

NINETEEN SEVENTY-FIVE and the beginning of 1976 were dominated by the achievement and implementation of the interim agreement with Egypt, political realignments in the Labor and other parties, and severe restrictive measures taken by the government to grapple with the country's serious economic difficulties.

The breakdown in March of the negotiations with Egypt placed a serious strain on Israel's relations with the United States. Although these were largely alleviated after the conclusion of the agreement in September, considerable sections of Israeli public opinion—not only among the opposition to the Rabin government—charged Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger with pressuring Israel into concessions without an adequate Egyptian quid pro quo, and despite American assurances, the suspicion was that further pressures were in preparation.

Talks with the United States on the possibility of further progress toward peace with Israel's Arab neighbors did not lead to any new initiative. The main immediate obstacle was Arab insistence on a major role for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel's determination to negotiate the future of the West Bank only with Jordan.

The Arabs succeeded in having a number of anti-Israel resolutions passed at the United Nations Assembly, culminating in the denunciation of Zionism as "a form of racism."

The Israel Labor party was hampered by financial difficulties, the absence of a generally accepted focus of leadership, and disagreements over peace policy. The formation in March 1976 of a small steering group of governmental and other leaders, including Mrs. Golda Meir, gave some promise of improvement.

In general, the period was one of holding actions in most areas, with no breakthrough offering promise of basic solutions to the country's problems.

## *The Interim Agreement With Egypt*

### NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN

Early in 1975 another attempt was made to get agreement on an interim settlement with Egypt (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], pp. 404–07). President Gerald R. Ford said in mid-February that prospects for renewed warfare in the Middle East were "very serious," and growing more serious "every day that we don't get some action for further progress in the settlement of some of those disputes."

After talks between Foreign Minister Yigal Allon and the President and Secretary Kissinger in Washington in January, Israel was reported to be ready for a 30–50 kilometer withdrawal in Sinai but not from the oilfields and the strategically important Mitla and Gidi passes. Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's reply, on February 2, was that he would accept nothing less than an Israeli withdrawal from both the passes and the oilfields. In a press interview a week later, Minister Rabin stated he would favor such a withdrawal in return for a formal, signed Egyptian declaration ending the state of belligerency.

In mid-February Kissinger paid a brief visit to the Middle East, mainly for discussions with an Israeli negotiating team consisting of Rabin, Allon, and Defense Minister Shimon Peres, but also to meet with Sadat in Egypt and, on his return trip, with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva. The main issues to be determined were: the extent of the Israeli withdrawal and the width of the demilitarized buffer zone; the political quid pro quo to be offered by the Egyptians; arrangements for demilitarization and limitation of forces; the functions of the UN peace-keeping force; the reopening of the Suez Canal, and the duration of the agreement. In a TV interview on February 14 Rabin said he had reiterated the suggestion of a withdrawal of 30–50 kilometers for a limited political return.

Kissinger began another round of shuttle diplomacy on March 8 with a meeting with Sadat, followed the next day by talks in Damascus. For two weeks (briefly interrupted by a visit to Turkey) the negotiations continued, but no agreement was reached. Egypt demanded withdrawal from the passes and the oilfields, but was not prepared to end the state of belligerency. Israel, on its part, offered to cede the Abu Rudeis oilfield and withdraw from the western half of the passes if Egypt would sign an agreement to refrain from the use of force for several years, which also was to contain such "elements of nonbelligerency" as passage across the frontier for foreign tourists and inhabitants of Sinai, and limitation of the Arab boycott and hostile propaganda. The Egyptians, on the other hand, demanded a deep withdrawal and, in return, were only willing to promise the periodic renewal of the UN Emergency Force's mandate for a total of 18 months. They refused even to consider the retention by Israel of the existing early warning station at Um Hashiba in the buffer zone, with a similar Egyptian station to be erected in the zone. The Israeli negotiators were particularly disturbed by this last refusal, which seemed to cast serious doubt on Egyptian intentions. Disagreement on these crucial points prevented serious discussion of Israeli proposals for Egyptian access to the oilfields and the diminution of political warfare and economic boycott.

Despite a strongly worded March 20 message from President Ford, warning that the United States would have to reassess its relations with Israel if the talks collapsed and blaming Israel for being needlessly stubborn, the Israelis remained firm, and the Egyptians terminated the talks two days later. On March 23 Rabin told the press that the political quid pro quo offered by Egypt amounted to "almost nothing," and for this it demanded as much territory as Israel had been willing to cede in exchange for full nonbelligerency. "Israel regarded this as a onesided withdrawal and not a

step towards peace," he declared. "We could not accept it." This stand was supported not only by most of the coalition, but also by the Likud opposition and the small center-left parties. Mapam, however, argued that all the negotiating possibilities had not been exhausted, while Moked and Rakah demanded much greater concessions. A public opinion poll showed that the government's decision was backed by 91 per cent of the population in the three large cities, although 76 per cent thought another attempt at an interim settlement with Egypt should be made.

The breakdown of the negotiations clearly was a bitter disappointment to President Ford and Secretary Kissinger. Remarks by the President and leaks from State Department sources blamed Israel, and Ford announced a "reassessment" of United States policy in the Middle East, which found practical expression in the suspension of discussions on Israel's requests for more advanced types of armaments, although existing commitments continued to be honored. At the same time, Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger hinted at the possibility of another outbreak of war in the Middle East in the summer.

There was some relaxation of the tension, however, when President Sadat announced on March 29 that the Suez Canal would be reopened on June 5 and agreed to another three-month extension of the UN Force's mandate. Prime Minister Rabin made it clear on April 2 that Israel was now prepared to renew contacts with Egypt for an interim settlement in Sinai, but saw no reason to deviate from the offers already made.

#### NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED

The United States continued contacts with Egypt and Israel through diplomatic channels: on April 10 President Ford pledged another major effort for peace in the Middle East, and on April 21 Foreign Minister Allon met Dr. Kissinger in Washington. It was announced that the United States and Israel would do their best to coordinate their positions, and on his return Allon expressed the hope that the recriminations between the two countries had ended.

On June 1 Ford and Sadat met in Salzburg to discuss the resumption of negotiations for a Sinai accord. On the following day Israel announced a unilateral reduction of forces on the Suez Canal front as a gesture of goodwill on the eve of the official reopening of the Canal. The Israel cabinet had a comprehensive discussion on the situation and, while reiterating Israel's desire for a peace settlement, agreed that, in view of the Arab attitude, the most realistic option was an interim agreement with Egypt through the good offices of the United States. Rabin accordingly went to Washington on June 11 for talks with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, at which, it was felt, positions had been sufficiently clarified to give hope of further progress. However, Rabin declared that much remained to be done before Dr. Kissinger attempted another round of shuttle diplomacy, which, it was reported, he would not do until he believed he had at least a 90 per cent chance of success.

During the next two months tripartite negotiations continued between the United

States, Egypt, and Israel, through U. S. Ambassador Herman Eilts in Cairo and Simha Dinitz, the Israeli ambassador in Washington. Ford and Kissinger, anxious to prevent renewed stagnation, played an active part in the process. On July 12, when both Rabin and Kissinger happened to be visiting Germany, they met in Bonn to review progress. Among the main issues still to be resolved were: the length of the extension of the UN Emergency Force mandate to which Egypt would agree; Israel's insistence on retaining at least the eastern foothills of the passes and drawing the line so that the air base at Refidim (Bir Gafgafa) would not be threatened; the Egyptian demand for a continuous corridor to the Abu Rudeis oilfield, where an Egyptian military presence might threaten Israeli communications with Ophira (Sharm al-Sheikh); the "elements of nonbelligerency"; American assurances of arms supplies, political support, economic aid, and guarantees that Israel's oil needs would be met; the number, position, and manning of warning stations in the buffer zone to prevent the possibility of a surprise attack from either side, and Israel's demand for the demilitarization of areas from which she would withdraw.

Some progress was made by mid-August and, although the Israeli cabinet stated on the 17th that there were "important issues still to be resolved," Dr. Kissinger decided to start another campaign of shuttle diplomacy. As the date of his arrival approached, opposition to the proposed agreement flared up in Israel. The Likud declared that the government had no authority to agree to further withdrawals without first asking for the nation's consent in a general election or referendum, and called for Rabin's resignation.

The Gush Emunim movement of religious activists (p. 495) threatened to use "unconventional methods" to obstruct Kissinger's mission. Together with members of the Herut youth movement, they blocked traffic, demonstrated in front of the Knesset, sent loudspeaker vans in the middle of the night to shout protests in front of Kissinger's hotel, the King David in Jerusalem, and some of them, demonstrating outside Allon's house in Jerusalem, climbed onto his balcony. The police reacted vigorously: several dozen demonstrators were arrested, bail was refused to those who would not undertake to keep the peace, and a number of the leaders remained in custody throughout the negotiations. Some of the police were accused of using undue violence in dispersing the protestors, but the Cabinet, denouncing their "hooliganism and violence" as a danger to democracy, declared that the police had acted with laudable restraint.

There were counterdemonstrations by Mapam and other left-wing elements, and a large, peaceful demonstration by the Alignment, addressed by cabinet ministers, on the day the agreement was ratified by the Knesset.

Dr. Kissinger, who had arrived on August 21 and met the Israeli negotiating team next day, left for Egypt and returned to Israel on the 23rd, after visiting Damascus. The negotiations continued, Dr. Kissinger shuttling back and forth seven times until the early morning of September 1, when agreement was reached after an all-night session. The agreement was initialed on that day after approval by the cabinet.

The central council of the Israel Labor party supported the agreement by a vote

of 370 to 4, with 4 abstentions, and it was submitted to a special session of the Knesset on September 3. Prime Minister Rabin told the house that the document's main significance lay in its political nature: it contained a contractual public agreement to reach a just and final peace through negotiations, without reference to UN resolutions and irrespective of developments on other fronts. Rabin further pointed to the close United States involvement which, he felt, could pave the way to settlements with Israel's other neighbors as well. While the military line would not be better than the old one, Israel would be stronger in terms of over-all security. Herut leader Menahem Begin charged the government with abandoning previous positions under American pressure and dissipating the fruits of the six-day war. He forecast further American pressure on Israel to withdraw on other fronts and called for a popular referendum or a general election.

The Knesset approved the agreement by a vote of 70—including, besides the Coalition, the Ya'ad faction, three members of the Agudah bloc, one Moked member, and Binyamin Halevi (independent)—to 43, with seven abstentions. Opponents were the Likud, former defense minister Moshe Dayan and two other ex-Rafi members, and the two members of the NRP youth group.


#### TERMS OF AGREEMENT

The agreement, officially signed on September 4 at UN headquarters in Geneva by Egyptian and Israeli representatives, declared that the conflict between the two parties "shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means," that the parties were "determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338," and that they undertook "not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other."

The limited-forces area provided in the disengagement agreement (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], p. 399) was to be extended eastward as far as the Israeli line in that agreement, and a new buffer zone was to be created, 10–25 miles wide and including most of the Gidi and Mitla passes but not extending to more than 20 miles from the Israeli base at Refidim (the final Egyptian proposal in March would have drawn the eastern boundary very close to Refidim). A new limited forces zone was established east of the buffer zone.

The Israelis would continue to man the Um Hashiba surveillance station, and a similar station was to be set up by the Egyptians. Three additional stations manned by United States civilian personnel and three unmanned sensor stations would be established by the United States to provide early warning of any possible attack. (The arrangements for the establishment, maintenance, and functioning of the United States stations were specified in a separate agreement between the United States, Israel and Egypt. Prime Minister Rabin maintained in a TV interview in the United States on September 7 that an American presence in the stations had first been proposed by President Sadat when he met with President Ford in June.)

SINAI AGREEMENT SEPTEMBER 1975



- |                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| Line E:            | The Egyptian line   |
| Line J:            | The Israeli line  |
| Line K:            | The limit of the Israeli area of limited forces and armaments.  |
| Line F:            | The limit of the Egyptian area of limited forces and armaments  |
| Line M:            | The line separating the Israeli-controlled area from: the area south of line E and west of line M; and the areas of buffer zones 2A and 2B. |
| B.Z.-1.            | The buffer zone between lines E and J.  |
| B.Z.-2A, & B.Z.-2B | The buffer zones along the Gulf of Suez.  |
| E-1:               | Egyptian surveillance station.  |
| J-1:               | Israeli surveillance station.   |

Line F east-west of line M and the

Egyptian access to the oilfields was provided through a strip along the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, in which no military personnel or installations would be permitted. The agreement further provided for the annual extension of the UN Emergency Force mandate; Egypt gave the United States a separate assurance that this would be for at least three years. A joint commission under UN aegis was established to deal with problems arising from the agreement. Nonmilitary cargoes destined for, or coming from, Israel were to be permitted through the Suez Canal.

According to the text, "This agreement is regarded by the parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement." It was to remain in force while "the parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva peace conference. "

An annex provided that a protocol for the implementation of the agreement would be prepared within two weeks by Israeli and Egyptian representatives meeting in the military working group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva.

#### RELATED U.S. DOCUMENTS

The terms of an unpublished agreement between the United States and Israel, signed on September 1, were unofficially revealed by the *Washington Post* in mid-September. The United States government undertook to make every effort, within the limits of its resources and congressional authorization, to meet Israel's defense and energy requirements and economic needs. It would enable Israel to purchase and transport oil required for its essential needs and finance a project to bring Israel's storage reserve capacity up to one year's needs. The United States government did not expect Israel to begin to implement the agreement before the passage of Israeli cargoes through the Suez Canal began. America also recognized Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through straits connecting international waters, such as the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb and Gibraltar.

The United States government agreed that the next agreement with Egypt should be a final peace settlement, and that negotiations with Jordan should also be directed toward an over-all settlement. The United States would consult with Israel in case of an Egyptian violation of the present agreement and would vote against any Security Council resolution that adversely affected it. Washington regarded the agreement as standing on its own, not conditional on any developments between other Arab states and Israel. In the event of a threat to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power, the United States government would promptly consult with Israel on support or assistance. A contingency plan for military supply in an emergency would be concluded within two weeks.

The United States government further agreed to supply Israel with F-16 aircraft and study the supply of high-technology and sophisticated items, including Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads.

## IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENT

On September 23 the Israeli-Egyptian Working Group at Geneva completed the protocol for the implementation of the agreement, which was to begin on October 5 and be completed on February 22, 1976. However, in view of an announcement by the United States that the American early warning stations would not be established until the proposal, which aroused much controversy at home, was approved by Congress, the Israeli side only initialled the protocol and did not sign it until October 10, when Congress ratified the United States-Israel accords accompanying the agreement—especially the stationing of the American technicians. On the same date, Israel handed over to Egypt the small Ras Sudr oilfield, north of Abu Rudeis.

Concern was expressed in Israel at President Sadat's anti-Israel and antisemitic statements during his state visit to the United States at the end of October, but the implementation of the agreement continued smoothly. On November 2 a ship carrying cargo for Israel (the Greek freighter *Olympus*) for the first time in more than 15 years passed through the Suez Canal; others followed later. The Egyptian-Israeli committee set up by the agreement met on November 22, and the Abu Rudeis oilfields were handed back to Egypt at the end of the month. The Israeli withdrawal, which took place in stages, was completed by February 20, 1976, and two days later the Egyptians took over their new positions, with the UNEF occupying the new buffer zone—1,650 of the 2,350 square miles evacuated by the Israelis. Israel continued to dominate the eastern ends of the Mitla and Gidi passes from the surrounding high ground; and, although the new Israeli line in Sinai was almost 190 miles long—twice the old one—half of it ran along the demilitarized corridor to Abu Rudeis, which the Egyptians would find very difficult to defend in case of hostilities.

*No Progress With Syria*

Meanwhile the situation on Israel's northern and eastern fronts gave ground for anxiety. The Syrians had been massively rearmed by the Soviet Union, and King Hussein, excluded from the representation of the Palestinian Arabs by the Rabat conference (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], p. 406), was assuming a more belligerent stance. On May 21 Syria agreed to another six-month extension of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) mandate; but on June 12, after an official visit to Jordan by President Hafez al-Assad—the first in 20 years by a Syrian head of state—the two countries announced the formation of a joint supreme committee to coordinate military and political planning, and to promote cooperation in civilian areas.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli accord, Dr. Kissinger was reported to have expressed hope to start talks with Syria on a further disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights to keep up the diplomatic momentum. He was said to have referred to the possibility of a three-kilometer withdrawal by Israel, but Prime Minister Rabin denied having approved such an idea since, in view of the closeness of Israeli settlements to the cease-fire line, there was very little room within

the framework of an interim settlement for more than "cosmetic" rectifications of the line. While Rabin repeatedly stated that Israel would not "come down from the Golan," he also indicated that a change in the present line was not out of the question as part of an over-all peace settlement with Syria.

The Syrians severely criticized Kissinger's Middle East policy and denounced Sadat as a traitor to the Arab cause. Assad declared toward the end of September that he had no interest in any further interim agreement on the Golan Heights, and Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam stated that the Egyptian-Israeli agreement had closed the door to any progress toward peace in the Middle East. In an October 6 speech, Assad did not rule out negotiations, provided Israel simultaneously negotiated with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

A Kissinger suggestion, on September 22, that an informal meeting of the super-powers and the parties to the conflict might be held to prepare the way for the resumption of the Geneva peace conference was not taken up.

### *Assault on Israel at UN*

Forebodings that Syria and the PLO, with Soviet support, would try to compete with Egypt and the United States for hegemony in the Middle East proved to be justified as the diplomatic offensive against Israel gathered momentum. For several months the Arab countries had been trying to win support for the expulsion of Israel from the UN, but they failed to get the backing of the conferences of the Organization of African Unity in Kampala in July and of the foreign ministers of the nonaligned countries in Lima in August for their initiative, or for an alternative proposal to keep Israel out of the General Assembly in October by rejecting the credentials of its delegation. Backed by the power of Arab oil and petrodollars, however, the Arab states, with the support of the Soviet bloc, most of the African and Asian countries and some from Latin America, succeeded in having Zionism included in a resolution calling for the elimination of various forms of colonialism and racism at the world conference of International Women's Year in Mexico City in June-July. They also persuaded the Organization of African Unity to denounce "the racist regime in occupied Palestine" and the conference of nonaligned nations in Lima to condemn Zionism as "a threat to world peace and security" and to call upon all countries "to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology."

The greatest Arab successes were achieved at the UN General Assembly in October-December, which devoted not far short of half its time to the Middle East and passed about a dozen anti-Israel resolutions. The climax came on November 9-10 with the establishment of a committee to make recommendations for realizing "the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people," a call by the Assembly for the participation of the PLO "in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East," and the adoption of a resolution recalling the anti-Zionist decisions of the three conferences mentioned above and stigmatizing Zionism as "a form of racism and racial discrimination" (for a full discussion, see pp. 97-127).

In view of Mexico's vote for the UN Assembly resolution against Zionism, Israel at first intended to cancel a scheduled visit by Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa in December, but the visit was held when it became clear that Mexico wished to retract its position. Rabasa laid a wreath on Herzl's tomb in Jerusalem and declared: "In Zion there is no discrimination at all. And where there is no discrimination there cannot exist a racist people." Foreign Minister Allon arrived in Mexico on February 29, 1976, for an official visit.

### *Israel and PLO*

The conditions made by Syria for the extension at the end of November of UNDOF's mandate on the Golan Heights successfully involved the Security Council in the Arab offensive and won for the PLO recognition as a major factor in Middle East affairs. The United States delegation blocked most of these conditions, but agreed to a debate in the Security Council on January 12, 1976, on "the Middle East problem including the Palestinian problem." The Council president stated that the PLO would be invited to attend the debate, and Egypt followed suit by proposing that a PLO delegation be invited to the Security Council meeting on December 5 to consider the Israeli air raid on terrorist camps in Lebanon on December 2.

Israel stated it would not be bound by any of these decisions, and its representatives did not attend the Security Council sessions in December and January. Prime Minister Rabin declared that Israel would never negotiate with the PLO, whose openly declared aim was the state's destruction, and that the problems of the Middle East must be settled by negotiations between the countries concerned, not by a solution imposed by the powers or the United Nations. Recognition of the PLO, he warned, could lead to the establishment, under the aegis of the Soviet Union, of a PLO-dominated state between Israel and Jordan, which would be a deadly threat to Israel's existence. He reiterated the policy enunciated in the Alignment's 1973 election platform and the government's basic principles: a solution of the Palestinian problem through negotiation with Jordan on the boundary between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian State, in which the Palestinian identity would be expressed, and categorical opposition to the establishment of a third state between Israel and Jordan.

Considerable disquiet was aroused in Israel by the November testimony by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders on the Palestinian question before a congressional committee, particularly his reference to the Palestinian question as "the heart" of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a suggestion that "coexistence between separate Israeli and Palestinian states might be considered" by the PLO. Jerusalem feared that this was the beginning of an effort to prepare United States public opinion for a policy shift on the PLO. An official communiqué stated that the Israeli cabinet had been unanimous in "severe criticism" of the Saunders paper, which was full of "factual and political errors and misrepresentations."

There was, however, some support by "dovish" Labor party circles, as well as

Mapam and the Independent Liberals, for the formula proposed by Aharon Yariv (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], p. 405) that Israel agree to negotiate with Palestinian representatives on condition that they recognize Israel's right to exist and abandon terrorism. Groups further to the left called for recognition of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and the establishment of their own state side by side with Israel.

Defense Minister Peres proposed two options for settling the question of the Palestinian Arabs: an agreement between Israel and Jordan, or the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian federation between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean, assuring equal rights for all citizens and enabling Jews to maintain their contacts with the Jewish world and the Arabs with the Arab world while each people maintained its own way of life.

### *Further Negotiations on Progress Toward Peace*

Israel informed the United States in mid-November of its readiness for the reconvening of the Geneva conference in its original composition (i.e., without the PLO) at any time after the renewal of the UN mandate on the Golan Heights, but the Arabs and the Soviet Union insisted that the PLO must be invited. Discussions continued with Washington on American military and economic aid to Israel, and Defense Minister Peres came to the United States in mid-December to discuss Israel's military needs with the new Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

On January 4, 1976, the Israel cabinet reiterated that Israel would not be represented at the scheduled January 12 Security Council debate on Palestine if the PLO was invited, and that it would not acquiesce in any change in Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The cabinet expressed confidence that the United States would honor its commitments under the Sinai settlement to oppose any such changes and not to recognize the PLO so long as it rejected the two resolutions and refused to recognize Israel's right to exist. Foreign Minister Allon had talks with Dr. Kissinger in Washington (January 6-8) to coordinate policy in advance of the debate.

Israel welcomed the American veto of the January 26, 1976, Security Council resolution which called for the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state and failed to reaffirm Resolutions 242 and 338. A Foreign Ministry statement next day noted the abstention of Britain, Italy, and Sweden, and regretted the support by France, Japan, Panama, and Rumania of the resolution, which, if adopted, "would have irreparably undermined the only agreed basis for any settlement."

Prime Minister Rabin arrived in the United States on January 27 for an eleven-day visit, during which he had lengthy talks with President Ford and the Secretary of State. The next day he addressed a joint session of Congress, the first Israeli prime minister to do so. On his return home on February 6, he reported that the United States and Israel had agreed on the need for efforts toward "more far-reaching goals" than those of the interim agreements with Egypt, with "peace or something very close to peace" as the target. There had also been consensus on directing

diplomatic efforts toward all the Arab countries, including Jordan, and on opposition to "a third state between Israel and Jordan." It was understood that this meant the end of the step-by-step method of Middle East negotiations.

Jordan's position remained unclear. On the one hand, King Hussein convened the Jordanian parliament, including representatives from the West Bank, on February 6 for a single session, a step that appeared to indicate a renewal of his claim to represent the West Bank despite the Rabat decisions. On the other hand, rapprochement between Jordan and Syria continued, and there were even reports that they might form a federation.

Israel was deeply concerned about the chaos in Lebanon, especially the weakened position of the Maronite Christians and the growing influence of Syria and the PLO. Israel warned that it would take action if its security were threatened from Lebanon, and kept an alert watch in the event that Lebanon should come under Syrian domination and hostilities break out on its border with Israel.

On February 22, in a response to an American initiative, the cabinet reiterated Israel's proposal to reconvene the Geneva conference on the original basis and its readiness to examine the possibility of separate negotiations with each Arab country with regard to an agreement ending the state of war. The decision was criticized by former Foreign Minister Abba Eban and others as tantamount to an abandonment by Israel of its aim of final peace; but this was denied by government spokesmen, who explained that both the United States and Israel regarded the "end of the state of war" as "the legal and political termination of the conflict"—only one stage removed from final peace. In return for Arab agreement on this point, Israel would be prepared to make large territorial concessions, but not as large as it would make in return for final peace treaties.

### *Terrorist Attacks*

Terrorist organizations affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization continued their attacks on Israeli civilians; there were several serious incidents, but not as many as in 1974.

On the night of March 5–6, 1975, eight Fatah terrorists came ashore at Tel Aviv and occupied the small seafront Savoy Hotel. When Israeli troops attacked, the terrorists detonated explosives, demolishing part of the building. Eight civilians, three Israeli soldiers, and seven terrorists were killed; one terrorist was captured on the spot and six in a boat which remained offshore. Salah Khalaf, al-Fatah's deputy leader, said the purpose of the raid was to show Kissinger, who was about to start his peace mission, that "there can be no peace in the Middle East without the Palestinians."

The security forces maintained constant vigilance against groups organized in cooperation with the terrorist organizations in Israel and the administered areas. A number of such groups were apprehended before they could attack, but not all.

Most of the bombs planted in Jerusalem were found and dismantled as a result

of increased public alertness, but some were not discovered. Two bomb explosions in Zion Square, in the heart of the city were among the most serious incidents there since 1967: on July 4 fourteen persons were killed and 72 injured, and on November 13 seven were killed and 42 wounded.

Intensive Israeli patrolling helped to keep down the number of incidents on the border with Lebanon. The most serious was an attack on Kfar Yuval, close to the border in the Hula Valley, by four members of the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front, who seized a farmhouse and held a family hostage against the release of Arabs held in Israel, among them Archbishop Capucci (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], p. 403). The terrorists were killed by an Israeli assault group after they had killed three civilians and wounded five.

There was also one serious incident on the Golan Heights on November 20, when three terrorists of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine attacked Ramat Magshimim, a settlement where talmudic study was combined with military service, and killed three soldier-students before returning to Syria.

On December 2 Israel Air Force planes attacked targets in the Nabatiya district in southern Lebanon and near Tripoli, north of Beirut. Defense Minister Peres explained that these were not retaliatory operations, but attacks on terrorist bases, designed to disorganize them and forestall further acts of terrorism.

Terrorist acts abroad were generally attributed to obscure groups not officially sponsored by PLO. The United States authorities confirmed on January 10 that the crash of a TWA airliner en route from Lod to New York into the Ionian Sea on September 8, 1974, in which all 88 persons on board were killed, had been caused by a bomb explosion. Responsibility for the crash was claimed by the so-called Nationalist Arab Youth.

A bazooka attack at Orly airport, Paris, on January 13 hit a Yugoslav airliner, but may have been intended for an El Al plane taxiing towards the runway at the time. Responsibility was claimed both by the Young Croatian Army and by the Mohammed Boudia Commando named after an Algerian PLO representative killed in Paris in June 1973. A week later, three terrorists, who later identified themselves as members of the Mohammed Boudia Commando, attacked an El Al Boeing about to leave Paris for Lod. Thirty police and passengers were wounded and the gunmen took ten hostages, whom they held until they were flown to Baghdad.

One of the most spectacular terrorist operations was the seizure, in Vienna on December 21, of 11 ministers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and 30 other hostages by a group of mixed nationality calling itself The Arm of the Arab Revolution. The Austrian TV broadcast a communiqué, drafted by the terrorists, denouncing any compromise involving Arab acceptance of Israel's existence. The hostages were flown to Algiers and Tripoli where they were released by the terrorists.

## DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

*Political Affairs*

There were strains and stresses in the main political parties as a result of the change in national leadership (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], p. 411) and the need to adopt policies, especially in foreign affairs, to changing conditions. The Labor party suffered from lack of a generally accepted center of authority. The differences between the factions representing the parties which had combined in 1968 were becoming blurred, especially in the large city branches; on vital foreign policy issues, for example, there were both dovish and hawkish elements in each. An unsuccessful attempt was made to organize the ex-Mapai group, which had lost much influence (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], p. 411).

There were many complaints that the party's governing bodies were not adequately debating and deciding on vital policy issues, and in several important cases prominent members voted against the government on the ground that no decision had been taken on the party level. On February 4 Information Minister Aharon Yariv resigned because he was dissatisfied with decision-making procedures in the cabinet and felt that his ministry was superfluous (it was abolished by the prime minister, and its functions distributed between the ministries of education and foreign affairs). In May former Foreign Minister Abba Eban criticized the government for agreeing to negotiate an interim agreement with Egypt and then failing to conclude it in March; former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan objected to the agreement arrived at in September, and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, at a meeting of the party Keneset group, criticized the compromise arrived at with the Sebaste settlers in December (see below). Arie Eliav, a former party secretary, moved further to the left, particularly on the question of peace policy, and left the party in May (p. 496).

There was some disquiet in the party at Rabin's appointment, on June 1, of Ariel Sharon, a former Likud leader with strong hawkish tendencies, as his personal advisor. Rabin was charged in some quarters with ignoring the party and moving toward the American system of presidential rule. He was severely criticized for a statement made on January 27, 1976, in an off-the-record press briefing in Washington by a "senior Israeli source," identified as Rabin himself, which appeared to be derogatory to Defense Minister Peres. The "source" had reportedly said that the original requests to the United States for military supplies were exaggerated and not to Israel's credit. On his return to Israel, Rabin accepted full responsibility for the list, but said that as originally presented it contained items (such as, presumably, the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles) which were used by those opposed to arms for Israel to prevent approval of the list, and that a more modest "corrective list" had been submitted. After a lengthy debate in the cabinet on February 8, the matter was allowed to drop; but the impression left was one of dissension between the prime minister and his senior colleagues.

Meir Zarmi of the Ma'yan Zvi kibbutz, secretary-general of the Labor party since August 1974, protested the political leadership's failure to consult the party and help it overcome its grave financial difficulties. In March 1976, after Zarmi had demonstratively resigned, he was promised aid to put the party's finances on a sound basis, and a steering group, consisting of senior ministers, Histadrut Secretary-General Yeruham Meshel, and Zionist Organization Chairman Yosef Almogi, as well as Mrs. Golda Meir, was formed to ensure closer coordination between the leadership and the party.

Unrest developed in Mapam over the government's economic and settlement policies, as well as the lack of adequate consultation with the Labor party within the framework of the Alignment, and there was strong pressure within Mapam to break up the alliance. There were also some signs of dissent within Likud. In January 1975 Binyamin Halevi, who, together with a Liberal member of the Knesset and two Labor members, had signed a manifesto in mid-1974 calling for a more sober approach to foreign policy, resigned from Herut, which he charged with pursuing "extremist policies." The Herut convention in mid-January reaffirmed the party's basic policies, including opposition to the "re-partition of the Land of Israel." At the Liberal party's convention in November, a large majority rejected proposals to approve interim agreements with Egypt and a possible territorial compromise on the "West Bank."

The Free Center, led by Knesset member Shmuel Tamir, who had advocated a more moderate and realistic foreign policy, split at the end of January. The break-away faction, called the Independent Center, merged with the State (Mamlakhti) List and part of the Land of Israel Movement early in 1976 under the name of La'am ("For the People"). Tamir advocated the "unification of the Likud", i.e., the abolition of factions and the establishment of a united party, but only some of the youth groups supported him.

The Youth Circles in the National Religious party continued pressure against the veteran leadership's policy of compromise on such problems as "Who is a Jew?" and support for Gush Emunim. In effect, they remained in opposition to the Rabin government until, in November, their leader Zevulun Hammer joined the cabinet as minister of social welfare to succeed Michael Hazani, who had died in July.

Gush Emunim ("Fidelity Bloc"), a religious activist movement, made a number of attempts to establish settlements in Judea and Samaria in defense of the inalienable right of Jews to settle in the whole of the Land of Israel and to forestall possible territorial concessions by the government in the area. Much of their effort was concentrated on the ancient site of Sebaste, near Nablus, where they attempted to found a settlement, called Elon Moreh, near an abandoned railroad station. The army repeatedly removed them by force until, on December 8, the government agreed as a compromise to accommodate 30 families at the nearby Kadum army camp, pending a decision on the principle of settlement in Judea and Samaria.

The Gush Emunim settlers won widespread admiration, especially in religious and right-wing circles, as the standard-bearers of a revived pioneering spirit; but

their actions were condemned, particularly by Labor and left-wing opinion, as a danger to democracy, for they defied government decisions on settlement priorities and deliberately broke the law in an attempt to force a change in government policy on a matter of vital national interest. Partly in reaction to the activities of Gush Emunim and on the initiative of some NRP members and religious academics, the Circle for Religious Zionism, a movement dedicated to political and religious moderation, was established in autumn 1975.

There was also a regrouping among the newer parties. In May a majority of the members of Shulamit Aloni's Civil Rights Movement joined with a faction of Amnon Rubinstein's Shinui ("Change") movement and the left-wing dovish Labor party group headed by Arie Eliav to form a new party called Ya'ad ("Objective" or "Goal"). However, serious dissension between the centrist and leftist elements led to the dissolution of the party early in 1976, and Eliav, with one of Mrs. Aloni's supporters, formed the Independent Socialist Group.

There was a growing tendency during the year for independent criticism of government policies by individual members of the coalition parties, especially the younger ones.

In view of the country's economic difficulties, there was much public criticism of decisions to increase the public funds allocated for political party expenses, and a bill authorizing state guarantees for low-interest loans to consolidate the accumulated debts of the parties was dropped after an appeal by its opponents to the High Court.

Demands were frequently voiced in the Knesset and the media that the government tighten up its machinery to set an example at a time of national economic stringency. In November the prime minister proposed the reorganization of the ministries for social welfare, labor and housing; but NRP and former Mapai circles in the Labor party hotly objected to the changes, which would have reduced the importance of portfolios held by their members.

After years of effort, a law providing for the direct election of mayors and local council chairmen was passed on July 30. The new procedure was first instituted in Nazareth (see below).

There was much controversy over press and TV reports that the ministry of religious affairs and the Tel Aviv marriage registrar kept lists, containing over 3,000 names, of persons suffering from various types of marriage disabilities, some of them apparently resting on hearsay evidence. Attorney General Aharon Barak ruled in October that there be only one central list; that it only contain names of persons who had applied to be married or appeared in divorce proceedings; that hearsay evidence should not be accepted, and that any person named in the list should be informed of the fact and enabled to state his case.

### *Economic Problems*

Economic difficulties, exacerbated by heavy expenditures for defense and debt services, compelled the government to adopt a number of drastic measures to follow

up those adopted in 1974. Radical steps were taken to reform the tax system, the calculation of the cost-of-living allowance, and anomalies in the wage structure. The danger of a large deficit in the 1974-75 budget (which, with a supplementary budget passed in January, totaled I£ 40 billion), moved the government on February 24 to increase a number of indirect taxes and to raise excise taxes on cigarettes, postal and telephone charges, and others. At the same time, government offices were asked to reduce spending and cut staffs. The budget for 1975-76, presented on the same day, totaled I£ 56 billion, with a planned deficit of I£ 1.5 billion.

In March a committee of experts, headed by Professor Hayim Ben-Shahar of Tel Aviv University, presented its recommendations for a drastic reform in the income tax system; legislation to implement these proposals was enacted in July. Under the new system, tax exemptions on travel, clothing, literature, and other allowances (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], p. 413) were abolished, thus expanding the tax base—the total income on which tax is levied—so that much lower rates were required to produce approximately the same revenue.

Taxes ranged from 25 per cent on the first I£ 3,000 (about \$400) monthly personal incomes to a maximum of 60 per cent on those exceeding I£ 8,400. Adjustments for men who were married or had children and other dependents were made by a simple system of credits linked to the cost-of-living index and deductible from the total tax payable. The needs of large families, invalids, etc., were to be met by direct national insurance subventions. To reduce tax evasion all residents over the age of 18 were required to declare their incomes and businessmen to keep books; penalties for lateness in tax payment were increased.

As a way of making up for the expected shortfall in tax revenue, it was decided to impose a value-added tax, which was required, in any case, to prepare for integration with the European Common Market. The committee recommended that for the first year employers make up the difference in take-home pay of anyone losing from the reform. It was hoped the reforms would considerably reduce tax evasion and increase the incentive to work in view of the much lower marginal rates. Several groups of workers tried by means of strikes or organized slow-downs to get special tax concessions, but these attempts were rejected. Some alleviation was granted with regard to traveling expenses.

Another committee of experts, headed by Dr. Zvi Zussman of the Bank of Israel, recommended fundamental reforms in the method of calculating the cost-of-living allowance, to replace the periodical bargaining between the Histadrut and the employers' organizations. It proposed a semiannual increase in the allowance if the average consumer price index for the preceding three months had risen by more than 5 per cent, to compensate for 70 per cent of the increase.

A new form of exchange control was adopted on June 18 in view of the inflationary trends and recent fluctuations in the relative values of the dollar and major European currencies. A small cabinet committee was empowered to devalue the Israel currency by not more than 2 per cent at intervals of not less than one month, thus allowing for a periodic adjustment of the exchange rate and the preservation of the competitive position of exporting industries. Successive "mini-devaluations,"

as well as a 10 per cent devaluation on September 28, brought the exchange rate, which had been I£ 6 to the dollar since November 10, 1974, to I£ 7.52 to the dollar on March 14, 1976.

As a result of the government's restrictive policies, 1975 was a year of slow economic growth. Inflationary pressures were curbed: the consumer price index rose by 23.5 per cent (compared with 56.2 per cent in 1974) mainly as a result of devaluation and other government measures. Industrial output was almost stationary, and building starts were reduced by 26 per cent; but the net agricultural product increased by 7 per cent. In real terms, imports remained the same, but exports rose only by 3 per cent. The deficit on current account totaled \$3.9 billion—\$300 million more than in 1974; net dollar reserves at the end of 1975 totaled \$1,040 million, about the same as the year before. For the first time since the slow-down years of 1966–67, there was no increase in the gross domestic product.

Further fiscal measures were taken to increase revenue. On September 28 taxes on purchases were raised by 10 per cent and fuel prices by 21 per cent. In February 1976 a 15 per cent surcharge was imposed on the import of services by raising charges for foreign currency allocated for foreign travel, insurance premiums to foreign companies, and so forth, and the basic travel tax was raised from I£ 750 to I£ 1,000. In March subsidies on basic foodstuffs and fuel were cut, increasing the cost of foodstuffs by 20–25 per cent and fuel by an average of 11 per cent; at the same time, bus fares were generally raised by 25 per cent.

A supplementary budget of I£ 8.7 billion, most of it required to cover increased prices resulting from devaluation, was passed on February 23, bringing the total for fiscal year 1975 to I£ 65.5 billion. The budget for fiscal 1976, presented the following day, totaled I£ 85.2 billion, including expected devaluations and price increases of 25 per cent for the fiscal year. At fixed prices, the budget total was 2 per cent higher than in fiscal 1975.

Defense accounted for 38 per cent of the budget and debt service for 21 per cent. In view of the proposed increase in the share of such economic services as export incentives, the share of social services had to be reduced to 32 per cent—2 per cent less than in the previous year. The hope was to increase tax revenue by reducing tax evasion and introducing value-added tax. The budget showed a deficit of I£ 2.7 billion; it was expected to increase domestic liquidity by I£ 4.2 billion.

While left-wing critics called for higher expenditure for social services, the Likud and some Labor members demanded further cuts to avert inflationary pressures. Finance Minister Joshua Rabinowitch rejected both demands, the latter because it would create unemployment.

Israel was plagued by a number of financial scandals, charges of corruption and large-scale tax evasion, and allegations of the accumulation of "black money" totaling billions of Israel pounds. The trials of the two most serious offenders (AJYB, 1976 [Vol. 76], p. 413) were concluded in 1975. Joshua Bension, manager of the Israel-British Bank who had illegally transferred bank funds to other companies of its owners, was sentenced in February to 12 years' imprisonment, to which the Supreme Court, on appeal, added a fine of I£ 25 million; Michael Tzur, manager

of the Israel Corporation, was sentenced in May to 15 years' imprisonment for fraud, bribery, theft, and illegal currency transactions. Ze'ev Kariv of the Mekorot Water Corporation (*ibid.*) was acquitted of the charges of falsifying the balance sheets of a subsidiary of the corporation.

### *Labor Relations*

Throughout this time of economic strain, the Histadrut, under Secretary-General Yeruham Meshel, steered a cautious middle course between the conflicting pressures of the government's stringent measures and the forcefully expressed demands of many groups of workers for wage increases to compensate for higher prices and taxes. The Histadrut opposed, sometimes successfully, proposals to reduce subsidies for essential foodstuffs and called for sterner measures to stop tax evasion and to impose a greater share of the burden on employers and financiers. On the whole, however, it refused to support claims, made under various pretexts, which were incompatible with the existing labor contracts.

Several unauthorized strikes, complete or partial, took place especially in the public services, but most of these were unsuccessful. In 1975 there were 121 strikes, involving the loss of 158,906 days' work, compared with 71 strikes with 51,333 days' work lost in 1974 (during half of which most of the reserves were still mobilized after the Yom Kippur war), and 96 strikes with 375,023 days' work lost in 1973. Close to 75 per cent of the strikes in 1975 were in the public sector.

In February 1976 the Histadrut and the employers' organizations signed a collective labor contract for 1976-77, covering workers in industry. The agreement provided for wage increases of up to 6 per cent in 1976 and a further 3 per cent in 1977; an increase in the minimum wage from I£ 880 to I£ 1,000 per month in 1976 and I£ 1,050 in 1977; negotiations for a comprehensive pension agreement; and reforms demanded by the employers to improve labor mobility, reduce absenteeism, and increase productivity.

In an attempt to induce workers to move from the services to industry, the government opposed any over-all wage increases in the public sector. During the last three years, however, almost one-third of civil servants had been successful in winning special increments, and the rest, arguing discrimination against them, demanded similar raises. A committee of experts headed by Professor Haim Barkai ruled that the increments already granted had been unjustified and proposed that they be withdrawn by deducting them in two installments from the cost-of-living allowance increases expected in April and September 1976. The Histadrut accepted the ruling, but proposed that civil service salaries be leveled by a small general increase from which the recipients of the special increments would be excluded.

### *Israel and World Jewry*

The UN resolution against Zionism produced a reaction of shock in Israel, as well as throughout Jewry. Spontaneous demonstrations of support for Zionism were held

in Israel, where the large participation of young people was notable, and all over the free world.

Prime Minister Rabin and acting chairman of the Zionist Organization Leon Dulzin invited leaders of world Jewish and Zionist bodies to a Conference on Jewish Unity, meeting in Jerusalem on December 3-5, which pledged devotion to Israel, denounced the resolution as "a violation of elementary right and justice," and called for worldwide campaigns to encourage Jews the world over to visit Israel, buy Israeli products, and express solidarity with Zionism and Israel.

On January 6, 1976, the Zionist General Council elected Yosef Almogi (Labor Zionist), mayor of Haifa, chairman of the Zionist Executive in succession to the late Pinhas Sapir by 67 votes, against 42 for Arye Leon Dulzin (Union of General Zionists), who had been acting chairman since Sapir's death. Later, he was also elected chairman of the Jewish Agency.

Immigration in 1975 dropped to 19,756—38 per cent less than in 1974. Of these 8,518 came from the Soviet Union (nearly 50 per cent less) and 2,964 from the United States and Canada, compared with 3,393 in 1974. It was estimated that the number of *yordim* (emigrants) during the year was roughly the same as that of *olim* (immigrants), and much public concern was expressed about this phenomenon. The Ministry of Education and Culture commissioned a statistical survey of the problem, and Minister of Transport Gad Yaakobi drafted a personal memorandum on the subject; the Jewish Agency set up a special section to promote the return of Israelis from abroad. The main matters at issue were the measures to be taken to maintain contact with Israelis abroad and the special incentives, if any, to be offered as inducement to return.

### *Arab Population*

There was growing unrest among Israeli Arabs, especially the younger generation, some of whom publicly identified themselves as Palestinians rather than Israelis. The main reason for this trend was believed to be the enhancement of the international status of PLO and anti-Israel influences emanating from the administered areas. Much of this feeling was channeled through the New Communist List (Rakah), whose nominee, Knesset member Tawfik Zayyad, was elected mayor of Nazareth on December 10, with the Rakah-led Democratic Front winning 11 out of the 17 seats on the municipal council.

Serious disturbances took place in March 1976 in connection with a government scheme to carry out development work in Galilee on 20,000 dunams (5,000 acres) of uncultivated and uninhabited land that was to be expropriated for the purpose. Almost half of the land was state-owned, 4,500 dunams were in Jewish hands, and the remaining 6,000 dunams were owned by Arabs, who were promised alternative land or cash compensation, whichever they preferred. Led by Mayor Zayyad, Rakah called for a general strike of Arabs in Israel on March 30; but this was opposed by the other 35 Arab local councils in the area, and the majority of the country's Arabs

went to work. However, riots took place in five Arab villages, and six Arabs were killed by security forces who were compelled to open fire in self-defense. The cabinet decided on a comprehensive review of policy in the Arab sector.

Meanwhile, there was trouble over the question of Jewish prayers on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, which is also revered by Muslims as Haram al-Sharif (The Noble Sanctuary) and on which the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa mosque stand. According to the prevailing rabbinical rulings, Jews must not set foot on the site for reasons of ritual purity, but in May 1975 a Betar (Herut youth) group tried to hold a demonstration prayer service on the Mount. They were charged with disturbing the peace, but acquitted on January 28, 1976, by magistrate Ruth Or, who criticized the authorities for denying Jews the right to pray on the Mount.

Although Police Minister Shlomo Hillel stated that the ban, authorized by a 1970 Supreme Court decision, would continue, rioting, mainly by Arab youngsters, took place in February on the Mount and elsewhere in Jerusalem, and about a hundred were arrested. Justice Minister Hayyim Zadok stated on February 15 that the magistrate's verdict would be appealed in the District Court, and the police continued to prevent Jews from praying on the Mount. On March 21, the High Court rejected an appeal by a tourist against this prohibition (see also Administered Areas below).

### *Population*

At the end of 1975 the population of Israel was estimated at 3,490,000, of whom 2,953,000 were Jews and 537,000 non-Jews. The increase of 65,000 in Jewish population and of 23,000 in the non-Jewish was almost entirely a result of natural increase.

### *Administered Areas*

The Gaza Strip was generally quiet and prosperous, many of the residents of the refugee camps improving their housing and living conditions with wages earned in Israel. Rashad al-Shawa, who in October 1972 had been removed as mayor of Gaza for refusing to extend municipal services to the adjoining refugee camp (an Israeli official had been administrator in the interim) was reinstated in October 1975 and a new municipal council was appointed.

In Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) Arabs opposed a suggestion made by Defense Minister Peres in October that the people of the area be given a large measure of self-government under Israeli rule. Local leaders stigmatized the proposal as an expedient for perpetuating Israeli occupation. Council elections held in 57 villages October 27 and November 5 proceeded without incident.

In February 1976 the rioting over the question of Jewish prayers on the Temple Mount spread to the main towns in the West Bank, but quickly subsided. However, trouble started again, on a larger scale, in March in connection with the Galilee development project, and in six towns mayors and councillors resigned in protest

against police action taken to suppress the disturbances. Among them were Sheikh Mohammed Ali Ja'abari, mayor of Hebron, and Nablus Mayor Haj Ma'azus al-Masri, both of whom refused to stand again in the April municipal elections. Some Israeli commentators suggested that the protests had been aggravated by the desire of candidates to accumulate political capital for the elections. The municipal franchise was considerably extended to cover nonhouseholders and women: 88,462 electors registered, including some 33,000 women, compared with 31,700 (all men) in 1972. A total of 514 candidates contested 205 seats in 22 municipalities.

### *Personalia*

Robert Gamzey, Israeli journalist and writer, died in Arad on January 5, at the age of 63. Mordecai Namir, former ambassador to the USSR, cabinet minister, and mayor of Tel Aviv, died in Tel Aviv on February 22, at the age of 78. Professor David Bergmann, noted scientist in the field of organic chemistry and former chairman of Israel Atomic Energy Commission, died in Jerusalem on April 6, at the age of 71. Samuel Hugo Bergmann, philosopher and first rector of the Hebrew University, died in Jerusalem on June 17, at the age of 92. Michael Hazani, National Religious Party leader and Minister of Social Welfare, died in Jenin on July 2, at the age of 62. Arye Wallenstein, chief representative of Reuters in Israel, died in Geneva on July 25, at the age of 55. Rachel Katznelson-Shazar, widow of the late President Shazar, died in Hadera on August 11, at the age of 85. Pinhas Sapir, chairman of the Zionist executive and former finance minister, died in Nevatim on August 12, at the age of 67. Moshe Silberg, former Supreme Court justice, died in Jerusalem on August 16, at the age of 75. Professor Chaim Wardi, expert on Christian affairs, died in Jerusalem on October 9, at the age of 74. Margot Klausner, Israeli film pioneer, died in Herzliya on November 12, at the age of 70. David Touviyahu, first mayor of Beersheba, died in Beersheba on November 14, at the age of 77. Beba Idelson, women labor leader, died in Petah Tikva on December 5, at the age of 80.

Among those who died in 1976 were: Reuven Alcalay, Hebrew-English lexicologist, in Jerusalem on January 4, at the age of 68; Baruch Agadati, pioneer dancer, painter, and film maker, in Tel Aviv on January 18, at the age of 81; Pinhas Lavon, former minister and labor leader, in Hadera on January 25, at the age of 71; Isser Yehuda Unterman, former chief rabbi, in Jerusalem on January 26, at the age of 90; Yohanan Aharoni, archaeologist, in Tel Aviv on February 12, at the age of 56; Hanoah Givton, consul-general at Los Angeles and former director of radio, in Los Angeles on February 16, at the age of 57.

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