Special Articles
Jewish Experience on Film —
An American Overview

by Joel Rosenberg

For one familiar with the long history of Jewish sacred texts, it is fair to characterize film as the quintessential profane text. Being tied as it is to the life of industrial science and production, it is the first truly posttraditional art medium — a creature of gears and bolts, of lenses and transparencies, of drives and brakes and projected light, a creature whose life substance is spreadshot onto a vast ocean of screen to display another kind of life entirely: the images of human beings; stories; purported history; myth; philosophy; social conflict; politics; love; war; belief. Movies seem to take place in a domain between matter and spirit, but are, in a sense, dependent on both. Like the Golem — the artificial anthropoid of Jewish folklore, a creature always yearning to rise or reach out beyond its own materiality — film is a machine truly made in the human image: a late-born child of human culture that manifests an inherently stubborn and rebellious nature. It is a being that has suffered, as it were, all the neuroses of its mostly 20th-century rise and flourishing and has shared in all the century’s treacheries. It is in this context above all that we must consider the problematic subject of Jewish experience on film.

In academic research, the field of film studies has now blossomed into a richly elaborate body of criticism and theory, although its reigning schools of thought — at present, heavily influenced by Marxism, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and various flavors of deconstruction — have often preferred the fashionable habit of reasoning by decree in place of genuine observation and analysis. Even so, the resources have grown immensely since the 1970s for developing a more sophisticated approach to the study of Jewish experience on film. This designation for the subject is preferable to the more colloquial term “Jewish film,” for several reasons. First, film is not just the neutral instrument of various national cultures expressing themselves in art — it is a powerful creation of human imagination and technology that has, in some sense, drawn these cultures into its ongoing life. Then, too, film is a vastly collaborative art that is inherently multinational and multicultural in its practical operations. Scan the credits of any film and you will see that even the most nationally or culturally identified films are indelibly international, as are film’s visual language and aesthetic choices.
Finally, the film of Jewish experience is intimately bound up with the non-Jewish world's use of Jewish experience for its own reflection. Jews in some sense participate in that reflection and have shaped it in significant ways — but we are dealing, in any case, with an intercultural realm, with the larger civil society in which Jews dwell, which has cultural claims of its own. Jewish film in the strict sense of the term is a component of that whole. But the representation of Jewish experience on film, which extends far beyond Jewish film as such, is an important subject of inquiry in its own right, which is only now gaining the serious attention of Jewish studies.

Clearly, there is a need for widening our conception of "Jewish film" to mean more than simply a discourse of either Jews or Gentiles; more, let us say, than an "image" of the Jew, considered as a prepackaged object submitted for Gentile approval or disdain; more, even, than the cultural output of various Jewish societies. Rather, the presence of the Jew in film needs to be rethought in the context of cinema history as a whole and set against the major crises and disasters of the 20th century, especially the Jewish catastrophe in Europe.

Film grew up, as it were, as an older sibling of modern totalitarianism, and of the Holocaust itself. The ideological exploitation of film by Nazi Germany and, throughout the same era, by the Soviet Union, was only a more conscious instance of a process long in place in the cinema of the bourgeois democracies. In those societies, film worked, usually unconsciously, in harmony with existing social institutions, and the dictates of censorship (typically motivated by churches, schools, and civic and political groups) were fairly early internalized in film practice by the film industry itself. One can of course learn a great deal by studying the representation of the Jew in the cinema of Nazi Germany. But cinema outside of Nazi Germany, and on other subjects than the Holocaust or Jewish life, must be studied as well — not so much to weigh the accuracy or inaccuracy, the degree of sympathy or hostility, in its representation of Jews (these issues have predominated in an older generation of Jewish film studies), but for its systematic connections to the unfolding of 20th-century history, to the development of the film medium itself, and to the broader problems of race, class, nation, and ethnicity in modern times.


What one needs to study is immense. The subject encompasses the world output of cinema, and extends all the way back to the era of primitive cinema, when, in 1903, the image of a Jew first appeared on screen. It requires some familiarity with film theory, past and present — a vast and often daunting thicket of reflection that draws on linguistics, semiotics, psychoanalysis, psychology of perception, optics, aesthetics, art history, and other disciplines. It properly requires a knowledge of several languages, and of film scholarship in those languages. It entails familiarity with particular Jewish film industries, such as Yiddish-language and Israeli film. It involves examination and comparison of changing trends in fiction film, documentary film, and political propaganda film. It entails consideration of key junctures in film history when technological developments, economic and geopolitical realities, and changes in production methods, stylistic fashions, audience composition, and public tastes and moods decisively shaped what was seen on screen and how it was seen. It involves the concurrent histories of the film representation of other national, ethnic, and social groups. And, of course, it requires knowledge of modern Jewish and world history, of the history of anti-Semitism, of the rise and fall of Nazism, of the planning, enactment, and aftermath of the “Final Solution,” of survivor experience, and the vast realm of postwar reflection and debate on the Holocaust and its representation.

Moreover, beyond the immense range of subjects and disciplines deployed, several kinds of understanding are required, including intuition. One must develop a feel for the nuances of individual films in their sensuous immediacy — of directorial style and gesture, of the impact of specific actors, of an era’s peculiar visual and auditory patina. It is impossible, for example, to evaluate the meaning and satirical impact of Ernst Lubitsch’s anti-Nazi burlesque, To Be or Not To Be (1942), without savoring the particular comic genius of Jack Benny, Carole Lombard, Felix Bressart, and Sig Ruman. It is impossible to separate the meaning of The Jazz Singer (1927) from specific choices in the casting and playing of it — Jolson’s spiritedly flirtatious hyperactivity, May McAvoy’s wide-eyed, nubile sweetness, or Eugenie Besserer’s flustered stammers of maternal delight — and from the film’s choppy interplay of orchestral theme music, sound performance, dialogue, and intertitle. It involves reconstructing what an audience might have heard when they were told by Al Jolson: “Wait a minute . . . wait a minute. . . . you ain’t heard nothin’ yet!”

1These two important topics are beyond the scope of the present essay, which will focus on English-language American film. On Yiddish film, see J. Hoberman, Bridge of Light: Yiddish Film Between Two Worlds (New York, 1991); Judith N. Goldberg, Laughter Through Tears: The Yiddish Cinema (Rutherford, N.J., 1983); Eric A. Goldman, Visions, Images, and Dreams: Yiddish Film Past and Present (Ann Arbor, 1983). On Israeli film, see Ella Shohat, Israeli Cinema: East/West and the Politics of Representation (Austin, Tex., 1987).
Some film theoreticians assert that intellectually rigorous work on film (of the sort purportedly introduced by the revolution in film theory that started in the late 1960s) is a fundamentally different labor from that of the cinephile — that is, the critic, historian, or film interpreter who proceeds chiefly from a love of film art and an interest in the *oeuvre* of particular filmmakers. But it is precisely the love of film art — in its full range and variety, in its historical specificity, in its susceptibility to the individual genius of particular directors, actors, scenarists, cinematographers, editors, and scorers, in its ability to foster enhanced perception and empathy in its viewers, to capture the minds and hearts of audiences, to epitomize the mood of an era, and to focus moral and ethical attention on the stream of human experience — that is vital to any informed writing about it.

**Film Representation of Jews: The American Setting**

Historical study of the film representation of Jews is indebted to two works in particular that have laid a useful groundwork, at least for understanding the American component of the subject: Lester D. Friedman's *Hollywood's Image of the Jew* (along with its coffee-table counterpart, Friedman's *The Jewish Image in American Film*, an illustrated popular history) and Patricia Erens' *The Jew in American Cinema*. Both authors cover a vast range of film examples from the silent era to the early 1980s and attempt to periodize the subject, largely by decades, at least for the latter half of this history. These works serve as a valuable inventory of historical examples and a useful compendium of conventional wisdom on the historical forces shaping cinematic representation of the Jew. The demands of comprehensiveness have led both authors to sacrifice much depth and specificity, offering little in the way of sustained analysis and interpretation of an individual film as text, and virtually no attempt at systematic correlation of their insights with the problematics of general film history and theory. Their studies, properly speaking, belong to an older trend in ethnic and feminist film studies, generally characterized as the "images of . . ." approach, which weighed the relative degrees of accuracy or stereotype in depiction of Jews, blacks, Asians, Hispanics, women, and others in given films and eras, usually animated by an informal partisanship on behalf of the group, class, or gender being studied.\(^5\)

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\(^5\)On image studies and their premises, cf. David Bordwell, *Making Meaning: Inference and
The organizing premise of such studies is therefore somewhat simple and misleading, but their importance in the history of discourse about ethnicity in film, both in stimulating popular and scholarly interest in the subject and in providing a broad inventory of examples and trends, should not be underestimated. Moreover, in some situations it is indeed still vitally important to reflect on film images, provided the wider issues of cultural history are kept in view. In fairness to Friedman and Erens, it should also be noted that both authors are aware of the limitations of their format and the provisional nature of their conclusions.

Our indebtedness to both Erens and Friedman is, in any case, considerable, for both authors have articulated, for better or for worse, what could be called a consensus view of the Jewish presence in American film and filmmaking, as mapped out by numerous investigators in film history and media studies over the past several decades, and that view has proven thus far a reasonably durable one. For a convenient overview, we may borrow, for the time being, Friedman’s and Erens’ rather simplified decade periodizations, which we shall have reason to qualify further on. Friedman divides his discussion into the following chapters with, it turns out, obligatorily alliterative names: “The Silent Stereotypes,” “The Timid Thirties,” “The Fashionable Forties,” “The Frightened Fifties,” “The Self-Conscious Sixties,” “The Self-Centered Seventies,” and (appropriately tentative for two years into the decade) “The Emerging Eighties.” Erens’ periodization is a bit soberer and more articulated, but in other respects similar: “The Primitive Years (1903 – 1919),” “The Silent Era (1920 – 1929),” “The Early Sound Years (1930 – 1940),” “The War and Postwar Era (1941 – 1949),” “The Fifties (1950 – 1960),” “The Sixties (1961 – 1969),” “The Seventies (1970 – 1979),” and “Recent Films (1980 – 1983).” Although more non-committal than Friedman’s in its characterization of decades, Erens’ periodization by specific years at least shows that the notion of “decade” has a sliding definition.

From a film-historical standpoint, in any case, these categories are of merely provisional value. Major changes in film production, cinematic styles, ideological perspectives, and patterns of audience reception, among other factors, often cut across decade boundaries, and it is probably more accurate, though pedagogically messier, to reckon in five- to seven-year, rather than ten-year, cycles. Erens is justified in defining her fourth period in terms of World War II and its aftermath, even though that period


Much of the present discussion is indebted to the useful overview in Frank Manchel, *Film Study: An Analytical Bibliography*, vol. 1 (Rutherford, N.J./London, 1990), pp. 818 – 51 (“The Jew in American Film”).
encompasses a major ideological reversal (as a consequence of events leading to the Hollywood blacklist) and even though the roots of the war itself, and its attendant cinematic expression, go back at least two decades earlier.

An even simpler schema than either Friedman’s or Erens’, though congruent with the substance of their analysis, has been offered by Stuart Samuels in his essay “The Evolutionary Image of the Jew in American Film,” which correlates cinematic representation of the Jew with four specific stages in 20th-century American Jewish history: alienation, acculturation, assimilation, and acceptance. This schema, or its substance, is shared, in one form or another, by a wide variety of investigators who regard the motion-picture industry as a central force in the socialization of immigrant Americans, virtually down to our own day, and it has influenced to some degree the present survey. But all existing paradigms require qualification and refinement, as we shall see.

Alienation and Its Pleasures

The earliest phase, which Samuels has dubbed a period of “alienation,” corresponds to the period of New World immigrant life in the early decades of this century, when the mainly Yiddish-speaking East European Jews lived as a ghettoized minority among other immigrant minorities, in large urban areas, often in conditions of severe poverty, pursuing small-scale entrepreneurship and trades, and representing a bold contrast both to the Anglo-Saxon mainstream of American culture and to the largely assimilated and prosperous German and Sephardic Jews who had been absorbed into American life decades earlier. During this period, filmmaking was still in an experimental phase, an amusement-park or nickelodeon entertainment whose production was still largely controlled by the Edison trust, a monopoly tied to patents on motion-picture technology.

In this earliest phase, stereotyped images of Jews, often borrowed from literature and theater, appeared frequently in the primitive narratives of one- and two-reeler diversions: the pawnbroker, the money-lender, the haberdasher, and the like. These Jews, obviously enough, were shown as “outsiders,” but perhaps no more so than other ethnic types displayed in

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the films, and to some degree all film characters in these early films were stereotypes. The nickelodeons and exhibition houses, moreover, were often filled with immigrant audiences who eagerly devoured the entertainment fare, taking great pleasure in beholding the screen images of their respective ethnic kinfolk. While the notion of "immigrant entertainment" has often been overemphasized in descriptions of this period (primitive cinema was in fact already targeted as much to native-born, middle-class recipients as to an immigrant and working-class clientele), the success of early films with immigrant spectators played a decisive role in shaping the ensuing phases of American film history.

Architects of Acculturation: The Studio Moguls

A second phase, which Samuels has dubbed a period of "acculturation," corresponds to the beginning of a long period of upward social mobility for the offspring of immigrant Jews, from about 1907 onward, and it seems inseparable from two important developments in the entertainment industry: the rise of Jewish entertainers in vaudeville, theater, film, and radio (these eventually included Al Jolson, Sophie Tucker, Fanny Brice, Eddie Cantor, George Jessel, George Burns, and the Marx Brothers); and the rise of a small group of ambitious Jewish entrepreneurs who helped to break the grip of the Edison trust and created a powerful system of film production.
and distribution through the founding and running of the great Hollywood studios. These included MGM (Marcus Loew, Joseph Schenck, Samuel Goldwyn, Louis B. Mayer), Paramount (Adolf Zukor, Jesse Lasky, B. P. Schulberg), Columbia (Harry and Jack Cohn), Warner Brothers (Jack and Harry Warner), Universal Pictures (Carl Laemmle, and his celebrated underling Irving Thalberg), and 20th Century (Joseph Schenck), later merged with Fox (William Fox). These founders were immigrants or children of immigrants, and all were Jews. One other major studio formed in this period, United Artists, was the creation of non-Jews: Charlie Chaplin, D. W. Griffith, Mary Pickford, and the half-Jew Douglas Fairbanks—performers whose role in both studio and cinematic history was similarly crucial, especially as a force for shaping the film star system.

Possessing little formal education but a vast amount of experience as entrepreneurs (Goldwyn had started as a glovemaker and salesman; Mayer as a scrap-metal and junk dealer; Zukor and Harry Cohn as furriers; Jack Warner as a cobbler, butcher, and bicycle merchant; Laemmle as a bookkeeper and clothier; Fox as a sundries peddler and, later, as a clothier; Schenck as a drugstore-chain owner and amusement-park impresario; Schulberg as a reporter and trade publisher), the studio pioneers were quick to sense the mass appeal of films, and they correctly understood that the success of the industry depended on building a viable system of distribution, through firm links between studios and theater chains, as well as important financial links, largely with Jewish-owned banking houses — among others, Warner Brothers with Goldman Sachs, Paramount with Kuhn and Loeb, and Universal with S. W. Strauss.

In the heyday of the studio system, from the 1920s to the 1950s, the studio heads maintained a legendarily despotic control over the careers of actors, directors, and screenwriters, severely reining in artistic freedom and retaining an often fatal final say about what survived on screen.

Much has been made of their boorish sensibilities and Philistine tastes (Harry Cohn was notorious for his ruthlessness, vulgarity, and lechery;
Samuel Goldwyn, a Polish Jew who never mastered English well, spawned a vast folklore of “Goldwynisms,” often apocryphal malapropisms such as “Include me out,” and “Anyone seeing a psychiatrist should have his head examined”). But it is also true that the studio pioneers played a crucial role in defining and refining the storytelling function of film, which, prior to 1907, had been mixed with such nonliterary amusements as travelogue and natural-history lectures, live musical entertainment, circus performances, vaudeville acts, and the like. Zukor, for example, traveled to Europe to survey filmmaking art and explored the potential of film to adapt theatrical and literary classics. Recent research on American film history has placed strong emphasis on 1907 to 1915 as the years of transition from primitive to classical narrative film, to that crucially influential form of film expression known as “the classical Hollywood style,” and this period coincides with the rise of the Jewish film moguls and the studio system.

During this period, two-reelers became three-reelers. Film entertainment was disengaged from live entertainment and largely constrained to single- and double-feature exhibition in darkened theaters before (mostly) quiet, attentive audiences, and later supplemented by newsreels, cartoons, and short subjects. Film editing was refined to facilitate narrative continuity and to preserve unities of space, time, and action. Film music (at first an improvised art of skilled theater organists and other musicians; later, in the transition to the sound era, a formally composed score as a fixed part of the soundtrack) was developed to underscore carefully movements and moments in the plot. In general, film spectatorship as such, in familiar contours that have persisted to the present day, was born. The methods of film production as a complexly collaborative art, and film distribution as a mass-market enterprise, were decisively shaped. It was during this period that Hollywood, California, became the capital of the American film industry, and, indeed, a world capital of film art. It was the seat of a highly coordinated system ruled by the mostly Jewish studio moguls; in a certain sense it was an industry ideally susceptible to the genius of ambitious immigrants, Jewish and otherwise, and later of other European émigrés of many nationalities, who populated all echelons of the film-production system.

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11These examples are from Ephraim Katz, The Film Encyclopedia (New York, 1979), s.v. “Goldwyn, Samuel,” p. 491.
12Gabler, An Empire of Their Own, p. 28.
It is highly misleading to see in this phenomenon merely the formation of a Jewish cabal of ruthless and powerful business interests acting, as it were, in a vacuum — sealed off from broader currents in American history of the time. It should be seen in the context of the Progressive Era and against the background of European immigration to America in the great age of open doors between the 1880s and the early 1920s. Film art fortuitously coincided with the complex formation of bourgeois ideology in Europe and America in this period — it was in some sense its inevitable harvest. The birth of the film spectator was an integral part of this process, and, in the United States, bespoke the formation of a genuinely cross-cultural (though surely also distorted and problem-laden) American identity. The rapidly maturing film theater, soon to blossom into the ornately architectured and furnished “film palace,” became a great leveler of race, ethnicity, and gender — creating an audience mostly invisible and anonymous to one another, set into a kind of temple where light shone in the darkness, where people went, as they continue to do today, to escape the prisons of identity and constraints of reality, to forsake their bodies and merge themselves with screen idols in tales of romance, adventure, comedy, and tragedy.

Clearly, film catered to fundamental human yearnings, to the power of fantasy as such. In this manner, it was a potent vehicle of acculturation in an America undergoing an intolerably rapid pace of economic development and urbanization, with inexorably painful ethnic, class, and familial dislocations and proximities. Film entertainment in this sense was surely a medium of escape, but also, to be fair to its premises, potentially an arena of healing, of mediation, of consensus, of ideological experimentation, empathizing and ethical reflection, and, at times of confrontation — a place for the articula-

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tion, as philosopher Stanley Cavell has suggested, of a democratized "poetry of the ordinary," which Cavell equated with the noblest tasks of philosophy.²⁰

That the Jewish film moguls sensed this possibility in its wider intellectual and cultural ramifications is highly unlikely, but they did sense it instinctually and devoted their life energies to its realization. As talented immigrants who had dissolved and rebuilt their own cultural identity, they were optimally suited to be the Promethean shapers of this newest art, and they were situated at an appropriate distance from American culture that enabled them to manipulate, usually with extreme caution, its prevailing symbols and myths. It is in this context that we must understand their profoundly assimilationist stance. The America created by the Jewish movie moguls was, especially in the sound era, a WASP/Yankee paradise of small towns and picket fences, of milk bottles on doorsteps, of crowing roosters and friendly neighbors, of cantankerously upright justices of the peace, of Horatio Algerish boys with slingshots in their back pockets, of soldiers marching off to distant war — an America of Norman Rockwell paintings, of Life, Liberty, and the Saturday Evening Post. Whatever non-Anglo ethnicity was portrayed — and it was extensively portrayed — throughout Hollywood film's formative period, from the Golden Age of the silent screen (1915 - 1928) through the great classic era of talkies (ca. 1928 - 1960), it was usually as counterpoint to a mainstream, or, more properly, Main Street, American type, whose fabled decency triumphed over all obstacles and toward whom all identities flowed and merged. The material capital of American film was Hollywood, but its spiritual capital, as Cavell has suggested for screwball comedy, was a mythical land known as Connecticut,²¹ that Eden of the Yankee social register. In the same era, a comparable aura surrounded Kansas, the American heartland, most memorably in the 1939 classic The Wizard of Oz.²²

Still, American film, particularly of the silent era, was deeply preoccupied with the tale of the immigrant — of Cohens and Kellys, of Abie's Irish Rose, of industrious street urchins and sweatshop maidens, of ruthless landlords, enterprising marriage brokers, and hand-wringing balabustas, and above all, of the ambitious seeker of prosperity, the parvenu in the making, the urban newcomer who by pluck and providence crosses ethnic

and class lines to realize the American Dream. A classic example of this story is *The Jazz Singer* (1927), usually remembered as the first sound film (sound and dialogue were in fact used only for the musical numbers, though memorably in one semi-improvised exchange of talk), but whose engaging tale of the rise of a cantor’s son to show-business stardom captured the hearts of American audiences just as the Jew was largely about to disappear from the American screen.\(^{23}\)

An interesting evolution in the tale of the Jewish immigrant seems to have occurred from 1920 to 1928 — it can be seen by contrasting the remarkable 1920 film *Hungry Hearts* with *The Jazz Singer*. In the former, a Jewish immigrant mother, living in a squalid New York City tenement, is gouged repeatedly for rent money by her cruel, stony-faced landlord, who threatens to evict her. In a gesture of stark despair, the woman goes berserk and destroys her apartment, chopping the walls into pieces with an axe. She is later arrested, tried, and acquitted, but the haunting power of her despair lingers, and her strikingly Luddite form of rebellion (here directed not at the machines of production but at property) cannot be erased from mind. Acculturation clearly had its price, and this story was meant to show it. In *The Jazz Singer*, entertainer Jake Rabinowitz (Al Jolson) is torn between appearing in the opening night of a Broadway show on Yom Kippur (his first and best chance at stardom) and filling in for his dying cantor father by singing *Kol Nidre* in the synagogue. The film solves the dilemma by having him do both: first cantoring and, on a subsequent night, resuming his role in the Broadway show. The film seems to say that one can have it all, that America is willing to cut some slack for the assimilating Jew as long as he or she gets the overall priorities straight — namely, an appropriately proportionate wedge of the American Dream. Between the desperate ambience of *Hungry Hearts* and the sunny affirmation of *The Jazz Singer* is a crucial eight years of burgeoning American prosperity — and with it American immigrant prosperity. But, as we know from hindsight, that circumstance was rapidly headed for a time of crisis.

*The Jazz Singer* should not be seen in isolation from other comparable approaches to ethnicity in films of the period. The ancient Judean prince Judah Ben Hur, in the 1925 *Ben Hur*, is arrested and sold to a slave galleon but gains his freedom after rescuing a Roman general. He subsequently rises to stardom in Rome as a champion charioteer in the Roman games, who then challenges his Roman ex-friend and enemy in a chariot competition, which he enters as “the Unknown Jew.” He arguably anticipates Jake

Rabinowitz’s metamorphosis into Jack Robin. *The Jazz Singer* can also be meaningfully compared to the portrait of a San Francisco Spaniard among American Anglos in the film *Old San Francisco*, directed by the same director, Alan Crosland, in the same year (the latter film even uses the same snatches of Tchaikovsky’s “Romeo and Juliet” that are present in *The Jazz Singer*); to the portrait of an assimilated Chinese man (“Chinaman,” in the era’s parlance) in San Francisco, played by Jewish actor Edward G. Robinson, in *The Hatchet Man* (1932); and to evocations of black life in the South in King Vidor’s 1930 film *Hallelujah*, as well as to the whole industry of “race movies,” films tailored for black audiences in the ’30s and ’40s.  

The lives and careers of the movie moguls have been engagingly chronicled by Neal Gabler in his book *An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood*. Despite its unfortunate subtitle (which, much to Gabler’s later dismay, seemed to bolster the anti-Semitic canard that “Hollywood and the media are controlled by Jews,” thus lending his book to considerable misuse), this is an absorbing account, drawing on numerous prior sources but greatly enriched by archival oral-history material. It covers the history of American film into the 1950s, when the studio system began to come apart. The book is perhaps justly criticized for its overemphasis on an *ad hominem* approach to American film history, its minimization of the vital influence of non-Jews, and its general lack of scholarly method, but the book’s richness of anecdote and fluency of narrative make it an indispensable resource for one pursuing the subject. It contains an especially illuminating account of the political conflicts between left and right that developed in Hollywood in the 1930s and ’40s, in the struggle of writers and directors with censorship by studio heads and by the Hays Office regulations (a code of censorship adopted by the film industry as a form of self-policing to ward off boycotts by conservative political and religious organizations).  

Alongside these events Gabler recounts anti-

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25 See note 16.  

26 On the Hays Office and American film censorship, see Leonard J. Leff and Jerold L. Simmons, *The Dame in the Kimono* (New York, 1991); Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D.
Semitically motivated attacks on Hollywood by congressional investigators, which began in 1940–41 and were interrupted, but not quelled, by the war years. But to understand these events properly, we should turn our attention to a third phase, that which Samuels has termed a period of assimilation.

Assimilation and Its Discontents

In truth, assimilation, and with it ethnic self-denial, was an integral premise of American film from its beginning — at least from the start of its development under the studio pioneers, and earlier, in implicit ways, through the whole of the preceding primitive period. Film producers in the era of transition discovered fairly quickly the penalties for overly blatant or stereotypic ethnic representation, and thus the Jewish image, like the Irish image, was often muted or placed in disguise. Some films rewrote Jewish stage characters as Anglo-Saxons. Others put Jewishness into soft focus by using non-Jewish actors for Jewish roles, a practice that has persisted well into our own time.

A more interesting strategy, made possible by the star system, was Charlie Chaplin’s use of the Tramp as the quintessential newcomer — and thus as a kind of allegorization of ethnicity. Chaplin, himself a non-Jewish émigré who never became a naturalized American, created a semantically plastic antihero, one who precisely eluded firm ethnic identification but still was dark-haired, curly-haired, mustachioed, and arguably Mediterranean or Jewish — easily at home among the hordes of Ellis Island arrivals and a conspicuous oddball when set against Main Street. It would be a mistake, however, to overlook the equally convincing Englishness of Chaplin’s performance, its rootedness in the vaudeville of Liverpool and London — an essentially stage performance whose contours were to become more apparent in the late, post-tramp Chaplin, in the sound era. Chaplin thus softened, allegorized, and universalized the newcomer, made him applicable to the experience of many immigrant groups while claimable by none. Still, Chaplin’s image went out to the world as an American image, which, by virtue of its improvised invention during a lunch break on a Hollywood set, it was in fact. The tramp was surely as American as Ellis Island, and soon became, as had Ellis Island itself, a logo for America. When the tramp became a


27See Gabler, An Empire of Their Own, pp. 311–86.

28See Musser, “Ethnicity, Role-playing, and American Film Comedy” (see note 12), pp. 52–54.

29Cf. Musser, p. 54.
Jewish barber in *The Great Dictator* in 1940, it was a believable permutation of the tramp's long-familiar image, but still the tramp as Jew (in this case, as Jewish barber), a self-consciously allegorical statement rather than a truly Jewish tramp. And, of course, it was a tramp who talked.

Assimilation, at any rate, was an actively touted ideal throughout the silent era, and stories often portrayed entrepreneurial zeal, upward mobility, intermarriage, show-business fame, and similar apotheoses of the remade self. The late silent era was the beginning of the age of radio, and radio's golden era, in the 1930s and 1940s, underscored this trend by featuring a bevy of increasingly Americanized Jewish stars such as Molly Goldberg (speaking in dialect), Fanny Brice, Jack Benny, Mary Livingstone, and, as noted earlier, George Burns, Eddie Cantor, and the Marx Brothers. Benny, in particular, was, like Chaplin, a figure of semantic plasticity. He embodied a kind of Everyman, an American Main Street type, but was also the classic schlemiel — the carping, debunking, worldly-wise hero of Yiddish folklore — as well as the preener, the pretender to highbrow culture, the hideously out-of-tune violinist, and often, in a wryly self-deprecating parody, the Jewish miser. In *To Be or Not To Be*, Benny was a reassuringly American presence in a Nazified Europe while playing a Pole of ambiguous ethnicity and remaining implicitly an assimilated American Jew throughout.30

The Marx Brothers, for their part, represented, as an ensemble, four stages of Americanization: the mute, wildly gesticulating newcomer (Harpo), the dialect-speaking street vendor/entrepreneur (Chico, in this case using an Italianized English), the fast-talking urban con artist or crackpot professorial pretender (Groucho), and the wholly Americanized youngest brother (Zeppo), who was invariably the straight man of the act. The zany, anarchic energy of the Marx Brothers, their subversive wordplay and dizzying nonsequiturs, suggest a kind of Melting Pot meltdown, a carnivalesque transformation of the American (and, in *Duck Soup*, fantasized European) landscape that was to have important reverberations in American comedy and satire far beyond its era. Its roots perhaps go back to the centuries-old tradition of the Purimshpiel, itself a parody of assimilation, which grew from the great biblical tale of assimilation, the Book of Esther.

It is in this context that one should examine the contributions of Ernst Lubitsch to American film.31 A German Jew born and raised in Berlin,

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30I deal with this matter at length in a forthcoming article in *Prooftexts*: "Shylock's Revenge: The Doubly Vanished Jew in Ernst Lubitsch's *To Be or Not To Be*."

Lubitsch left his father's haberdashery business while still a teenager and made his mark initially as a player in Max Reinhardt's Deutsches Theater, the foremost German theater company in the first third of this century. Soon he was directing one- and two-reelers, and eventually feature-length films, often featuring a Jewish schlemiel character (played by Lubitsch himself) who went by such names as Meyer from Berlin, Sigi Lachmann from Rawicz, and Sally Pinkus. As Enno Patalas notes of Lubitsch's Jewish antihero: "Like Charlie [Chaplin], he is hungry, counts his pennies and chats up the ladies. The roots in popular art, the slapstick origin in vaudeville films, remained alive in Lubitsch's later films, too, as they did with Chaplin, Keaton, the Marx Brothers, and [eventually] Jerry Lewis."32

By the early 1920s, Lubitsch had become an internationally distinguished director, "the European Griffith," whose grandly costumed historical spectacles (Madame Dubarry in 1920 is a key example) easily alternated with wry satires and bittersweet domestic chamber-dramas. He lived in the United States from 1922 onward and became one of Hollywood's foremost directors. Almost all of his films were portraits of Europe, a fanciful, dreamlike Europe of the past or present, mixed with pointed hints of the impact of modernity.

Lubitsch wore his Jewishness unselfconsciously, and he had direct or indirect ties with various classic films of Jewish experience. One filmography lists him, perhaps apocryphally, as an uncredited director of certain scenes in Der Golem — which is not implausible, given Lubitsch's close association with the film's co-director, Paul Wegener, another Reinhardt alumnus, during Lubitsch's period in Germany (Wegener starred in several Lubitsch films).33 Lubitsch also had a strong interest in Samson Raphaelson's story "The Day of Atonement," prototype of the stage play of The Jazz Singer. (Lubitsch was a close collaborator with Raphaelson on other films.)34 He wanted to direct The Jazz Singer on film, and almost had the opportunity, but he left Warner Brothers when the film was still in the planning stages.

Most of the films of Lubitsch's American period lack identifiably Jewish characters, but they are present, I think, as "implicit Jews" in many of the

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33On Lubitsch's possible connection to Der Golem, see the filmography in Robert Carringer and Barry Sabath, Ernst Lubitsch: A Guide to References and Resources (Boston, 1978).
34Raphaelson's remarkable memoir of his association with Lubitsch, "Freundschaft: How It Was with Lubitsch and Me," is found in Samson Raphaelson, Three Screen Comedies (Madison, Wis., 1983), pp. 21–47.
non-Jewish characters of his films: one thinks of Jean Hersholt’s Dr. Jüttner, the kindly, bespectacled, and mustachioed tutor of Prince Karl Heinrich in *The Student Prince in Old Heidelberg* (1926), and the portrayals by Felix Bressart in *Ninotchka* (1939) and *The Shop Around the Corner* (1940). Bressart, an East Prussian Jew, was part of the stream of Jews and liberals who emigrated from Central Europe in the 1930s, many of whom settled in Los Angeles and worked on Hollywood films. Lubitsch himself was active in campaigns on behalf of European Jewry during this period, and he eventually cast Bressart as the first unambiguously Jewish character in Lubitsch’s American period, the unforgettable Greenberg in *To Be or Not To Be*. Greenberg, the Polish Jewish stage extra who yearns to play Shylock, represents (alongside Chaplin’s Jew in *The Great Dictator*) one of the few truly bold uses of a Jewish character in American films of this period, and himself presents an eloquent plea, entirely through the words of Shakespeare, for mobilization against Hitler.

All of the above examples suggest that the alleged era of assimilation (which includes Friedman’s “Timid Thirties”) was in fact marked by at least some subversive approaches to ethnicity and Jewishness in film at a time when it was a highly sensitive matter. Audience interest in ethnic characters had, to be sure, waned considerably with the onset of the Great Depression, and the wave of nativism that hard times brought on made the studio moguls very timid indeed. During the same era, the Hays Office regulations, known as the Motion Picture Production Code, exercised tight censorship over the sexual, political, and moral content of American films, prohibiting film images of nudity, profanity, adultery, homosexuality, and even married couples in the same bed. Portrayal of ethnicity was tightly reined in by the stipulation that “[t]he just rights, history, and feelings of any nation are entitled to most careful consideration and respectful treatment.”

In practice, this last regulation was not as fair-minded as it purported to be. Blacks, Asians, and decidedly non-Anglo foreigners (Slavs, Hungarians, Turks, Arabs, Gypsies) were continually stereotyped in American film of the 1930s, and the plight of European Jewry was largely ignored during a time when some attention to it might have made a difference. Studio heads were reluctant to invite the ire of the U.S. Congress, where diatribes against Hollywood, and especially against Hollywood’s Jews, were becoming fashionable, and where a spirit of isolationism on American foreign policy

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35Leff and Simmons, *The Dame in the Kimono*, p. 292; for a full text of the Code, see ibid., pp. 283 – 92.

prevailed. The political and economic consequences of alienating Nazi Germany were carefully — indeed, too carefully — weighed in Hollywood, and the strongly conservative, isolationist, and perhaps anti-Semitic personnel of the Hays Office often sent back for revision film scripts critical of the Third Reich or identifiably pro-Jewish in outlook. Hollywood's middle echelon — the writers, directors, and some producers who often did battle with the Hays Office and studio heads over the representation of Nazi Germany — were by and large a markedly liberal, antifascist, and pro-Jewish element, many of them émigrés and refugees, and of course many of them Jews themselves.

In short, far from being merely an era of "timidity," the period from 1928 to 1942 was an arena of intense ideological battle, in which a few confident dissidents, such as Chaplin and Lubitsch, as well as a number of performers popularly associated with explicit or implicit Jewishness, occasionally scored significant victories. But the overall effect on American public opinion, let alone on American officialdom, was, unhappily, minimal. It took the Pearl Harbor attack, on December 7, 1941, and the consequent U.S. declaration of war, to spark a partial reversal of this trend in film of the time; even then, a true breakthrough to honesty about European Jewry was not possible.

The War and Its Aftermath

Identifiably Jewish characters began reappearing in American films in the war years, usually alongside, among others, Irish, Swedes, Italians, Polish Americans, and Anglo-Saxons in sanitizedly multi-ethnic "platoon" films — members of the "Melting Pot" dutifully serving abroad in the struggle against the Axis. In addition to those mentioned already, two films of this period deserve somewhat closer attention by film historians: *The Man I Married* (1940), the story of an American woman (Joan Bennett) whose husband, a German émigré (Francis Lederer), becomes increasingly pro-Nazi when the couple visits the German homeland, only later to learn of his own mother's Jewish identity; and *Once Upon a Honeymoon* (1942), the story of a romance between an American reporter (Cary Grant) and a former American burlesque queen (Ginger Rogers), who is at the outset married to a Nazi ideologue (Walter Slezak). The film features a brief, remarkable scene in a concentration camp where the Hebrew prayers of Jewish inmates are overheard. Again, in both films, these were rare expres-

sions of candor quite out of key with mainstream ideology.

It is symptomatic of this entire period that Al Jolson, star of The Jazz Singer, never established a successful film career.38 It was Jolson's life and public image that had inspired Raphaelson's story in the first place (Jolson was himself a cantor's son), but Jolson was picked for the film role only after George Jessel was dropped over a contract dispute. After Jolson's successful film portrayal of Jake Rabinowitz, he rarely appeared in films of the sound era, though he continued to perform live to enthusiastic theater and nightclub audiences throughout the same period and entertained troops during the war.

The great drama of assimilation portrayed in The Jazz Singer (although it likewise traces a journey of return to the Jewish fold, in however qualified a way, and is all too often ignored as such) acquired a special poignance in occurring at the threshold of sound film. Sound, after all, made English rise to a new prominence in film art. "Garbo talks!" was a cause of hullabaloo among film fans, and in her case it proved as beneficial to her image as silent film had been. In the case of many other foreign-born stars of American film, it had the reverse effect. Sound exaggerated both foreignness and homeborn ethnicity, and this coincided with the other forces of the 1930s that made ethnicity a sensitive matter. Although it had been Jolson's privilege to declare "You ain't heard nothin' yet!" Jolson himself was heard very little on screen from then on. Perhaps by way of tacit atonement, the film The Jolson Story was released in 1946, four years before Jolson's death, with Larry Parks as Jolson. Jolson himself, his voice dubbed into the musical numbers throughout, appeared in blackface in one performance within the story. The film also generated a sequel, Jolson Sings Again (1949).

The postwar years brought certain important changes in Hollywood — most notably, as a consequence of the Cold War, the withering effects of renewed congressional investigation into alleged Communist subversion in the film industry. The issue divided Hollywood bitterly, and the most notorious effect was the Hollywood blacklist, which ended or interrupted the careers of a significant number of producers, directors, screenwriters, and performers, many of them Jews.39 (The non-Jew Chaplin was likewise hounded into exile.) Simultaneously, the revelations of Nazi war crimes, through the Nuremberg trials and widespread media attention to the death camps (including newsreel film footage of the piles of bodies and the emaciated survivors) evoked a new soul-searching about the fate of the Jews,
Films like Body and Soul (1946), the tale of a Jewish prizefighter who defies his gangster promoters, Crossfire (1947), a film-noir tale portraying an investigation into the murder of a Jewish civilian by an anti-Semitic war veteran, and especially Gentleman's Agreement (1947), Elia Kazan's film based on Laura Z. Hobson's novel about a Gentile reporter (Gregory Peck) who disguises himself as a Jew in order to investigate anti-Semitism in American life, focused attention on anti-Semitism in a manner not possible in previous years. The last-mentioned film won several Academy Awards, including Best Picture. But these films are notable as well for their absence of any endorsement of ethnicity. Jews are portrayed as participants in an American civil religion, whose members attend either the church or synagogue of their choice but are not otherwise marked by great differences of appearance, speech, custom, or behavior. The Holocaust, not yet widely known by that name, was almost totally ignored. Only later did European imports, such as the landmark 31-minute French documentary by Alain Resnais, Night and Fog (1955), attempt to deal honestly with the legacy of the European death camps.

Jews were about to become, in any case, far more visible on the American screen than in the previous two decades, both as Jewish actors playing Jewish or implicitly Jewish roles and as Jewish roles played by Gentile actors. As if in belated tribute to the legacy of Jolson and The Jazz Singer, the show-business bio-pic flourished, often dealing with Jewish performers — including, as noted earlier, The Jolson Story (1946) and Jolson Sings Again (1949); plus The Eddie Cantor Story (1953); The Benny Goodman Story (1956); and, inevitably, an updated remake of The Jazz Singer (1953), this time featuring Lebanese-American Danny Thomas as Jake Rabinowitz. Although a significant market for these films was American Jews, who were by now moving to suburbs in large numbers and were quite happy to see Jews universalized as American success stories, a comparable interest in the subject among American filmgoers at large is equally significant. Films about Jewish refugees in Palestine, Sword in the Desert (1949) and The Juggler (1953) — the latter starring Kirk Douglas, a Jewish-born actor who was an “implicit Jew” in several films (see below) — drew some attention to the legacy of the war and to Israel's battle for independence. (Douglas would eventually portray Gen. David D. “Mickey” Marcus, American war hero turned Haganah soldier, in Cast a Giant Shadow, in 1966.) Sinister Jews made notable appearances here and there — Alec Guinness's Fagan in the British import Oliver Twist (1948); Kirk Douglas's implicitly Jewish “bad boy” roles in Out of the Past (1947) and The Bad and the Beautiful (1953); and Rod Steiger’s memorably ruthless film mogul in The Big Knife.
(1955). All of these films warrant close analysis of their style, outlook, and preoccupations.

The late 1950s and early '60s brought about some change in the predominant silence on the Holocaust, with the release of such films as *The Diary of Anne Frank* (1959), which focused attention on the Nazi occupation of Holland through the viewpoint of its posthumously renowned Jewish victim; *Exodus* (1960), which celebrated the formation of the State of Israel and began to confront realities of Holocaust-survivor and refugee experience; and * Judgment at Nuremberg* (1961), which dramatized, albeit in a fairly schematic and bowdlerized fashion, the war-crimes trials in Germany. (The capture and Jerusalem trial of Adolf Eichmann between 1960 and 1962 was a further stimulus of interest in these matters.) These three films in particular helped to inaugurate what could be called, according to Stuart Samuels' schema, an era of "acceptance," although a full-blown confrontation with the Holocaust was still far from realized, and, properly speaking, as with the era that preceded, it is the evasions and circumlocutions of these films that are as interesting and illuminating as their good-faith efforts. Still, it is all too easy to sit in judgment of cinema and far more useful to understand the halting return of ethnicity to American film (whether it was ever absent in the first place is, to be sure, a legitimate question) in the context of the larger history of the medium and broader developments in international cinema as a whole.

It is impossible, for example, to understand the period of the 1940s and '50s without examining certain pivotal films, such as Frank Capra's memorable *It's a Wonderful Life* (1946). Here ethnicity is not explicitly an issue, but a clash between mainstream American optimism and more pessimistic, essentially film-noir conceptions of the world (more or less the artistic parameters of *Gentleman's Agreement* and *Crossfire*, respectively) is allowed significant attention.40 It is also useful to explore foreign films of the period that reflect on American identity and its relation to ethnic cosmopolitanism. I have in mind, for example, the films of British director Michael Powell and his Hungarian Jewish co-director and scenarist Emeric Pressburger, who in *A Canterbury Tale* (1944) and *Stairway to Heaven* (1948) explored Anglo-American relations and the multi-ethnic heritage of both Britain and America. Films such as these could be meaningfully compared with, say, French films of the National Front era and its aftermath; or of the Occupation and postwar periods, where issues of French identity in an era of tyranny, or of life and collaboration under fascism, were dealt with, usually metaphorically. The film output of many other countries and regions during the era of fascism and its aftermath — including the former

Soviet Union, Japan, China, India, the Middle East, Australia, Africa, and Latin America — is all highly relevant to the situation of American film, as well as of Jewish experience on film, and comparative study of this sort could prove immensely useful. The experience of each film-producing nation with the conflicting claims of civil society and ethnic unity, and of ethnic unity and national unity, as these shaped film art, bears close examination, as does the experience of individual peoples within nations.⁴¹

**Ethnicity Comes of Age**

As we come closer to the present era, we find a period marked by revolutionary changes in American film, beginning in the 1960s and '70s. The breakup of the studio system and the consequent expansion of independent production companies played a major role in this transformation, as did the wider changes in American politics and society. It is widely acknowledged that ethnicity as such gained a new respectability in the '60s as the freedom marches in the South, the worldwide decline of European colonialism in Africa, the Black Power movement, four major political assassinations (including that of Malcolm X), the growth of New Left student politics in Europe and America, and the U.S. entry into war in Vietnam began to reshape American life and culture. A widespread respect for Israel marked that country’s sweeping victory in the Six Day War of 1967, and most American Jews were proud to identify with Israel, which had already been shown favorably in film and other media since its early years of Arab besiegement.

A new acceptance of the textures and idiosyncrasies of Jewishness was reflected in films, including period pieces, that celebrated Borscht Belt humor and East Coast Jewish culture *(Hello, Dolly!; Funny Girl; The Night They Raided Minsky’s; Bye, Bye, Braverman; I Love You, Alice B. Toklas)*. Jewish and Holocaust motifs were drawn upon for black comedy *(The Little Shop of Horrors; The Fearless Vampire Killers; The Twelve Chairs; The Producers)*; as well as for historical tales and literary classics *(Operation Eichmann; Freud; Judith; The Pawnbroker; Ship of Fools; Cast a Giant Shadow; Ulysses; Tobruk; The Fixer; Oliver!)*. The biblical film and the Christian tale of Jewish antiquity continued in this period *(The Story of Ruth; Esther and the King; King of Kings)*, following upon well-known

examples of the '50s (David and Bathsheba; The Ten Commandments; Samson and Delilah; Solomon and Sheba; Ben Hur).

Toward the end of the '60s, the look of American movies began to change. The Production Code, as a consequence of Supreme Court decisions on obscenity and civil liberties, was revised in 1966 to permit a new frankness in language, sexuality, and story line in films. And the influence of certain European-born trends, such as classic French cinema, Italian Neo-realism, the French New Wave, and Eisensteinian montage techniques — some of whose stylistic hallmarks had previously influenced American film noir — began to register more powerfully on mainstream American filmmaking. The classical Hollywood style had long tended to simplify the screen image, to mute or neutralize background visual information, to set story lines into a tight, goal-oriented structure, and to portray clear-cut struggles of good and evil. Film art now became more steeped in hyper-realism, ambiguity, irresolution, skepticism, and spontaneity, and deepened these traits throughout the 1970s and '80s.

Along with a new frankness in language, sexuality, violence, and moral complexity came a similar openness in the representation of race and ethnicity. Interracial romance became more common in film stories, though still charged with meaning and mystique. Supposed ethnic traits that had once been considered impolite to discuss publicly were now embraced unapologetically — for example, notions of the Jew as rude, pushy, ruthless, or subversive became the model for certain Jewish "bad boy" types (Richard Dreyfuss in The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz; Dustin Hoffman in Lenny; Mark Rydell’s violent Jewish gangster in The Long Goodbye; even Ron Leibman’s decidedly honorable union organizer in Norma Rae). Also, the Jew as oversexed, neurotic, narcissistic, or strung out found expression in portrayals by Woody Allen (Annie Hall and Manhattan, among many examples), Richard Benjamin (Diary of a Mad Housewife; Portnoy’s Complaint; The Sunshine Boys), George Segal (Bye, Bye, Braverman; Where’s Poppa?; Blume in Love), Ron Leibman (memorably as Segal’s older brother in Where’s Poppa?), and of course Dreyfuss and Hoffman, as in the examples already cited and even in not explicitly Jewish roles (Dreyfuss, say, in American Graffiti and Close Encounters of the Third Kind, and Hoffman in The Graduate, and playing an Italian-American street person, “Ratso” Rizzo, in Midnight Cowboy).

Black comedy and parody continued, notably in the further work of actor/director Mel Brooks (Blazing Saddles; Young Frankenstein; High Anxiety; and, in the '80s, The History of the World — Part I, as well as Brooks’s not wholly successful remake of Lubitsch’s To Be or Not To Be) and Woody Allen. The Jewish gangster was played in notable depth and historical detail in Francis Ford Coppola’s The Godfather and The Godfa-
ther, Part II, the latter featuring a crime boss (Lee Strasberg) somewhat modeled on Meyer Lansky. A much-neglected film of this era (indeed, not released until two decades later, then largely ignored), *The Plot Against Harry* (1970), is a puckishly jaundiced look at a Jewish gangster, Harry Plotnick (Martin Priest), who runs small rackets in New York City but also lives life as a parolee, an ex-husband, a father, a frequent attendee and celebrator at family occasions like weddings and bar mitzvahs, while he copes with health problems, tax woes, and various family preoccupations. The film is played as a comedy and suggests the ultimate bourgeoisification of the Jewish gangster, in urban New York terms.

A newly visible type of feisty, aggressive Jewish woman was brought to the screen at star level chiefly by Barbra Streisand in her many variations on a tough, unabashedly ethnic New York Jew in many films, including *Funny Girl*, *Funny Lady*, and *The Way We Were*. Though often schmaltzy and sentimental, often in some sense confessional, Streisand's persona was a welcome change from the Jewish American Princess featured in films of the '50s and early '60s, often portrayed by non-Jewish actresses (Natalie Wood in *Marjorie Morningstar*; Ali McGraw in *Goodbye, Columbus*). Her emergence to prominence, as in the case of the Jewish male comedian in the '50s and '60s, should be seen in the context of comparable emergences of self-assertive Jewish women in television and live entertainment — one thinks, among others, of Selma Diamond and Joan Rivers on TV talk shows and the pop concert career of Bette Midler. No less interesting on screen in the same period is Melanie Mayron's understated New York Jewish photographer in *Girl Friends* (1979), a version of her later television character in *thirtysomething*, and the muted self-assertion of Carol Kane in *Hester Street*.

One would welcome, in any case, more systematic study of the situation of Jewish women in American film — with regard both to Jewish and Gentile actresses playing Jewish roles and to the roles themselves and the narrative and cinematic strategies that give them meaning. (In theory, the ethnicity of an actor or actress should be irrelevant to the role — acting, after all, is just that: acting — but broader ideological factors influence casting decisions, and these in turn become relevant to the film depiction of ethnic experience.) Integrating these and comparable areas with the broader issues of feminist and gender-oriented film studies is an important task, on which meaningful work, at the time of this writing, is only just beginning.42

The way toward a more unvarnished sense of Jews and Jewish life had in truth already been paved by films of the late classical era — one thinks

of Kirk Douglas's "bad boy" roles and Rod Steiger in *The Big Knife*, both mentioned earlier. But a more fundamental measure of this change is that, to a degree not seen since the 1920s, it had become possible to show something more like Jewish *experience* rather than simply *images* of Jews. This is not to suggest that the category "Jewish experience" is irrelevant to the intervening eras. Often it is there by its absence: silence, disguise, implicit Jewishness, allegorization, sentimentalization, the soft focus of Gentile actors in Jewish roles — all such evasions of Jewish realities are likewise part of Jewish experience, even when it is the larger society that has dictated or encouraged the evasion.

But the situation is not as monolithic as it may seem. If Jews were scarce or merely counterpoint presences in classical American sound film, they were plentiful in radio and television in the same period, media that thrived on the continuous productivity of theater and nightclub venues, and they were present *as Jews*, not concealing (though not always announcing) their Jewishness: Jack Benny, Milton Berle, Sam Levenson, Henny Youngman, Danny Kaye (himself a film star), and many others, including Jerry Lewis, whose fame abroad, especially in France, was of the legendary proportions accorded Chaplin and Tati. On the other hand, when non-Anglo ethnicity became more visible and popular as a film subject in the 1960s, it was by no means free of stereotype, nor of a certain labored earnestness — a glitzy, at times candied Hollywoodization of Jewry and other groups that did not always add up to a genuine effort to view Jewish or other ethnic experience on its own terms. Friedman's notion of "The Self-Conscious Sixties" thus rings true for this period.

While this trend continued well into the '70s (*Fiddler on the Roof* was perhaps its culmination), other approaches during this period promised a more unassuming but also more focused gaze on actual cultural and historical experience. Joan Mecklin Silver's *Hester Street* (1975), mentioned earlier, brings alive realities of New York's Lower East Side at the turn of the century and includes segments in subtitled Yiddish. Bob Fosse's *Cabaret* (1972), based on Christopher Isherwood's 1935 double novel *Berlin Stories*, captures the early days of the Third Reich via the life of émigrés in Berlin, and has, as a subplot, the tale of a pair of star-crossed Jewish lovers. The whole is assembled with a pungently Brechtian evocation of cabaret satire. Like the other characters in the film, the Jews here are stylized representations, but Fosse's gift for creating discontinuous alternations of story and music showed that classical narrative was not the only available structure for framing Jewish experience. A similar vision informs Fosse's *Lenny* (1974), where the life — and later the disintegration — of "bad boy" comedian Lenny Bruce is intercut with the work, Bruce's nightclub act, and the film includes a powerful portrayal of Bruce's mother by Jan Miner.
In Herbert Ross’s film version of Neil Simon’s play *The Sunshine Boys* (1975), two aging Jewish vaudeville comedians (Walter Matthau, George Burns) call a truce in an ongoing estrangement to rehearse their act for television. The film is, in a sense, an admirable sequel to *The Jazz Singer* (far more than the 1980 remake of that film), in its rounding out of the historical destiny of the vaudeville entertainer. Burns represents that segment that found its way to the suburbs and to placid respectability; Matthau the resplendently shabby remnant that remained in the urban backwater to ply the theatrical trade. Jews are never identified as such in the film, but this is no evasion, for Jewishness of a sort is everywhere present in the story. Like the Jewish comic tradition to which this film is a tacit tribute, Matthau and Burns seem to capture opposed alternatives of character formation in ghetto tenements of a former era, where privacy was impossible, and where people grated on one another because they knew each other too well. Matthau’s Willie Clark had learned to yell and be aggressive; Burns’s Al Lewis to shrink from yelling and be passive-aggressive. Their combination here is the same typical match of contrasts — in truth, a form of biblical sibling battle — that shaped the classic vaudeville act, Jewish and Gentile alike, with its perennially self-debunking presentation of self.

The act’s comedy, however, like the story as a whole, masks a more serious underlying theme: that of growing old, which was to become a frequent topic of Jewish experience in films of the ensuing years — notably, *Going in Style* (1979), which likewise featured Burns, here alongside Lee Strasberg, as two elderly Jews with their Irish-American cohort (Art Carney), in an unusual version of the “heist” film; and *Tell Me a Riddle* (1980), Lee Grant’s film version of Tillie Olson’s acclaimed novelette, which explores the experience of an elderly Jewish couple (Lila Kedrova and Melvyn Douglas) who leave behind their suburban East Coast home and travel to the West Coast in a state of failing health.

Bob Fosse’s use of camera and story discontinuity, noted earlier, points to the impress of European filmic models — say, of Eisenstein, Lang, Truffaut, Fellini, and Bergman — on many American directors of the ’70s. This trend was markedly influential on Woody Allen. Allen’s satirical comedies of the ’60s had revived the spirit of Lubitsch, Benny, the Marx Brothers, and Sid Caesar of television’s *Your Show of Shows*, injecting a distinctive blend of parody, fantasy, and schlemiel in such films as *What’s New, Pussycat?* (1965), *Take the Money and Run* (1969), *Bananas* (1971), *Play It Again, Sam* (1972), *Everything You Wanted to Know About Sex but Were Afraid to Ask* (1972), *Sleeper* (1973), and *Love and Death* (1976). Starting

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with *Annie Hall* (1977), Allen began to experiment more boldly with cinematic styles, including neo-realist and surrealist modes, and increasingly playing a version of himself. He interspersed Felliniesque, surreal fantasy, in parts of *Annie Hall*, *Zelig* (1983), *The Purple Rose of Cairo* (1985), *Radio Days* (1987), *Oedipus Wrecks* (part of the 1989 triptych *New York Stories*), and *Alice* (1990); parody, in *Zelig* and *Shadows and Fog* (1991); and Bergmanesque preoccupations, in taut chamber dramas such as *Interiors* (1978), *September* (1987), and *Another Woman* (1988); in *Stardust Memories* (1980), *A Midsummer Night’s Sex Comedy* (1982; a tribute to Bergman’s *Smiles of a Summer Night*), *Crimes and Misdemeanors* (1989), and, more recently, *Husbands and Wives* (1993), which recalls Bergman’s *Scenes from a Marriage* (one should also remember Paul Mazursky’s 1990 film, *Scenes from a Mall*, which co-starred Allen with Bette Midler). Many of the above titles, as well as the critically acclaimed *Hannah and Her Sisters* (1986), represent a focus of Allen’s creative energies on bittersweet, urbane comedies of yuppie life in contemporary New York. But Allen’s more experimental forays into nostalgia for the past — specifically, for America of the ’30s and ’40s — are something of a personal obsession, especially successful in films like *Zelig*, *The Purple Rose of Cairo*, and *Radio Days*. One should also keep in mind Allen’s portrayal of a friend of a group of blacklisted screenwriters during the McCarthy era who allows them to sell their scripts under his name, in Martin Ritt’s *The Front* (1976).

*Zelig*, in any case, is perhaps Allen’s most explicit reflection on Jewishness and ethnicity, one that in recent years seems to have left a significant impression, both positive and negative, on ethnic film studies.44 Leonard Zelig, Allen’s persona in this film, is a Jazz Age Jewish misfit who undergoes a form of psychosis causing him to metamorphose into a copy of whoever he converses with — taking on, in the course of the story, the physical appearance and dress of cigar-store Native Americans, black jazz musicians, Chinese opium smokers, Republican presidents, Babe Ruth’s team, a Mexican mariachi band, and Greek restaurateurs, as well as the behavioral characteristics of his Gentile analyst (Mia Farrow).

The film, as one can see, does not present ethnicity so much as icons of ethnicity. Its tale is audaciously narcissistic, combining Allen’s own nostalgia for a simpler America, his then-flourishing romance with Farrow, and a quite thoughtful parody of the style and structure of historical documentary, including nearly poker-faced filmed commentaries by such pundits as

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Irving Howe, Saul Bellow, Bruno Bettelheim, and Susan Sontag (all playing themselves) on what made Leonard Zelig an American Melting Pot phenomenon. Zelig's most extraordinary adventure is his brief and near-disastrous identification with German National Socialists during Hitler's rise—which essentially happens when he skips therapy. But he is summarily rescued, then turns rescuer, flies upside-down across the Atlantic, is eventually paraded in ticker tape down Broadway, and marries his analyst.

Throughout his career as a standup comic, actor, and filmmaker, Allen took impressively big risks by making his inner life seem so central to his public persona and film stories. It is rooted in the way that nightclub comedians habitually make themselves a part of their jokes, and, as in the case of Lenny Bruce, it is subject to the normal occupational hazards of this most dangerous of professions. Comedians are gadflies and typically invite public ire. Jewish comedians invite Jewish ire, and Allen has often been accused, I think wrongly, of being a "self-hating Jew." This conception jars with Allen's wholehearted willingness to make his Jewishness an issue, to present, like Benny, the classic schlemiel in American idioms, and, going beyond Benny, to declare it Jewish, and specifically New York Jewish, openly and explicitly. All his other preoccupations—old jazz, old movies, classic radio, baseball, New York life, yuppies, morality, European cinema, and the unfinished *Moby Dick*—flow from that emphatic claiming of New York Jewish home ground. What it excludes is a legitimate matter for reflection, but what it encompasses is important.

What most of the foregoing film examples from the '70s onward have in common is a tendency to make a character's (or actor's) Jewishness something other than the main point of his or her presence in the story. We savor a character's Jewishness not because it explains Jewishness but because it helps to explain the character. While such a strategy would seem to deemphasize Jewish experience, it can also enhance it by rooting it in complexities of character and circumstance. Jewishness is not a problem but rather a natural component of a wider social landscape. In this way, these films anticipated the present era's consciousness of multiculturalism, of a multi-ethnic America, of difference without otherness. Whether they also anticipated an era of cultural struggle and rivalry is less clear, but the multi-ethnic America of these films is in any case not a Garden of Eden, and Jewishness is neither evaded nor trumpeted.

At times, however, where the Jew is portrayed in mortal struggle with enemies, as in *Marathon Man* (1976), *Black Sunday* (1977), or *The Boys from Brazil* (1979), it is part of a cameo ("Jew vs. Arab" in the second example; "Jew vs. Nazi" in the first and third) that has itself become an American cultural icon. Dustin Hoffman is once again a Jew in *Marathon Man*, this time not as a "bad boy" but as a kind of Kafkaesque antihero...
battling forces he does not comprehend. This film and *Black Sunday* are both gripping thrillers, but in all the foregoing cases there is an implicit reminder that the struggle of Jew vs. Nazi, or of Jew vs. Palestinian could threaten the peace of civil society even when the Jewish cause is sympathetically portrayed. In *Black Sunday*, the one potential victim that perhaps inspires the greatest emotional identification is the annual Super Bowl game. The film's Israeli protagonist (Robert Shaw) saves the game's spectators from disaster, but he is unable to head off postponement of the game itself, which may, within the film's ideological horizons, be considered the greater loss. Friedman's rubric of "The Self-Centered Seventies" may be most applicable to this film, but it has some validity, often at an implicit level, for many other films of the period, including those not specifically dealing with Jewish experience.

**Paradoxes of the 1980s**

By way of introducing certain films of the early 1980s, attention may be drawn to a barely noticeable moment in Ridley Scott's sci-fi classic *Blade Runner* (1982), a film that portrays, with extraordinary detail and sense of style, life in a futuristic Los Angeles of the 21st century. This film, whose depiction of the future as a time of squalor and chaos is a hallmark of the style and vision we have come to call "postmodern," presents Los Angeles as an economically stratified, multi-ethnic, and multi-tongued Babel whose street life includes such familiar sights as Asian food stands, a downtown Casbah district, "Hare Krishna" chanters, and, notably, a Hassidic Jew going about his daily business. Jews are otherwise not explicitly present in this film's story, but the image of the Hassid is a familiar cultural icon of a multi-ethnic, urbanized America, one that could serve equally well an ideology of tolerance (as a sign of the thriving vitality of American urban life) or intolerance (as part of the cultural detritus of a "mongrelized" America, of an imperial nation in decline).

This ideological ambivalence is itself a hallmark of the postmodern outlook, but the film, in any case, positions the Hassid at a key moment in the unfolding of the plot, when the protagonist, police detective Dekkard (Harrison Ford) is about to hunt down and "retire" (i.e., execute) an escaped "replicant." The replicants are exceptionally intelligent and gifted humanoids, outwardly indistinguishable from ordinary humans, possessing emotions and existential angst, who have been ghettoized in off-world colonies and are forbidden to live on earth. In its way, then, *Blade Runner* has clearly absorbed the legacy of the era of European catastrophe — when forbidding an entire people to live on earth was perhaps first definitively conceived.
Or has it? The universalization and metaphorization of the Holocaust is another feature of postmodern vision (although, in this respect, the film does not differ significantly from earlier films such as *The Diary of Anne Frank* and *The Pawnbroker*), and it bears directly on our assessment of Jewish experience on film in more recent times. This film's brief, incidental, almost hieroglyphic use of the Hassidic image is the hint of what Fredric Jameson has called "a new depthlessness" in the culture of the postmodern, reflecting a cybernetically saturated era when one can effortlessly change decades or nations by inserting a different cassette into a VCR, and therefore when one no longer perceives time, history, or geography in the hitherto customary ways. The film's image of the Hassid is arguably no different in depth from its overall implicit analogy between replicant retirement and Hitler's Final Solution. To some degree, such transfer of meaning is praiseworthy. Many Holocaust survivors, notably Elie Wiesel, have argued that the lessons of the Holocaust must apply today in places like Bosnia and Rwanda, and the broader question of the Holocaust's historical uniqueness is still far from settled. What is suspicious here is the ease of iconographic ascription by which the analogy is effected. Is this admirable restraint or callous fudging? It is hard to tell, precisely because the film depicts a world in which historical memory as such is no longer possible.

And yet, paradoxically, this newly laid-back sense of historical and cultural relativity has as often worked to the advantage of Jewish experience on film as to its detriment. Films of the 1980s and '90s have essentially continued the 1970s trend of unselfconscious representations of Jewishness, while also occasionally making possible deeper and more nuanced treatments of specific themes. This has coincided with the prominence of a new generation of Hollywood or sometime-Hollywood Jews (directors like Steven Spielberg, Barry Levinson, Lee Grant, Barbra Streisand, Paul Mazursky, Rob Reiner, and David Mamet; performers like Streisand, Richard Dreyfuss, Ron Silver, Mandy Patinkin, Billy Crystal, and others), many of whom, unlike the Hollywood moguls of a former era, have openly identified with Jewishness and have repeatedly portrayed Jewish themes and characters. These developments by no means freed Hollywood from classical paradigms of Jewish experience, nor from the continuance of stereotypes, evasions, and banality in the representation of Jews. But they call into question any hastily conceived litmus tests of authenticity in evaluating this output, such as Patricia Erens' faulting of *Tell Me a Riddle* (1980) for its absence of "specifically Jewish issues," or of Alan Pakula's 1982 film version of William Styron's novel *Sophie's Choice* for its "Christian solution

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[Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, N.C., 1995), p. 6.]

of a Jewish problem." Tell Me a Riddle, on the contrary, brings alive Jewish experience precisely by not making it an issue, by allowing it to emerge in a natural and unforced manner as part of the landscape of character and historical memory. And although Sophie's Choice allowed a Gentile survivor of Nazi concentration camps (Meryl Streep) to occupy the focus of its survivorship theme, it dealt with the psychological scars and moral complexity of survivorship in a newly direct and unvarnished way that eventually proved fruitful in stimulating other film treatments dealing more directly with the Jewish survivor. Films of the early 1980s that deal with Jewish experience, at any rate, manifested somewhat of a new historical depth and psychological resonance, which were to undergo further maturation later in the decade and into the present.

Jeremy Paul Kagan's 1982 film version of Chaim Potok's The Chosen has been cited by Lester Friedman as "one of the most interesting pictures of Jews ever to emerge from Hollywood." This is perhaps a bit overstated, but the film certainly deserves mention in the present context. It deals with the friendship, in Brooklyn of the 1940s, between a young man of Orthodox but otherwise liberal upbringing (Barry Miller) and a Hassidic Jew (Robbie Benson) who is the son of a local rebbe (Rod Steiger). The film is especially interesting for the chunk of historical time that it isolates (wartime and early postwar New York), for its ability to capture the awakening of American Jews to the birth of the Jewish state, and for its close look not only at Hassidic life but at a liberal Orthodox milieu rarely, if ever, portrayed on film. Intellectually open but traditional in religious practice, this milieu has been a significant historical presence in American Jewry. The film's drama covers otherwise fairly obvious ground in obvious ways, but the fact that a story set almost wholly within the parameters of the traditional Jewish world was now possible in American mass entertainment was itself significant.

Part of the same trend is Barbra Streisand's Yentl (1983), a musical version of Isaac Bashevis Singer's short story "Yentl the Yeshivah Boy." Streisand had long sought to do a film version of this story, and her production spent some $20 million realizing this goal. It eventually earned her an acerbic denunciation from Singer himself for what he held to be its schmaltz and self-promotion, and it was not, in any case, a box-office hit. But it has, perhaps, aged well. The film reflects Streisand's own genuine respect for Jewish tradition, and the loving camera attention to the artifacts of Jewish domestic and religious life, often in honey-colored lighting, is especially striking. Two back-to-back musical numbers, one set in the yeshivah, the other in the well-furnished home of a prosperous Jew, effectively take apart

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47Ibid., p. 381.
48Friedman, The Jewish Image in American Film, p. 243.
the differing worldviews of men and women in traditional Jewish life and belong to the history of reflection on that issue. Streisand has a good-humored sense of paradox, which inhabits this meditation from start to finish. The much criticized final scene of the film, showing Yentl in transatlantic passage to New York, belting out a traditional Streisand number, is at least significant as offering a cultural, spiritual, and ideological genealogy of Barbra Streisand. It is simultaneously deeply personal and resoundingly public. It points from the East European shtetl westward toward Ellis Island, and by pointing westward also points to California and the West Coast. That a Jewish theme could become a mass-market filmmaker’s personal obsession was not new, if we take note of Lubitsch’s deep emotional investment in To Be or Not To Be. But its scale was new and served perhaps as a precedent for Steven Spielberg’s eventual obsession with Schindler’s List.

Other films of this period that touch on Jewish experience include Richard Fleischer’s flaccid 1980 remake of The Jazz Singer, which stars Neil Diamond and Lucie Arnaz, with Sir Laurence Olivier as the cantor father; Ralph Bakshi’s animated feature American Pop (1981), which traces four generations of a Jewish immigrant family alongside the development of American popular music; Peter Yates’s Eyewitness (1981), an international thriller that features a villainous Israeli diplomat (Christopher Plummer), perhaps the first such portrayal of its kind in American film; Henry Hudson’s Chariots of Fire (1981), a British film that won the 1982 Academy Award for Best Picture, portraying two athletes — one a Scotsman, the other a Jew — who ran in the 1924 Olympics; Sidney Lumet’s Daniel (1983), a well-wrought film version of E. L. Doctorow’s novel The Book of Daniel, whose story is loosely based on the trial and execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg; Martin Scorsese’s King of Comedy (1983), whose protagonist, Rupert Pupkin (Robert De Niro), clearly an implicit Jew, is an autograph hunter and aspiring comedian who contrives a desperate but fiendishly clever scheme to convince a late-night TV talk-show host (Jerry Lewis) to feature him on his program (the film features a memorable performance by Sandra Bernhard as his acid-tongued, floridly wacko, and explicitly Jewish co-conspirator); George Roy Hill’s The Little Drummer Girl (1984), based on John Le Carré’s novel, which explores moral ambiguities of Israeli antiterrorism activity in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Francis Ford Coppola’s The Cotton Club (1984), which deals with the multi-ethnic scene of American gangsters in 1920s Harlem and includes a memorable performance by James Remar as the Jew, Dutch Schultz; Sergio Leone’s Once Upon a Time in America (1984), which again brings Jewish gangsters into focus, this time in an epic tale that runs for over three hours in its unabridged version; and Bruce Beresford’s King David (1985), a
disappointingly shallow effort at a biblical period film.

What do these examples have in common? For most of them, historical distance; for some, geographical distance, or the social marginality of their characters (spies, gangsters, losers). But one should not make too much of this phenomenon — as suggesting a distancing or marginalization of the Jew, for it is likewise a way of incorporating the Jew, writing the Jew into a collective history. Assimilation, in a sense, moves in two directions. Just as newcomers assimilate to a mainstream culture, the mainstream assimilates its component cultures by incorporating their historical experience and in this way gradually comes to look more like them.

The Impact of “Shoah”

1985 is a watershed year in one important sense. It is the year that Claude Lanzmann's monumental nine-hour documentary Shoah was shown to American audiences. Film on Holocaust themes had been relatively dormant for some time, and now a French film was opening up the realities of the death camps and their survivors in an unprecedented manner. Though the film did not have a widespread popular impact (one comparable, say, to the 1977 TV miniseries Holocaust), it did have an effect on filmmaking. Here again was the filming of an obsession, which explored the memories and after-effects of the Holocaust through the eyes and words of its survivors and onetime bystanders and perpetrators.

Filmed chiefly in Germany, France, Poland, and Israel, Shoah, unlike traditional documentary film on the Nazi era, contains no archival newsreel footage, no images of bodies or newly liberated death camps, no Hitler orations or marching troops. Instead, it reads the Holocaust in the faces and voices of survivors, in the often self-serving and self-incriminating anecdotes of Polish villagers and German war criminals, in the shabbiness and desolation of the undismantled Auschwitz barracks and death factories, in the disarming beauty of the Polish countryside, and in long, hypnotic takes of the camera as it surveys railway lines, rivers, forests, and unmarked grave sites. It is an intensely and unsettlingly quiet film, single-mindedly focused on issues of moral responsibility, remaining steadfastly focused on the irreparable damage of the Holocaust, to its victims and to the wider world. And yet it likewise captures the ever-present reality of silence and forgetting, both for the survivor victims and for the one-time perpetrators and bystanders — captures it in motion as a yawning void that threatens to swallow every conversation, every testimony, every remembered anecdote. The film insistently asserts a rational standard, measured in the Holocaust's toll in human lives, civility, sanity, and peace of mind. And yet, in showing the pain and ethical difficulty of uncovering dormant memories, it know-
ingly displays the insanity at the heart of the investigative process itself.

It is hard to calculate the effect of this film on popular filmmaking, but some register of its impact can perhaps be detected in films from the late '80s onward — most notably, on The Wannsee Conference (1987), a German film, first aired on German television, which dramatized, through a tautly written 90-minute tale, the original 90-minute meeting of Nazi high officials that resulted in approval of the Final Solution. Far from a mere effort to duplicate that meeting moment by moment, the film presents a freely roving narration as it moves in and out of conversations, zeroes in on individuals and their mannerisms, portrays backroom political maneuvering, and allows dramatic tensions to emerge unconstrained by a documentary or docudrama format. The film, in its way, was an important testimony of public reflection in Germany on the war, emphatically declaring German responsibility for the death camps and acknowledging those events as crimes.49 In addition to the film’s implicit debt to Lanzmann’s Shoah, it should be seen as a partial reply to Hans Jürgen Syberberg’s seven-hour surreal fantasy Hitler: A Film from Germany (1975), which set Nazism into a distinctly “postmodern” aura, embracing irrationality as a fact of life and providing a disturbingly quietistic normalization of German experience in the context of an inhumane world. Lanzmann’s Shoah itself had very likely been mustered, in part, as a reply to Syberberg.

Echoes of Lanzmann’s film are perhaps discernible in a different way in Paul Mazursky’s seriocomic Enemies, a Love Story (1987), based on Isaac Bashevis Singer’s novel, which placed the experience of Holocaust survivors into a newly intimate context. This is possibly Mazursky’s best film, exploring the tragicomic domestic entanglements of a Holocaust survivor, Herman Broder (Ron Silver), living in the New York City of 1949. The foreground of this film — Singer’s tale itself, respectfully rendered into a tautly competent screenplay by Mazursky, and well acted by a superb cast (which includes Mazursky himself in a key supporting role) — is perhaps less interesting than the re-created setting of midcentury New York’s bustling Jewish life: a world of kosher dairy restaurants, religious-articles merchants, ubiquitous Orthodoxy, thriving Yiddish presses, bus trips to spare but heymish Catskill resorts, and the vast thicket of personal ads from survivor refugees seeking family members. This is a Jewish New York that appeared, as if out of nowhere, in the late ’40s, unique by its complicated blend of newly arrived refugees and long-settled homeborn. This extraordinary commingling would be witnessed only once in this century and within a few years would lose much of its form and presence. This would be an...

“On postwar German cinema’s relation to the Nazi years, see, in general, Anton Kaes, From Hitler to Heimat: The Return of History as Film (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), and Eric Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990).
intriguing subject for a documentary film to explore in depth, but Mazursky’s selective and stylized treatment of it is well crafted, respectful, and a perfect foil to the story.

A major accomplishment of the story itself was to demonstrate how realms touched by the Holocaust could be approached through comedy. Lubitsch had already shown this in 1942, in *To Be or Not To Be*, before the world knew fully of the destruction under way, but Lubitsch’s film was a flop in its time, and humor related to the Nazi era was thereafter largely quelled or confined to black comedy (as in Mel Brooks’s *The Producers*) and cabaret satire (as in Bob Fosse’s *Cabaret*). But Singer wrote extensively about survivors, and his peculiarly mordant vision of the world translated surprisingly well to their experience. As a disciple of Gogol, Dickens, and other 19th-century masters of storytelling, Singer knew how to universalize his characters without departing from his own cultural universe, and Mazursky preserved the Singeresque rhythms. *Enemies*, at any rate, is a tale in which tragic and comic are inseparable, a storytelling and filmic ideal, and Mazursky’s thoughtful creation of the midcentury New York milieu allows the film to say a great deal, not just about survivors’ experience as such but about the historical setting of their survival.

Film on the Holocaust and survivor experience should, properly speaking, be set in the context of a now vast harvest of discussion on the representation of Nazism and the Holocaust, discourse that amounts to a virtual cultural explosion, which has grown notably intense from the late ’80s onward: explorations of the Holocaust’s historical uniqueness; literary and artistic dimensions of Holocaust writing and art; problems of historiography and historical comprehension; consideration of the task of remembering and the nature of memorials; the history of acknowledgement and

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of the representation of disaster in Jewish and other literature, past and present; and matters of theology and belief in the aftermath of the Holocaust.

This trend has also spawned research and evaluation of film on Holocaust subjects, most notably, Annette Insdorf’s *Indelible Shadows: Film and the Holocaust*, the most comprehensive overview of the area up to the 1980s. Her wide-ranging essays on many topics, her willingness to consider certain individual films or themes in depth, her involvement with the international output of film, her engagement both with film’s cinematic language and with the ongoing state of discussion and reflection on the Holocaust, and above all the compelling moral purpose that motivates her to write, make Insdorf’s study a valuable resource. Also useful is Judith Doneson’s *The Holocaust in American Film*, which confines its scope to certain representative films in the American milieu that marked what Doneson calls “the Americanization of the Holocaust.” Some helpful emphasis is placed on idioms of popular culture and on questions of ideology, public opinion, and historical reception.

Somewhat less successful than these works is Ilan Avisar’s *Screening the Holocaust: Cinema’s Images of the Unimaginable*, which is marred by exceptionally awkward writing, by a seemingly random progression of topics, and by numerous questionable turns of argument. Even so, the book gets into some interesting areas, including chapters on Czech cinema, on the relation of modern and postmodern, and on Chaplin’s *The Great Dictator*.

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*Ilan Avisar, Screening the Holocaust: Cinema’s Images of the Unimaginable* (Bloomington, Ind., 1988).
Avisar’s overall thesis, in any case, should be evaluated in the light of the considerations of the preceding pages. In his own words:

Genuine works on the Holocaust are rooted in the necessity to furnish truthful pictures of the unprecedented horrors, and they attempt to convey to the beholder the unsettling degrees of human suffering and human evil in the Nazi universe of atrocities. . . . [W]e need to define the critical principles which can contribute to the avoidance of inadequate representations in the form of compromising distortions or reprehensible falsifications.60

This is essentially a restatement of the old “images” approach, which, in truth, is impossible to expunge from any study of Jewish experience on film. Avisar’s thesis, to be sure, is rooted in a special context, one influenced by the overwhelming flood of survivor testimony that began to reach a wide readership from the ’60s onward. The writings of Primo Levi, Elie Wiesel, Jean Améry, and others have made “testimony” a principal imperative of postwar literature and film on the Holocaust, and Lanzmann’s Shoah, which receives extensive and respectful comment by Avisar, is surely an act of testimony carried to its moral and artistic limits. But the fact that a film like Shoah cannot be seen out of the context of other important films with which it interacts, or which in turn it influences, means that one cannot address to these films the simple questions that Avisar asks: Is it “genuine”? Are its pictures “truthful”? Does it contain “compromising distortions” or “reprehensible falsifications”? This approach is in danger of making discussion of film on the Nazi era and the Holocaust into little more than a moral report card. In any case, given the close intertwining of the history of film with the history of 20th-century tyranny, there is virtually no film that fails to be a “genuine” Holocaust film. We can learn as much from a putatively reprehensible film as we can from an impeccable one.

Recent Trends

It is too early to evaluate the present, to assess the shape and direction of the films of Jewish experience in the past ten years. To some degree, we find a continuation of the trends toward unselfconscious representation of Jewish experience that have prevailed since the 1970s, with a deepening and expansion of their possibilities. In other ways, we find a continuation of the classical themes and preoccupations of a former era. These trends have affected both mainstream, mass-market films and the much broader tide of low-budget, independent, and foreign films that comprise the programs of Jewish film festivals. The festivals, which are now an annual event in major cities, have multiplied impressively around the United States and abroad in recent years and are themselves an institution worthy of study.

60Ibid., p. 1.
Among mass-market films that come readily to mind as subjects for future study are Mazursky's *Enemies, a Love Story*, discussed earlier; Chris Menges' *A World Apart* (1988), a foreign import based on the lives of Joe Slovo and Ruth First, respected but embattled South African anti-apartheid activists of Jewish origin (this latter fact not mentioned by the film), seen from the vantage point of their daughter, Shawn Slovo, who wrote the screenplay; Paul Bogart's *Torch Song Trilogy* (1988), based on Harvey Fierstein's semi-autobiographical account of a Jewish drag-queen entertainer, superbly played by Fierstein himself; Bruce Beresford's *Driving Miss Daisy* (1989), about the slowly developing friendship between a well-to-do Alabama Jewish widow and her black chauffeur, tracing their story from the 1940s to the recent past; *Avalon* (1990), Barry Levinson's saga of Jewish family life in Baltimore in the '40s; Barbet Schroeder's *Reversal of Fortune* (1990), based on Alan Dershowitz's memoir, detailing the Jewish attorney's defense of socialite Claus von Bulow, on trial for attempted murder of his wife; Billy Crystal's *Mr. Saturday Night* (1992), featuring Crystal as a Borscht Belt and TV comedian, whose career over several decades is recounted; Frank Pierson's HBO film *Citizen Cohn* (1992), based on Nicholas von Hoffman's biography of "bad boy" Jewish attorney Roy Cohn, famous for his role in the McCarthy era, featuring an extraordinary performance by James Woods as Cohn; Robert Mandel's *School Ties* (1992), about a Jewish kid from Scranton on athletic scholarship at a New England prep school, who encounters the anti-Semitism of his classmates; and most notably, Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List* (1993), based on Thomas Keneally's acclaimed docu-novel about Oskar Schindler, the Czech-German entrepreneur and war profiteer who sheltered over 1,100 Jews from deportation to death camps.

American films of the above list, which had separate destinies at the box office, provide, for better or for worse, a composite portrait of mainstream America's present-day attitudes toward Jewishness, or at least toward those themes of Jewishness that have attained a certain "classical" respectability: "bad boy" success stories; the Jewish presence in modern history; Jews seen through the lens of nostalgia; anti-Semitism in the cradle of Yankeedom, New England; and Holocaust survivors and near-victims. Again, the fact that most of these films deal with the period of the 1940s to the early '60s, and that the remainder (*Torch Song Trilogy* and *Reversal of Fortune*) are set in a recent past now seen in historical hindsight, is surely significant. While it could suggest that Hollywood is still uncomfortable about narrating the Jewish present, or that Jews are somehow seen as synonymous with "pastness," or with historical memory as such, the process likewise demonstrates a reverse assimilation, that of mainstream culture to its marginal components. Although this is a trend long rooted in Hollywood custom,
recalling the show-biz biographies in 1950s cinema, several of the above films, especially *Enemies, a Love Story*, *Avalon*, *Citizen Cohn*, and *Schindler's List*, are told with a deeper respect for the historicity of their subjects than was possible in a previous generation of cinema.

*Schindler's List* in particular represents something of a milestone in the depiction of Holocaust themes, as well as marking a distinctive turn in that director's output. Filmed superbly in black-and-white by cinematographer Janusz Kaminsky, *Schindler's List* is mostly quiet, respectful, and dignified, a genuinely moving film, solidly rooted in the wartime milieu of Krakow, Poland, and nearby Zwittau, Schindler's home town in Czechoslovakia to which he moved his factory after its Krakow operations were closed down. The enthusiastic reception of this film, however, should prompt caution in evaluating its cultural impact. Its visual sophistication, superbly crafted story, and fine performances do not conceal the fact that the film, in some respects, has more in common with the TV miniseries *Holocaust* than with, say, Lanzmann's truly groundbreaking *Shoah*. It comes close at points to sentimentalization of Holocaust realities and an assimilation of the wartime milieu to idioms of the classical Hollywood style. On the latter grounds, the film can, and should, be savored and appreciated, but it would be a mistake to allow it to stand as the last word on the subject, as the Holocaust film par excellence. Were such a lionization to occur, *Schindler's List* could very likely recapitulate the fate of the 1927 *Jazz Singer* (with which it has much else in common): to be the preface to a long era of silence on Jews and Jewish experience.

**Beyond the Mass Market**

*Schindler's List* is a case where we must uncouple the excellence of a film from the problematic nature of its enthusiastic reception. In light of this problem there are grounds for arguing that mass-market film should not be seen as the sole, or even main, arena for the films of Jewish experience. One should look, rather, to low-budget and independent filmmaking, and to imported films, both domains that have manifested a richer and more variegated approach to Jewish realities. Among these films, some of which had their principal airings in the United States on public television or in

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urban (not specifically Jewish) film festivals, one should keep in mind Eli Cohen's *The Quarrel* (1991), a Canadian film based on Chaim Grade's short story "My Quarrel with Hersh Rasseyner," about two Holocaust survivors, one an atheist writer, the other a Hassid, who had been yeshivah students together in Poland and now meet by chance and argue about God's justice; David Mamet's *Homicide* (1991), about a Jewish cop in New York investigating the murder of a Jewish doctor; Anthony Drazan's *Zebrahead* (1992), the story of a Jewish kid in an interracial romance in Detroit's inner city; and *Fires in the Mirror* (1993), the public-television airing of Anna Deavere Smith's live one-woman drama about tensions between Jews and blacks that exploded in Crown Heights after a Hassidic driver fatally struck a black child in an auto accident and another Hassid was murdered in a revenge attack. While not, strictly speaking, a film, Smith's play is intercut with film and still-shot sequences and represents an important document on contemporary Jewish-black relations in an urban setting.

This is the place to mention the fine work that has been done in documentary films in recent years, some of which has been aired on public television. These include *Lódź Ghetto* (1989), Kathryn Taverna and Alan Abelson's extraordinary assemblage of rare footage, in color and black-and-white, of life in the Nazi-era ghetto, with narrative based on Lucien Dobroszycki's *A Chronicle of the Lódź Ghetto* and on individual diaries from the ghetto; *The Partisans of Vilna* (1986), Josh Wiletzky's film about Jewish resistance fighters in and around the Jewish ghetto in Lithuania, including some interesting focus on the role played by the women fighters; and Martin Ostrow's *America and the Holocaust* (1994), a scathing indictment of U.S. immigration policy in the era of the European catastrophe, based largely on David Wyman's historical work. Although Holocaust subjects probably account for the bulk of the output of Jewish-related documentary film, there have been some worthwhile films on contemporary Jewish culture. Michal Goldman's *A Jumpin' Night in the Garden of Eden* is an intriguing exploration of the contemporary art of Klezmer music, the Yiddish musical idiom that has undergone an impressive revival in recent years.

Documentaries have formed one important component of the Jewish film festival movement, which has burgeoned in the past decade in the United States and abroad. Jewish film festivals have become annual events in several North American cities, usually extending over a period of two or three weeks. The emphasis at these events is usually on lesser-known American and foreign films (from Canada, Latin America, Europe, Israel, North Africa, and other lands), and on independent filmmakers in several countries, including the United States.

*For a partial listing of films shown in such festivals, see Deborah Kaufman, Janis Plotkin, and Rena Orenthal, eds., *A Guide to Films Featured in the Jewish Film Festival* (Berkeley, Jewish Film Festival, 1991).*
Here is a sampling from one such program held in the San Francisco Bay Area in July 1993. Among documentaries and short subjects, there were Connie Marks's *Let's Fall in Love: A Singles Weekend at the Concord Hotel* (U.S., 1993), a thoughtful and good-humored look at a thriving Jewish social scene in the Catskills; Jonathan Berman's *The Shvitz* (U.S., 1993), a richly textured study that features patrons, staff, and neighbors of the few remaining public Russian-Jewish steambaths in New York City, with reflection on the cultural meaning of this cherished but dying institution; Babak Shokrian's *A Peaceful Sabbath* (U.S., 1993), a dramatic short, set in Los Angeles's Iranian and Iranian-Jewish communities, that explores relations between the sexes in a particularly disenchanted light; Ruggero Gabbai's *The King of Crown Heights* (U.S., 1992), a 58-minute look at the Lubavitch community in Crown Heights and its charismatic leader, Rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson (since deceased); and Steve Levitt's *Deaf Heaven* (U.S., 1992), a 29-minute film drama featuring a conversation at a health club between a young homosexual man whose lover is dying of AIDS and an elderly Holocaust survivor (played by David Opatoshu) who gives him a reason to go on living. Films more directly on Holocaust themes included Pavel Lozinski's remarkable *Birthplace* (Poland, 1992), a documentary chronicling Holocaust survivor Henryk Grynberg's trip back to Poland to find out who murdered his father during the war; and Jack Kuper's *A Day in the Warsaw Ghetto: A Birthday Trip in Hell* (Canada, 1992), a 35-minute display, with narrative commentary, of the extraordinary photographs illegally taken by a Wehrmacht sergeant during a visit on his 42nd birthday to the Warsaw Ghetto in 1941.

Among foreign-made feature films, there were Assaf Dayan's *Life According to Agfa* (Israel, 1992), an award-winning, if uneven, fiction film set in an all-night bar in Tel Aviv, whose staff and patrons bring with them the full array of social and political tensions in contemporary Israel; Jacek Bromski's *1968 — Happy New Year* (Poland, 1993), a fiction film about Communist Poland's anti-Jewish purges in 1968; Andrzej Wajda's *The Promised Land* (Poland, 1974), an epic film about the partnership of a Pole, a German, and a Jew who team up to build a textile factory in Lodz, Poland, in the late 19th century; Wajda's *Korczak* (Poland, 1990), a tender but unblinkeredly lucid portrait of Janusz Korczak, the Jewish physician who ran an orphanage in the Warsaw Ghetto and who perished at Auschwitz with the children under his care; and Jens Carl Eblers' *Republic of Dreams* (Germany, 1993), a surrealistic fantasy depicting a contemporary artist's efforts to commune with the late Polish-Jewish writer Bruno Schulz by traveling to Schulz's hometown of Drohobycz, Poland.

There were, as well, two classic films in the festival program: a beautifully restored version (with live organ accompaniment) of Frank Borzage's *Humoresque* (U.S., 1920), based on Fannie Hurst's novel, the melodramatic
tale of a young Jewish man who is pressed by his mother to become a concert violinist, then is injured in World War I and later enabled, through his mother's devoted love, to resume his career; and Robert Rossen's *Body and Soul* (U.S., 1947), mentioned earlier, which starred John Garfield, the story of a Jewish boxer from the Lower East Side who must deal with the efforts of a local crime boss to fix his fight.

What is especially intriguing about this array, apart from the intrinsic appeal of the films themselves, is its relative freedom from classical film paradigms of Jewish experience, as discussed in the foregoing pages. In all but the last two festival films mentioned, Jews are comfortably "out" in a variety of senses: as urban singles, elderly, liberated women, gays and lesbians; as working-class, ultra-Orthodox, Yiddish speakers, immigrants, refugees, survivors; as seekers of vindication, of bodily pleasure, of messianic redemption. If the festivals themselves have an ideological underpinning it is that of multiculturalism, except that here multiple cultures are shown to thrive *within* Jewish life itself. There is, to be sure, preoccupation with the Jewish catastrophe of the Holocaust, but it is not permitted to engulf the life of the present. One way or another, the film festivals have resulted in a refreshingly varied and richly informative selection of films, a format that will, in time, prove influential to future film of Jewish experience and to study of the subject.

One should also mention here important archives and collections in Jewish film that have been founded in recent years, notably the National Center for Jewish Film at Brandeis University in Boston, which has maintained a generally close connection with the film festivals. Under the direction of Sharon Rivo, the center has pursued restoration work on film materials in danger of disintegration, has amassed an important collection of films of Jewish experience (including silent film, Yiddish film, documentaries, and American film of the classical era), which it makes available through videotape and exhibition rentals, and has served as a valuable archive for researchers in film studies.

Also important in this context are the National Jewish Archive of Broadcasting, at the Jewish Museum in New York City, which has collected more than 2,000 television programs on Jewish subjects, and the closely allied Jewish Heritage Video Collection, a project of the Jewish Media Fund, sponsored by the Charles H. Revson Foundation, in New York City. The project has developed courses, programs, and video-library materials for Jewish community centers, Hillel organizations, the Jewish Y, family education curricula, public libraries, museums, synagogue youth groups, and adult education programs. This institutional maturation and productivity in Jewish media studies will eventually prove immensely helpful to the study of Jewish experience on film.
Conclusion: The Future of Jewish Film Research

The foregoing pages have aimed at providing a broad overview of films, film personnel, and trends that have played a major role in shaping American cinema of Jewish experience in this century. Some further reflections are in order on the tasks facing the investigator of Jewish experience on film, in the context of the disciplines of film studies and Jewish studies. It would be impossible to discuss in the present space the full range and depth of problems that await elucidation by the historian or theoretician of the subject, but a few brief suggestions can be offered.

First, much room exists at present for study in depth of particular films. This approach has, for good reasons, been called into question by some film scholars, both for its tendency to imitate slavishly the methods of literary textual study and for the film interpreter's frequent use of the individual film as a proof-text for some preconceived theoretical doctrine that the film is alleged to exemplify or confirm. But close study of the individual film can, in fact, serve as a disciplining groundwork for understanding the full range of factors that create filmic meaning in a given historical era, and, as noted earlier, such study has been largely absent from existing histories of the Jewish image in film. Provided attention is given to the many dimensions that make up a film — its concrete devices of cinematic art; its historical and ideological context; its production and reception; its relation to other films of its era, genre, or subject; and the various philosophical and cultural problems arising from its interpretation — the individual film can serve as a vitally important focus for understanding the historical tensions and preoccupations that find their way to cinematic expression.

For Jewish film historians, this is true whether one is dealing with canonically momentous films like Der Golem, The Jazz Singer, Gentleman's Agreement, The Diary of Anne Frank, Exodus, Shoah, or Schindler's List, or with neglected or forgotten films like Hungry Hearts, The Man I Married, or The Plot Against Harry. Addressing the question of how it was possible for a particular film to be made and released (or withheld, or ignored) at a particular moment in history can shed light on important areas of Jewish history in the countries and environments where Jews have lived.

Second, the historian of Jewish experience on film will sooner or later have to confront the vast thicket of film theory and explore its usefulness for Jewish film studies. As noted earlier, there is much that is wrong-

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64 Cf. Tom Gunning, "Film History and Film Analysis: The Individual Film in the Course of Time," Wide Angle 12, no. 3 (July 1990), pp. 4 - 19.

65 Major collections of essays in earlier and contemporary film theory include Gerald Mast,
headed about contemporary film theory, and many of its voguish postures, stale dogmas, and esoteric excesses well deserve to be called into question. 66

But the philosophical ambition of this body of reflection is praiseworthy nonetheless, and its contentions have thus proven immensely challenging and stimulating. Integration of film study with the insights and preoccupations of linguistics, semiotics, psychoanalysis, anthropology, economic and social theory, philosophy, aesthetics, literary criticism, gender studies, and so forth should continue to be encouraged, and many of the dubious and unquestioned contentions of contemporary theory should be polemically challenged. Moreover, there is a great deal to be learned from rereading earlier film theoreticians (Eisenstein, Balazs, Bazin, Kracauer, et al.), by way of illuminating the horizons of film practice in former eras and by way of discovering unresolved problems that contemporary theory has mistakenly declared solved or obsolete. 67 Special realms of film theory can help us to illuminate certain specific areas — such as spectator identification with screen characters and situations; film’s role in the shaping or undermining of belief and prejudice; film representation of gender, family relations, childhood, adolescence, and elderly experience, ethnicity, and social class; and ways that the historical reception of a film mirrors larger social forces — that have direct relevance for understanding the film of Jewish experience.

Thirdly, study of Jewish experience on film must seek to place its insights in the context of ethnic film studies as a whole and the study of various national cinemas, both for comparative purposes and for the sake of under-


standing the broader relation of minority cultures to a cosmopolitan civil society. Attention to the latter problem will enable ethnic film studies to escape the confines of narrow interpretive bailiwicks, defined by the life of a particular people, and will thereby unite specialists in individual cultures on questions of common interest. The problems America faces as a multi-ethnic society are not far different from those facing the bourgeois democracies abroad, and they must, as well, be evaluated in relation to the experience of various less bourgeois and less democratic nations that have recently come unmoored from their Cold War alignments. The ethnic and religious fanaticism that has shaken Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, for example, in the aftermath of the Cold War clearly demonstrates that the establishment of a viably cosmopolitan society is very much an open question for any nation, even for the most stable democracies. In such a context, current doctrines of multiculturalism, such as those popular at present in contemporary film studies, have been both a help and a hindrance. They have helped by widening the playing field, by insisting that the whole social tableau of a modern nation, and in particular its most marginalized components, be made relevant to that nation's cultural history. They have hindered by often reducing that history to a power game, to a scenario of subjugation and dominance; by failing to see a nation's mainstream culture as a flexible and protean organism; and by viewing films and other cultural artifacts as little more than ideological tracts. These difficulties can, I think, be transcended, and historians and interpreters of the film of Jewish, African, Hispanic, and Asian experience, among others, have much to teach one another.

This is true even where certain historical events, such as the Holocaust, have, as some might argue, placed Jewish experience beyond the pale of translatability. That very abyss of apparent incommensurateness puts the Jewish film scholar, more than ever, in need of common ground with other ethnic film studies specialists. Fortunately, film on Holocaust subjects has proven to be of interest to film scholarship at large, and forms a central subject for those interested in film's comprehension of 20th-century history. Sooner or later, such study will prove useful for exploring the cine-

Useful (and often faulty) theoretical essays on the subject by various authors have been offered in Friedman, ed., *Unspeakable Images: Ethnicity and the American Cinema* (see note 5). See also Wohl and Miller, *Ethnic Images in American Film and Television* (see note 7). A fine theoretical discussion on the relation of minority cultures to civil society is offered by Louis Menand, "Diversity," in *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago, 1995), pp. 336 – 53.

matic response, if it exists, to the mass slaughter of Armenians, Gypsies, Kurds, Bosnian Muslims, Rwandan Tutsis, and other peoples, and for understanding the moral, ethical, psychological, and philosophical problems of comprehending atrocity-survivor experience in modern society at large. This could lead to firmer insights about the role of cinema in both jeopardizing and enhancing human rights and intercultural understanding.

Finally, the film of Jewish experience should be plumbed for its specifically Jewish historical meaning. Jewish peoplehood has long evolved according to its own internal dialectic. It is perhaps to the historian Gershom Scholem that we are most indebted for that insight, and Scholem spent his life elucidating the texts of Jewish mysticism that manifested this process. Scholem, however, was deeply interested in the material circumstances of Jewish history, in secular Jewish culture, in the interaction of Jews with their environment, and in the emergence of a post-traditional Jewish society in modern times. He advocated close attention to what he called the “basement” areas of Jewish experience, such as the life of the Jewish underworld and other areas banned from the “salon”-centered history of the major 19th-century Jewish historians. As Scholem observed: “Such matters were simply disregarded [by the historians]. Today, we have to collect them with the greatest difficulty in order to gain a reasonably complete picture of how the Jewish organism functioned in relation to its actual environment.”

The film of Jewish experience is a rich register of such “nonofficial” areas of Jewish history, and Scholem would perhaps have welcomed it as a serious topic of Jewish studies.

Only a few themes of classical Jewish tradition and folklore have found their way to filmic expression. This very scarcity is a problem of historical importance, and the few themes that have appeared are thus, for better or for worse, magnified in importance and suggestiveness. In particular, the legend of the Golem and that of the Dybbuk have spawned several film classics (the 1920 German film Der Golem; the 1937 French film Le Golem; and the 1938 Yiddish film from Poland Der Dybbuk). Understanding the shared preoccupations of these films, and the ways in which their respective legends served as parables or metaphors of modern history and of the film medium, and generated permutations in more “secular” film stories of Jewish experience, is a vitally important task. The 1920 Golem, for example, makes the golem figure a parable of film art itself (a parable facilitated by the traditional belief that the Golem’s inventor, the 16th-century mystic Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague, was also the inventor of the camera obscura, predecessor to both photographic and motion-picture camera), and Paul Wegener, the film’s co-director and star (who played the Golem), can be

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shown to have exhibited a remarkable prescience, conscious or otherwise, about the relation of film to modern catastrophe. Wegener himself would later make films under Nazi aegis, during the years of the Third Reich, and in some sense he already foresaw film’s troublesome servitude to demonic forces in *Der Golem*.

Both the Golem and the Dybbuk legends, and their filmed portrayals, manifest interesting uses of motifs of disguise and metamorphosis, and these have had meaningful reverberations in the film of Jewish experience generally. So many Jewish film characters undergo disguise or temporary metamorphosis that deeper factors seem to be at play: Ben Hur as “the Unknown Jew”; Jake Rabinowitz as Jack Robin, Jack Robin as blackface minstrel; the Golem as a household servant; Khonnon as the Dybbuk; the Marx Brothers as four variegatedly costumed facets of a single personality; Bressart’s Greenberg as Shylock; Ari ben Canaan as a British colonial official; Streisand’s Yentl as a yeshivah boy; Schindler’s Jews as wartime munitions workers; Woody Allen’s Zelig as everybody. This fascination with disguise is not unique to the film of Jewish experience — it has affected other ethnic films’ affinity for tales of “passing” in an alien society, or, in the case of Yentl and much screwball comedy, an alien gender, and underlies, as well, science-fiction film’s fascination with androids, changelings, and liquid cyborgs. The preoccupation could, I believe, if investigated with appropriate caution and skepticism, be meaningfully connected with Jewish mysticism’s themes of messianic disguise and apostasy, and the closely related Hassidic theme of “the descent of the Tzaddik,” motifs that prompted Gershom Scholem to associate the failed 17th-century messianic movement of Shabbatai Tzvi with the dawning of Jewish modernity — to Emancipation, Reform, Zionism, historicism, revolutionary politics, and Jewish secular culture.13 The broader issues of exile, catastrophe, and redemption that helped to shape early modern Jewish messianism, all major preoccupations of Jewish life and thought from the Middle Ages onward, have had, in their way, considerable impact on film history, both in general and in the film of Jewish experience, and more systematic and reflective attention to these connections is an important task for the Jewish cultural historian.

The early Hollywood moguls were themselves distant recipients of these vast historical tides. The East European immigrants who founded and shaped the studio system may not have known directly the stories and lore of a messiah’s apostasy, the journey of disguise, or the exile of God. But they had it, as it were, in their bones. It was in the shrug of the schlemiel and in the haberdasher’s trade; it was in their own assimilation to America, and ultimately it was in American film. It encompassed America’s vision of

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picket-fence respectability and small-town values, of Yankee decency, and, too, however muted, of Melting Pot harmony. These were messianic fantasies of a sort, but they were also a serious vision of America, and, more important, they helped open up a public space where fantasy, belief, and thought about America could thrive. The studio moguls were perhaps simply selling another kind of clothing, a clothing for the mind. But they had inadvertently helped to create something of incalculable value to civil society: a national cinema. Like Rabbi Judah Loew's troublesome Golem, however, it was a product haunted by catastrophe, and it did not weather innocently an era of catastrophe. These events, at a point of intersection between Jewish history, American history, and film history, form a significant part, though by no means the totality, of the complicated subject we call the film of Jewish experience.
Israelis in the United States

by Steven J. Gold and Bruce A. Phillips

The subject of Israeli Jews coming to settle in the United States is one that has generated considerable controversy over the years, focusing on two primary issues: the actual number of Israelis who have come here, and their acceptance by the American Jewish community. The first, although it might appear simple, is in fact extremely complicated, in part due to lack of adequate data but equally because of the very difficulty of deciding whom to include in such a count. In the words of Israeli demographer Sergio DellaPergola, "The problem of 'Who is an Israeli?' is no less, and probably quite more, complex than the issue of 'Who is a Jew?'" Depending on the definition used and on the available sources of data, "possibly as many as 15 or 20 different estimates can be reached."

The second issue, how American Jews relate to Israeli immigrants, is also complex. While American Jews have a long and impressive record of assisting newly arrived landsmen from overseas, their attitude toward the Israelis who have come to settle in the United States has been characterized by a mixture of suspicion, coolness, and even condemnation. Only recently has that attitude begun to moderate into something more accepting. It is true that every new immigrant wave has posed problems for earlier generations of Jews, with the already established, Americanized Jews typically viewing the newcomers as "wretched refuse," uncivilized, uncultured individuals who are likely to arouse anti-Semitism. The Israeli immigration, however, has presented an entirely novel situation.

For one thing, unlike nearly all Jews entering the United States before or since World War II, the Israelis could in no way be construed as "refugees," people who needed to be "rescued" or who were unable to return to their countries of origin. There were, apparently, no objective reasons why Israelis should come to this country or merit support from American Jews. To the contrary. American Jews had a large financial and emotional invest-

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1 Personal communication.
ment in the new Jewish state, which assumed almost sacred status as both a refuge for persecuted Jews and the fulfillment of the centuries-old Zionist dream of return to the biblical homeland. While most American Jews chose not to participate personally in the "ingathering of the exiles," they saw themselves playing a vital role by contributing money and insuring political support. The complementary role of Israelis, in this view, was to inhabit and develop the land and defend it. Thus, the very act of leaving the Jewish state was seen as abandonment and betrayal of both the Zionist dream and the unspoken compact between American and Israeli Jews.

Israel, too, has always viewed emigrants negatively. People who leave the country are commonly referred to as "yordim" — a stigmatizing Hebrew term meaning those who "descend" from the "higher" place of Israel to the Diaspora, as opposed to immigrants, or "olim," who "ascend" from the Diaspora to Israel. During the 1970s, Israeli politicians were especially vitriolic on this issue, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin calling Israeli emigrants "the fallen among the weaklings," others referring to them as "moral lepers" and "the dregs of the earth."2

Faced, thus, with a Jewish immigrant population that did not fit into the "refugee" category and about which it had considerable ambivalence, and bolstered by the Israeli government's hostility, the organized American Jewish community's reaction was "part denial and part outrage,"3 leading to a communal policy that effectively ruled out official contact with Israeli migrants. (Although the Soviet Jewish immigration of recent decades also prompted objections from Israel and its supporters, who believed all Soviet Jews should go to Israel, Soviet Jews were seen as unequivocally merit a warm welcome and maximum support.)

Most of the literature on Israeli immigrants asserts that members of the group themselves accepted the negative "yored" stereotype, choosing to depict themselves as temporary sojourners, students, tourists, "anything but Jewish settlers seeking to build new lives for themselves and their families in the United States."4 As a result, they remained marginal both to Israel and to the American Jewish community, having little contact with Jewish institutions, and relatively little is known about them. As two researchers

put it, "If Jews have been the proverbial marginal people, Israeli emigrants are the marginal Jews." 5

The official Israeli view of yordim began to change in the mid-1980s to a more constructive position of both encouraging "re-aliyah" (return to Israel) and simply establishing good relations with American Israelis. In a 1991 interview Yitzhak Rabin recanted his earlier statement: "The Israelis living abroad are an integral part of the Jewish community and there is no point talking about ostracism." 6 The change in Israel's attitude in turn opened the way for federations, Jewish community centers, and other organizations in this country to reach out to Israeli families — albeit still without official approval from national headquarters — "attempting to treat these Israelis and their families as members, or at least 'associate members,' of the American Jewish community with a shared stake in its future." 7

By the mid-1990s, several demographic trends were in evidence: a continuing stream of Israeli immigrants to this country, a rise in the number of Israelis returning to Israel to live, and the emergence of a new category of "transnationals," i.e., individuals with footholds in both the United States and Israel. In the social/psychological sphere, Israeli émigrés showed evidence of growing self-acceptance along with signs of willingness to identify with American Jewish communal life.

This article presents a profile of Israelis in the United States based on a wide range of demographic and sociological studies, focusing on three related topics. The first is the demographics of the migrant population — its size and composition in terms of age, family structure, occupational and ethnic characteristics, and the like; the second is the motivation of those who choose to leave Israel. The third area concerns the adaptation of Israelis to American life. Are they becoming a viable American-Jewish subgroup, or do they remain marginal men and women who see their presence here only as a temporary sojourn?

Sources of Data

The primary quantitative data used in this article come from our own analyses of three sources: (1) The Council of Jewish Federations 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS); (2) the 1991 New York Jewish
Population Study conducted by New York UJA-Federation (N.Y. Study); and (3) special tabulations run from the 1990 U.S. Census, using the 5-percent Public Use Microsample ("PUMS") files for New York and Los Angeles (New York City and Los Angeles County).8

Each of these sources has advantages and limitations. The NJPS, a national survey, has a relatively small sample of Israelis; the N.Y. Study a significantly larger one. Both NJPS and the N.Y. Study asked only place of birth, not country of last residence, thus excluding Israelis born outside the State of Israel. (Methods for compensating for this are discussed below.) However, these studies ask several questions regarding Jewish behavior and identification.9

The U.S. Census is rich in a variety of information, but is not very well suited to the accurate counting of small, tightly cloistered, recent migrant populations, like Israelis. In the words of demographer David Heer: "When American population statistics are inadequate, they will normally be found to be so in terms of underenumeration and underestimation of minority groups, defined in terms of race or national origin and concentrated in specific neighborhoods."10 The census also includes the responses of non-Jewish Israelis (e.g., Armenians and Palestinians) along with Israeli Jews. (How this is dealt with is discussed below.) Further, while the census provides data on economic status, it does not ask about religion and thus offers no information about Jewish behavior.

We also rely on the small number of published studies of Israelis that have been carried out, which are useful but suffer from various shortcomings.11 Surveys with large samples of Israelis are built on problematic sample designs,12 while surveys that employ reliable probability samples include...
only a small number of Israelis. For example, the few studies devoted exclusively to the study of Israelis that have applied some form of random sampling techniques identified Israelis through records of persons who had become U.S. citizens. Because migrants from any nation who become U.S. citizens tend to be among the most established members of their group, these studies do not represent the totality of their population in the United States. In addition, because people tend to change residences with some frequency (causing address records to become rapidly outdated), respondents to these surveys were selected from those who had become citizens in the years immediately prior to data collection — thus excluding long-term residents.

A study sample drawn exclusively from the boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens in New York — areas of heavy Israeli settlement but with a lower socioeconomic standing than other parts of metropolitan New York (with the exception of the Bronx) — excludes Israelis who live in more affluent neighborhoods. Thus, these sampling frames effectively exclude large fractions of the marginal (noncitizens) and the most successful (long-naturalized Israelis and residents of affluent communities).

Most studies of Israelis in the United States have been conducted in New York City, a few in Los Angeles and Chicago. New York and Los

quota of the needed type of respondent. Consequently, both of these sampling techniques are likely to include a selection bias.


Angeles account for roughly half of Israelis in the United States. The other half are dispersed throughout the United States, living in mid-sized and smaller Jewish communities. It may be that Israelis who gravitate to smaller communities or those furthest from the largest Jewish centers are different, that they have weaker ties to Israel and Jewishness than those in the large cities, and thus that studies including them would yield different findings.

Finally, much existing research on Israelis in the United States was carried out during the 1970s or early 1980s when (and often because) the relationship between both the Israeli government and the American Jewish community and Israeli émigrés was more hostile than currently. Such studies tend to overemphasize the role of conflict between Israelis and American Jews and slight the extent of communal organization and cooperation that has developed over the last decade.

The profile we provide also relies on qualitative data, much of it from work conducted in Los Angeles by Steven Gold emphasizing ethnic solidarity and adaptation strategies. It draws upon 94 in-depth interviews with Israeli immigrants and others knowledgeable about the Israeli community; participant observation data gathered at a variety of Israeli community activities; and a convenience-sample-based survey of Israeli immigrants collected during 1991–92.18 Natan Uriely and Moshe Shokeid have also conducted field studies of Israeli emigrants in the United States; Zvi Sobel studied departing Israelis in Israel.19

All told, the present study seeks to cast a wide net, encompassing and analyzing as broad an array of available data as possible.

HOW MANY ISRAELIS?

In 1981, Jewish Agency executive director Shmuel Lahis issued a report citing up to 500,000 Israeli emigrants in the United States, based on his own investigations.20 A major study of Jewish immigration reported 300,000 Israelis in the United States in 1979, and revised this estimate upward to 350,000 Israelis by 1981.21 A few years later the Jewish Federation Council of Los Angeles’s Commission on Israelis put the number of Israelis in that


18N = 96. Gold, “Israelis in Los Angeles.”

19Uriely, “Rhetorical Ethnicity of Permanent Sojourners”; idem, “Patterns of Identification and Integration”; Shokeid, Children of Circumstances; Sobel, Migrants from the Promised Land.


During the 1980s, common wisdom had it that New York had well in excess of 100,000 Israeli residents.

As the current debate about the impact of immigration on the larger American society demonstrates, it is virtually impossible to come up with an accurate and specific enumeration of any foreign-born population. Although paucity of data — including the noted deficiencies of the census — presents problems for the study of all immigrants, especially for the smaller groups, in the case of Israelis there is also a problem of definition. As noted earlier, different definitions of "Who is an Israeli?" — depending on the availability of data sources — will yield quite different estimates. For Jewish purposes, for example, a count of Israelis should distinguish between Jews and non-Jews, since many Israeli Arabs (Christians and Muslims) as well as Armenians have come to this country over the years. But even definitions limited to Jews may be more or less inclusive, for example: Israeli-born Israelis ("sabras," as the native-born are dubbed) who come here as immigrants, Israeli-born Israelis who come here as students or as professionals for unspecified periods of time; children born in Israel who come here at a young age; individuals born in Europe or elsewhere who lived for a year or two in Israel; individuals born in Europe or elsewhere who lived for many years in Israel; American-born individuals who lived in Israel for a year or more; Americans married to Israelis; American-born children of Israelis, and so on. Estimates based on any of these definitions could be considered legitimate, based on the researcher's assumptions and purposes.

The approach of the present authors will be to present several estimates derived from analyses of different data sources. These are the entrance and exit data collected by Israeli border control; entrance and exit data collected by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); the U.S. Census; and demographic studies of Jewish communities in the United States, in particular the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey and the 1991 New York Jewish Population Study. The estimates presented here provide what can be considered a plausible range for the number of Israelis in the United States.

Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (Border Control Data)

The Israeli Border Police record the exits and entrances of Israeli residents. However, since there is no legal definition of a "yored," it is impossi-
ble to know who has left permanently and who is traveling as a tourist, a student, or on business. The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics analyzed the border control data and computed a "gross balance" of 581,000 Israelis living abroad during the period 1948 – 1992. In other words, there were 581,000 more exits from Israel than re-entries on the part of Israeli residents (i.e., persons living in Israel whether native-born or born elsewhere). About half of the persons leaving Israel named the United States as their destination. Assuming that they stayed in the United States, and that no other Israelis came to the United States via other countries, the "gross balance" of Israelis residing in the United States would be 290,500.

But not all "Israelis" are Jews. As Israeli sociologist Yinon Cohen has observed, there are significant economic pressures inducing Israeli Arabs to emigrate to the United States. How many of the emigrants to the United States from Israel were Jews and how many were Arabs, Armenians, or other non-Jews? Zvi Eisenbach, working from Israeli data, has calculated that about 74 percent of American Israelis are Jews. Thus, the gross balance of Israeli Jews in the United States over the period 1948 – 1992 is adjusted down to 216,000.

From this number the present authors subtracted 25,000 persons who would have died, leaving 191,000. Since the gross balance subtracts re-entrances to Israel from exits out of Israel, the authors subtracted 18,400 more persons who may be assumed to have returned to Israel in 1993 (the number that re-entered Israel in 1992), for an adjusted gross balance of 172,848 Jewish Israelis living in the United States.

U.S. Immigration

As noted, the Israeli exit/entrance data do not distinguish between travelers abroad and actual emigrants. On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) does make this distinction. Israelis arrive in this country by ship or plane, and their arrivals are recorded by one or more official documents. Israelis who arrive on temporary visas are recorded separately from Israelis who apply for some sort of immigrant status. The "Application for Immigration Visa" is handled in Israel by the Consular Service of the State Department. After the arrival of the immigrant in the United States, the INS processes the "Immigrant

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Visa and Alien Registration" form. The INS also processes and documents permanent residence through the "Memorandum of Creation of Record of Lawful Permanent Residence" form. These are all applications for some kind of permanent residence status. Israelis can also apply for citizenship using the "Application to File Petition for Naturalization." Some Israelis who arrive as tourists and students overstay their visas and remain as "illegal immigrants." Conversely, some proportion of Israelis who have applied for permanent residency return to Israel.

Researcher Pini Herman, an expert on INS data, has estimated 93,000 Israelis in the United States. He started with a figure of 140,500 Israelis who applied for immigrant status between 1948 and 1990. From this number he subtracted the estimated number of returnees to Israel, which he derived from two longitudinal studies of Israeli immigrants. In one study the return rate was 47 percent, and in the other it was 33 percent (which Herman considers too low). From this he derived a range of between 74,465 and 94,135 Israelis who remained in the United States after applying for immigrant status. Drawing upon other research on illegal immigration to the United States, Herman estimated 23,000 Israeli "illegals" who overstayed their visas for a resulting estimate of between 97,465 and 117,135 Israelis. Herman considers this an upper limit because it does not adjust downward for mortality.

Both the INS data and the Israeli border control data share a common source of uncertainty: how many Israelis returned to Israel after a sojourn in the United States? This uncertainty in the quantitative data is paralleled by a comparable uncertainty in the qualitative research. Many Israelis interviewed were uncertain about whether they wanted to live in the United States permanently, and if not, about how long they would remain before returning to Israel.

U.S. Census

The U.S. Census provides data on place of birth. In 1980 there were 67,000 Israeli-born persons enumerated who had lived in the United States for six months or more. In the 1990 census this number had increased by almost 34 percent to 90,000. The 90,000 figure must first be adjusted down

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2Eisenbach, "Jewish Emigrants from Israel."

3U.S. Census, Special Tabulations, Foreign Born Population By Place of Birth, downloaded by Pini Herman from the U.S. Census "GOPHER" site on the Internet.
to exclude non-Jewish Israelis and then upward again to include an estimate of non-native-born Israelis. The census does have a question on "ancestry," in which non-sabras can identify themselves as Israelis and Arabs can identify as "Palestinians." However, these data were not available nationally, so other sources were used for these estimates.

Using data which differentiate between Jews and Arabs leaving the country, Eisenbach found that the proportion of non-Jews in the Israeli population abroad was highest in the 1950s and 1960s, when Arabs who left Palestine in 1948 made their way to the United States (many settling, for example, in "metro" Detroit). Overall, he estimated that between 69 percent and 73 percent of the Israeli-born population in the 1980 census were Jews. In his analysis of the 1980 U.S. Census data, Eisenbach also calculated the proportion of non-native-born Israeli Jews for each period of immigration up through 1980. The present authors applied his procedures to the 1990 census for each period of immigration through 1990 and arrived at an estimate of 193,000 Jewish Israelis living in the United States as of 1990.

NJPS and N.Y. Study

The CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey included a question on place of birth. Phillips and Herman analyzed this data set to come up with an estimate of close to 90,000 Israeli-born persons — almost identical to the number in the 1990 census. To estimate the number of non-native-born Israelis, they used the question on time spent in Israel. They assumed that all North African-, Middle Eastern-, and European-born Jews who spent a year or more in Israel were émigrés, and came up with an additional 3,500 Israelis. However, the question was asked only of respondents, and thus spouses or other household members who may have lived in Israel were not counted. Assuming that the estimate of non-native Israelis was off by half, the Herman-Phillips estimate for the total number of Israelis would be 96,760.

For the present article Phillips did a similar analysis using the 1991 New York Jewish Population Study, which had a larger overall sample than the NJPS and, because Israelis are concentrated in New York, a larger absolute number of Israeli interviews to work with. The N.Y. Study did not have a question on time spent in Israel, so a different technique had to be employed.

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10They were used to identify Israelis in the analysis of the New York and Los Angeles "PUMS" files.

11Eisenbach, "Jewish Emigrants from Israel."

to estimate the number of non-native-born Israelis. Each household with an
Israeli-born person was examined individually. A foreign-born person mar-
rried to a sabra who had married that person prior to moving to the United
States was counted as an Israeli. This procedure produces an estimated
27,000 Israeli Jews living in the greater New York Jewish community —
22,000 Israeli-born persons, plus 5,000 non-native-born Israelis and chil-
dren.

An estimate of the total number of Israelis in the United States can be
arrived at from the N.Y. figures, as follows: Start with a figure of 30,000
in New York (knowing that the 27,000 figure is a conservative one); add
15,000 for Los Angeles (based on Herman and Phillips estimate that there
are twice as many Israelis in New York as in Los Angeles\(^3\)); double that
figure, since New York and Los Angeles account for half of the Israelis in
the United States, to arrive at a national estimate of 90,000.

Although the estimates cited above use divergent data sources and em-
ploy different methods of calculation, they are all based on a common
strategy. Each estimate begins with a known number from a primary data
source that is relevant to, but not a direct or comprehensive count of, the
Israelis in the United States. In each case, the source is missing some vital
information. For example, estimates based on the “gross balance” of exits
and entrances from and to Israel include both Jews and non-Jews and don’t
distinguish between emigrants and temporary travelers; estimates using the
U.S. Census have only the number of native-born Israelis; and so forth.
Each procedure then derives an estimate of the total number of Israelis in
the United States by filling in the missing information from a separate and
unrelated secondary data source.

There are two sources of divergence in the estimates. The first is the lack
of comparability among the primary data sources (e.g., exits and entrances
enumerated in Israel versus persons listing Israel as their place of birth in
the U.S. Census). The second is the accuracy of the secondary data sources
(e.g., the ratio of native-born Israelis to non-native-born Israelis), all of
which have limitations.

The primary and secondary data sources for each estimation procedure
are summarized in table 1. Given the number of steps where error is
inevitably introduced, it is remarkable that the estimates fall into a rela-
tively compact range of between 100,000 and 200,000 Israelis in the United
States. Even the largest estimate is considerably smaller than the figures
once widely publicized and accepted.

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\(^3\)P. Herman and B. Phillips, paper presented to meeting of the Population Commission of
the International Geographical Union, Los Angeles, Aug. 6, 1992.
TABLE 1. ESTIMATES OF NUMBER OF ISRAELIS IN U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Estimated No. of Israelis</th>
<th>Primary Data Source</th>
<th>Adjustments Made on the Basis of Secondary Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold &amp; Phillips</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>NY Study</td>
<td>(1) Distribution of Israelis nationally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillips &amp; Herman</td>
<td>96,760</td>
<td>NJPS, 1990</td>
<td>(1) % Sabra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herman</td>
<td>97,465 – 117,135</td>
<td>INS</td>
<td>(1) % Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) % who returned to Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Estimated number of illegal immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold &amp; Phillips</td>
<td>172,848</td>
<td>Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (Border Police Data)</td>
<td>(1) Proportion in United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Proportion Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Adjustment for mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) % who will return to Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold &amp; Phillips</td>
<td>193,000</td>
<td>US Census 1990</td>
<td>(1) % Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) % Sabra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHILDREN OF ISRAELIS

Analyzing data from the NJPS, Phillips and Herman were able to break down the Israeli-American population by generation status in Israel and to identify American-born children of Israeli parents. They estimate that there are 12,000 Israeli-born children in the United States as compared with over 31,000 American-born children of at least one Israeli parent. The former are presumably included in the figures cited above. Should the latter be counted as Israelis? One argument for counting them is that they are being raised in an Israel-derived household, are exposed to Israeli influences, have Israeli relatives, and are often thought of by their parents as "Israeli." The data analyzed by Phillips and Herman suggest that this is not entirely the...
case, however, since two out of three American-born children of Israelis have one American-born parent.

**Patterns of Migration**

The major data sources all show a steady acceleration of Israeli immigration, particularly after 1970. According to census data from New York and Los Angeles, one-third of Israelis came since 1985, and roughly two-thirds since 1975. Of the two communities, Los Angeles Israelis are more recent arrivals. (See table 2.) The growth of Israeli immigration is also evident in the INS data on arrivals from Israel and applications for citizenship. A review of 26 years of the flow of legal migration from Israel to the United States found that number slowly increasing from about 1,000 per year in 1948 to almost 6,000 a year by 1979.34

It is much harder to measure the rate of return of Israelis to Israel, because there is considerable movement back and forth between the two countries and a growing class of "transnationals," sometimes referred to as "birds of passage," individuals who are citizens or legal residents of both countries and whose business or work has them living in both countries for longer and shorter periods of time.

Israeli government sources report that the number of Israelis returning home has increased substantially since 1992 — the year that marked the election of the peace-oriented Labor Party in Israel and a major economic recession in the United States — aided undoubtedly by an intensified official


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
<th>New York</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985 – 90</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 – 84</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 – 79</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 – 74</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 – 69</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 – 64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 – 59</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1950</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* 1990 Census.
outreach policy toward expatriates. During 1985 – 1991 the annual average number of returnees was 5,500; during 1992 – 1994, 10,500 returnees; and 14,000 returned in 1993 and in 1994. A booming economy in Israel has clearly encouraged this increased return migration.

Motives for Migration

When asked why they came to the United States, most Israelis offer one of three overlapping responses: economic opportunities (including education), family factors, and a need for broader horizons. A fairly large number, generally women and children, came to accompany their husbands and fathers who sought economic betterment and educational opportunity. Another family-based reason for migration was for unification with relatives already living in the States. Several respondents had links to America prior to their emigration, which initially made them consider moving and, once they did, facilitated the adjustment process. Among these were Israelis married to Americans.

Israelis who were self-employed prior to migration and retain their entrepreneurial pursuits here assert that the United States is a better location for capitalistic endeavors than Israel, because there are fewer regulations and controls and lower taxes.

While most Israelis enter the United States with specific goals of education, economic and career advancement, or family unification, some arrive as part of a "secular pilgrimage" of world travel that is a common rite of passage among Israelis following their military service. This pattern has been less commonly observed in Midwestern locations like Detroit and Chicago than in coastal cities like New York and Los Angeles, because the former are unlikely stopping points for international travelers. Instead, migrants come to these "backwaters" for specific reasons: to take a job, attend school, or join friends or relatives.

Israelis interviewed in Los Angeles and New York described how they had come to the United States as part of their travels, picked up a job to earn some cash and then had "gotten stuck" — because of economic oppor-


34 Rosen, The Israeli Corner; Sobel, Migrants from the Promised Land; Herman, "Jewish-Israeli Migration to the United States Since 1948."


37 Uriely, "Rhetorical Ethnicity of Permanent Sojourners."
tunities, relationships, or other factors — for a period longer than they had initially planned.\textsuperscript{40} Isaac described this:

Isaac described this:

Israel is a country that is not easy to live in. Everybody finishes the army after three or four years. After the army, you understand life differently. So you are ready to try something else. I came to Los Angeles, and then I met my wife and that's how I started. I got into the clothing business and I stayed. We had kids. Since then, I'm in clothing. I haven't done anything but clothing.\textsuperscript{41}

In Los Angeles, a number of Israelis commented that their travels to Latin America prior to arrival in the United States had allowed them to become competent enough in Spanish to communicate easily with Latino workers.\textsuperscript{42} This was a definite asset and an inducement to stay on, since many found work in labor-intensive industries such as garments or construction, which have a predominantly Spanish-speaking labor force.\textsuperscript{43}

Finally, like various groups in both previous and current migrant flows, Israelis are involved in chain migration. The presence of established co-ethnics in the host society is an attraction as well as a valuable resource for later migrants.\textsuperscript{44} Israelis also ease their resettlement in the United States by residing in the Jewish neighborhoods of Queens and Brooklyn in New York City, and Beverly-Fairfax, West Hollywood, Pico-Robertson, and the San Fernando Valley in Los Angeles; North Miami Beach, Florida; Troy and Farmington Hills, Michigan, and Devon and Skokie in the Chicago area.\textsuperscript{45}

DISILLUSIONMENT AND LIMITATIONS

An additional explanation for Israeli emigration is the desire to get away from the confines of the Jewish state. Because direct criticism of the Jewish state is regarded by those living beyond its borders as disloyal, it is voiced relatively infrequently by émigrés. However, in explaining why they left Israel, certain migrants describe feelings of disillusionment or a general attitude of not being able fit into the social order. According to an Israeli government estimate, about 5 percent of all permanent emigrants do so for ideological reasons.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{40}Ben-Ami, “Schlepers and Car Washers”; Gold, “Israelis In Los Angeles.”

\textsuperscript{41}Quoted extracts are from interviews conducted by Steve Gold.

\textsuperscript{42}One building contractor placed ads in the Spanish-language press to hire helpers.

\textsuperscript{43}Gold, “Patterns of Economic Cooperation.”

\textsuperscript{44}Michael J. Fiore, Birds of Passage (New York, 1979); George J. Borjas, Friends or Strangers (New York, 1990); Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, Immigrant Entrepreneurs (Berkeley, 1988); Douglas S. Massey, Rafael Alarcon, Jorge Durand, and Humberto Gonzalez, Return to Aztlan (Berkeley, 1987).

\textsuperscript{45}Mehdi Bozorgmehr, Claudia Der-Martirosian, and Georges Sabagh, “Middle Easterners: A New Kind of Immigrant” (Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies, UCLA, 1995), mimeo; Herman and LaFontaine, “In Our Footsteps”; Rosen, The Israeli Corner.

\textsuperscript{46}“Going Home.”
Several respondents asserted that they left Israel in order to avoid the constant threat of war and violence. This motive was mentioned in terms of both the Yom Kippur War and the invasion of Lebanon, as well as by the descendants of Holocaust survivors. A Los Angeles-based Israeli psychotherapist describes many of her co-national patients as war refugees:

Those who come to my office now are the result of the first Lebanon war. This is a wounded group. For them, the idealism, the Zionist goals are gone. Now they are saying "I want to make money. I need time out, [away from] the pressure cooker [atmosphere]. How many more times am I going to go to war? I am sick and tired of going to the army, the reserves and everything."

Another reason for leaving is perceived ethnic discrimination. As a nation of immigrants, Israel is ethnically diverse. A significant distinction exists between the higher-status Ashkenazic (European-origin) group and the lower-status Oriental and Sephardic Jews, whose origins are North Africa and the Middle East. Most Israelis assert that ethnic discrimination against Sephardic and Oriental Jews has been reduced significantly since the 1950s; however, "[t]he ethnic factor does play a role of some importance in some deportees' decision to move." A Yemeni-origin Israeli woman with a degree in education explains her decision to exit:

I remember one time my brother came to my mom and he asked her, "What is Ashkenazy?" And "What is Temany?" Another time we went to visit my aunt in Tel Aviv. And there the kids were telling us, "Black, black, you guys are black. Go from here, go from here."

I was trapped between the two worlds and I really had a rough time. Socially it was terrible for me. I did not find myself. I think that in a way I was afraid to face [Israeli] society. I was afraid not to fit in. Even though I had the knowledge and the education, I was afraid of not being accepted. . . . I didn't have the support system around me to fit me in. . . . discrimination was part of it. I just did not see myself teaching in Israel. I just thought that America would be better. I did not know too much about it. I just decided to come.

And an Oriental Jew in Chicago describes his motivation for leaving:

I am of Kurdish origin, and in Israel, the Polish elite treated us as trash. They acted as if they were better than us. Being Sephardic was associated with being primitive or being Chah-Chah [riff-raff]. When I came to Chicago, I left all of this behind. Nobody treated me as an inferior Sephardic. Here I see Polish people who are lower than me. I see a different reality, and it makes me angry about what I went through in Israel.

Finally, some émigrés maintain that they simply felt uncomfortable within the Israeli environment, that the nation is too small, conformist,

“Sobel, Migrants from the Promised Land, p. 217.
“Uriely, “Patterns of Identification,” p. 35.
competitive, and socially demanding for their liking. In his book on Israeli emigration, Zvi Sobel asserts: "Repeatedly I was struck by the extent and depth of frustration expressed by a wide range of individuals with respect to this factor of limited opportunity that is tied to a natural and unassailable limitation of smallness — physical and demographic."\(^5\)

**Israeli Emigration in World Perspective**

On the level of the individual, a decision to leave Israel can be explained in terms of personal situations and choices. On the societal level, emigration can be understood not merely as the sum of individual decisions but as part of a larger "world system" perspective that connects the experience of Israelis with the broad flows of contemporary international migration. In this view, isolated individuals moving from one place to another are part of a large-scale interconnected process wherein shifting social, economic, and demographic realities yield fundamental changes in social and economic relationships both between and within nations. Especially in recent years, the expansion of international links in capital, technology, transportation, and communication has accelerated the cross-national movement of information, finance, goods — and migrants.\(^5\)

For a number of macrosociological reasons, Israelis can be considered likely candidates for international migration. First, because they are relatively recent arrivals to the Jewish state, their numbers probably contain many individuals with a propensity to move on.\(^5\) Second, as Jews, many Israelis have access to a long tradition as middlemen, entrepreneurs, and the like — skills that can be plied in various national settings. Third, many have direct connections to the United States — through relatives, education, the military, and work. These provide both information about opportunities and assistance in resettlement. Finally, the State of Israel has many social, economic, cultural, and political links with the United States which contribute to a sense of familiarity and and make integration relatively easier.

Israeli demographer Sergio DellaPergola has shown that the post-World War II migration of Jews has generally followed a pattern of movement from less developed areas of the world (the periphery) to more economically central, advanced regions, demonstrating that economic improvement

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\(^5\)Sobel, p. 77.


\(^3\)Herman and Phillips, analyzing data from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, found that the majority of the Israeli-born Jewish population (69 percent) were themselves the children of immigrants to Israel.
ranks with nationalism as a major force behind Jewish migration. Since, in this analysis, the United States and other Western nations are more developed economically than Israel, emigration of Jews from Israel to the United States is consistent with the general trend in Jewish migration. DellaPergola further suggests that the pattern of Israeli emigration does not appear "to reflect any major crisis that might have occurred" but is characterized "by frequent and short-term ups and downs, broadly comparable to those of the typical business cycle." Given the incentives for migration, the proportion of immigrants who subsequently re-migrate from Israel is not as high as one might expect. It is comparatively lower than for countries like the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, and New Zealand, which also experienced large-scale immigration. While the absolute number of Jewish emigrants from Israel has tended to increase over the years, the rate of emigration has been relatively low and stable, between 3 and 4 per 1,000 inhabitants per year.

**DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF AMERICAN ISRAELIS**

*Age, Sex, and Marital Status*

Israelis are a young population. According to the 1990 U.S. Census, 79 percent of Israelis in New York and 81 percent of Israelis in Los Angeles are under age 45. The 1991 New York Jewish Population Study shows an almost identical age profile (table 3). Israelis in the New York survey are the youngest Jewish nationality group as well: 89.6 percent of Israelis in New York are under 50, compared with 75.2 percent of native-born Jews and 50.5 percent of the rest of the Jewish foreign-born population. On both coasts, there are more males than females. New York's community is 55 percent male, while Los Angeles's is 54 percent male.

*Family Composition*

Based on 1990 data (N.Y. Study), Israeli households in New York are more likely to consist of married couples than are foreign-born or native-
TABLE 3. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF ISRAELIS, LOS ANGELES AND NEW YORK (PERCENTAGES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>LA PUMS</th>
<th>NY PUMS</th>
<th>NY Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 44</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 54</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 - 64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 1990 Census, PUMS; 1991 N.Y. Jewish Population Study. Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Born Jewish households (67 percent for Israelis as compared with 62 percent of non-Israeli foreign-born households and 52 percent of native-born Jewish households). Conversely, only 13 percent of Israeli households are single-person households as compared with 28 percent of other foreign-born as well as native-born households. The differences are even more dramatic when children are considered. Israeli households are more than twice as likely as other foreign-born households or native-born Jewish households to consist of a married couple with children under 18 (55 percent versus 23 percent for both foreign- and native-born).

Marriages between Israelis and Americans are fairly common. In 1986, over a third of all Israelis with immigrant status in the United States were married to an American citizen. "One out of four Israelis married the U.S. citizen outside the U.S., probably in Israel, and the rest married in the U.S." A survey of naturalized Israelis in Los Angeles found that of the 80 percent who were married, 35 percent were married to American Jews; 49 percent were married to other Israelis; 8 percent to European or South American Jews; and 8 percent to non-Jews.

Herman, "Jewish-Israeli Migration," p. 20.
Ethnic and National Origins

Different studies have found different proportions of Ashkenazim and Sephardim among Israelis in this country. The 1980 New York Jewish Population Study reported that 7 percent of Israeli-born immigrants were Sephardic/Oriental Jews, while the 1980 census data showed 16 percent. In another New York study, 45 percent of respondents reported themselves as Ashkenazic, 42 percent as Sephardic/Oriental, and 13 percent as a mixture of both. In one Los Angeles study, 58 percent of naturalized Israelis were of Ashkenazic origin, while 37 percent were Sephardic/Oriental, and 2 percent were mixed.

While Israelis of diverse ethnic origins associate with each other in the United States, several studies suggest that patterns of social interaction, religious participation, economic cooperation, and adjustment to the States often take place within ethnic boundaries.

Education and Mobility

Israelis in the United States are a relatively well-educated group. According to the 1990 census, 56 percent of men and 52 percent of women in New York and 56 percent of men and 62 percent of women in Los Angeles have at least some college, while fewer than 20 percent in either city are not high-school graduates. Moreover, Israeli women are as educated as Israeli men. The Israelis in the N.Y. Study have a higher educational attainment profile than those in the New York census file: 71 percent of Israeli men in the N.Y. Study had one or more years of college vs. 56 percent in the census data. Among Israeli women, the disparity between the survey and the census data is smaller, but in the same direction: 65 percent of the Israeli women in the N.Y. Study had completed one or more years of college as compared with 52 percent of Israeli women in the census file. The differences in educational attainment between the N.Y. Study and census data may reflect the studies’ different sampling frames. The study includes only Jews and only Israeli-born Israelis, groups that are likely to have higher levels of education than the census sample, which includes Israelis born outside of the Jewish state as well as non-Jews. (See “Subgroup Relations,” below.)

Israeli immigrants frequently report that they came to the United States in order to increase their education. This seems to be borne out by the data.

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"Ritterband, “Israelis in New York.”
"Rosenthal, “Assimilation of Israeli Immigrants.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schooling</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LA</td>
<td>NY PUMS</td>
<td>NY Study</td>
<td>LA PUMS</td>
<td>NY PUMS</td>
<td>NY Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th grade or less</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6 (HS grad.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6 (HS grad.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some high school</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11 or less:</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14 or less:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finished high school</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28 30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29 32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23 10</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College grad or more</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33 61</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29 46</td>
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<tr>
<td>(One or more years college)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(56) (71)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td>(52) (65)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In one study of Israelis in New York, while 28 percent of those responding had a bachelor's degree or greater before leaving Israel, the proportion increased to 39 percent in the United States. Similarly, of respondents' spouses, the fraction with a college-level education increased from 28 percent in Israel to 45 percent in the United States.63

### Occupational and Economic Status

In both New York and Los Angeles, almost half of Israeli men are employed as managers, administrators, professionals, or technical specialists. Another quarter in either city are employed in sales. Other important occupational categories are gender-based: craft work (frequently in construction) for men and clerical occupations for women. On both coasts, the most common occupational category for Israeli women is professional/technical. In both New York and Los Angeles, female Israelis are professionally employed at nearly double the figure of their male counterparts: 41 percent of Israeli women are professionally employed in New York, 33 percent in Los Angeles. This reflects the large fraction of Israeli women who find employment in Jewish communal occupations, such as teaching in day schools and synagogues. (See table 5.) Recent studies have shown that 7 percent of all Hebrew school teachers in Atlanta, Baltimore, and Milwaukee and 25 percent in Los Angeles were born in Israel.64

While the image of the Israeli taxi driver in New York was a popular stereotype in the 1980s, census data reveal that this is no longer a major calling among the community (if in fact it ever was). According to the 1990 census, only 4 percent of Israeli men in New York and 2 percent in Los Angeles are employed in the field of transport. By the mid-1990s, taxi companies, for example, that were owned by Israelis, tended to employ an ethnically diverse labor force.

The occupational profile of Israelis in New York differs somewhat in the census data and the N.Y. Study. The latter shows many more Israeli males concentrated in the professional/technical categories than the former (44 percent vs. 21 percent) and many fewer in sales (8 percent vs. 29 percent). The N.Y. Study also shows more women in professional and technical occupations than does the census (63 percent vs. 41 percent) and fewer in sales (8 percent vs. 16 percent) and clerical (8 percent vs. 23 percent). The rest of the distributions are nearly identical. (See table 5.) The differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>LA PUMS</th>
<th>NY PUMS</th>
<th>NY Study</th>
<th>LA PUMS</th>
<th>NY PUMS</th>
<th>NY Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manager/administrator</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof./tech.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in occupational distribution between the N.Y. Study and census data may reflect the studies' different sampling frames, as discussed above, with the less educated more likely to be employed in clerical and sales occupations. Further, since teaching Hebrew is a common professional occupation for Israeli women in the United States, we might surmise that non-native speakers of Hebrew (and non-Jews) are less likely to be working in this field.

The occupational profile of Israeli males in New York is very similar to that of other foreign-born Jewish males as well as of American-born Jewish men with two minor exceptions: Israelis are less likely than native-born males to be employed in sales and more likely to be employed in skilled occupations.

Research suggests that Israeli immigrants are extremely entrepreneurial. The 1990 census found that around a third of Israeli men in both New York (31 percent) and Los Angeles (36 percent) were self-employed. Nationally, Israelis have the second-highest rate for self-employment of all the nationality groups in the 1990 census. Only that of Koreans was higher. The rates of Israeli self-employment in the N.Y. Study are consistent with those tabulated in the 1990 census for New York City: 36 percent for males and 20 percent for females in the former; 31 percent and 14 percent in the latter. (See table 6.) Further, Israeli males and females are more likely to be self-employed than other foreign-born and native-born Jewish New Yorkers.

Other surveys have estimated the Israeli rate of self-employment to be even higher. A researcher in Los Angeles found that 77 percent of Israeli men and 37 percent of Israeli women in Los Angeles were self-employed; a New York study found that 63 percent of Israeli men and 23 percent of Israeli women in New York were self-employed; and an analysis of 1980 census data for California showed Israelis with the highest rate of entrepreneurship of any nationality in the United States. 65 Given that immigrants generally have higher rates of self-employment than the native-born, and that Jews — foreign-born and native-born alike — are also characterized by high rates of self-employment, this is not surprising. 66


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>LA PUMS</th>
<th>NY PUMS</th>
<th>NY Study</th>
<th>LA PUMS</th>
<th>NY PUMS</th>
<th>NY Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High rates of self-employment are maintained by extensive economic cooperation involving co-ethnic hiring, subcontracting, and ethnic economic specialization. In Los Angeles, Israelis are especially active in construction, jewelry and diamonds, retail sales, security, garments, engineering, and media. One illustration of Israelis’ entrepreneurial orientation can be found in the “Jewish/Israeli Yellow Pages of Los Angeles.” Originally started as an offshoot of the Hebrew weekly Hadshot LA, the bilingual (Hebrew and English) directory grew to over 300 pages, advertising some 1,500 Israeli-owned businesses. The publisher estimated that there were closer to 3,500 Israeli-owned businesses in Los Angeles in 1995.

LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION

Israelis in New York and Los Angeles have generally high rates of employment and low rates of welfare use. Men have very high rates of labor-force participation, but a large fraction of Israeli women are not in the labor force. (See table 7.) One survey of naturalized Israelis in New York found that “only 4 percent of the women indicated ‘housewife’ as their occupation in Israel, while 36 percent did so in the United States.” Another study found that while 30 percent of Israeli migrant women had not been in the labor force in Israel, 56 percent were not in the labor force in New York.

Further, many Israeli women who work do so only part time. Israelis are different in this regard from many other immigrant women, who maintain high labor-force participation rates. While this trend may be an indicator of the migrants’ improved economic status, it also undoubtedly reflects the decision of Israeli women to stay out of the labor market in order to compensate on the domestic and communal fronts for the support networks and services they enjoyed in Israel but find lacking in the United States. (See below, “Gender and Family Adaptation.”)

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67 Bozorgmehr et al., “Middle Easterners: A New Kind of Immigrant”; Gold, “Patterns of Economic Cooperation.”
68 Personal communication, Jan. 1996. This figure accords with 1990 census data, which show some 14,000 Israelis living in Los Angeles, about 29 percent (4,000) of them self-employed.
69 This despite the fact that — as of 1984 — the United States had a higher female labor-force participation rate (44 percent) than Israel’s (38 percent).
71 Korazim, “Israeli Families in New York City,” p. 79.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Men LA PUMS</th>
<th>Men NY PUMS</th>
<th>Men NY Study</th>
<th>Women LA PUMS</th>
<th>Women NY PUMS</th>
<th>Women NY Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In labor force</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Employed)</td>
<td>(83)</td>
<td>(85)</td>
<td>(86)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Unemployed)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in labor force</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCOME

The earnings of Israelis in New York and Los Angeles are considerable, exceeding the average for the foreign-born and approaching those of native whites. Employed Israeli men residing in New York City were making approximately $35,000 annually in 1990, while their counterparts in Los Angeles were making almost $49,000. For purposes of comparison, the average income for all employed foreign-born men was about $26,000 in New York and $24,000 in Los Angeles in 1990, while employed, native-born white men in New York and Los Angeles earned approximately $46,000.

Employed Israeli women made about $25,000 in New York and approximately $22,200 in Los Angeles. For purposes of comparison, the average income for employed, foreign-born women in New York in 1990 was $19,000 and $16,400 in Los Angeles; employed, native-born white women earned about $31,000 in New York and $26,000 in Los Angeles.\(^7\)

While the average income of former Israelis suggests a generally successful merger into the American middle class, it should be noted that the economic circumstances of this population cover a wide range, from poverty to significant wealth. In 1990, according to the census, between 1 and 2 percent of Israelis in New York and Los Angeles were on welfare. Also, when length of residence is taken into account, incomes tend to rise. In Los Angeles, Israeli men who had been in the country for ten years averaged almost $72,000 a year. (Figures are for persons aged 24 – 65.)

Residential Distribution in New York

Israelis tend to live in older, established Jewish neighborhoods. In the New York area, Israelis are concentrated in Brooklyn and Queens.\(^7\)

Different kinds of Israeli households live in different parts of New York. Israeli singles, even more than native-born Jewish singles, are attracted to Manhattan (50 percent versus 40 percent). Married couples in which one or both partners are Israeli gravitate toward Brooklyn (39 percent) and Queens (20 percent), as do married couples in which one or both partners is foreign-born (but not Israeli) (39 percent to Brooklyn, 18 percent to Queens). Jewish couples in which both partners are American-born, by contrast, are most likely to live in the suburbs (40 percent), particularly Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties.

Israelis in Brooklyn and Queens tend to have the lowest socioeconomic status, and in this regard they are like other Jews in these boroughs. Israeli

\(^7\)PUMS for New York City and Los Angeles County, 1990 Census.
males in Brooklyn and Queens, like other foreign-born as well as native-born Jewish males, are the least likely to be employed in management, administrative, professional, or technical occupations, compared to Jews living in all areas of New York City. The more affluent areas of Manhattan and Riverdale (in the Bronx) are the most likely to have Jews in higher-status occupations. This is also true of the suburbs, though Israelis in affluent areas may be self-employed rather than professionals.

A similar pattern is observed for females. Employed Jewish females in Brooklyn and Queens are the least likely to work in high-status occupations, regardless of their place of birth. Israeli women in the suburbs, however, have a decidedly higher occupational profile than suburban Israeli men. This is probably due to the fact that Israeli women often find jobs as teachers or other kinds of Jewish communal professionals.

Another difference between suburban and urban Israelis in New York has to do with religious observance. Israeli families in Brooklyn and Queens are the most likely to have moved there to be near a Jewish day school or yeshivah or a synagogue that appeals to them. Israelis in Brooklyn and Queens are more likely than suburban Israelis to engage in Jewish rituals, including attending synagogue one or more times per week, using separate dishes for milk and meat, fasting on Yom Kippur, refraining from using money on Shabbat, and observing the Fast of Esther. Suburban Israelis, on the other hand, are more likely to have attended a Yom Ha'atzma'ut (Israel Independence Day) celebration.

Language

Israelis make exceptionally good progress at learning English. One analysis of 1990 census data for Los Angeles found that only 5 percent of Israelis do not feel confident in their English ability. In interviews with over 100 Los Angeles Israelis representing all walks of life, Steve Gold encountered only one — a recently arrived Persian-born Israeli who worked in the heavily Iranian garment district — who could not speak fluent English. About 80 percent of Israelis in Los Angeles report speaking Hebrew at home, a figure that reduces to 60 percent for the generation of Israelis who came to the United States as young children and spent many years here.75

In general, Israelis speak Hebrew at home, but the percentage who report speaking Hebrew at home declines with length of time in the United States. Israelis in New York are far more likely than Israelis in Los Angeles to report Yiddish as one of the languages spoken at home. (See table 8.)

75Bozorgmehr et al., “Middle Easterners,” pp. 31 – 32.
### Table 8. Languages Spoken at Home, Israelis in Los Angeles and New York (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
<th>New York</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yiddish</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: 1990 Census, PUMS.*

### Patterns of Adaptation

#### Social Adaptation

Much of the literature on Israeli immigrants cited in this study asserts that, despite their economic well-being, many members of the group accept the negative *yored* stereotype, suffering from feelings of shame, guilt, and alienation, making frequent mention of their plans to return home, and refusing to call themselves Americans. The ambivalence experienced by many Israelis is reflected in interview comments such as these by a man living in a mostly Israeli apartment complex in the San Fernando Valley:

> An Israeli is torn apart the minute he is leaving Israel [to come to the U.S. for an extended period]. It’s not like people from other countries who come here and settle down, hoping for better life. An Israeli is torn apart the minute he leaves Israel and that’s when he begins to wonder where is it better — here or there.

> We Israelis come here and organize our lives as if we are going to stay for a short period and our life here is a make-believe. The reality is that we live here and at the same time we don’t live here. That leaves the question for which I don’t have an answer — what will happen and where are we?

According to one view, the kind of ambivalence just expressed blocks the formation of a viable Israeli ethnic community, making Israelis in this regard "out of tune with the mainstream of ethnic behavior in America." They remain marginal both to Israel and the American Jewish community because of their "problem concerning the legitimacy of their emigration, their self-definition and self-esteem."

Without denying that many Israelis feel ambivalent about being in the United States, our research suggests that feelings of nostalgia and homesickness can function as an incentive for co-ethnic cooperation rather than only as a source of shame that discourages the maintenance of ethnic ties.

In New York, Los Angeles, and other locales the desire of Israelis to interact with each other and to maintain their ties to Israel is expressed in various ways: Israelis socialize with each other, live near co-nationals, consume Hebrew-language media (originating in both the United States and Israel), patronize Israeli restaurants and nightclubs, attend formal social events and celebrations, observe Israel Independence Day together; they work in jobs with other Israelis, consume goods and services provided by Israeli professionals and entrepreneurs, keep funds in Israeli banks, send children to Israeli-oriented religious, language, recreational, and cultural/national activities; they raise money for Israeli causes (e.g., the Macabees/L.A. Kings fund-raising basketball game), call Israel on the phone, host Israeli visitors, and make frequent trips to Israel.

They patronize Israeli-style day-care centers. In Los Angeles there are two types — one run as a social service by formally organized groups, such as the Gan-Chabad Israeli Center; the other, home-based day-care businesses organized by Israeli women. The 1992—1993 Los Angeles Israeli Yellow Pages lists ten such centers, among them Ariella’s Day Care, Dorit’s Day Care, Hila Day Care, and Kids’ Gym.

And they belong to a variety of associations. In addition to synagogues, these include clubs of various sorts and Hebrew-speaking chapters of American or international organizations such as ORT, B’nai B’rith, and WIZO (the latter reportedly brought to Los Angeles by Israelis). The 1993—1994 Jewish Yellow Pages of Los Angeles devotes six pages to 30 such organizations. While some of these groups, such as ADL or the Simon Wiesenthal Center, are clearly not limited to the immigrant community, a number are exclusively oriented toward immigrants.

Among these are the Israeli Flying Clubs (there are two), the Israeli Musicians’ Organization, the Israeli Organization in Los Angeles (ILA), the Israeli-Yemenite minyan at Temple B’nai David Judea, the Summit political club, YELI (an organization of Israeli mental health professionals who assist co-nationals), several sports organizations, and Israeli folk-dance groups. These, as well as various informal networks of business people, were created by immigrants themselves. Youth activities like Hetz Vakeshet (summer in Israel program) and Tzofim (Israeli scouts) are sponsored by the Israeli government. Still other activities — the Jewish Community Center’s Israeli program, the AMI (Israeli Hebrew) school, the B’nai B’rith Shalom Lodge, the Jewish Federation’s Israeli Division, the Chabad Israeli

Program, and WIZO Shaked — are linked with American or international Jewish organizations. Regardless of their affiliations, these groups reflect Israelis’ desire to interact with each other and enjoy being in a setting where they can exchange information, share social and economic support, and develop common perspectives on life in the United States.

A case can be made that the sizeable Israeli population in Los Angeles, along with the many institutions that serve it, constitutes what Canadian sociologist Raymond Breton calls an “institutionally complete” community. Within this collectivity, an Israeli immigrant or visitor can satisfy nearly all of his/her needs in Hebrew.

While Los Angeles may well have the most organizationally active Israeli community in the United States, other communities reveal a similar if less intensive communal pattern. Chicago, Miami, San Francisco, and New York all have Tzofim and Tzabar programs (the latter involves “education in Jewish tradition without an emphasis on religion”) and a variety of Israeli associations and clubs. With the exception of Miami, each city also has an Israeli-oriented Hebrew school program. Further, these cities, along with Detroit, have all made efforts to include Israelis within the local Jewish Federation and other communal activities.

Israelis clearly possess a desire to associate with and help one another. They become each other’s families — celebrating holidays together, for example — and helping each other get established. But the examples cited above demonstrate a stronger communal orientation than was believed to exist, contrasting with the image of the conflicted yored who is too ashamed to make contact with his or her co-nationals.

**SUBGROUP RELATIONS**

While Israelis in the United States cooperate among themselves and with other Jewish groups, various subgroups of the Israeli immigrant population (based upon common background, outlook, and the like) have developed more extensive forms of cooperation than exist in the Israeli community as a whole. For example, in Los Angeles, groups based on ethnicity — such as Persians and Yemenis — organize many of their own social events and religious activities and occupy economic niches that they share with others of a common background. This is how one Israeli of Persian (Iranian) origin

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"Raymond Breton, "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants," *American Journal of Sociology* 84, 1964, pp. 293 – 318.

"Mittelberg and Waters, "The Process of Ethnogenesis Among Haitian and Israeli Immigrants."


"Uriely, "Rhetorical Ethnicity of Permanent Sojourners"; Shokeid, *Children of Circumstances*; Gold, "Patterns of Economic Cooperation."
describes the high level of economic cooperation that exists among members of his group:

For us it is very easy to find out a job only on the downtown. Before I went downtown, I tried to look at the ads in the American newspapers, like the *Times*. My son was looking with me. But I couldn't get into the business. But the minute I went to downtown L.A., there are a lot of Israelis and Persian guys, we contract between each other and start business.

While Yemeni- or Persian-origin Israelis tend to know their co-ethnics, their social networks and community knowledge do not extend to prominent Ashkenazi Israelis. Another strong network is made up of former kibbutz members who cooperate in economic and social activities. For example, Avi, a former kibbutz member who now runs a large construction company, describes his motives for hiring other Israelis:

I think that it hurts me and it takes away from my power to see another Israeli without work and without any way to make his living and that's why we are helping them. My company now has at least 35 to 40 "children" and "grandchildren" in various aspects of the business. I had many foremen who decided to go on their own and they even got a job from me as a subcontractor.

Long-established Israelis have their own social circle, which revolves around a Hebrew-speaking lodge of B'nai B'rith; and the more recently arrived are involved with WIZO and a federation-affiliated business association.

Finally, the boundaries between subgroups also reflect some of the ethnic prejudices carried over from life in Israel. For example, a Hungarian-born graduate student confides that he did not want to attend a Yom Ha'atzma'ut (Israel Independence Day) celebration because "too many Chach Chachim" (a Hebrew slang term for a flashy, working-class person, often of Oriental ethnicity) would be there. While he explains that "there are white Chach Chachim," most are Oriental or Sephardic. For their part, Moroccan, Yemeni, and Persian-origin Israelis in Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago, who made a relatively easy transition to Orthodox and Hasidic synagogue life in the United States, often criticize the antireligious outlook of secular Ashkenazi Israelis. A Chicago study found that Sephardic Israelis had higher rates of synagogue membership, attendance at High Holy Day services, and keeping a kosher home than did Ashkenazim.

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84 Uriely, "Patterns of Identification"; Shokeid, *Children of Circumstances*; Gold, "Israelis in Los Angeles."

Similarly, Middle Eastern-origin Israelis are active participants in Chabad activities in New York. In fact, judging by the number of photographs of the late Lubavitcher Rebbe displayed in Israeli businesses and other immigrant settings, Chabad has made strong connections with Israelis in Los Angeles as well.

**Gender and Family Adaptation**

In nearly every study of Israelis in the United States, including our own field interviews, one finds that while migration was a "family decision," and the family as a whole enjoys economic benefits as a result of migration, the decision to migrate was made by the men seeking the expanded educational and occupational opportunities available in the United States. In the words of Rachel:

> For most of the people that came here, the men came and the women came after them. Like when I came, my husband came for a job. I had to leave my job and I had to find a new job and it was very painful. I think more and more now there are women coming on their own, but if you look at most cases, it is the men coming after jobs and it means that the women are the ones that have to take care of finding apartment, finding schools for kids and they get depressed, very badly depressed.

A study of Israeli immigrant women in suburban New York found that all 22 of "the women who left Israel with their Israeli spouses, except one, put the onus of the decision on 'his' education, 'his' career or business plans. As a group of immigrant women they can in fact be seen as adjuncts to their spouses' immigration."

Once in this country, men often enjoy the benefits of their expanded opportunities and accordingly feel more comfortable with the new environment. One study of former kibbutzniks found that women, especially those with children and established careers, have more negative views of the new society, are less satisfied with America, and retain a stronger sense of Israeli and Jewish identity than men, who increasingly see themselves as American. Even when these Israeli women work in the United States, they have less of a professional identity than men and would prefer to return home.

These findings appear to apply to a large segment of the Israeli population. Once in the United States, through their immersion in education and work, men develop a social network and a positive sense of self. Women,

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*Shokeid, *Children of Circumstances.*


however, because they are responsible for child rearing and many of the family's domestic and social activities, are the family members who most directly confront alien American social norms and cultural practices — but without the knowledge or the family, friendship, and neighborhood resources to which they had access at home. Thus, Israeli immigrant women find their domestic and communal tasks — such as building social networks, finding appropriate schools and recreational activities, dealing with teachers and doctors, obtaining day care, and the like — to be quite difficult.

According to one researcher, an Israeli woman's family status and prior work involvement have much to do with her feelings about being in the United States. Younger women who had few social attachments prior to migration (i.e., no children or established careers) looked forward to migrating and enjoyed being in America. However, women who had children and who were forced to give up good positions in Israel to come to the United States had a much harder time, experiencing their exit as "devastating."

The presence of young or school-age children in Israeli immigrant families often heightens their ambivalence about being in the United States. The New York women in Lipner's study experience the environment in which their children are growing up as entirely antithetical to the Israeli one in which they were socialized. Essentially, they see the dominant values of the adult world, competition and individualism, replicated in the children's reality, and they are critical of it.

In reflecting on their experience, many Israelis contrast this country's positive economic and occupational environment to its communal and cultural liabilities: immigrants almost universally regard Israel as a better place for children. It is safer, they maintain, has fewer social problems, and does not impose the generational conflicts Israelis confront when raising children in the United States. Further, in Israel, Jews are the culturally and religiously dominant group. The institutions of the larger society teach children Hebrew and Jewish history and help them to shape their basic national, ethnic, and religious identity. (More on this below.)

Role reversals sometimes occur between parents and children, with the younger generation gaining in power at the expense of the older. This is because children generally become Americanized and learn English much faster than their parents. One woman reported that her teen-age son would react to her advice by saying, "What do you know about it? You're from Israel."

Another source of conflict occurs when family members disagree over their country of residence. These problems are most dramatic when one

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"Ibid., p. 232."
spouse is American-born or has many American relatives, while the other's family resides in Israel. Similarly, children who have spent much of their lives in the United States often prefer to remain, while their parents may wish to return to Israel. Conversely, parents may wish to remain in the United States for career opportunities, while children may wish to return to Israel. Such is the case for Dan, an active member of the San Fernando Valley Tzofim chapter:

On Yom Kippur, we went to the synagogue and it was so different because we prayed and then we went home and people were driving by on the street and people were eating in restaurants and it was very hard. It was very different. I felt that I am not in the right place; I shouldn’t be here. I told my parents and they said “You are in the United States, you are not in Israel. You should expect that.”

**Israeli vs. American Jewish Identity**

For many Israelis — particularly those with children — the issue of their basic identity as Israelis and as Jews is a highly charged one. The identity of many Israelis is ethnic, secular, and nationalistic. While they appreciate Jewish holidays and speak Hebrew, they connect these behaviors to “Israeli-ness” rather than Jewishness. They are not accustomed to participating in organized religious activities and depend on the larger society and public institutions to socialize their children. But the very fact of living in a non-Jewish society presents new challenges, as the following anecdote illustrates. It was told to research assistant Debra Hansen by Gili, who was stationed in Los Angeles by an Israeli company.

Gili’s oldest daughter, who attended a Jewish day school, was asked by her teacher if she would marry a non-Jew. She replied “yes,” because her parents had taught her not to judge people by their background but only by their character. When informed of this reply by their child’s teacher, Gili and his wife were shocked. They had imparted their principle in the context of Israel, so that she would not judge people according to their Ashkenazi or Oriental/Sephardic origins, but they never intended her to apply it in a non-Jewish environment.

While Israeli parents may seek to impart a Jewish/Israeli identity to children whom they see assimilating quickly to the non-Jewish folkways of American life, they find no easy way to do so. The “synagogue-based, ethno-religious identity of Diaspora U.S. Jews” is foreign to them (particularly those identified with the Ashkenazi elite), and they are unfamiliar with the uniquely American forms of Judaism, specifically, the Reform and

Conservative movements, with which the great majority of American Jews affiliate, because those movements have only a small presence in Israel.93

The dilemma of many Israeli parents is described by Batia, a psychologist and mother of two teenagers:

Israelis are born secular citizens. Most of us are raised secular, non-religious. And that's the point. Because if we're not religious, we are not identifying ourselves with the Jewish community here. Therefore, we are not Jews, we're Israelis.

So, Israelis send their kids to public school and they have this little American running around at home that is not Jewish. And remember, the Israeli also are not Jewish, so where do we meet in the family? On what value system do we meet? There is no value system that Israelis can give to their children as Americans because they don't know it. The children bring home the American culture, their parents don't know it. None of them meet on the Jewish arena, which is the healthiest, because it gives you a value system and lifestyle and it does not exist in Israeli family and that's why the breakdown occurs.

Many Israeli parents feel forced to choose between having their children socialized in either (or perhaps both) of two unfamiliar cultural traditions — those of non-Jewish Americans and those of Diaspora Jews. Those Israeli parents who try to remedy the situation by enrolling children in parochial day schools and other American Jewish institutions are confronted with a foreign culture and identity, one that is religious rather than nationalistic. Some are troubled by what they describe as the excessive religiosity of day schools. They object to the children's school-inculcated demands for a kosher kitchen, family synagogue attendance, and strict Sabbath adherence. Committed to secularism, such parents comment on their own dislike of the growing power of religious parties in Israel and do not want to raise their children to become supporters of Orthodoxy. But they are torn between their rejection of too much religion in Israel and the threat posed in America by too little.

Thus, despite complaints about excessive religiosity, and about the high cost of Jewish day schools and synagogue membership, some secular Israelis decide that the only reasonable means of resolving the gap in generation and culture is to raise their children as religious American Jews. As a result, some Israelis who present themselves as having been radically secular prior to migration claim that they are more religiously observant in the United States than they ever had been in Israel.

It is important to point out that the desire of Israeli parents to expose their children to Israeli or Jewish culture is only partly because they value these traditions. Many also want their offspring to understand "where they are coming from," so that there can be some shared experience that permits Americanized children to relate to their parents and relatives. Added to

93 Ritterband, "Israelis in New York."
this, parents’ fears about public schools and the perceived negative elements of American youth culture (drugs, individualism, excessive sexuality, low achievement motivation) also make Jewish schools look like desirable alternatives.

The solution for many Israeli immigrant families who wish to escape the polarities of assimilation and Orthodoxy, but want to give their children some form of Jewish and/or Israeli training, is to establish connections with Israeli and/or Jewish life through special family activities of their own creation or involvement in specially designed Israeli-American programs.

Many Israeli youngsters attend after-school Hebrew programs and various Israeli clubs that seek to provide Israeli-American children with some notion of an Israeli identity. Starting in 1983, New York’s Board of Jewish Education, with UJA-Federation funding, developed “a secular experimental educational program” that eventually resulted in a number of after-school programs throughout the city as well as an array of cultural activities for all ages: folk-dance groups, parent workshops, summer camps, even bar/bat mitzvah training. Chana Silberstein, director of the program, estimates that some 2,500 Israeli families have been involved in Jewish educational programs. She stresses the need of Israelis living outside of Israel “to redefine their Jewish identity, making the necessary transition from being part of a Jewish majority to part of a Jewish minority.”

An Israeli staff member in a Los Angeles Hebrew school program explained her goals this way:

When I put the program together, I was trying to think what does an Israeli ... a child that was born to an Israeli family that lives in the United States ... when he graduates this school, what does he need in order to feel comfortable in his community? So, one of them, of course, is Hebrew ... to feel comfortable at home. They must know about the culture in which ... we grew. Like the poems and the riddles and the rhymes and the stories that these parents recite at home.

They should be able go to a synagogue and feel comfortable with the Jewish community so we have lessons for the Holy Days and Shabbat. Of course, they have to know about the geography of Israel to know what’s going on political wise. They have to know the history and they should know about the different Jewish heroes from the Biblical time to modern history. Who was Trompeldor, Hanna Senesh, all the way ... back to Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Hillel. And we celebrate the Holy Days the way we would in Israel.

Tzabar, the American branch of Tzofim (Israeli Scouts) has groups for youngsters aged 10 – 19 in eight states and a membership of some 1,500. Each summer, 200 Israeli-American youth spend a summer in Israel as part

“While they exist between the polarities of assimilation and Orthodoxy, “middle ground” approaches to Judaism such as Reform and Conservative are very American and, accordingly, may have little more appeal to recently arrived Israelis than the extremes.

Rosen, The Israeli Corner, pp. 18 – 19.
of Hetz Vakeshet, a program that combines "elements of summer camp, Outward Bound, and army training all in one."96

**Jewish Involvement**

Although the issue of identity is clearly central for many Israelis, it remains to be seen how and to what extent they will become involved in the American Jewish community. One school of thought suggests a growing trend toward assimilation to non-Jewish cultural patterns. Largely secular and unaccustomed to American Jewish life, Israeli émigrés' very departure from the Holy Land signifies a move away from the Jewish ideal. Even their participation in ethnic activities is limited and oriented toward secular pursuits with little religious content — meals, parties, dancing, and sports. Moreover, their poor relations with, and social and cultural distance from, American Jews suggests little potential for integration into the larger community.97

Another school of thought sees Israelis increasingly participating in American Jewish life and becoming involved in a variety of Jewish institutions. While survey data on the Jewish involvement and behavior of Israelis are limited and overrepresent the well-established, existing studies indicate that Israeli émigrés engage in many Jewish behaviors at higher rates than those of American-born Jews.

When comparing Israeli immigrants' observance of Jewish customs — lighting candles on Shabbat and Hanukkah, attending synagogue on the High Holy Days and Shabbat, and fasting on Yom Kippur — with their patterns of practice in Israel, several studies of naturalized Israelis in New York and Los Angeles found that these practices increased in this country. A study of Israelis in Los Angeles that did not draw from a sample of those with U.S. citizenship noted a slight reduction in these religious practices. Overall, based on the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS), it appears that Israelis are more likely than American Jews to observe the above-mentioned Jewish practices, both in Israel and in the United States. (See table 9.)

In Los Angeles, 80 percent of Israeli parents provide their children with some form of Jewish education; 50 percent of Israeli youth in Los Angeles attend day schools.98 In one New York study, over 30 percent of Israeli children in Brooklyn and Queens attend day schools. This latter rate is quite high, considering that Israeli residents of Brooklyn and Queens are among

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97 Shokeid, *Children of Circumstances*.
98 Ibid.
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<tr>
<th>Observance*</th>
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<th>American Jews</th>
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<td>LA-Herman</td>
<td>NY-Rosenthal</td>
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<td>Light Shabbat candles</td>
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<td>Light Hanukkah candles</td>
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<td>Fast on Yom Kippur</td>
<td>71</td>
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*Always, usually, or sometimes

**Sources:**

Herman: Data collected from 40 randomly selected Israelis naturalized between 1976 and 1982 in Los Angeles County. (Herman and LaFontaine; see text note 13.)

Rosenthal: Data collected from 205 Israelis in Brooklyn and Queens, 1984 – 86, consisting of sub-samples of 155 randomly selected naturalized Israelis and 50 snowball-sampled non-naturalized Israelis. From the 205 questionnaires, data on 870 individuals were collected. (Rosenthal; see text note 13.)

Shachal-S.: Data collected from 100 Israeli immigrants in Los Angeles in 1991 – 92. (Shachal-Staier; see text note 16.)

the least affluent Jewish New Yorkers, and that many come from secular backgrounds.99

Communal Response

Until the 1980s, much of the organized American Jewish community and the Israeli government either ignored or actively condemned the Israeli population in the United States. One top Israeli government official referred to the émigrés as zevel (garbage) and urged consulates worldwide to have "little if anything to do with them." In order to discourage further emigration and to foster re-immigration, from the early 1970s until the mid-1980s, the Israeli consulate in New York "repeatedly urged the federation to provide no special services to Israelis."100

In the late 1980s, however, this relationship began to change. Subtly and without grandstanding, the Israeli government encouraged its consular officials to initiate the development of relations between Israeli immigrants and American Jewish institutions. Yossi Kucik of the Jewish Agency reported that he attended a 1985 meeting wherein "it was agreed that the State could no longer afford to ignore these citizens abroad." A consular official asserted, "It is preferable to see these Israelis participating in American Jewish life rather than for them to be isolated Jewishly." Early in 1990, Los Angeles consul-general Ron Ronen approached the Jewish Federation (which had been offering some outreach activities since 1984) to develop a new and more inclusive policy toward Israeli émigrés.101

In 1992 the Israeli government announced that "because of the importance it attaches to the re-emigration of Israelis to Israel," it was taking responsibility for "re-aliyah" from the Jewish Agency and establishing an Office for Returning Israelis in the Ministry of Absorption. It offered émigrés a package of benefits including cash assistance, low-cost air fair, suspension of import duties, education, assistance in finding jobs and housing, financial aid for schooling, and reduction in military duty for Israelis and their families who return.102

Following Israel's lead, American Jewry took steps to acknowledge both the existence of an Israeli immigrant community and the importance of

99Rosenthal, "Assimilation of Israeli Immigrants." On the other hand, given the poor reputation of urban public schools and the many Jewish day schools located in these neighborhoods, Israelis living in Brooklyn and Queens may have both the motive and the opportunity to provide their children with a religious education.


101Rosen, The Israeli Corner, p. 3.

102"Going Home."
outreach. Since that time, major American Jewish communities — New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami, and the San Francisco Bay Area — have supported a series of programs to aid and incorporate Israelis. These include social activities, secular Israeli-style education, and Israeli divisions of federations. However, because of the ongoing controversy surrounding the presence of Israelis in the United States, these services are sometimes provided with little official acknowledgment, even though federation dollars support them.

RELATIONS WITH AMERICAN JEWS

Significant differences between Jewish Israelis and Jewish Americans are normally obscured because of the limited and selective nature of contact between these two groups. Despite their common religion and often shared ancestral origins in Eastern Europe, Israelis and American Jews speak different languages, maintain different cultural norms and practices, eat different kinds of food, have contrasting political outlooks, and like different kinds of sports, music, and entertainment. Further, although both support Israel, they have differing national allegiances. Finally, the two groups often express their common religious identification in disparate ways.

Existing literature and our own research indicate that as individuals, Israelis and American Jews often get along well in social, workplace, and organizational settings, but on the group level some friction exists. For example, Israelis and American Jews create good friendships and happy marriages, hire each other, and work together. Major Jewish organizations have Israeli employees and members, and Israeli students attend institutions of Jewish learning.

American Jews admire Israelis' chutzpah, idealism, and military prowess. However, they often consider them to be boorish, arrogant, and overly aggressive. In Rosenthal's study of naturalized Israelis in Brooklyn and Queens, 47 percent had been invited to American Jews' homes fewer than three times, and, while 18 percent of Israeli-Americans reported their two closest friends to be American Jews, 78 percent said their best friends were fellow Israelis. Given that these Israelis had become U.S. citizens, and therefore had lived in the United States at least three to five years and knew English, this would appear to be a low rate of interaction.

103 Shokeid, *Children of Circumstances*; Gold, "Israelis In Los Angeles"; Uriely, "Rhetorical Ethnicity."
104 Rosen, *The Israeli Corner*.
Just as American Jews have mixed feelings about Israelis, Israelis are ambivalent about their American cousins, whom they sometimes portray as affluent but soft Diaspora Jews who exist as a minority in a bland and potentially hostile Christian country. In Israeli eyes, "Diaspora Jews are plagued by a 'galut' (exilic) mentality that precludes them from freely expressing themselves as proud, self-confident and self-respecting Jews."

An Israeli perspective on American life is summarized in the following quote from Yoram, an engineer employed in Detroit's auto industry. Yoram and his family speak fluent English, have an impressive suburban home, belong to a temple, and are active in the federation. Further, his children are popular campus leaders in the high school and university they attend. Nevertheless, Yoram expresses distance from his adopted country.

I would say that I feel more like an outsider. I've never been discriminated against, at least that I have felt it. I was sometimes treated like an oddity, you know, "You come from the Middle East where they are still riding camels." But basically, we lack the understanding and the feeling of being an American. An apple pie is just a cake; Halloween is an American version of Purim and Thanksgiving is a little bit like Succot. Thank God there is Hanukkah.

I don't have a problem with feeling like a minority because I have my roots. I think American Jews have it in a much more difficult way. They might feel as a minority — to cry for more opportunities or to say that they have been discriminated against. But I always have the option. I mean, I can always get up and go and whenever I go, I go home.

And I'm not the only one. I think what you'll find very interesting is that Israelis, the majority of them always maintain their house in Israel. They never sell their house in Israel.

American Jews' view of Israeli immigrants is often conflicted. On the one hand, at least until recently, many American Jews felt that Israelis should return home to support the cause of Zionism. At the same time, when confronted with Israelis' ambivalence about being in the United States — expressed in refusal to call themselves Americans, praise their new country, accept American social codes, and participate in American-style Jewish communal life — American Jews resent the newcomers' lack of patriotism and reluctance to assimilate. One federation leader in a Midwestern city complained:

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10"Lipner, "The Subjective Experience of Israeli Immigrant Women"; Sobel, Migrants from the Promised Land.
10"Cohen, "Israeli Émigrés and the New York Federation"; Sobel, Migrants from the Promised Land."
We have several thousand Israelis and there’s minimal involvement. It’s very, very frustrating. They get involved in those things that the community does for them that are Israel focused — like Israel Independence Day or if we bring an Israeli singer. But we’ve really outreached and we haven’t been very successful.

Israelis are often sensitive to the negative views held by the American Jewish community. Some feel rejected, even bitter, complaining that they are viewed as stereotypes, not as individuals. On the level of personal interaction, some Israelis describe being initially impressed by American Jews’ politeness. However, they also feel that Americans are fundamentally less friendly and sincere than Israelis. Israelis see themselves as being open to spontaneous sociability. To them, Americans appear distant and reserved, people who socialize only formally and infrequently. However, as Israelis live in the United States longer, they often find themselves taking on similar social patterns, at least partly because of demanding work schedules. Nevertheless, the open sociability of Israelis seems to be a deeply rooted norm.

Interestingly, Israelis see both Americans and themselves as materialistic, but in different ways. Young Israelis may view affluent American Jews as snobbish and more concerned with possessions than with human relationships. This is the opinion of a second-generation Israeli-American in Chicago:

There is something that I don’t like in American Jews. They are so... “JAP” [Jewish American Princess]. They have money and that is very important for them. They are spoiled kids who think about themselves most of the time.”

Poorer American Jews, while considered by Israelis as more “down to earth,” are seen as being “not very Jewish,” perhaps because their lack of income deprived them of a Jewish education. At the same time, Israelis see their own peers as nouveaux riches — constantly trying to impress each other with shows of extravagant consumerism. Taking a psychoanalytic tack, some respondents in our studies attribute this behavior to Israelis’ need to compensate for the status loss and insecurity associated with life in the “Golah” (outside of Israel).

As these examples suggest, Israelis feel significant social distance from American Jews in language, values, sociability, and life-shaping experiences. One of the most revealing differences between Americans and Israelis involves the observance of Yom Hazikaron, the Israeli Memorial Day, which occurs the day before Israel Independence Day. Although religiously identified American Jews typically know all about Jewish holidays and have visited Israel, they have little awareness of or feeling about Yom Hazikaron.

10 Lipner, “The Subjective Experience of Israeli Immigrant Women.”

11 Uriely, “Patterns of Identification,” p. 41.
which to Israelis is one of the most solemn and moving occasions of the year, when they remember the Israelis whose lives were sacrificed in combat — many of them friends and relatives — during their nation's short history. Accordingly, it is at the time of Yom Hazikaron that many Israelis feel most distanced from American Jews and closest to each other.

Recognizing these differences with American Jews, nearly all Israelis hope nevertheless for improved relations. In the words of David, an Israeli community activist:

The Israelis here have to come into the Jewish community. I don’t like the fact that some of them want to be independent. I’m not against them organizing, but we should become a part of the mainstream of Jewish-American life because we are not separate.

Take for example my own family. I don’t see that somebody’s grandmother left the same village in Poland that my grandmother lived in 80 years ago and came to New York, and my relatives came to Israel, that I’m that different from that person. So, since we are the same people, we should not have a separate Israeli Federation. For two reasons. The main reason to me is that most Israelis will not admit that most of them will stay here forever. Most of them will end up living here, and 90 percent of their children will end up living here.

I mean, all Israelis somewhere harbor the hope that they will go back to Israel. But the truth is that all of them are here temporarily, and then they die. And that’s the reality. I’ve been here 18 years, I would like to go back, I don’t know if I will. You have your businesses, people have families, you know, they cannot just pick up and leave. And they have gotten used to the way of life here and that’s their reality.

So these two communities need each other. And I’m not saying the Israelis should assimilate into the Jewish community and become Americans because they won’t. Their children probably will, but they won’t. And they can keep their uniqueness, but in total cooperation. I think that instead of having their divisive or divided Jewish community, we need to have one strong united community, because here, you’re bringing new Israeli, precious Israeli blood into the Jewish Federation. The Federation will get stronger and I’m going to tell you that some of the nicest people I know work in the Federation and it will do a hell of a lot of good for Israelis to meet these people and become one community. Not show the resentment of Americans to Israelis and Israelis see themselves as outsiders. I mean it will take time. This is not a process that will happen overnight, but it will happen.

Reconsidering Israeli Immigrants’ “Unique Status”

While various studies have made much of Israelis’ mixed feelings about being in the United States, even a cursory review of the literature demonstrates that the ambivalence of immigrants is far from unusual. The “sojourner” (temporary) perspective of Israeli migrants resembles that of many American immigrants, ranging from 19th-century Italians and Chinese to
today's Caribbeans and Latin Americans. Indeed, the image of the patriotic "new American," Stars and Stripes in hand, is far from the norm, even if it is a dominant cultural myth.

A perceptive scholar noted recently that the popular notion that immigrants came to the United States ready to assimilate "is a myth. The specter of 'Americanization' troubled more immigrants than historians have been willing to admit." Accordingly, if Israelis maintain a desire to return home, this outlook is neither unusual nor — judging from the experience of other migrant groups — does it preclude the possibility of their creating viable ethnic communities in the United States.

TRANSNATIONAL ISRAELIS

Transnationalism, a new approach in the field of migration studies, enables us to understand better international migrant communities, which, like Israeli-Americans, maintain social, cultural, and economic links to other countries on a more or less permanent basis. From the perspective of transnationalism, migration is a multilevel process rather than a discrete event consisting of a permanent move from one nation to another. This theory suggests that by retaining social, cultural, and economic links with multiple settings, people can avoid the impediments traditionally associated with long distances and international borders and remain intensely involved in the life of their country of origin, even though they no longer reside there.

A number of factors make the movement of Israelis from the Jewish state to the United States relatively easy and suggest that Israelis might be considered a transnational people. They are well educated, often possessing occupational and cultural skills that are useful in both countries. They generally have access to networks in both countries that can provide a broad variety of services ranging from pretravel information to job opportunities, child care, housing, and social life. While some Israelis in the United States lack legal-resident status, as a group they are likely to become naturalized and are among a select few allowed to have dual citizenship. Even prior to migration, Israelis are apt to be familiar with American society from their


113 Dinnerstein et al., p. 139.


exposure to popular culture, American visitors, and intergovernmental relations. As Sobel put it, "America, it might be posited, has become the alter ego of Israel in political, economic, and cultural terms."116

A large proportion of the Israeli population has resided in the Jewish state for fewer than two or at most three generations. Accordingly, their family lore and cultural background are rich in stories of life in other settings as well as techniques for coping with the challenges that displacement presents. Many émigrés we interviewed had lived in other countries — as wide-ranging as Japan and Hong Kong, Switzerland, England, Italy, South Africa, and Latin America — prior to their settlement in the United States. This group included not only professionals and high-level entrepreneurs but also less skilled and educated migrants such as carpenters and restaurant workers. Hence, many Israelis possess a cultural orientation and life experience compatible with an existence beyond the borders of the Jewish state.

Finally, while the literature asserts that transnational groups are often lacking a vocabulary to describe their experience — "Individuals, communities, or states rarely identify themselves as transnational" — Jews are in fact accustomed to seeing themselves in this way.117 "Extranational" identity is expressed when non-Israelis proclaim themselves to be Zionists, when Jews say "next year in Jerusalem" during the Passover Seder, when they refer to "world Jewry," or when Jewish families who had lived in Poland for generations refuse to identify themselves as Polish.

Further facilitating Israeli-American transnationalism are the good political relations and extensive links between the United States and Israel. The U.S. government and American Jewish agencies have developed an active presence in the Jewish state. American firms have branches there, and American companies sometimes hire professional and skilled workers directly from Israel. At the same time, Israeli government agencies, banks, and industrial enterprises have offices in New York, Los Angeles, and other American settings. These not only inject an Israeli flavor into the American environment but also provide employment for migrants.118 At the same time, we noted a variety of Israeli-oriented activities that allow migrants to maintain a semblance of Israeli life in the United States.

Travel between the two countries is easily arranged. Israeli immigrants often report making frequent trips from the United States to Israel, and it is not uncommon for children to return to Israel to spend summer vacations with relatives. A Los Angeles obstetrician describes the great value he places on his trips back to Israel:

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116Sobel, Migrants from the Promised Land.
118Sobel, Migrants from the Promised Land, p. 196.
I was talking to my accountant two days ago — he is also an Israeli — he says "What is going on?" And I said "What can I tell you, we are in a concentration camp." Okay — this is the way you describe it, and it is so true. We are in a concentration camp and we get a relief once a year when we go to Israel for a vacation. This is the bottom line.

Sociologist Zvi Sobel, in his 1981–1982 pretravel survey of 117 Israeli emigrants (most of whom planned to enter the United States), found evidence of a transnational outlook. About half denied "that leaving Israel and moving to the U.S. was an act of emigration." Instead, they defined the travel as "temporary" or "commuting." Moreover, "almost all interviewees denied that their leaving meant a cessation of contributing to the development of Israel. . . . Almost all saw their departure as . . . to Israel's good."

In all of the ways cited, the context, history, and culture of Israel have prepared its citizens for transnationalism. For some individuals, at least, the distinction between being an Israeli or being an American may not be nearly as clear-cut as the literature on international migration generally suggests. Instead, such factors as flexible notions of ethnic and national identity, access to and participation in social and occupational networks, and the ability of people to sustain cultural competence and legal status in more than a single society allow these individuals to maintain meaningful forms of involvement in multiple national settings at one time.

While transnationalism is a reality for many Israelis, this does not mean that it is an easy way of life. Even as these migrants build communities and networks that help them cope with the social and cultural dimensions of ties to two places, and enjoy the economic benefits of migration, most are not quite comfortable with this status. In the words of a Los Angeles accountant: "Israel is my mother and America is my wife, so you can imagine the way I must feel."

CONCLUSION

The presence of Israeli immigrants in the United States provides the world Jewish community with unique challenges. While American Jews have achieved a long and enviable record in aiding their co-ethnics, Israelis have been largely excluded from this tradition. This is linked to American Jews' support for Israel as the national home of the Jewish people — a country that fellow Jews should go to but never think of leaving. The émigrés themselves, who seldom conceive of themselves as permanent immigrants, have also discouraged being incorporated into the American Jewish community. During the late 1970s, hostile statements and inflated

119Ibid., p. 209.
population estimates reflected the low esteem with which Israelis in the United States were regarded by both the Israeli authorities and the American Jewish establishment.

Differences in religious, national, and cultural identity, language, and other factors also separate American Jews and Israelis. However, following the recent change in Israeli government policy toward its expatriates, the American Jewish community has become more open to these migrants. As a result, several informal and formal programs to both support and include these migrants have been established.

This new perspective has also permitted the American Jewish community to notice that, in contrast to statements depicting Israeli émigrés as a marginal and alienated noncommunity, Israelis have already become involved in American Jewish life — living in Jewish neighborhoods, working in traditionally Jewish occupations, supporting communal institutions, and serving as teachers and communal functionaries.

An important contribution made by Israelis, along with other Jewish immigrants, is the role they play in retaining the Jewish character of older Jewish neighborhoods. Recent arrivals occupy real estate, patronize shops, purchase existing neighborhood businesses, and create new ones. They attend neighborhood synagogues and public and day schools and congregate in local parks. For example, in Los Angeles, directly across Robertson Boulevard from the Workmen's Circle building (Workmen's Circle is a fraternal secular/socialist organization created by European Jewish immigrants early in this century) is located the relatively new Orthodox Gan Chabad Israeli program, staffed by a Yemeni rabbi. In like manner, Hebrew and Farsi conversations echo Yiddish ones of decades past in the garment center and jewelry districts. One can see Israelis and other Jewish migrants talking over news of American Jewish life, just as East Europeans did early in this century. In this way, they are maintaining but also transforming the institutions of Jewish life, changing the nature of the American Jewish community.

Despite the sometimes stigmatized status of Israelis and their own reluctance to consider themselves immigrants, Israelis as a group have done relatively well in their social and economic adjustment to the United States. Their community has many accomplishments to show in entrepreneurship, the arts, the professions, and the academy. Further, they have created a number of community organizations, some of which benefit not only Israelis but the larger American Jewish community as well. For example, the Israeli film festivals in Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and elsewhere are important events for Israelis, American Jews, and film buffs of all stripes. This is but one example of Israelis providing a vital communal service to the entirety of a Jewish community. As Jewish fund-raisers discover that
Israelis are both affluent and strongly Jewish, the notion of an Israeli division of the local Jewish federation no longer appears to be an oxymoron, as it did only a decade ago.

Despite their presence in the United States, Israeli émigrés tend to maintain a strongly positive view of their country of origin. They keep abreast of Israeli issues, maintain contact with Israeli friends and relatives, and visit frequently. When they become U.S. citizens, eligible to vote in U.S. elections, their central political concern is supporting Israel.

Given the accomplishments of Israeli immigrants in the United States and the newly benign attitude with which they are regarded by both Israel and American Jewry, it is not unreasonable to predict a positive future for them, one yielding many benefits for the relations between Israel and American Jews — in contrast to the negative feelings surrounding their presence in the recent past.

Finally, as we evaluate the place of Israeli immigrants in American society, it might be worthwhile to look for parallels in the long history of Jewish migration to the United States. Throughout the 19th century and into the 20th, the European Jewish elite — including both its rabbinical and intellectual wings — condemned America as a place unsuited for Jews. Their reason? American Jews were not concerned with religious traditions but only with personal gain. Writing from San Francisco for a journal published in Russia in the 1880s, Hebrew scholar Zvi Falk Widawer asserted, “Jews came here only to achieve the purpose which occupied their entire attention in the land of their birth. That purpose was money.” A few years later, a similar report appeared in an Orthodox journal from Galicia, railing that “[t]he younger generation has inherited nothing from their parents except what they need to make their way in this world; every spiritual teaching is foreign to them.”

As these quotations indicate, two of the major accusations leveled at Israeli emigrants in the 1970s and 1980s — that they were obsessed with material gain and that their children would lose their Jewish identity — were leveled at European Jews in the United States by the elites in their home countries a full century before. During the same period, voices were also raised in both Europe and the United States against Jewish migration to what would eventually become Israel. In the 1920s and ’30s, Elazar Shapira, a European Hassidic leader, preached that both America’s materialism and Jerusalem’s secular Zionism were “gates to hell.”

121 Ibid., p. 158.
These historical observations highlight the fact that international migration has always presented a major challenge to the Jewish status quo, and that while it seldom occurs without acrimonious debate, it also opens new horizons of growth and potential.