Brazil

National Affairs

According to the most recent census, completed in 2000, Brazil had a population of approximately 169,000,000. Multiethnic and multicultural, Brazil counted the largest populations of African and Japanese descent of any country in the world. Many Brazilians are of European and Middle Eastern background, and in recent years the country attracted significant immigration from Korea and China as well as large numbers of Palestinians. The common description of Brazil as the world’s largest Catholic country was somewhat misleading. Many who self-identified as Catholic also practiced syncretistic Afro-Catholic religions. In addition, the Protestant population had been growing rapidly, and in some cities there were more non-Catholic Christians than Catholics. Other religions represented in large numbers—concentrated in specific parts of the country—were Buddhism and the so-called New Japanese Religions (in São Paulo) and Islam (in the deep south of Brazil, notably the city of Foz de Iguaçu).

In 2002, the two-term presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso came to a close. He was barred from a third term by law, and Brazil held elections to choose a successor. Cardoso, a former university professor who had been forced into exile during the military dictatorship of 1964–88, did much to strengthen democracy in the country. Taking political reform seriously, he noticeably reduced the entrenched power of regionally based politicians. Perhaps his most important democratic legacy was simply serving out his two terms and then handing over the office of president to a democratically elected successor.

While Brazil faced many economic, political, and social crises in 2002, none reached the level of those in Argentina (a disintegrating economy), Venezuela (political instability under the Chavez regime), and Colombia (continued and growing civil war). Cardoso had committed the country to open markets, an export/import-based economy, and a relatively free-floating currency. This led to a year of modest inflation. The Brazilian economy ended 2002 with a growth rate of approximately 2 percent, with better than 4-percent growth predicted for 2003. Cardoso privatized many formerly state-owned industries, and this, along with a commitment to
budget containment, led to much hardship for the middle classes, government employees, and workers in the newly privatized industries who were no longer guaranteed "jobs for life."

Brazil continued to have one of the most unequal societies in the world, whether measured by income, health, land ownership, or education, and the resentments arising from this fact fueled interest in the hotly contested 2002 presidential elections. Much of Brazil's electioneering takes place on television, with each political party allotted its share of free time on all the stations.

One major candidate for president was Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, the perennial standard-bearer of the Workers' Party (PT). This time, the charismatic union leader transformed his public image, emerging as a well-dressed neo-social democrat à la Tony Blair or Bill Clinton, whose main aim was the welfare of the Brazilian people. Another leading candidate was Senator José Serra of the Partido da Social Democracia (Social Democracy, PSDB), which was Cardoso's party. A classic Marxist activist as a university student, he, like Cardoso, spent considerable time in exile. By 2002, however, his political posture was that of a center-right technocrat. While Serra sought to appeal to voters by portraying himself as a leftist opposition figure within the previous administration, Lula was clearly the opposition candidate. Other serious contenders for the presidency were Anthony Garotinho, governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, and Ciro Gomes, a former governor of the state of Ceará and Cardoso's first finance minister. Underlining his commitment to the democratic process, President Cardoso played a nonpartisan role in the election, maintaining relationships with all candidates.

Brazil's presidential electoral system demanded a majority of votes cast, and thus runoffs were often required. That is what happened in 2002. In the first round, held October 6, Lula won 46 percent of the vote, with 23 percent for Serra, 17 percent for Garotinho, and 12 percent for Ciro Gomes. The second round, pitting the two top finishers against each other, occurred a month later. It was a landslide for Lula and the Workers' Party, which won 61 percent, versus 39 percent for José Serra.

While Lula had promised to modify Brazil's neoliberal economic model with a more social-democratic perspective, he had also made a commitment to hold to International Monetary Fund agreements. Thus despite fears expressed by some vociferous anti-Lula politicians, the Brazilian unit of currency, the real, did not fall against the dollar in the wake of the election, and remained in the 3.5:1 range.

One of the toughest issues Lula would face, as Cardoso did before him,
was the problem of landlessness and the growing strength of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Landless Rural Workers' Movement, or MST). While the 1988 Brazilian constitution strengthened provisions stating that unutilized lands could be taken over by the government and distributed to landless people, few landless people in Brazil had the financial resources to take advantage of the opportunity and farm the land. Cardoso's administration—under pressure from the MST, which organized “land invasions” throughout Brazil—distributed land to more families than had been settled in decades. This did not satisfy the MST, however, which wanted Brazil to put an end to large commercial agriculture by redistributing all farms of over 1,000 hectares to the landless.

Some MST leaders sought to link their plight to that of the Palestinians. In March 2002, Brazilian television showed film of Palestinian Authority president Yasir Arafat, confined to his compound in Ramallah by the Israelis, receiving an MST flag from Mario Lill, a member of the MST directorate of the state of Rio Grande do Sul.

Some other Jewish-related issues emerged during the election contest. Presidential candidate Anthony Garotinho, an evangelical Christian, frequently brought his faith into the campaign, and some Jewish leaders suggested that his policies as governor of Rio de Janeiro had unfairly benefited evangelicals. Another candidate, Ciro Gomes, said that he admired Adolf Hitler's determination, even though it was toward a bad end. As for the two front-runners, both Lula's and Serra's vice-presidential candidates (José de Alencar and Rita Camata respectively) made pro-Palestinian remarks in discussing the crisis in the Middle East. Alencar went so far as to say that the only solution was for Israelis to “leave the Middle East.” This led Rabbi Henry Sobel, a national figure and leader of the Congregação Israelita Paulista, Latin America's largest synagogue, to demand and receive an apology from Alencar, who expressed regret that he had been insensitive and uninformed. Indeed, just a few days after the remarks, during Yom Kippur, Alencar, Lula, and São Paulo mayor Marta Suplicy (a member of the Workers' Party whose husband was Jewish), visited Sobel's congregation.

While these incidents raised some initial concern in the Jewish community, there was little evidence to suggest that they represented a larger anti-Semitic trend. First, they were isolated, apparently spontaneous statements, not part of any discernible anti-Jewish or anti-Israel platform. Second, all the candidates considered the Brazilian “Jewish vote” important enough to warrant politicking in Jewish spaces, such as syna-
gogues and community centers. Third, Jewish leaders almost uniformly understood the comments as stemming from ignorance of the complexity of the issues. Jews from a wide range of class backgrounds and of varying degrees of religious practice supported numerous presidential candidates, but most noticeably Lula and Serra. While some Jews worried that Brazil’s leftist movements might take a stridently anti-Semitic turn, Brazilian political life, in 2002, was characterized by little open anti-Jewish activity.

Israel and the Middle East

Brazil continued along the “middle road” that it had traditionally taken on Middle East issues. In 2002, the government strongly supported UN Security Council resolutions calling for the end, as soon as possible, to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories. Brazil called for the peaceful creation of a democratic state of Palestine, based on the Beirut Declaration issued by the League of Arab States and the proposals formulated by the “Quartet” (the U.S., the European Union, Russia, and the UN secretary general). Brazil also belonged to the Rio Group, which had consistently called for an immediate cessation of all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement, and destruction in the Middle East.

Brazil had strong trade relations with Israel, especially in the areas of agriculture, technology, and water usage. Lula, the new president, gave no indication that these economic ties, or Brazil’s position on the Middle East situation, would change in 2003. Indeed, in his inaugural address, he made specific mention of the region, saying that the conflict there should be resolved by “negotiated and peaceful means.”

Holocaust-Related Issues

Literature denying the Holocaust continued to be published in Brazil, almost all of it privately funded by 71-year-old Siegfried Ellwanger Castan, a wealthy industrialist living in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Castan’s publishing company, Editora Revisão (Revisionist Publishing House), distributed an unknown quantity of books, for free, to politicians all over Brazil, but there was no sign that they affected policy. Castan’s books were not available in any of the major bookstore chains, but could occasionally be found in independent and second-hand shops. His Holocaust: Jewish or German? was said to have reached its 30th edition in 2002, but no one knew how many copies had actually been printed. His The Lie
of the Century, published in 1993, called the accounts of Nazi murders of Jews "Zionist lies." In 1994, Castan offered a prize to anyone who "has lived in Brazil for 20 years and can prove that any Jew was killed in a gas chamber." A number of Jews took up the offer, but Castan refused to entertain their claims. Castan also reprinted a number of anti-Semitic books originally published in the 1920s, such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and Henry Ford's The International Jew. In spite of its small circulation, Castan's literature was widely attacked, and consequently received disproportionate publicity.

All such publications were actually banned by Brazil's antiracism laws (Brazilian constitution of 1988, Article 5, paragraph XLII). But attempts to enforce the laws and suppress this material were not supported by politicians, and, indeed, when cases were prosecuted, the courts often found for the racists on the basis of Brazil's guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Thus, when Editória Revisão was removed as a member of a publisher's consortium in Rio Grande do Sul, a local judge reinstated it. In April 2002, after a trial lasting several years, Castan received a two-year conditional sentence (served as community service) from a federal high court judge for "inciting racism." In December, however, the Supreme Court threw out the conviction, agreeing with a defense argument that since Jews were not a "race," there could be no racism against Jews in the juridical sense of the term as used in the constitution.

Another problematic publication was the academic journal Revista Humanus, which began publication in 2000 in Campinas, home to the prestigious university, UNICAMP. It was published by Oaska—Centro Espiritual Beneficente União do Vegetal. The cover of Revista Humanus bore the Nazi rune symbol, and many of its articles extolled Nazi figures and attacked Jews (including this author).

**Racism and Anti-Semitism**

Racism, especially that targeted against people of African descent, was noticeable in the social and economic spheres. While Brazil's elite had always insisted that the country was a "racial democracy," such claims were increasingly harder to sustain. The correlation between race and income was very high, with darker-skinned people generally belonging to the lower classes. And as Brazilians from the impoverished northeastern part of the country moved south into the large urban centers like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the number of physical attacks on them multiplied.
In contrast, there was little open anti-Semitism. One factor explaining this was the limited contact between the relatively small community of Jews, on the one hand, and the mass of Brazil’s impoverished urban and rural people, on the other. Another was that Jewish communal organizations were careful to keep internal Jewish issues (as opposed to ones related to Israel) out of the spotlight. Also, Brazil’s strong rhetorical commitment to ethnic, cultural, and racial tolerance was backed up by law, making public anti-Semitism a potential crime. And finally, the wide publicity given to the active involvement of some Jewish community leaders in popular movements to combat hunger, poverty, and discrimination presented Brazil’s Jews in a favorable, socially conscious, light.

Outright anti-Semitic movements in Brazil attracted only a tiny number of participants. One moribund old group, the Integralist Party, based in the interior of the state of São Paulo, revived with the return to democracy in 1988. Back in the 1930s, its precursor and namesake, the Ação Integralista Brasileira, had some members who engaged in a virulently anti-Semitic campaign that was tolerated by the government. At their height, those Integralists claimed one million members, but in late 1937 they were banned along with all other political parties. The new Integralist Party appeared to be supported by a few hundred people, at most.

There was a formal neo-Nazi political party, the Brazilian National Revolutionary Party (PNRB), which had about 200 sympathizers. A number of other groups popularly associated with neo-Nazism were Carecas do Suburbio, Carecas ABC, Carecas do Brasil, SP Oi!, Carecas, White Power, S.P.F., and Neo-Nazis. While their discourse was frequently anti-Semitic, these groups seemed to have non-specific bigoted ideological roots, and were committed to little more than generic thuggery. Much of the “evidence” that some observers used to suggest a growth in Brazil’s neo-Nazi movement was the result of better reporting techniques and an increasing unwillingness, among both Jews and others, to let anti-Semitic rhetoric or actions pass without comment.

The small extremist groups were based in the industrial suburbs surrounding Brazil’s largest cities, where the economic crisis of the previous half-decade created high levels of unemployment. During 2002, skinhead groups appeared to grow as well (although they may simply have been more frequently noticed), but their attacks were random, not specifically targeted at Jews. The victims tended to be migrants from Brazil’s impoverished northeastern states, those of African descent, and homosexuals (Brazil had the highest rate of recorded homosexual murders in the world between 1980 and 1999).
JEWSH COMMUNITY

Demography

The Jewish community of Brazil, formed primarily after 1920, was ethnically diverse, encompassing Ashkenazim (primarily of Polish and German descent) and Sephardim (the largest plurality was of Egyptian descent). Preliminary information collected for the 2000 Census showed a Jewish population of 86,825, almost all of whom lived in urban areas. Some Jewish organizations in Brazil disputed this figure and placed the number between 120,000 and 140,000. Probably the most reliable estimate came from Israeli demographer Sergio DellaPergola, who placed the 2002 number at 97,300, a slight decline from the 1980 figure of 100,000. This made Brazilian Jewry the 11th largest Jewish community in the world. Early breakout numbers from the census suggested that the population self-identifying as Jewish was diminishing, in large part because of intermarriage.

The largest Jewish community in Brazil was in São Paulo, Brazil's largest city. In 2002, the Albert Einstein Jewish Hospital sponsored a study of the Jewish community of São Paulo. It showed a Jewish population of 60,000 out of a total population of 10.4 million, significantly higher than the official census figure of 44,000. The findings of this study must be used with caution, however, since DellaPergola, a consultant on the project, has suggested publicly that the methodologies used were not fully reliable. According to the Einstein data, some 60 percent of Jews in São Paulo attended synagogue only on High Holidays or for social activities, 13 percent never attended, about 14 percent attended weekly, and 3 percent—representing, in large part, a small but growing Orthodox community—went every day. The study also indicated a low number of students in Jewish day schools.

The second largest Jewish community was in Rio de Janeiro (25,000–30,000 Jews out of a population of 5.85 million), the third largest was in Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul (10,000–12,000 Jews in a population of about 1.36 million), and there were other significant communities in Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Santos, and Recife.

Communal Affairs

As in many other countries with relatively large Jewish populations, there were numerous nationwide and local community organizations
seeking to represent Jews. The central body representing all the Jewish federations and communities in Brazil was the Confederação Israelita do Brasil (CONIB), founded in 1951. This umbrella body included 200 organizations engaged in promoting Jewish and Zionist activities, as well as groups involved in Jewish education, culture, and charity. The Jewish Federation of São Paulo had a standing commission dedicated to fighting racism. The Latin American Jewish Committee Section for Interreligious Affairs, in the same city, actively combated racial hatred with support from the Brazilian National Commission for Catholic-Jewish Dialogue, an affiliate of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops. There was a special police unit specializing in the investigation of racial crimes in São Paulo, and the Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo (Jewish Federation of São Paulo) had a permanent member on the unit's advisory board. All the major international Zionist organizations and Zionist youth movements were represented in Brazil. Brazilian Jews published a number of newspapers and journals in Portuguese, and much Jewish activity took place in "Hebraica" clubs, which were Jewish community centers.

Culture

Books about Jews and Jewish issues were published regularly in Brazil. Books about Brazilian Jewry tended to be either hagiographic or to engage in debates about varying interpretations of Brazilian immigration policy during World War II. Two important scholarly works published in 2002 were Fábio Koifman's Quixote nas Trevas O Embaixador Souza Dantas e os refugiados do nazismo, about Brazil's ambassador to France who provided visas to Jews during the Holocaust, and the translation from Yiddish of Meir Kucinski's memoir on life as an immigrant in São Paulo beginning in the 1920s, entitled Imigrantes, Mascates & Doutores.

The major cities held Jewish film festivals that presented a wide range of features and documentaries from around the world on Jewish themes. The Israeli film Promises was certainly the most successful such film in 2002, running for months in major art-house cinemas in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In addition, the film version of Moacyr Scliar's novel, Sonhos Tropicais (Tropical Dreams), drew considerable interest.

An important event during the year was the inauguration of the new site of the Casa de Cultura de Israel in São Paulo. In its new premises, this Jewish cultural center expanded its activities in 2002 to include a significant number of courses, lectures, and films. It also began publication of a new, high-quality, Jewish cultural review, Revista 18.
Brazilian Jewry, like many other Jewish communities in the Americas, experienced a wave of “Sephardism” that attracted interest from Jews (both Ashkenazi and Sephardi) and non-Jews. In Brazil, much of the cultural fascination had to do with the myth that most of the Portuguese explorers of the country were actually secret Jews, a notion that found its way into elite and middle-class culture. In 2002, CONFARAD, the First Sephardi Conference in Brazil, was held in São Paulo, with good attendance and much publicity.

Jewish studies was growing as a field of research at major Brazilian universities, as evidenced by the impressive proliferation in M.A. and Ph.D. theses in Brazil on Jewish topics. In 2002, the Latin American Jewish Studies Association held its research conference in Rio de Janeiro, with strong support from the local universities.

**Personalia**

Rabbi Henry Sobel of the Congregação Israelita Paulista was perhaps the best known Jewish leader in Brazil, in large part because of his active stance against discrimination and poverty, and his engagement in interreligious dialogue. Rabbi Nilton Bonder of Rio de Janeiro’s Congregação Judaica do Brasil, known as the “green rabbi,” was a prize-winning and best-selling author who used Jewish tradition and mysticism to discuss a wide variety of spiritual matters, and social issues such as the environment. Dr. Celso Lafer, one of Brazil’s most important diplomats, served as minister of foreign affairs beginning in 2001. José Mindlin, now retired as director of Metaleve Industries, a large international producer of metal products such as pistons, bearings, and oil pumps, did much to preserve rare Brazilian books. His own book, *Uma vida entre livros* (A Life among Books), was published in 2002 to great acclaim. The Safras, former owners of Banco Safra, constituted one of the most prominent Sephardi families in Brazil. Silvio Santos (“Señor Abravanel”), Brazil’s most popular television personality, increasingly asserted his Jewish identity publicly, even though his wife and daughter were evangelical Christians. This came to public attention after the kidnapping of Santos’s daughter, which was followed by the kidnapper invading Santos’s home and holding him hostage before a Brazilian television audience.

*Jeffrey Lesser*
Argentina

National Affairs

After three-and-a-half years of economic recession, the Argentinean economy went into free-fall in December 2001. Both the budget deficit and the external debt were out of control, nearly a fifth of the workforce was unemployed, and an estimated 2,000 Argentineans slipped below the poverty line each day. To prevent a massive run on the banks, strict limitations were placed on the amount of money that account-holders might withdraw. Angry people—workers and members of the middle class—took to the streets, and 28 were killed in rioting. The government of President Fernando de la Rúa (Radical Party) fell on December 20. Within a few months de la Rúa’s economy minister would be jailed for corruption, and his state security secretary for violent repression of demonstrators.

The first president the national Congress elected to serve out de la Rúa’s term resigned quickly, and was replaced by Adolfo Rodríguez Saá of the Justicialista Party (Perónist). Saá defaulted on $155 billion in interest payments on the country’s debt, the largest single default by any sovereign nation in history. But he was out of office within a week. After one more president rose and fell, Eduardo Duhalde took office on January 2, 2002. A Perónist with a populist reputation who represented Buenos Aires Province in the national Senate, Duhalde was an experienced politician. He had been vice president from 1989 through 1991, and then served as governor of Buenos Aires Province, where he drew criticism for police bungling of, and possible ties to, the still unsolved 1994 bombing of the AMIA building, the central headquarters of Jewish life in the country (see below). Duhalde ran for president in 1999 but lost to de la Rúa.

Quite aside from the strictly economic challenges facing the new regime, there were political dangers as well. Not only were Duhalde’s opponents in the national Congress waiting for the opportunity to oust this unelected president, but the powerful governments of Argentina’s 24 provinces, determined to avoid cuts in their own budgets, were unlikely to be very cooperative. The possibility that the country could descend into anarchy and chaos was not out of the question.
On January 6, the new government devalued the peso to a fixed rate of 1.40 to the dollar, and announced a new two-tier system of exchange rates—an official rate set by the country's monetary authority for trade in goods, and a floating rate for everything else. To protect citizens from the impact of the devaluation, bank deposits of up to $100,000 would be translated into pesos at the old one-to-one ratio, with the losses to the banks partially compensated for with money from a new tax on oil, an industry that stood to gain from the cheaper exchange rate. The government clamped down even further on bank deposits, freezing accounts with more than $10,000 in them. The regime hoped that such steps would help persuade the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to lend Argentina $15–20 billion, and to work out a repayment agreement with the country's foreign creditors. But the freeze on bank accounts triggered a new round of middle-class rage, and on January 25, thousands blocked highways and gathered at rallies against the new government; in Buenos Aires, riot police fired tear gas to disperse the crowds.

By the beginning of March, when IMF representatives arrived in Argentina to negotiate the possibility of new loans, President Duhalde could point to an economic accomplishment—on February 28 he had convinced Congress to pass a budget 14 percent lower than that of the previous year. But this was not enough to convince the IMF that Argentina was on the road to fiscal responsibility, and new loans were not forthcoming. Duhalde's economy minister resigned, and the situation continued to deteriorate. GDP for the first quarter of 2002 was 16 percent lower than it was for the same period in 2001. Inflation reached 41 percent, and the cost of the basket of basic products increased by 75 percent. Unemployment reached 25 percent—even higher in some areas of the country—and estimates of how many people lived below the poverty line were as high as 60 percent. About a fourth of the population supported themselves on less than $100 a month. People who had previously belonged to the solid middle class were reduced to living off charity.

Argentina having defaulted on its loans, there was no new outside investment coming into the country. Two foreign banks closed their subsidiaries in Argentina, with more threatening to follow suit. President Duhalde, meanwhile, bowing at least symbolically to rising public demands for new elections to provide a democratically elected government, moved up the date of the scheduled national election from September 2003 to March. On June 26, there were again riots in the streets.

In early July, a number of leaders of other Latin American nations met with Duhalde in Buenos Aires and came away issuing supportive state-
ments. Argentinean officials continued their consultations with the IMF, and while the latter helped prop up the economies of neighboring Brazil and Uruguay with loans, it refused to do so for Argentina. The key sticking point was the refusal of Congress to approve Duhalde’s proposal, backed by the IMF, to convert the frozen bank deposits into bonds, so that undoing the freeze would not trigger a sudden spike in inflation; the majority in Congress, reflecting the feelings of their constituents, supported a simple end to the freeze. Complicating matters further, the nation’s Supreme Court ruled a number of the government’s economic measures unconstitutional, at least partly out of pique at Duhalde’s unsuccessful attempt to impeach all its members. The Economist (Sept. 5) noted that “the prospect of Argentina recovering from its shocking economic collapse seems to recede like a mirage on an endless Pampas road.”

In the fall, hopeful sounds about the Argentinean economy hitting bottom and being poised to inch upward were dashed by news that the government was defaulting on the country’s debts to the World Bank. On November 14, it repaid just $79.2 million out of the $805 million it owed. Only 18 countries had previously defaulted on World Bank loans in the 58 years of the bank’s existence. Argentina was its fourth-biggest debtor, and the amount left unpaid was larger than that of all the earlier defaulting countries together. Meanwhile, political jockeying between and within the Perónist factions over whom to back in the 2003 election added another element of uncertainty to the situation.

**Anti-Semitism**

Argentina had been settled by immigrants from many different countries, and its society encompassed a wide variety of ideological tendencies. Yet there emerged, over time, a certain shared vision of Argentinean society requiring immigrant groups to integrate into the cultural model already set by the earlier arrivals. This attitude encouraged Jews to become part of the Argentinean collective, but harbored potential antagonism to the retention of a distinctive Jewish identity.

This assimilationist view was espoused not only by right-wing Catholic nationalists, who disapproved of immigrants who might threaten the religious uniformity of the country, but also by the bourgeois democratic streams and the socialist left, which demanded that Jews and other immigrants abandon traits differentiating them from other members of society, or, in the case of the socialists, from the rest of the proletariat. (The Communist Party was the only group to dissent from this position, allowing the formation of special Jewish and Italian sections.)
Throughout the twentieth century, Jews entered nearly every field of Argentine life; the only two sectors off-limits were the middle and senior levels of the military, and the senior foreign service. Jews were prominent in academia, business and industry, the sciences, the arts, and communications. Some were active in political life, and in the second half of the twentieth century Jews began to win election to the provincial and national legislative bodies as representatives of the Socialist, Radical, and Peronist parties. A number of Jews became cabinet ministers and provincial governors. To be sure, there was often informal bias against Jews even in those sectors of Argentine life that did not expressly discriminate.

Expressions of ideological anti-Semitism appeared in intellectual and journalistic circles as early as the 1880s and have continued since. Jews were attacked for being leftists, revolutionaries, and anarchists; for being bourgeois, capitalist, and imperialist; for being a separate nation within the “Argentine nation”; for participating in an international plot together with the freemasons; for being descendents of Jesus’s murderers; for their unbelief and for remaining loyal to their beliefs. The teachings of the Catholic Church often lay behind popular anti-Semitism, and there was also continuous dissemination of anti-Semitic literature modeled on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

In the 1930s, a right-wing military junta took power that drew on Catholic and nationalist sentiments in the country. It set limits on Jewish immigration to Argentina, and these remained in effect for years. Also, the Nazi government in Germany spread anti-Semitic propaganda throughout Latin American, and Argentinean army officers trained in Germany came back home imbued with Nazi anti-Jewish ideology. Since then, the army retained an anti-Jewish bias, one that surfaced again from 1976 to 1983, when the military suspended the constitution and took power. While the regime outlawed public manifestations of anti-Semitism—just as it banned all independent political activity—Jews were harassed and tortured more than others in the official detention centers and clandestine prisons.

When democracy returned to Argentina in 1983, anti-Semitic groups resumed open activity, continuing with their propaganda and mounting physical attacks against Jewish organizations. In the 1990s some of them succeeded in organizing two political parties. While these trends alarmed Argentine Jews and contributed to Argentina’s image as an anti-Semitic country, they did not endanger Jewish existence in Argentina. In fact hostility from some sectors of the population united the Jewish community to fight publicly against potential or actual attacks.

In the 1960s a new variant of anti-Semitism emerged, originating in the
Arab world, and it continued to have great resonance in 2002. In this case, the hatred of Jews was tied together with anti-Zionism and antagonism toward Israel. Paradoxically, while the Arab variety of anti-Semitism tended to identify with the radical left, its practitioners often allied themselves with Argentinean nationalist groups, finding common ground in anti-Semitism. Anti-Jewish organizations continue to disseminate their literature in 2002. For example, the book *El Kahal de Oro* (The Gold Kahal) by Hugo Wast—pseudonym of the Catholic anti-Semitic writer Gustavo Martínez Zuviría—was exhibited at the fourth annual Exhibition of the Catholic Book in La Plata, in November. This book, originally published in the late 1930s, was a popular classic of Argentinean anti-Semitism.

Remarkably, the social and economic crisis that Argentina experienced in 2001–02 produced no anti-Semitic reaction either in the political arena or in the popular protests. For a short time, indeed, an Argentine-Israeli economist, Mario Blejer—an observant Jew—was governor of the Central Bank. Public discussion about his performance focused on his policies and the fact that for many years he had worked for the International Monetary Fund. Not only did he attract no anti-Semitic comments, but, like all of the prominent Jews in politics in recent years, the fact of his Jewishness went unmentioned.

An instance of anti-Jewish discrimination in politics did come up in 2002, but it had nothing to do with the economic situation and had a happy ending. The country’s new constitution of 1994 canceled the previous requirement that only a Catholic could be elected president, vice president, or president of the Senate. But this change was not introduced into the provincial constitutions. In December 2002, when the possibility rose that the Justicialista Party would choose Senator José Alperovich, a Jew, as its candidate for governor of Tucumán Province, the archbishop of Tucumán, Luis Alberto Villalba, together with candidates from the opposition, expressed outrage. They pointed out that the provincial constitution required the governor and lieutenant governor, upon taking office, to swear their loyalty to “God, the Nation, and the Holy Gospels.” An intense public debate ensued in which Jewish organizations, representatives of the Muslim community, and the Evangelist Christian Council—a union of 200 non-Catholic churches—demanded repeal of the discriminatory requirement. In a public survey carried out in Tucumán toward the end of the year, 52.8 percent of the people favored the constitutional change while 45.3 percent opposed it. Despite the constitutional provision, the voters of the province, in a re-
markable rejection of religious bigotry, elected Alperovich governor in June 2003.

This complex framework of relationships between the Jewish community and other sectors of Argentine society was reflected in reactions to the terrorist attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 that left 29 dead, and, especially, the attack two years later, July 18, 1994, on the building of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (Argentine Israelite Mutual Aid Association, AMIA), the headquarters of most of the organizations of the Jewish community, that killed 85 and injured hundreds more.

The spontaneous popular reaction, after the AMIA bombing, was to identify with the victims in a mass demonstration a few days after the attack. Tens of thousands, including the president of Argentina and leaders of the Jewish community, gathered in Plaza Congreso for expressions of solidarity by different sectors of the society. And yet it was not until September 2001, more than seven years later, that 20 Argentine men, four of them police officers, went on trial for allegedly providing local help for the attackers, who were assumed to be foreigners. On July 22, 2002, the New York Times revealed that an Iranian defector had provided information linking Iran to both the Israeli embassy and the AMIA attacks. Ever since the atrocities took place and continuing during the ongoing trial of the 20 Argentineans, suspicions were voiced about the possible collaboration of politicians, members of the judiciary, and police officers in obstructing the investigation.

Beginning in 1994, the Jewish community tightened its security considerably. Most buildings belonging to Jewish organizations, such as synagogues, schools, and social and sports clubs, were surrounded by barricades, and Jewish institutions hired guards to supplement the police or gendarmerie officials patrolling outside the buildings, a state of affairs similar to Jewish communities in Europe and elsewhere.

A public-opinion survey in 2000 sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and AMIA showed that only 15 percent of Argentineans would "prefer not" to have Jews as neighbors, and that the same proportion of people who thought Jews had "too much" influence in society—roughly a quarter—believed that Jews had "too little" influence. Multinational corporations, the Catholic Church, the mass media, banks, politicians, and the military were all considered more powerful than Jews. Some 28 percent of the sample considered anti-Semitism a "very serious problem" in Argentina, and another 35 percent considered it "somewhat of a problem." Seventy-two percent agreed with the statement that there
"are groups in our society that espouse Nazi ideology." Asked about the AMIA bombing, 52 percent thought it was targeted at "Jews generally," 31 percent that it was targeted at "all Argentines," and only 7 percent that it was aimed specifically at AMIA.

Holocaust-Related Matters

A major change in Argentina’s attitude toward the Holocaust occurred in 1995, when the government approved funding for the Fundación Memoria del Holocausto (Holocaust Memorial Foundation), and provided it a building. In 1999, Congress granted the foundation a 99-year lease on the property. That same year, the Ministry of the Interior issued a book on the Holocaust, *Seis millones de veces uno—el Holocausto* (Six Million Times One—the Holocaust), edited by Eliyahu Toker and Anita Weinstein, that was distributed to public schools to educate the country’s young people about the subject. In addition, April 19, the date of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, was set aside for the public schools to honor cultural diversity. That day, called Día de la Convivencia en la Diversidad Cultural en Recordación del Levantamiento del Ghetto de Varsovia (Day of Coexistence and Cultural Diversity in Recollection of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising), was devoted totally to the study of subjects related to the Holocaust.

Steps were also taken at that time to bring to light Argentina’s historical role during World War II and the Holocaust. At the initiative of Guido Di Telia, who was then foreign minister, the government established the Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de las Actividades del Nazismo en la Argentina (Commission for the Clarification of Nazi Activities in Argentina, or CEANA), which sponsored research and published two compilations of articles resulting from it in 1999 and 2000. Working independently, journalist Uki Goñi studied archives in Germany, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, the U.S., Great Britain, and Switzerland—in addition to those of Argentina—and in 2002 published *La auténtica Odessa—La fuga nazi a la Argentina de Perón* (The Authentic Odessa—the Nazi Escape to Perón’s Argentina), about the escape routes that Nazi war criminals used to reach Argentina, with Perón’s express support. There has also been some historical scholarship on the involvement of some of these Nazi refugees in industry, commerce, and scientific and military research in Argentina. But nothing has yet been published about their role in the security forces and their ideological influence upon officials in the various branches of the military,
or their active participation in military and police repression of the civilian population.

The opinion poll undertaken by the American Jewish Committee and AMIA in 2000 indicated that over 70 percent of Argentineans wanted the memory of the Holocaust kept alive and that Holocaust denial had had a negligible impact on the country. Nevertheless, Argentineans, on the whole, had meager factual knowledge about the Holocaust.

JEWISH COMMUNITY

Demography

The Jewish population of Argentina was estimated at about 180,000 in 2002. At its peak, in the 1960s, the community had numbered 300,000, but had steadily declined since. One reason was the low birthrate. As in other predominantly urban and middle-class Jewish communities around the world, a low birthrate meant an aging Jewish population. The average age, which was 25–27 in 1930, 31 in 1947, and 35 in 1960, jumped to over 40 in the 1970s, and continued rising. In addition, a growing number of Jews abandoned the community, many through exogamous marriages, which increased steadily. While no exact statistics are available, the intermarriage rate was estimated at 30–40 percent in the mid-1980s, and certainly went up in the interim. There was also a negative migratory balance. The rate of aliyah was proportionally among the highest in the Jewish diaspora, and there was also considerable emigration to the U.S., other countries in the Western Hemisphere, and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe.

The Jewish population of Argentina—about 80 percent Ashkenazi—was mostly urban. Memories of Jewish agricultural settlement and the “Jewish gaucho” retained their places of honor in communal consciousness—reinforcing the idea that Jews were an old and legitimate element in predominantly Catholic Argentine society—and in the country’s tourist industry, which was eager to use the image to lure American Jews to visit. But they had no relation to current reality. Until 1905, 66 percent of Jews lived in agricultural settlements, but as early as 1935 the number had plummeted to 10 percent.

In 2002, more than 80 percent of the Jewish community lived in Buenos Aires (Capital Federal and the suburbs), and another 10 percent in cities that had more than a million inhabitants (Córdoba, Rosario, Tucumán, and La Plata).
Communal Affairs

La Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (Argentine Israelite Mutual Aid Association, AMIA), whose origins dated back to the 1930s when the Ashkenazi Jews of Argentina formed a burial society, coordinated the religious, cultural, and social-welfare activities of the Ashkenazi community, on the model of the European kehilla. The 20 percent of Argentine Jews who were Sephardi had three separate organizations, depending if they came from Aleppo, Damascus, or Morocco. A Sephardi umbrella organization encompassing them disbanded in 1998, and in October 2002 a new one was launched, La Federación Sefaradí de la República Argentina (Sephardi Federation of the Argentine Republic, FESERA), with 66 institutions participating.

La Federación de Comunidades Israelitas Argentinas—Vaad Hakehilot b'Argentina (Federation of Argentine Jewish Communities), included all the Jewish institutions in Argentina—Ashkenazi and Sephardi—under a federative umbrella. AMIA, which was instrumental in organizing the federation, continued to play a dominant role. While constituents from the provinces sometimes complained that the Buenos Aires administration maintained excessive control, the federation remained the only body dealing with widely different services—spiritual and religious, cultural, educational, and social welfare—throughout the country.

The key political umbrella organization of the Jewish community was La Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas (Delegation of Israeli Argentine Associations, DAIA), founded in 1935. Responsible for defending Jewish interests before the civil society and the government, DAIA also functioned as the Latin American representative of the World Jewish Congress, and, in 1964, took the initiative in founding the Latin American Jewish Congress. DAIA fought anti-Semitism, racism, and other forms of discrimination in Argentina, and belonged to the advisory council of Argentina's National Institute Against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Racism (INADI), established in 1997.

The DAIA managed to maintain itself through almost seven decades of political, social, and economic upheaval by sticking to a self-imposed limitation: no identification with any Argentinean party or political faction. To be sure, DAIA's silence during the period of the military junta, 1976–83, which used kidnapping, torture, and murder to maintain power, drew criticism from within the Jewish community, although DAIA's supporters responded that outright defiance of the junta would make things
even worse for Jews. More recently, a sharp debate arose over whether the DAIA's response to the terrorist attacks against the Israeli embassy in 1992 and the AMIA building in 1994 was sufficiently vigorous (the DAIA's offices were located on the fifth floor of the AMIA building). The Memoria Activa group, highly critical of what it saw as the DAIA's too cozy relationship with the authorities, continued its regular demonstrations in front of the main courthouse in Buenos Aires every Monday at 9:53 A.M., the day and exact time of the AMIA attack. The man who was DAIA's president in 1994, Rubén Beraja, had to resign his position in 1998 because of irregularities in the administration of the bank he owned, Banco Mayo.

Elections for officers of AMIA and DAIA were often accompanied by vigorous political activity. Many of the competing Jewish factions appealed across the Ashkenazi-Sephardi boundary, identifying themselves with one or another Israeli political party (Abraham Kaul, current president of AMIA, supported the Labor Party), various social and political ideologies, sports clubs, or specific leaders.

Religion and Secularism

The Jewish community of Argentina was overwhelmingly secular. For many, synagogue attendance on Shabbat or Jewish holidays was not a religious expression but instead a mode of social and national identification with the Jewish people and its culture. Yet even while the large majority of Jews and their leaders lived secular lives, the central institutions of the community remained officially Orthodox.

One controversial religious issue with potentially profound implications for Argentine Jewry as a whole was conversion. With the high rate of intermarriage, some non-Jewish spouses were willing to convert to Judaism, be formally incorporated into the community, and raise their children as Jews. As early as the 1920s, however, suspicions that many "conversions" did not fulfill the requirements of Halakhah led some Orthodox rabbis to ban all conversions in the country, but not every rabbinical authority abided by the ban. In 2002 there were still many Jews in Argentina, including people who were not themselves religiously observant, who insisted that non-Jews converted by local rabbis were not yet Jews and should go to Israel, the U.S., or Europe to be converted by rabbis there before the community could recognize them.

The Masorti movement, which identified with Conservative Judaism and performed its own conversions, began its activity in Argentina in
1960, and in 2002 had dozens of affiliated congregations there. The Reform movement, which also performed conversions, had a very limited presence in Argentina and very few followers. Most Jews of Argentina, whose Judaism was a matter of social and ethnic identity and who emphasized active participation in Jewish life and the upbringing of children as members of the Jewish people rather than following Halakhah, were satisfied with Conservative and Reform conversions.

According to some estimates, about half of all Jews in Argentina who maintained relatively continuous contact with a synagogue were identified with the Masorti movement. In 1962, Masorti established the Seminario Rabínico Latinoamericano (Latin American Rabbinical Seminary) in Buenos Aires, an institution of higher learning to train rabbis and other religious leaders. In 2002, more than 60 graduates of the seminary were serving as rabbis in Argentina, elsewhere in Latin America, the U.S., and around the world.

Recently, a growing number of young Jews, especially from Aleppo, Syria, as well as some Ashkenazim, had “returned” to religious Orthodoxy. They observed Jewish law strictly and studied rabbinical literature in the traditional way. But this trend had very little impact on the broader community.

More significant was the growth of the Chabad-Lubavitch Hassidic group. Chabad’s entry into the Argentine Jewish community began in the late 1960s, and by the end of the 1990s it had 20 centers in the country, two-thirds of them in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. Part of Chabad’s strategy, not only in Argentina but worldwide, was to establish a public presence by celebrating holidays like Hanukkah, Sukkot, and Lag Ba’omer in public, non-Jewish spaces, and many Jews responded positively to such demonstrations of Jewish pride. Chabad’s original appeal in Argentina was to the poorer Jews—a steadily growing group under the economic conditions of 2001–02—who appreciated the economic help it furnished them. It also attracted a number of wealthy people to help support its activities. It was unclear, however, how many of those who identified with Chabad or received financial aid from it adopted the fully observant Chabad lifestyle, since the movement did not insist on strict conformity to Halakhah on the part of those who found their way into its orbit.

**Education**

Jewish schools, among the most vital factors enhancing Jewish socialization and community organization in Argentina, traditionally reflected
the various streams of Jewish thought in the community. Until the late 1960s these were afternoon schools that children would attend after the public-school day. There were schools for Ashkenazim and Sephardim, as well as those with religious, traditional, leftist, secular, Zionist, non-Zionist, and anti-Zionist ideologies. A central educational organization for the Ashkenazim was founded in 1935. In the early days Yiddish was the language of instruction for most Ashkenazi schools, even the Zionist ones. The number of students in Jewish schools rose from 5,300 in 1940 to 17,500 in 1965. The ideological map shifted as well during these years, most schools declaring a Zionist identification and adopting Hebrew as the language of instruction.

When the public educational system changed its schedule to a longer day in the late 1960s leaving no time for the afternoon Jewish schools, the community transformed them into private day schools offering both a general and a Jewish curriculum. This put pressure on the schools to excel in their general programs so that parents would not remove their children and send them to public school. While tending to relegate the Jewish program to a secondary place, this strategy did succeed in retaining Jewish students. In addition to formal Jewish education, Jewish schools offered an informal social framework with events connected to the Hebrew calendar and Israel-related activities such as dance groups and choirs. For students in the higher grades there was the opportunity for educational trips to Israel.

A survey carried out in 1997 found that nearly half of all Jewish families in Argentina with children aged 13–17 and two-thirds of those with children aged 6–12 sent them to Jewish day schools. These schools taught the mandated national curriculum along with a Jewish cultural program that took up between five and 20 hours per week. A total of 19,248 students attended classes in 56 nursery schools, 52 elementary schools, and 29 high schools.

By 2002, however, the numbers apparently dropped—a new study showed just 14,700 students in 40 elementary schools and 22 high schools. Although the two surveys conducted five years apart had different methodologies and were therefore not necessarily comparable, it is likely that the difference reflected a real downturn, the natural result of a low birthrate, assimilation, and emigration. Indeed, since the bulk of Jewish emigration took place in the second half of the year and was not yet reflected in the 2002 data, the actual decline was probably greater. The high tuition charges were also a deterrent under the grim economic circumstances, even though local Jewish institutions, the Jewish Agency, and Israel's Ministry of Education established financial aid programs.
Recognizing that other educational alternatives were necessary for those not in day schools, the community, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency, established supplementary programs with classes two or three days a week. Chabad developed a similar strategy, offering children attending public school an enriched after-school curriculum in computers, English, and other subjects, together with Jewish studies.

Economic Catastrophe and Emigration

The Jewish community's economic troubles had begun in 1998, when two Jewish-owned banks, Mayo and Patricios, where money belonging to Jews and Jewish institutions had been invested, went bankrupt. Then, the collapse of 2001 devastated the primarily middle-class Jews of Argentina. An estimated 30 percent of Jews were unemployed, and one-fourth lived below the poverty line. Those who could not pay their utility bills had their gas and electricity cut off. Some had no food to eat, and the community worried about the possibility of suicides. Jewish welfare agencies in Buenos Aires struggled to keep up with the rising demands of families in need, especially those living in the countryside. Many synagogues and community centers opened emergency soup kitchens.

The Jewish community of Argentina could not itself handle the heavy new welfare burden. In December 2001, the Inter-American Development Bank granted $1.73 million to AMIA for its job placement service, which was receiving 500 work applications a month as compared to 1,000 for all of 2000. The AMIA's Tzedaka Foundation, founded to help the community's needy, could not do so on its own, and relied on a heavy infusion of funds from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), the U.S. Jewish organization that funded overseas relief, to pay for the distribution of food packages and vouchers, medicine, clothing, and cash assistance. The JDC's chief social worker in Buenos Aires said: "I feel that poverty is consuming us one by one. First went the business employees, then the business owners, then the professionals: lawyers, doctors, architects, then property owners—and the end is not yet near." By the time Passover came, there were so many Jews who could not afford a seder that the JDC and Tzedaka organized several massive communal seders—hundreds of people attended each one—in Buenos Aires. In all, the JDC spent $6.7 million on Argentina in 2002.

When the economic crisis broke, the Jewish Agency declared the Jewish community of Argentina—along with those of France and South Africa—"endangered," and stepped up its program to encourage aliyah with promises of jobs, language training, free health insurance, and a
$20,000 living allowance. The agency’s office in Buenos Aires reported a 300-percent increase in inquiries about opportunities in Israel. Argentina was fertile soil for calls of aliyah: over the previous ten years about 14,000 Jews had moved from Argentina to Israel, a number equal to 8 percent of the Argentinean Jewish population.

During 2002, Israeli political leaders visited Argentina to encourage Jews to leave, several mayors of Israeli cities advertising the benefits of life in their hometowns. Some 1,500 Jews had gone on aliyah in 2001, and Israel reportedly hoped to double or even triple that number in 2002. Prime Minister Sharon personally greeted a planeload of Jews from Buenos Aires who landed in Israel on January 23. In February, reports circulated that Sharon had met with American Jewish leaders to request $200 million to fund aliyah from Argentina. He did not get such an astronomical sum, but a United Jewish Communities (UJC) press release on February 27 announced it was giving the Jewish Agency $35 million to bring 5,000 Jews from Argentina to Israel during 2002. This was in addition to a $5-million allocation to the JDC for aid to Jews in Argentina. By March, the Jewish Agency raised its sights, announcing a “master plan” to absorb 20,000 Jews from Argentina (more than 10 percent of the community) over three years.

By year’s end, 5,931 Argentinean Jews had left for Israel—most of them in the second half of the year—nearly four times as many as in 2001. Although there were no statistics for Jewish emigration to other countries, their number was estimated as roughly equal to those who chose aliyah. HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society), based in New York, played an indispensable role in facilitating the migration of Argentinean Jews.

One factor that might have made some Jews in Argentina think twice about the policies of the State of Israel was a lingering uncertainty over the role that the Israeli government had played during the dictatorship of 1976–83 in their country. While Israel helped more than 300 Jews leave Argentina at the time (HIAS saved hundreds as well, both Jews and others), relatives of some of the Jews who “disappeared” claimed that their requests for intercession by the Israeli embassy had not been honored, and since Israel was helping Argentina militarily in those days, they thought that more could have been done to save the imperiled Jews. Israeli diplomats, however, claimed that they had presented the military government with lists of hundreds of names of “disappeared” Jews, but that the junta had not responded.

In 2000, the Israeli Knesset established an interministerial commission, including two representatives of the families, to investigate the charges. By the end of 2002 it had heard testimony from some 100 victims of the
junta, its staff had combed through the relevant archives of the Foreign Ministry and the Jewish Agency, and it discreetly requested the current Argentinean government to check its records. The commission’s final report was due for release in 2003.

**Culture**

Jews constituted an integral part of Argentine cultural life. Jewish participation was evident in every sphere of culture—literature, journalism, theater, cinematography and television, the visual arts, and classical and popular music. Furthermore, Jews generally made up a disproportionate part of the audience at cultural events and scholarly conferences.

Two of the best known Argentinean writers were Jewish. Marcos Aguinis, whose Spanish-language novels, short stories, and essays demonstrated the breadth of his erudition in medicine, psychoanalysis, literature, and history, was the recipient of numerous awards and attracted international acclaim. Perla Suez was one of the most important writers of children’s books in the country, and she also wrote and lectured on the role that reading played in the imaginative life of the child.

Milá Publishing House, sponsored by AMIA, published many works of Jewish interest, most in the original Spanish, as well as a number of translations, particularly from Yiddish.

Two original creative works that appeared during the year deserve special mention. One was *Recreando la cultura judeoargentina, 1894-2001: en el umbral del Segundo siglo*, (Recreating Jewish-Argentine Culture, 1894–2001: On the Verge of the Second Century), a compilation of papers delivered at a conference in Buenos Aires in August 2001. Presenting diverse views about the cultural inquietude that generates creativity, it focused on the transmission of Argentine Jewish culture, and included the perspectives of Argentinean Jews who wrote or performed in Spanish but whose work was especially popular in Israel and the U.S.

The second was a film, *Aquellos niños* (And We Were Children), which documented the experiences of people who underwent the Holocaust as children, and explored the deep imprint the experience left in their souls. This was one of the first works in Argentina to document the Holocaust and its spiritual legacy. Previously, Argentinean audiences had been exposed to film treatments of the Holocaust only via imports from the U.S., Europe, and Israel.

Demonstrating its conviction that the history of the Jews in Argentina was a valued and integral part of the country’s culture, the prestigious
Academia Nacional de la Historia (National Historical Academy) elected Raanan Rein as a member. Rein, director of Tel Aviv University’s Institute of Latin American History and a native of Argentina, was the author of nine books on Jewish and Israeli relations with Spain and Latin America. In 2002 he also won the Latin American Jewish Studies Award for Outstanding Research for his latest work, *Argentina, Israel, and the Jews: From the Partition of Palestine to the Eichmann Affair*.

**Personalia**

César Milstein, a co-winner of the 1984 Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine, died in England on March 24. Born in Argentina in 1927, Milstein attended the University of Buenos Aires. In 1958 he went to Cambridge University to complete his Ph.D., returned to Argentina in 1961 to head the molecular biology division at the National Institute of Microbiology, but left two years later and went back to Cambridge to protest the dismissal of many of his colleagues by the regime. The Nobel Prize, which he shared with two others, was for the development of a technique to produce monoclonal antibodies, accomplished in 1975.

Two important Argentine Jewish educators passed away in December. Rajel Bogopolsky de Hodara, born in 1939 in Buenos Aires, died in Jerusalem. A member of the Zionist youth movement Ijud Habonim, Bogopolsky de Hodara graduated from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem with a degree in Bible and Hebrew. She taught mostly Spanish-speaking adults in the Jewish communities of Latin America and in Israel, and was an especially favored speaker for Mexican Jewish organizations. A Ph.D. candidate at the time of her death, she had published scholarly articles on women during the Holocaust.

Jaime Barylko was born in 1936 in Buenos Aires, where he died. A graduate of the Teacher’s Seminary in Moisesville, he taught in Jewish schools in the interior of the country as well as in Buenos Aires. He directed the Rambam secondary school and, later, the Vaad Hachinuch Hamercazi (Central Council of Jewish Education). Earning a Ph.D. in philosophy from La Plata University, Barylko was a professor in various Argentine universities and dean of humanities in the private university Maimónides in Buenos Aires. He wrote many books on philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy, lectured for Jewish organizations, and appeared on many radio and television programs.

*THE EDITORS*