5.08	1.76
145	3.73	69	4.16	193	4.09	31	4.34	139	3.33	142	4.03	847	3.82	----

^aThe following scales were used in the various forms:

- Form 78: A-S Scale (12 items)
- Form 60: E Scale (10 items)
- Form 45: E Scale (10 items)
- Form 40: E Scale (5 items)

in the various income levels provides another indication of the largely middle-class character of the total sample. The \$5,000-\$10,000 group was the largest, with 205 cases. The \$2,000-\$2,900 and \$3,000-\$3,900 groups, which during 1944-46 would probably have been the largest in the general population, had 154 and 186 cases, respectively. A disproportionately large number, 55, were in the "\$10,000 and above" group. The interpretation of these data is complicated by the fact that the father's income now may not be what it was

TABLE 19 (V)

MEAN A-S OR E SCORES^a FOR GROUPS WHOSE FATHERS HAD VARIOUS INCOMES

	Below \$2,000		\$2,000- 2,900	
	N	Mean	N	Mean
<i>Groups taking Form 78:</i>				
U.C. Public Speaking Class Women	8	2.94	17	3.35
U.C. Public Speaking Class Men	2	5.45	6	3.33
Extension Psychology Class Women	1	4.20	2	4.25
Professional Women	2	5.65	6	2.30
Totals:	13	3.84	31	3.20
<i>Groups taking Form 60:</i>				
University of Oregon Student Women	5	3.45	7	3.08
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Women	0	----	9	3.17
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Men	6	2.60	11	3.28
Totals:	11	2.99	27	3.19
<i>Groups taking Form 45:</i>				
Maritime School Men	12	3.88	26	4.09
Psychiatric Clinic Men	6	3.62	4	2.88
Psychiatric Clinic Women	5	4.36	4	3.70
Totals:	23	3.92	34	3.90
<i>Groups taking Form 40:</i>				
George Washington University Student Women	2	4.80	7	3.20
Maritime School Men	6	5.57	34	5.48
Middle-Class Women	7	3.46	9	3.29
Middle-Class Men	3	2.87	8	3.35
Working-Class Men	5	4.00	4	5.40
Totals:	23	4.16	62	4.62
Over-all totals:	70	3.84	154	3.92

during the subject's childhood. It should also be noted that almost half of the subjects left this question blank; it is not possible to say how much this has influenced the results.

The E means in Table 19(V) do not vary consistently in relation to father's income. They show negligible and unsystematic variations (from 3.77 to 3.92) among the various levels below \$10,000. However, the group whose fathers earned \$10,000 per year and above is significantly less ethnocentric than the combined lower income levels (means of 3.35 and 3.84

\$3,000-3,900		\$4,000-4,900		\$5,000-10,000		Above \$10,000		Blank		Over-all		
N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	S.D.
28	2.99	9	3.97	22	3.32	11	3.83	45	3.34	140	3.32	1.43
10	3.18	5	3.42	13	3.39	5	3.34	11	3.03	52	3.34	1.48
7	3.17	0	----	4	2.63	1	4.70	27	3.43	42	3.40	1.36
3	2.40	0	----	10	2.23	5	2.34	37	2.59	63	2.57	1.37
48	3.02	14	3.77	49	3.06	22	3.42	120	3.10	297	3.18	1.46
8	3.17	0	----	10	3.03	1	5.31	16	3.80	47	3.42	1.38
9	3.14	4	3.13	11	3.34	0	----	21	3.28	54	3.24	1.29
8	3.17	5	2.56	8	2.66	2	2.49	17	3.01	57	2.93	1.25
25	3.16	9	2.81	29	3.05	3	3.43	54	3.35	158	3.18	1.31
31	4.48	12	4.68	28	4.68	8	3.54	64	4.40	178	4.36	1.60
6	3.03	2	3.25	7	2.97	0	----	25	4.18	50	3.67	1.59
5	1.66	2	3.95	6	2.75	1	1.60	48	3.92	71	3.65	1.60
42	3.94	16	4.41	41	4.11	9	3.32	134	4.19	299	4.07	1.63
13	4.11	10	3.64	35	4.14	7	3.97	58	4.12	132	4.04	1.58
30	5.01	14	4.73	29	5.13	5	4.60	46	4.89	164	5.08	1.76
10	3.30	5	1.84	9	2.64	5	1.72	109	3.96	154	3.64	1.96
6	4.63	5	4.56	10	4.12	4	2.40	33	4.00	69	3.89	2.08
12	4.00	0	----	3	5.67	0	----	35	3.41	59	3.83	1.72
71	4.40	34	3.96	86	4.37	21	3.29	281	4.08	578	4.19	1.90
186	3.77	73	3.88	205	3.82	55	3.35	589	3.84	1332	3.82	-

^aThe following scales were used in the various forms:

- Form 78: A-S Scale (10 items)
- Form 60: E Scale (12 items)
- Form 45: E Scale (10 items)
- Form 40: E Scale (5 items)

respectively). Whether this lower mean holds for *all* individuals whose fathers are in this income group, or only for those individuals who get into organized groups such as those tested, is not clear. Further study may reveal that the lower E mean characterizes those individuals who were born in wealthier families but who tend—presumably for emotionally important reasons—to gravitate toward middle- or working-class groups, occupations, and ideologies. We are led to suspect, on the basis of results in numerous areas, that upward class mobility and identification with the *status quo* correlate positively with ethnocentrism, and that downward class mobility and identification go with anti-ethnocentrism.

A final "socioeconomic background" factor studied was father's occupation. Table 20(V) gives the mean E score for various groups based on occupation of father. The most common occupations ($N = 136-169$) were: Labor (skilled and unskilled), white collar, and big business-managerial. Small business and professional groups were next in size ($N = 95$ and 90), and in order of decreasing size we find farmers, engineers, government officials, and religious (ministers, etc.). With regard to E mean, there are only three groups which deviate more than 0.3 points from the over-all mean of 3.86. The offspring of engineers are significantly above average, with a mean of 4.36. On the other hand, the offspring of fathers with religious or government occupations are well below average (3.20 and 3.25). For all other occupations differences are minor and even smaller than the differences from sample to sample for any one occupation. No occupational grouping is consistently high or consistently low in every sample. Even in the case of fathers with big business and managerial occupations, the E mean varies considerably; it is sometimes below, sometimes above that for the test group from which it was taken. Thus, we find particularly low E means for this occupational group in the Extension Psychology Class and Professional Women, and a relatively high mean for the George Washington University Women (relative to the other occupational groupings in each sample). These variations suggest, as do the data above, that ethnocentrism in the individual is not significantly correlated with many of the socioeconomic groupings which are commonly assumed (by many social scientists as well as by laymen) to be direct, immediate determinants of ethnocentrism. It is the *meaning* of the group to the individual rather than membership *per se*, that helps us to predict his stand on ethnocentrism and other issues.

On the basis of the group membership data presented in this section (Tables 12(V)-20(V)), certain hypotheses can tentatively be drawn. Perhaps the first lesson to be learned concerns the danger of stereotyped thinking about groups. *No broad grouping in this study showed anything approaching ideological homogeneity.* This is not presented as a startling discovery but rather as a sober reminder to those who assume a close relation

TABLE 20. (1)
MEAN A-S OR E SCORES^a FOR GROUPS WHOSE FATHERS HAVE VARIOUS OCCUPATIONS

Groups	Labor (skilled and unskilled)		White collar (including foremen)		Small independent businessmen		Farmer		Religious		Professional		Engineer		Big business and managerial		Government official		Nepotized (stock, retired, miscellaneous)		Blank		Over-all		
	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	S. D.
<i>Groups taking Form 78:</i>																									
U.C. Public Speaking Class Women	23	2.93	25	3.16	12	3.76	9	3.08	3	2.20	16	3.28	10	4.31	36	3.38	0	----	6	3.87	0	----	140	3.32	1.43
U.C. Public Speaking Class Men	16	3.65	5	2.96	10	2.35	0	----	1	2.60	6	3.70	2	4.80	8	3.96	0	----	4	2.78	0	----	52	3.34	1.48
Extension Psychology Class Women	1	4.00	8	3.23	2	4.55	3	4.10	0	----	4	3.13	2	3.20	6	2.72	0	----	16	3.53	0	----	42	3.40	1.36
Professional Women	6	2.80	12	2.23	6	2.75	4	3.05	0	----	9	1.63	1	2.00	10	2.34	0	----	15	3.32	0	----	63	2.57	1.37
Totals:	46	3.19	50	2.92	30	3.15	16	3.26	4	2.30	35	2.91	15	4.07	60	3.22	0	----	41	3.40	0	----	297	3.18	1.46
<i>Groups taking Form 60:</i>																									
Univ. of Oregon Student Women	5	2.94	8	3.37	3	3.54	6	4.08	0	----	4	3.30	0	----	13	3.20	0	----	8	3.59	0	----	47	3.42	1.38
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Women	1	2.32	14	3.45	4	3.44	8	3.05	3	3.10	2	2.82	2	1.95	13	3.66	0	----	7	2.80	0	----	54	3.24	1.29
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Men	8	3.24	7	3.69	6	2.35	11	2.54	2	1.99	5	2.97	0	----	7	2.58	0	----	11	3.34	0	----	57	2.93	1.25
Totals:	14	3.07	29	3.49	13	2.96	25	3.07	5	2.66	11	3.06	2	1.95	33	3.25	0	----	26	3.27	0	----	158	3.18	1.31
<i>Groups taking Form 45:</i>																									
Maritime School Men	48	4.16	29	4.29	17	4.32	9	4.82	1	6.30	9	4.08	5	5.22	18	4.58	0	----	30	4.45	12	4.08	178	4.36	1.60
<i>Groups taking Form 40:</i>																									
George Washington University Student Women	14	3.83	20	4.28	10	4.34	1	2.20	1	6.40	25	4.03	9	3.78	18	4.79	12	3.25	18	3.71	4	3.95	132	4.04	1.59
Maritime School Men	47	5.22	16	4.76	25	5.01	10	5.72	0	----	10	5.30	12	5.18	7	5.00	0	----	26	5.09	11	4.20	164	5.08	1.76
Totals:	61	4.90	36	4.49	35	4.82	11	5.40	1	6.40	35	4.39	21	4.58	25	4.85	12	3.25	44	4.53	15	4.13	296	4.61	1.78
Over-all totals:	169	4.07	144	3.70	95	3.95	61	3.81	11	3.20	90	3.62	43	4.36	136	3.71	12	3.25	141	3.95	27	4.11	929	3.86	

^aThe following scales were used in the various forms:

- Form 78: A-S Scale (10 items)
- Form 60: E Scale (12 items)
- Form 45: E Scale (10 items)
- Form 40: E Scale (5 items)

between prejudice and membership in certain groups. While certain average differences have been found, the Standard Deviations are large and the overlapping between groups considerable. This does not mean that group memberships and social forces are unimportant in the formation and in the expression of ethnocentrism; indeed, there is a wealth of sociological literature to show that they are. Rather, it would appear that sociological factors play an essential but *complex and indirect* psychological role. Social psychology must, therefore, advance beyond its initial stage of seeking—and expecting to find—simple relationships between ideology and group memberships; it must go on to study the complex processes by which the individual *selectivity assimilates* the manifold pressures from his socio-ideological environment.

While no ideologically homogeneous groupings were found, there were significant relations between ethnocentrism and certain group memberships. The groups which are most differentiated with respect to ethnocentrism—that is, which tend to be predominantly high or predominantly low—have two main properties: They involve membership by choice rather than membership by birth, and they show relatively great homogeneity with respect to various other psychological characteristics. Thus, the political preference or the income-occupation grouping of the father shows no consistent relation to ethnocentrism in the offspring. But the subject's personal political preference (membership by choice), like his socioeconomic aspirations and his tendency to accept or reject his father's political views, is more closely related to E score. Similarly, membership in the exclusive Women's Club or the Labor School is more significant in terms of E than membership in the United Electrical Workers Union or the Parent-Teachers' Association, the latter groups being less homogeneous in all ideological areas.

The group memberships having the greatest significance for ethnocentrism are, then, those which have the greatest *psychological significance* for the individual. They are, it seems, groups which the individual chooses to join because they permit the further development and fuller expression of dispositions existing prior to joining. We are forced to reexamine the notion that the group membership determines the ideology—that, for example, a man is prejudiced *because* he is a Republican or a member of a snobbish club. Not only is the ideology likely to have preceded (in at least a primitive form) the joining of the group but, more important, both the ideology and the group membership seem to express deeper trends in the individual. An example of such a trend is "independence" versus "submission" in relation to parental authority. Thus, high scorers on E demonstrated greater submission and conformity than did the low scorers, both in the content of their ideology (E and PEC) and in their choice of political party (Table 14(V)). The individual's choice of group, like his choice of ideology, appears to be not merely a matter of chance or of simple imitation, but in large part an expres-

sion of important emotional dispositions. Before turning to these issues in more detail we shall, in the next chapter, consider religious ideology and groupings in relation to ethnocentrism.

F. CONCLUSIONS

The study of politico-economic ideology and group memberships has led to a broadening in our conception of the antidemocratic individual. The Anti-Semitism and Ethnocentrism scales, our primary measures of antidemocratic trends, show statistically significant relationships with the right-left dimension of politico-economic ideology. There appears to be an affinity between conservatism and ethnocentrism, liberalism and anti-ethnocentrism. The relationship is, however, quantitatively imperfect ($r =$ approximately .5) and qualitatively complex. It is proposed, in further studies, to break down the right-left dimension into numerous ideological patterns. One of these—perhaps the most significant in terms of potential antidemocracy—is the *pseudoconservative*.

In previous chapters we have seen that anti-Semitism or anti-Negroism, for example, are not isolated attitudes but parts of a relatively unified ethnocentric ideology. The present chapter suggests that ethnocentrism itself is but one aspect of a broader pattern of social thinking and group functioning. Trends similar to those underlying ethnocentric ideology are found in the same individual's politico-economic ideology. In short, ideology regarding each social area must be regarded as a facet of the total person and an expression of more central ("subideological") psychological dispositions.