Special Articles
As Israel moved into its 36th year in 1982—the nation celebrated 35 years of independence during the brief hiatus between the withdrawal from Sinai and the incursion into Lebanon—the country was deeply divided. Rocked by dissension over issues that in the past were the hallmark of unity, wracked by intensifying ethnic and religious-secular rifts, and through it all bedazzled by a bullish stock market that was at one and the same time fuel for and seeming haven from triple-digit inflation, Israelis found themselves living increasingly in a land of extremes, where the middle ground was often inhospitable when it was not totally inaccessible.

Toward the end of the year, Amos Oz, one of Israel's leading novelists, set out on a journey in search of the true Israel and the genuine Israeli point of view. What he heard in his travels, as published in a series of articles in the daily Davar, seemed to confirm what many had sensed: Israel was deeply, perhaps irreconcilably, riven by two political philosophies, two attitudes toward Jewish historical destiny, two visions. "What will become of us all, I do not know," Oz wrote in concluding his article on the development town of Beit Shemesh in the Judean Hills, where the sons of the "Oriental" immigrants, now grown and prosperous, spewed out their loathing for the old Ashkenazi establishment. "If anyone has a solution, let him please step forward and spell it out—and the sooner the better. The situation is not good."

OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE

Background of the Lebanon War

The military thrust into Lebanon that began on June 6, though launched in response to a specific occurrence, was, in retrospect, the seemingly inevitable consequence of a series of developments that began over a decade earlier with the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan and its subsequent move into Lebanon. The PLO's move did away with Lebanon's delicate political balance and unleashed a civil war that raged for over five years, bringing in its wake a large-scale military intervention by Syria. When the dust settled, as it were, Lebanon had ceased
to exist as a sovereign entity with an effective central government. The country had been carved up into a number of zones of control: Syria dominated the area east and north of Beirut and the strategic Beka'a valley along its own border; the PLO, with its headquarters in Beirut, controlled virtually the entire country south of the capital.

Having established its own "state within a state" in Lebanon, the PLO sent murder squads across the Israeli border and provided training and haven for terrorist groups that operated against Jewish and other targets around the world. In the course of time, Israel's north became the virtual hostage of the PLO, which interspersed its dispatch of terrorist squads with mortar and rocket shellings of Galilee. Israel sought to deal with the increasingly intolerable situation through air, artillery, and commando strikes, and in March 1978 through "Operation Litani" (see AJYB, Vol. 80, 1980, p. 263). That large-scale ground operation in southern Lebanon resulted in the formation of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and helped consolidate the enclave of Major Saad Haddad, a defector from the Lebanese army who, with Israeli assistance, had formed his own militia in the south of the country, the so-called "Free Lebanon."

In July 1981 a two-week "mini-war" erupted between Israel and the PLO, resulting in the partial evacuation of Israel's north and the paralysis of normal life there. A ceasefire, negotiated by U.S. special envoy Philip Habib, came into effect on July 24, 1981. (See AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, pp. 245-247.) However, that agreement was interpreted differently by Israel and the PLO. The latter claimed that the agreement referred exclusively to hostilities across the Israel-Lebanon border, whereas Jerusalem maintained that it covered all PLO terrorist activities everywhere.

Thus, even though the actual ceasefire across Israel's northern border was for the most part maintained, Israeli spokesmen in the latter half of 1981 and the first half of 1982 charged that the PLO was violating the agreement by its massive stockpiling of arms in southern Lebanon, by attacking Jewish or Israeli targets abroad, and by attempting occasional raids into Israel across the border with Jordan. Throughout the first half of 1982, as the dramas of Yamit and the West Bank were being played out in the foreground (see below), Lebanon provided the background. Indeed, there were some in Israel who urged action against the PLO in Lebanon precisely to "test" Egypt before the final withdrawal from Sinai. In the event, the situation in Lebanon itself provided its own momentum toward the inevitable.

In February 1982 Prime Minister Menachem Begin told Colombian television that Israel would take "immediate action" in southern Lebanon if any of its civilians were killed in a PLO raid or attack. On March 7 Defense Minister Ariel Sharon said in a U.S. television interview that the
United States had asked Israel to refrain from taking action in Lebanon unless a "clear provocation" existed. By then, U.S. special envoy Philip Habib was back in the region, seeking to defuse an increasingly tense situation. On March 24 Israeli forces seized three armed terrorists in southern Lebanon. Two terrorists were apprehended on April 9 attempting to infiltrate from Jordan, in an incident that generated a series of dramatic pronouncements, a six-hour cabinet session, and emergency measures in Israel's north. Four days later two terrorists carried out an unsuccessful ambush against an Israeli military vehicle in the Jordan Valley and then escaped across the Jordanian border. On April 21 the Israeli air force bombed terrorist bases in southern Lebanon for the first time since July 1981, after an Israeli soldier was killed and another wounded by a land mine in southern Lebanon; two Syrian MiG-23 aircraft were shot down when they tried to intervene.

Speaking one week later, on Israel's Independence Day (April 28), Prime Minister Begin warned that Israel would consider moving into Lebanon "to destroy the terrorists' aggressive potential" if Israel were shelled from that country. In an interview on Israel Radio on May 1, the director of military intelligence, Major General Yehoshua Saguy, stated: "This is a year in which sharp changes of direction are possible because of significant events in the region. One of these events, the evacuation of Sinai, has already occurred. In the summer there will be elections in Lebanon, and we also have to bear in mind the instability of many of the Arab states around us."

On May 9 the Israeli air force again struck at terrorist positions in southern Lebanon, drawing a response of katyusha fire against Israel's north, though no casualties were reported and little damage was caused. A major Israeli troop buildup along the northern border and on the Golan Heights was implemented, and the regular army was placed on alert. Speaking in press and television interviews (May 14 and 16), the chief of staff, Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, asserted that "the terrorists can be seriously weakened only by military action, not political action." He also revealed that katyusha rockets had been fired at Israeli settlements from Jordan on three separate occasions, while two other such attempts had been foiled. Closer to home, a large bomb was defused in downtown Jerusalem on May 14, minutes before it was due to go off. Across town, Labor party chairman Shimon Peres was just then meeting with Prime Minister Begin on how to defuse the situation in Lebanon.

On May 25 two Syrian MiG fighters were downed in a dogfight with Israeli planes that were on what the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesman termed a "routine" reconnaissance patrol near Beirut. The incident occurred as U.S. state department official Morris Draper wound up a tour of the region in an attempt to bolster the ceasefire agreement. He was told by
Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir that Israel wanted the agreement to remain in force, but would react if the PLO attacked Israel or Israeli targets "anywhere and from anywhere."

The trigger was an act committed in London. On Thursday, June 3, Israel's ambassador to the Court of St. James's, Shlomo Argov, was shot in the head and gravely wounded by Arab terrorists as he was entering his car after attending a diplomatic dinner. Argov, 52, was the highest ranking Israeli diplomat to be gunned down by terrorists in 12 years of sporadic attacks on Israeli missions abroad, which claimed the lives of four Israelis—the most recent having been the killing in Paris, on April 3, 1982, of Yaacov Bar-Simantov, second secretary of Israel's embassy in France—and of five local employees of Israeli legations. (Argov, one of Israel's top diplomats, was hospitalized in London in critical condition and flown to Jerusalem on August 8. At year's end he remained hospitalized, severely incapacitated.)

On Friday, June 4, the cabinet, meeting in extraordinary session, authorized the air force to bomb and shell terrorist positions in Lebanon from the south all the way to Beirut. One of the targets hit in the raid was a large PLO arms depot located under the grounds of a sports stadium near the Sabra refugee camp in Beirut. The terrorists retaliated with massive rocket, artillery, and tank shelling of western and northern Galilee and the enclave commanded by Major Haddad in southern Lebanon. Saturday, June 5—the 15th anniversary, as it happened, of the Six Day War in 1967—saw a continuation of the exchanges of fire. All told, 23 Israeli settlements came under attack during the two days, in which about 500 katyusha rockets were fired, resulting in two deaths, 15 wounded, and extensive property damage. (On June 6 an IDF spokesman released a document stating that there had been 290 terrorist actions since the cessation of hostilities agreement in July 1981. Included in this figure were clashes between the PLO and UNIFIL, terrorist attacks against targets in southern Lebanon, deaths of terrorists in the administered areas while handling explosives, anti-aircraft fire directed against Israeli planes over Lebanon, and the arrest by the Italian police of a Syrian man and a German woman found carrying explosives and forged passports.)

On Saturday evening, June 5, after the end of the Sabbath, the cabinet met in secret extraordinary session and decided to launch "Operation Peace for Galilee" the following day. The text of the cabinet resolution, made public on June 6 after the operation had already begun, stated that the government of Israel was determined to place "all the settlements in Galilee out of range of the terrorists concentrated in Lebanon—them, their headquarters, and their bases." The resolution continued: "The name of the operation is 'Peace for Galilee.' During implementation of the operation,
the Syrian army is not to be attacked unless it attacks our forces. The State of Israel continues to strive for the signing of a peace treaty with an independent Lebanon which would preserve its territorial integrity.”

During the regular cabinet meeting on Sunday, June 6, even as Israeli troops were pushing across the border into Lebanon, Prime Minister Begin received a message from U.S. president Ronald Reagan. While deploring the “abominable” assassination attempt on ambassador Argov, Reagan urged Begin to give “the most serious consideration” to an earlier message of his calling for Israeli constraint—and expressed the hope that “[you] will do what you can to avoid military steps that could lead to a widening of the conflict and even greater Israeli casualties.” In his reply that same day, Begin first made use of the figure that was to become a prime source of confusion, and eventually a rallying point for opponents, in Israel and abroad, of the war’s later stages. “The army,” Begin informed the president, “has been instructed to push back the terrorists to a distance of 40 kilometers to the north so that all our civilians in the region of Galilee will be set free of the permanent threat to their lives.” Citing the country’s right of self-defense under article 51 of the UN charter, the Israeli leader declared that “we do not covet even one inch of Lebanese soil.”

**The Conflict Begins**

The IDF’s incursion got underway at 11 a.m. local time on June 6 in a four-pronged armored land assault bolstered by close air and artillery support and, in a surprise element, accompanied by a sea-borne troop landing on the Lebanese coast north of Sidon. On June 7, just after midnight, the IDF’s crack Golani Brigade took Beaufort castle after fierce hand-to-hand fighting in which six Israeli soldiers lost their lives, including the commander of the assault force. From this mountaintop Crusader fortress, whose defenses had for years proved immune to Israeli air and artillery strikes, the PLO was able to observe and shell Israel’s north at will. As Israeli forces continued to push northward—surrounding the cities of Tyre and Sidon, while giving the noncombatants there time to move out of the battle zone before moving against terrorist strongholds in the midst of population centers—initial contact was made with Syrian forces near Jezzine, in the central sector. Tank battles flared up on June 7 and 8, and the air force shot down six Syrian aircraft on June 8.

Tuesday, June 8, also saw the first direct political challenge to the operation, in the form of a no-confidence motion introduced in the Knesset by the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE), Israel’s Communist party, against “the government’s decision to launch war and invade Lebanon.” Speaking on behalf of the Labor Alignment, Labor party chairman Peres, who together with other Labor leaders had been briefed on the
situation by the prime minister on June 6, said Israel had “no choice” but to demonstrate that the PLO’s strategy of terrorism would achieve nothing. The “real problem,” he continued, was “the extremism of the Palestinian leadership,” whose resort to “irrational and hopeless violence” precluded any diplomatic settlement. Summing up the debate, Prime Minister Begin declared that the fighting in Lebanon would cease as soon as Israel achieved a line 40 kilometers beyond the country’s northern border. He called on Syrian President Hafez Assad “to instruct the Syrian army not to harm Israeli troops, and in that case no harm will befall the Syrians.” The Knesset rejected the no-confidence motion overwhelmingly, by a vote of 94 to 3, with only the three DFPE members present voting for it. However, nine left-of-center members who were present did not vote; 14 MK’s were absent.

Despite the declared Israeli desire to avoid a major clash with the Syrians, Wednesday, June 9, saw just such a development. As U.S. special envoy Habib—dispatched on June 7 to Israel from Paris after he had been briefed there by President Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig—was about to commence his negotiations in Damascus in an effort to end the fighting, the Israeli air force destroyed 19 Syrian SAM anti-aircraft missile batteries in Lebanon (Habib himself had failed to negotiate their removal a year earlier: see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, pp. 245–247) and downed 22 Syrian MiG fighters, all without the loss of a single Israeli aircraft. Defense Minister Sharon termed the air operation “a turning point in the war.” Another 25 Syrian planes were shot down on June 10, and two more SAM missile batteries were knocked out of action. On the ground, the IDF’s western sector task force, having taken the terrorist stronghold of Damour on the coast, was no more than 15 kilometers from Beirut and was shelling PLO and Syrian positions in the Lebanese capital. In the central sector, Israeli forces were within striking distance of the Beirut-Damascus highway, while in the east the IDF pushed on toward the Syrian border, encountering stiff resistance in the mountainous terrain. On the diplomatic front, President Reagan, in a message to Prime Minister Begin, quoted a message he himself had received from Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. The Russian leader had termed the situation “extremely dangerous” and rife with “the seeds of escalation.” The American president insisted that Israel declare a ceasefire by 6 a.m. Friday, June 11, local time. (On June 9 the U.S. had vetoed a UN security council resolution condemning Israel for its Lebanon action.) Following reception of the Reagan message, the cabinet was convened in urgent session at 4 a.m. on Friday. At 11 a.m. Israel announced that it was declaring a unilateral ceasefire to go into effect one hour later. The ceasefire referred to Syrian forces only, and on condition that they did not fire at Israeli troops or try to reintroduce anti-aircraft missiles into Lebanon. The PLO was excluded. Until minutes before the ceasefire came into effect,
Israeli air and artillery forces pounded Syrian and PLO troops concentrated in and around Beirut. The PLO's six-story headquarters building in Beirut was demolished in an Israeli air strike, while on the eastern front Israeli-built Merkava tanks destroyed at least nine Soviet state-of-the-art T-72 tanks.

The ceasefire for the most part held in the central and eastern sectors, but broke down within less than three hours in the Beirut area. Israeli forward forces moved toward the Beirut outskirts of Baabda—site of the Lebanese presidential palace—and Khalde, as heavy artillery barrages continued to be directed by the IDF at terrorist sites in and around Beirut. By Saturday, June 12, at 9 p.m. local time, when a second unilateral ceasefire came into force—altogether, there were to be no fewer than 11 ceasefire agreements, all of which broke down, before the PLO evacuated Beirut—Israeli troops had virtually encircled Beirut and were seeking to cut off possible escape routes by holding the south of the city, linking up with Christian Phalangist units in the area north of Beirut, and closing off the Beirut-Damascus highway to the east.

A series of pronouncements on June 11 and 12 by ranking Israeli officials asserted that the set objectives of "Operation Peace for Galilee" had all been fully accomplished. An official communique, read to the press on June 11 by cabinet secretary Dan Meridor, stated inter alia: "In five days of fighting, the IDF carried out completely the mission it was charged with—heroically, conscientiously, and with great resourcefulness. . . . Following the execution of the mission assigned to the Israel Defense Forces, the government has ordered all branches of the armed forces to cease their fire today at 12 noon." Later that day, Defense Minister Sharon explained at a press conference that Israel had declared a unilateral ceasefire "because our aim of creating a security belt of 40-45 kilometers has been achieved." In reply to a question, he said that the government had decided to implement a further move, beyond that belt, toward the Beirut-Damascus highway, in order to threaten the Syrian forces from their rear, to clear the northern zone of terrorists, and to obtain a bargaining card for the political negotiations to follow. On June 12, Chief of Staff Eitan issued an order of the day stating in part:

On the seventh day of Operation Peace for Galilee, the IDF has accomplished all its missions as set by the government of Israel. The threat of the katyushas and the cannons has been removed from the residents of the northern border, and the terrorist infrastructure in southern Lebanon has been destroyed. The Syrian army, which occupied Lebanon and exploited it for its own purposes while supporting the activities of the terrorists against Israel, attempted to aid the terrorists in their struggle with the IDF. In every place where a collision with them occurred, the IDF struck them a victorious blow and defeated them in battle.
The public's perception, then, was that the fighting was to all intents and purposes over, the operation having been successfully completed in terms of its original declared aims. Moreover, a heavy price had already been paid for these achievements: as of June 12, over 130 soldiers had been killed in action and about 600 wounded. Among those who fell was Major General Yekutiel Adam, a former deputy chief of staff, whose appointment as head of Israel's Mossad intelligence agency was to have taken effect just three days after he was killed. General Adam was the most senior Israeli officer ever to fall in battle.

On the ground, in southern Lebanon, the terrorists' infrastructure lay in ruins. The vast PLO arsenal of weapons, many of them stored in immense underground bunkers, was confiscated. The war material taken out of Lebanon by the IDF included over 1,300 vehicles and armored vehicles (including several hundred tanks of various models), over 5,600 tons of ammunition, 33,000 light arms, 215 mortars, 88 field cannons, 62 katyusha rocket launchers, over 1,300 anti-tank weapons, and over 2,000 items of communications equipment. In all, some 4,330 truckloads of captured equipment were removed from Lebanon.

In addition, the IDF detained over 9,000 persons suspected of being PLO members or of having aided and abetted PLO actions against Israel. Their nationalities spanned the Moslem world, from India to Morocco, Niger to Pakistan. A number of persons from European countries were also apprehended. By November over 3,000 of those detained had been released; the rest, representing 25 different countries, were interned at a 20-acre detention facility built by the IDF near the village of El-Ansar, 13 kilometers east of Tyre. These prisoners, while not regarded by Israel as prisoners of war as defined by the Third Geneva Convention, were covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in wartime.

Israel also sought to restore life in southern Lebanon to normal after it had been severely disrupted by seven years of internecine strife and terrorist domination. IDF civilian assistance units were sent into southern Lebanon from the second day of the campaign. Working with the local Lebanese authorities, they set as their first priority the restoration of local government and essential public services. They also helped ensure the supply of basic commodities and aided in the re-establishment of trade and commerce. It was estimated that about 100,000 residents of southern Lebanon soon returned to the homes they had fled during the civil war. Israeli military and civilian personnel, working with, and at times in the face of, the United Nations Relief and Welfare Agency (UNRWA) and the Lebanese authorities, sought to provide shelter—in the form of tents in the first stage—for Palestinian refugees, some of whom were made homeless for a second or
even third time by the fighting. In mid-June the cabinet appointed Minister for Economic Coordination Yaacov Meridor to head this effort. (On August 1, Minister Without Portfolio Mordechai Ben-Porat was appointed to head a ministerial committee to formulate “principles, ways, and means for a solution of the refugee problem in the Middle East, through the refugees’ resettlement.” Brigadier General David Maimon, the IDF officer in charge of providing assistance to southern Lebanon, told the Knesset’s defense and foreign affairs committee that about 30,000 Palestinian refugees were rendered homeless in the wake of the devastation wreaked in the fighting, mainly in the Ein Hilweh and Rashadiyeh refugee camps in southern Lebanon. Israel called on the government of Lebanon to take measures that would ensure housing for the refugees in the coming winter.)

On June 13 Israel presented to U.S. special envoy Habib—who was engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy between Jerusalem, Damascus, and Beirut—its initial outline for a settlement in Lebanon. The focus was on the creation of a multinational force to be stationed along a line 45 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border. Foreign Minister Shamir, meeting in Paris with President François Mitterrand and other top French officials (June 14–17), urged France to take part in such a multinational force.

In mid-June Prime Minister Begin addressed himself to some of the war’s broader ramifications on a number of levels. With respect to the highly contentious issue of civilian casualties, he told the Knesset’s defense and foreign affairs committee that while every effort had been made to spare civilians—to the point, at times, where IDF personnel were endangered due to the caution being exercised—such casualties were sometimes impossible to avoid. Drawing an analogy, Begin said that if Adolf Hitler were in a building which also contained innocent civilians, no one would hesitate to shell that building even at the cost of civilian casualties. In a television interview (screened while he was en route to the United States for a week-long visit), Begin asserted that Operation Peace for Galilee, by demonstrating the IDF’s strength and courage, had “healed the nation of the trauma of the Yom Kippur War.” In addition, the campaign had put the peace treaty with Egypt to the test—and had proved the treaty’s firmness. The prime minister also rejected press allegations that Defense Minister Sharon had strung along the cabinet with misleading information and faits accomplis in order to accomplish his own broad objectives in Lebanon. “The cabinet took explicit decisions on everything,” he said.

On June 15 the Peace Now movement called on the government to end the fighting in Lebanon and invite the Palestinians to join the peace process. In a statement to the press, the movement said that it had exercised self-restraint during the actual operation, but now felt free to make its stand public.
In the United States, Prime Minister Begin addressed the UN general assembly (on the disarmament issue), met with American Jewish leaders, and held talks with senior administration officials, notably with President Reagan on June 21. Following their three-hour session, President Reagan told reporters: "It's clear that we and Israel both seek an end to the violence in Lebanon under a strong central government." He added: "We agree that Israel must not be subjected to violence from the north." Prime Minister Begin said "the day is near" when an independent Lebanon would sign a peace treaty with Israel. Begin told American Jewish groups that the IDF would "remain in Lebanon as long as the PLO poses a threat to the security of Israel." Underscoring his rejection of possible U.S. pressure on Israel, the prime minister declared: "I broke my leg—but my knee is unbent."

Beirut under Siege

On June 24, following the end of one of the fiercest sustained engagements of the entire war—a 60-hour clash in which West Beirut came in for the heaviest bombardment since the June 12 ceasefire, and in which two Syrian MiGs were downed and three SAM anti-aircraft batteries were knocked out—Defense Minister Sharon told the Knesset's defense and foreign affairs committee that Operation Peace for Galilee had already achieved its minimum objective: the creation of a 45 kilometer security belt in southern Lebanon. However, he added, the operation also had a secondary aim—to remove all foreign forces from Lebanon—and a maximum goal of establishing in Lebanon a strong central government which would be able to sign a peace treaty with Israel. (In a television interview on June 16, Sharon revealed: "It is my dream to sign a peace agreement with a free and sovereign Lebanon. This is their golden chance, and I hope they can seize it.") The defense minister called for "patience and fortitude" on the part of the Israeli public, because "that is the only way we will be able to reap the political fruits of our military success."

On June 27, following a U.S. veto of a security council resolution (sponsored by France) calling for an immediate separation of forces in West Beirut and a permanent ceasefire, Israel offered the terrorists in the Lebanese capital safe passage to Syria under International Red Cross protection. Negotiations would then begin "between all the parties concerned" for an agreement guaranteeing Lebanon's territorial integrity and the departure of all foreign forces from its soil.

Two days later the Knesset held its second debate on the operation since it began. Speaking for the Labor Alignment, former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin asserted that the nation was united on the original, declared purpose of Operation Peace for Galilee—to create a 45 kilometer buffer zone north of the Israeli border. However, Rabin warned against keeping the IDF in
Lebanon for a lengthy period and endangering soldiers' lives for the "auxiliary goals" being mooted by the government—removal of the Syrians from Lebanon, liquidation of the PLO, or the establishment of an independent Lebanese government. Replying, Defense Minister Sharon said the government had resolved that the PLO must cease to exist and that Israel sought to forge "a triangle of peace in the Middle East, linking Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon, with open borders between the three neighboring countries." Sharon said it was not the Palestinian people that Israel was fighting in Lebanon—"we want to live with them in peace and brotherhood"—but the PLO terrorists. In 17 years of terrorism, Sharon said, from 1965 until the onset of Operation Peace for Galilee, PLO terrorism had caused 1,392 deaths in Israel and abroad, while over 6,200 persons had been wounded in their raids and attacks. (The figures also included non-Israeli nationals, IDF soldiers killed in operations against the PLO, and some 400 Arabs in the administered areas, many of whom were killed or maimed while handling explosives.) Summing up the debate, Prime Minister Begin said Israel did not seek to humiliate the terrorists; they could leave Beirut with their personal weapons. The Knesset adopted by 60 votes against 47 a resolution essentially restating the cabinet's announced terms for a settlement.

As it became increasingly clear that U.S. envoy Habib—based in Beirut and dispatching his aide, Morris Draper, to Israel for frequent consultations—was unable to negotiate a quick resolution of the situation, the IDF, constantly exchanging gunfire with the PLO, tightened its seige of Beirut. On July 4 the IDF cut off the water and electricity supply, leading Lebanese Premier Shafik al-Wazzan to break off his talks with Habib in protest. Israel, responding to terms communicated from the PLO to Wazzan, through him to Habib, and thence to Israel (this due to Israel's refusal to speak directly with the PLO), issued the following statement: "The government of Israel rejects without any qualification whatsoever any proposal relating to any presence—political, organizational, or symbolically military—of terrorists in Lebanon. All of them without exception must leave Lebanon. No change in the existing lines in Lebanon will be implemented without Israel's consent."

A spate of pro- and anti-war demonstrations took place early in July. The largest, sponsored by Peace Now and held in Tel Aviv on July 3, drew about 100,000 persons. About 7,000 persons turned out in the northern development town of Kiryat Shemona, often the target of terrorist shelling and raids in the past, to voice their support for the operation. Other demonstrations, for and against, were organized by small groups, nearly all of them ephemeral in nature. Yet the phenomenon itself, taking place as the guns continued to roar and the casualties to mount, was one that gave Israelis pause for reflection. That the split between the war's supporters and
deplorers was perceived—correctly or incorrectly—to be congruent with the deep-seated ethnic and religious cleavages that were increasingly manifesting themselves in the Israeli polity (see, for example, AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 238), gave rise to added concern among many.

Two polls were conducted during the third week of the fighting and published in the Jerusalem Post. Fully 93 per cent of the home-front Jewish adult public justified the operation in varying degrees, and an election, according to the poll, would have produced a crushing Likud victory (48 per cent vs. 31 per cent for the Alignment). The popularity of Prime Minister Begin had leaped 11 per cent since May (40.4 per cent to 51.5 per cent) and that of Defense Minister Sharon by 14 per cent (42.1 per cent in May to 56 per cent one month later). On July 17 a pro-government rally in Tel Aviv drew about 200,000 persons.

Heavy fighting flared up toward the end of July in the wake of several ambushes against the IDF and the firing, on July 21, of a single katyusha rocket from southern Lebanon which hit the northern Galilee settlement of She'ar Yishuv. On July 22 Israel unleashed a heavy barrage against Syrian-PLO positions along a 40 kilometer line in the eastern sector, destroying over 70 Syrian tanks. In the following days the air force destroyed three Syrian vehicles carrying SA-8 anti-aircraft missiles that were moved into the Beka’a valley under cover of night; steady shelling of West Beirut, particularly the area of the refugee camps, was maintained. An Israeli Phantom jet was downed on July 24 by a missile fired from just inside the Syrian border opposite the Beka’a valley. A number of Israeli soldiers were killed and wounded in artillery and tank exchanges with the PLO in Beirut.

As U.S. special envoy Habib visited a number of Arab and European capitals, seeking broad agreement on the PLO’s evacuation of Beirut and the formation of a multinational force, the Israeli cabinet, under growing internal pressure to break the stalemate, was said to be split down the middle on whether to order the IDF into West Beirut. One soldier who refused to wait until the cabinet made up its mind was Colonel Eli Geva, who at the age of 32 was the IDF’s youngest brigade commander. He asked to be relieved of duty as a commander of a tank brigade in Lebanon because he opposed any possible Israeli move into West Beirut. When Geva, who requested to be allowed to serve as a regular soldier, was discharged from the IDF altogether (July 25), his case became another rallying point for opponents of the war, though he himself made no public comment.

On July 30, as the latest ceasefire in Beirut broke down (only to be replaced by another, negotiated by Special Envoy Habib, that night), and following passage of a UN security council resolution calling on Israel to lift its blockade of Beirut (the resolution, sponsored by Spain, passed 14 to 0, with the United States not participating), the PLO presented Habib with
a six-point plan for leaving Beirut. The plan, similar to an 11-point plan offered by the PLO in mid-July, though dropping its earlier demand for a continued military presence in Lebanon, called for an Israeli pullback from Beirut and from the Beirut-Damascus highway, the entry of a multinational force into Beirut prior to the PLO's withdrawal, and a three-stage PLO evacuation. Israel rejected the plan out of hand, insisting on a one-stage withdrawal and refusing to move back from its positions as long as the PLO remained in Beirut. Israel agreed to give Habib more time, but warned that its patience was well-nigh exhausted.

PLO Evacuation of Beirut

On August 1, as heavy fighting erupted again in Beirut, IDF units advanced along the runways of Beirut international airport, and by day's end had occupied the entire airfield and terminal. Pressure continued to build from Washington. The U.S. lent its support to a security council resolution of August 1 authorizing the UN secretary-general to post, at Lebanon's request, observers in Beirut to oversee the situation there. Israel rejected this resolution, and Israeli troops the following day turned back a contingent of 28 UN observers seeking to enter Beirut in accordance with the resolution.

More substantive American pressure came as Foreign Minister Shamir met in Washington with President Reagan and other senior administration officials. In Washington's view, the continued Israeli shelling and bombing of Beirut was endangering Special Envoy Habib's mission just as it was on the brink of success. The president and his aides were particularly insistent that Israel not enter West Beirut. However, on August 4, in a series of moves involving house-to-house fighting and at a cost of 18 Israeli soldiers killed and 84 wounded, the IDF advanced some 300 meters across the "green line" dividing West Beirut from the rest of the city. The Israeli moves, which continued the following day accompanied by a land, sea, and air bombardment of PLO positions in Beirut, drew a furious response from the United States. Against a backdrop of hints of possible sanctions against Israel, President Reagan informed Foreign Minister Shamir that U.S.-Israel relations "would be affected" if Israel invaded West Beirut. On August 5 Reagan, in a sharp message to Prime Minister Begin, warned that further Israeli shelling of Beirut would place relations between the two countries "in the balance." (Nevertheless, the U.S. on August 6 vetoed a security council resolution calling for military sanctions against Israel.)

The Israeli cabinet, meeting in extraordinary session for nearly six hours on August 5, rejected calls by the U.S. and the UN to have the IDF revert to the positions it held August 1, and asserted that Israel was not forgoing the military option should diplomacy fail in West Beirut. Prime Minister
Begin replied to President Reagan, stating that "in the balance" were "Israel's security and the lives of its citizens," and not relations between the two countries. The Labor party's political bureau adopted a resolution "unequivocally opposing any military entry into West Beirut as well as any military action geared to facilitating such an entry." Calling for a mutual ceasefire and for "every effort to evict the PLO from Beirut by diplomatic means," the Labor party came out against any Israeli "initiatives which would render this diplomatic objective more difficult to attain."

A major diplomatic breakthrough occurred on August 8 when Prime Minister Begin informed Secretary of State George Shultz (who had assumed office on June 25, 1982) that Israel would agree to a multinational force moving into West Beirut following the departure of "most" of the PLO personnel there. Israel had been insisting on the PLO's complete pullout from Beirut prior to the entry of a multinational force, because once such a force took up positions in the city, Israel's military options would be severely restricted and the terrorists could use the force as a cover behind which to halt their evacuation. The IDF restored the water supply to West Beirut following a two-week cutoff, and on August 9 Israel allowed fuel to be delivered to West Beirut hospitals so they could operate their power generators. On August 10 Damascus announced its readiness to take in the terrorists to be evacuated from Beirut, Special Envoy Habib arrived in Jerusalem, and the Israeli cabinet approved in principle the evacuation plan that he had worked out, while informing him that a number of changes, both "technical and substantive," would need to be made before it could be implemented. Israel was also demanding as a condition for going ahead with the plan the prior return of an air force pilot whose plane was downed by ground fire on the very first day of the operation, and the bodies of nine IDF soldiers, four of them still missing since Operation Litani four years earlier.

At 5 a.m. on Thursday, August 12, the Israeli air force, with artillery support fire, launched what was reportedly the most massively concentrated bombardment of Beirut in the entire war. As the Israeli cabinet met in extraordinary session, President Reagan personally phoned Prime Minister Begin to express his shock at the Israeli action—he charged Israel with having violated the ceasefire—and to insist that it be halted. A sharply worded written message from Washington was also received in Jerusalem. The attack was called off after 11 hours, following mediation efforts by Special Envoy Habib. About 300 persons were said to have been killed in the bombing; 18 Israeli soldiers were wounded in the exchanges of fire. In a second phone call to Begin, during the cabinet session, President Reagan was informed that a ceasefire was in effect.

The cabinet meeting itself was one of the most acrimonious of the war. A number of ministers charged that Defense Minister Sharon had exceeded
the cabinet’s instructions not only in ordering that day’s attack, but also in having the IDF chop away at West Beirut in the preceding week. Deputy Prime Minister David Levy said it was “intolerable” that cabinet ministers should have to learn about major IDF military moves via the media. Replying to the charges, Sharon said his actions had been taken to protect the lives of Israeli soldiers in the field. He explained that he was acting in accordance with a cabinet resolution approved some weeks earlier by which the IDF could advance into certain areas on the perimeter of downtown Beirut in response to PLO ceasefire violations.

Summing up the discussion, Prime Minister Begin stated that no further ground advances into West Beirut and no more aerial activity over the city were to be implemented without his and, if need be, the entire cabinet’s prior approval. Other measures would have to be taken against future PLO ceasefire violations, Begin said. Several hours later, Sharon told the Knesset’s defense and foreign affairs committee that the cabinet resolution was “inconsistent with the security of the IDF’s soldiers.” In a radio interview on August 14, Sharon, rejecting calls for his resignation —“I don’t engage in the wars of the Jews”—said the heavy air attacks were intended to help speed up the political negotiations. He further maintained that Israel should not panic at U.S. attempts to pressure it, because Washington was interested in the successful resolution of the negotiations. “The United States got a wonderful achievement against the Soviets on a silver platter and they won’t want to give it up so easily,” Sharon averred.

With the ceasefire in Beirut being observed—though terrorist actions elsewhere in Lebanon continued to take their toll of Israeli soldiers—the final touches were put to the plan for the PLO’s evacuation of Beirut. Conveyed to Israel via the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv on August 18, the amended Habib plan was approved the following day by the Israeli cabinet at a special session. The government of Lebanon also gave its approval. Israel agreed to allow the Syrian troops in Beirut to redeploy in the Bekaa valley (where, according to Israeli military sources, some 25,000 Syrian and PLO troops would remain even after the Beirut evacuation) because, as Foreign Minister Shamir explained, the Syrian forces had in fact originally been invited into Lebanon by the government there.

The IDF further relaxed its siege of Beirut, allowing fuel and 40 tons of emergency food into the city. On August 20, as a prelude to the evacuation plan—Israel insisted on terming it a “plan” rather than an “agreement” in accordance with its position that the PLO could not constitute a valid partner for an “agreement”—the PLO released Aharon Ahiaz, the Israeli pilot captured on the first day of the war, and another IDF soldier, Ron Haroush, who had been abducted by terrorists in Lebanon on August 18. The bodies of the nine IDF soldiers, whose return was demanded by Israel
as a prior condition for the implementation of the evacuation plan, were also handed over.

As spelled out in the Habib plan, the evacuation process was to begin on August 21 and end on September 4. The plan's first paragraph stated: "All the PLO leadership, officers, and combatants in Beirut will leave Lebanon peacefully for prearranged destinations in other countries, in accordance with the departure schedules and arrangements set out in this plan. The basic concept of this plan is consistent with the objective of the Government of Lebanon that all foreign military forces withdraw from Lebanon."

With Defense Minister Sharon observing the proceedings from a nearby vantage point and hailing the event as "a great victory" for Israel, Lebanon, and the entire international community, a first group of 397 PLO and Syrian-controlled PLA (Palestine Liberation Army) personnel left Beirut by sea at 3:13 p.m. on August 21, bound eventually for Jordan and Iraq. The first contingent of a three-nation multinational force—about 300 French Foreign Legion troops—had arrived earlier that day to help supervise the evacuation along with the Lebanese army. The forces sent by the two other countries involved, the United States and Italy, arrived several days later in accordance with the Habib plan.

The evacuation was completed by September 1, three days ahead of schedule, virtually without hitches. According to an official communique released by the IDF spokesman, entitled "Expulsion of Terrorists and Syrian Forces from Beirut," 14,398 terrorists, PLA members, and Syrian forces left Beirut between 3:13 p.m. August 21 and 4 p.m. September 1, along with 664 women and children. Of the military personnel, 8,144 left by sea, while 6,254 went by land. Those who left by land, including 3,603 Syrian soldiers and 2,651 PLA members, redeployed in the Beka'a valley or continued to Syria; while those who departed by sea were bound for eight different countries: Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, North Yemen, South Yemen, Sudan, Syria, and Tunisia (which was to serve as the PLO's central base). Some 200 wounded PLO men went to Athens. Athens was also the destination of PLO chief Yasir Arafat, who set sail from Beirut on August 30, vowing to continue the struggle and telling reporters that he was "very proud to have had the honor of defending West Beirut from the barbarous and savage Israelis."

Operation Peace for Galilee, which began on June 6 and was officially deemed to have ended on September 1, with the departure from Beirut of the last of the terrorists and Syrians there, claimed in that period the lives of 345 Israeli soldiers. Another 2,130 were wounded in the fighting, while three were in Syrian captivity and five were missing. Israel lost two planes and two helicopters, all from ground fire. Israel held nearly 300 Syrian soldiers in detention. The Syrians were estimated to have lost several
hundred men killed and about 1,500 wounded. Between 450 and 500 Syrian tanks were destroyed, while the Syrian air force was dealt a severe blow with the downing of 86 of its planes and six helicopters. At least 19 SAM anti-aircraft missile batteries were destroyed by Israel, as well as a number of missiles deployed on vehicles. Terrorist losses were put at about 1,000 killed. In addition, about 6,000 were being held at the Ansar detention facility. The PLO's military and political infrastructure in southern Lebanon and its command headquarters in Beirut had ceased to exist.

The IDF spokesman in Beirut estimated that fewer than 3,000 persons had been killed there since June 6, and 80 per cent of those, he said, were PLO terrorists or other armed personnel. Sources in Lebanon cited far higher figures. Regarding the rest of southern Lebanon, the IDF spokesman's office in December listed civilian casualties as follows: Tyre district—56 killed, 95 wounded; Sidon district—265 killed, 700 wounded; Nabatiyeh—10 killed, 15 wounded.

Speaking to an armored unit in Lebanon on July 7, Chief of Staff Eitan stated: "Our presence in Lebanon serves the struggle for Eretz-Israel. That is the point. This whole battle for Beirut is also the struggle for Eretz-Israel; it is a war against our chief enemy, which has been battling us for Eretz-Israel for the past hundred years." The present fighting, he said, had created "a once-in-a-generation opportunity to change conditions in our favor in the struggle for Eretz-Israel." Reinforcing the Lebanon-Judea-Samaria connection, Defense Minister Sharon on August 21 called on "the Arabs of Eretz-Israel" to seize this "historic opportunity" and join in negotiations with Israel "for peaceful coexistence." On August 22 the cabinet resolved to "initiate action for the establishment of comprehensive peace in the Middle East in accordance with the Camp David accords." (Whether because of the tragic events that were soon to occur in Beirut—see below—or due to the issuing a week later of the Reagan proposals—see Foreign Relations—or for other reasons, the "action" spoken of in the cabinet resolution had not been initiated by year's end.)

Once it became clear that the PLO's evacuation of Beirut was an irrevocable fact, the Lebanese parliament met (August 23) and elected Christian Phalangist leader Bashir Jemayel, aged 34, as the country's next president, with the inauguration scheduled for September 23. (On August 19, Israeli forces had withdrawn from the area of the parliament in Beirut so that the election could be held without undue external pressure.) Prime Minister Begin cabled Jemayel, with whom senior Israeli defense establishment personnel had been in close touch for some years: "Warmest wishes from the heart on the occasion of your election. May God be with you, dear friend, in the fulfillment of your great historic mission, for the liberty of Lebanon and its independence. Your friend, Menachem Begin." On September 1
Begin met secretly with Jemayel in the northern Israeli resort town of Nahariya, reportedly to try to persuade the Lebanese president-elect to be more forthright in his public utterances regarding future ties with Israel. Jemayel, under heavy Syrian pressure not to talk to Israel, and desirous of a reconciliation with Moslem and Druze groups in Lebanon itself, had been adopting a more balanced tone in his public statements.

Following a growing number of PLO and Syrian ceasefire violations in the central and eastern sectors, including the abduction on September 4 of eight Israeli soldiers by PLO terrorists from an Israeli lookout post east of Beirut, and the killing of three IDF soldiers in an ambush on September 10, the air force on September 13 pounded PLO and Syrian positions in central and eastern Lebanon for eight hours. Earlier in the week, a state-of-the-art Syrian MiG-25 was downed by Israeli aircraft over the northern Lebanese port of Jouniyeh. A number of SAM anti-aircraft missile units were also destroyed. Israel asserted that it would not countenance a “war of attrition” in Lebanon.

On September 8 the Knesset met in special session to debate Operation Peace for Galilee. Defense Minister Sharon termed the war a success “unparalleled in the history of warfare.” Sharon said the experience of Lebanon should “turn on a thousand red lights” and make manifest why Israel was opposed to a Palestinian state in Judea-Samaria and Gaza. With no more than 275,000 Palestinians in Lebanon, he said (citing the UNRWA figure for the number of refugees there), they were able to create an armed force, organized in units, of 25,000 men and a militia of 40,000. The lesson for Israel was unmistakable, he stated. Replying for the opposition, MK Haim Bar-Lev said the real issue was not the use of the IDF to bring about peace for Galilee, but “the use of force to achieve goals ancillary to the welfare of Galilee.” For the first time, Bar-Lev averred, Israel had “slid into a military operation whose objectives were not vital to Israel’s survival and well-being.” The Knesset approved the government statement by a vote of 50 to 40.

Earlier that week (September 5) Prime Minister Begin had stated at a cabinet meeting:

Operation Peace for Galilee, an illustrious, historic campaign, has effectively ended in a total victory for Israel. . . . [The IDF has] guaranteed, in essence, peace for Israel for many years. No one will take away from us the fruits of victory. . . . We still have in our possession inventions that no one else has, and this is a result of the Jewish thinking and preparedness for sacrifice that was revealed in the past three months. There has been nothing more sublime than this since the time Jews, weapons in hand, went out to battle for the freedom of their nation more than 40 years ago. There was never more supreme sacrifice and lofty heroism in the history of humanity; certainly, very rarely has there been anything even similar. In all of this we are blessed and proud, and we shall know what a great privilege it is to be the government of Israel in these days and to command such an army.
The Beirut Massacre

Two weeks later, on Saturday, September 18, the first day of Rosh Hashanah, Prime Minister Begin, at home in his official Jerusalem residence, was listening to a BBC newscast. It was just after 5 p.m. The BBC was reporting that a massacre of civilians had apparently taken place in two Palestinian refugee camps in West Beirut. What made the report even more shocking was the fact that both camps were located in an area that had been under the control of Israeli forces for two days. The prime minister immediately contacted the defense minister and the chief of staff to find out what was going on.

Ninety hours earlier, at about 11 p.m. on Tuesday, September 14, the prime minister, along with the defense minister and the chief of staff, had decided to order Israeli forces into West Beirut. They acted once the death had been confirmed of Lebanese president-elect Jemayel in a bomb blast at Phalangist headquarters in Beirut that afternoon. The IDF began to move into West Beirut early in the morning of September 15. By midday on September 16, Israeli forces had surrounded the remaining PLO and Moslem militia strongholds in the city, notably the three large refugee camps of Fakahani, Sabra, and Shatilla. The cabinet had met in extraordinary session on the evening of September 16. It was here that Prime Minister Begin, together with his cabinet colleagues, heard for the first time, from the defense minister and the chief of staff, that Phalangist forces, in coordination with the IDF, were about to enter the refugee camps for mopping up operations. After its four-hour session, the cabinet issued the following statement:

Following the assassination of the president-elect of Lebanon, Bashir Jemayel, the IDF seized positions in order to prevent the danger of violence, bloodshed, and chaos in West Beirut, as 2,000 terrorists armed with heavy weapons remained in West Beirut and thereby violated the evacuation agreement. That danger was indeed prevented. The government of Israel has ordered the IDF to evacuate these positions when the Lebanese army will be ready to accept supervision of them in coordination with the IDF, in order to ensure public order and security.

In eve-of-holiday interviews in the Hebrew press, published on Friday, September 17, though taped around noon on September 16—some five or six hours prior to the Phalangists' entry into the refugee camps—Defense Minister Sharon had declared (in Ma'ariv): “In the past 24 hours the IDF has taken control of all the key points in the city and has encircled the refugee camps. Today there is not one area in all of Beirut that is under the exclusive control of the terrorists.” Chief of Staff Eitan told Yediot Ahronot: “The refugee camps—Burj-al-Barajneh, Shatilla, Sabra, and Fakahani—are surrounded and closed off by the IDF. But the soldiers will not enter them,
and they are calling on the terrorists remaining there to lay down their arms and turn themselves in.”

Yet when he was interviewed by Israel Television and by foreign news agencies on Sunday evening, September 19, after it had become clear that hundreds of unarmed men, women, and children had been massacred by Phalangists in the Sabra and Shatilla camps, General Eitan said that the Phalangists had penetrated the camps under cover of darkness from the east, whereas the IDF, which was positioned west of Shatilla only, had not noticed what was going on until it was too late. The Phalangists, Eitan explained, had been engaged in battle inside the camps and had even sustained casualties. “But in the morning, when we saw what had happened, we intervened quickly and they left.” Eitan also accused U.S. special envoy Draper and Lebanese Premier al-Wazzan of having blocked IDF attempts at coordination with the Lebanese army so that the latter could take control of the camps.

On the afternoon of Sunday, September 19, the second day of Rosh Hashanah, truncheon-wielding police used tear gas to break up a demonstration in front of the prime minister’s residence in Jerusalem organized by Peace Now in protest against the massacre in the refugee camps. About 60 of the demonstrators were arrested and several dozen were injured. Other demonstrations took place in Tel Aviv and elsewhere. That evening the Alignment members of the Knesset’s defense and foreign affairs committee, meeting under the chairmanship of Labor leader Peres, called on the prime minister and the defense minister to resign. Expressing its “profound shock and anger” at the Beirut massacre, an act “abhorrent to all Israelis,” the Alignment voiced the call which was to be repeated relentlessly during the next ten days by groups and individuals of all political convictions: for the formation of a judicial commission of inquiry to investigate the events surrounding the massacre.

The cabinet was convened in extraordinary session at the prime minister’s residence in Jerusalem on the evening of September 19, following the end of Rosh Hashanah. As internal and foreign outrage and shock intensified, and pressure on the government began to mount—the United States was demanding an immediate IDF pullout from Beirut, and President Reagan had implicitly held Israel responsible for the atrocity—the cabinet issued a statement asserting that “a blood libel is being woven against the Jewish state and its government and against the IDF.” The statement continued: “In a place where the IDF was not stationed, a Lebanese unit entered an area where terrorists were hiding, in order to trap them. This unit harmed the civilian population and caused it heavy losses. The government notes this fact while expressing regret.” Going on to say that without the IDF’s intervention the number of casualties would have been far greater, and that
the PLO had violated the evacuation agreement by leaving 2,000 terrorists and immense arms stocks in Beirut, the resolution concluded: "No one will preach to us moral values or respect for human life, the basis on which we were educated and will continue to educate generations of fighters in Israel."

Nevertheless, a tremendous groundswell of protest demanded the establishment of a formal judicial commission of inquiry to investigate the circumstances of the massacre. The calls for an independent investigation cut broadly across lines of party, religion, or social stratum. On September 20 President Yitzhak Navon, following a meeting with the prime minister, asserted that Israel was being unjustly accused abroad of responsibility for the massacre. He called for an inquiry by "reliable and independent persons" to determine what had happened. President Navon's predecessor in office, Professor Ephraim Katzir, was one of the signatories on a statement issued by six of the country's most respected scholars urging the cabinet to initiate "a thorough and impartial investigation." Another of the signatories, Professor Ephraim Urbach, president of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, told Israel Television that none of the explanations presented so far—he cited particularly the "confused" remarks by the chief of staff—could explain what had actually taken place.

On September 21 the cabinet, reeling under the pressure to set up a commission of inquiry, met in special session. The statement it released following the meeting—that it would "deliberate upon the appropriate manner in which to examine the facts" within two weeks—only intensified the outcries. Jewish Agency chairman Arye Dulzin said that Jews abroad were "concerned lest the massacre harm Israel's good name." The Bar Association called for an inquiry and refuted the notion, aired by the prime minister and others at the September 21 cabinet meeting, that the creation of a commission of inquiry would constitute an implicit admission of Israeli culpability in the massacre.

As the Israeli press was unearthing more and more facts about the course of events in Beirut following the assassination of Bashir Jemayel, the Knesset met on September 22 to debate two motions for the agenda. One, introduced by the Labor Alignment, called for a full discussion of the IDF's "entry into West Beirut and the grave consequences thereof." Presenting the motion, Labor party chairman Peres articulated much of the sense of shame and repugnance that many Israelis felt in the wake of the massacre, even though no Israeli hand had been involved. Replying for the government, Defense Minister Sharon presented what he termed a "dry and laconic" 18-point military account of the events of September 15–18 in Beirut. Its gist was that the IDF agreed to the Phalangists' entry into the refugee camps after the Lebanese army had refused to seize control there.
Sharon said that the Phalangist forces entered the Shatilla camp from the south and west during the night of September 16/17, “and their action was halted by the IDF on Friday, September 17, in the afternoon, after rumors reached us about what was happening in the camp.” The Phalangists had vacated the area completely on Saturday morning, September 18. “We did not imagine in our worst dreams that the Phalangists would behave this way in battle,” Sharon asserted. “They resembled a regular army in every respect. They promised to fight only against terrorists.” Although the Alignment motion was defeated (47 to 40), observers noted that Sharon’s statement was not consistent with the chief of staff’s remarks in his television interview of September 18. Sharon’s explanation also raised new questions, such as why the Phalangists had remained in the camps until Saturday morning despite “rumors” concerning their actions which had reached the IDF as early as Friday afternoon.

The second motion, introduced by MK Amnon Rubinstein, leader of the Shinui party, called for the establishment of a judicial commission of inquiry into the massacre. Rubinstein noted that Phalangist leaders had made no secret of their intention to take revenge against the Palestinians in the refugee camps. Indeed, Israeli officers had been quoted in the IDF weekly *Bamahaneh* even before the Jemayel assassination, as warning against such Phalangist behavior. If the government had nothing to hide, Rubinstein said, an inquiry would only be to Israel’s advantage. Prior to Justice Minister Moshe Nissim’s reply on behalf of the government, frantic efforts had been made by the coalition leadership to ensure that Tami and the National Religious party (NRP), both members of the coalition, would vote against the Shinui motion. Both Tami and the NRP were insisting on a binding government assurance that the massacre would in fact be investigated. After negotiating the issue throughout the day, the justice minister, with the prime minister’s acquiescence, was able to tell the Knesset that the cabinet “will decide in the very near future on the appropriate manner in which the atrocities perpetrated by a unit of the Lebanese forces will be probed.” This satisfied the two wavering parties—the Shinui motion was defeated 48 to 42—but not Energy Minister Yitzhak Berman (Likud-Liberal), who tendered his resignation and, along with his colleague, MK Dror Zeigerman, voted with the opposition.

In the midst of all this, Amin Jemayel, older brother of the slain Bashir Jemayel, was on September 23 sworn in as Lebanon’s president, having been elected two days earlier. Israeli troops maintained their positions in Beirut as calls grew for the return of the French-Italian-American peace-keeping force which had supervised the PLO’s evacuation from Beirut. (The multinational force had been withdrawn in accordance with the Habib plan.) On the day of the inauguration, the International Red Cross announced that 293 bodies had so far been recovered in the refugee camps.
On Friday, September 24, the cabinet convened in emergency session and decided to request supreme court president Justice Yitzhak Kahan to head an investigation into the massacre—though not a formal judicial commission of inquiry with the power to subpoena witnesses and seize documents. However, when Justice Minister Nissim presented the cabinet’s request to Justice Kahan, he was informed that the high court of justice had several hours earlier issued an order, at the behest of two private persons, requiring the government to show cause why it was not setting up a statutory commission to investigate the massacre. The issue was in fact sub judice, Justice Kahan said.

The concerted pressure on the government to set up a commission of inquiry peaked on the evening of Saturday, September 25, when an estimated 400,000 Israelis—the largest public gathering ever held in the country—converged in Tel Aviv to denounce the government, call for the resignations of the prime minister and the defense minister, and demand a formal judicial investigation of the refugee camps massacre. The protest rally was organized by several political parties—Labor, Mapam, Shinui, and the Independent Liberals—working together for the first time with Peace Now. Other dissident groups formed during the war, such as Yesh Gvul (“there’s a limit/border”) and Soldiers Against Silence, also took part. Many Israelis were shocked to see parents of soldiers whose sons were killed in Lebanon carrying signs saying “My son died in vain!” or “Why did my son die?”.

Sources close to Prime Minister Begin accused the Labor Alignment of “deliberately and hypocritically whipping up hysteria.” However, President Navon, speaking to French television on the day following the rally, said: “The very fact that a moral issue has raised a storm in Israel, attests to the character of the State of Israel and constitutes a mark of honor.” This was also the view of most foreign observers. (A Likud-sponsored rally, planned for October 2, to counteract the Labor-Peace Now gathering and demonstrate support for the government, was announced and then cancelled following the cabinet meeting of September 28. A Labor party call for another special Knesset session to demand Sharon’s resignation was also shelved.)

On September 28, the day after the Yom Kippur fast, the cabinet met again and resolved to establish a commission of inquiry in accordance with the commissions of inquiry law of 1968. “The matter which will be subject to inquiry,” the cabinet’s formal charge to the commission stated, “is: all the facts and factors connected with the atrocity carried out by a unit of the Lebanese forces against the civilian population in the Shatilla and Sabra camps.” Under Israeli law, the president of the supreme court appoints the members of a commission of inquiry. In this case, Justice Kahan, aged 69, named himself as chairman of the commission and added as its members...
supreme court justice Aharon Barak, aged 45, a former attorney-general who had played a key role in the Camp David talks, and Major General (Res.) Yona Efrat, aged 56, former O.C. central command, who retired from active military service in 1977. It was announced that the commission would begin its work around mid-October.

In Beirut, the French and Italian contingents of the multinational force had returned on September 27 to take up security duties in the refugee camps and elsewhere. The U.S., however, refused to allow its marine task force to enter the city until all Israeli troops had been withdrawn. On September 29, after Israel had complied, the marines entered the city.

Following the appointment of the Kahan Commission, political recrimination inside Israel waned somewhat. However, reports began to surface of agitation within the IDF high command and in the defense establishment. Late in September, at a meeting attended by officers with the rank of colonel and up, including Chief of Staff Eitan, Defense Minister Sharon came in for acute criticism for his handling of the war. A second meeting of this same forum was then called by the defense minister himself. What was clear from these and other events—the Eli Geva case (see above), the threatened resignation of the commanding officer of the IDF's Staff and Command College in the wake of the Beirut massacre, the dismissal of a career officer with the rank of major for writing an unsigned article in the daily Ha'aretz in defense of Colonel Geva—was that the political-ideological rift within the nation was in some way reflected in the IDF. Whether the sharp differences among the officer corps and the evident alienation between the field staff and the political echelon within the defense establishment were political or professional in nature, they could not but cast a pall of unease over the general public and affect the Israeli public's perception of the IDF. This meant a further tarnishing of the country's self-image.

There was mistrust within the cabinet itself vis-à-vis the defense establishment, and this began to have practical political repercussions. On October 3, six Israeli soldiers were killed and 22 wounded when a bus carrying soldiers was ambushed by terrorists in broad daylight on the main road near Beirut. When, at a cabinet meeting the following day, the prime minister and the defense minister urged a broad strike at PLO bases in the Tripoli area of northern Lebanon, a tie vote ensued—those against the strike were led by Deputy Minister David Levy—and the operation was called off. (The cabinet did, however, authorize the air force to destroy a SAM-9 anti-aircraft missile launcher some 35 kilometers east of Beirut.)

A week later (October 10), the cabinet put forward its stand regarding the withdrawal of all foreign forces (including Israeli forces) from Lebanon. This was the opening gambit in a protracted, at times seemingly interminable, series of comings and goings by U.S. mediators, of positions advanced
and retracted, of hopes raised only to be dashed—all against the backdrop of sporadic terrorist acts in Lebanon that pushed the Israeli casualty rate ever higher, and intensified dissent among previously sanguine or uninvolved sections of the population in Israel.

The Israeli plan had as its final goal the signing of a peace treaty with Lebanon, despite the altered political milieu due to Bashir Jemayel's assassination, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country. However, Israel would not withdraw until its soldiers being held prisoner were handed back, and until "all necessary arrangements" were effected to ensure that Lebanon could never again serve as a base for terrorist attacks on Israel. On October 13 the plan was conveyed to Foreign Minister Shamir, who was then in Washington for talks with senior U.S. officials. Shamir subsequently informed the cabinet that the plan had been very favorably received by the Americans. U.S. special envoy Draper was already in the region, shuttling between Beirut, Damascus, and Jerusalem.

As IDF troops in Lebanon intervened to restore calm in clashes between Druze and Phalangists in the Shouf mountain area southeast of Beirut, drawing criticism both from the Druze community in Israel and from various sections of the Israeli public—the former complaining that the IDF was not doing enough to protect their coreligionists and the latter maintaining that it was not the IDF's business to act as a policeman in Lebanon, the more so as these clashes did not affect Israeli security—a mid-October poll in the Jerusalem Post showed public satisfaction with the government's performance falling sharply due to the impasse in Lebanon, and particularly in the wake of the refugee camp massacre.

On October 20 the Kahan Commission began its formal hearings in a building at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Whereas the Agranat Commission of Inquiry after the Yom Kippur War held all its sessions in camera, the Kahan Commission functioned openly, except where considerations of state security necessitated closed sessions. A sense of high drama prevailed when, after a number of closed sessions involving the chief of staff and ranking intelligence personnel, the commission held its first open session on October 25. The witness, Defense Minister Sharon, told the tribunal that no one among Israel's policy-makers had foreseen such a massacre. Sharon said the first he had heard of something having gone wrong was when the chief of staff told him at about 9 p.m. on Friday, September 17, that "they overdid it"—meaning, apparently, that the Christians had wreaked havoc among the Palestinians beyond what was expected. (Sharon, like many others who testified in open session, also gave part of his testimony behind closed doors.)

As the commission went about its business, internal inconsistencies began to emerge in the open testimony. Thus, for example, when Major General
Amir Drori, O.C. northern command, testified (October 31) that "somewhere in his mind" every Israeli had feared a Phalangist massacre of Palestinians in the refugee camps, he seemed to be at considerable odds with Defense Minister Sharon's assertion that "no one in his worst dreams could have foreseen such a conclusion."

The array of figures appearing before the commission included three other ministers besides Sharon: Prime Minister Begin (November 8), Communications Minister Mordechai Zippori (November 18), and Foreign Minister Shamir (November 24). What jolted many Israelis about the prime minister's testimony—and also seemed to confirm the persistent reports that major decisions in the war were taken by Defense Minister Sharon and Chief of Staff Eitan without Begin's prior knowledge—was his confirmation that he learned of the Phalangists' entry into the camps along with the rest of the cabinet some two hours after their operation had begun and about 40 hours after Sharon and Eitan had decided to send them in, and that he first heard about the massacre via BBC radio about ten hours after the Phalangists had left the camps. Zippori, for his part, said he had first heard about a "slaughter" in the camps as early as 11 a.m. on Friday, September 17, from the military correspondent of Ha'aretz. Unable to make contact with senior intelligence personnel, Zippori had called Foreign Minister Shamir, who he knew was about to meet with ranking intelligence officials, and asked him to look into the matter. Shamir had a different version of the conversation. He said Zippori had used the term "running wild" and had not mentioned a "slaughter"; and that Zippori had not specifically asked him to verify the report. Shamir added that he had not raised the matter with the senior intelligence personnel, assuming that if anything was amiss they would already be apprised of it.

On November 24 the Kahan Commission, acting under paragraph 15(a) of the commissions of inquiry law, notified Prime Minister Begin and eight other persons who had appeared before it that they were liable to be "harmed" by its findings. The nine were, besides the prime minister: Defense Minister Sharon; Foreign Minister Shamir; Chief of Staff Eitan; Director of Military Intelligence Saguy; O.C. northern command Drori; the IDF divisional commander in Beirut, Brigadier General Amos Yaron; the head of the Mossad intelligence agency (whose identity is a secret while he holds office); and Avi Dudai, personal aide to Sharon. Each of the nine was informed that he had 15 days to ask to reappear before the commission, to study all the relevant material in the commission's possession, to cross-examine other witnesses, and to submit further evidence. They were also informed of their right to take legal counsel.

The letter sent to Prime Minister Begin stated that he "may be harmed if the commission arrives at the following findings or conclusions: (A) That
the prime minister did not appropriately consider the role to be played by the Lebanese forces during and due to the IDF’s entry into West Beirut, and ignored the danger of acts of revenge and bloodshed by these forces against the populations in the refugee camps. (B) That the aforementioned omission is tantamount to non-fulfillment of a duty which was incumbent upon the prime minister.” Similarly, Defense Minister Sharon might be harmed if the commission were to find or conclude that he “ignored or disregarded” possible revenge by the “Lebanese forces against the population in the refugee camps in Beirut, and did not order that the appropriate measures be taken to prevent this danger.” In addition, he might be harmed if it were found that he did not act “as quickly as possible” to have the Lebanese forces removed from the camps when he received reports of aberrant actions perpetrated in the refugee camps which they had entered. Most of those who were warned by the commission chose to submit written letters or memoranda, or to have their lawyers appear on their behalf.

By year's end the commission had virtually completed its formal work and was about to retire to consider the evidence. The commission had heard 49 witnesses, including nine who appeared before it twice (i.e., 58 testimonies), in 65 hours of hearings. The recorded testimony covered 1,692 pages. Twenty-three of the testimonies were given in open session, the rest behind closed doors. The commission staff interviewed about 160 persons, including officers, soldiers, local and foreign civilians, and local and foreign journalists. In the course of the hearings, the commission was presented with 245 exhibits and documents, covering 3,000 pages. In addition, some 12,000 pages of material were given to the commission at its request from government departments and the IDF, including notes, recordings, situation appraisals, intelligence reports, field logs, and the like. The Kahan Commission was expected to issue its report in early 1983. (A full report on the Kahan Commission findings will appear in the 1985 AJYB.)

Other dramas were not lacking in the open-ended aftermath of Operation Peace for Galilee. At 7 a.m. on November 11, a tremendous blast rocked Israel’s military government headquarters building in Tyre, in southern Lebanon. Within seconds the seven-story structure was reduced to an eight-meter-high heap of rubble. Killed outright were 75 Israeli soldiers and security personnel, and 14 local Arabs who were in the building at the time of the explosion. Another 27 Israelis and 28 Arabs were injured; six of the Israelis were seriously hurt, and one died of his wounds two weeks later, bringing the death toll to 90. It was the worst single disaster in Israeli military history. Heart-rending scenes were played out before the television cameras as rescuers frantically searched through the rubble for possible survivors (three were pulled out). A military commission of inquiry established on the day of the blast by Defense Minister Sharon, and headed by
Major General (Res.) Meir Zorea, comptroller of the defense establishment, found that the explosion was caused by a combination of two factors: the poor construction of the building, and a gas-air mixture that collected in a certain part of the structure. The commission was able to determine that no explosives were involved, nor did it come across "even one factor to suggest that the blast was caused by sabotage." However, a "basic re-examination" was to be undertaken regarding the position and maintenance of the gas tanks. The cabinet declared November 15 a national day of mourning for the victims of the disaster.

Speaking on November 11, Defense Minister Sharon asserted that Israel would not leave Lebanon until Beirut signed a political agreement with Israel providing for normalization of relations. Israel was insisting that the talks be political in character, not military, and that, to underscore this, they be held in Jerusalem as well as in Lebanon. The Lebanese were balking at these terms. By early December, with special envoys Habib and Draper both in Washington to report on their ongoing mediation efforts, the United States was accusing Israel of deliberately stalling over a troop withdrawal from Lebanon. Washington was particularly incensed at Jerusalem's rigid posture on procedural matters.

On December 19 the cabinet approved a written agreement, purportedly worked out by Defense Minister Sharon in secret talks with Lebanese officials, regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. Israel dropped its insistence that the talks be held in Jerusalem. Although Sharon told the Knesset's defense and foreign affairs committee that he already had a detailed draft of the agreement to be signed with Lebanon, the Lebanese government failed to ratify Sharon's document and instead produced a new agenda of its own, downplaying the political aspects. Sharon came under fire from various quarters in both the coalition and the opposition for having leaked the terms of the purported agreement (and his own part in obtaining them), thus causing the Lebanese to disown them.

At all events, on Tuesday, December 28, talks did open at Khalde, near Beirut, with the delegations of the participants, the United States, Israel, and Lebanon, seated around a large triangular table. Speaking first, the head of the Lebanese delegation, Antoine Fattal, said that his government's "first objective" was "to seek the restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty and full authority over the whole of its territory." To that end, "Lebanon requests that all non-Lebanese troops and forces actually stationed de facto within its internationally recognized boundaries must withdraw according to a comprehensive plan of evacuation by the terms of a specific and accelerated schedule." In a broader context, Fattal harked back to the Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement of March 23, 1949, maintaining that it "remains the juridical instrument regulating Lebanese-Israeli relations"—
notwithstanding Israel's claims that the agreement had been annulled by Lebanon's declaration of war on Israel in June 1967.

Departing from his prepared text, the head of the Israeli delegation, David Kimche, director-general of the Foreign Ministry, took issue with Fattal's description of events in 1967 and thereafter. Kimche said that Lebanon's actions in 1967 and its subsequent signing of certain agreements were "in complete violation of the armistice agreement." Israel therefore considered that agreement to be "terminated de jure and de facto." Nonetheless, he stated, "no real conflict exists" between Lebanon and Israel, nor had Israel's military effort been directed against the people of Lebanon, "but against the terrorists, who have transformed Lebanon into a base for aggression against us, against the will of the Lebanese." With the removal of the terrorist threat, Kimche said, Israel sought a relationship of good-neighborliness and peace with Lebanon "as two sovereign and independent countries, living side by side in friendship and in security."

The chief U.S. negotiator, Morris Draper, said that his government, being a "close friend" of both countries, would do all it could to help bring about an agreement. He noted that the United States was cognizant of Israel's "legitimate security interests," which "should be addressed and satisfied to the maximum extent possible." At the same time, Washington supported the "independence, national unity and integrity" of Lebanon, and the "restoration of full sovereignty" throughout that country. Since, as Draper pointed out, Israel had declared that it did not covet any Lebanese territory, and Lebanon had affirmed that its territory would not be allowed to become again a base for attacks on Israel, and since both countries agreed "on the need for the quickest possible withdrawal of all external military forces from Lebanon," the negotiations ought to prove productive. "We have an historic opportunity to set the stage for a future filled with hope," Draper asserted.

Two days later, on December 30, the three delegations were greeted by flag-waving schoolchildren as they arrived in the northern development town of Kiryat Shemona, a chief target of terrorist attacks, for the second round of talks. (The negotiations were to alternate between Khalde and Kiryat Shemona.) At the community center, where the talks were to take place, the delegations were offered the traditional bread and salt welcome. Visibly moved, Lebanon's delegation head Antoine Fattal said: "I leave our political differences for the conference table. Here I wish to declare that the Jews and the Moslems are children of the same God."

Conclusion

The first six months of Operation Peace for Galilee and its aftermath claimed the lives of 463 Israeli soldiers and other security personnel; over
THE YEAR IN REVIEW

Terrorism

Terrorism inside Israel in 1982 was confined to sporadic attempts at planting explosive devices. Following the onset of Operation Peace for Galilee, there was a marked decline in even this very limited activity. The year also saw a series of attacks on Israeli and/or Jewish targets abroad—including the shooting of Israel ambassador to London Shlomo Argov on June 3, sparking off the war in Lebanon—which intensified in the latter half of the year, almost in inverse proportion to the terrorist attacks inside Israel.

In mid-January two bombs exploded within minutes of each other in the Petah Tikva market; the second device wounded a police bomb disposal expert. Early in March police explosives experts safely dismantled bombs in the Beersheba market, a Petah Tikva bank, and at a Jerusalem overpass. An eight-year-old girl was slightly wounded on May 9 when a bomb went off in a Jerusalem bus, while on May 29 a fuel tanker truck was damaged when it struck an anti-vehicle mine on a dirt road in Beersheba. A small explosive device was discovered and dismantled in the Beit Shemesh commercial center at the end of May. On November 8, four elderly persons were wounded, one of them seriously, when a bomb went off under a park bench in Herzliya.

Abroad, an Israeli-owned restaurant in West Berlin was bombed on January 15, wounding 25 persons; a Beirut-based group claimed responsibility. On July 31, seven persons were wounded, two of them seriously, when a bomb went off at the El Al ticket counter in Munich’s Riem Airport. Foreign Minister Shamir said the incident demonstrated that Israel was right to insist that “all sources of terrorism must be eliminated.” An Israeli diplomat was seriously wounded and 43 other persons—40 of them schoolchildren—were hurt on September 17 in a car bomb blast in Paris. The following day four persons were wounded in a submachine gun attack in front of the main synagogue in Brussels. The worst outrage occurred on October 9, Simhat Torah, at the main synagogue in Rome when assailants opened fire and threw grenades at worshippers as they were leaving the building after the prayer service. A two-year-old girl was killed and 35 persons were wounded. A foreign ministry spokesman in Jerusalem said the attack “underscores once again the nature of those who plot against Jewish worshippers on their festivals. It is high time the enlightened world united against terrorism.” Two persons were hurt late in December when a bomb
exploded in the Israel consulate in Sydney; two other devices went off under cars parked near a Jewish recreation club in the city. According to the Israel consul-general there, the PLO claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Of the trials of terrorists in 1982, that of Ziad Abu Eian, 24, of El-Bireh, which opened in Tel Aviv district court in January, attracted the most attention. The defendant was charged with having planted a bomb in Tiberias in 1979 that killed two persons and wounded 36. Abu Eian had fled to Chicago via Jordan and was extradited to Israel, following two-and-a-half years of negotiations. Reportedly, the U.S. government insisted that the trial be held in a civil rather than a military court as the condition for Abu Eian's extradition. Representatives of the state department, the International Red Cross, and the International Federation of Jurists attended the proceedings. On June 17 Abu Eian was found guilty of murder and causing harm with aggravated intent. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

In mid-February Dov Shilansky, deputy minister in the prime minister's office, told the Knesset that the security service was continuing to investigate the June 1980 bomb attack that seriously wounded two West Bank mayors (see AJYB, Vol. 82, 1982, p. 254; see also The Administered Areas, below). Shilansky, who was replying to a parliamentary question from MK Amnon Rubinstein (Shinui), stated that he was "constantly asking the head of the security service" about the course of the investigation. He noted, however, that such clandestine operations posed special problems for investigators.

The Withdrawal from Sinai

As the date approached for the final Israeli evacuation of Sinai by the terms of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty (April 26), a situation bordering on anarchy prevailed in the northern Sinai agricultural settlements and in the urban center of Yamit. (See AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 260.) On the one hand, the settlers, who had been lured to the area by government promises of development and assistance, were refusing to leave until a binding compensation agreement was worked out and passed by the Knesset. On the other hand, tension in the area was fueled by the presence there of members of the Movement to Stop the Sinai Withdrawal, most of them from Gush Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful") settlements in Judea-Samaria or students from religious academies, who had taken up residence in abandoned buildings throughout the area. Driven by a potent mixture of ideological fervor, religious zeal, and security concerns, they called on the government to tear up the agreement with Egypt. Beyond that, they were also evidently seeking to "traumatize" the collective Israeli consciousness so as to preclude any possible future withdrawal agreement in Judea-Samaria.
Caught in the middle was the government. Although official statements continued to insist that Israel would “carry out every commitment” and “implement the peace treaty down to the last word, phrase, and sentence,” as cabinet secretary Arye Naor put it to reporters on January 3, some believed the government to be playing a double game. Leaders of the anti-withdrawal movement claimed that they had received “clear signals” from senior government personnel not to evacuate Yamit. Deputy Prime Minister Levy implicitly confirmed this when he told Israel Radio that some cabinet ministers were undermining public respect and authority by failing to maintain law and order in Yamit. “Giving up the settlements was the price we agreed to pay for the peace with Egypt,” he pointed out.

However, the cabinet soon agreed to pay a different kind of price. On January 7 it raised the proposed compensation agreement by some 20 per cent, pushing it well past the IS4 billion mark. Only five of 17 ministers voted for the new sum, following entreaties by the prime minister; four voted against, while no fewer than eight did not take part in the vote. Finance Minister Yoram Aridor noted that under the new terms, if an average factory worker saved all his wages for 70 years, he would attain the same sum as would be paid to just one Sinai evacuee.

As diehard religious ultra-nationalists began actively to disrupt the dismantlement of greenhouses and other structures in northern Sinai early in February, leading the defense ministry to suspend the work, Israeli soldiers for the first time used force to oust withdrawal resisters. MK Hanan Porat (Tehiya-Renaissance), on hand to support the resisters, accused the IDF of using unwarranted “brutality” in removing the squatters. He added: “If our people are attacked, it may be assumed that they will defend themselves as best they can.”

In a surprise move on February 26, just two months before the final withdrawal date, Defense Minister Sharon, acting at the behest of the prime minister, ordered the IDF to seal off the Yamit and Northern Sinai areas. The move came to ward off a massive drive by Gush Emunim, slated to begin two days later, to bring thousands of settlers into the region with the aim of preventing the withdrawal. Scores, if not hundreds, of persons had already entered the area in the preceding weeks. Ugly scenes took place at IDF roadblocks. Settlers wearing yellow Stars of David baited soldiers with cries of “Nazis!”, “Kapos!”, and “Yamit will not be Judenrein!” On March 2 the Tehiya faction presented a motion of no confidence in the government following the IDF’s actions against the anti-withdrawal movement. Defense Minister Sharon told the Knesset that the IDF had discovered nearly 500 grenades that had been smuggled into Sinai through a security fence cut by the withdrawal resisters. The motion was defeated 58 to four, with 43 Alignment abstentions.
Throughout March, Israel Television brought home the events in the Yamit area, screening footage of men and women soldiers forcibly evicting opponents of the withdrawal, who usually practiced passive resistance. The Chief Rabbinate Council declared March 24 a day of fast and atonement, calling on Jews to pray that the government reconsider the withdrawal from the Northern Sinai approaches. The IDF was forced to increase the number of troops guarding equipment as settlers sabotaged giant cranes and other machinery being used in the dismantling of the settlements. On March 31 the coast from Eilat to Ophira (Sharm el-Sheikh) was closed to civilians as the IDF made final preparations to hand the area back to Egypt. Virtually all the transportable equipment had been sent north to Israel in some 2,000 truckloads. In Yamit nearly all the local residents left in a final mass exodus on April 1 (the date set by the government for vacating the area was actually March 31), leaving only the anti-withdrawal diehards and the army.

The Knesset, which had gone into frantic action after the eleventh hour, managed to pass a law (at 3:40 a.m., April 1) guaranteeing the Yamit and Sinai evacuees compensation for having to leave their homes and businesses. A week later some 50,000 Israelis took advantage of the Passover holiday for one final campout on the Sinai coast of Eilat, opened up for civilians for the last time under Israeli control. However, only about 200 persons—a far cry from the predicted 2,000—arrived for the Passover seder meal (April 7) held by the three Tehiya MK's at the war memorial in Yamit. Defense Minister Sharon had in fact injected new hope into the anti-withdrawal movement by announcing that its adherents would be allowed to remain in the area until after Passover. In the view of a Jerusalem Post editorial (April 6), Sharon’s “puzzlingly unsteady” tactics regarding Yamit were designed “to keep the Egyptians guessing about Israel’s intentions in the event of an Egyptian violation of the peace treaty.” (It was also just at this time that tension in the north escalated, with Israeli troops poised to move into Lebanon at a moment’s notice following a series of security incidents and the government’s reaction to them.)

Most of the anti-withdrawal diehards had taken positions atop buildings, defying the soldiers to remove them. Since the troops were ordered not to use firearms or other undue force, they resorted to climbing ladders to get at the resisters. What ensued was, in the words of MK Amnon Rubinstein, “one of the most shameful spectacles Israel has ever known.” Contrary to their promise not to use force against the army, the resisters used crowbars to try and topple the ladders as the soldiers were climbing them, dropped burning tires, bricks, and other heavy objects on them, and pushed, shoved, and cursed those soldiers—all of them officers—who did manage to get on to the roof. The entire scene took on a surrealistic aspect when soldiers, hoisted above the resisters in a cage by a giant crane, sprayed those on the
roof and, unavoidably, the troops trying to remove them, with a white foam. Elsewhere in Yamit, crack troops forced their way into a bunker where six men and three women of Rabbi Meir Kahane's "Kach" movement had barricaded themselves and were threatening suicide; they were quickly overcome, handcuffed, and led away. The final group to go—voluntarily—consisted of about 30 students who had occupied the 28-meter-high war memorial in Yamit. They emerged peacefully after one of their leaders said they had to choose between fighting their own feelings "or fighting soldiers with whom we may soon have to go north to guard the Israel-Lebanon border."

On April 23, after the last of the resisters had been removed, a series of tremendous blasts rocked the seaside town; Yamit was razed; the only building left standing was the synagogue. Although no official explanation for this act was forthcoming, the destruction of Yamit was evidently carried out to prevent its becoming a magnet for opponents of the peace treaty in the future, and to deter Egypt from creating any major settlement in this strategically important sector.

On April 25 at midnight, 15 years after the Six Day War and three years after the signing of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, Sinai reverted to Egyptian hands. It was the third time the IDF had withdrawn from Sinai or parts thereof. The first was in 1949, following the War of Independence; the second time was in 1957, in the wake of the Sinai campaign the year before; and again in 1982, this time within the framework of a formal peace treaty. President Anwar Sadat, the initiator of that treaty in his visit to Jerusalem five years earlier, was gunned down less than a year before the final implementation of the agreement. However, during the cabinet meeting of April 25, the day of the handover, Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, phoned Prime Minister Begin to express the Egyptian people's appreciation for Israel's execution of the peace treaty on schedule. Mubarak also recalled that in his first meeting with the Israeli leader, following President Sadat's assassination, the two had pledged to maintain the peace between their countries "forever."

It was, in fact, a letter from President Mubarak, along with a message from President Reagan, that had given Prime Minister Begin the last-minute assurances he was seeking, leading him on April 21 to recommend to the cabinet that the withdrawal proceed on schedule. The Egyptian president affirmed his commitment to the Camp David process, while the American leader promised to maintain Israel's "qualitative technological edge" in the security sphere, and to support the Camp David accords as "the only agreed plan to resolve the Palestinian problem." President Reagan also reaffirmed all the Israel-U.S. agreements since 1973, which included a U.S. undertaking not to talk to the PLO until that organization
accepted security council resolution 242, and a number of key defense agreements.

No joint ceremonies were held to mark the handover of Sinai. The Israeli flag was lowered at Ophira at 7:30 a.m. on April 25, while at Yamit the Israeli force, accompanied by about a dozen members of the Movement to Stop the Sinai Withdrawal, who spent the weekend in the synagogue, left around noon.

One issue remained unresolved—the fate of the Taba area, just south of Eilat. Both sides cited the original Sinai frontier demarcation in support of their claims to the 700 square meter area. Direct negotiations to settle the matter were unsuccessful, and on May 21 Foreign Minister Shamir said the issue would be referred to a conciliation committee, and if that failed, to agreed arbitration. In the meantime, much to the Egyptians' discomfiture, construction continued on an Israeli hotel in the area; the hotel opened late in the year. While both sides remained unbending over the Taba issue, other elements of the peace treaty went ahead as scheduled, including the opening of the Israeli-Egyptian checkpoint just below Taba, for travellers entering Sinai from Israel or wishing to enter Israel, and the inauguration, on April 29, of the Tel Aviv-Cairo bus route.

**Normalization of Relations with Egypt**

While the return of Sinai to Egyptian control was manifestly the dominant event in relations between the two countries in 1982, other developments also played a key role. An anticipated visit to Israel by President Mubarak, who had accepted President Navon's invitation (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 255), failed to materialize. Although Egyptian foreign minister Kamal Hassan Ali told Israeli journalists in mid-February that the Mubarak visit would take place in March, the Egyptian leader balked at Israel's insistence that he include Jerusalem on his itinerary. A month later Prime Minister Begin formally re-extended the invitation through Foreign Minister Ali, who was visiting Israel, but nothing came of it. Once the war in Lebanon broke out, such a visit was ruled out by Cairo.

Operation Peace for Galilee was, as in many other spheres, a dividing line, if not a watershed, in Israeli-Egyptian relations. Prior to the eruption of hostilities at the beginning of June, relations at the diplomatic and governmental level proceeded relatively smoothly, although at the popular level, as reflected in tourism, relations were still a one-way street; there was virtually no tourism from Egypt to Israel. Besides several high-ranking reciprocal visits connected with the final stages of the Sinai withdrawal, a number of Egyptian missions spent time in Israel in the first half of the year. Among the visitors were industrial and agricultural delegations in January; a "youth mission" of 60 Egyptian teenagers who spent a week touring the
country that same month; Minister of Culture Mohammed Abdul-Hamid Radwan and Egyptian chief of staff Lieutenant General Rab el-Nabi Hafez, both of whom paid (separate) official visits in February; 180 singers, dancers, and orchestra members who took part in the Tel Aviv Spring Festival in May; and, on the very eve of the Lebanon war, a mission of ranking members of Egypt's ruling National Democratic party.

On June 2 Foreign Minister Ali and Osama el-Baz, President Mubarak's chef de bureau, arrived in Jerusalem for a lightning visit connected with a possible tripartite summit meeting between Mubarak, President Reagan, and Prime Minister Begin to revive the autonomy talks (see below). President Mubarak took the occasion to send a personal message to Begin, recommitting himself and his country to "peace forever" with Israel.

Although Egypt condemned the Israeli incursion into Lebanon, and normalization came to a virtual standstill, the peace itself held fast. However, on September 20, following the massacre in the two Beirut refugee camps, the Egyptian ambassador to Israel, Sa'ad Mortada, was recalled to Cairo "for consultations." About a week later, President Navon called on the Egyptian leadership to use its influence to restrain "unbridled attacks" on Israel in the Egyptian press following the refugee camps massacre. Early in October Prime Minister Begin received another message from President Mubarak stressing Egypt's commitment to the peace treaty. The oral message was delivered by former U.S. special envoy Sol Linowitz, who was on a private visit to the region.

However, a different note was sounded by Foreign Minister Ali in a speech marking the anniversary of the 1973 October war: "Mistaken are those, particularly Israel, who believe that the peace treaty has defused the mine of war and confrontation in the Middle East, and that matters can be left as they are for a long period during which Israel will impose a status quo." That, Ali asserted, was "a wrong assessment, because peace must be comprehensive if it is to be durable."

On October 31 the cabinet urged Egypt to resume talks on all outstanding issues. Several days earlier, Prime Minister Begin had told the Knesset's defense and foreign affairs committee that notwithstanding the continuing denunciations of Israel in the Egyptian press, nothing fundamental had changed where the peace was concerned, including Cairo's adherence to the demilitarization terms. However, a senior IDF intelligence officer charged that Egypt was not doing enough to prevent terrorist infiltration across the new border, drawing a reaction from Cairo to the effect that Egypt was "meticulously discharging all its obligations under the peace treaty and is sparing no efforts in taking all security measures across its borders." On November 10 Foreign Minister Shamir told the Knesset that Egypt's continued refusal to return its ambassador to Israel would constitute "an
explicit violation of the peace treaty.” Shamir accused Egypt of “deviating from the path of peace” by showing an “evasive” approach to the renewal of the autonomy talks and to the normalization process. Cairo, he said, had not responded to Israeli requests for normalized relations in new spheres, and had backtracked on the implementation of agreements already signed.

A more optimistic note was sounded by Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs Butros Ghali in an interview with the Jerusalem Post marking the fifth anniversary of President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. While criticizing Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon, Ghali declared: “We still believe in peace and the peace process, and we still believe very deeply in the importance of a continuing dialogue.” Ghali also said that Egypt was pinning its hopes on the re-emergence of “moderate” forces within Israel: “We believe that inside Israel, in spite of the apparent victory of the extremists and the rejectionists, that the attitudes of the moderates, of the Israelis who really want peace, will prevail.”

The Autonomy Negotiations

Despite a flurry of activity late in 1981 (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 256) and its augury of a resumption of the stalled autonomy talks, 1982 saw no progress whatsoever on this issue. Secretary of State Haig, seeking to achieve an autonomy agreement prior to the final Israeli withdrawal from Sinai on April 26, visited Israel and Egypt twice in January. He was said to be worried that failure to reach agreement by April 26 could lead to the collapse of the Camp David accords due to pressure from various quarters for the adoption of a new approach. However, nothing substantive came of Haig’s talks.

On January 15, hours after Haig had left for Washington at the end of his first round of talks in the region, Defense Minister Sharon declared: “If the Egyptians believe that we will be more pliable and forthcoming on the autonomy issue after the withdrawal, they are badly mistaken. If the Egyptians will not sign an autonomy agreement, we will not flinch from perpetuating the present situation in the territories.” The defense minister, who was speaking at a political meeting, revealed that Israel had told Haig it would not countenance the creation of a “second Palestinian state” (in addition to Jordan) in the territories, or permit the establishment there of anything liable to serve as the precursor to such a state.

Early in February, Israel issued an official document stating its position on the autonomy talks. Going into considerable detail, the paper enunciated Israel’s view of the “scope, jurisdiction, and structure of the self-governing authority (administrative council).” The council would have power in 13 separate areas such as justice, finance, education, religious affairs, and local police—but not in security or foreign affairs. The document, which also
spelled out Israel’s conception of the council’s size and the manner of its
election, concluded; “All of the above indicates Israel’s readiness to observe
the Camp David agreement fully and in every detail, in letter and in spirit,
while safeguarding the interests of all concerned.”

On February 12 President Reagan confirmed the appointment of Richard
Fairbanks as the new U.S. envoy to the autonomy talks; Fairbanks had been
serving as assistant secretary of state for congressional relations. A week
after his appointment, the new envoy met in Jerusalem with a number of
Israeli ministers involved in the autonomy process. Fairbanks said his
approach would be to achieve agreement on the less complicated issues in
the first stage. The new U.S. negotiator returned to the Middle East in May,
in the midst of a new dispute which was preventing the resumption of the
talks: Egypt’s refusal to accede to the Israeli demand that the site of the
talks be Jerusalem, and not Herzliya, as had been the case in the past.
Speaking on Israel Radio on May 8, Foreign Minister Shamir said Israel
would not accept a boycott of Jerusalem. This impasse had already led to
a cancellation by Egypt of talks at the level of experts, in March.

On August 27, in an article published in the Jerusalem Post, Foreign
Minister Shamir linked Operation Peace for Galilee with the broader Pales-
tinian issue. “Israel,” he wrote, “is convinced that the expulsion of the PLO
from Lebanon will have a positive impact on the Camp David process.”
Calling on the Arab governments to ban the PLO and seek regional stabil-
ity, the foreign minister asserted: “Now is the time to resume the autonomy
negotiations and bring them to a quick and positive conclusion.” These and
other hopes were dashed, at least temporarily, by the events in Sabra and
Shatilla three weeks later.

The Administered Areas

Menachem Milson, on leave from his Hebrew University post as profes-
sor of Arabic literature to serve as civil administrator of Judea-Samaria
since November 1981 (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 249), told the Jerusalem
Post in mid-February: “The basic assumption upon which I work—a very
deep belief—is that the term ‘Palestinian’ is not synonymous with PLO.”
Explaining that Israel needed to “fight the PLO politically as well as mili-
tarily because the organization is the most serious impediment to peace in
the Middle East,” Milson aimed “to create an atmosphere of friendship, of
trust, of confidence, of willingness to negotiate.” However, few, if any, of
those trends were visible in the administered areas in 1982.

On January 23 Bethlehem mayor Elias Freij appealed to the PLO to
recognize Israel, and thereby “challenge it and the U.S. for peace.” The
mayor asserted that the protracted impasse was working in Israel’s favor:
“Every day that passes sees new settlements, and in ten years there will be
nothing left for the Palestinians to talk about.” A political dialogue was the only viable solution, Freij said, adding that it was “the destiny of both peoples to coexist in this country.” He called on other West Bank mayors to join him in urging the PLO to recognize Israel. However, a few days later, Nablus mayor Bassam al-Shaka, generally considered to be the chief exponent of the radical approach in the areas, termed the Bethlehem mayor’s appeal “unhelpful.” Al-Shaka said that since all the major Israeli political parties had already declared that they would not talk to the PLO, it would be pointless for the organization to recognize Israel.

Early in February the high court of justice rejected a petition by 16 villages in the areas opposing the military government’s seizure of territory after having declared it “state land.” The court accepted the “state land” designation and upheld the authority of the military review boards set up to consider the ownership claims of local residents. In the view of many observers, the practical result of the ruling would be to end attempts to block Israeli settlement in the areas by recourse to the courts. However, Justice Meir Shamgar, who wrote the opinion, did instruct the military government to use “defined and fair administrative procedures” in these cases.

The settlement boom in Judea-Samaria, set in motion by the first Likud government, was given accelerated momentum in 1982. On January 29 Defense Minister Sharon told a group of Israel Bond leaders from North America that the Jewish settlements in Judea-Samaria were meant to be Israel’s “first line of defense” against any attack from the east.

During the year it became increasingly clear that there were two types of settlers in Judea-Samaria. The “ideological settlers,” spearheaded by the Gush Emunim movement, though still numerically insignificant, continued to press for the settlement of what they regarded as the divinely sanctioned eretz yisrael hasheleima, the “whole land of Israel.” Indications that these settlers were moving into a new, more assertive phase could be seen in reports that Jewish settlers had formed “vigilante groups” to deal with incidents of stone-throwing at Israeli vehicles in the areas; in the part played by armed Israeli civilians in quelling demonstrations; in the arrest of four residents of Kiryat Arba, the large urban settlement adjacent to Hebron, for possession of explosives and weapons (in November, two of them were formally charged with having deliberately destroyed a bomb, found in the local council building, which may have had some connection with the bombs used in the still unsolved June 1980 attacks on three West Bank mayors: see AJYB, Vol. 82, 1982, p. 254; see also Terrorism, above); and in the destruction by Jewish settlers of several empty buildings in Hebron’s ancient Jewish quarter, as the incipient stage in a plan to create a Jewish residential area in the heart of the city.
The other side of the settlement coin was perhaps best encapsulated in a four-page supplement to the Jerusalem Post that appeared in November, sponsored by the World Zionist Organization. Directed at potential new immigrants from Western countries, the supplement listed a number of places where such persons might want to settle. The great bulk of the sites were located in “Judea and Samaria—Israel’s fastest growing suburbs.” Among the attractions of these areas, according to the World Zionist Organization, were “an appropriate home for a growing family at a very reasonable cost” and “a pollution-free rural setting within easy commuting distance” from metropolitan Tel Aviv.

On November 25 Deputy Agriculture Minister Michael Dekel, the driving force behind this new concept of the West Bank as suburbia, laid the cornerstone at Nofim, in Samaria, the first settlement in the areas being developed entirely by a private company. Three months earlier (September 1) the town of Maaleh Adumim, just east of Jerusalem on the road to Jericho, had been inaugurated by Housing Minister Levy. According to him, Maaleh Adumim, which was planned as a town of about 10,000 inhabitants, would help solve the problem faced by young couples who could not cope with the inordinately high costs of housing in Jerusalem and elsewhere. In December Deputy Minister Dekel and Matityahu Drobell, co-director of the WZO’s land settlement department, informed the Knesset’s economic committee that an additional 40,000 settlers (8,000 families) would move to Judea-Samaria in the coming months—thus raising the Jewish population in these areas to about 70,000—while by 1986 some 130,000 Jews would be living there. The long-range plan called for a Jewish population of 1.3 million in the West Bank within 30 years. Dekel and Drobell told the committee that the cost of settling one family in the areas was approximately IS4.5 million.

It was against the background of an increasingly intensive settlement process that some of the worst violence in the entire period of Israeli rule erupted in the areas. On February 15, after an official of the civil administration was beaten by Arab students as he was leaving Bir Zeit University following a meeting with its acting president, the military government again closed down the institution for a two-month period. The closure touched off three weeks of sporadic demonstrations and violent incidents, generated chiefly by students at the various colleges and universities in Judea-Samaria.

On March 9 Jordan announced that West Bank inhabitants who participated in “Israeli-sponsored civic organizations” would be liable to the death penalty for treason. The following day Defense Minister Sharon retorted that if Amman tried to carry out its threats against the village leagues—the main organization in question, which was being cultivated by the civil administration under Professor Milson (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983,
Israel would deal with Jordan in the same manner as it dealt with terrorists. On March 11 Sharon officially outlawed the National Guidance Committee, an informal group, made up of mayors and other public figures, that coordinated PLO-directed activities in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza Strip. One week later, the Israeli authorities dismissed El-Bireh mayor Ibrahim Tawil and disbanded the local municipal council, which had refused to deal with the civil administration, replacing it with an Israeli-appointed committee.

On March 20 Israeli troops shot and killed a 17-year-old youth during a violent confrontation in El-Bireh; six other demonstrators were wounded, and an Israeli soldier was struck on the head by a rock. The youth was the first of twelve local Palestinians who were to be killed by Israeli fire, some of it from civilian settlers, in the coming six weeks. In that period, nearly 200 Arabs were wounded. Two Israeli soldiers were killed and over 90 other Israelis were wounded in the violent clashes that continued into the early part of May.

On March 25 Nablus mayor Bassam al-Shaka and Ramallah mayor Karim Khalaf were dismissed by the Israeli authorities. Both mayors had been seriously injured when bombs exploded in their cars in 1980 (see AJYB, Vol. 82, 1982, p. 254; see also Terrorism, above). A document released by the IDF spokesman stated that the mayors had incited demonstrators, had been members of the National Guidance Committee, and had refused to deal with the civil administration. An Israeli civilian, Noam Tal, was appointed to run the Ramallah municipality, while IDF Major Nir Tsoref was named to head the Nablus town council.

The strife in the areas took on added intensity after April 11, when Allan Harry Goodman, aged 38, a recent immigrant from the United States who was doing his army service, went on a shooting rampage on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Two persons were killed and 12 wounded before Israeli troops were able to subdue the apparently crazed assailant. Although the incident was condemned by the government, the mayor of Jerusalem, and Israel’s two chief rabbis, Arab governments and the Soviet Union began whipping up anti-Israel hysteria. A draft resolution defining Jerusalem as “occupied Arab territory” and implicitly condemning Israel for the Temple Mount shooting was circulated at the UN security council. On April 15 the prime minister’s office issued a statement asserting that in April 1982 “the forces of black reaction perpetrated a blood libel against the Jewish people in its homeland, while the civilized, democratic world once again stood by and remained silent.”

In the event, the United States vetoed the security council resolution. The trial of Goodman, who after psychiatric examination was declared fit to stand trial, opened on September 8. In Jerusalem a week of school and
commercial strikes, demonstrations, and violent clashes followed the Temple Mount incident. Two persons were killed and nearly 200 wounded—local Arabs, Israelis, tourists, and policemen—in the violence. (On October 26, Yoel Lerner, aged 42, of the ultra-nationalist "Kach" movement led by Rabbi Meir Kahane, was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison for plotting to blow up the Dome of the Rock, the golden-domed Moslem shrine on the Temple Mount.)

The outbreak of the war in Lebanon and the rapid advance of the IDF during the initial stages of the fighting stunned and shocked the residents of the areas—many of whom were also fearful for the fate of relatives in Lebanon. Early in July, as violence again flared up in the wake of the Israeli siege of Beirut, four demonstrators were killed in clashes with the IDF troops, bringing the total for the year to 16; the 1982 toll eventually reached 20. On July 2 a resident of the Jewish settlement of Tekoah, near Bethlehem, was savagely murdered at nearby Herodion, the ancient fortress where he worked as a supervisor. The perpetrators of the deed, a gang of Bedouin, were quickly tracked down.

Strikes and demonstrations intensified once more following a call by the Voice of Palestine, still broadcasting from Beirut, to West Bank Palestinians to "open a second front against Israel" in the areas. On July 6 Israeli authorities dismissed Jenin mayor Ahmed Shauki and the local council for refusing to cooperate with the civil administration. Three days later Gaza mayor Rashad a-Shawa was ousted for engaging in political activity and for not ordering striking municipal employees back to work. (Another mayor, Wahid Hamdallah, of Anabta, had been dismissed on April 30 after being convicted by a military court of leaving his village in defiance of a confining order.) On July 8 Bir Zeit University was shut down for three months following a student demonstration against "the Israeli occupation." Applauding the closure, the organization of Jewish settlements in the areas issued a statement saying it was "inconceivable that the PLO should be destroyed militarily in Lebanon but allowed to flourish politically in Judea-Samaria." Israelis on the other side of the political spectrum termed the closure "another attempt by Israel to destroy the national culture of the Palestinian people."

Similar accusations were hurled at Israel later in the year in the wake of its insistence that foreign academics teaching in West Bank universities sign a pledge undertaking not to support the PLO. In October the president of an-Najah University in Nablus, Munser Salah, a Jordanian citizen, was deported from the West Bank for refusing to sign such a pledge. By mid-November Israeli authorities had barred 22 overseas academics from teaching in the area; all of them were expelled from the country. A group of several hundred Israeli academics signed a petition calling on the
government to drop the pledge requirement, as it "would turn the university staff into an instrument for achieving political objectives." On November 18 U.S. secretary of state Shultz urged Israeli university staff to protest the anti-PLO declaration. Terming it a "loyalty oath," Shultz said it posed problems with respect to "freedom of thought." Israeli officials pointed out in rejoinder that the United States itself, in common with most countries, required incoming foreigners to sign declarations regarding their political views. However, a few days later the Judea-Samaria civil administration removed the controversial clause from the work permits. Foreigners wishing to work in the territories were instead asked to sign a statement expressing their awareness that support for the PLO constituted an offense under Israeli law. Washington welcomed the change, although the (Arab) West Bank Council of Higher Education said the new wording was "unacceptably ambiguous" and remained "a political commitment that academics cannot sign." At year's end, the situation remained clouded.

The Beirut refugee camps massacre in September sparked off a new wave of violent protest demonstrations in Judea-Samaria (and among Israeli Arabs as well). The events in Beirut and the initial refusal of the government to appoint a judicial commission of inquiry to investigate them prompted Menachem Milson to tender his resignation as head of the civil administration on September 22. The cabinet's decision not to appoint a commission of inquiry, Milson claimed, had made it impossible for him to go on developing contacts with Palestinians in the areas who did not support the PLO. Some observers averred that the civil administration chief had seized on the Beirut tragedy to take a step he had long had in mind due to policy differences with Defense Minister Sharon. In December Colonel Shlomo Iliya, an intelligence officer, was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and appointed to replace Milson. Iliya, however, served in civilian clothes, rather than in uniform.

On June 18, 12 days after Israeli troops moved into southern Lebanon and effectively destroyed the PLO's infrastructure there, Defense Minister Sharon told the IDF radio station that in his view the Arabs of Judea-Samaria and Gaza would soon be ready to talk with Israel. Two months later, on August 21, as he observed from an IDF position in Beirut the start of the PLO's evacuation of the Lebanese capital, Sharon expressly called on "the Arabs of Eretz-Israel" to commence negotiations with Israel. "We have all been freed from the terrorism of the PLO from Beirut," the defense minister said. "Let us not miss this moment. Let us build the peace together."

Three months after Sharon made his remarks, a public rally was held in Hebron (November 12) organized by the civil administration and the village leagues in Judea-Samaria, now federated as the Palestinian Leagues.
impressive demonstration of support, some 2,000 persons from all over the West Bank turned up for the event, whose slogan was "Yes to peace." Mustafa Dudein, founder of the first village league and chairman of the new federation, declared: "We firmly reject terrorism, recognize the State of Israel as our neighbor, and demand mutual recognition between the Arab states and Israel." Dudein also urged Jordan's King Hussein to open talks with Israel. "The Jordanian nation and the Palestinian nation are one and their land is one," he asserted.

In December eight IDF soldiers went on trial for the alleged systematic mistreatment of Hebron Arabs earlier in the year. The trial was ordered following public charges (levelled seven months earlier) by a group of Peace Now members, all of them holding officer rank, who had just completed reserve duty in the territories. They said that Arabs were humiliated, demeaned, and sometimes physically beaten by Israeli soldiers, and that collective punishments were imposed by the IDF in which innocent persons suffered. They charged that a general atmosphere existed which legitimized such behavior by soldiers in the area. After two of the group met with the chief of staff to present a detailed report, a formal investigation was ordered.

On the Golan Heights, the practical consequences of the application there, in December 1981, of "Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration" (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, pp. 250–251) were soon felt. On February 14 the Druze on the Golan launched a general strike in protest against the detention of four of their leaders on suspicion of inciting a revolt against the state. A few days earlier, Golan Druze community leaders had sent a message to Prime Minister Begin in which they said: "The Druze residents are first of all Syrian Arabs. Their villages and their lands are part of Syrian soil. We do not intend to act against the security of the state, but we will resist if you force us to be Israeli citizens." As the strike intensified, a defense ministry official met with Druze representatives and urged them to call off their action and accept Israeli identity cards, in accordance with their status under the new law. The meeting was to no avail. On February 25 the IDF sealed off access to the Golan Heights—all telephone lines were disconnected as part of these measures—though the O.C. northern command, Major General Drori, said the 13,000 Druze inhabitants on the Golan would be provided with food and medicine. On March 11 the interior ministry announced that all Druze residents on the Golan aged 16 and up would be required to hold Israeli identity cards as of April 1.

By mid-March all three of the IDF's regional commands were busy quelling unrest of one sort or another in the territories held by Israel: in the east, Judea-Samaria seemed on the verge of civil revolt; to the south, Jewish opponents of the Sinai withdrawal were putting up increasing resistance to the IDF; while in the north, tension ran high on the border with Lebanon
and the strike of the Golan Druze dragged on. In the meantime, free access to the Golan (and to Yamit) was denied to local and foreign journalists. The IDF was ready to permit only conducted tours of the region. The Israel Union of Journalists appealed to Prime Minister Begin to lift the restrictions. It was pointed out in the Israeli press that the restrictions on journalists made a mockery of recent condemnations of the foreign press by government press officer director Ze'ev Chafets. Chafets had accused reporters in Lebanon of bowing to PLO intimidation and slanting their reports.

According to the O.C. northern command, 4,399 Golan Druze had received Israeli identity cards by the beginning of April, including all the local secular and religious leaders. Although the military closure of the Golan was lifted, the general strike persisted in protest against the Israel government, which “compelled us to accept identity cards forcibly,” as the pro-Syrian leaders on the Golan put it. Israeli Druze held a number of public meetings in solidarity with their coreligionists. Reports filtering out of the Golan said that dozens of persons who accepted the new cards had then torn them up.

On April 15 the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) held a press conference at which the group’s chairman, former deputy president of the supreme court Haim Cohn accused the IDF of having engaged in actions on the Golan which were “clearly illegal,” including physical beatings of residents and the imposition of collective punishments. “This is not Israeli law or administration,” Cohn asserted, “this is the law of barbarians.” What the IDF had done amounted to “a thwarting of the Knesset’s will in extending Israeli law to the Golan.” The ACRI demanded the establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate its charges, which were supported by signed affidavits of complainants. Denying the charges, the IDF spokesman added that it was not the army that took the decision to impose emergency regulations on the Golan. Moreover, the IDF had been meticulous in executing the regulations “wholly in accordance with the law, with patience, tolerance, and considerable respect.” Interior Minister Yosef Burg said that “no violence was employed to force people to accept identity cards.”

Early in May Major General Drori was appointed coordinator of government operations on the Golan. Interior Minister Burg explained that this did not constitute a return of military government on the Heights. Drori, he said, would serve as chairman of a coordinating committee, and the civilian authorities would retain all their powers. On May 8, six Golan Druze were injured in a clash with police over the holding of Israeli identity cards. Three days later ten Druze residents of the Golan were fined by a local civil court for being found without Israeli identity cards. Attorney General Yitzhak Zamir circulated a memorandum among ministerial
directors-general noting that the IDF had exceeded its authority by imposing travel restrictions on Golan Druze who did not carry identity cards, since the maximum penalty for such an offense was a fine of IS500.

The strike itself ceased to make an impact once Operation Peace for Galilee was launched and large numbers of Israeli troops were posted on the Golan to deter a possible Syrian attack. However, it was not until July 20, over five months after the strike was launched, that the Golan Druze called it off. Many of them found that their jobs had been taken by others. Tension on the Golan persisted between pro-Syrian radicals and more moderate groups, and the long-term effects of the strike on the previously cordial relations between the Golan Druze and the Israeli authorities had yet to be assessed. Matters were compounded in the wake of the IDF intervention in fighting between Druze and Christians in Lebanon, leading to renewed charges of anti-Druze bias by the Druze of Israel.

Israel and the Middle East

Israel's actions in 1982, particularly in Lebanon where the aims of Operation Peace for Galilee were both explicit and implicit, continued to reflect the Likud government's strongly activist approach to the problems of the Middle East. A number of pronouncements by ranking Israelis during the year helped to clarify further the government's security stance.

In January, after Saudi Arabia officially denied remarks by its foreign minister, quoted in the New York Times, as saying that the Fahd plan, put forward in August 1981 (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 252), implied recognition of Israel, the foreign ministry spokesman in Jerusalem pointed out that this was not the first time the Saudis had played such a double game. "It just goes to show they don't mean it seriously when they seem to hint at peace and recognition," he said. Another apparent initiative along the same lines, this time by Syria in February, was also dismissed by Israel. In an interview published in the Lebanese weekly Monday Morning, Syrian information minister Ahmed Iskander Ahmed had called for a "just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East," citing several "fundamental elements" which could bring about such a peace. The Israel foreign ministry spokesman dubbed the Syrian plan a "propaganda exercise," pointing out that Iskander had nowhere mentioned peaceful relations with Israel, negotiations with Israel, or recognition of Israel.

Persistent reports in the foreign press about Israeli aid to Iran in its war with Iraq were confirmed by Defense Minister Sharon. Sharon said that Iraq had always been implacably hostile to Israel. Moreover, he noted, Israel had "to leave a small window open" in Iran, "a tiny small bridge to that country, because one day the war will be over and somebody will come back to Teheran and have influence in Teheran." Sharon's insistence that
the U.S. had been informed in advance about the Israeli arms sales to Iran—which included tires and spare parts for U.S.-made Phantom jets and "maybe some munitions"—was denied by the state department. Sharon said he had decided to tell the public about the "largely symbolic" arms sales (a state department spokesman said they were worth about $27 million) to counter deliberately misleading reports that Israel was a major arms supplier to Iran.

During his visit to the United States, Sharon several times noted three main dangers to Israel and to peace in the region. These were: Palestinian terrorism, which could generate a broad military confrontation in the Middle East; sales of sophisticated weaponry to Arab states, particularly missiles of various kinds to Jordan (speaking in Tel Aviv on May 31, Sharon said that a combination of long-range artillery and anti-aircraft missiles in Jordan was "a sure recipe for war"; see also Foreign Relations, below); and an emerging anti-Iranian "coalition" of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, with possible U.S. support.

One major strategic issue that continued to be of concern to Israel was the development or acquisition of nuclear arms by Arab states. Replying in March to an urgent motion about the "renewal of French help to Iraq to construct a nuclear reactor"—Israel having destroyed Baghdad's reactor in June 1981 (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 251)—Deputy Foreign Minister Ben-Meir told the Knesset that Israel "will not tolerate the presence of nuclear weapons of any kind from any source whatsoever" in an Arab state "that considers itself in confrontation with and in a state of war with Israel." Ben-Meir added that Israel was keeping a close watch on the situation and had more than once expressed to France its "categorical and unreserved" opposition to Paris's resumption of nuclear aid to Iraq. Dismissing international supervision or guarantees as inadequate, the deputy foreign minister said that as far as Israel was concerned, "the only guarantee is that no atomic reactor, no atomic installations or material that is convertible into nuclear military capability shall be in the possession of Iraq or any other Arab state or confrontation state."

In September an Arab summit meeting in Fez, Morocco, convening after the PLO's Beirut debacle, put forward another plan for a Middle East peace, based on the Fahd plan but reintroducing the PLO as the Palestinians' "sole legitimate representative." The Fez plan also called for a UN security council guarantee of "peace among all states of the region, including the independent Palestinian state" to be established with East Jerusalem as its capital. Other points in the plan were: the dismantling of all Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza; Israel's withdrawal from all territories it seized in 1967, including East Jerusalem; and freedom of worship for all faiths at holy shrines. On September 10, the day after the Fez plan was
published, Foreign Minister Shamir termed it “a renewed declaration of war on Israel,” adding that the Fez resolutions amounted to “one more plan for Israel’s liquidation in one stage or two.” Shamir declared that “all of Eretz-Israel from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean will remain in our hands.” At its meeting on September 13, the cabinet asserted that the “anti-Israel resolutions of hostility passed at Fez are anchored in previous Arab summit resolutions whose purpose in practice was to destroy Israel.”

A few days later, Israeli officials reacted to an interview with Jordan's King Hussein on British television in which he stated that it had been “absurd not to recognize Israel for 34 years.” The monarch said that he personally had recognized Israel's right to exist in having helped draft security council resolution 242 in 1967. While it was too early to speak of diplomatic or normal relations with Israel, Hussein argued, “obviously, at the end of the line, when we establish peace, one visualizes normal relations.” Israeli officials said that Hussein's remarks amounted to “an optical observation that Israel exists” but indicated no readiness to negotiate. Hussein's “vague, hypothetical” talk about some future peace was “absurd,” the officials stated, noting that if the Jordanian leader were sincere he could enter into concrete negotiations at any time and “not merely imply that he is ready to retake the West Bank and Gaza, without negotiations, under the new U.S. peace proposals.” (This referred to the Reagan plan, launched on September 1: see Foreign Relations, below.)

Early in November reports emanating from Tunis spoke of the approval by the Fatah organization (the largest group within the PLO and the one personally controlled by Yasir Arafat) of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. These reports followed the first meeting between Arafat and King Hussein since the PLO had been expelled from Jordan in 1970. Israel dubbed the reports “a worthless gimmick.” Israeli officials pointed out that the Fatah organization advocated the “phased doctrine” in which a West Bank-Gaza state would constitute the first phase in the eventual dismantling of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state on its ruins. The Fatah signals were directed not at Israel but at American public opinion, the officials added.

Speaking in the Knesset on November 10, Foreign Minister Shamir said that recent Arab peace feelers were no more than psychological warfare, designed to mislead Israel and its friends. The chief purpose of the flurry of activity in the Arab world, following the PLO's evacuation of Beirut, was to get Israel out of Judea-Samaria as fast as possible and establish a Palestinian state there under PLO rule. As for the mooted Palestinian-Jordanian federation, Shamir said it would be no more than the first step in the creation of an independent Palestinian state. “Is there anyone familiar with the Arab world who does not know the meaning of a federation, of any
federation in the Arab world?,” Shamir asked the Knesset. “How many times have they had federations which turned out not to be worth the paper they were written on?”

**Foreign Relations**

On January 11 U.S. ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis conveyed to Prime Minister Begin a message from President Reagan in which he reaffirmed the American commitment to Israel’s security and the U.S. determination to bolster the peace process in accordance with Camp David. This message was interpreted in Israel as signalling the end of a month-long period of tense and uncertain relations between the two countries following Israel’s passage of the Golan law (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, pp. 243–244 and 250–251). Indeed, nine days later the U.S. vetoed a Jordan-sponsored security council resolution calling for sanctions against Israel for its annexation of the Golan Heights.

Following the rapprochement, the main focus of Israel-U.S. relations during the first half of the year was on the United States’ determination to effect an arms sale with Jordan which Israel viewed as menacing to its security. In mid-February Defense Minister Sharon told the cabinet that Israel must act “immediately and with resolution” to block a proposed U.S. sale of mobile Hawk air defense missile systems to Jordan. Believing that it had a good friend in Secretary of State Haig, Israeli officials, echoing Prime Minister Begin’s *ad hominem* jabs at Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in the 1981 election campaign (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 235), vented their wrath on the secretary of defense as the chief proponent of the U.S.-Jordanian arms deal. Weinberger seemed to confirm Israel’s worst suspicions during a visit to Amman in February, when he promised King Hussein that the U.S. would sell him both F-16 jets and mobile Hawk ground-to-air missiles. This was followed (February 13) by the remarks of a “senior official” aboard Weinberger’s plane—his Middle East junket pointedly failed to include Israel—that the U.S. was now “getting tough with Israel,” had embarked upon a “redirection of American policy” in the region, and would no longer “be hostage to Israel.”

On February 16, the day after the Knesset adopted, by a vote of 88 to three (six abstentions), a resolution calling on President Reagan “to refrain from gravelly imperilling Israel’s security” by going ahead with the proposed arms deal with Jordan, and just hours before Israel’s new ambassador to the United States, Moshe Arens, presented his credentials, President Reagan, in a letter to Prime Minister Begin, pledged to maintain Israel’s “qualitative technological edge” in the arms sphere. Reagan said that U.S. military assistance policies for the Middle East had been misinterpreted by the press, and added: “There has been no change regarding our military
supply relationship with Jordan." The letter went on to term Israel "America's friend and ally." But the president also struck a note less pleasing to Israel when he stated that "it is in the interest of both our countries for the United States to enhance its influence with other states in the region" as well.

Commenting on these developments, the Jerusalem Post noted (February 18) that in recent years neither Israel nor the United States had seemed interested in working out a comprehensive coordination of policy. The result of this "void," the paper said, would necessarily be "periodic strains" in the relations between the two countries. Those relations could be moderated either by "American domestic political considerations" or by "fears that Israel might be provoked into rash actions." Given the tension surrounding the final Sinai evacuation, the turmoil in Judea-Samaria, and the escalation along the Lebanese border, it seemed to be the latter consideration that underlay U.S. policy toward Israel in the first half of 1982.

At the end of May Defense Minister Sharon paid a ten-day visit to the United States, meeting with secretaries Haig and Weinberger and with Jewish groups. Briefing the cabinet on his trip at a special session (June 1), Sharon said his talks in Washington had been held in a "cordial" atmosphere. Following the outbreak of the war in Lebanon just one week after Sharon's return, some reports alleged that the U.S., and in particular Secretary of State Haig, had given Israel the go-ahead for an incursion into Lebanon—reports that were vigorously denied by both sides. Whatever the accuracy of those reports, the initial U.S. reaction to Operation Peace for Galilee was perhaps best reflected in its veto on June 8, two days after the fighting began, of a security council resolution condemning Israel for its actions in Lebanon.

Prime Minister Begin visited the United States from June 15-23, addressing the UN general assembly, speaking to Jewish groups, and meeting with President Reagan and other senior administration officials. At this stage in the war, with Israel's goals in Lebanon seemingly achieved (see Operation Peace for Galilee, above, on this point and for further details of Israel-U.S. interaction during the war), both President Reagan and Prime Minister Begin on June 21 sounded optimistic notes regarding the apparently imminent removal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. The following day, however, the Israeli leader had a decidedly less pleasant experience when he was subjected to rigorous questioning and criticism by members of the Senate foreign relations committee. The senators were especially angry at reports that Israel was using U.S. weapons, notably cluster bombs, against civilian targets in Lebanon. Senator Larry Pressler (R., S.D.) termed the meeting "confrontational." He predicted—correctly—that the administration would suspend a planned sale of 75 more F-16 jet fighters to Israel.
(President Reagan was later to block the sale of additional cluster bombs to Israel pending a study of whether the IDF had used them in contravention of U.S. conditions of sale.) Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D., N.Y.) said it had been "the most difficult meeting with a head of government" in his experience. Prime Minister Begin, however, described the session as "lively," denied there had been a "confrontation," and added "I enjoyed the discussion very much."

Two days after the prime minister's return to Israel, the person he had called "Israel's great and good friend" in the U.S. administration, Alexander Haig, resigned as secretary of state. While Israeli officials were naturally loath to express an opinion in public on this issue, privately they voiced concern about future U.S. policy, particularly regarding the continuation of the war in Lebanon, and the more so when Haig's replacement turned out to be George Shultz, a former senior official, like Caspar Weinberger, in the Bechtel Corporation.

Yet whatever effect the switch in the state department might have, much damage to Israel had already been done in the United States due to the course of the fighting in Lebanon. The senators' clash with Begin was one manifestation of an intensifying anti-Israel attitude not only in the administration but also among the public at large, not excluding the Jewish community. This was brought about by the images of Lebanon broadcast daily into the homes of Americans by the networks—sometimes showing damage actually caused years earlier in the Lebanese civil war, though without saying so—the vastly exaggerated refugee figures bandied about in the operation's incipient stages, the inevitable civilian suffering produced by the prolonged Israeli siege of Beirut, and the PLO's ability to project itself as engaged in a heroic Leningrad-type last ditch stand.

As the PLO evacuation of Beirut got underway nine days after the heavy Israeli bombardment and the Reagan phone calls, the U.S. president praised "the statesmanship and the courage of President Sarkis and his colleagues in the Lebanese government," along with "the magnificent work of ambassador Habib." Israel was not mentioned in Reagan's nationally-televised remarks. (In a letter to President Reagan on September 5, following publication of the new U.S. ideas on the autonomy talks—see below—Prime Minister Begin said he had been "struck by the omission" of Israel's bravery and sacrifices in the president's remarks. Begin added: "The impression one could have gotten was that Mr. Philip Habib, with the help of expeditionary units, achieved the results.") Secretary of State Shultz sought to sum up the mood and the situation as the Beirut evacuation began when he repeated the traditional U.S. pledge of "support for the security of Israel" while adding: "The United States opposed the entry of Israeli troops into Lebanon. There were some occasions when it seemed to us that Israeli military
actions were excessive, and we said so. So those times presented great strains. But underneath it all, the relationship between the United States and Israel remains a strong one."

That strong relationship was very soon subjected to new stresses and strains. On September 1, the day the PLO completed its evacuation of Beirut, President Reagan, in an address to the American people, outlined "the principles upon which American policy toward the Middle East conflict will be based." Calling for a "new realism on the part of all the peoples" of the region, and basing himself on the Camp David accords which, as he emphasized, refer to "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements," President Reagan explained how his administration read the accords in concrete terms. During the five-year transition period in which "the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs," the U.S. "will not support the use of any land for the purpose of settlements." The president called on Israel to adopt an immediate "settlement freeze" which, "more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in the autonomy talks." Looking beyond the transition period, Reagan rejected both an independent Palestinian state and Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza. Instead, "it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just, and lasting peace." As for Jerusalem, it "must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations." The president stressed several times that at no stage must Israel's security be jeopardized.

Unanimously rejecting the proposals 24 hours after they were made public, the Israeli cabinet issued a lengthy document which, like the Reagan ideas, was also based on a reading of the Camp David accords—but this time to refute the U.S. ideas. Israel would continue to establish settlements "in accordance with our natural right," the document declared, adding that nothing in the Camp David agreement ruled out the application of Israeli sovereignty in the territories following the transitional period. Moreover, under the American plan "there would be nothing to prevent King Hussein from inviting his new-found friend Yasir Arafat to come to Nablus and hand over rule to him," thus bringing into being the very Palestinian state opposed by both the United States and Israel. Reiterating that Israel was ready to recommence the autonomy talks immediately, the cabinet statement added: "Since the positions of the government of the United States seriously deviate from the Camp David agreement, contradict it, and could create a serious danger to Israel, its security and its future, the government of Israel has resolved that on the basis of these positions it will not enter into any negotiations with any party."
On the other side of the political spectrum, the new U.S. principles were welcomed by the Labor party, whose chairman, Shimon Peres, termed them "the most convenient for Israel that any American president has ever proposed." Taking the proposals as an endorsement of Labor's own "Jordanian option"—Peres was to tell Israel Radio two days later that all of King Hussein's evasive statements were for "local consumption and cosmetic purposes" and that Jordan had in fact agreed to join the peace process—the party's political bureau passed a resolution accepting the U.S. views in principle, and emphasizing their positive aspects from the Israeli viewpoint: opposition to a Palestinian state and to a return to the 1967 borders; Jordan's inclusion in the peace process; an association between Jordan and the West Bank/Gaza without those areas being cut off from Israel; and the continued existence of the already established settlements.

In a meeting with U.S. secretary of defense Weinberger, who was in Israel September 2-3 as part of a brief Middle East visit, Prime Minister Begin reiterated that Israel did not consider President Reagan's ideas to be a basis for renewing the autonomy talks. On September 5 Prime Minister Begin wrote a letter to President Reagan in which he enclosed the cabinet's September 2 resolution and expressed his "protest at the omission to consult us prior to forwarding your proposals to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the former an outspoken opponent of the Camp David accords, the latter a complete stranger to and an adversary of these accords." On September 8 Begin told the Knesset: "The repartition of Eretz-Israel—that is the U.S. plan in a nutshell." However, he declared, "no one will determine the borders of Eretz-Israel for us," and "if anyone wants to take Judea and Samaria from us, we will say: Judea and Samaria belong to the Jewish people until the end of time." Indeed, as far as Begin was concerned, the Reagan plan "no longer exists." Nonetheless, the prime minister added, no change had occurred in Israel-U.S. friendship; that was not the issue. The Knesset approved the government statement on the Reagan proposals by a vote of 50 to 36, and defeated an Alignment motion urging acceptance of the proposals' positive aspects and negotiations on the others.

On September 8 the joint Israel government-World Zionist Organization committee, chaired by Agriculture Minister Simcha Ehrlich, decided to establish eight new settlements in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Secretary of State Shultz termed the decision "a very unwelcome development."

A month later (October 10) Finance Minister Yoram Aridor spoke of "the friendship and support of the United States, for which we are most thankful." The occasion was Aridor's presentation of Israel's annual request for financial aid to Ambassador Samuel Lewis, for conveyance to Washington. The amount being sought in the financial year commencing in October 1983 was $3.1 billion. Lewis said the U.S. would attach no
strings to its aid to Israel. He was evidently referring to reports emanating from Washington, in the wake of Israel’s rejection of the Reagan proposals and its continued settlement activity in the territories, that political differences between the two countries would find their reflection in the administration’s attitude vis-a-vis Jerusalem’s aid requests. The Lewis statement was echoed by Secretary of State Shultz who, while again chastising Israel’s settlement policy as “a major stumbling block” in the peace process, asserted that continued U.S. aid to Israel was not linked to that policy.

Nonetheless, the Reagan administration did intervene with the Senate appropriations committee when it voted to increase the aid level to Israel beyond the administration’s request. This prompted Foreign Minister Shamir to tell the cabinet (December 5) that the seriousness of the administration’s move “cannot be overstressed.” Several days later, following Congressional rejection of White House pressures and the passage of an aid bill giving Israel somewhat more money and considerably better terms than the administration had requested, Shamir noted that Israel had taken special umbrage at the reasons cited by the administration to back up its opposition to more aid for Israel—namely, that such aid would constitute “a prize for inflexibility” and would be “detrimental to the prospects of Middle East peace.”

The pattern of Israel’s relations with Europe in 1982 seemed to be largely determined by the return of Sinai and then by the war in Lebanon. In the first half of the year no fewer than one president and four foreign ministers of European nations, along with the foreign minister of another Western ally, Australia, visited Israel. The final months of the year saw just one visit at this level.

In March President François Mitterrand became the first French head of state ever to visit Israel. Following his crowded 48-hour visit (March 3–5), Foreign Minister Shamir told Israel Television that the visit heralded “the opening of a new era of friendship and understanding after 15 years of coolness.” Mitterrand, who was accompanied by his wife and a large delegation, met with President Navon, Prime Minister Begin, Foreign Minister Shamir, and opposition leader Shimon Peres, a fellow member of the Socialist International. The French leader also found time to address the Knesset, receive an honorary doctorate from the Hebrew University, visit the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem, and travel north to visit the Museum of the Holocaust and the Revolt in Kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot. France’s ministers of foreign affairs, culture, and finance met with their Israeli counterparts and sought to find means to enhance bilateral cooperation between the two countries. In particular, foreign ministers Shamir and Claude Cheysson laid the groundwork for the revival of the long dormant France-Israel Joint Commission. (Shamir visited Paris June 14–17, in the midst of the Lebanon war, and urged
France to participate in a possible multinational force to help keep the peace in Lebanon. France did in fact dispatch a contingent when the force was created in August.)

It was the Palestinian issue that dominated the visits of the European statesmen. President Mitterrand asserted that “in the final analysis” the Palestinians must have a state of their own. Australian foreign minister Anthony Street, who visited Israel March 26–30, termed the Palestinian question “the central, crucial issue” of the Middle East, and told Prime Minister Begin that his country favored “a Palestinian homeland alongside Israel.” British foreign secretary Lord Carrington, in Israel for 24 hours (March 31–April 1), asserted that the European Economic Community’s (EEC) Venice declaration (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 244, ff.), calling for the PLO’s “association” in the peace process, “continues to be valid.” However, Belgian foreign minister Leo Tindemans, visiting (May 29–June 1) in his capacity as president of the EEC Council of Ministers, averred that the Venice declaration was by now outdated and went on to praise the autonomy idea. In the meantime, Italian foreign minister Emilio Colombo (May 12–14) told Foreign Minister Shamir that his government would consider Israel’s request for support against the Arab boycott. West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (in Israel for 36 hours, June 2–3) told a festive dinner tendered in his honor by Foreign Minister Shamir: “Israel’s comprehensive security presupposes comprehensive peace, in which all neighboring peoples are involved. The Palestinian people must not be omitted. Equality, self-determination, and security are as indivisible as is peace in the Middle East.” Danish foreign minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, visiting Israel November 27–28—after the PLO’s evacuation from Beirut—as president of the EEC’s Council of Ministers, expressed the apprehension that Israel’s West Bank policies could lead to the creation of a virtual “apartheid state.” Jensen told reporters he had been instructed by the other EEC foreign ministers to make clear to the Israel government “our concern over what we see as lack of flexibility.”

Israel’s relations with most Latin American countries remained stable. In March Minister of Industry and Trade Gideon Patt led a delegation of 12 businessmen on a visit to Venezuela and Chile, resulting in the signing of agreements with the former country worth $50 million in agriculture, electronics, and other spheres, and in a trade and cooperation agreement with the latter nation. Foreign Minister Shamir visited Costa Rica in October and signed a number of agreements, including one by which Israel was to deposit $7 million of its foreign currency reserves in Costa Rica banks. Defense Minister Sharon denied that he had concluded an arms agreement with Honduras during his visit there at the beginning of November. However, he told reporters that an Israeli delegation would go to Honduras in December to finalize details of a defense cooperation pact with that country.
While the hoped-for major breakthrough in relations with Africa did not materialize, Defense Minister Sharon's 1981 visit to a number of countries on that continent (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, pp. 244–245) and behind-the-scenes work by the foreign ministry bore fruit in one instance. On May 14 Zaire formally announced its intention to resume diplomatic ties with Israel, which had been severed on the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. On May 21 the Israeli flag was raised over Israel's embassy in Kinshasa. On June 25 Israel's ambassador to Zaire, veteran diplomat Michael Michael, presented his credentials in Kinshasa, with Zaire's envoy to Israel, Mbuze N'some Lobwanabi, reciprocating in Israel on July 28. Although a scheduled visit to Zaire by Prime Minister Begin was postponed at the request of President Sese Seko, Foreign Minister Shamir, accompanied by Major General Avraham Tamir, the strategic planning adviser in the defense ministry, as well as a large delegation of government officials and directors of major Israeli firms, visited Kinshasa from November 28–30. Upon his return to Israel, Shamir told reporters the visit had been very satisfactory, adding that Prime Minister Begin would soon be visiting Kinshasa. Shamir and his Zaire counterpart, Kamanda Wa Kamanda, signed agricultural and economic cooperation agreements, and confirmed a military protocol, signed in December 1981, that was already being implemented.

Israel's relations with the Vatican, always uneasy at best, seemed to take a turn for the better in January when Foreign Minister Shamir met at the Vatican with Pope John Paul II—the first such extended encounter since the late Moshe Dayan, then foreign minister, met with Pope Paul VI in 1978. Pope John Paul II urged Israel to make a firm commitment toward a "just and dutiful" solution to the Palestinian problem. Shamir expressed the hope that the Vatican would extend diplomatic recognition to Israel. Foreign ministry spokesman Avi Pazner said the meeting had been very cordial. However, when on September 15 the Pope received PLO chief Yasir Arafat, expelled from Beirut two weeks earlier, in audience, the foreign ministry expressed "shock" and "profound disappointment" at the meeting. "It shall now be recorded in the national memory of the State of Israel and of the Jewish People," the foreign ministry statement continued, "that the spiritual leader of millions of believers around the world did not recoil from meeting with the head of an organization that has written into its constitution as a central aim the annihilation of the Jewish state." When Israeli officials accused the Catholic Church of having remained silent during the Holocaust, the Vatican issued a sharply worded statement that "such an outrage to the truth cannot go unanswered. The statement of the Israeli government contains words that are incredible." It "should be well known to the many Jews who were saved who now live in Israel" and elsewhere that Catholics had saved thousands of Jews in World War II, the Vatican asserted.
Political Affairs

Perhaps the most significant political development in 1982 was one that did not take place—a new general election. The closest the nation came to a second election campaign within two years was on March 23, when in the aftermath of a tie vote (58 to 58) that day in the Knesset on a motion of no-confidence, the cabinet met in emergency session and persuaded Prime Minister Begin—who had earlier said he would resign in the event of a deadlocked vote—to remain in office. About three weeks later Labor party chairman Peres for the first time advocated an early election. The issue lay dormant for some months, but was raised again by Prime Minister Begin in the September 8 Knesset debate on the Reagan proposals. In that debate the prime minister challenged the Labor Alignment to prove its contention that the majority of the nation supported its platform of territorial compromise in Judea-Samaria. However, these and one or two other similar episodes came to naught largely because of the reluctance of the small coalition partners—Tami and the National Religious party—to go to the polls for fear of being decimated, and because of hesitations within the Labor Alignment.

Some Alignment figures thought the Likud should be left to stew in its own juice in Lebanon; others were waiting for President Yitzhak Navon to announce his plans. On September 15 Navon told Israel Television that he would announce in early 1983 whether he intended to seek a second five-year term as president (his first term would expire in May 1983). A ranking Labor party member and a highly popular figure among most strata of the nation, Navon was thought by growing numbers within Labor to be the party's main hope for regaining power. Others believed that his popularity, while genuine, was to a great extent a function of his holding the presidency, where he stood above the fray, as it were, but that in the rough-and-tumble of Israeli politics he would be as vulnerable as anyone else. At all events, many leading Labor party politicians were loath to set in motion an election process until Navon announced his decision.

The Alignment received a boost in mid-May when two Likud MK's, Amnon Linn and Yitzhak Peretz, defected to the Labor party the day before a crucial no-confidence vote on the economy. In the event, the government survived the May 19 vote, 58 to 57. Following the switch of the two MK's, the coalition numbered 59 members, or two fewer than a majority in the 120-seat House. The figures were in many ways misleading, however, since in key votes the Likud-led coalition could count on support from individuals or blocs supporting its foreign and defense policies. The Likud soon regained the two seats it had lost when, in the wake of the formal dissolution on June 16 of the Telem party, formed in 1981 by the late Moshe Dayan (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 232), its two Knesset members, Yigael Hurvitz and Mordechai Ben-Porat, joined the coalition. Ben-Porat was on July 4
co-opted into the cabinet as a minister without portfolio and received formal Knesset approval the following day. Three weeks later (July 25) the number of coalition members was increased to 64 when the three members of the Tehiya party, who had been in the vanguard of the resistance to the evacuation of Sinai (see The Withdrawal from Sinai, above) but now felt that the government needed support in Lebanon and for its policy in the territories, joined the coalition. On July 26 the Knesset approved the co-option into the cabinet of Tehiya leader Professor Yuval Ne’eman as Israel’s first minister of science and technology.

The Beirut refugee camps massacre in September had its repercussions in the coalition as well when Energy Minister Berman, of the Liberal party, resigned when the government failed to establish a judicial commission of inquiry into the affair immediately. Berman’s resignation came during a Knesset debate on September 22 (see also Operation Peace for Galilee, above), though for technical reasons it did not enter into effect until September 30. Berman’s Liberal party Knesset colleague Dror Zeigerman joined him in voting against the government on September 22 and on one or two other occasions, though both remained in the coalition. Liberal party MK and Minister Without Portfolio Yitzhak Modai, a former energy minister, was once again named to that post by the cabinet (October 17) and approved by the Knesset two days later.

Following these shifts, the coalition numbered 64 MK’s, consisting of the Likud (48), NRP (6), Agudat Yisrael—which supported the coalition though not as a formal member—(4), Tehiya (3), and Tami (3). The opposition’s 56 MK’s were made up of the Alignment (50), the DFPE (4), and Shinui (2). It was perhaps not coincidental that, with the Alignment’s emergence as the largest single parliamentary force, and with the government battered by the political ramifications of the Beirut massacre and the unresolved war, Labor party chairman Peres should try to hasten, if not a new election, then a process whereby through a shift of allegiances within the present Knesset makeup, the Labor Alignment would gain power.

Early in October, Peres told the Paris daily France-Soir that he might be able to form a new coalition without elections due to the disintegration of the coalition because of events in Lebanon. Peres was said to be counting on the defection of several disgruntled Liberal party MK’s (including Bergman and Zeigerman), the support of Tami and the NRP, and the return to active politics of former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, who would be offered the defense portfolio in a Peres-led government. However, Tami and the NRP denied any part in such moves (although NRP leader Yosef Burg did confirm on October 10 that he had been approached by certain persons who sounded him out on his possible leadership of a government of national unity), while the rumors concerning Weizman led to the resurfacing of the
internal Labor party feud between Peres and MK Yitzhak Rabin—who felt himself personally aggrieved over the reports that Peres had offered Weizman the coveted defense post.

Weizman's name came up again in December in a similar connection, when he reportedly told the president of Costa Rica that he would form his own center party and head its list if elections were held in 1983. Weizman himself, a highly popular figure on the Israeli political scene, told reporters that he had taken no decisions and was “still weighing the options.”

In July the Knesset voted to postpone the municipal elections, scheduled for November 1982, until October 25, 1983. The bill for postponement was presented jointly by the Likud, the Alignment, and the National Religious party.

Economic Developments

With the war in Lebanon not yet over as the year ended, its ultimate cost to the Israeli economy could not yet be calculated. However, Israelis were already feeling the war's economic effects in 1982, as the government introduced a series of measures designed to increase its revenues, both to help offset the costs involved in the direct use and amortization of weaponry and ammunition, as well as the cost of maintaining large numbers of troops in Lebanon for an extended period. The indirect costs to the Israeli economy of increased reserve duty (most reservists did double or even triple their usual 30–40 day annual average) could not even begin to be calculated. The direct cost of the war itself was estimated to be well over $1 billion by the end of the year.

On June 13, one week after the fighting began, Finance Minister Yoram Aridor announced an increase in value added tax from 12 per cent to 15 per cent, and the imposition of a two per cent levy on all stock exchange sales transactions, in effect as of June 15. About six weeks later the government, the employers, and the Histadrut (Israel's General Federation of Labor) reached an agreement whereby salaried workers would be deducted at source for a compulsory war loan of between two per cent and five per cent of their gross salary (depending on their income), from July 1982 until April 1983. Self-employed persons and companies had to purchase war loan bonds in ten monthly installments based on their taxable income in 1980. At the end of August the cabinet executed the other main plank in the tripartite economic agreement by slashing civilian expenditure by about IS5 billion, largely in the sphere of subsidies. The prices of the subsidized basic commodities were indeed upped regularly throughout the year, particularly in mid-June, by 19 per cent, and early in August, by a further 25 per cent.

None of these measures could reduce Israel's triple-digit inflation rate, one of the banes of the economy in recent years. In September the treasury
introduced a new economic program aimed at cutting the inflation rate to
85 per cent per annum. The new plan was based, *inter alia*, on a slowdown
in the devaluation rate of the shekel, small regular increases in the prices
of subsidized commodities (rather than large, sporadic increases), a reduc-
tion of several purchase taxes, and a partial monthly cost-of-living incre-
ment without an accompanying adjustment of tax brackets, thus eroding net
salaries. Whatever the long-term effects of the plan might turn out to be,
its immediate influence was imperceptible: the inflation rate in 1982 was
131.5 per cent, just 1.4 per cent lower than the 1980 record rate, and fully
30 per cent higher than the 1981 figure.

The devaluation of the shekel against the U.S. dollar failed to match the
inflation rate—apparently a direct result of the new economic policy. The
shekel was devalued by only 115.65 per cent against the dollar, and by no
more than 100.8 per cent against a basket of other major currencies. The
devaluation slowdown was evidently one of the contributing factors to the
country's trade deficit of nearly $3 billion, an 18 per cent increase over 1981.
Exports fell by about seven per cent, while net commodity imports regis-
tered an increase of over one per cent. However, the import of consumer
goods rose by ten per cent (including a 39 per cent increase in the import
of new cars), and private consumption was up by 7.5 per cent. The GNP
registered zero growth, industrial production was only very slightly better,
while the industrial output per worker actually declined by 1.4 per cent.
Unemployment remained steady at about five per cent, but there was an
increase of four per cent (to nearly 80,000), particularly in the latter part
of the year, in the number of persons from the administered areas working
in Israel—reflecting the fact that in December a record 3,200 mainly young
and unskilled Israelis refused jobs offered them by the Government Em-
ployment Service—double the 1980 figure. Gross wages of salaried workers
in the public services fell by 4.8 per cent, while the decline for all salaried
workers was nearly one per cent—this following a ten per cent increase in
their wages in the previous year.

It was the workers in the public services who were involved in one of the
major labor disputes of 1982. After negotiations between the Histadrut and
the coordinating bureau of economic organizations over the size of the
cost-of-living increment broke down at the end of March, an interim agree-
ment was signed covering the immediate period following the expiration of
the old agreement on March 31. Since the interim agreement was tan-
tamount to an erosion of wages, work stoppages were declared in various
sectors of the civil service in May. By mid-November, after talks—dis-
rupted by the war—had dragged on without result, the civil servants union
and others in the public sector began declaring labor disputes. After last-
minute efforts to avert a strike failed, entire sectors of the Israeli economy
were paralyzed for two days (December 7–8) when 400,000 civil servants and other public sector workers walked off their jobs. It was only at the end of the year, following additional large-scale strike action by local authority employees, teachers, some civil servants, and others, that a new wage agreement was finally concluded.

The situation in El Al, Israel's troubled national airline (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 258) reached what was perhaps the inevitable outcome when it was shut down completely in September following months of labor friction. The events leading to the company's closure began in March, when the Council of Torah Sages, the group of rabbis whose pronouncements were binding on the four Agudat Yisrael Knesset members who supported the coalition, demanded that the government implement the clause in the coalition agreement by which El Al would not fly on the Sabbath and on Jewish holy days (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 240). On May 2 the cabinet resolved to ground El Al on those days "within three months." After a number of delays, caused by appeals to the supreme court against such a move and then by the outbreak of the war in Lebanon, Prime Minister Begin informed coalition chairman Avraham Shapiro (Agudat Yisrael) that El Al would cease flying on the Sabbath as of September 1.

On August 12 hundreds of El Al workers, chanting slogans such as "Aguda, to the army!" (referring to the non-service of ultra-Orthodox Jews) and "Shabbos!," blocked the entrance to the airport departure hall of Jews dressed in traditional Hasidic garb. The action was roundly condemned even by persons and organizations who were against the closure of El Al on the Sabbath. Events took a dramatic and fateful turn on September 12, when a wildcat strike by stewards, who lay down in front of El Al planes and prevented their takeoff, forced the company to suspend operations. Four days later the El Al management declared a lockout, and on September 19 the 5,000 airline employees were sent on indefinite, unpaid leave. In the meantime, the government, in its reply to a petition submitted to the high court of justice by three private individuals who contended that the suspension of El Al flights would infringe their civil rights, noted that Sabbath flights by El Al constituted a violation of a 1969 order by the minister of transport who ruled that "no regular flights will take place on the Sabbath unless there is a security reason for them." On September 22 El Al's board of directors gave the management 30 days to recommend basic changes in the company's organization and operations. The airline's annual report, released October 7, showed assets of $350 million, debts of $510 million, and an annual loss in 1981/82 of $32.6 million, bringing the company's cumulative deficit to $202 million.

On October 19 El Al's board of directors recommended the company's liquidation, but the cabinet on October 24 deferred this move, pending the
outcome of talks on the company’s amelioration, after the Histadrut and seven of the El Al works committees—with the notable exception of the pilots—agreed to management’s principles for restructuring the company. Negotiations on a new labor agreement for El Al finally opened on October 31, following a government threat to liquidate the airline by November 17 if no agreement were forthcoming by then, and in the wake of a 24-hour “takeover” of Ben-Gurion International Airport by workers and their families, who insisted that talks begin at once even without the pilots’ consent. The government granted the negotiators an extra week, but on November 24, when no comprehensive agreement had been reached, El Al’s shareholders voted to approve the board’s recommendation to liquidate the airline. Meeting in special session later that day, the cabinet resolved to establish a new airline to replace El Al.

On December 5 the Jerusalem district court granted the government’s request to appoint Israel’s administrator-general, Amram Blum, temporary receiver to handle El Al’s affairs. Blum was given wide-ranging powers by the court, including the authority to seize the company’s assets worldwide, and the power to hire and fire workers. At year’s end, the court authorized the resumption of El Al flights after the temporary receiver and the Histadrut’s legal adviser informed the court that all outstanding issues had been settled and a new labor agreement concluded. Under the agreement there would be pay slashes of 12.5 per cent to 25 per cent, annual leave would be cut, and about 20 per cent of the company’s employees would be dismissed. The date of the airline’s flight resumption was not yet clear, however, due to the need for thorough mechanical checks of the idled planes and the need to raise initial operating capital.

The course of events at El Al was seen by many observers as the first major attempt by the Likud government to strike at and weaken the Histadrut, a Labor bastion of political and economic strength. El Al workers also lacked broad public sympathy because of their generally high wages and unique benefits. Thus, while the government was able to stand firm in this instance, it remained to be seen what would happen if other, more essential sectors of the economy tried unbending confrontational tactics.

All told, in 1982 over 1.8 million working days were lost in 112 full strikes in which more than 838,000 workers took part. This constituted a rise of 24 per cent over 1981 in the number of strikes, 132 per cent in the number of working days lost, and 166 per cent in the number of persons taking part. There was also an increase of 39 per cent in the number of partial strikes, including industrial sanctions and slowdowns.

One area that seemed unaffected by other economic developments was the Tel Aviv stock exchange, where fortunes were made as the nominal value of all stocks rose by about 300 per cent in 1982 and by over 160 per
cent in real terms. The carefully manipulated stocks of certain companies and banks gained by breathtaking amounts. One company's shares increased in value—on paper—by over 5,000 per cent, another by 1,430 per cent, and gains of hundreds of per cent were not uncommon. The lure, particularly in view of the slowdown in devaluation and the liquidity of stocks, was immense. For many families, the stock market replaced savings plans and some even liquidated other assets to raise the capital for investment on the stock exchange. A two per cent levy on oversubscriptions to new shares—another of the treasury's efforts to raise money for the war in Lebanon—had no perceptible effect on the stock exchange. On December 31, Bank Leumi board chairman Ernst Japhet sounded a strong cautionary note when he told the Tel Aviv Industrial and Commercial Club that "a stock exchange where prices always rise" held grave potential dangers for savings. Japhet also pointed to the phenomenon of new enterprises with "nothing behind them and very little in front of them" seeking to raise money via the stock exchange—an average of nearly one new share issue per week was floated on the stock exchange in 1982, raising well over IS3 billion—and added that "the relation between the stock value of a share and its real value has been severed."

A potent indicator of the state of the Israeli economy was to be found in an amendment to the products and services law that came into effect on May 1. This required all prices of products to be displayed in local currency and not, as had been the rapidly growing custom due to the shekel's relentless and dizzying decline, in dollars. Houses and apartments were exempted since they were not "products," and tourism services also received special permission to advertise in foreign currency.

Tourism dollars were down by some $70 million in 1982, the result of a 12 per cent decline (135,000 persons) in incoming visitors. Largely the result of the war in Lebanon, and aggravated by the Beirut massacre and the El Al strike, the fall in tourism—termed that industry's "most severe crisis since the establishment of the state" by Tourism Minister Avraham Sharir—led Sharir to announce emergency plans to deal with the crisis, based on a revamped advertising campaign abroad.

Some of the lost tourism currency was recouped from an unexpected source: trade with Lebanon, largely one-way in nature. Toward the end of the year, Israel was exporting about $9 million worth of goods a month to Lebanon, mainly foodstuffs.

Other Domestic Matters

Israel's population at the end of 1982 stood at 4,055,000, including 3,366,300 Jews (83 per cent) and 688,700 non-Jews. This constituted a population growth of 1.7 per cent relative to 1981, with the Jewish
population having grown by 1.4 per cent and the non-Jewish population by 3 per cent. The figures included the 13,000 Druze residents of the Golan Heights, annexed at the end of 1981.

Early in January Minister of Economic Coordination Yaacov Meridor said that he would resign if a secret energy production system that had been brought to his attention failed to have revolutionary effects on Israeli society. True to his word that the wraps would come off in March 1982 (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 259), the device was unveiled in a dramatic television broadcast on March 12. However, the results were less than spectacular, and it was subsequently revealed that the inventor of the device, a 47-year-old Tel Aviv native named Daniel Berman, had two years earlier received a suspended 30-month prison sentence for fraud, theft, and impersonation of an army officer. In a meeting with Prime Minister Begin, Meridor offered to resign, but was dissuaded from doing so.

One resignation that did come into effect was that of cabinet secretary Arye Naor, as of April 1. Naor denied that his resignation was in any way connected with a civil service disciplinary court hearing against him for leaking privileged information to a journalist. His replacement was a young Jerusalem lawyer, Dan Meridor (no relation to the minister of the same name).

A more serious case concerned the second trial of Minister of Labor and Social Betterment & Immigrant Absorption Aharon Abuhatzeira (for the background, see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 234). Convicted on April 19, he was sentenced to a suspended term of four years and three months for offenses committed while he was mayor of Ramleh (30 months for larceny, 18 months for breach of trust and fraud by an administrator, and three months for breach of trust by a public servant). Abuhatzeira’s chief mayoral aide received a year’s suspended sentence. District court judge Victoria Ostrovsky-Cohen said in effect that she was not imposing an actual prison term on the two because they were the first persons to face trial on the mismanagement of charity funds, an area where the interior ministry’s allocations system itself was badly in need of reform. After some hesitation, Abuhatzeira resigned his ministerial posts on April 30, and on May 4 the number-two man in the Tami party, MK Aharon Uzan, was sworn in as Abuhatzeira’s replacement. Both sides—the state and Abuhatzeira—subsequently appealed the court’s ruling, the former maintaining that it was too lenient, the latter that it was unjust.

Late in January, one year almost to the day after the deed, the three sons of Druze Sheikh Jabar Muaddi were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Bedouin MK Sheikh Hamad Abu Rabia. (See AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 258 for the background.)
A 50-year-old murder case also came in for scrutiny, first in a best-selling book and then, in its wake, in the form of a cabinet resolution (March 14) to establish a commission of inquiry to review its circumstances. The case concerned the murder, in June 1933, of Labor Zionist leader Chaim Arlosoroff in Tel Aviv—an act which so enflamed both the victim's party, Mapai, and the Revisionists, some of whose members were accused (though later acquitted) of having done the deed, that it continued to be a source of controversy nearly half a century later. Following a number of legal appeals and some difficulty in finding a jurist willing to head it, the three-man commission met for its first session on December 16 under the chairmanship of retired supreme court justice David Bekhor.

Crime in 1982 declined by nine per cent, according to police statistics. Also down was the number of fatalities in road accidents, though road deaths still averaged over one per day: 386 in 1982 as compared with 440 the previous year. There were 12,736 road accidents during the year, in which 18,461 persons were injured.

In the religious sphere, Justice Meir Shamgar, deputy president of the supreme court, late in the year suggested a possible compromise in a case in which two Reform rabbis had petitioned the court against the religious affairs minister and the chief rabbinate, charging that they were being discriminated against. Shamgar's idea was that the two Reform rabbis would be permitted to perform marriage services, while the chief rabbinate would remain in charge of verification and registration procedures. The suggestion was to be brought to the attention of the religious affairs minister for his consideration.

At the City of David archaeological dig, the focus of a dispute with ultra-Orthodox elements who claimed the site was a Jewish medieval cemetery and hence inviolable (see AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 259), a compromise was reached whereby the excavation team would not dig in the entire area allowed it under the terms of its permit. Nonetheless, opponents of the dig staged a number of unlawful demonstrations which were forcibly dispersed by the police.

On October 8 a fire that was deliberately set destroyed the Baptist church in Jerusalem. Prime Minister Begin joined in the general public condemnation of the act.

One of the most unusual ceremonies in Israeli history took place on May 11 when 200 of the country's leading personalities, including the president, the prime minister and other ministers, the two chief rabbis, the chief of staff, and senior IDF officers were flown to a barren desert hilltop near the Dead Sea for the interment of 25 skeletons, unearthed in a nearby cave in 1960. The skeletons were said to be those of the followers of Shimon Bar-Kochba, leader of the Jewish revolt against the Romans in 132-135
C.E. Yigael Yadin, the archeologist who discovered 19 of the skeletons, boycotted the ceremony along with other archeologists. The full military ceremony, for which the IDF chief rabbi composed a special prayer castigating the "evil" Romans, cost about IS5 million.

The normally anonymous film and theater censorship board was in the news several times during the year. In March the board ordered that The Great Whore of Babylon, a work by Israel's leading playwright, Hanoch Levin, and staged by the Cameri Theater, be presented "without complete nudity." This was a rare instance in which the board sought to intervene in a theatrical production, and after a good deal of protest, it dropped the ban. Some weeks earlier, Deputy Minister of Education and Culture Miriam Glazer-Ta'asa had bitterly flayed the Cameri production of another Hanoch Levin play, The Sufferings of Job—which also contained a nude scene—as "nothing but abomination and pornography." In the course of a Knesset debate on a motion by MK Rabbi Haim Druckman (NRP) regarding the "Hellenization" of Israeli society, Glazer-Ta'asa stated her belief that "freedom of speech and freedom of expression in this country are altogether exaggerated." However, Transport Minister Haim Corfu said she was not speaking for the government. In October the censors viewed a dress rehearsal of Yehoshua Sobol's Soul of a Jew, a play with several erotic scenes and one which called into question many values of the Israel-Zionist ethos. The board gave its approval for the Haifa Theater to stage the play. Later that month the board banned in its entirety yet another Hanoch Levin work, a satirical review called The Patriot, whose content was found to be offensive to national and religious values. This was the first Hebrew-language play ever to be banned in toto. Four board members resigned in protest at the sweeping ban. In the meantime, the play had been reworked by the playwright, and the Neve Zedek Theater Center was going ahead with its production, although warned that it could face criminal charges.

Also on the cultural scene, the foreign ministry's prestigious quarterly of the arts and letters, Ariel, resumed publication after a lapse of several years. In April the Likud finally had a media organ that expressed its views—a weekly newsmagazine named Yoman Hashavua ("weekly diary"). A notable anniversary was the centenary of the birth of violinist Bronislaw Huberman, founder of the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra. A week-long festival was held in December to mark the event, culminating in a gala concert in which six of the world's finest violinists performed with the IPO under the baton of Zubin Mehta.

Israel's first test-tube baby, a girl weighing 3.78 kg., was born on September 22 at Sheba Hospital.

In December the Hebrew University of Jerusalem received the archives of the late Albert Einstein, heretofore deposited at Princeton University, in accordance with the scientist's will.
Immigration to Israel continued at only fractionally above the very poor showing of the previous year (some 13,000 in 1982, up about 700 over 1981). With the gates of the Soviet Union all but closed to Jewish emigration, the Jewish Agency in July shut down its hostel in Vienna for Soviet Jewish emigrants. There was better news from Rumania, where immigration to Israel in 1982 was up by over 50 per cent as compared with the previous year (1,606 vs. 1,067) according to information provided by Rumanian chief rabbi Moshe Rosen. He was also reported as saying that a travel tax imposed in November by the Rumanian authorities on all persons emigrating from that country would not affect Rumanian Jews bound for Israel. Jewish Agency chairman Arye Dulzin had earlier stated that “under no circumstances” could this Rumanian decision be countenanced, and that the Jewish Agency would mobilize all its resources to have it rescinded.

The Jews of Ethiopia—the Falashas—were in the news in 1982 when leaders of Israel’s 1,300 Ethiopian Jews told reporters that their brethren in Ethiopia were suffering terribly, and called for a government campaign to bring them to Israel. In November hundreds of Falashas in Beersheba and the southern development town of Ofakim staged a strike in protest against alleged government indifference to the plight of their relatives and friends in Ethiopia. The following month the Israel Public Committee for Ethiopian Jews welcomed an invitation by the Ethiopian government for “Israeli envoys” to visit the 28,000-strong Falasha community in Ethiopia. Minister Without Portfolio Ben-Porat told the Knesset that the government would cooperate in the establishment of a public council for Ethiopian Jewry which would seek to enlist world public opinion on behalf of the Falashas’ right to immigrate to Israel.

The sensitive question of Jewish “dual loyalty” was raised implicitly by Defense Minister Sharon when he stated that British and Argentinian Jews involved in the Falkland Islands fighting were taking part in a war “that is none of their concern.” The Tel Aviv Spanish-language weekly El Tiempo castigated Sharon for the “audacity and arrogance” of his remark, adding that his declaration played into the hands of those who questioned the loyalty of local Jews. The paper said it had been contacted by Argentinian Jewish community leaders and others who were worried about the possible “repercussions” of Sharon’s statement. Foreign Minister Shamir, who visited Argentina and Uruguay in December, told reporters upon his return to Israel that Argentinian officials had promised to examine the cases of Jews who had “disappeared” in recent years. Shamir told Israel Radio that the Argentinian authorities “understand the organic relationship between Israel and Jews in other countries. They see Argentinian Jews as potential citizens of Israel—if not today, then tomorrow.” Briefing the cabinet on his trip, he noted also the particularly
The war in Lebanon generated manifestations of support for Israel among Diaspora Jews. On June 25 the World Zionist Executive published a statement calling for solidarity with Israel and noting that Jewish community leaders "from all over the world" had met together with the Keren Hayesod and United Jewish Appeal leadership in Jerusalem from June 22–24. They had decided "to mount a special campaign to raise additional funds to support the increase in welfare, education, housing, and health services now needed by Israel." At about the same time, Sam Rothberg, general chairman of the Israel Bonds Organization, headed a three-day mission to Israel of 32 Jewish leaders from North and South America as well as Europe. The mission members issued a statement asserting that they would return to their communities "to start working immediately . . . to fulfill the commitment that we made to Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Finance Minister Yoram Aridor—to produce an additional $100 million, in cash, to help keep Israel economically strong."

On December 7 Arye Dulzin, chairman of the WZO and Jewish Agency executives, delivered the keynote address at the opening session of the 30th World Zionist Congress in Jerusalem. He urged the creation of a new movement of hagshama (self-realization) to enlist Jews everywhere to commit themselves to settle in Israel. However, during the ten days of the Congress, Dulzin also asserted that Zionism was not just aliyah: "Even a Zionist leader who does not come on aliyah himself is still a Zionist because of the hope that his son or his grandson may come on aliyah." The entire Congress seemed to have a never-never-land air about it. Born in the throes of a months-long dispute over the validity of the American delegation, since no elections had been held in the United States, and ending in a bitter, unresolved struggle over the allocation of portfolios in the new 34-member executive (the largest ever), the course of the Congress was marked by ideological conflict that at times erupted into actual physical violence. The spectacle staged by the 651 delegates who were eventually accredited, following rulings by the Zionist supreme court (the Likud bloc received 176 places and the Labor bloc 145), led former Knesset member Zalman Abramov to comment, "The Congress failed to elicit the interest and sympathy of the Israeli public, nor did it enhance the standing of Zionism. It was in many respects counter-productive; at best, it was a non-event."

Arye Dulzin was re-elected to another four-year term as chairman of the Zionist executive. The vote came at dawn on December 17, after a full night of wrangling over the allocation of portfolios, when about one-third of the delegates were in the vast hall, many of them asleep. A resolution of the political affairs committee adopted by the plenum after tough in-fighting
reaffirmed that "the right of the Jewish people to Eretz-Israel is inalienable" and that "settlement constitutes a central expression of the Zionist idea." However, the resolution concluded: "The Congress could not reach a consensus on the settlement issues" (referring to the establishment of settlements in the administered areas). The comments of Hebrew University professor Eliezer Jaffe (Jerusalem Post, December 20) on the Congress seemed to sum up the feelings of many in Israel: "I’ve heard a lot of complaints recently about our leadership in Israel. It’s about time that we Israelis had some responsible leadership from the Diaspora. For those whose relationship with us is defined by philanthropy rather than by immigration—it’s time you put your house in order. And in doing so, we may together save the Zionist movement and the Zionist Congress from the embarrassing circus it has become."

**Personalia**

Moshe Mandelbaum replaced Arnon Gafny as governor of the Bank of Israel, having been nominated by the cabinet on January 3. The new state comptroller was Yitzhak Tunik, nominated by the Knesset’s house committee on January 6 to succeed the retired Yitzhak Nebenzahl. On February 11 Major General Moshe Bar-Kochba (Bril) took over as commander of the IDF armored corps from Major General Amnon Reshef, who went on study leave. On April 30 Justice Yitzhak Kahan was sworn in as president of the supreme court, replacing Justice Moshe Landau, who retired after 42 years on the bench; Justice Meir Shamgar was sworn in as deputy president. On September 12 Major General Yitzhak Hofi retired after eight years as chief of the Mossad intelligence agency; as is traditional, his successor’s name was kept secret. On November 25 Deputy Clerk of the Knesset Shmuel Jacobson replaced longtime Knesset Clerk Netanel Lorch, who was dismissed the previous day at the behest of Knesset speaker Menahem Savidor. Michael Elkins, Jerusalem-based BBC correspondent for 15 years, retired at the end of 1982. Major General Amos Lapidot was appointed commander of the Israel air force, replacing—effective January 1, 1983—Major General David Ivri, who was appointed board chairman of Israel Aircraft Industries.

Personalities who died during the year included: Knesset member Moshe (Mussa) Harif, aged 48, killed together with his wife and son in a road accident on January 16; Leopold Leib Trepper, legendary leader of the "Red Orchestra" espionage network in World War II, on January 19, aged 77; Ino Sciaky, the father of dental education in Israel, on February 10, aged 70; Haim Gamzu, influential critic and founder of the new Tel Aviv Museum, on February 16, aged 72; Gershom Scholem, the world’s foremost authority on the Kabbala and Jewish mysticism, on February 21, aged 84;
Yoel Sussman, retired president of the supreme court, on March 2, aged 71; Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, spiritual mentor of Yeshivat Mercaz Harav, on March 9, aged 91; Michael Argov, pioneer Israeli artist, on April 29, aged 61; Mendel Kohansky, theater critic and theater historian, on May 20, aged 70; Shmuel Mikunis, longtime Israel Communist party leader, on May 20, aged 79; Simha Blass, designer of the revolutionary drip irrigation method, on July 17, aged 84; Yefet Ben-Avraham Zedaka, leader of Israel's Samaritan community, on July 30, aged 87; Aharon Danin, the first child born in the city of Tel Aviv, and a veteran JNF official, on August 25, aged 72; Nahum Goldmann, Zionist leader, diplomat, and statesman, in Germany on August 29, buried on Mount Herzl, Jerusalem, on September 2, aged 87; David Shifman, MK and deputy minister of transport, on October 18, aged 57; Aliza Begin, wife of Prime Minister Begin and a volunteer activist, on November 14, aged 62; Yehuda Ya'ari, third aliyah pioneer and leading writer, on November 6, aged 81; Rachel Kagan, longtime president of WIZO in Israel, on November 15, aged 94; Arye Tartakower, noted sociologist and historian, on November 20, aged 85; Lieutenant General Haim Laskov, Israel's fifth chief of staff (1958–1961) and first IDF ombudsman, on December 8, aged 63; Avraham Kidron, ambassador to Australia and former foreign ministry director-general, in Canberra, on December 8, aged 63; and Robert Weltsch, noted journalist, essayist, and editor, on December 21, aged 92.
The United States and Israel: Impact of the Lebanon War

By George E. Gruen

The war in Lebanon overshadowed all other developments in the Middle East in 1982. The conduct of "Operation Peace for Galilee," as Israel termed the massive onslaught of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) against the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) military and political infrastructure in Beirut and southern Lebanon, aroused a sharp debate within the United States, as it did throughout the world.

The administration of President Ronald Reagan was generally sympathetic to Israel's desire to remove the PLO threat to the civilian population of northern Galilee. Moreover, President Reagan expressed his "deep sense of shock and outrage" at the "cowardly and unconscionable attack" by Palestinian terrorists on Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador in London. In his message to Prime Minister Menachem Begin following the June 3rd assassination attempt, Reagan added, "I pray with you that the day will soon arrive when this mindless violence will no longer plague the earth." The Israelis thus had good reason to believe that the Reagan administration would applaud the destruction of the PLO's bases in Lebanon, which had served as training centers for Soviet-supported terrorists from more than twenty countries around the globe.

Strategic Implications of "Operation Peace for Galilee"

The Reagan administration, in general, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in particular, viewed all developments on the international scene in terms of their impact on the global Soviet-American rivalry. From this perspective, the war in Lebanon—including Israel's decisive blow against Kremlin-backed terrorism, the IDF's destruction of Syria's Soviet-supplied SAM-missile sites and large quantities of Syrian aircraft and tanks, the apparent superiority of American over Soviet weapon systems this revealed, and the impotence displayed by the Kremlin in the final months of the Brezhnev era by its failure to save the PLO or its Syrian ally from humiliating defeat—served to enhance America's prestige in the power struggle with Russia.

Because of the special relationship that existed between the United States and Israel, it was to Washington rather than Moscow that Lebanon and
most of the other states in the Arab world turned in hope of influencing the Israelis and promoting peace. Thus the United States took the lead in creating the multinational force that supervised the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. The force was recruited from three Western NATO members—France, Italy, and the United States—excluding the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. In the diplomatic arena, it was the Reagan initiative of September 1, and not the Brezhnev peace plan announced two weeks later, that became the major focus of attention and debate in Palestinian, Jordanian, and most other Arab circles. And it was the special envoys dispatched by President Reagan whom the Lebanese relied upon to facilitate the negotiations with Israel that began late in 1982.

By destroying the PLO state-within-a-state in southern Lebanon, removing PLO and Syrian forces from Beirut, and exerting military pressure on Damascus, the IDF significantly changed the balance of forces within strife-torn Lebanon. For the first time since the outbreak of the bloody civil war in 1975, there was hope that an independent Lebanon, under Maronite Christian leadership, and with an essentially pro-Western orientation, might emerge. Thus, as Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon argued, it was the power of Israeli arms that advanced America’s strategic interests in Lebanon and the broader Middle East region. While Prime Minister Begin made it clear that Israel did not covet an inch of Lebanese territory, and that the IDF was prepared to withdraw when conditions assuring Israel's security had been met, the presence of Israeli armed forces in southern Lebanon provided the United States with a potential bargaining chip to negotiate the removal of the PLO and the approximately 30,000 Syrian troops, who had been stationed in Lebanon since 1975. (The Syrian troops ostensibly were in Lebanon as an Arab League-sanctioned peacekeeping force, but they actually served as an instrument for asserting Syria's claim to hegemony over Lebanon.)

President Reagan underscored the extent to which the United States and Israel shared basic strategic objectives when he declared, at the conclusion of a three-hour meeting with Prime Minister Begin at the White House on June 21: “All of us share a common understanding of the need to bring peace and security to the Middle East... On Lebanon, it is clear that we and Israel both seek an end to the violence there and a sovereign, independent Lebanon under the authority of a strong central government. We agree that Israel must not be subjected to violence from the north. The United States will continue to seek these goals and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.”

Differences Within Reagan Administration on Israel

Nevertheless, there were sharp disputes between Washington and Jerusalem. These arose not only over the tactics employed by Israel in the conduct
of the war, but over the more fundamental question of the extent to which American and Israeli interests in the region were in fact congruent, and whether the United States should treat Israel as its primary strategic ally against Soviet penetration and radical destabilization of the region. While various reasons were advanced for the sudden resignation of Secretary of State Alexander Haig at the end of June, for Israel this meant the removal of a sympathetic voice and a firm advocate of close cooperation between Washington and Jerusalem. The departure of Haig also marked the ascendancy of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who had alienated Israel and its American friends by his vigorous pressing of the AWACS and F-15 enhancement sales to Saudi Arabia, and of William Clark, who had recently replaced Richard Allen, also known for his understanding of Israel’s position, as the president’s national security adviser. Unlike Haig, who believed that occasional disagreements between Washington and Jerusalem could be best resolved by offering aid and other positive inducements to the Israelis, Weinberger and Clark were not afraid of confrontation, and at times advocated the use of pressure against Israel. Clark, who lacked experience in foreign affairs in general, and knew little about the Middle East, was reportedly sharply critical of what he regarded as Israeli “intransigence” and “aggression” in Lebanon.

George Shultz, who succeeded Haig as secretary of state, was more evenhanded in his approach. At his Senate confirmation hearings in mid-July, he reiterated the traditional American recognition of Israel as “our closest friend in the Middle East,” and confirmed America’s enduring commitment to support Israel’s security needs. However, he also stressed “the importance to our own security of wide and ever-strengthening ties with the Arabs,” and defined America’s vital interests in the Arab world in terms of oil, resistance to Soviet imperialism, and promoting Middle East peace. While expressing his support for the Camp David accords, Shultz emphasized their importance as the framework for resolving the Palestinian problem. The Lebanese crisis, he declared, “makes painfully and totally clear a central reality of the Middle East: the legitimate needs and problems of the Palestinian people must be addressed and resolved—urgently and in all their dimensions.” This renewed emphasis by the administration on the Palestinian issue was to be reflected in the unveiling on September 1 of the Reagan initiative, an effort to induce King Hussein of Jordan and Palestinian Arabs to enter American-sponsored negotiations on the future of the West Bank. (For details, see below.)

At the confirmation hearings, Senate members questioned the secretary of state-designate about his connections with Bechtel, the giant construction company with extensive projects in the Arab world. Senator Paul Sarbanes (D., Md.) criticized Bechtel’s non-compliance with American legislation forbidding U.S. firms to cooperate with the Arab boycott of Israel, and
questioned whether Shultz's past association with the company would color his policies on the Middle East. Senator Larry Pressler (R., S.D.) questioned Bechtel's intensive lobbying on behalf of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia. Shultz replied that Bechtel had been entirely law-abiding under his leadership. He justified the company's advocacy of the AWACS sale, and firmly denied that his Bechtel experience would have any bearing on his conduct in office.)

Shultz's testimony revealed a fundamental difference in the positions of the American and Israeli governments with regard to the Palestinian issue. The Americans hoped that a militarily weakened and chastened PLO might be induced to moderate its aims and agree to work with King Hussein of Jordan toward creation of a Palestinian entity on the West Bank linked to Jordan and at peace with Israel. But for this scenario to work, PLO leader Yasir Arafat would have to be provided with an opportunity to withdraw his forces from Beirut without humiliation and with his political organization intact. Some American visitors to the besieged PLO leader, notably Representative Paul McCloskey (R., Calif.) who saw him in Beirut toward the end of July, contended that Arafat had already agreed to "recognize" Israel. (This was promptly denied by Arafat and other PLO spokesmen.) Other American officials, while not convinced that the PLO had yet made any decisive change in its policy of rejection of Israel, still felt that the mainstream of the PLO might be moving in the direction of accommodation. They pointed out that the British had uncovered evidence that the assassination attempt against Ambassador Argov, which triggered the Israeli attack on the PLO in Lebanon, had not been initiated by Arafat, but was the work of the dissident Abu Nidal faction, which had broken away from Arafat's al-Fatah and had been working, with Syrian and Iraqi backing, to destroy any chance of an Israeli-Palestinian political settlement.

Critics of the Israeli incursion into Lebanon contended that Israel's action was unjustified because the PLO had not initiated any direct shelling of Israeli civilians across the border from Lebanon since the cease-fire arranged the previous summer by U.S. envoy Philip Habib had gone into effect. George Ball, an under secretary of state during the Johnson era, and a long-time critic of Israel, told the Senate foreign relations committee that Israel's invasion of Lebanon "was not a defensive action; it was an attempt to crush the only legitimate and recognized Palestinian opposition, so that Israel could proceed unchallenged to absorb the occupied areas." He urged the United States government to "recast its relations with Israel." While not going quite that far, committee chairman Charles Percy (R., Ill.) questioned whether the time had not come to define what was meant by "defensive actions." Senator John Glenn (D., Ohio) asked for an inquiry into whether Israel's use of American weapons in the war in Lebanon had violated the
conditions under which the arms had been sold. The administration responded by suspending the sale of cluster bombs to Israel, by initiating an inquiry into Israel's use of U.S. weapons in Lebanon, and by holding up the pending sale of 75 F-16 fighter planes. (Israel had an option to purchase the planes as part of an earlier arms package to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. After the Reagan administration won congressional approval of the AWACS and F-15 enhancement package for Saudi Arabia in 1981, Israel activated its request for the F-16's.)

The Begin government was angered by the Reagan administration's embargo of the F-16 sale, both because Jerusalem regarded this as an improper form of pressure, and because it symbolized administration disapproval of the Israeli action in Lebanon, lending support to the charge that Israel was not acting strictly in self-defense.

In the months before the launching of Operation Peace for Galilee, there had been extensive discussions between American and Israeli officials as to what would constitute an unquestionable breach of the cease-fire which Ambassador Habib had obtained in July 1981. The view of the PLO was that it had only agreed to stop direct shelling of Israeli targets from across the Lebanese border, but that it was entitled to continue its armed struggle against Israel and Israeli supporters abroad. Early in 1982 a variety of terrorist acts occurred in Israel and the occupied territories. After Israel had stopped several PLO attempts to infiltrate via Jordan, the state department had declared that the United States' understanding was that "any hostile action originating from Lebanon but going through Syria and Jordan into Israel would be a violation" of the cease-fire. This clarification was issued in March after Ambassador Habib had returned from yet another trip to the Middle East to defuse the rising tension. Habib told reporters that the Israelis had given him "a clear indication that they wish to abide by the cease-fire" and would "not be the first to attack." However, Israel had also put Washington on notice that it reserved the right to respond to PLO violations that constituted "clear provocation."

More dangerous to Israel over the long run was the growing evidence that the PLO was engaged in a massive buildup of conventional military forces in southern Lebanon. In February the Kuwaiti News Agency reported that the Soviet Union had recently supplied the PLO with $50 million in sophisticated weapons, including surface-to-air and FROG missiles, as well as heavy artillery. An Associated Press dispatch on February 11 confirmed the PLO's acquisition of some 80 tanks and 500 artillery pieces. Secretary of State Haig condemned the provision of such armaments to the PLO in southern Lebanon as "an aggravation of the efforts we have been engaged in to prevent the outbreak of conflict." Nevertheless, the buildup continued, and, on March 16, Drew Middleton, veteran military analyst of the New
York *Times*, wrote that the PLO was "now able to attack most of the cities and towns in northern Israel at long range." Middleton reported that "a steady stream of long-range guns, rockets, and mortars has been reaching southern Lebanon in the last two months." He added that the Soviet-supplied PLO forces had been steadily reinforced by well-trained military volunteers from Iraq, Libya, and South Yemen.

As the PLO increased its capacity to pose a serious threat to civilian life in Israel's northern population centers, Prime Minister Begin became convinced of the necessity to attack the terrorist organization. In February Major General Yehoshua Saguy, chief of Israeli military intelligence, was dispatched to Washington to seek the understanding of the Pentagon and Secretary of State Haig of the danger confronting Israel. After Soviet Air Force commander Pavel Kutakhov held talks with Syrian defense minister Mustafa Tlas in Damascus in March, diplomatic sources in Beirut reported that Syria and the Soviet Union had signed an arms agreement under which Moscow was to supply Syria with a new missile network and advanced MIG planes. This introduced an additional element of urgency to Israel's military planning, since if the IDF was to strike effectively against the PLO and the Syrian missile batteries in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, it had to do so before the Syrians had emplaced and learned to use the more sophisticated new Soviet equipment.

Defense Minister Sharon visited Washington in mid-May and made no secret of the fact that if Israeli lives were threatened by the PLO, Israel would strike swiftly and firmly to protect its citizens. According to Ze'ev Schiff's account, published in the Spring 1983 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Secretary of State Haig "issued no threat against Israel's forthcoming military action.... He emphasized that it would take an unquestionable breach of the cease-fire by the PLO to warrant an Israeli riposte. Without such a breach, he said, an Israeli attack would be neither understood nor accepted in the international arena." In a letter to Prime Minister Begin on May 28, Haig expressed American concern over the unforeseeable consequences of Israeli military action, and emphasized that the U.S. would appreciate "uttermost restraint" on the part of Israel. Yet Defense Minister Sharon did not interpret this as an American warning not to act. Indeed, a subsequent meeting between Haig and Israeli ambassador Moshe Arens seemed to support Sharon's contention that the United States would not oppose an Israeli move, since Arens reported that he had discussed "in a positive atmosphere" Israel's need to establish a security zone in southern Lebanon.

There was a rather broad consensus among Israel's supporters in the United States favoring the initial Israeli incursion and the establishment of a 45-kilometer-deep security zone in southern Lebanon. Once Israeli forces moved further north, however, and especially when the bombardment of
Beirut intensified and casualties mounted, this consensus broke. During his visit to Washington in late June, Prime Minister Begin came in for harsh questioning even from traditional congressional friends of Israel.

Secretary of State Haig's warning that Israel's action would not be understood or accepted internationally was borne out by the scathing condemnation of Israel not only by the Communist and Islamic blocs, but also by commentators and intellectuals in Western Europe and Latin America, as well as by liberal elements in the United States. One reason for the criticism of Israel was the confusion in the public mind as to the objective of the Israelis. If the aim was a 45-kilometer security zone, why besiege Beirut? The basic explanation—which was not adequately presented at first by the Israelis—was that the 1978 Litani operation had demonstrated that a quick "riposte" to the PLO terrorists in the south of Lebanon would not prevent their eventual return. The only way to assure that the PLO would not operate in the south was to destroy its headquarters in Beirut and eliminate its infrastructure.

The vast extent of the PLO's military arsenal did not become known for several weeks. The total, including huge amounts contained in a network of 15-foot-high tunnels that the PLO had dug under Beirut, was not discovered until after the PLO evacuation in late August. According to military experts, the equipment was sufficient to equip three to four full divisions. It included tanks, artillery pieces, armored personnel carriers, mortars and rocket launchers, rifles and automatic weapons for 35,000 men, and 5,000 tons of ammunition. While much of the equipment was of Soviet and East European origin, there were arms and vehicles produced in 15 countries, including the United States. To the amazement and annoyance of American officials, the PLO arsenal even included crates of G-3's, the current NATO rifle.

Media Coverage Heightens Anti-Israel Sentiment

Another difficulty the Israelis faced in presenting their case to the American public was the sense of horror that was evoked by the war. Night after night, Americans sat in front of their television sets, absorbing images of death and destruction. In contrast to the immediacy of the graphic coverage of the carnage of war, the factual background analysis necessary to put the pictures into proper perspective was usually difficult to obtain, and even where available, did not lend itself to dramatic pictorial presentation.

Moreover, the star reporters who were flown into Lebanon frequently lacked essential background information on the complicated situation. Thus they were unable to distinguish between damage caused in the course of the Israeli advance and destruction that had occurred years earlier during the civil war. It also took several weeks before detailed newspaper stories...
began to appear on the extent to which the PLO had terrorized the civilian population of southern Lebanon. In at least one case, an American television crew stopped filming as soon as it became clear that the robbing and raping that a Lebanese woman was describing had not been perpetrated by Israeli soldiers but by armed PLO elements. The TV crew reportedly explained that this "old story" was of no interest to them since they were assigned to cover only the casualties inflicted in the course of the Israeli invasion.

The Israelis were also at a disadvantage in the battle for public opinion about such disputed issues as the number of civilian casualties. The PLO and other Arab sources had no hesitation in issuing exaggerated and unsubstantiated figures as part of a propaganda campaign to portray the Israelis as indiscriminate murderers and perpetrators of genocide. The information gap was especially severe during the first week of the war when it was impossible for reporters to obtain figures from the Israeli side. At first, the IDF was too busy fighting to take time out to consider the needs of the press. After persistent calls for timely information, liaison was established between the IDF and the relevant civilian information personnel to arrange press briefings and visits to the front. While this greatly improved the situation, the army still ruled certain areas out of bounds to reporters because of danger, as well as for military-security reasons.

Another difficulty the Israelis faced was technical. If one sought facts rather than propaganda, it was necessary to go through the painstaking work of checking hospitals for the wounded, as well as identifying bodies, some of which were buried in the rubble of buildings that had been struck. Since many persons had fled their homes during the fighting, it took time and effort to distinguish between those who were missing because they had taken shelter with relatives or friends out of range of the fighting and those who had been killed.

The extent to which civilian life in southern Lebanon had been disrupted by the fighting was also a matter of dispute. At first the Lebanese Red Cross claimed that 600,000 persons had been made homeless—an impossibility since the total pre-war population was scarcely half a million—and that some 10,000 persons had been killed. These figures came into question when it was revealed that they had originated with the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, whose director was the brother of PLO leader Yasir Arafat. The International Red Cross cut the refugee figure in half and the Lebanese government provided an estimate of 70,000.

The number of Lebanese civilian casualties was far fewer than the extravagant high figures widely circulated in the early days of the war. Mahmoud Khadra, director of civil defense for southern Lebanon and a native of Sidon, told one visitor that he estimated that fewer than 400
civilians had been killed there. Moreover, he stated that of the 20,000 persons in Sidon who had heeded an Israeli appeal to evacuate to the seashore, only nine had been injured. Reporters for the New York Times and the Associated Press who interviewed Khadra duly filed his estimates, but they received far less play than the initial claim of 10,000 killed. Toward the end of June, Israeli officials put the total number of civilians killed in Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiye, where the heaviest battles took place, at 408, and the number of new refugees at 20,000.

The Israeli side of the story of the fighting in southern Lebanon had just begun to reach the American public when the siege of Beirut began in earnest, and once again the television screens were filled with scenes of Israeli planes and ships pouring countless shells into civilian areas in Beirut. While the Israelis insisted that they were only targeting military emplacements and various PLO headquarters, it was inevitable that Lebanese and Palestinian civilians would be among the casualties. Although the IDF's intention was to put pressure on the PLO to withdraw, the Israelis also contributed to the suffering of civilians in Beirut by periodically turning off the electricity and water and limiting the entry of supplies into the city.

The increasing ferocity of the Israeli bombardment led to anger and revulsion in Washington. The IDF faced the dilemma of exerting sufficient pressure on the PLO to force it to leave, without causing such extensive damage to Beirut as to jeopardize Israel's friendship with the United States. This dilemma was compounded by an American diplomatic blunder. Although the United States officially shared the Israeli strategic goal of removing the PLO from Beirut, Vice President George Bush allegedly assured the Saudi officials that the United States would not permit Israeli forces to enter Beirut. The Saudis in turn relayed this information to Yasir Arafat. Once the PLO leader believed that the United States would shield him from Israeli ground forces, he began to stiffen his terms, demanding that the PLO be permitted to retain political headquarters and other signs of a continuing PLO presence in Beirut. This was totally unacceptable to Israel and to the Lebanese Christian Phalangists as well. The latter, however, were not prepared to commit the Lebanese Forces under their command to the kind of house-to-house fighting that would force the PLO out of West Beirut. Thus it was left to the IDF to convince the PLO fighters that Israel was prepared to defy the United States and world public opinion, and drive the PLO out by force if it did not agree to leave voluntarily. This entailed an unprecedented shift in Israeli policy, for never before in any of the Arab-Israeli wars had the IDF undertaken a full-scale ground occupation of an Arab capital city. While the Israelis had bombed selected targets in Cairo during the war of attrition and the Iraqi nuclear reactor on the outskirts of Baghdad, Israeli forces had always stopped short of entering Arab capitals. The intensive
Israeli bombardment of Beirut, and the growing public impression that Defense Minister Sharon was a ruthless commander who would stop at nothing to achieve his objectives, finally convinced the PLO it had no alternative but to agree to a total withdrawal from Beirut.

U.S. Concern for Palestinian and Lebanese Refugees

In the course of the following weeks, as it became clear that the PLO would not be permitted to return to southern Lebanon, many civilians who had fled to Beirut and other places further north to escape from PLO domination and the dangers of warfare returned to reoccupy homes that had been taken over by Palestinian militants and to rebuild others that had been damaged in the fighting. Those who suffered most seriously were Palestinians living in United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) camps in the Sidon area. Refugees of the 1948 war with Israel, they had been joined by Palestinians fleeing from Jordan following the expulsion of the PLO by King Hussein in 1970. The PLO militants had turned an UNRWA technical school in Sidon into a PLO terrorist training center and had entrenched their military base within the Ein Hilwe refugee camp, using the Palestinian civilians as a shield.

UNRWA’s own report in September 1982 revealed that the PLO had also interfered with the distribution of needed supplies to Palestinian refugees. During the seige of Beirut, the PLO seized well-stocked UNRWA warehouses and prevented the relief agency from distributing the supplies to the Palestinian civilians in the city. UNRWA regained control of its supplies only after the PLO evacuation. Yet these facts were not reported at the time.

The fresh evidence of PLO interference with the humanitarian work of UNRWA aroused anger within the U.S. Congress, since the United States had long been a major contributor to that United Nations body. In November Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D., N.Y.) urged Secretary of State Shultz to suspend all aid to UNRWA, which had amounted to $67 million in 1982. In December, Congress cut $22 million from the UNRWA allocation requested by President Reagan for fiscal 1983.

A major issue in the aftermath of the PLO withdrawal from Beirut was the fate of the Palestinian civilians remaining in the country. American and UNRWA estimates of the Palestinians were in the range of 375,000 to 400,000. Of these, about 100,000 belonged to families that came in 1948 and had been fairly well integrated, many even acquiring Lebanese citizenship. The problem was what to do about the other 300,000, especially those who had lived in refugee camps in the Sidon area and Beirut. The Israelis preferred to have them permanently resettled in Lebanon or Jordan. Although the Israeli government provided emergency medical service, clothing, blankets, and food for immediate relief, as well as assistance in repairing
the infrastructure of southern Lebanon, nothing came of the various long-range plans for Palestinian refugee resettlement.

The deadlock was essentially political in nature. The Maronite Christian Lebanese who dominated the new government of Lebanon scarcely concealed their hostility to the Palestinians. In addition to anger at the havoc the PLO had wrought in the country, the Christians feared that the Palestinians, the great majority of whom were Muslims, would back other Muslim elements in Lebanon working to deprive the Christians of the newly won political power they had acquired thanks to the Israeli defeat of the PLO and its Syrian allies. The depth of the Phalangists' hatred of the Palestinians was revealed by the brutal massacres the former perpetrated in September in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Beirut. While the assassination of Phalangist leader and President-elect Bashir Jemayel triggered the Phalangist bloodbath, which resulted in the deaths of 700 Palestinian refugees, it is also possible that the action was a premeditated attempt to induce the Palestinian refugees to flee the country.

In the absence of agreement on a permanent solution, Israeli and UNRWA officials, with grudging Palestinian approval, began to provide cement and other materials to help the refugees in the Ein Hilwe camp to lay concrete bases upon which tents could be erected that would withstand the winter storms. In some places the refugees were able to construct more durable structures. The Lebanese authorities reluctantly allowed the reconstruction to proceed, in part because of a desire to mitigate the impression of cruelty and callous indifference that the Phalangist atrocities had aroused in the United States and around the world, and in part because many of the refugees had found temporary shelter in schools and other communal institutions which were needed by the local Lebanese once the academic year began in the fall. Moreover, although the Lebanese feared the political influence of the PLO, they were reluctant to lose the services of Palestinian workers who provided manual labor in the agricultural and industrial sectors.

In contrast to the congressional controversy over aid to the Palestinians, there was widespread bipartisan support for aid to the Lebanese victims of war. At a House foreign affairs committee hearing in mid-July, M. Peter McPherson, President Reagan's personal representative for disaster relief to Lebanon, testified that a total of $65 million was available from United States sources, and that other countries had pledged more than $41 million. When asked about the extent of Arab aid, he replied, "So far, it is a small amount; Saudi Arabia has given about $1 million." McPherson, who was administrator for the Agency for International Development told the White House press corps, on July 14, that Israel had sent a medical convoy to Lebanon with more than 20 ambulances and 60 doctors and other medical
personnel. Israel had already spent $1.9 million for food, relief goods, and health services, and the ministry of health had provided $87,000 worth of medical supplies. "People should know what the Israelis have done," he asserted, noting the "strong, popular response" from the Israeli citizenry.

**Reaction in the Jewish Community**

While American Jews were distressed by the scenes of human suffering displayed on their television screens, and empathized with the Lebanese victims of the conflict, they were angered by what they took to be a double standard as applied by the media to Israel. Jewish viewers were incensed that the television editors invariably identified film taken by crews accompanying the Israeli forces as "subjected to Israeli censorship," while they rarely noted the restrictions placed on the reporters covering the Arab side. Crews in West Beirut focused on the wounded persons in hospitals and on buildings damaged by Israeli shelling, but they were forbidden by the PLO to photograph the nearby military installations that had drawn the Israeli fire.

Other even more brutal conflicts in the Middle East were not portrayed on the American television screens because reporters were totally barred. Thus, in February 1982 the northern Syrian city of Hama was totally sealed off for three weeks while government forces used tanks, heavy artillery, and helicopter gunships to crush the opposition Muslim Brotherhood that had been assassinating Syrian officials and their Soviet advisers. When Thomas Friedman of the New York Times was finally permitted to visit Hama three months later, he reported that half of the city of 180,000 had been damaged or totally destroyed. The centuries-old market place had been demolished, "eight mosques were blown apart, and all the domed tombs in Hama's ancient cemetery were crushed to bits." Amnesty International investigated the numerous reports of "atrocities and collective killings of unarmed innocent inhabitants by the security forces," and concluded that while precise figures were unobtainable, "estimates of the dead on all sides ranged from 10,000 to 20,000." The number of orphans created was estimated at 20,000. Yet no scenes of the devastation in Hama appeared on American television. The electronic media also virtually ignored the heavy casualties in the Iran-Iraq war, which raged fiercely throughout much of 1982. Because both sides generally barred reporters from the battlefields, there was no action footage of the carnage, which, since the war's outbreak in September 1980, had resulted in the deaths of more than 100,000 persons and the wounding of some 300,000.

While restrictions on press coverage in the Arab world might be invoked to explain the failure of television news programs to portray the horrors of Hama and the shelling of cities in the Iran-Iraq war, friends of Israel asked
why news commentators and editorialists generally failed to subject Hafez al Assad of Syria, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran to the scathing condemnation that they applied to the actions of Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin in the conduct of the war in Lebanon. The answer provided by some American media executives was that the Western world expected a higher standard of behavior from Israel than from third world dictators.

Yet the general absence of criticism in the media of democratic Britain when it imposed censorship and resorted to massive force in the spring of 1982 to protect the Falkland Islanders, caused many members of the Jewish community to suspect that the readiness of the Western world to heap condemnation on Israel reflected not only a double standard but also a resurgence of antisemitic feeling. No doubt, it was this perception of bias and bigotry which prompted most American Jews to refrain from public criticism of the policies of Israel, and to moderate the tone of many of those who did speak out.

Disapproval of some of the Begin government’s policies had arisen even before the outbreak of the war in Lebanon. Observers of the American Jewish scene had perceived a growth in dissatisfaction which threatened to result in an increasing estrangement from Israel. On January 9, Rabbi David Polish, a well-known Reform leader and Zionist, urged Israeli leaders to pay attention to the “changing mood” in the American Jewish community. Speaking at the 25th convention of the Labor Zionist Alliance in New York, Polish declared that “Jews are not yet openly critical, but in contrast to their former undeviating assent, they are strongly dissenting in private.” He decried the absence of a “proper forum for the discussion of controversial issues in our communities and on a national level.” Polish asserted that it was harmful to adopt a stance that “Diaspora Jews must always approve of Israel’s policies, even when they are being bitterly fought in Israel.” He contended that such a course had resulted in “growing divisions within American Jewish life,” which in turn led to alienation. “The alienation is due,” he argued, “not so much to honest differences of opinion, but rather to the silencing and discrediting of those who entertain different judgments.”

The moral right and, indeed, the duty of American Jews to dissent publicly from Israeli government actions was also championed by Philip Klutznick, former U.S. secretary of commerce and president emeritus of the World Jewish Congress. Speaking at a meeting sponsored by the New Jewish Agenda in Washington on April 18, Klutznick declared that American Jews were losing credibility and “fooling [them]selves” in believing that they were “fooling others” in maintaining that Jews in America and other countries were united behind every action of the Israeli government. He
contended that "we are doing great damage to Israel by our acts that give rise to serious questions of credibility of our own American Jewish institutions, our own American Jewish leaders, who are perceived in too many places as acting as rubber stamps" of Israeli policy. Although Israel had to make the final decision on issues affecting its security, Klutznick said, this did not mean that American Jews could not speak out on such matters. "I wish our Jewish community was as open and respected differences and the right to differ as much as the State of Israel."

Klutznick said that the United States should not simply be a "by-stander," but should work vigorously to resume negotiations for West Bank and Gaza autonomy, and also bring Jordan and other Arab elements into the peace process. He urged Washington to "encourage" Israel and its Arab neighbors, including the PLO, to make "simultaneous commitments" in order to achieve a comprehensive peace. Klutznick warned that unless this were done, the Camp David agreements would come to nought. He urged the PLO, which he said had been sending "signals" through private contacts, to declare publicly that it was prepared to recognize the right of the Jewish state to exist. For its part, Israel should be prepared to yield territory on the West Bank to the Palestinians.

The attempted assassination of Ambassador Argov was quickly condemned by spokesmen for the organized Jewish community. Maxwell Greenberg, national chairman of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, called on the Reagan administration to launch a worldwide "diplomatic offensive" with the goal of "quarantining the PLO, ousting it from international agencies . . . and denying it financial and military support." Edgar Bronfman, president of the World Jewish Congress, similarly condemned the PLO, and called for a "concerted effort" to halt international terrorism. On June 7, Americans for a Safe Israel issued a statement applauding Israel's decision to "eliminate" the PLO in Lebanon. The American Jewish Committee took note of Israel's declaration that it had no territorial ambitions in Lebanon, and issued a variety of background materials explaining the factors which had prompted Israel's move against the PLO bases. Robert Loup, national chairman of the United Jewish Appeal, called on the American Jewish community to respond to the Lebanon crisis by taking "all possible measures to increase the flow of cash to meet the basic human needs of the people of Israel." When Prime Minister Begin appeared in New York for an Israel Bonds luncheon on June 18, the organization raised a one-day record of $35 million in pledges.

As the war went on and the fighting extended to the outskirts of Beirut in July, a painful ambivalence arose within the American Jewish community. "We all cherish Israel," said Roland Gittlesohn, a Reform rabbi in Boston, but the invasion "threatens to tear us apart . . . We worry, agonize, fear, and also doubt." Leonard Fein, editor of Moment magazine, and a
supporter of the Peace Now movement in Israel, stated: "Our powerful communal disposition has always been to rally round the flag. The problem is that the flag now is in a suburb of Beirut, and that's a long way to go for a rally."

On June 23 some 400 Jews in the San Francisco area published a denunciation of Israel, saying that "peace and the survival of the Jewish people cannot be achieved through Israeli aggression and disregard for Lebanese sovereignty." Many of the signers were from Berkeley and other university campuses, and few were affiliated with mainstream Jewish organizations. In New York on July 10, members of the New Jewish Agenda participated in a protest rally organized by the National Emergency Committee on Lebanon (NECOL), a broad coalition established on June 24 in opposition to the Israeli invasion. Among the members of the coalition were the Palestine Congress of North America, the American Friends Service Committee, Clergy and Laity Concerned, the United States Peace Council, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Mobilization for Survival, and Women Strike for Peace. Also participating in the protest was a contingent of 20 Israelis, carrying a banner that read "Israelis Against the Massacre in Lebanon." Dan Isaac, a Reform rabbi from Connecticut, told the protestors that he, along with hundreds of other rabbis, "reject the concept of turning West Beirut into a city of slaughter." He called on Jews to recognize the justice of the Palestinian demand for a state.

Earlier, on June 30, Rabbi Israel Dresner, president of the Association of Reform Rabbis of Greater New York, had joined with two Christian clergymen in a press conference sponsored by NECOL. Dresner stated that "hundreds of thousands" of Israelis and "millions of Jews in the United States and around the world are opposed to what is going on" in Lebanon. "I am a lifelong Zionist dedicated to a democratic and just Israel," Dresner declared, but "what is happening in Lebanon today has nothing to do with that kind of Israel." While Dresner was sharply critical, he would not join in the more extreme sentiments voiced by the two Christian clergymen at the news conference—Bishop Dale White of the United Methodist Church in New Jersey and the Reverend Timothy Mitchell, chairman of the National Conference of Black Churchmen—who frequently used the words "genocide" and "holocaust" to describe what the Israelis were doing to the Palestinians and Lebanese civilians. In addition to calling for Israel's unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon, the Christian clergymen called for an end to U.S. military aid to Israel. When asked by reporters whether the panelists also supported the withdrawal of PLO and Syrian forces from Lebanon, only Dresner replied in the affirmative.

The question of how to respond to events in the Middle East evoked impassioned debate at the annual meeting of the Central Conference of American Rabbis (Reform) in New York at the end of June. Rabbi Robert
Marx of Chicago offered a resolution declaring that "the tragic loss of human life and the tremendous destruction of property" in the Lebanon war "leave us concerned, not only for the people in Lebanon but for the soul of Israel and the Jewish people. . . . The current Israeli leadership interpreted American Jewish support for Israel as support for its policies in Lebanon. This is not so." Rabbi Ronald Gittlesohn, who had just returned from Israel, succinctly stated the basic question: "Was Israel right in pushing beyond its 40-kilometer objective? I don't know," he said. "I have been among Israel's severest critics. . . . I have criticized Israel in the past and I shall criticize again . . . but not now, my friends, not now . . . . The house is on fire and my brothers and sisters whom I dearly love are in that house. . . . For the sake of Zion, I will hold my peace."

"Over and over," countered Rabbi Jerome Malino of Danbury, Connecticut, "we are told: 'this is not the time to criticize.' There are times when we must speak what we know to be right irrespective of the prevailing circumstances." Rabbi Herbert Rose defended the Begin government policy of driving the PLO from Lebanon. "Our philosophy in Judaism is not to turn the other cheek to evil," he said, "but to strike out at evil and cut off its arm." Rabbi Everett Gendler of Lowell, Massachusetts, said that it was wrong to "confuse moral principles with the politics of a given nation-state." The clinching argument was provided by Rabbi Stanley Davis of Worcester, Massachusetts, who reminded the rabbinic group that "this resolution is not going to be read by Israelis. . . . It will go to Congress. . . . It will influence funding . . ." The critical resolution was defeated by what appeared to be a two-to-one show of hands.

The Phalangist massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut in September sent waves of shock and revulsion through the American Jewish community. Expressions of sadness and regret were issued by numerous Jewish organizations. The dismay within the Jewish community was intensified when the Begin government, in the face of Labor party demands for its resignation, seemed to stonewall all attempts to conduct an inquiry. Major American Jewish organizations, including the American Jewish Committee, B'nai B'rith, and the American Jewish Congress, as well as many prominent individuals, called on Israel to conduct an independent judicial inquiry into the facts, to discover what acts of omission or commission by Israeli military officers and government officials might have facilitated the massacre. Once the Israeli government agreed to the appointment of the Kahan commission of inquiry, Jewish organizations expressed confidence that the truth would emerge. They also contrasted the strength of the moral conscience in democratic Israel with the callous indifference displayed by the Lebanese, who made only half-hearted efforts to find and bring to justice the Phalangist militiamen who had actually perpetrated the massacre.
Debate over Extent of Jewish Dissent

The question of the extent to which the war in Lebanon fragmented traditional American Jewish solidarity with Israel received considerable attention in the general press. On July 6 the Christian Science Monitor ran a front-page story, "Some American Jewish Leaders Voice Anguish over Lebanon." The story noted that Philip Klutznick, former World Jewish Congress President Nahum Goldmann and former French premier Pierre Mendès-France, had called on Israel to lift the siege of Beirut and declare its readiness to negotiate with the PLO on the basis of mutual recognition. Within the American Jewish community, the statement by the three Jewish leaders had been quickly denounced. Julius Berman, the newly-elected chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, maintained that Klutznick, Goldmann, and Mendès-France spoke only for themselves and were "overwhelmingly in the minority." "The overwhelming consensus of the Jewish community in the United States," he added, was "in support of the operation in Lebanon."

On July 15 the New York Times ran a full-page article headlined, "Discord Among U.S. Jews over Israel Seems to Grow." The article conceded that there was no way to determine with precision the feelings of American Jews, especially those who were not affiliated with synagogues or Jewish organizations. Supporters of Israel who were interviewed argued that the critics had become more vociferous, but not more numerous. Those who were critical generally said that they had opposed the Begin government long before the Lebanese invasion, but maintained that events were pushing the uncommitted toward dissent. Norman Podhoretz, editor of Commentary, contended that many of the critics were people who had shown little concern for Israel in the past, but who had been briefly converted to Israel's cause by the trauma of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. They "are being deconverted now," he maintained.

Some observers argued that a split was developing between the leadership and the broader membership of Jewish organizations. Hans Jonas, professor of philosophy at the New School for Social Research, claimed that "the official Jewish organizations cannot bring themselves to say this, but in the rank and file I can assure you there is a feeling of disgust, of shame. I know rabbis who feel exactly as I do, but who cannot express it because their congregations would be up in arms." Jonas, who said he had been a Zionist since his youth in Germany and had fought as an artillery lieutenant in Israel's 1948 war of independence, was among 67 American Jewish scholars, writers, and rabbis who signed an advertisement in July in support of Israel's Peace Now movement. The ad expressed "grave misgivings" over the fighting in Lebanon, and advocated "national self-determination" for the Palestinians. It also posed a rhetorical question to American Jews: "Is it not time for us as supporters of Israel to speak out critically about those
Israeli policies we know to be mistaken, self-defeating, and contrary to the original Zionist vision?” In addition to Jonas, signers included Saul Bellow, E.L. Doctorow, Alfred Kazin, Irving Howe, Meyer Schapiro, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, and Seymour Martin Lipset.

Whatever their private misgivings, most American Jews who had previously contributed to Israeli causes generally tended to increase their contributions after the Lebanon war started, just as they had in earlier crisis situations. Murray Wood, executive director of the community relations committee of the Los Angeles Jewish federation, noted that in early July he had received a letter from a benefactor stopping contributions because of Israel’s continuing presence in Lebanon, but that such letters were “very few and far between.” The Jewish community in Los Angeles tended to be “very supportive of Israel’s policy,” Wood said. “I can’t perceive that we have the division you read about on the east coast,” he told the New York Times.

Arthur Hertzberg, former president of the American Jewish Congress, and a self-described “dove” in the Arab-Israel conflict, summed up moderate American Jewish opinion on Lebanon in July as “a kind of two-edged anger: first, anger at Begin and Sharon for having overdone it; second, anger at the press for using this as a holiday to beat up on Israel.” Hertzberg labeled the proposal of Goldmann, Klutznick, and Mendès-France for Israeli negotiations with the PLO as “counterproductive” and likely to “polarize Jewish opinion.” Instead, he argued for new effort to bring success to the long stalled Egyptian-Israeli talks on Palestinian autonomy.

Joseph Kraft, the syndicated columnist, maintained that the division within the American Jewish community over the war in Lebanon provided the Reagan administration with a significant opportunity for diplomatic maneuver. In an article, “American Jewry Divided” (Washington Post, July 20), he argued that “the easing of Jewish support for Israel in this country makes it possible to press the Begin government hard on the West Bank.” He warned, however, “that pressure can only succeed if it is set in a wider policy that involves a strong American line toward all the Arab parties to the dispute. Fairness, in other words, means renunciation all around.”

**Arab Disarray Provides U.S. Opportunities**

Developments in the Middle East also seemed to make the time opportune for a new American peace initiative. The war in Lebanon had demonstrated the unwillingness or inability of the Soviet Union to save Syria and the PLO from humiliating military defeat. Indeed, Moscow had made a point of publicly proclaiming its unwillingness to extend the provisions of the Soviet-Syrian treaty of friendship and cooperation to cover Syrian forces
in Lebanon. The radical Arab states had been equally ineffectual; Muammar Qaddafi, the vocal Libyan champion of Arab unity and the Palestinian cause, had offered Arafat and his desperately besieged fighters in Beirut the not very helpful advice that they commit suicide and become martyrs to their cause. The PLO’s attempt, encouraged by the Soviet Union, to have the Arabs impose an oil embargo on the United States for its alleged backing of the Israeli attack on Lebanon, also met with failure.

Although Syria and the PLO were allied in the so-called “front of steadfastness and confrontation” against Israel, Damascus had concluded a separate cease-fire with Israel after the first week of the Lebanon war that left the PLO isolated and on its own in Beirut. Friction had been developing for some time between PLO leader Arafat and Syrian president Hafez al Assad over tactics to pursue against Israel. Attempts at rapprochement between Arafat and King Hussein, who had expelled PLO forces from Jordan in September 1970, also angered Assad, who suspected that the Jordanians were aiding his Muslim Brotherhood opponents. Assad was also worried that Hussein and Arafat might be tempted to participate in American-sponsored negotiations that would wrest the West Bank from Israel. This would satisfy at least some Jordanian and Palestinian aspirations and might result in a separate peace, leaving Syria out in the cold. While Assad was not ready to negotiate peace with Israel in his weakened position, he was also reluctant to be drawn into a full-scale war before he felt ready. Consequently, Assad kept the Palestinians in Damascus under tight rein. When, at the dramatic conclusion of the PLO exodus from Beirut at the end of August, Arafat decided to travel by ship to Athens, where he was officially welcomed, rather than to Damascus, this was seen as a snub of Assad.

Washington had been making steady progress in convincing some Arab states of the value of economic, political, and even military cooperation with the United States. By mid-1982, Egypt, Sudan, Oman, and Somalia were all providing facilities for, or cooperating with, the U.S. rapid deployment force. Increased American military aid to Morocco had also strengthened that country’s readiness to cooperate with the United States. Even Iraq, among the most implacable foes of Israel, had begun to drop hints to American officials in 1982 that it was not unalterably opposed to a fair, negotiated peace settlement. In return, the U.S. government had agreed in February to remove Iraq from the list of countries barred from purchasing American civilian aircraft and other sensitive products because it was a “terrorist” supporter.

Also significant from the American point of view was the gradual rapprochement between Egypt and other Arab states. In addition to the manifest success of Egypt’s American-backed peace effort in achieving the total
withdrawal of Israeli forces from its territory, Egyptian-Arab rapprochement was spurred by Iran's apparent success in its war with Iraq, which frightened the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. In February Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak paid an official visit to Muscat, and on a return visit in May, Omani Sultan Qabas bin Said held talks with Mubarak about promoting Egyptian reconciliation with other Arab states. Both Jordan and Morocco sent warm official greetings to Egypt upon the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. The ending of Egypt's period of ostracism was symbolized by the visit of Moroccan foreign minister Mohammed Boucetta to Cairo on June 7 and by President Mubarak's attendance, the following week, at the funeral of Saudi king Khalid. Mubarak met with his successor, Crown Prince Fahd, and other Arab leaders.

A scheduled visit to Israel by President Mubarak, and an attempt by Secretary of State Haig to get the long-stalled autonomy talks resumed before the completion of Israel's Sinai withdrawal, both foundered on the issue of the venue for the talks. Prime Minister Begin insisted that the Egyptian leader come to Jerusalem, Israel's capital, as President Sadat had done on his first trip. Mubarak, sensitive to the strong feelings of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinians that "Arab Jerusalem" was occupied territory, refused to hold meetings in Jerusalem. The American position was closer to that of Egypt than Israel. While the Israelis had passed a law proclaiming all of unified Jerusalem the eternal capital of Israel, the United States never accepted it, and continued to maintain that although the city should never again be divided by barbed wire, its ultimate status would have to be determined through negotiations.

There continued to be a wide gap between Cairo and Jerusalem as to how the Camp David provisions regarding Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza were to be interpreted and implemented. Prime Minister Begin was prepared to grant extensive personal autonomy to the Arab inhabitants of "the Land of Israel," but insisted that Israel control internal security, defense, and foreign policy. Israel, in Begin's view, would also exercise a veto power over land and water use, and would actively seek to prevent any foreign sovereignty from attaining power within the territories. In contrast, President Mubarak spoke about the need for Palestinian "self-determination" and the creation of a "national entity." The escalation of PLO-Israeli clashes into a full-scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6 made all thought of an early resumption of Palestinian autonomy talks a moot point.

Once the United States had succeeded in securing the agreement of Israel, Syria, and the PLO on terms for the withdrawal of PLO forces from Beirut, attention in Washington turned to the wider issue of Arab-Israeli peace. The Reagan administration put its emphasis on an intensified campaign to
induce King Hussein of Jordan to enter the Camp David peace process. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Nicholas Veliotes, who had served as ambassador to Jordan, made a secret visit to Amman, and he returned to Washington confident that King Hussein was now finally ready to take the step of openly entering into peace negotiations. The preoccupation of the Syrians with the Israelis in Lebanon and with the domestic opposition to the Assad regime made it less likely that Damascus would be able to exert heavy pressure, such as the marshalling of troops along the Syrian-Jordanian border, that it had used in the past to dissuade the Jordanians from entering the American-sponsored talks. Moreover, the intensification of ideological debate and struggle for power within the PLO following the Beirut debacle weakened the organization's claim to be "the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." The Arab League summit conference, which was scheduled to reconvene in Fez, Morocco, in early September, seemed to offer an opportunity to revise if not reverse the Arab League's earlier decision, at its Rabat conference, to have the PLO serve as the exclusive representative of the Palestinians. Moreover, the Arab League had on its agenda a revised version of the Fahd plan, which assumed increased significance because the Saudi crown prince had since assumed the throne, and because the plan represented, at least in the view of the more optimistic members of the Reagan administration, an attempt to achieve an Arab consensus in favor of a peaceful, final, and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. (On the original Fahd plan see AJYB, 1983, Vol. 83, pp. 83–84.)

A new American peace initiative, sensitive to Jordanian and other Arab concerns, it was thought, might influence the decisions reached at the forthcoming Arab summit. The Reagan administration was also concerned about countering the widespread impression in the Arab world that the United States government, despite public criticism of Israel's actions in Lebanon, had in fact quietly colluded in the Israeli campaign to smash the Palestinian resistance movement. American diplomats in the area had been sending reports to the state department expressing fear that the Palestinians and their radical allies would enflame the Arab masses to engage in violence directed against American institutions and U.S. supporters in the Arab world. It was thus considered important for the Reagan administration to distance itself from Israel by making it clear that the United States did not share or endorse Prime Minister Begin's and Defense Minister Sharon's approach to the Palestinian question.

If King Hussein could be brought around to joining in peace talks with Israel, this would also neutralize much of the opposition in the American Jewish community and among Israel's supporters in Congress to an American arms sale to Jordan. During Secretary of Defense Weinberger's visit to
Jordan in mid-February, press reports had indicated that he tried to dissuade the king from going through with the purchase of $200 million worth of advanced mobile SAM-8 missiles from the Soviet Union—to be paid for by Iraq—by offering Jordan U.S. mobile Hawk missiles and F-16 fighter planes. To justify the arms sales to Jordan, Weinberger had stated (on the NBC Today show on February 16) that "what is important is that the United States have more than one friend in the Mideast." After a bipartisan resolution opposing the sale was introduced in the Senate on May 27 by Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.), John Heinz (R., Pa.), Gary Hart (D., Colo.), and Rudy Boschwitz (R., Minn.), with 49 co-sponsors, the administration quietly informed Congress that any request for formal approval of a Jordanian arms sale would be deferred until after the November congressional elections. The poor showing of Soviet equipment in the war in Lebanon presumably made Hussein less willing to rely on Moscow as an alternative to Washington as a source of arms. His proclaimed readiness to enter into peace talks would remove an important political obstacle to congressional approval of increased American-Jordanian military cooperation.

The Reagan Peace Initiative

On September 1, President Reagan went on national television to set forth the U.S. position on how to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and, most particularly, the Palestinian issue. It was the most comprehensive and detailed statement on the subject since the Reagan administration had assumed office more than a year and a half earlier.

Reagan began by noting that Americans could be proud of the crucial role that the United States had played in bringing about the successful evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, which had been completed that day. The president said he was happy to announce that the U.S. marine contingent, which was part of the multinational force helping to supervise the evacuation, "had accomplished its mission" and that, therefore, "our young men should be out of Lebanon within two weeks." When first ordering the marines into Lebanon, Reagan had made a point of assuring congressional critics—who were concerned that the U.S. might be drifting into a Vietnam-like commitment—that their mission was solely as peacekeepers, that they would be there for only a month, and that they would be withdrawn earlier should they be subjected to attack. These assurances regarding the nature of the marines' mission and length of service had been necessary to obviate the need for formal congressional approval under the terms of the war powers resolution.

President Reagan went on to note that for more than a generation successive American administrations had been working to bring peace to the Middle East. He underscored the strategic importance of the region to the
United States and the need "to deter the Soviets and their surrogates from further expansion" there, as well as the fact that the "well-being of much of the world's economy is tied to stability in the strife-torn Middle East." Reagan emphasized, however, that "our policy is motivated by more than strategic interests. We also have an irreversible commitment to the survival and territorial integrity of friendly states." Finally, "our traditional humanitarian concerns dictate a continuing effort to peacefully resolve conflicts."

With respect to the Arab-Israel conflict, President Reagan said, "we've embraced the Camp David framework as the only way to proceed." The administration's first objective under the Camp David process was to ensure the successful fulfillment of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The president noted that intensive American diplomatic efforts had led to the creation of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which was in place, supervising the peace treaty's terms in Sinai. He explained that "the successful completion of Israel's withdrawal from Sinai" in the spring, and "the courage shown by Prime Minister Begin and President Mubarak in living up to their commitments convinced me the time had come for a new American policy to try to bridge the remaining differences between Egypt and Israel" on the issue of Palestinian autonomy. Before any action could be taken, however, the conflict in Lebanon had "pre-empted our efforts." Nevertheless, Reagan argued, the Lebanon war, "tragic as it was, has left us with a new opportunity for Middle East peace. We must seize it now . . . ."

In the days before his September 1 address, President Reagan had dispatched American envoys to the leaders of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel with personal letters from him as well as a detailed list of "talking points," which outlined the American position on the essential issues in dispute. As noted above, a major American objective was to induce King Hussein to enter into the Camp David negotiations. In the "talking points" presented to King Hussein, Reagan went quite far toward meeting the Jordanian monarch's concerns. Regarding the final status of the area, the president affirmed the American position, which was sharply at variance with that of the Begin government, that UN security council resolution 242 "applies to the West Bank and Gaza and requires Israeli withdrawal in return for peace." Yet he also reaffirmed the American interpretation that the resolution did not necessarily require total withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines: "Negotiations must determine the borders." In place of the formulations used by earlier American administrations, which had said that the changes should be limited to "minor rectifications" dictated by security needs and should not reflect "the weight of conquest," Reagan offered a more pragmatic yardstick: "The U.S. position in these negotiations on the extent of the withdrawal will be
significantly influenced by the extent and nature of the peace and security arrangements offered in return.” In theory, this held out to Hussein the hope that Jordan, like Egypt, could in a full peace agreement regain sovereignty over all the territory lost in war, although the actual exercise of that sovereignty would be subject to demilitarization and other agreed restrictions in areas affecting Israel’s security.

In his public address on September 1, President Reagan modified his prepared text by inserting the following words to reassure Israel: “I have personally followed and supported Israel’s heroic struggle for survival ever since the founding of the State of Israel 34 years ago. In the pre-1967 borders, Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its narrowest point. The bulk of Israel’s population lived within artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask Israel to live that way again.” The Israeli position, even under the Labor party, was that this narrowness was inherently a cause of insecurity and that the pre-1967 border—which was really only an armistice demarcation line set after the 1948 war, subject to future negotiation—would have to be changed. The president left ambiguous whether he endorsed actual changes in the line. He did spell out somewhat more clearly in his speech than in the “talking points” what kind of peace Jordan would have to offer, saying “the extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization and the security arrangements offered in return.” Later in the speech, Reagan reiterated that the United States “will oppose any proposal—from any party and at any point in the negotiating process—that threatens the security of Israel. America’s commitment to the security of Israel is ironclad and, I might add, so is mine.”

With regard to the final status of the territories, the Reagan initiative excluded both the Palestinian demand for an independent state and the Begin government’s desire for permanent Israeli control. While stressing that the outcome must be determined by negotiations, the president told the American people that “it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.” In the talking points, Reagan indicated that “there is no foundation of political support in Israel or the United States” for the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the territories. However, the president said, “we believe that the Palestinians must take the leading role in determining their own future” and he went on to spell out the broad powers of self-government that the Palestinians would enjoy under the American interpretation of the Camp David autonomy provisions.

President Reagan proceeded to call for “full autonomy” for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, and due consideration to
"the principle of self-government." He emphasized that the aim of the five-year transitional period called for by the Camp David agreement was "the orderly and peaceful transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants" of the territories. The Palestinians' autonomy should include "real authority over themselves, the land and its resources, subject to fair safeguards on water." This was in sharp contrast to the Begin government's view that the autonomy was to be personal and not territorial. Moreover, to allay the frequently expressed fear of Jordanians and Palestinians that the United States was encouraging an Israeli policy of "creeping annexation" by doing nothing to stop rapid settlement activity, Reagan declared that "the United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transitional period." He publicly urged Israel to adopt a "settlement freeze," saying that this "could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks."

While in the talking points, President Reagan said that the United States backed the view that external security "must remain in Israel's hands during the transitional period," and that Washington would oppose any "provisions which represent a legitimate threat to Israel's security, reasonably defined," in his speech the president explicitly rejected the Israeli view, propounded by Defense Minister Sharon, that all the settlements filled a security need. Reagan declared that "further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated." In the talking points, the president stated that the United States would oppose "dismantlement of the existing settlements" during the transitional period, but this intended reassurance to the Begin government was undercut by the assertion that the ultimate status of the settlements "must be determined in the course of the final status negotiations," and the further reassurance to King Hussein that the United States "will not support their continuation as extraterritorial outposts."

While calling on Israel to show "magnanimity, vision, and courage" to achieve peace, President Reagan also called on the Palestinian people to "recognize that their own political aspirations are inextricably bound to recognition of Israel's right to a secure future." In the talking points, Reagan reiterated that the United States would maintain its commitment to Israel not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it had met the conditions previously set down, i.e., recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance of security council resolutions 242 and 338. The president called on the Arab states to "accept the reality of Israel, and the reality that peace and justice are to be gained only through hard, fair, direct negotiation." He acknowledged Israel's security concerns, and said that during the transitional five-year autonomy period the Palestinians of the West Bank would
have to prove not only that they would run their own affairs, but also that “such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's security.”

President Reagan outlined several areas, including the utilization of joint water resources, in which there would be natural interaction and, hopefully, cooperation among Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians. In the talking points, he said that the United States would oppose “isolation of the West Bank and Gaza from Israel,” implying a continuation of the existing economic ties and free movement of persons back and forth.

With regard to Jerusalem, President Reagan declared that this city “must remain undivided,” adding, however, the longstanding American view that “its final status must be determined through negotiations.” In the talking points, Reagan also endorsed the view, advocated earlier by U.S. special envoy Sol Linowitz, that “the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem” be permitted to participate in the election of the West Bank-Gaza authority. Ambassador Linowitz had tried, unsuccessfully, to convince the Israelis that such a form of “absentee ballot” for Arab Jerusalemites did not imply that the territory of East Jerusalem was part of the West Bank.

President Reagan made it clear that he was determined to stick to his position even if, as anticipated, it would provoke a critical reaction from the Israeli government or among some of the Arabs. He informed Prime Minister Begin that the same proposals had been given to King Hussein, who was giving them “serious attention,” and that “Hussein understands” that “Camp David is the only base that we will accept for negotiations.” The proposals were also being discussed with the Saudis. Should the response be positive, the United States planned to take immediate steps to relaunch the autonomy talks with the broadest possible participation.

**Reaction to the Reagan Plan**

The negative reaction of the Begin government to the Reagan initiative was swift and total. Within 24 hours the Israeli cabinet adopted a resolution declaring that President Reagan's proposals either went beyond the provisions of the Camp David agreement or “contradict it entirely.” The cabinet offered a point by point rebuttal of the American proposals with regard to Jerusalem, security, the settlements, the definition of full autonomy, ties of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan, possible Israeli sovereignty over the territories, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. While endorsing President Reagan’s stated opposition to a Palestinian state, the cabinet pointed out that “were the American plan to be implemented there would be nothing to prevent King Hussein from inviting his newfound friend, Yasir Arafat, to come to Nablus and hand the rule over to him.” The result would be a PLO state allied to and armed by the Soviet Union, and this state would over time form a joint front with the neighboring Arab states to
"launch an onslaught against Israel to destroy her." The cabinet bluntly stated that since the Reagan proposals "seriously deviate from the Camp David agreement, contradict it and could create a serious danger to Israel, to its security and its future, the government of Israel has resolved that on the basis of these positions it will not enter into any negotiations with any party."

The American press headlined the Israeli response as "Begin Rejects Reagan Peace Plan," giving the impression that Israel was the intransigent party in the Middle East, and that it did not desire peace. When this was pointed out to Prime Minister Begin by a visiting American Jewish delegation in October, he said that this was an unfair impression to draw from the cabinet statement, since it also included the following:

The government of Israel is ready to renew the autonomy negotiations forthwith with the Governments of the United States and Egypt . . . and with other states and elements invited at Camp David to participate in the negotiations, with a view to reaching agreement on the establishment of full autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district, in total conformity with the Camp David accords.

It was suggested to Begin that had this paragraph been at the beginning of the cabinet's statement rather than at the very end, Israel's position might have received more balanced and sympathetic coverage in the American media.

Opposition Labor party leader Shimon Peres welcomed the Reagan plan, saying that it contained "a great deal of very positive points," as well as some points to which he might object. He stressed, as had state department spokesman John Hughes, that the Reagan plan was not a "dictat" or imposed solution, but only a "basis for negotiations." Peres had recently urged reviving the so-called Jordanian option, under which much of the heavily populated area of the West Bank would be returned to Jordan, with Israel retaining a security belt, this in accordance with the Allon plan, propounded by the late foreign minister in the Labor alignment government. Since this was similar in major respects to the Reagan initiative, the opposition Alignment urged the Knesset to accept the positive aspects of the U.S. initiative and agree to negotiations on issues in dispute. The opposition motion was defeated; the Knesset endorsed the Begin government rejection of the Reagan plan by a vote of 50 to 36.

Many people in the American Jewish community tended to favor the Labor party's approach to the Palestinian question, either because they found it ideologically more to their taste than the religio-historical, nationalistic approach of the Likud, or because they believed it had a greater practical chance of success. In any case, since the Labor party had former chiefs of staff, defense ministers, and generals to support its position of territorial compromise with Jordan in the West Bank, there was room for
disagreement with the Begin government’s categorical declaration that the Reagan plan constituted a grave danger to Israel’s security. Accordingly, the response within the organized American Jewish community to the U.S. initiative tended to be temperate and balanced. American Jewish Committee president Maynard I. Wishner maintained that there were a “number of positive aspects of the Reagan peace plan” which were “obscured by several procedural faults.” The first fault was the absence of adequate consultation with Israel before extensive discussions had been held by the United States with the Arab nations. Second, Reagan’s approach “missed the genius of Camp David, the process of taking one step at a time, ... allowing further steps to evolve, rather than specifying outcomes in advance.” The third tactical error was that the United States “stepped into a double role, that of protagonist for certain positions as well as of mediator.” Wishner noted, however, that President Reagan had not made acceptance of all his points a precondition for the resumption of negotiations, and that Israel had also indicated a readiness to enter negotiations forthwith. The American Jewish Committee president therefore called on “Jordan and moderate Palestinians” to enter into negotiations with Israel, noting that the history of the Sadat peace initiative showed that “anything is possible once negotiations get under way.”

In a speech in Washington on September 12, Wishner went somewhat further in giving qualified endorsement to the Reagan initiative. Despite some objectionable features, he said, President Reagan’s effort “deserves thoughtful and thorough consideration,” and represents “a reasonable approach to be dealt with on its merits.” Turning to the question of Reagan’s call for a settlement freeze, Wishner noted that the American Jewish Committee had urged a moratorium on new settlement construction after Egypt had agreed to negotiate with Israel, and that Prime Minister Begin had indeed agreed on a three-month freeze at Camp David. Wishner said that if King Hussein joined the peace process, “I would again be willing to call upon Israel for such pause and restraint.” In subsequent debates within the American Jewish Committee, Wishner’s position was endorsed, while the more radical position of calling on Israel for an unconditional settlement freeze unlinked to Hussein’s entry into negotiations was defeated.

After a meeting with Secretary of State Schultz on September 2, Julius Berman, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, said that while the Reagan plan contained “a lot of solid points,” his group had told the secretary that they found it “on balance, in terms of moving forward, not constructive.” Berman expressed concern that the Reagan administration would hurt peace prospects by deviating from its role as an honest broker enjoying the confidence of all
parties. Presenting a specific American plan "does violence to the spirit of Camp David." For peace negotiations to succeed, he explained, it was critical that the United States "not pre-ordain the ultimate results." In a formal letter to President Reagan, Berman reiterated the view that it was not Israeli settlements, but Jordan's refusal to negotiate with Israel, that was the fundamental obstacle to peace.

The New York Times, on September 7, gave front-page coverage to the comment by Thomas Dine, executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) that there was "a lot of value" in President Reagan's Middle East peace plan. Since AIPAC was the official pro-Israel lobby in Washington, Times reporter Bernard Gwertzman considered Dine's comment to be in the category of a man bites dog story. Another of Israel's major supporters in Washington, Senator Rudy Boschwitz (R., Minn.), chairman of the foreign relations subcommittee on the Middle East, said that the speech "had positive value" and he praised the president for taking "considerable political risk" in the effort to get King Hussein to act.

In the Arab world, the Reagan initiative received a mixed reaction. It was welcomed by President Mubarak of Egypt and Mayor Elias Freij of Bethlehem. King Hussein reiterated in public his private pledge to give it "serious study." The Reagan plan was rejected out of hand by Damascus radio, which denounced it as "a new maneuver in an established American policy that supports Israel's aggression, expansionist plans, and racist goals." Libya and South Yemen also denounced the American initiative. While some PLO leaders said they saw some "good points" in President Reagan's initiative, they invariably criticized his failure to support an independent Palestinian state and provide an explicit role for the PLO.

The final declaration issued by the Arab League summit conference in Fez, on September 9, made no reference to the Reagan plan. Instead, it noted that it had taken into account two Arab plans in its deliberations. The first was that of Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba, who had long counselled the Palestinians to base their claim to an independent state on the UN General Assembly's Palestine partition plan of 1947, which the Zionist leadership of what was to become Israel had accepted, but which the Arabs had rejected at the time. The second plan explicitly mentioned in the Arab League declaration was that of Saudi king Fahd. The eight principles adopted by the Arab summit were a somewhat tougher version of the original Fahd plan. The Fez summit called for Israeli withdrawal from "all Arab territories occupied in 1967 including Arab al Qods (Jerusalem)," the dismantling of Israeli settlements in Arab territories, and the "establishment of an independent Palestinian state with al Qods as its capital." Jewish access to the Western Wall was implied in a call for "freedom of worship and practice of religious rites for all religions in the holy shrines." Those
who had hoped that Jordan would be given a mandate to negotiate were disappointed by the Fez declaration’s reaffirmation of “the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination . . . under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, its sole and legitimate representative.” Indemnification was to be paid to all Palestinians “who do not desire to return.”

Some western observers claimed to see implicit recognition of Israel in the Fez declaration’s statement that “the (UN) security council guarantees peace among all states of the region including the independent Palestinian state,” as well as in the observation that “the security council guarantees the respect of these principles.” This was not likely to reassure Israel in view of the security council’s patent failure to guarantee peace between Iraq and Iran, or to bring about an end to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Reference to the UN security council was reportedly inserted at Syrian and PLO insistence in order to provide a renewed role for the Soviet Union, which possessed veto power in the council.) Moreover, in view of Arab denial of Israel’s legitimacy, the omission of any explicit mention of Israel in the context of the phrase “all states of the region including the independent Palestinian state,” as well as the failure to limit the borders of the proposed Palestinian state, left open the ominous interpretation that it was designed eventually to replace the State of Israel entirely. The immediate objective, stated in the Fez declaration, was the placing of the West Bank and Gaza Strip “under the control of the United Nations for a transitory period not exceeding a few months.”

Pessimists noted that by simply restating Arab demands and once again refusing to assume any explicit Arab responsibility to bring about peace, the Fez declaration constituted a rejection of President Reagan’s clear call to “accept the reality of Israel, and the reality that peace and justice are to be gained only through hard, fair, direct negotiation.” Optimists saw as a good sign the absence of explicit condemnation of the Reagan plan, and regarded the Fez declaration as an Arab consensus position, which might serve as an opening bargaining position. This more optimistic view was bolstered by the Fez summit decision to send delegations to Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, and Peking—the capitals of the five permanent members of the UN security council—to explain the Arab League position. Meanwhile, King Hussein and PLO chief Arafat intensified their discussions in an attempt to overcome mutual suspicion and achieve an agreed formula for Palestinian-Jordanian cooperation.

In other actions, the Fez summit rejected a Sudanese proposal that Egypt be formally readmitted to the Arab League. However, it did agree that individual Arab states should be free to resume bilateral relations with Egypt. The Arab summit waffled on the request of Lebanon that the Arab League terminate the mission of the Arab deterrent force in Lebanon and
thus call for the removal of the Syrian army. The Fez declaration merely noted that “the Lebanese and Syrian governments will start negotiations on measures to be taken in the light of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.”

Conclusion

As the year ended, American influence and prestige in the Middle East far outshone that of the Soviet Union. This was true even though the hasty withdrawal of American marines from Beirut in early September, and the consequent inability of the United States to prevent the massacre in the Palestinian camps, somewhat weakened American credibility as a protector of the Palestinians. The return of the marines later in the month, and active American efforts to bring about Lebanese-Israeli negotiations for the withdrawal of Israeli forces in the context of the termination of the state of war between the two countries, once again underscored the crucial position of the United States in relation to Israel and the other states of the region.

Much of the acrimony in Israeli-American relations that had developed in the course of the Lebanon war abated by the end of 1982. The underlying sense of shared democratic values between Jerusalem and Washington and their common concern to resist Soviet expansion and radical penetration of the Middle East once again came to the fore. The Reagan plan remained a matter of dispute between the United States and Israel, but this was more a potential than an actual issue as long as Jordan and the Palestinian leadership were unprepared to commit themselves in support of President Reagan’s plan. At year’s end, King Hussein was still sitting on the fence.

Fears of serious and permanent erosion of support for Israel on Capitol Hill, frequently mooted during the height of the Lebanon war, failed to materialize. On the contrary, as measured in terms of United States economic and military aid to Israel, the situation actually improved. On December 14, Congress approved a total of $2.485 billion in aid for Israel for fiscal 1983. Not only was the total $300 million greater than the year before, but Congress sweetened the terms. The administration had proposed that only $1.025 billion be in the form of a grant and the remainder a loan, but Congress stipulated that $1.535 billion, or more than 60 percent of the total, be in the form of a grant. Public opinion surveys also indicated that among the American public at large, Israel had regained much of the traditional sympathy it enjoyed before the outbreak of the war in Lebanon.
U.S. Public Opinion Polls and the Lebanon War

by Geraldine Rosenfield

Between June 6 and the end of September 1982 a number of polls measured American reactions to the Israeli incursion into Lebanon and the subsequent Beirut massacre. This article examines ten such polls and compares them with earlier ones.

The polls are as follows: Gallup, June 11-14; NBC, June 14-16; Harris, June 18-22; CBS, June 26-27; Los Angeles Times, July 4-8; Gallup, August 4-5 (Newsweek, August 16); NBC, August 9-10; ABC/Washington Post, August 17; Gallup, September 22-23 (Newsweek, October 4); ABC/Washington Post, September 24-26.*

Findings

Reading the poll responses chronologically, it is clear that there was some decrease in support for Israel as well as in seeing Israel as an ally. The popularity of Prime Minister Menachem Begin dropped with increasing media coverage of the events in Lebanon. Simultaneously, there was a rise in pro-Arab sentiment, though Israel was still preferred to the Arab nations. Only Egypt was looked upon as favorably as Israel.

Two of the ten polls asked about American Jews, and for the first time in several years the issue of the loyalty of Jews to the United States surfaced as a significant factor. What is more, many Americans, who in previous years had been almost unaware of the existence of antisemitism, stated that they expected it to increase because of events in Lebanon.

Between 20 and 25 per cent of the respondents consistently fell into the “don’t know” category. In fact, on September 24, an ABC poll found as many as 44 per cent of Americans saying that they were not following Middle East events closely. (It has been repeatedly shown that many Americans are not interested in foreign affairs.)

Support/Sympathy

The standard question is: “In the Middle East, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations?” Table 1 shows how feelings

*See Appendix for tables.
about Israel have fluctuated over the years, depending on events, but always remaining between 40 and 50 per cent approving. Sympathy for the Arabs has grown steadily during the same period, with a jump from 18 to 27 per cent occurring after the Beirut massacre (while support for Israel remained close to 50 per cent). A likely assumption is that sympathy for the Arabs in August and September 1982 came from the ranks of those who in previous polls had said "neither." Note the drop in this category from 29 per cent in June 1982 to 12 per cent in September 1982 (Table 1).

On the whole, the public supported Israel over the Arabs by a margin of nearly two to one in June 1982 (Table 2). This was essentially the same as in June 1980, when CBS reported a ratio of 43 to 23 per cent.

After the Beirut massacre, a question about sympathy for Israel's position now as compared with the previous year (Table 3) indicated a sharp drop in support for the Jewish state: 51 per cent of the respondents were less sympathetic.

Perceptions of Israel

How is Israel's government regarded by Americans? Do Americans think of Israel as an ally? In July respondents were fairly evenly divided about Israel (Table 4): 46 per cent had a favorable impression of the Israeli government, whereas 48 per cent did not. A similar division manifested itself with regard to Saudi Arabia (45 to 45 per cent), while Egypt was seen in a far more positive light (59 to 27 per cent).

A question posed by Harris asked respondents to label various countries in the Middle East as either allies, friends, non-friends, or enemies (Table 5). Over a third saw Israel as an ally, and more than two-fifths as a friend. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were seen as friendly by more Americans, but were less often labeled as allies.

On three occasions an ABC question asked whether certain countries were reliable allies (Table 6). In October 1981, 64 per cent of the respondents had seen Israel as a reliable ally. By September 1982, however, only 40 per cent held this view. Still, with Egypt at 41 per cent, Israel and Egypt were the Middle East countries that Americans regarded most highly.

After the first news accounts of the Beirut massacre, most Americans judged Israel to be either partially or entirely responsible (Table 7).

Lebanon

The public seems not to have known its own mind on the subject of Israel's action in Lebanon.

A week after Israel made its move into Lebanon, Gallup asked about Israeli military operations to stop Palestinian artillery attacks (Table 8).
More people said they approved (40 per cent) than disapproved (35 per cent). Several days later, however—presumably following intensive TV coverage—there was a sharp reversal in response to a similar NBC question (Table 9): 51 per cent disapproved and 25 per cent approved. A week later the respondents were almost evenly divided; asked by CBS whether Israel was right or wrong to go into Lebanon to stop the PLO, 34 per cent said right and 38 per cent replied wrong (Table 10).

Contradictory attitudes abounded. After the initial approval and subsequent disapproval, Americans seem to have wanted Israel to defeat its enemy, but without being aggressive (Tables 11 and 12), and to remain in Lebanon until a buffer zone was established, yet without having attacked in the first place (Tables 13 and 14). Despite growing disapproval by August, more respondents felt that Israel's action was justified than not (Tables 15 and 16). The findings of the ABC poll conducted on September 24–26 (Tables 17 and 18) were particularly contradictory: by more than four to one, Americans felt that removing the PLO from Lebanon would change things for the better; yet, 46 per cent of the same respondents felt that the Lebanese invasion was unjustified. (Compare the wording in Tables 16 and 18 for a possible explanation of the difference in response. In Table 16, Israel is “sending troops into Lebanon,” in 18, Israel is “invading Lebanon.”)

American Aid for Israel

On the whole, Americans approved of United States policy toward Israel. In July three-fifths said they wanted United States policy to remain as it was (Table 22). In August a plurality of 43 per cent stated that the United States gave Israel the right amount of military aid (Table 24). When asked specifically about reducing military aid to Israel, the respondents were equally divided, with 44 per cent saying yes and 46 per cent saying no (Table 19). On two occasions, military aid reduction was mentioned as one of a number of possible American responses to events in Lebanon. Within that framework, in June (Table 20), 24 per cent of Americans favored a reduction in military aid; in August (Table 23), 27 per cent said that the United States should suspend military aid for the time being, while 16 per cent wanted it cut off permanently. The most decisive response came to a question about selling F16 fighter planes to Israel: 55 per cent disapproved (Table 21).

Menachem Begin

Prior to the Beirut massacre, Prime Minister Begin enjoyed the good opinion of the American people. The 1978 Camp David agreement had brought his favorable rating to 59 per cent (Table 26), and in July 1982 three-fifths of the respondents still had a favorable impression of him (Table
Three ABC polls showed a lower favorable rating, and a steady decline from March to September 1982 (Table 28).

To a question in the September 22–23 Gallup poll (Table 29) whether Prime Minister Begin's policies were hurting support for Israel, fully 70 per cent of the national sample (and 78 per cent of an oversample of Jews) said yes. But the answers to this question, not to speak of the question itself, may have reflected the emotions of the moment.

American Jews

Two polls taken at the end of September posed questions about American Jews. In addition, Gallup interviewed an oversample of American Jews for their opinions. The response to the question about antisemitism, which asked whether people thought it would increase because of Mideast developments (Table 30), was striking. Heretofore most Americans had not thought of rising antisemitism as a real likelihood. In February 1981 Yankelovich, Skelly & White had asked whether people thought an increase in antisemitism was possible. Only a fifth of the sample thought so, and of that fifth only a tenth said problems in the Middle East could be a cause. Events in Lebanon obviously accounted for the 51 per cent who told Gallup in September 1982 that increased antisemitism was a possibility (Table 30). More than three-quarters of the Jews feared a rise in antisemitism.

Another disquieting element was the response to an ABC question about American Jewish support for Israel (Table 31). Forty-one per cent of the national sample agreed that Jews would support Israel even if this worked against the best interests of the United States. In the past (Gallup, March 1982 and other polls), only 30 per cent had expressed the view that Jews were more loyal to Israel than to the United States.

Of course, most Jews did not see themselves as favoring Israel to the detriment of the best interests of the United States. When Gallup asked Jews what they saw as the most appropriate role for American Jews in regard to Israel (Table 32), slightly less than a quarter urged unconditional support, more than a third recommended taking an active role to affect Israel's policies, and slightly under a third wanted to "remain neutral."

Despite the shock of the Beirut massacre (Table 7), American Jews did not withdraw their staunch support for Israel. When Gallup asked (September 22–23) whether United States aid to Israel should be suspended to force an Israeli pullout from Lebanon, 75 per cent of American Jews said no, compared with 38 per cent of the national sample (Table 25).
APPENDIX

TABLE 1. In the Middle East situation are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ABC 9/82</th>
<th>ABC 8/82</th>
<th>L.A. Times 7/82</th>
<th>Gallup 6/82</th>
<th>Gallup 5/82</th>
<th>Gallup '81</th>
<th>Gallup '79</th>
<th>Gallup '75</th>
<th>Gallup '67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Nations</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2. What should the United States do: pay more attention to the Arabs or give strongest support to Israel? (CBS, June 26–27)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>41</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both/Neither</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3. Compared with a year ago, would you say you are more sympathetic or less sympathetic to the Israeli position? (Gallup, September 22–23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Sample</th>
<th>American Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4. What is your impression of the government of the following as of today? (L.A. Times, July 4–8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 5. Is this country a close ally of the United States, friendly, not friendly, enemy, not sure? (Harris, June 18–22)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ally</th>
<th>Friendly</th>
<th>Not Friendly</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 6. Tell me whether you think this country is a reliable ally of the United States—one that can be trusted to cooperate with the U.S. (ABC/Washington Post, September 24–26)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reliable</th>
<th>Not Reliable</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/26</td>
<td>8/17</td>
<td>10/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/26</td>
<td>8/17</td>
<td>10/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26 n.a.</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9 n.a.</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7. Which of the following comes closest to your view? Israel cannot be held responsible for the massacre because it was carried out by: (Gallup, September 22–23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Sample</th>
<th>American Jews</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Christians</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel must bear partial responsibility</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel is very much responsible</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 8. Israel recently began military operations in southern Lebanon to stop Palestinian artillery attacks on settlements in Israel. Do you approve or disapprove of this action? (Gallup, June 11–14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 9. Have you heard about recent fighting between Arab and Israeli forces in southern Lebanon? Do you approve or disapprove of the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon? (NBC, August 9–10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>8/82*</th>
<th>6/82</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haven't Heard or Read</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In August the order of the words Arab and Israeli was reversed and southern was omitted before Lebanon.

TABLE 10. Some people say Israel is right to fight in Lebanon in order to stop the PLO. Others say Israel is wrong to go into Lebanese territory. Do you think that Israel is right or wrong to fight in Lebanon? (CBS, June 26–27)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 11. Do you think Israel’s military action in Lebanon was defensive or aggressive—or haven’t you heard enough yet to say? (L.A. Times, July 4–8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unaware</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure/No Answer</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 12. Should the Israeli army have finished the job of pushing the PLO out of Lebanon? (L.A. Times, July 4–8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unaware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should Not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure/No Answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 20 | 46 | 24 | 10 |

TABLE 13. Should the Israeli army stay until a buffer zone is established between southern Lebanon and northern Israel? (L.A. Times, July 4–8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unaware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should Not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure/No Answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 20 | 51 | 18 | 11 |

TABLE 14. Should Israel have attacked Lebanon to begin with? (L.A. Times, July 4–8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unaware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should Not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure/No Answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 13 | 24 | 50 | 13 |

TABLE 15. The Israelis sent their military forces into Lebanon. Do you approve or disapprove of this action? (Gallup, August 4–5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 30 | 60 | 10 |

TABLE 16. The Israelis have given the following reasons for sending troops into Lebanon: to stop the rocket attacks on Israeli settlements and to remove PLO military forces from Lebanon. Do you think the Israelis were justified in sending troops into Lebanon for these reasons or not? (Gallup, August 4–5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Justified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 47 | 41 | 12 |
TABLE 17. Do you think the Israeli invasion to remove the PLO from Lebanon will change things for the better or worse in the Middle East? (ABC/Washington Post, September 24–26)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/24–26</th>
<th>8/17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change for the Better</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change for the Worse</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Won't Change Things at All</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Opinion</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 18. Some people say Israel was justified in invading Lebanon. Others say Israel was not justified. What do you think? (ABC/Washington Post, September 24–26)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/24–26</th>
<th>8/17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justified</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Justified</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Don't Know/No Opinion</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 19. Should the United States reduce military aid to Israel? (NBC, June 14–16)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Sure</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 20. What should the United States do? (CBS, June 26–27)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Publicly Support Israel</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Say or Do Nothing</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Publicly Criticize Israel</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reduce Military Aid to Israel</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Opinion</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 21. Should Congress approve the sale of F-16 fighter planes to Israel? (L.A. Times, July 4–8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approve</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Approve</strong></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Sure/No Answer</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 22. Do you think United States foreign policy should be more pro-Israel or more pro-Arab, or should it stay the way it is? (L.A. Times, July 4–8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Pro-Israel</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Pro-Arab</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 23. In the past few days Israel has sent its military forces into West Beirut to try to expel the PLO military forces. What should the United States government do? (Gallup, August 4–5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support Israel's Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticize Israel &amp; Pressure Diplomatically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspend Military Aid for Time Being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanently Cut Off Military Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 24. How do you feel about United States military aid to Israel? (NBC, August 9–10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8/82</th>
<th>1/82</th>
<th>8/81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We Give Too Much Aid</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Amount of Aid</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Enough Aid</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 25. Do you think United States aid to Israel should be suspended or reduced in order to force a pullout of Israel’s forces from Lebanon? (Gallup, September 22–23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Sample</th>
<th>American Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should Be Suspended</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should Not Be Suspended</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 26. On a scale of plus-5 (most favorable) to minus-5 (most unfavorable) how far up or down the scale would you rate Menachem Begin? (Gallup, June 11–14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>6/82</th>
<th>1981 (After Camp David)</th>
<th>1978 (Before Camp David)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Favorable</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Favorable</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 27. What is your impression of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, as of today? (L.A. Times, July 4–8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 28. Would you say your feelings about Prime Minister Menachem Begin are: (ABC/Washington Post, August 17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/26/82</th>
<th>8/17/82</th>
<th>3/8/82</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 29. Do you think Israeli Prime Minister Begin's policies are hurting support for Israel in the United States? (Gallup, September 22–23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Sample</th>
<th>American Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/22/82</td>
<td>9/22/82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 30. Do you think antisemitism in the United States is likely to increase because of recent developments in the Mideast? (Gallup, September 22–23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Sample</th>
<th>American Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 31. American Jews will support anything the country of Israel does even if it is against the best interest of the United States. Do you agree or disagree? (ABC, September 24–26)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 32. What do you believe is the most appropriate role for American Jews concerning Israel? (Gallup, September 22–23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>American Jews</th>
<th>9/82</th>
<th>9/81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Take an active role in trying to affect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel's policies</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Israel's government regardless of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Israeli government actions</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to remain neutral</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>