Review of the Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES
Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations

IN OBSERVING ITS FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY in early 1979, the National Conference of Christians and Jews released a national survey prepared by Louis Harris on prejudice in America. While focusing heavily on white-black relations and attitudes toward Roman Catholics, the most surprising portion of the survey dealt with black-Jewish relations; it indicated that blacks tended to be more anti-Jewish than other groups. The survey found that 17 to 32 per cent of whites agreed with a series of negative stereotypes about Jews; while 37 to 56 per cent of blacks did so. Anti-Jewish and anti-Israel feelings were particularly pronounced among younger and better educated blacks, and among black leaders. The survey also noted a corresponding increase in anti-black feeling among Jews. The Harris findings forecast what later in the year became the bitterest black-Jewish confrontation since the 1968 New York City school strike—the furor surrounding the resignation of Andrew Young as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

Race Relations

BLACKS AND JEWS

As the year began, many black leaders saw the condition of their group as deteriorating. Their sense of anxiety was based on continuing resistance to school desegregation efforts and a growing conservative mood in the country that led to calls for cutbacks in government services, particularly to the poor.

New York mayor Edward Koch, whose administration had come under sharp attack from black leaders in 1978, continued to be a focus of racial animosities. The Baptist Ministers Conference of Harlem, charging that Koch had shown “insensitivity” in his poverty reform efforts, withdrew an invitation for him to take part in services marking the birthday of the late Martin Luther King, Jr. The New York Urban League called on Koch to put a halt to “name calling and strident rhetoric that has led to a polarization of the city’s racial and ethnic groups.” A move got underway, led by a black state senator, to amend the New York City charter so as to permit the recall of a mayor, but most black leaders stood apart from the effort.
Koch moved to allay some of the anger against him in a series of community visits in which he underscored his desire to end discrimination. (At the same time he reiterated his belief in a single standard, with no preferential treatment.) The New York *Amsterdam News*, which had been assailing Koch's dealings with the black community, toned down its attacks on him. On a related front, a new Crown Heights coalition of black and Jewish leaders was formed in May and announced its intention to establish a "hot line" to head-off confrontations. But the cycle of black-Jewish tensions continued to be hard to break. At a "constituent hour" in Harlem, Koch was greeted by boos, catcalls, and antisemitic remarks.

In 1978 black-Jewish tensions had been heightened by the intense debate over the Bakke case, which involved a quota program for minorities at the University of California Medical School at Davis. In 1979 attention centered on another case—*United Steelworkers of America v. Weber*. Weber was a white worker who had been barred from a special training program, at the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Company, which reserved half its places for blacks; he had more seniority than two of the blacks accepted into the program. Weber brought suit in federal district court charging that the arrangement violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held the training program unlawful, as did the U.S. court of appeals for the fifth circuit. Unlike in the Bakke case, the major Jewish community relations agencies split over the question of filing briefs before the Supreme Court. The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) entered the case, but the American Jewish Committee and American Jewish Congress refrained from doing so. Samuel Rabinove, legal director for the American Jewish Committee, explained that in the Bakke case some of the blacks admitted under the quota were less qualified than the whites who were rejected, whereas in the Weber case the black workers were just as qualified. It was clear, however, that the decision of the two Jewish agencies was motivated, in part, by a desire not to exacerbate further the tensions between blacks and Jews.

On June 27 in a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Kaiser program. Speaking for the majority, Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. declared: "It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by the nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had been excluded from the American dream for so long constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger disputed this conclusion, calling it "contrary to the explicit language of the statute."

The Weber decision was applauded by civil rights leaders, as well as by many in the labor movement and the liberal media. On the other hand, Professor Carl Cohen of the University of Michigan, writing on the subject in *Commentary*, entitled his article "Justice Debased." As Nathan Lewin noted in *The New Republic*, the Weber decision was carefully circumscribed in that the court "was careful to avoid placing its seal of approval on all conceivable quota plans." In September the Supreme Court was asked in *Fullilove v. Kreps* to determine the constitutionality of a
provision in a federal law which required that at least ten per cent of public works funds be awarded to minority-owned construction companies. As in the Weber case, the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress refrained from participating, while the ADL filed an anti-quota brief.

THE ANDREW YOUNG AFFAIR

It was in the context of already strained black-Jewish relations that the Andrew Young affair exploded with tremendous force. On July 26, as part of the U.S. government's effort at the UN to forestall a Security Council meeting on Palestinian rights, Young visited the home of the Kuwaiti UN ambassador in New York. As Young later explained, he had told the ambassador that he "could not meet with representatives of the PLO," but neither could he refuse an invitation from a member of the Security Council to come to his home for a business meeting, nor dictate "who you can have in your home." When Young arrived, he encountered Zehdi Labib Terzi, the PLO's observer at the UN. Young later claimed, "I made no attempt to negotiate any arrangements or any language with Terzi, but reiterated U.S. government policy of not wanting the council debate then." However, Young did not report the meeting to the State Department.

The unauthorized meeting with the PLO official came at a time when the U.S. administration was making overtures to the PLO. In an interview with the New York Times early in August, President Carter had declared that he did not think a stable peace could be arrived at in the Middle East without a solution to the Palestinian problem. He added that the Palestinian cause could be likened to the "civil rights movement here in the U.S." These comments evoked a sharp reaction among Jewish leaders. A statement released by the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations declared, "We are dismayed and disappointed that the president should even think of the civil rights movement, characterized by non-violent means and seeking the liberties that our Constitution promises to all Americans, in the same breath as the obscene acts of a terrorist gang which seeks through violent means to eliminate the Jewish state." "My fear," commented Nathan Perlmutter, head of the Anti-Defamation League, "is that this is part of the greening of the PLO. We cannot but be concerned that the president is preparing the American public for negotiations with the PLO that would be inconsistent with previous promises." Black organizations, including the New York Urban League, also assailed the civil rights analogy.

Information about Young's meeting with a PLO official soon began to circulate. Following Young's resignation there were media reports that the meeting had been bugged by Israeli agents. In an effort to head off adverse criticism, Young met with Israeli UN ambassador Yehuda Blum to deny that "there was some grand conspiracy to change our policy toward the PLO." He argued that Israel should keep quiet about the incident. Stuart E. Eisenstat, the president's chief domestic advisor, who served as a liaison with both the Israeli government and American Jewish
organizations, explored the possibility of having Israel issue a statement opposing Young's resignation, but the idea was rejected. Instead, Israel lodged a protest with the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv.

When Young was first asked for an explanation by the State Department, he reported that he had met Terzi accidentally when he dropped in to see the Kuwaiti official. After this account was branded a lie, Young further explained, "I did not lie. I didn't tell all of the truth." When U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance learned the full truth about the matter, according to a Newsweek account, he went to the White House and told the president that Young had damaged U.S.-Israel relations and had to go. Congress was in recess, but Senate majority leader Robert C. Byrd quickly called on the president to dismiss Young. On August 15 Young resigned.

"I have chosen to remove myself," he said. "I see myself in some ways continuing to jeopardize the administration." At a news conference he added, "I really don't feel a bit sorry for a thing I have done. I have tried to interpret to our country some of the mood of the rest of the world . . . I come from the ranks of those who had known and identified with some level of oppression in the world . . ."

No prominent Jewish leader was identified publicly as calling for Young's resignation. Charlotte Jacobson, chairman of the American section of the World Zionist Organization, stated before the resignation that it was up to Carter and Vance "to give concrete assurances" that the Young-Terzi meeting was "not part of a master strategy to change the United States position." On the day the New York Times carried the story of the resignation, it quoted Howard Squadron, president of the American Jewish Congress, as saying that "even more serious than Andy Young's indiscretions and deceptions is the fundamental uncertainty as to where this country now stands." "I prefer to hold his boss responsible, to wit, the president," Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York said. In a letter to President Carter, Theodore Mann, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, stated, "... we did not ask for Ambassador Young's resignation, nor is his resignation an issue in the relationship between the Jewish and black communities. Our differences are with the State Department policy."

Despite this, the nation's black leaders were stunned by Young's resignation. Mayor Richard Hatcher of Gary, Indiana called it a "forced resignation" that was "an insult to black people." Reverend Jesse Jackson of Chicago, head of People United to Save Humanity (PUSH), asked whether Young had not become "a fall guy in a shifting policy." He called for a White House meeting of black and Jewish leaders to iron out relations between the two groups, which he said were "more tense than they've been in 25 years."

The black-Jewish confrontation quickly escalated. On August 22 an emergency meeting of black leaders was convened at the offices of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in New York City. Some 200 people attended, including representatives of every major black organization. Called to discuss the Young resignation, the meeting quickly expanded into a heated discussion of black grievances against Jews. A working paper expressing indignation over
Young's resignation was adopted. The prepared statement on black-Jewish relations produced what *Afro*, Washington's leading black newspaper, called "dynamite." Several black leaders who participated in the meeting stated later that they had never experienced such intense anti-Jewish feeling as was expressed at the session.

As finally adopted, the statement on black-Jewish relations acknowledged that individual Jews and Jewish organizations had worked with blacks as part of a liberal coalition. It added, however, "that Jewish organizations and leadership had done so when it was in their perceived interest to do so." Other salient portions of the statement charged that "within the past ten years some Jewish organizations have become apologists for the racial status quo," and that "powerful Jewish organizations opposed the interests of the black community in the DeFunis, Bakke, and Weber cases . . ." The statement concluded with an assertion that blacks "... were deeply affronted by the inherent arrogance in the attacks on Ambassador Young by certain Jewish groups . . ."

The meeting gave expression to repressed feelings of anger toward Jews that had been building for more than a decade. Kenneth Clark, the black psychologist, expressed this most dramatically when he declared after the adoption of the statement on black-Jewish relations, "This is our declaration of independence," i.e., independence from undue Jewish influence. A growing black-Jewish confrontation was now acknowledged in the media. The New York *Times* captioned its story on the meeting, "Black Leaders Air Grievances on Jews," while the New York *Daily News* ran the headline, "Jews, Carter, Denounced by Blacks."

Concern felt by Jews continued to grow as black leaders moved closer to the PLO. Shortly after Young's resignation, a Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) delegation led by Reverend Joseph E. Lowery met with Terzi, the PLO's UN representative. After the meeting, the black group issued a statement declaring its support for "the human rights of all Palestinians, including the right to self-determination in their homeland." (The statement went on to acknowledge Israel's right to exist.) In the following days, the SCLC met with Yehuda Blum and Howard Squadron, but the rift only deepened.

Shortly after the SCLC meeting with Terzi, a ten-man SCLC delegation led by Lowery and District of Columbia congressional delegate Walter Fauntroy visited Lebanon. The SCLC leaders' embrace of Yasir Arafat, following which they joined with Arab guerrillas in singing "We Shall Overcome," attracted wide media coverage. Shortly after the SCLC's departure, Jesse Jackson arrived in the Middle East promising to bring about a "major breakthrough" for peace. He exhorted Palestinians on the West Bank to copy the U.S. civil rights movement in their struggle for an independent state, and criticized "the persecution complex" of Jews which made them "overreact to their suffering."

Throughout September public attacks on Jews and expressions of support for the PLO came from broad segments of the black community. New York *Times* editorial board member Roger Wilkins declared that Jewish leaders had intellectual contempt for blacks, and that when blacks "refused to bow to their directions, the split
had to come.” Novelist James Baldwin wrote in *The Nation* that “the Jew in America is a white man . . . is still doing the Christian’s dirty work, and black men know it.” At the conclusion of its annual meeting, the board of directors of the NAACP called on the Carter administration “to re-examine” its pledge to Israel barring U. S. negotiation with the PLO. The board indicated, also, that it fully endorsed the August 22 statement adopted by black leaders. A smaller number of blacks, including Bayard Rustin, Bernard Gifford, Tony Brown, and Julius Lester, attempted to counter these statements. Writing in the *Village Voice*, Lester denounced antisemitic attacks on Jews, and declared that blacks had been insufficiently sensitive to the violence experienced by Israelis at the hands of Arab terrorists.

Of special concern to Jews was the effort of Arabs to forge a new political alliance with blacks as part of an attempt to change American policy in the Middle East. During this time M.T. Mehdi, president of the American Arab Relations Committee, met with black leaders in New York, Philadelphia, and other communities, promising to get American companies doing business in the Arab states to invest millions of dollars in black businesses, colleges, and inner city projects. *The Christian Science Monitor* reported on September 28 that Jessie Jackson had met with Arabs representing the League of Arab States, the Arab-American Congress for Palestine Human Rights Campaign, and the Libyan government at PUSH headquarters in Chicago. It quoted him as telling the group: “. . . By October 1 there will be no black leaders left willing to come to the aid of the Palestinian cause if there is not an immediate infusion of funds into the black community from the Arab states. We will all learn to recite the alphabet without the three letters P - L - O.” Following his return from the Middle East early in October, Jackson received a contribution of $10,000 from the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, which had been trying for 12 years to establish relations with major civil rights organizations. The Arab group had paid the travel costs to the Middle East of Jackson and some members of his entourage, as well as of Joseph Lowery and other members of the SCLC. In September a black American delegation, including Georgia state representative Hosea Williams, head of the Atlanta chapter of the SCLC, traveled to Libya where a Martin Luther King, Jr. medal was conferred on Moammar Khadafy, the Libyan chief of state who had defended Arab terrorists and provided support for Idi Amin.

A great deal of anger was expressed by Jews against President Carter for having failed to clarify fully the circumstances of Young’s resignation—a step which might have blunted the confrontation. It was felt by some that the president was seeking to redirect black anger away from his administration. Carter made an attempt to lessen the black-Jewish rift in a speech at Emory University in Atlanta on August 30 in which, after strongly praising Young, he urged the two groups to resolve their differences. The controversy over Carter’s role in the Young affair continued, however, causing him to discuss the matter further on September 23. At the swearing-in ceremony for Young’s successor, the president declared that no
"American Jewish leaders or anyone else" urged him to seek the resignation of Young.

By October some black leaders were having second thoughts about the identification of the civil rights movement with the PLO. In Washington, Walter Fauntroy, chairman of the SCLC, indicated that his group had rescinded an invitation to Yasir Arafat to visit the U.S., and had cancelled a series of educational forums on the Middle East. A group of black civil rights and labor leaders, including William S. Pollard of the AFL-CIO and Bayard Rustin, president of the A. Philip Randolph Institute, arrived in Israel to meet with government leaders. Rustin summed up the viewpoint of this group when he declared, "To give credence or respectability to one terrorist organization gives it to all, and to make the PLO in any way respectable is to make the Ku Klux Klan respectable." In a directive to the NAACP's 1,700 branches early in October, Executive Director Benjamin Hooks urged that they not let the dispute about the Middle East interfere with relations between blacks and Jews. Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., head of the Urban League, broke his silence and castigated other black civil rights leaders for their approaches to the PLO, calling such initiatives "sideshow" compared with the "vital survival issues" that blacks faced. "The confusion of the past several weeks," he said, "must not be allowed to polarize the civil rights alliance, nor must it be allowed to heighten or to release feelings of racism, antisemitism or religious bigotry." These remarks were criticized by Mayor Richard Hatcher of Gary as adding to the disunity in the black community. Black columnists William Raspberry and Vernon Jarrett saw Jordan's statement as an attempt to keep Jewish funds flowing to the Urban League.

As the year drew to a close, the black-Jewish confrontation moved out of the headlines. It was clear, however, that a serious rift between the two groups remained. The Progressive National Baptist Convention, with a membership of 1.2 million blacks, announced that it would establish an office in Washington which, among other things, would monitor the ADL "as they (sic) travel about the country in their desperate efforts to keep blacks out of professional schools." A hasidic rabbi was shot to death in the racially troubled Crown Heights section of Brooklyn just prior to the trial of two hasidic men who had been charged a year and a half earlier with assaulting a black teenager. (The two men were found not guilty.) Tensions between Mayor Koch and black leaders in New York also continued.

The black-Jewish confrontation varied in intensity in different cities, being best contained in those where lines of communication and cooperative programs had not been permitted to lapse in recent years. The newest ingredient appeared to be the role of younger members of the black middle class and black intelligentsia drawn to "left" and "third world" ideologies. Negative reactions to Jews appeared to be less strong among rank and file blacks, according to a Gallup poll taken for Newsweek immediately after the Young resignation.
Religion

CULTS AND EVANGELICALS

The absolutism and mind control that characterized such cults as the Unification Church, Hari Krishna, and Jews for Jesus—all of which attracted significant numbers of Jewish youth—spurred efforts at counter action. B'nai B'rith announced an anti-cult project which encouraged concerned citizens to lobby for official investigation of the cults, and sought to aid the parents of cult members. Stimulated by concern in Congress over the Jonestown, Guyana tragedy the year before, Senator Robert Dole (R., Kansas) organized what he termed a "meeting" of an ad hoc group of House and Senate members on the dangers presented to the country by the growth of religious cults. The informal hearings early in February drew criticism from a number of religious groups, including the Synagogue Council of America, which expressed concern that the hearings would "inflame the public and obscure the delicate and complex issues which surrounded the activities of minority (religious) groups." When California authorities took action against alleged illegalities by several churches, and moved to restrict the religious activities of others, concern mounted that first amendment rights of religious freedom were being endangered.

The year saw the continued growth of fundamentalist, evangelical activity. In a surprise move on April 5, Senator Jesse Helms (R., N.C.), a prominent evangelical layman, added an amendment to allow voluntary prayer in public schools to a bill creating a new Department of Education. It secured a favorable vote. The action brought a joint response from the American Jewish Committee and the ADL calling on the Senate to "reconsider and reverse" its vote. The two agencies declared that the amendment was "a blatant attempt to circumvent the clear mandate of the Supreme Court which had outlawed school prayers." Commenting on the Helms amendment the day after the vote, President Carter told a group of editors, "I think the government ought to stay out of the prayer business." He declined, however, to say whether the move was unconstitutional. The Senate rescinded its vote a few days later, but in June the power of the pro-prayer forces was again shown by the passage of a similar bill in the House.

CATHOLICS

The year saw the continuation of strong pressure by Catholics in the "pro-life" movement to press for anti-abortion legislation. Some 60,000 people gathered in the sixth March for Life in Washington, D.C. on January 22. Earlier in the month, Protestant and Jewish clergy had marched to St. Patrick's cathedral in New York and affixed to the door a "declaration of religious conscience" which stated that Catholics had "opted for a kind of demagoguery that destroys the spirit of dialogue and sows the seeds of bitter religious discord." In response, an official of the
Archdiocese said, "Abortion is the holocaust of the 1970's." Even as the Catholic church stepped up its efforts in this area, however, there were indications that it was losing the battle among the faithful, as it had done earlier on the issues of divorce and birth control. A New York Times/CBS News poll reported that 64 per cent of Catholics (the same as for Protestants) agreed with the statement, "The right of a woman to have an abortion should be left entirely to the woman and her doctor."

Abortion opponents continued to attempt to further restrict medicaid-funded abortions for poor women. Late in June the House voted 241-180 to limit such aid to situations in which a woman's life was in jeopardy. When the Senate voted in the following month to maintain the existing arrangement of providing funding in cases of rape and incest as well, the measure was sent to a conference committee for resolution. Meanwhile, a decision was pending in the federal district court in Brooklyn in the case of McCrae v. Califano—a case centering on the claim that a limitation on medicaid-funded abortions for poor women was unconstitutional because it discriminated on religious grounds.

Many Catholics still Smarted over the defeat sustained in Congress in 1978 in efforts to obtain tuition tax credits for parents of non-public school children. This had been opposed by most Jewish groups. In a dramatic reversal of position, however, delegates to the February convention of the Rabbinical Assembly, representing Conservative rabbis, voted to support tax credits. As the new Congress got under way, Senator Patrick J. Moynihan (D., N.Y.) indicated that he would introduce two new tax credit bills—one to provide aid to college students, and the other to assist parents of elementary and secondary school children. In April the Supreme Court refused to continue a lower court order preventing New York State from reimbursing parochial schools for complying with state-mandated tests and record keeping. While this ruling freed from escrow some $20 million earmarked for 2,000 parochial schools, it made no determination of the constitutionality of the 1974 act which had been challenged by a group of organizations including the American Jewish Congress and the American Civil Liberties Union. In May a similar coalition was successful in obtaining a 6-3 decision from the Supreme Court striking down New Jersey's tax exemption for parents of children attending private schools.

The feeling continued to grow among some Catholic intellectuals that much of the opposition that Catholics faced in the political sphere reflected an underlying religious bigotry. (The Louis Harris survey, mentioned above, did in fact find that one in three white non-Catholics saw Catholics as "narrow minded.") Addressing the Cathedral Club of Brooklyn in February, Senator Moynihan cited a number of allegedly anti-Catholic tracts that had found their way into Supreme Court opinions. The reiteration of the theme of anti-Catholicism by Moynihan, Andrew M. Greeley, James Hitchcock, and Virgil Blum drew an objection from Jim Castelli of the National Catholic News Service. Conceding that anti-Catholicism was a problem, he argued that "a simplistic, paranoid, self-serving attack on anti-Catholicism is a disservice to Catholics and non-Catholics alike." Seemingly concerned about the issue, the ADL, while expressing its traditional support for separation of church and
state, held two meetings with the National Conference of Catholic Bishops on non-public school aid. The two organizations agreed to hold further discussions.

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

In February the Internal Revenue Service revised a set of guidelines aimed at denying tax exempt status to private schools which discriminated on the basis of race. While the guidelines had been prepared in order to counter the "Christian academies" that had sprung up in the South as a way of avoiding court desegregation bans, they had aroused opposition from Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant organizations which argued that the guidelines would punish their schools even though they did not discriminate on the basis of race. The revisions sought to focus more clearly on the "Christian academies," but despite this, the guidelines continued to run into opposition in Congress.

Groups such as the well-financed religious lobby Moral Majority, which was formed in June by Jerry Falwell of Lynchburg, Virginia, sought to unite the nation's religious conservatives into a coalition capable of steering America away from liberal, humanistic, and secular tendencies. Evangelical Protestants helped defeat liberal candidates, and contributed to the election of such politicians as Senator Orrin Hatch, a leader of the Republican "New Right," who told reporters, "We think—we know—this is a Christian nation, and we're here to give voice to that point of view." In its first effort as an established political group in November, the Right to Life party in New York made a good showing; its candidates did nearly as well as Conservative party candidates, and generally ran ahead of Liberal party candidates outside of New York City.

Extremism

ANTISEMITISM

Despite more frequent public expression of anti-Jewish feeling by elements of the black intelligentsia and black middle class, antisemitism continued to remain at a low level generally. The Harris survey taken for the National Conference of Christians and Jews found that only eight per cent of the American people felt that anti-Jewish sentiments were on the rise—down by 11 per cent from two years earlier; 82 per cent reported that their relationships with Jews were "pleasant and easy." However, various surveys (brought together in *Anti-Semitism in America* by Harold Quinley and Charles Y. Glock) showed that between one-in-four and one-in-five Americans harbored a number of negative stereotypes about Jews.

A highly publicized incident involved anti-Jewish remarks made by Billy Carter, the president's brother. In January, while leading a tour of Libyan businessmen and officials in Atlanta, he was quoted by the Atlanta Journal as saying that Libya's poor
international image was due to the fact that the "Jewish media tears up the Arab countries full time, as you well know." He added, "There's a hell of a lot more Arabs than there is Jews." The remarks produced a sharp reaction by Jewish groups. White House press secretary Jody Powell publicly denied that the president shared his brother's views. The following month, asked by a radio newsmen about the criticism from the Jewish community, Billy Carter said, "They can kiss my ... as far as I am concerned now." Late in February at a news conference, the president disassociated himself from these sentiments, saying that his brother was "seriously ill."

**KU KLUX KLAN AND NAZIS**

There was growing concern about indications of an upsurge of Ku Klux Klan activity, particularly in Alabama and Mississippi. While some Klan activity was noted in 22 states, including the Middle Atlantic region and California, the growing ferment in the South appeared to be in those areas where blacks were a noticeable part of the population but not enough to have real political, social, or economic power.

An important characteristic of the upsurge in Klan activity was that after several years of attempting to mold a new moderate image, the southern Klan was reverting to violence as a tactic. In addition to the standard rallies and cross burnings, Klansmen in Alabama and Mississippi were involved in shotgun attacks on the homes of black leaders, threats against interracial couples, and murder. By April 20 Klansmen had been arrested pursuant to federal warrants for such acts. While the primary Klan target was blacks, it remained openly antisemitic. There were Klan inspired incidents against synagogues in Mississippi and Maryland; in July two Klansmen were sentenced to eight years in prison for conspiring to bomb a synagogue in Baltimore.

A major incident occurred in Greensboro, North Carolina, where students had first sat in at lunch counters in 1960, sparking the modern phase of the civil rights movement. Angered by an earlier run-in with the Communist Workers party, a group of Klansmen fired into a CWP "Death to the Klan" demonstration on November 3, killing five CWP members. Later investigation showed that the attack on the rally involved a joint effort by the Klan and the American Nazi party. The episode received wide media attention and led to a meeting of five groups, four of them black, in Atlanta to formulate strategies for "actively dealing with the Klan." Fear was also expressed by some civil rights leaders that the Greensboro killings might provide Communist groups with a foothold among poor, southern blacks.

Despite heightened Klan activity, at year's end the ADL reported the Klan posed no present threat to American society. The ADL estimated that membership in 22 states had grown from 8,000 to 10,000, with sympathizers currently numbering 100,000. The ADL was particularly concerned about Klan efforts in the armed forces and called on the Defense Department to stop military personnel from joining hate groups such as the KKK and the Nazis.
In contrast to the previous year, when the furor over the possibility of a Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois received nationwide coverage, there was only isolated Nazi activity. In Cleveland, a group of 17 Nazis was routed by rock-throwing Jews. A proposed Nazi-Klan march in Philadelphia attracted much publicity but proved to be a hoax. The American Civil Liberties Union, which had suffered widespread resignations in the wake of its legal support of the Nazis in the Skokie episode, reported that it had begun to make up membership losses.

HOLOCAUST

Public interest in the Holocaust, which had been aroused by a memorable NBC television mini-series in 1978, continued to run strong. On April 29 the first televised Christian service in commemoration of the Holocaust was held at the National Cathedral in Washington. Attended by President Carter and most of the members of Congress, it was part of the observance of Holocaust Remembrance Week, which had been mandated by congressional act. At the service, the president called for ratification of the United Nations genocide treaty, which the United States had not yet passed. Earlier, the Presidential Commission on the Holocaust, created in 1978, had held its first meeting at the White House; the Commission was headed by the distinguished author Elie Wiesel. In a meeting in June, the Commission voted to recommend the establishment of a permanent national Holocaust program, combining a physical memorial and various educational efforts. When the Commission presented its final report to the president on September 27, it recommended that the memorial museum incorporate displays on Gypsies, Poles, and others murdered by the Nazis.

Attention in this country focused on a bill in the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany to repeal the statute of limitations that would bar the prosecution of Nazi war criminals after December 31, 1979. In February a delegation from the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council met with the West German ambassador in Washington to express support for the bill; also participating in the meeting were representatives of the National Council of Churches and National Council of Catholic Bishops. In May both the House and Senate passed resolutions calling for an extension of the statute of limitations. Early in July the Bundestag voted to make it possible to initiate prosecution of Nazi war criminals irrespective of the amount of time that had elapsed.

Legal action against an estimated 200 Nazi war criminals in the U.S. was stepped up, in large measure due to pressure by Jewish organizations. The special litigation unit of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which dealt with the matter, was reorganized and revitalized. In June the fifth U.S. circuit court of appeals overruled lower court actions and stripped Feodor Federenko, a former concentration camp guard, of his citizenship. At year's end the Justice Department was moving against 11 alleged Nazi war criminals, including Andrij Artukovic, former minister of interior and justice in the Nazi puppet state of Croatia, and Bishop Valerian Trifa, head of the Rumanian Orthodox episcopate.
Throughout the United States, teaching about the Holocaust was becoming an integral part of education—a fact that did not please everyone. Some groups, including German-Americans and Ukrainian-Americans, feared that an adverse reflection on themselves might be created by the study of the Hitler era, while others wanted to explore the persecution of Christians by Hitler and Stalin, as well as the slavery experience of American blacks.

**Conclusion**

Opposition by Jews to quotas, and increasing collisions with blacks, caused some to believe that American Jews were moving politically to the right. A report by black publishers in October, however, indicated that Jewish members of the U.S. House of Representatives, as a group, overwhelmingly favored legislative measures selected by the Congressional Black Caucus as “of concern to black and low-income persons.” In an article in *Society* (May-June) summarizing Jewish responses to surveys over 20 years, Alan M. Fisher noted the same tendency for Jews as a group. It seemed clear that Jews were struggling to remain identified with the liberal causes they had long supported.

**Murray Friedman**
In 1979 the Middle East was the region in which the Carter administration achieved its greatest single policy success—the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty—and suffered its most serious setbacks—the overthrow of the Shah in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Washington's failure to anticipate the latter events and to develop consistent policies in response to them resulted in serious damage to American interests. There was growing fear among both America's traditional Western allies and the non-aligned nations that the United States was no longer capable of leading the non-Communist world.

The signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty by President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin on the White House lawn, with Jimmy Carter serving as witness, marked a triumph for the president's painstaking personal involvement in Middle East diplomacy. (For details see AJYB 1980, Vol. 80, pp. 107-117 and 262-263.) By ending the state of war between Egypt and Israel, the treaty greatly diminished the likelihood of a major Arab-Israeli conflict in the foreseeable future. Moreover, since Sadat had thrown out his Russian advisers and turned to the United States for help, there was a reduced chance of a Soviet-American confrontation—a confrontation which had appeared imminent in the summer of 1970 when Israeli and Soviet-piloted Egyptian planes clashed over the Suez Canal. Yet, while American influence seemed clearly on the ascendant in Cairo, the United States' position was being undermined in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf by a combination of Palestinian and Arab rejectionism, Islamic fundamentalism, and Soviet adventurism. These developments hurt Israel directly, as when the new regime of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran broke economic and political ties, and indirectly, by placing increasing strains on American-Israeli relations as Washington sought to shore up its position in the Arab world.

Egyptian-Israeli Relations

Israeli withdrawals from Sinai—including return of el-Arish to Egyptian civilian administration in May and the Mount Sinai area in November—proceeded on or ahead of the timetable set in the peace treaty. Despite some "technical difficulties" on the Egyptian side, the process of normalization also proceeded more or less on schedule: Israel withdrew to the el-Arish-Ras Muhammad line on January 26, 1980 and telex communications were opened the same day; direct overland transit from Cairo to Israel was inaugurated on February 5 by a three-bus convoy of the American Jewish Committee's board of governors; direct mail links were established later in the month; the formal opening of diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level took place on February 27th; and direct air links between Cairo and Ben Gurion
airports were established the following month, serviced by El Al Israel airlines and a "private" Egyptian company specially created to lessen the danger of a boycott of the official Egyptian airline by the Arab rejectionist states.

The initially cold personal relationship between Sadat and Begin also seemed to improve. The Israeli leader received a warm reception in Alexandria in July 1979, and Sadat was cheered when he visited Haifa two months later. Sadat cited the 99.9 per cent support he had received for his peace policy in a referendum submitted to the Egyptian people as proof that his peace policy enjoyed popular support. When an Israeli broadcaster in Haifa asked him what guarantee Israel had that a successor might not reverse his policy, Sadat insisted that this fear was unjustified since the widespread backing for peace demonstrated that it was not simply "a tactical step ... (but) a strategic step." Unfortunately other Egyptian officials were less enthusiastic, their hesitation stemming in part from traditional bureaucratic lethargy and in part from growing concern over the consequences of Egypt's isolation in the Arab world.

**Arab Reaction**

Only Sudan and Oman unreservedly supported the peace treaty. All the other Arab states broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt. The Arab League headquarters was moved "temporarily" from Cairo to Tunis, and Egypt was expelled from the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Arab Monetary Fund. This followed an Arab League meeting in Baghdad at the end of March 1979 which called for the complete severing of economic and diplomatic relations with Egypt within a month.

The effect, however, was less devastating than it seemed on the surface. While ending government to government aid and official joint projects, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait left some $2 billion on deposit in Cairo. Moreover, using the argument that the Baghdad sanctions were intended to punish the Sadat regime and not the Egyptian people, most of the Arab states, with the notable exception of Syria and Libya, maintained airline service to Cairo and permitted the Egyptian airline to serve their countries. They also allowed the nearly two million Egyptians working in their countries to continue to remit salaries to Egypt. To some extent private Arab investment in Egypt also continued.

Sadat skillfully used the attacks against Egypt by other Arab League members to rally popular support at home, noting that his distant Arab critics had become rich from oil revenues while the Egyptians were sacrificing their lives and treasure in four wars with Israel. He also emphasized the unity and primacy of Egyptian civilization dating back to the glories of the Pharaonic era, and spoke contemptuously of the "dwarfs" and "clowns" who ruled Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq.
Egyptian-U.S. Ties

Sadat's readiness to cooperate openly with the United States in confronting the twin dangers of Soviet expansionism and local fanaticism—whether of the radical left or the Islamic right—strengthened his position in gaining Congressional support for American economic and military aid. In July the Carter administration announced plans to sell Egypt 35 F-4E Phantom fighter-bombers, worth $594 million, as well as 12 batteries of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, 750 armored troop carriers, and other vehicles, worth $694 million. (Israel was to receive 290 M-60 tanks, 800 armored personnel carriers, and 200 howitzers, worth $580 million. This was in addition to the $800 million grant and $2.2 billion loan to relocate the Sinai airbases in the Negev.)

Between 1974 and 1979 the U.S. had spent about $2.4 billion providing Egypt with food, and assisting in port construction, agricultural research, health care, mechanization, transport and telecommunications, and water and sewage projects. In addition to American aid and private investment in hotels and housing, Egypt's balance of payments position was improving as a result of growing Western tourism (which more than made up for the loss of some Arab tourism), expanded Suez Canal revenues, oil income steadily boosted by increased production (especially from the Sinai oilfields returned by Israel), as well as the above-mentioned remittances from Egyptian workers abroad. The fundamental question, which remained unanswered, was whether Sadat would be able to take such steps—attracting sufficient foreign investment, streamlining the Egyptian bureaucracy, and curbing the rapid birthrate (which was adding 1.25 million Egyptians annually to the country's 40 million population)—as would enable him to make good on his promise that in the wake of peace there would be economic progress for the Egyptian masses.

Normalization and Palestinian Issue

Aside from the psychological difficulty of rapidly changing, deeply ingrained attitudes, the process of normalization between Egypt and Israel was impeded by the lack of substantial progress in the autonomy talks regarding the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza. Egyptian officials took pains to demonstrate that the peace treaty with Israel did not mean that they had abandoned hope of achieving a more comprehensive peace or that they had sold out the Palestinians, as the rejectionists of the Arab "steadfastness front" incessantly charged. Consequently, Egyptian representatives at the United Nations and at the non-aligned conference in Havana and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting in Addis Ababa stood in the forefront in pressing for Palestinian rights and in demanding Israeli withdrawal. The non-aligned conference adopted a resolution on September 9 critical of the peace treaty and endorsing the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Arab states "to reject and oppose any solution or settlement detrimental to the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people." The UN
General Assembly also implicitly attacked Egypt in resolutions, on November 29 and December 12, that strongly condemned “all partial agreements and separate treaties which constitute a flagrant violation of the rights of the Palestinian people, . . .” However, at the OAU meeting, in January 1980, Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Boutros-Ghali succeeded in beating back an anti-Egyptian proposal presented by the PLO. Egypt had improved its standing within the African group by demonstrating that the peace treaty brought about the liberation of African territory from occupation. Egyptian opposition to Libya's abortive effort to save the regime of Ugandan dictator Idi Amin from ouster had also won Egypt some support in black Africa.

The Autonomy Negotiations

Since the framework of the peace process had been developed at Camp David and the United States was a “full partner” in the autonomy talks, the Carter administration had a significant stake in the outcome of the latter. No less so than Egypt, the United States was concerned about not being isolated in the Arab and Islamic world. The desire to involve additional participants in the Camp David process and to demonstrate that it offered real hope of meeting Palestinian aspirations led the U.S. to move closer to the Egyptian position, and this aroused suspicion and irritation in Israel. The Begin government was greatly concerned that the Carter administration was departing from the letter of the Camp David agreements. Israel insisted that autonomy was personal—for the Palestinian Arab inhabitants—and not territorial; that the Self-Governing Authority (SGA) was to be exclusively an “administrative council” with no legislative or judicial functions; and that Israel was to retain full control over internal security and foreign affairs. Moreover, Israel insisted that since the Camp David accords did not mention Jerusalem or settlements, the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem should play no role in the autonomy scheme, while Israel was free to continue the establishment of Jewish settlements anywhere it wished in Eretz Israel (“Palestine”). The Begin government did agree, however, to try to avoid taking private Arab land for new settlement activity. The Israeli position also softened somewhat during the year regarding sharing authority with the local inhabitants over water and other resources. Finally, agreement was reached on the modalities of election to the SGA, covering such technical questions as age, residence, and other matters.

For their part, the Egyptian negotiators increasingly insisted that the SGA have some legislative as well as judicial functions; that the authority of the SGA extend to the inhabitants “as well as the land in the West Bank and Gaza”; that residents of “Arab Jerusalem” participate in the SGA; and that the purpose of the agreement was realization of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights, “including their right to self-determination.” This code word for an independent Palestinian state had been carefully omitted from the Camp David accords, which spoke only of Palestinian “participation” in determining their future.
Sadat tried to reach agreement with Begin on a statement of principles concerning Jerusalem, providing for the city to remain physically united, but with an Arab share in the city's administration and a special agreement concerning the holy places—something that might win Saudi acquiescence. Begin, however, would not agree to any change in his oft-stated position that Jerusalem, "Israel's eternal capital, is one and indivisible." When U.S. special envoy Sol Linowitz, who had replaced Robert Strauss in November 1979, proposed giving absentee ballots to the nearly 100,000 Jerusalem Arab residents who had retained their Jordanian citizenship, this was rejected by Israel. In addition to being concerned that this might presage efforts to redivide the city, the Israelis feared that giving voting rights to one group of Palestinians who were not physically resident in Judea and Samaria would set a precedent for eventually including the one to two million Palestinians living in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf region.

The target date of May 26, 1980, set in the peace treaty for achieving an agreement that could be submitted to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, passed with the Egyptians and Israelis still far apart on several crucial issues.

The Andrew Young Affair

The events surrounding the resignation of Andrew Young, on August 15, 1979, as American delegate to the United Nations led to a crisis in black-Jewish relations in the U.S., and aroused grave concern among Jews about what was seen as a dangerous shift in Washington's policy toward the PLO. (For the impact of the Young affair on black-Jewish relations, see the article on "Intergroup Relations" in this volume.)

The Young affair had its origin in the July 26 meeting between Young and Zehdi Labib Terzi, the PLO observer at the UN. The meeting took place at the New York apartment of Kuwaiti delegate Abdallah Yaccoub Bishara, who facilitated the encounter with Young's tacit approval. Young's objective was to gain Terzi's cooperation in the postponement of a Security Council session, scheduled for July 31, to consider a resolution on Palestinian rights. He accomplished this, but in the process violated official U.S. policy, which eschewed recognition of, or negotiation with, the PLO until the organization endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 242 and accepted Israel's right to exist. This policy was based on a formal pledge made on September 1, 1975 by then secretary of state Henry Kissinger to Israel foreign minister Yigal Allon as one of the assurances to Israel to induce it to withdraw from part of the Sinai.

The issue which brought about Young's resignation was not so much his intentional breach of U.S. policy—U.S. ambassador to Austria Milton Wolf had on three occasions met with PLO representative Issam Sartawi in Vienna without being reprimanded by the administration—but rather his failure to initially notify the State Department of the meeting, and his subsequent inaccurate and misleading account of the circumstances and substance of the encounter. Young defended his
behavior on the ground that he was trying to protect the State Department from being implicated in his actions. Young's duplicity, however, caused both President Carter and Secretary of State Vance a great deal of embarrassment. Carter could not tolerate such behavior by Young at a time when he was trying to project an image of strong presidential leadership. For his part, Vance was incensed at having to withdraw a statement made on the basis of the untrue story which Young had supplied to the State Department. Vance threatened to resign if Young stayed on, and the latter had no choice but to give up his post.

At a press conference following his resignation, Young explicitly blamed Israel for having leaked news of the Terzi meeting to the press, despite his warning that such a disclosure would be counterproductive. He stated: "I said, in fact (to Israeli ambassador Blum) that a big uproar over this issue only creates a constituency on the Palestinian issue that does not exist . . . It was the Israeli government that decided to make this a public issue." The implication of this was that Young had been fired because he offended Israel, rather than because he lied to the State Department and embarrassed Vance. Instead of setting the record straight, both Carter and Vance initially remained silent, thereby allowing a black-Jewish crisis to develop.

Though Young's resignation was the subject of tremendous media attention, many Israeli and American Jewish leaders felt that the real issue was something more important than a brief meeting between one American official and a PLO representative. In their view, the truly significant development was that, as Israeli UN delegate Blum asserted, "the United States (was) shifting its policies toward the PLO." Howard Squadron, president of the American Jewish Congress, echoed this view when he asserted that "even more serious than Andy Young's indiscretions and deceptions is the fundamental uncertainty as to where this country stands." The Young affair occurred against the backdrop of months of tension between Israel and the United States over the Palestinian issue. Problems began when the Middle East negotiations reached the sensitive issue of the future of the West Bank. The State Department became convinced of the need to draw the PLO into the diplomatic dialogue and started, as a statement by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) put it, "acclimating the American people to the smiling, false side of the PLO and creating a misleading impression that it contained 'moderate' leaders, notwithstanding its terrorist character."

_U.S.-PLO Relations_

On August 1, 1979 the New York Times had reported an assessment by high administration officials that there would have to be noticeable progress in the Palestinian autonomy talks soon or the West might face new pressures on its oil supplies from Arab petroleum producers. Concern on the part of Israeli and American Jewish leaders about what this implied for Israel was exacerbated by reports that President Carter had, in the course of a press dinner, likened Palestinian demands
to those of the civil rights movement in the United States. Nathan Perlmutter, national director of the ADL, declared: "My fear is that this is part of the greening of the PLO. We can't but be concerned that the president is preparing the American public for negotiations with the PLO that would be inconsistent with previous promises." Bertram Gold, executive vice president of the American Jewish Committee, said that by making the analogy, Carter "was doing an injustice to the civil rights movement." The president's remarks were called "extremely inappropriate, unfortunate, and misleading" by Horace Morris, executive director of the New York Urban League, who noted that the American civil rights movement "was first and foremost based upon a solid nonviolent, nonterrorist approach."

Vice President Mondale, appearing on Israeli television the following day, asserted that the administration's policy toward the PLO remained unchanged, and that the U.S. was totally committed to "a secure and permanent Israel." The vice president explained that Carter's comparison of the Palestinians to the American civil rights movement had not been intended to equate their methods. Rather, in the course of discussing the implementation of the Camp David accords, the president had mentioned the provision for negotiations to allow some Palestinian refugees to return, and had likened this to the demand of the civil rights movement that blacks be given the right to attend a previously segregated college even though they might not have had any intention of doing so. "In other words," as Mondale expressed it, "the right was the important fact." This clarification did little to reassure Israel. In fact, it reinforced fears that the Carter administration either did not understand the intricacies of the refugee issue or was intending to place additional pressure on Israel.

The growing concern on the part of many that the U.S. was moving closer to the PLO was intensified by events in the following weeks. Robert S. Strauss, President Carter's special Middle East envoy, declared on his arrival in Israel on August 17 that the purpose of his trip was to discuss the series of incidents that had "temporarily" strained American-Israeli relations. Yet, Strauss precipitated another controversy when he raised the matter of a new American initiative at the United Nations. The Security Council was planning to resume discussion of the issue of Palestinian rights, and U.S. officials were seeking a way to avoid having to veto an Arab-sponsored pro-Palestinian resolution. Indeed, the administration wanted to provide some positive sign to induce Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to enter into the autonomy talks. Reports were also circulating in Washington that such an American initiative was considered necessary in order to placate Saudi officials who were hinting that oil production might be reduced.

The proposed American initiative, believed to have been drafted by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and approved by President Carter, would have endorsed Security Council Resolution 242, while going on to spell out Palestinian rights using language agreed upon at Camp David. The PLO Central Council, meeting in Damascus, had already made it clear that it would not accept any resolution that did not explicitly recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and acknowledge the Palestinians' right to create an
independent state. Both these elements were absent from the American proposal, and Carter had only a few days earlier reiterated his opposition to a Palestinian state. Apparently, however, there was still some hope within the State Department and the National Security Adviser's office that the American formula might be sufficient to enable moderate West Bankers to persuade the PLO and King Hussein to give their tacit approval to the entry of individual West Bank Palestinians into the autonomy talks.

The American initiative met with unequivocal rejection from Prime Minister Begin and his cabinet, which, in a rare show of unanimity, denounced the proposal as a reneging of the 1975 American commitment to Israel, and as violative of the basic understandings underlying Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Any tampering with the language of Resolution 242, the Israelis warned, would upset the delicate balance achieved at Camp David and could cause Israel to reconsider its obligations to participate in the autonomy negotiations. This reaction led President Sadat to urge Strauss to drop the American initiative, the Egyptian president having quickly grasped that if Israel felt its basic interests threatened, there would be no further negotiations and no further Israeli withdrawals from Sinai. Strauss himself, as an experienced practical politician, was reportedly furious at having been given instructions which he had no role in formulating, and about whose wisdom he had grave doubts. Indeed, only a week before departing on his Middle East shuttle diplomacy, Strauss had told the American Bar Association that his mandate consisted of resolutions 242 and 338 "in their entirety, unchanged." (Resolution 338, adopted in 1973, called for negotiations by the parties to implement Resolution 242.)

The American initiative was never made public, but Israel and Israeli supporters in the United States suspected that it had not been buried but merely deferred until a more opportune time presented itself. The desire to win support among the Palestinians and the oil-producing Arab states continued to be an important consideration for the Carter administration.

**Iranian Crisis**

When he visited Teheran on New Year's Eve 1978, President Carter toasted the Shah for maintaining "an island of stability" in the turbulent Middle East, adding that this was "a great tribute to the respect, admiration, and love of your people for you." Scarcely a year later the Shah was driven from power by an escalating series of massive popular demonstrations.

Officials in the Carter administration were deeply divided as to what course of action to urge upon the Shah in the waning months of his rule. Ambassador William Sullivan in Teheran and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance recommended that the Shah form a more broadly based regime. Once the Shah's position was seriously eroded, as became clear by November 1978, the policy Sullivan advocated was to seek to work out an arrangement between the Paris-based Islamic movement, headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the leaders of the military, before the latter
disintegrated totally. However, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski vetoed at the last moment a proposal for a high-ranking State Department official to meet with Khomeini in Paris, to see if a *modus vivendi* could be worked out. Brzezinski contended that any such contact with Khomeini would further undercut the Shah's authority, although Sullivan later claimed that the Shah himself had approved the meeting. Air Force general Robert Huyser was sent by the White House to try to keep the Iranian army together, and to counsel a policy of non-confrontation. The army officers were reportedly deeply divided between those who were ready to strike a deal with Khomeini and those prepared to engage the masses in open confrontation.

The Shah left Iran in mid-January and Khomeini returned in triumph on February 1. On February 11 the regime of Shahpour Bakhtiar collapsed and the armed forces disintegrated. More than 100,000 weapons were seized by armed factions, of both the left and right, who roamed Teheran, searching houses, looting, and arresting and shooting persons whom they considered their enemies. Among the major groups were the Mujahedeen, Muslim militants who dispensed justice as they saw fit. The left-wing Fedayeen and the old Communist Tudeh party were also operating on their own.

On the same day, rioting demonstrators broke down the gates surrounding the unofficial Israeli trade mission in Teheran, ransacking the reception room and running up the PLO banner. The mob also attacked the Egyptian embassy in protest against Sadat's willingness to make peace with Israel and his readiness to welcome the exiled Shah.

The United States embassy was permitted to function fairly normally until November 4, when militant "students" took it over and seized scores of hostages in protest over the American admission of the Shah for medical treatment. Khomeini had himself stirred up the anti-American sentiment that led to the embassy seizure, declaring that "all our problems come from America" and that "it is therefore up to the dear pupils, students, and theological students to expand with all their might their attacks against the United States and Israel, so they may force the United States to return the deposed and criminal Shah."

The United States government might have known what was in store for its personnel from the experience of the unofficial Israeli embassy. Many of the opponents of the Shah had received military training in PLO camps in Lebanon, and when Khomeini came to power, PLO leader Yasir Arafat sent him a message of congratulations. In contrast to his previous emphasis on a secular, democratic Arab state in Palestine in which Jews, Muslims, and Christians would live together in amity, Arafat now stressed the ties that bound the PLO to the Islamic world: "The huge revolutionary torch radiating from . . . Iran these days . . . will light the sky of our dear and beloved homeland—Palestine—and the sky of our Islamic nation . . . illuminating the path of *jihad* and struggle for the wronged and tyrannized peoples." Arafat was the first foreign leader to visit Iran after Khomeini came to power, and was warmly greeted by armed mobs shouting "death to Israel." The
Israeli mission building was officially handed over to the PLO as its headquarters in Iran. Maxwell Greenberg, national chairman of the ADL, claimed on December 10 that because "the world stood mute" when the Israeli embassy was seized, a climate had been created that permitted the later takeover of the American embassy. "Earlier strong action against PLO lawlessness and violations of diplomatic immunity might have deterred the PLO-trained Iranian students from taking American citizens as hostages in defiance of law, morality, and American power," Greenberg charged.

Khomeni's Anti-Israel Position

Khomeni made no secret of his own opposition to Israel. In an interview with Le Monde (May 6, 1978) he included among the Shah's "crimes" his relations with Israel. Israel, he asserted, had "usurped a Muslim people's land." It was clear that Khomeni did not refer only to the territories that Israel had occupied as a result of the 1967 war. In an interview with Der Spiegel (January 22, 1979) he said that his Islamic republic would "break off relations with Israel because we do not believe there is any legal justification for its existence. Palestine belongs to the Islamic space and must be returned to the Muslims."

Khomeni did give assurances, which were enshrined in the new Islamic constitution, that Iranian Jews would be accorded the status of a recognized religious minority. This was qualified, however, by the obligation that minorities not conspire with enemies of the state. As "Zionism" increasingly became a major focus of the ire of the revolution, even the natural personal links between Iranian Jews and Israel became the basis for arrest on capital charges. Fear increasingly spread through the Jewish community that the distinction between Jews and Zionists was being blurred, and the stage set for antisemitic mob action. By the end of 1979 an estimated 30,000 of Iran's 80,000 Jews had left the country, about half going to Israel and the other half to the United States, with a few thousand in Western Europe.

Afghanistan

On February 14 "Islamic insurgents" in Kabul abducted American ambassador Adolph Dubs from his car and held him in a downtown hotel. American officials were unable to prevent the Afghan police and their Soviet advisers from storming the hotel room and engaging in a shootout in the course of which Dubs was killed.

Afghanistan had traditionally been a neutral buffer between the Russian and Western spheres of influence since the days when the British ruled India. Consequently, U.S.-Soviet relations entered into their most bitter and hostile period since the Cold War years as a result of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan at the end of December 1979. The Soviet decision to move an initial 40,000 troops —later expanded to 100,000—into Afghanistan and to oust and execute President Hafizullah Amin, replacing him with the Soviet puppet Babrak Karmal, was widely
viewed as a move on a par with the previous Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Western analysts indicated several possible motivations for the Afghanistan invasion, including Soviet determination not to allow a pro-Soviet, Marxist regime on its southern flank to be toppled by Muslim tribal rebellion, and the compelling fear that the emergence of a conservative Islamic state in Afghanistan (linked, perhaps, to Iran and Pakistan) might negatively influence the Soviet Union's 50 million Muslims. There was considerable speculation, as well, that the Soviet perception of the United States' inability to react decisively in the face of the Iranian seizure of the U.S. embassy contributed to its willingness to intervene in Afghanistan. Most significantly, this action brought Soviet influence nearer the warm water ports and oil of the Persian Gulf—a long-standing Russian objective.

President Carter responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with a special message to Soviet leader Brezhnev in which he warned Moscow to withdraw its forces or face "serious consequences" in its relations with the United States. The president publicly called the invasion the most serious threat to peace since the Second World War. Adding a personal element to his reaction to the Afghanistan invasion, President Carter said that his view of the Soviet Union had changed more in one week than in all his previous time in office. Critics of the administration seized upon this as evidence of the president's naïveté about Russian ambitions.

Saudi Arabian Instability

While professional Arabists tried to point out the structural differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran in arguing that a Khomeini-style revolution was unlikely in the former country, optimism gave way to concern toward the end of 1979 as news leaked out of an unprecedented and ominous threat to the country's stability. The seizure and occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca on November 20 lasted two weeks and left 244 people dead as a result of heavy fighting between security forces and the more than 700 attackers. Although the precise details of the Mecca incident are still unclear, the available evidence suggests that at least some of those who participated in the takeover were Saudi Arabians trained by the most radical elements of the PLO at camps in South Yemen.

Initially, Saudi authorities claimed that the attackers were a group of fanatics solely interested in religious—rather than political—issues, noting that the attack coincided with the start of the year 1400 in the Muslim calendar. The attackers' messianic fervor and their demands for a cleansing of Saudi Arabia from the corrupting influence of Western modernizing trends were cited as further proof of this contention. By January 1980, however, Saudi officials were publicly conceding that religion and politics were inseparable in a country whose political structure and tradition were so deeply rooted in Islam. Saudi leaders also began to allude to the strong possibility of involvement by Russian-backed Arab forces wishing to undermine the stability of the country.

Although the Mecca uprising was thwarted, and 63 people were beheaded for their participation in the attack, reports soon surfaced of unrest in other parts of
the country. Thousands of demonstrators in the oil-producing eastern region demanded that Saudi Arabia stop supplying the U.S. with oil, and that the Saudis support the Islamic revolution in Iran. Discontent was most notable among Saudi Arabia's 200,000–300,000 Shi'i Muslim minority, which was religiously linked to Iran's Shi'ite majority. Moreover, there were reports of a siege at the mosque in Medina and of clashes between the royal army and the Saudi national guard, some of whose members were allegedly involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the royal family.

**Cutoff of U.S. Aid to Syria**

The Carter administration had requested $45 million in aid for Syria during 1979, a reduction from earlier years. However, the Senate appropriations committee in October voted in favor of an amendment by Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis.) denying all aid to Syria on the grounds that the Assad regime was determined to wreck the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and had "committed itself to the destruction of Israel." Syria's intervention in Lebanon and its continuing refusal to permit emigration of 5,000 Syrian Jews were other factors prompting Congress to deny all aid to Damascus.

As a result of the collapse of efforts in early 1979 to achieve Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement, and the increasing unpopularity of the 30,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon, Syria was feeling extremely isolated within the region. The regime accused the Sunni orthodox Muslim Brotherhood and Iraq of fomenting a wave of assassinations against Assad supporters, who belonged to the Alawite (Shi'i) minority ruling Syria. This internal and international isolation propelled President Assad to move closer to the Soviet Union, despite grave Syrian misgivings over Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan. Early in 1980 the Soviet Union supplied Damascus with the most modern T72 tanks, and announced plans to supply it with advanced Mig-25 fighter planes in the near future.

**UNIFIL, UNDOF, and UNEF**

Lebanon continued to be plagued with internecine strife. In January 1979 the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for five months, and invited Lebanon to work out, in consultation with the UN secretary-general, a phased program of activities to promote restoration of the central government's authority in southern Lebanon. On April 19 Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim reported that there had been some increase in Lebanese civilian administrative personnel working in the south, and that a token 500-man contingent of the Lebanese army had been deployed there. Waldheim charged that Major Saad Haddad's Christian militia, which was supported by Israel, had sought to thwart the latter move "by forceful means," but that after intensive diplomatic efforts, primarily by the United States, Israel had agreed to cooperate with UNIFIL in implementing the deployment of the Lebanese contingent.
Violence escalated in April. The Lebanese government complained of "persistent acts of aggression perpetrated by Israel," and called on the Security Council to act. Israel's response, in a letter of May 16, reaffirmed that Israel supported the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, but stressed that the situation in the south could not be divorced from the problem in the country as a whole. The PLO, Israel asserted, was subverting the country, and 2,000 armed PLO terrorists south of the Litani River constituted a threat to Israeli citizens, to the villagers in southern Lebanon, and to the UNIFIL forces. Moreover, the occupation of Lebanon by some 30,000 Syrian troops constituted the major obstacle to Lebanese independence. Unless these realities were faced, the Israeli note concluded, UNIFIL could not fulfill its mandate.

The problem of peacekeeping in Lebanon was debated for three days and resulted on June 14 in the extension of the UNIFIL mandate for an additional six months, by a vote of 12-0 with two abstentions (USSR and Czechoslovakia). The Council, after generally deploring acts of violence, placed most of the blame on Israel, and explicitly called on the Jewish state "to cease forthwith its acts against the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon, in particular its incursions into Lebanon, and the assistance it continues to lend to irresponsible armed groups." Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim praised the "overall cooperation of the PLO," which he contended had helped to prevent numerous attempted infiltrations by armed Palestinians from the UNIFIL area into Israel. Israel countered that UNIFIL was not doing nearly enough to restrain the PLO from launching attacks on Israel, and in certain individual cases UNIFIL members had even succored the terrorists by smuggling explosives into Israel.

U.S. representative Richard W. Petree, who voted in favor of the resolution extending UNIFIL, criticized the resolution for its one-sidedness, and stated that the council should insist not only on Israeli cooperation with UNIFIL, but that "those in a position to influence Palestinian extremists make strong efforts to end the mindless terrorism which leads to violence and counter-violence on Lebanese and Israeli territory." He expressed the hope that the Palestinians would fulfill their promises to the secretary-general.

The turmoil in southern Lebanon was debated again on August 29, 1979 at the request of the Lebanese government. Declaring that the U.S. wanted to break the "deadlock of terror and counter-terror" in southern Lebanon, U.S. ambassador Young demanded that Israel put an end to its "policy of preemptive strikes" in southern Lebanon, and that the Palestinian guerrillas stop attacking Israel and its Lebanese Christian allies. In a speech which was more harshly critical of Israel than usual, Young declared that Israel's military policies in Lebanon were "wrong and unacceptable to my government." There was some speculation that the tough tone of Young's speech was an intentional reaction to Prime Minister Begin's statement a week earlier that Israeli raids had been successful in preventing Palestinian attacks against Israel from Lebanese bases.

In addition to his criticism of Israel, Young implicitly warned the PLO that Washington would not consider moving toward recognition of the organization as
long as it attacked Israeli civilians. Israeli representative Yehuda Blum reiterated that Israel was being used as a scapegoat for Lebanon's fundamental problems, which had been exacerbated by the occupation of that country by 30,000 Syrian troops and 10,000–12,000 PLO guerrillas.

The Security Council on May 30, 1979 decided virtually unanimously (China continued its practice of non-participation in Middle East peacekeeping discussions) to extend for another six months the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights. It was one of the paradoxes of the Arab-Israel conflict that the Lebanese frontier, which had been a peaceful area for many years following 1948, had recently been transformed into a center of instability and a base for continuing violent raids against Israel, while the Syrian frontier had become quiet, despite the militant opposition of Damascus to the Camp David accords and Syrian demands for return of the Golan Heights. Ironically, the fact that Syrian forces were so deeply embroiled in Lebanon was among the major factors explaining this situation. Another factor was the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which meant that Syria could no longer count on Cairo's support for an attack on Israel.

The UN Emergency Force (UNEF), whose mandate was due to expire on July 24, became a bone of contention between the United States and Israel. UNEF, in compliance with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, had been instrumental in supervising Israel's phased withdrawal from the Sinai and keeping watch along the Egyptian-Israeli lines. President Carter, in a side letter attached to the treaty, had pledged to create "an acceptable alternative multinational force" should the arrangements for redeploying UNEF, as called for in the treaty, fail to be confirmed by the Security Council. Shortly after the completion of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, it became apparent that the Soviet Union was planning to veto an extension of the UNEF force when its mandate came up in July. The Russians had not previously contributed funds to UNEF, but had abstained on its periodic renewals. Now Moscow threatened a veto as an indication of pique at being excluded from the Camp David process, and as a way of currying favor with the Arab states opposing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

In order to avert a Soviet veto, the Carter administration reached an agreement with Moscow whereby several hundred unarmed military observers of the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO)—originally created by the General Assembly during the 1948 Arab-Israel War—would be assigned as an alternative to the 4,000-member UNEF. On July 24 the Security Council, at an informal, closed meeting, agreed not to renew UNEF's mandate, but rather to keep an enlarged UNTSO presence in the Sinai. Israel protested against this arrangement on the ground that UNTSO was not under the direct control of the Security Council and could hence be withdrawn by the UN secretary-general, just as U Thant had withdrawn the first UNEF at the behest of President Nasser in May 1967, and so precipitated the Six-Day War. Israel made it clear that it would much prefer to see a U.S.-organized multinational force take UNEF's place. The State Department, however, insisted that the substitution of UNTSO for UNEF was consistent with
the terms of the treaty, and assured Israel that the secretary-general promised to consult the Security Council prior to taking any action concerning UNTSO. Some American officials also argued that UNTSO was a temporary expedient, and that the U.S. obligation to Israel to create an effective multinational force would formally come into effect only at the time of the final Israeli withdrawal to the international boundary, which was not scheduled to take place until the spring of 1982.

**Conclusion**

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of December 1979 led Washington to intensify its search for allies and facilities in the region. The debate was thus sharpened between two opposing schools of thought. Friends of Israel contended that the events in Iran and Afghanistan demonstrated that the Palestinian issue was by no means the major problem facing the United States, and that the only effective way to counter growing Soviet presence was to rely more heavily upon the demonstrated friends of the U.S. in the region, notably Israel, and possibly Egypt and Turkey. The other school of thought, which had strong advocates within the administration, and among liberal Protestants and the business community, argued that since the Saudis and other potential Arab allies continued to be preoccupied with the Palestinian issue and the future status of Jerusalem, it was more urgent than ever to press forward toward a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. While this goal might not be within reach in the immediate future, the United States should as a minimum make it clear that it supported Palestinian rights and opposed such Israeli actions as new settlements in the West Bank and unilateral moves to strengthen Israeli hegemony in Jerusalem.

The failures of U.S. policy in Iran and Afghanistan, coupled with zigzags in dealing with the Palestinian question, disturbed and alienated many American Jews, including those who traditionally had been supporters of the Democratic party. The Carter administration's Middle East policy was thus certain to become an issue in the 1980 presidential election campaign.

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