Review of the Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES
Politics and Intergroup Relations

The year 1974, observed the New Republic (December 28), was an "incredible year." For the first time in the history of the United States a president, facing certain impeachment and possible criminal prosecution, resigned. He subsequently received a "full, free, and absolute" pardon before he could be convicted of wrongdoing. For the first time, too, the president and vice-president were not elected by the people. The impeachment hearings on the Watergate scandal in the House Judiciary Committee—the immediate cause of Richard M. Nixon's resignation—were widely hailed as proof that "our system" works. While this was reassuring, Americans had come to feel a deep distrust of politicians and political institutions. According to an April report by public-opinion analyst Daniel Yankelovitch, they saw the great institutions of society in the United States as having "an excess of power, and abusing it by using this power to serve their own selfish ends rather than the country."

The year began with the country struggling to adjust to what the vast majority of Americans held to be naked blackmail, the Arab-imposed oil embargo. It was lifted in March, but the quadrupling of oil prices by the Arab-dominated OPEC countries severely dislocated the world economy and aggravated an already serious inflation and recession in the United States, while it brought undreamed-of wealth to the oil producers. Unable to absorb domestically their wealth, Arab countries and nationals invested in the United States in real estate, industry, and short-term bank notes. American businessmen sought out such investments. Some visited the Middle East, seeking to sell or provide goods and services needed to transform the underdeveloped Arab countries into modern industrial societies. This gave rise to increasing apprehension among non-Jews and Jews alike about the political and economic implications of Arab acquisition of a piece of America. Reports of discrimination against Jews working for, or seeking employment with, companies and institutions doing business with Arabs became widespread.

The simultaneous "double digit" inflation and an unemployment rate of some seven per cent contributed to the grim mood of most Americans. Federal and state unemployment compensation, augmented by union benefits and labor-management

1Address at American Jewish Committee New York Chapter annual meeting, April 2, 1974.
agreements, helped cushion the shock. Neither the Nixon and Ford administrations, nor the Congress, were able to devise a plan or program to stop the growing economic decline. At the close of the session, however, Congress approved additional public-service jobs and extended unemployment benefits. According to a Congressional Joint Economic Committee survey for 1974, the poor were affected most severely. "Not only are they less able to cope with inflation because of their limited discretionary income," it noted, "but low income families and individuals have also suffered price increases significantly greater than those experienced by upper income consumers." Blacks, women, and other minorities were particularly hard hit, since those hired in recent years because of affirmative-action programs were the first to be released as industry cut back. In October the unemployment rate for black workers jumped to almost 11 per cent, compared to an approximate 6.5 per cent for the nation as a whole.

All these factors gave rise to fears that new intergroup tensions were likely to erupt, unless there was an upturn in the economy. The current situation, Elmer L. Winter, president of the American Jewish Committee, warned a White House Summit Conference on Inflation in September, could "exacerbate intergroup conflicts, provide inflammable tinder for scapegoating, and pit race, ethnic and class groups against each other." As the job market diminished, illegal immigrants became the special target of public resentment and official concern.

The condition of urban America worsened. A sharp drop in revenues, the result of a shrinking tax base and reduction of federal grants, aggravated such chronic problems as crime, mass transit, middle-class flight to the suburbs, housing, and substandard schools.

When the year came to a close, there were some who were pessimistic about the future; they felt that we had come to the end of an era of affluence and that it was necessary for America to adjust to changed world economic conditions. Few, however, would agree with Joseph Alsop's evaluation in the Washington Post (December 23, 1974) that "the American situation . . . is the most dangerous . . . faced by this country since the Civil War."

Elections

As anticipated, Democrats made substantial gains in the 1974 elections. They increased their representation in the House by at least 43 seats, considerably more than preelection predictions of 30 to 35. In the Senate, they gained at least three seats, giving them a three to two majority. (The outcome of the Senate race in New Hampshire is still undetermined.) There were Democratic governors in 37 states comprising 74 per cent of the nation's population, and Democrats controlled both houses of the legislatures in 36 states, the greatest degree of Democratic control at

\[ \text{\footnotesize FBI statistics for 1974 revealed a 17 per cent increase over 1973, the largest in 45 years, in serious offenses: murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.} \]
the state level since 1936. According to the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly* of November 19, there was a high degree of ticket-splitting. Voters in 10 of the 25 states electing both senators and governors voted for a senator of one party and a governor of the other. The electorate turned to the Democrats with no great enthusiasm. The low voter participation—only 38 per cent of registered voters—did not indicate apathy, but rather a feeling that the electorate could bring about no real change or a solution to the country's problems. If anything, the elections were a classic example of negative voting, with Democrats perceived the lesser of two evils.

A preelection Gallup poll, released on November 4, indicated that a majority of Americans were liberal on such issues as health, education, and welfare programs, establishing relations with Cuba, and gun registration, and conservative on such issues as busing to achieve better racial balance, reinstatement of the death penalty, and unconditional amnesty for draft evaders.

The elections brought to a halt Republican gains in the South. In many southern states, there were no Republican candidates for the U.S. Senate or the House. In Texas, where the Republicans had contested every House district in 1964, eight Democrats ran unopposed in 1974.

**CAMPAIGN ISSUES**

While major concerns of the electorate appeared to be inflation, unemployment, the Watergate scandal, and taxes, the election campaigns generally lacked serious discussion of substantive issues. Democrats were reluctant to use Watergate as a direct weapon and concentrated on so-called "integrity" issues, such as financial disclosures, release of personal financial data, limitations on amount of contributions and expenditures—all of which called Watergate to mind.

Inflation was discussed in almost every campaign, but not as an issue, and suggestions of specific remedies were usually avoided. There was agreement that an energy problem existed, but here too, no one offered a solution, except perhaps to imply that it would disappear once "Project Independence," a plan to make America self-sufficient, got underway. Taxes were an important issue, for lower-income and middle-class voters felt that the tax laws favored the wealthy. With some exceptions, Democratic candidates for the Congress urged increased spending for programs that would create more public jobs, increase benefits to welfare recipients, and give relief for those hardest hit by inflation—the elderly and those on fixed incomes. Other widely discussed issues were food shortages, consumerism and housing; abortion replaced busing as the most talked-about social issue. While law and order virtually disappeared as an issue, there was considerable sentiment for the reinstitution of capital punishment. Regionally, trade restrictions, subsidies, and the sale of wheat

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3 *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, November 19, 1974.

to the Soviet Union, low beef prices, failure to anticipate the fertilizer shortage, excess profits of corporations, oil depletion allowances, and prayer in the public schools were key issues.

MINORITIES AND WOMEN

Of the 91 newly-elected congressmen, nine were Jews, one was black, five were of Italian, one of Japanese, and one each of Lebanese and Polish origins. Michael S. Dukakis, a Greek by birth, was elected governor of Massachusetts, and for the first time since 1919, New Mexico voters elected a governor of Spanish-American origin, Jerry Apodaca.

According to Frances Farenhold, head of the National Women's Caucus, 1974 was the year of the breakthrough for women. There was a significant increase in the number of women candidates, with a total of 113 running for the U.S. Senate, the House of Representatives or governorships, as compared to 70 in 1972 and 47 in 1970. Of the candidates, 47 were major-party nominees for Congress—three of them for the Senate—with the remaining 63 minor-party or independent candidates. They ran on the tickets of the American Independent, Communist, George Wallace, Socialist Workers, U.S. Labor, and Conservative parties. There were now 18 congresswomen in the House, a net gain of two. None of the three major-party candidates for the Senate were elected.

THIRD-PARTY MOVEMENT

Ultra-conservatives, disenchanted almost from the beginning with the Ford administration's "liberalism," called for a new, conservative political entity after the elections. Interpreting the Republican defeat as a direct result of the failure to enunciate clearly and delineate conservative dogma, they made serious efforts to organize a third-party movement. There was persistent talk of a Reagan-Wallace presidential ticket for 1976 which, despite any overt encouragement from either man, seemed to grow in momentum.

While pollsters disagreed on the actual percentage of independent voters, they did agree that their numbers were increasing due to disenchantment with the political system and a deep apathy for politics. This was confirmed by a mid-1974 Gallup poll, which found that 44 per cent of respondents considered themselves Democrats, 33 per cent independents, and 23 per cent Republicans. George Gallup concluded from his data that "there is a fairly good chance that [independent] groups could be grabbed by a 'man on a white horse' if the economy slipped enough." Pollster Daniel Yankelovich, in October, maintained that the growing national anxiety, resentment, and a loss of confidence in institutions swelled the ranks of conservatives, with a "serious potential drift toward authoritarianism" that would work to the disadvantage of "many minority groups who fare badly when democratic processes are threatened."
Presumably because of the growing disenchantment with existing political parties, the ultra-right, represented by the John Birch Society and the American party, ran an unprecedented number of candidates for national, state, and local office. (The American party, whose membership was 35 to 40 per cent Bircher’s, claimed a total of more than 600 candidates running for elective office nationwide.) Nevertheless, no known member of the American party was elected to office.

Its most successful candidate appears to have been Dr. John Grady, a member of the John Birch Society’s National Council, who ran for the U.S. Senate in Florida but polled only 16 per cent of the total vote. In Massachusetts, Birch Society member Leo F. Kahian, running for governor on the American-party ticket on an anti-busing platform, polled over 3 per cent of the total votes, thereby establishing the American party as an officially recognized political party with the right to hold primaries, register voters, and enter candidates without securing petitions. Almost one-third of Kahian’s votes came from Boston and Springfield, the two cities affected by court-ordered busing.

Several prominent members of the Birch Society ran for public office on major-party slates. C. R. Lewis was defeated as Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate from Alaska. Dr. Lawrence McDonald was elected Democratic congressman from Georgia. H. L. Richardson, who had been prominent in the Birch Society, was defeated as Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate in California, while Floyd Paxton lost on the Republican ticket in Washington’s 4th Congressional district. Republican John Rousselot, a life member of the Birch Society and the only Bircher in the 93rd Congress, was reelected in California’s 24th Congressional district. The Birch Society strongly opposed senatorial candidate Mike Gravel of Alaska, Alan Cranston of California, and Frank Church of Idaho, all of whom were reelected.

Politics

For the first time in its history, the Democratic party, in December, held a convention between presidential elections. It produced a party charter, whose prime provisions focused on insuring full participation by all groups in party proceedings. Potentially far more important was the resolution, however temporary, of the vexing problem of how to insure fair representation in party deliberations and conventions without “quotas” for blacks, women, youth, and minorities, which had once threatened party unity (AJYB, 1973 [Vol. 74], p. 172).

After much acrimonious debate, threats of walkouts by the Black and Women’s Caucuses, a vague threat by some trade unionists and Southerners to bolt the party in 1976, and astute and skillful maneuvering by party chairman Robert Strauss, article 10 of the new charter was adopted. It provided, among other things, that the Democratic party be open to all who desire to support the party and wish to be known as Democrats. It prohibited “discrimination in the conduct of Democratic Party affairs on the basis of sex, race, age (if of voting age), religion, economic status
or ethnic origin." It further mandated an affirmative action program on the national and state level "to encourage full participation by all Democrats, with particular concern for minority groups, native Americans, women and youth in all the delegate selection process and in all party affairs as defined by the bylaws."

**Interreligious Relations**

Although the spirit of ecumenism moved steadily forward, aid to parochial schools and abortion continued to be tension-producing issues. Catholics remained deeply concerned over what they regarded as the failure of other religions to appreciate and understand their perspectives.

In fact, so widespread was the feeling that anti-Catholic prejudice was growing that a group of Roman Catholic priests and laymen organized the Catholic League for Religious Rights to combat it. In January it filed an *amicus curiae* brief for a review of *Wheeler v. Berrera* by the U. S. Supreme Court, arguing that the denial of remedial reading, hearing, and speech services to nonpublic-school pupils was part of an effort "to supress the exercise of First Amendment liberties by supporters of religious schools upon the pretext that such exercise is divisive." The League's Executive Director, Rev. Virgil C. Blum, in a June statement urging greater unity among American Catholics to achieve their objectives, declared that, compared to American Jews, they were "political pygmies" when it came to creating public understanding of Catholic positions on vital questions affecting Catholic interests, and that much of the mass media treated "Catholics with total disrespect, indecency, and unfairness." At the October convention of chief administrators of Catholic education, Blum again urged Catholics to greater political action, calling them "politically simplistic" for voting "the party, not the issues." In a December statement to the Washington, D.C., *Star News*, he charged the U. S. Supreme Court with "religious hostility," of scuttling "rules of law because the predominant beneficiaries of the legislation are Catholics."

Even in situations where the Catholic stand received some measure of support from other faiths, friction developed. After the much-publicized March testimony on abortion by four Cardinals before a Senate subcommittee, representatives of other religious groups, who had also given testimony, remonstrated about the lack of publicity given to non-Catholics opposed to legalized abortion, who were seeking to dispel the impression that abortion was a Roman Catholic issue. During these hearings, too, interfaith divisiveness surfaced when representatives of the 200-member Board of the American Baptist Churches accused Catholics of attempting to coerce the conscience and personal freedom of Americans favoring abortion.

Jewish attitudes on abortion continued to distress many American Catholics. Typical was a May 26 editorial by Father Albert J. Nevins in the influential *Our Sunday Visitor*, a nationally circulated diocesan paper, which called for understand-

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ing and sensitivity by American Jews with regard to the Catholic position on abortion. Wrote Father Nevins: "What I am appealing for Jewish groups to understand is that for millions of us, our feelings are just as deep, as sincere, as horrified, and as despairing as was theirs for the genocide perpetrated on their own people."

As in the past, the Jewish and Catholic agendas differed. The "liberal left" segment of the Roman Catholic community resented the preoccupation of American Jews with Israel, which, it felt, diminished the social consciousness of Jews. Mainstream Catholics were primarily concerned with domestic issues such as abortion, birth control, involuntary sterilization, and euthanasia, matching in intensity Jewish feelings over Israel and Soviet Jewry.

Despite differences, however, there were encouraging signs of harmonious relations between Jews and Christians. The formation by the National Council of Churches of an Office on Jewish-Christian Relations in February was a major step in increasing Protestant-Jewish understanding. Commenting on the new office, Dr. Claire Randall, general secretary of the National Council of Churches, expressed the hope that it would overcome the "lack of understanding by most American Protestants of either the interrelation of Christianity and Judaism or the relationship between the Holocaust and the State of Israel." In June the Presbyterian Churches in the U.S. made public a proposed new "Declaration of Faith" that repudiated prejudice against Jews.

While in domestic affairs Protestants worked closely with Jewish leaders and many spoke out in defense of Israel and condemnation of Arab terrorists, there were significant differences of opinion on the Palestinian question. David Hunter of the National Council of Churches, for one, contended in November that, in view of developments at the Rabat Conference, Israel must recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization "as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." The World Council of Churches maintained in February that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be recognized and implemented for the achievement of a lasting peace in the Middle East. Christian Century of November 7, 1974, printed an editorial by James M. Wall, declaring America's Christians have a responsibility to demand that the rights of Palestinians be respected, but not at the price of Israel's destruction. The National Council executive, which in December affirmed "the right of Israel to exist as a free nation within secure borders," also endorsed "the right of Palestinians to self-determination."

Among the more prominent pro-Israel Christian voices was that of David Hyatt, president of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, who, in a Thanksgiving sermon, urged "men and women of goodwill throughout the world, and particularly my fellow Christians, to speak out with courage and force and defend Israel's right to exist and to live in freedom and peace forever."

Christian concern for the distress of Soviet Jewry was expressed by demonstra-

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10 Address at American Jewish Committee annual meeting, May 15, 1974.
tions, protests, and other public functions. Interfaith meetings in ten major American cities were sponsored by the National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry, directed by Sister Ann Gillen, a Roman Catholic. Sister Margaret Ellen Traxler, another Catholic, testifying before the Senate Finance Committee in April, urged passage of the Jackson Amendment, and asked the Senators "not to sell your brothers and sisters [in the Soviet Union] for a few pieces of silver." On Easter Sunday, some 200 members of six downtown Washington, D.C., churches conducted a 15 minute vigil on behalf of Soviet Jews in front of the Soviet Embassy. In New York in April, a strong plea for freedom for Soviet Jews was issued by a group of prominent Christian leaders, who asked all New Yorkers to speak out against the growing repression of Soviet Jews. Calling for Christian support of a Solidarity Day Parade on behalf of Soviet Jews, M. L. Wilson, chairman of the National Committee of Black Churchmen, said: "Wherever the rights of the Jewish community or others are at stake, the black community must be there not only as silent partners.... We must speak out... to make our voices heard for Soviet Jews."

**Children of God**

Forecasting doom for America, extolling the virtues of Libya's President Muammar al-Qaddafi, and preaching antisemitism and anti-Catholicism, hatred of parents and of previous religious affiliation, a bizarre cult familiarly known as the Children of God undertook mass distribution of literature in the streets of American cities and on college campuses. An offshoot of the so-called Jesus Freaks movement, the Children of God are led by one David Brandt Berg, also known as Moses David. The movement now has some 2,500 members, living in communes, mostly in Texas and the West. They are required to surrender all personal belongings, including bank accounts and cash, to leaders of the communes, who, in turn, are to transfer assets to Berg. Since the Yom Kippur war, widely distributed Moses David tracts have kept up steady anti-Israel and pro-Arab propaganda, frequently replete with ancient antisemitic canards.

**Jews for Jesus**

The Jews for Jesus, sponsored by the Beth Bar Shalom Christian Fellowship, continued to proselytize among Jewish students on college campuses. Calling themselves "fulfilled Jews, not Christian converts," a hard core of some 25 missionaries traveled to various college campuses and churches seeking converts, primarily

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11For a full discussion see William Korey, "The Struggle Over the Jackson Amendment, II," in this volume.
through the medium of rock concerts and the distribution of leaflets and flyers in the streets of cities with large Jewish populations. The literature suggests that rabbis and parents keep young Jews in ignorance of the fact that Christianity is the logical extension of Judaism. Despite considerable efforts, however, Jews for Jesus remain a fringe group, with little prospect of significant growth.

The Jews

For many American Jews, 1974 was a year of misgivings, insecurity, and anxiety. To a large degree, Israel's isolation among the nations of the free world, its expulsion from UNESCO, the welcome given Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat in the UN General Assembly, the possible outbreak of a new war in the Middle East, and fear that American support of Israel was weakening were largely responsible for the widespread unease among Jews. Many also feared that the rise of unemployment and the rate of inflation, as America attempted to cope with a serious recession, could lead to Jewish scapegoating. Some were particularly concerned that heavy Arab investments in the United States may lead to economic and political influence, which could ultimately be used against Israel and American Jews.

Despite the prevailing pessimism, there were indications that these fears were baseless. Polls reflected strong support for Israel by the American people, that Israel was not viewed as being responsible for the energy crunch or the high price of oil, and that there was no discernible inclination to blame Jews for America's economic malaise.14

ELECTIONS

For the first time in recent history, four Jewish candidates ran for the U.S. Senate; Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.) and Jacob Javits were reelected; Richard Stone (Dem., Fla.) was the first Jewish Senator to be elected by popular vote in the deep South. Of three Jews who ran for governor, two were elected: Marvin Mandel of Maryland and Milton Shapp of Pennsylvania, the first governor in a century to be reelected in that state. Of 37 Jewish candidates running for the House of Representatives, 21 were elected including Elliott Levitas, a 43-year-old Atlanta attorney and the first Jew to be elected to Congress in Georgia.

Despite the large number of Jewish candidates for high public office, antisemitism as a political weapon continued to be virtually nonexistent. However, in upstate New York a whispering campaign was directed against State Senator Mary Ann Krupsak, a Roman Catholic married to a Jew, who was elected lieutenant-governor, and frequent references were made to excessive "New York City influence," taken

by some to be a euphemism for "Jewish influence." Two candidates for state office in Florida openly appealed for Ku Klux Klan support, a tactic eschewed by major party candidates for more than two decades. In the Georgia Democratic primary, self-avowed white racist and antisemite J. B. Stoner, running unsuccessfully for the lieutenant-governorship on a hate blacks and Jews platform, polled more than 67,000 votes, a dramatic upsurge from the 17,633 votes cast for him in his unsuccessful 1970 gubernatorial attempt.

ISSUE OF ISRAEL

One of the few campaigns in which Israel was an issue, which generated considerable heat, was the New York senatorial race between Democratic candidate Ramsey Clark and incumbent Republican Senator Jacob K. Javits. It was sparked off by a position paper on the Middle East issued by Clark in September, advocating Palestinian representation in any peace discussion and the eventual creation of a Palestinian state as "a solid guarantee of Israel's protection against terrorist attack," a view Javitz saw as "fuzzing and ambiguous" and "gambling on the survival of Israel." Clark denied the charge that he espoused the creation of a West Bank Palestine state.

In the congressional campaign in Colorado, Republican James P. Johnson was attacked for having characterized arms shipments to Israel as an act of war toward Arab countries; in California, the challenger Jack Redden criticized his Democratic opponent Ronald Dellums for having voted against aid to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

"NEW ANTI-SEMITISM"

There was the feeling among Jews that the mood of the country was changing, that there had developed an insensitivity and indifference to Jewish concerns. This change, Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein of the Anti-Defamation League asserted in a study, was the basis of a "new anti-Semitism," which differed from the traditional kind in that it "is not necessarily deliberate in character and more often is expressed by respected individuals who would be shocked to think themselves, or have others think them anti-Semites." Their analysis, they said, unequivocally refutes any notion of the existence of a potential for Nazi-like devastation; but "something is happening which is not good for Jews": anti-Israel statements with an anti-Jewish impact, often from respectable sources; silent acceptance by public officials and the clergy of overt manifestations of anti-Jewish bigotry; antisemitism among black extremists blaming Jews for urban ills; radical-left assaults on Israel, Jews, and Jewish concerns, and a revival of anti-Jewish stereotyping in the arts.

While there was considerable agreement among Jews on ADL's new definition

of antisemitism, or some part of it, others felt that it extended and distorted the meaning of antisemitism by failing to make a distinction between an anti-Israel stance and antisemitic attitudes, and between policies which are contrary to Jewish interests and antisemitism. Non-Jewish criticism of the study's thesis was in the main that it ignored the distinction between lack of sympathy toward Zionism or Israel and antisemitism.

SAXBE INCIDENT

Several incidents reported from Washington, D.C., however, supported the thesis. On April 3 U.S. Attorney General William N. Saxbe held a news conference in which he announced a new study of the Attorney General's List of Subversive Organizations and related internal-security laws, last reviewed in 1955. Explaining his department's concern over a "new breed" of terrorist organizations that replaced the Communist-based organizations of the McCarthy era as potential threats to the country's internal security, Saxbe noted that in the McCarthy era "there was a great distrust of the intellectual," and added: "One of the changes that came about is because of the Jewish intellectual, who was in those days very enamored of the Communist Party."

After vigorous protest by Jewish organizations and widespread editorial rebuke, Saxbe attempted to clarify his remarks on the very next day by stating that "there was a great deal of anti-Semitism in the Communist witchhunts in the late '40s and '50s," much of which was "directed at some highly visible Jewish intellectuals who were considered sympathetic to Russia," but that, "because of the Soviet posture toward issues of importance to Jews, this is no longer the case today, and I believe this change can best be seen by the totally different type of individual involved in the terrorist groups now operating." Despite explanations by Saxbe's aides that his remarks about Jewish intellectuals "just came out" and were not premeditated, the Washington Post, on April 21, editorially chastized Saxbe for having made "profoundly unfair and offensive references to Jews," and an "even more offensive" explanation.

BROWN AFFAIR

Speaking to a Duke University law forum on October 10, General George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speculated during the question and answer session that if a severe new oil embargo imposed not merely inconvenience

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16Earl Rabb in "Is There a New Anti-Semitism?," Commentary, May 1974, stated: "Forster and Epstein accurately sensed that there is a danger abroad in America that does not fall within the old definition of anti-Semitism and they have turned to the idea of indifference in an effort to identify it."


18A U.S. Senator in 1973, Saxbe, in a public statement on U.S.-Soviet trade, for which he subsequently apologized, said: "If the Zionist Jews believe that we are going to fight to the last drop of farmers blood, then I'm not going to be a party to it."
but suffering on Americans, they "might get tough-minded enough to set down the Jewish influence in this country and break that lobby." Brown further remarked that Jewish influence in the U. S. Congress "was so strong, you wouldn't believe it," that the "Jews own, you know, the banks in this country, the newspapers." Brown's off-the-cuff remarks remained unnoticed until the Washington Post, tracking down rumors, verified that Brown in fact did make them, and published the story in its November 13, 1974 edition.

Reaction was instantaneous, drawing protests from all major Jewish organizations, editorial condemnation, and criticism from senators, congressmen, and other prominent Americans. In an unprecedented action, President Ford publicly rebuked Brown. Presidential press aide Ron Nessen reported that the President considered Brown's remarks "ill advised and poorly handled," and that they "in no way represent Mr. Ford's views, or the views of any senior officer of his administration, military or civilian," and that the President "feels very strongly about this matter." In a telegram to the Jewish War Veterans, Brown apologized for his comments and declared that he regretted having made them and that they "certainly do not represent my convictions."

However, Brown's remarks brought more widespread discussion of the hitherto muted subject of "Jewish influence" and of the "pro-Israel lobby." On Capitol Hill there was serious consideration of the nature and extent of military aid to Israel and intensified speculation that America's arsenal has become dangerously depleted because of our shipments to Israel.

The Brown incident brought to the surface some antisemitic resentment. Many letters to the editor in responsible publications from persons with no known record of antisemitic activity were laced with antisemitic remarks or innuendos. Brown, in his first public speech after the story broke, told a business group in Sacramento, Calif., on November 25 that he had "received some letters of support of a type I totally reject as alien to America and alien to me," an obvious reference to antisemitic mail.

The hard-core antisemites found the Brown incident a made-to-order opportunity. The National States Rights party organ, The Thunderbolt, called for a "flood of telegrams to Congress," urging its followers not to allow "the Jews to destroy this courageous patriot who has the guts to tell it like it is." James H. Johnson's The Truth Seeker headlined its story: "Jew Power Reigns in the U.S.," and veteran antisemite Don Bell devoted his entire four-page Don Bell Reports to: "The Influence of Those Who Say They Are Jews." Gerald L. K. Smith reported that "the Jew-Zionists . . . were saturated with armaments furnished by the U.S. and sneaked out of our arsenal by prostituted politicians powerful enough to overrule the best judgment of our military leaders." The neo-Nazi National Socialist White Peoples party flooded the Pentagon parking lot with flyers screaming, among other things, "America's defenses have been dangerously weakened by the Israel first, America

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last policy of Secretary of Defense Schlessinger and other Zionist or pro-Zionist officials."21

**AMERICAN NAZIS**

Between mid-October 1973 and fall of 1974, the National Socialist White People's party (NSWPP), which had been quiescent since founder George Lincoln Rockwell's assassination in 1967, significantly increased its level of activity and became more abrasive in its agitation. Under the direction of its national commander, Matt Koehl, NSWPP flamboyantly picketed foreign embassies, the White House, book stores, theatres, and Jewish houses of worship; appeared in full Nazi stormtrooper regalia before boards of education and city councils; distributed literature and defaced public buildings with propaganda stickers in downtown business areas; conducted “Free Rudolph Hess” vigils in a dozen cities, and publicly announced the opening of “new” national headquarters in at least three cities. Its national and local leaders were featured in television and radio news programs and as panelists on talk shows, and were profiled in local newspapers. The often uncritical presentations thus gave wide circulation to Nazi race theories, religious bigotry, and antisemitic canards.

**Black America**

**ELECTIONS**

One additional black congressman, Harold E. Ford (D., Tenn.) was elected; 12 other blacks running as major party candidates lost, including James H. Brannen, Republican candidate of Connecticut and the only black who ran for the Senate. Mervyn M. Dymally was elected lieutenant governor of California and George L. Brown lieutenant governor of Colorado, the highest state offices ever won by blacks in these states. Southern blacks won more state seats than at any time since Reconstruction. (Since the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, black voter registration has increased from 1.5 to 3.5 million, out of a voting-age population of 6 million.)

**ECONOMIC PROGRESS**

There was growing evidence of the economic progress of blacks. In a report on an intensive survey it conducted, *Time* (June 17, 1974) concluded that “more and more blacks are achieving the American dream of lifting themselves into the middle class. They have become as well-heeled, well housed, and well educated as their white counterparts.”22 This was based on the following findings: More than 30 per

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21Ellerin, *ibid.*

22Political analysts Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, in a widely discussed article in the April 1973 issue of *Commentary*, reported significant economic advances by blacks in recent years; that, as a result, a slight majority of all blacks could now be considered as belonging to the middle class.
cent of American blacks earned $10,000 or more, and 12 per cent earned at least $15,000. There also were significant increases of blacks in the colleges, in the professions, and in technical jobs. The survey further found that as a result of governmental pressure to end discrimination, enlightened attitudes on the part of business and industry, and efforts by blacks themselves, blacks have increasingly been moving into skilled jobs and managerial positions; that while blacks comprised 11 per cent of the total population, they now held 15 per cent of all full-time jobs in the federal government. Economic advances and the crumbling of housing barriers have enabled blacks to move steadily into better homes, in some cases into second homes.

However, the report added, the "job situation for poor blacks has lately turned worse." Black unemployment stood at 9.5 per cent, compared to 4.7 per cent for whites. One-third of all black teenagers were unemployed, twice the rate for white teenagers. And five million blacks received some form of public welfare.

A United Nations Economic and Social Council report, "1974 Report on the World Social Situation," stated that, since 1965, earnings of blacks and whites have narrowed considerably for both men and women; that while differences between black and white men were still considerable, black women, except in the South, now received higher wage rates than white women. At the same time, the report stated, blacks as a group had a higher infant mortality, shorter life expectancy at birth, and lower standards in housing and education than whites.

EDUCATION

If progress was being made in the desegregation of elementary and secondary schools in the South, this was not true of state colleges and universities. A study made public on December 28 by the Southern Education Foundation disclosed that most institutions in a region that was 20 per cent black remained 90 to 95 per cent white.

There were some differences of opinion on whether over-all college enrollment of blacks had peaked and was now declining. A survey conducted by Alexander Astin, professor of higher education at the University of California, Los Angeles, revealed that the percentage of blacks in the total college enrollment dropped from 8.7 in 1972 to 7.8 in 1973, and to 7.4 at the beginning of the 1974 academic year.23

Some black educators charged that the drop in black college enrollment resulted from a lessening of commitment by college recruiters, who assumed that nothing more remained to be done since the black enrollment had increased, as well as from a change in the policy of the government, the principal source of financial aid to minority students. These educators maintained that as the number of colleges

23A survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Census in October 1974 indicated that black enrollment had increased from 684,000 at the beginning of the 1973–74 school year to 784,000 at the start of the 1974–75 school year, a figure discounted as inaccurate by some black recruitment officers.
having financial problems increased, the tendency was to decrease financial assistance to minority-group students; that Spanish-Americans, Indians, and women at the graduate level were competing with blacks for whatever financial assistance was available, and that pressure from black and civil-rights groups had all but evaporated.

In contrast to Professor Astin's findings, Karen J. Winkler, assistant editor of the Chronicle of Higher Education, reported the total number of college-bound blacks has been growing due to the continued increase over the past years of enrollment in black colleges. Paradoxically, notes Miss Winkler, the active recruiting of blacks for other institutions reduced enrollment in black colleges to only 25 to 30 per cent of blacks in higher education, thus threatening these colleges with a loss of their identity within the next few years. A U.S. Census Bureau study, released on January 1975, reported that the education gap between blacks and whites and between women and men was narrowing. The differential between black and white women was reduced by 2.1 per cent. There also was some encouragement for the prospective black college graduates. A year-end New York Times survey (reported on December 16, 1974), in which college placement officers and graduate students were interviewed, found that "if you are black or female, or both, your opportunities in many fields are very good."

BOSTON SCHOOL INTEGRATION

Violence erupted in Boston when schools opened in September, after U.S. District Court Judge W. Arthur Garrity had ruled in June that Boston's schools were willfully and illegally segregated and ordered compliance with a state program, including busing as a temporary measure until a more permanent, long-range plan could be evolved. A state law requiring the desegregation of schools was passed by Massachusetts more than a decade ago. The busing program involved some 18,000 junior and senior high-school students in 80 of the city's 200 schools located primarily in South Boston, a predominantly white, Irish-Catholic, working-class district, in white Hyde Park, and in overwhelmingly black Roxbury.

There was violent resistance by parents and students, during which buses carrying black students into South Boston were stoned, both white and black students were physically assaulted, and innocent pedestrians were attacked. Serious fighting erupted in a predominantly black housing project and in South Boston. When violence reached its peak in early October, Mayor Kevin White unsuccessfully appealed to Judge Garrity for 125 United States marshals. (Ultimately, 450 state and city police were needed to cope with the situation.)

Just at that time, in an October 9 news conference, President Ford reaffirmed his long-standing opposition to forced busing to achieve quality education, stating that he "respectfully" disagreed with the federal court order to bus Boston school children. Following widespread editorial condemnation of the President's statement, press secretary Ron Nessen announced that the President's remarks should
not give "aid and comfort to those who disobey the law," since the President believes that the public and the city administration of Boston "must respect the law, and this ruling of the Court is the law."

While the Boston conflict over busing had undeniable racial overtones, it also appeared to be motivated by a class conflict. South Boston's workers resented that white liberal suburbanites, whose children were unaffected, were among the most ardent supporters of the court-ordered busing. Judge Garrity, a resident of white suburban Wellsley; Mayor White, whose children attended private schools, and Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Edward W. Brooke, neither of whom had children in Boston's public schools, were the prime targets. Busing, they complained, is not "for them," the white liberals, but for "us," the Irish, the Italians, and the blacks.2

Racial bigots and Marxists attempted to exploit the mood of strife-torn Boston. The American nazis and a Louisiana-based variation of the Ku Klux Klan independently sent "national leaders" into Boston in an unsuccessful effort to agitate and recruit. The Trotskyite Socialist Workers party played a dominant role in organizing a broadly based, massive "keep the buses rolling" march of an estimated 20,000 people through Boston streets on December 14.

On December 22 the Boston School Committee, after refusing to comply with a court order to approve and submit a plan for full integration of all Boston schools, unanimously agreed to adopt Judge Garrity's desegregation order and busing plan, which was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In defiance of a court order to approve and submit a new desegregation outline, three of the five-member School Committee rejected a plan prepared by school administrators, declaring they would rather go to jail than approve a plan which would lead to more violence. Christmas vacation was set ahead of schedule in an effort to restore calm. But at year's end Boston remained a city gripped by fear and divided by racial hatred.

BLACK NATIONALISM

Imamu Baraka, the foremost proponent of black nationalism and its most prominent personality, renounced the movement in favor of "the scientific socialist theory founded by Marx and Engels,"23 because it had become "ineffective and racist." He urged his followers to make common cause with poor whites and other economically deprived groups to improve their lives and to end capitalism in the United States.

Huey Newton, supreme commander of the Black Panthers who, like Baraka, built a following and a movement by preaching that whites were inherently evil and totally to blame for the economic and social condition of blacks, was arrested by the Oakland, Cal., police in July, and again in August, on a variety of charges.


ranging from street fighting to shooting a black prostitute. Due for arraignment on August 23, Newton disappeared without trace, forfeiting $421,000 bail. Without his leadership, the Panthers movement, once a potent voice in the black community, has all but ceased to exist outside the San Francisco Bay area.

The anti-Israel, antisemitic Black Muslims, whose dogma includes hatred of whites because they are responsible for the ills of American blacks, remained essentially a religious movement, but with heavy emphasis on economic self-sufficiency for blacks. At year's end, these groups still had some activists. But Baraka's shift in priorities and the disappearance of Newton deprived the black nationalist movement of charismatic leadership, with the likely result that it would no longer be a significant force in the black community.

**Black-Jewish Relations**

Tension between blacks and Jews continued to surface, but it was considerably less severe than in the preceding few years. A decline in the advocacy of the Third World and black power muted the once overt and strident anti-Israel rhetoric of young blacks, who preached solidarity with their Arab brothers—a significant factor in exacerbating black-Jewish relations and in the alienating of many American Jews.

The large black publications, despite Arab efforts to curry favor with many of their editors (a three-week tour of Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria by a delegation of black publishers and editors was financed, according to one member of the delegation, by "Arab oil money"), condemned the Arab massacre of innocent Israeli school children at Ma'alot. The prestigious *Amsterdam News*, on May 25, described it as "a crime against humanity," while the Columbus, Ga., *Times*, a black daily, on May 19 bitterly condemned those Arab governments without whose financial support "the activities of these gangs [Arab terrorists] would be impossible."

Beyond the sympathies evoked by wanton Arab terrorist attacks, distinguished black leaders, such as Bayard Rustin, Roy Wilkins, and Vernon Jordan, frequently and publicly called for support for Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state. The *Philadelphia Tribune*, in its reaffirmation of support for Israel on May 25, challenged "the assumption of many Jewish leaders... that black Americans no longer support the right of Israel to exist." It pointed out, among other things, that 13 of the 15 black congressmen cosponsored a House resolution urging the government to resupply Israel with arms and ammunition depleted or lost in the Yom Kippur war.

The prime cause of what many blacks viewed as a stumbling block to better relations was the Jewish position on quotas, affirmative action, and reverse discrimination. Almost always, however, when the issue was raised in public discussions by prominent black spokesmen, there was, at the same time, reaffirmation of a mutual-

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ity of Jewish-black interests with regard to other issues, and the acknowledgment of Jewish support during the civil-rights struggles of the late 1950s and early 1960s.\(^9\)

The prevailing black sentiment was one of sharp disagreement with the stance in the widely publicized DeFunis\(^{30}\) case of such influential Jewish groups as the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, which filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of DeFunis. The American Jewish Committee brief argued that the university's action in granting preferential admission to certain applicants on the basis of race violated the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the law school's plan to bring about a "reasonable representation" of minority-group students, although not labeled a quota, inevitably set a limitation or quota for other groups. The U.S. Supreme Court, in April 1974, ruled the case moot, since DeFunis was about to graduate from another law school.

While Vernon E. Jordan, executive director of the National Urban League, expressed understanding of the strong Jewish hostility to quotas of any sort, he argued that blacks were not insisting on quotas, but rather on meaningful affirmative-action programs to erase past and present discriminations, and a less rigid and dogmatic definition of appropriate qualifications.\(^{31}\) Clarence Mitchell, director of the NAACP's Washington bureau, maintained that the inevitable effect of the position of Jewish groups and others opposed to "affirmative admission practices" was that "most blacks who have been handicapped by discrimination in their education would never be admitted to law school."\(^{32}\)

Although the DeFunis case and sharply divergent opinions on what affirmative action means strained relations between blacks and Jews, even those blacks who were the most critical of the dominant Jewish position on these issues wanted to prevent harmful conflict. There was frequent acknowledgment that the National Council of Jewish Women, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, and other individual Jews supported the black position on DeFunis; and that even those Jewish groups which supported his case were, at the same time, strong advocates of affirmative action in other areas of discrimination against blacks.\(^{33}\)

Black gratification was also expressed when, in May 1974, the Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Committee, and American Jewish Congress joined with the National Urban League, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund, and the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP in urging Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Secretary Caspar Weinberger to establish "nondiscriminatory guidelines" clarifying

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\(^{31}\) Address at annual meeting of American Jewish Committee Atlanta, Ga., chapter, June 2, 1974.

\(^{32}\) Jones, *op. cit.*

\(^{33}\) Poussaint, *op. cit.*
how educational institutions could best develop appropriate tools for special efforts to recruit persons from previously excluded groups.

Generally, responsible black leaders believed that there was greater support for blacks among Jews than in any other group. Civil-rights activist Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, in a declared effort to end black isolationism and to solve the country's social problems, approached various Jewish organizations for the purpose of forming an alliance between them and blacks, Arabs, and Spanish-speaking Americans. He and Rabbi Irwin M. Blank, president of the Synagogue Council of America, in November convened a two-day conference of 50 Jewish and black religious leaders at the University of Chicago to discuss and air differences in order to reaffirm that there were "more things to unite us than to divide us." A joint statement at the close of the conference called for a program of full employment as a matter of right, rejection of President Ford's anti-inflation program; an adequate national health program, and an effective affirmative-action program for women, blacks, and other minorities.

Earlier, in June, a National Consultation on Black-Jewish Relations, under joint sponsorship of Fisk University and the American Jewish Committee, convened at the university. Representative black and Jewish scholars and institutional leaders examined in depth relationships between Jews and blacks from biblical, theological, historical, and sociological perspectives. Serious disputes arose over historical interpretations, with some blacks resorting to antisemitic remarks to which no black raised objections. Still, at the end of the conference, blacks and Jews agreed that new ways must be found to work together for the benefit of both.

**Civil Rights**

At the 25th anniversary meeting in Washington in February of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, a coalition of 135 national organizations that spearheaded the 1950s and 1960s movement for civil-rights legislation, the consensus was that what was now needed was enforcement of existing laws, rather than new legislation. The overriding concern was aid to the poor and disadvantaged.

Despite a Congress and country preoccupied with Watergate and the impeachment proceedings, some significant civil-rights legislation was passed. A minimum-wage law (S 2747), raising the hourly minimum for most nonfarm workers and extending overtime coverage to domestics and federal, state, and local government employees, was signed on April 8. A three-year struggle to provide legal services for the poor ended in July with the establishment of a Legal Services Corporation. The first major housing legislation (S 3066) since 1968, the key features of which substituted community-development block grants for categorical urban-funding programs and established a new rent-subsidy program for low- and moderate-income Americans, became law on August 22. Six days later, the President signed

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an omnibus amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 134-36), extending most of its programs to 1978 and authorizing appropriations of over $25 billion for that period.

In its closing days, the 93rd Congress enacted legislation (S 754) to enforce the constitutional right to a speedy trial. One of the Nixon administration's most controversial crime-control measures was eliminated when, on October 16, the Congress passed PL 93481 repealing the so-called "no knock" law which, in some circumstances, authorized federal agents to enter and search dwellings and make arrests without first knocking and identifying themselves.

In a June 10 decision, the U. S. Supreme Court (*Michigan v. Tucker*) modified, but refused to overturn, the Miranda ruling which barred the use of evidence obtained by the police from a person who was in custody, but was not fully warned of his constitutional right to remain silent and, if necessary, to have legal counsel at public expense.

**EQUAL-RIGHTS AMENDMENT**

The drive for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution, which would prohibit any form of sex discrimination by federal, state, or local governments, seemed headed for an uncertain future (AJYB, 1974-75 [Vol. 75], p. 117). Although by year's end, 33 of the necessary 38 state legislatures had ratified the amendment, strong opposition was beginning to develop. Spearheading the opposition was Phyllis Schlafly, author, lecturer, and political activist long identified with such right-wing organizations as the Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation and the John Birch Society, who maintained that the amendment would give "women no new rights, but a whole bunch of responsibilities." The Birch Society, declaring the defeat of the amendment to be one of its important objectives, mounted an aggressive campaign opposing ratification. The National Council of Catholic Women, the Southern Baptist Association, the Daughters of the American Revolution, fundamentalist groups, and the Mormon Church opposed ratification for ideological reasons. They believed that it would threaten woman's role as wife and mother, and her traditionally privileged position. Other less formal opposition developed because of a bleak economic picture, which made women reluctant to disturb existing relationships and thus jeopardize jobs.

**Affirmative Action**

The thrust of the government's various affirmative-action programs barring discrimination because of race, sex, color, religion, or national origin shifted from blue-collar occupations to academia. The HEW Office of Civil Rights exerted con-
considerable pressure on law schools and other educational institutions, insisting under threat of terminating federal contract funds, that they actively recruit more faculty members and students from minority groups. Blacks generally saw the issue as a test of whether or not the nation had the will, through preferential treatment of blacks, to rectify previous wrongs.\textsuperscript{38} Whites, who agreed on the need for increasing minority admissions and faculty representation, saw the actual implementation of affirmative action as reverse discrimination and the legitimation of quotas. Some distinguished blacks argued that acceptance of quotas was an admission of inferiority, or, as Bayard Rustin maintained, a means to "further entrench the tendency of society to respond to the call for equal opportunity with tokenism."\textsuperscript{39}

In a significant effort to heal the wounds caused by the DeFunis case and implementation of affirmative-action programs, the professional heads of the American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Congress, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Urban League, and Puerto Rican Legal and Defense Fund, in a joint letter dated May 17, urged Secretary Weinberger to issue nondiscriminatory guidelines "for recruitment of minorities by educational institutions."

In order to correct some of the admitted abuses flowing from the affirmative-action employment programs of colleges and universities, HEW Office of Civil Rights Director Peter E. Holmes, after a series of meetings with representatives of major Jewish organizations, issued new guidelines on admissions policies. They stipulated that colleges receiving federal contracts may not 1) discriminate against white males in efforts to improve employment opportunities for minority groups and women; 2) lower job standards for women or minorities; 3) advertise that females or minorities are preferred, or designate certain jobs on the basis of sex or race to meet employment goals.\textsuperscript{40} To avert a cutoff of federal funds, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia submitted plans for the desegregation of state-controlled universities and colleges, which were approved by HEW.

Generally, however, the government's affirmative-action program continued to take root. Government employees and those working under government contracts constituted a significant segment of the work force covered by goals and timetables. There was substantial compliance with affirmative-action regulations, some voluntary and some to avoid legal action. In March seven of the nation's largest trucking companies, threatened by a government lawsuit, agreed to adopt hiring goals under which one-third to one-half of their employees would be blacks or persons with Spanish surnames. In April nine major steel companies signed a consent decree with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the U.S. Departments of Labor and Justice, agreeing to fill within the next year 20 per cent of new production

\textsuperscript{38} Amsterdam News, March 9, 1974.

\textsuperscript{39} Testimony before the Special Subcommittee on Education, U.S. House of Representatives, September 17, 1974.

\textsuperscript{40} "Memorandum to College and University Presidents," December 1974.
and maintenance jobs with women, 15 per cent of new high-craft jobs with minorities, and 25 per cent of supervisory and management-training jobs with minorities and women.

The city of Jackson, Miss., agreed to hire two blacks for every white in its police department, until a 35 per cent ratio was achieved. The Maryland state police, in conformity with a consent decree, agreed to hire enough blacks to constitute at least 4 per cent of its personnel. A U.S. District Court Judge in Newark ruled in October that one-third of all policemen hired in the city must be black or Hispanic.

Revenue Sharing

The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, known as the General Revenue Sharing Act, was conceived by the Nixon administration as part of its New Federalism to phase out traditional patterns of federal aid by giving state and local officials more control over the expenditure of federal funds; to help create greater fiscal equity, and to bring government closer to the people. But two years of implementation have pointed up the shortcomings of the law. In general, Congress was having second thoughts about the entire program, with many congressmen increasingly reluctant to allow state and local officials to decide how substantial federal monies should be spent. Their misgivings were not without cause.

There has been concern over growing difficulty encountered in financing local programs for the poor, the aged, the sick, and other disadvantaged. Hearings in June before the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations produced testimony by the Brookings Institution and others that state governments were using the funds made available to pay bills, or to lower or hold down taxes; that states were failing to enforce the civil-rights provisions of the act, and that only a relatively little amount was being spent for the poor and elderly. In a December 4 meeting in Houston, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., executive director of the National Urban League, charged that cities were not spending funds to aid the poor, and that only 1 per cent of monies received were used for social services, 2 per cent for housing and community development, and 5 per cent for health programs.

The Revenue Sharing Law, it was asserted, has also worked to the disadvantage of minorities. Big cities with large black and Spanish-speaking populations, which were undercounted by census-takers, have received less monies than they should. The law contains antidiscrimination provisions, but these were generally not known. Awareness of these provisions became more widespread when on December 18, following a federal court ruling that the city of Chicago was guilty of discrimination against blacks and Chicanos in its police recruitment, testing, promotion, and

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41 Congressional Quarterly Weekly, July 6, 1974.
assignment practices, the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., ordered a halt of all payment of revenue-sharing funds to that city until it ceased its discriminatory practices. Authorities believed that this decision, the first of its kind, could well set a precedent for action against other cities, where similar suits were pending.

**Illegal Aliens**

The continuing influx of illegal immigrants in ever larger numbers has been causing considerable concern. According to Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., some three million undetected illegal aliens were living in the United States at the beginning of 1974. By June 30, he put the number at "somewhere between five, six, or seven million," and growing every day.45 There were 670,000 arrests in 1973, and 800,000 in 1974. In contrast to years past, many illegal aliens now came to the large cities, rather than farms, swelling the ranks of the poor. Fearful of exposure, they generally did not apply for welfare relief or other social services. Those who managed to find employment were frequently exploited by unscrupulous employers, who paid less than the minimum wage.46 In some areas of extensive unemployment, residents resented that these people were working as waiters, bellhops, and taxi drivers.

Sentiment was growing to curb illegal entry by legislation making it unlawful for an employer knowingly to hire an illegal alien. Opposition to such a law came from farming interests, and, in some instances, from the Roman Catholic clergy who considered the law "anti-Catholic," since 90 per cent of the aliens in question were Mexicans.

**Textbook Controversy**

Deep community divisions, based on class lines, religious beliefs, life styles, and cultural values, gave rise to new attacks on public schools after several years of relative calm. In the ultra-rightist-inspired assaults of a decade-and-a-half ago, schools had been a major target of the war against "Godless Communism.' Violence erupted in West Virginia's coal-mining area of Kanawha county over the use of textbooks in the public schools which, in compliance with state law, were multicultural. It began when school opened and lasted for almost six months. In a region heavily Fundamentalist in religious outlook, many parents denounced the textbooks as "un-American, anti-Christian, and pornographic," and complained bitterly that they had no voice in determining what their children should be taught. Protest marches, rallies, parades, scuffles, picketing, and arrests were almost daily occurrences; weekly church sermons frequently stirred up the people. The Ku Klux Klan and John Birch Society, which opposed the use of the mandated textbooks, came into the community to cajole and recruit.


In October two elementary schools and a rural bridge, used by county school buses bringing pupils to schools where the controversial textbooks were being used, were bombed. At the end of the month, an explosion shattered windows in the school board administration building in Charleston. Similar, though less violent, protests over textbooks or classroom materials took place in Hanover county, N. C., Boise, Ida., Prince George's and Montgomery counties, Md., Prince William and Bedford counties, Va., and Sauk Village, Ill.

While ultra-rightists continued to regard the textbook controversy in terms of a "conspiracy," more objective observers read deeper meaning into it. According to U. S. Commissioner of Education T. H. Bell, it was a manifestation of a "growing concern on the part of parents that they have lost control over their children's education." Others, such as Paul Salmon, executive director of American Association of School Administrators, observed that both parents and teachers are seeking more power, and that teachers, who frequently lived outside the communities where they taught, were unfamiliar with community mores or life-styles. However, the fundamental issue surfacing from the current conflicts appeared to evolve over the rights of parents, as opposed to boards of education, to determine what their children should be taught in the public schools.

Amnesty

An unresolved divisive issue continued to be the question of amnesty for young men who, for a variety of reasons, either failed to report for induction or deserted from the armed forces during the Vietnam war. In a clearly sincere effort to "bind up the nation's wounds" and to respond to a growing sentiment for forgiveness, President Ford, speaking to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 19, announced his amnesty program. Although he favored "leniency," he said, he endorsed pardon only for those who agreed to do some public service to earn their way back into the country's good graces.

There were many who initially approved of the President's program, among them newspapers like the New York Times and religious leaders. There were others who, harking back to Ford's "full, absolute, and unconditional" pardon for Richard Nixon, argued for unconditional amnesty here too.

Immediately after the President announced the details of the plan on September 16, spokesmen for those to whom the conditional amnesty would apply called it "vindictive" and "more punitive than expected." Exiles in Canada maintained that anything less than unconditional amnesty was unacceptable. Indeed, the response was far less than anticipated. When the amnesty offer expired on July 31, only 15 per cent of the estimated 12,500 eligible deserters had applied; of 6,800 draft evaders, only 97 had surrendered, and of the estimated 213,000 convicted of draft evasion or desertion, only 623 had asked for a Clemency Review Board hearing.

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Indians

For the first time in American history, the United States Department of Justice sued to protect the voting rights of Indians. In a January complaint filed in the United States District Court, Phoenix, Ariz., the Department charged that the state of Arizona, by dividing the Apache county—which was inhabited by 23,994 Indians and 8,304 non-Indians—into three separate districts, left the Indians with a majority of voters in only one of the three districts. Each of the districts elects a county supervisor, and the three collectively manage county affairs. The suit alleged that the redistricting, which went into effect in 1972, violated the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, as well as federal voting statutes.

Disappointed over the fulfillment of a promise of increased self-government made by President Nixon in July, 170 Indian tribes from coast to coast intensified demands that their reservations be given commonwealth status. Earlier, in June, the American Indian Movement had voted to establish an International Indian Treaty Council and to apply to the United Nations for membership on "behalf of all Indians." At the same time, it declared its intention to open negotiations with the government through the State Department as a sovereign people, rather than as citizens of the United States.

MILTON ELLERIN
The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

During the first half of 1974, United States diplomatic efforts in the Middle East concentrated on the negotiation of disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel, and Syria and Israel, to replace the fragile cease-fires that had halted the intensive October 1973 war (p. 398). The ultimate success of the negotiations was attributed at the time to the unprecedented “shuttle diplomacy” of United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. While his personal negotiating skills and his seemingly tireless efforts in moving back and forth between the belligerent parties to help narrow their differences no doubt played an important role, equally important were the unpublicized understandings and assurances he provided to the parties on behalf of the United States.

Thus, the disengagement of the hostile forces depended in large measure on the confidence Kissinger inspired among the parties that the United States would stand behind its promises. While explicit United States commitments, such as arrangement for American photoreconnaissance to provide independent surveillance of the deployment of forces in the disengagement zones, helped to reassure each of the parties regarding compliance by the other, the more general American pledges to work for a just and lasting peace in accordance with UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338 gave rise to conflicting expectations.

The Egyptian government thought this meant that the United States had committed itself to restoring all of Sinai to Egyptian authority and would use the necessary pressure on Israel to agree to withdraw its armed forces. Egypt, in turn, would agree to end its belligerence against Israel, but only after Israel had withdrawn from all occupied territories and satisfied the “rights of the Palestinians.” The Israeli government thought that United States commitment to Israel’s right to live within secure and recognized boundaries meant that the United States would not only provide all the military equipment Israel needed to maintain its defenses, but would also refrain from imposing its own views on the parties, limiting itself to facilitating the negotiations between them. This difference in conception of the American posture became apparent in the latter part of the year. The Egyptians began to urge Washington to press for speedy further withdrawals by the Israelis, while the Israelis urged a period of waiting for practical evidence of Egypt’s peaceful intentions by reopening the Suez Canal and rebuilding the cities along its banks.

Nothing came of various suggestions for a similar disengagement or thinning out of Israeli and Jordanian forces along the Jordan River and for restoring Jordanian civilian authority in part of the West Bank. Since there had been no active fighting along the Jordan River frontier during the Yom Kippur war, the practical military urgency to avoid renewed confrontation, which had motivated the disengagement
agreements with Syria and Egypt, was not as great. Moreover, the Rabat Arab summit conference's designation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate spokesman of the Palestinians greatly reduced the likelihood of any arrangement exclusively between Jordan and Israel regarding the West Bank.

**Geneva Conference in Abeyance**

Although the bilateral disengagement agreements were nominally undertaken within the framework of the Geneva conference, the full conference failed to take place in 1974. The only meeting in Geneva was the one at which the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement was signed at the end of May. Since the Syrians had officially refused to participate in the Geneva conference because such direct negotiations might have implied political recognition of Israel's legitimacy, the meeting was ostensibly only between the Israeli and Egyptian military working groups, with the Syrians subsumed under the Egyptian delegation.

Only the Russians seemed publicly eager for an early resumption of the Geneva conference. In reiterating this Soviet position to the UN General Assembly on September 24, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko emphasized that the Palestinians should take their "rightful place" at the conference table. A Soviet-PLO joint communiqué, issued after PLO leader Yasir Arafat's visit to Moscow in August, had reaffirmed Soviet support for PLO, authorized it to open a Moscow office with embassy status, and noted with satisfaction that the Arab and Islamic summit conferences had recognized the PLO as sole spokesman of the Palestinians. At the same time, however, Gromyko also reiterated in his UN speech that the Soviet Union "stands in favor of Israel existing and developing as an independent sovereign state," a position officially rejected by Arafat in the UN Assembly on November 13, when he emphasized that the PLO's political objective continued to be a single secular, democratic Arab state in all of Palestine.

**Dispute Over PLO Position**

There were some who thought that, despite his rhetoric, Arafat was moving toward acceptance of a mini-Palestine state on the West Bank and in Gaza. Alleged indications of this were the endorsements given to PLO by the Palestine National Council in Cairo in June, and by the Arab League at the Rabat summit, to establish an independent Palestinian "national authority" on any territory "liberated" from Israel; Arafat's new professed willingness to allow all Jews currently living in Israel to remain in his proposed Palestinian state, and his subsequent explanations to reporters that when speaking at the UN, he had purposely chosen the word "dream" in speaking of the establishment of a secular, democratic Arab state in Palestine to indicate that this was only an ultimate objective, implying that he might reach some interim *modus vivendi* with Israel.

Widespread reports that the PLO would soon set up a provisional Palestinian government-in-exile were not borne out in 1974. One reason for the delay appeared
to be Arafat's failure to win approval for such action from the more militant groups in PLO. On September 26 the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), headed by George Habash, announced in Beirut that it was withdrawing from the PLO executive committee because of the organization's "deviation from the revolutionary course." Its deputy chief Ahmed Yamani said it would continue to struggle until all Palestine was "liberated," Israel destroyed, and King Hussein overthrown. Two other guerrilla groups belonging to the self-styled "rejection front" said they would follow PFLP.

While King Hussein nominally agreed to abide by the Rabat decision, he continued to pay subsidies to West Bank Palestinian leaders friendly to the throne and refused to permit PLO terrorist operations against Israel from his territory. Although the Rabat summit set up a committee to attempt to reconcile PLO-Jordanian relations in preparation for a common negotiating line toward Israel at Geneva by the Arab "confrontation" states, no substantial progress was made in that direction.

Israeli and U.S. Attitudes to PLO

The government of Israel reiterated its categorical refusal to negotiate with PLO (p. 405). Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin enumerated the reasons for this position in an interview with Livio Caputo (published in *Epoca* on July 27, 1974): 1) the PLO was not the legitimate representative of the Palestinians "since nobody has elected them;" 2) Israel saw no point in negotiating with people "who want to eliminate us from the face of the earth and who seek to murder civilians, including women and children;" 3) "on principle, we will deal only with sovereign states—otherwise we risk having to face a myriad of organizations, each one claiming that it is a representative body." Israel, Rabin declared, continued to prefer to deal with Jordan, noting that Jordan in fact was a predominantly Palestinian state in population and that Hussein had promised to hold a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the West Bank Palestinians after the area had been relinquished by Israel.

While there was virtual unanimity in Israel against negotiating with the PLO as long as it sought the elimination of Israel and used terrorist methods, Israelis were deeply divided on the future of the occupied territories. As a result, the Israel government pledged not to sign any treaty relinquishing territory in Judea or Samaria (the Biblical names for the West Bank) without approval from the electorate.

Because of the numerous complications involved in dealing with the Palestinian issue in general, and the PLO in particular, the United States government tried to defer any decisions on the matter. When President Richard M. Nixon went to the Middle East in June, all the Arab leaders he met with stressed the importance of recognizing Palestinian national rights as part of any just solution to the Arab-Israel conflict. King Faisal was most explicit in stating the Arab demands when he warned, at a state dinner in Nixon's honor, that there would be no lasting peace in the area "unless Jerusalem is liberated and returned to Arab sovereignty, unless liberation
of all the occupied Arab territories is achieved, and unless the Arab people of Palestine regain their rights to return to their homes and their right to self-determi-
ination." Nixon did not respond directly; he praised Faisal as a wise leader and assured him that the United States was interested in "a lasting peace."

In its official pronouncements the United States stopped short of recognizing the "legitimate national rights" of the Palestinians—the Soviet and Arab formulation —and shied away from any reference to PLO as Palestinian spokesman. However, the United States did modify its concept of the Palestinians as constituting a refugee problem and began to acknowledge their role as a people. Thus, the joint statement issued by Nixon and Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat in Cairo on June 14 declared that a durable peace based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 "should take into account the legitimate interest of all peoples in the Middle East, including the Palestinian people, and the right of existence of all states in the area." The latter clause was seen as the implied Egyptian recognition of Israel. The statement also noted that "peace can be achieved only through a process of continuing negotiation as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 338 within the framework of the Geneva Middle East peace conference." This left open the door for the continuation of Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy, while giving lip service to the Soviet demand that the negotiations be part of the Geneva conference.

A vague formulation was also used to sidestep the issues of PLO and the Geneva conference in a joint communique issued by Nixon and Brezhnev at the end of their meeting in Vladivostok in July. It asserted that a peace settlement should take into account "the legitimate interests of all people in the Middle East, including the Palestinian people, and the right to existence of all states in the area." It called for the resumption of the Geneva conference "as soon as possible," a compromise formula that papered over the Soviet-American disagreement on the subject.

At a press conference during Nixon's visit to Jerusalem in June, Kissinger de-
clared that "the most efficient way for the Palestinians to be brought into the [negotiating] process is through the Jordanian delegation in which there is the historical background and for which Israel has always declared its readiness in principle." At a press conference in Washington on October 7, he reiterated that he would not meet Arafat, or any other Palestinian leader, during his forthcoming trip to the Middle East. While there were some informal contacts of lower-level American officials with PLO representatives in the Middle East, on the official level the United States shunned PLO.

The resignation of President Nixon in August and the assumption of the presidency by Gerald R. Ford brought no immediate change in American Middle East policy or in the United States attitude to PLO. Ford, who had established a record of sympathy for Israel during his years in Congress, expressed full confidence in Kissinger's peace efforts in the Middle East.

At the United Nations, United States delegate John Scali opposed the invitation extended to PLO, warning that its participation could impede rather than promote current peace efforts. He emphasized that "the only basis for a just negotiated
settlement is and must remain Security Council resolutions 242 and 338," which did not recognize the Palestinians as a separate party to negotiations. At the June meeting in Cairo of its National Council, PLO had explicitly rejected the underlying principles of these resolutions when it declared that it would continue to "struggle against any scheme or projected Palestinian entity the price of which is recognition, peace, secure boundaries" or denial of the Palestinian objective of "liberation of the entire Palestinian soil."

End of Arab Oil Embargo

On March 18 the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) announced the lifting of the embargo on oil supplies to the United States, which they had imposed during the October 1973 war. They warned, however, that this decision, as well as the question of production levels, would be periodically reviewed. The main objective of their embargo and production cutbacks, the Arab oil ministers explained, had been to draw world attention to the Arab cause and to "create the suitable political climate" for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, which, they contended, calls for Israel's "complete withdrawal from the Arab-occupied territories, and for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." This differed from the interpretation of the resolution by its American and British sponsors, who had deliberately omitted reference to withdrawal from "all" or "the" territories to allow room for negotiation by the parties of secure and recognized final boundaries as part of a package peace agreement. The resolution also failed to include explicit reference to Palestinian rights, speaking only in general terms of the need for "a just settlement of the refugee problem."

The Arab oil ministers noted that their embargo had made world public opinion aware of the "importance of the Arab world for the welfare of the world economy," and thus "receptive" to Arab rights, which led to the "gradual isolation of Israel" and the adoption of "political stances which openly condemn Israel's expansionist policy." After singling out Belgium, Italy, West Germany, and Japan for special praise in this regard, the Arab oil ministers noted that there were also some signs of a more "evenhanded policy" on the part of the United States. Apparently alluding to the United States role in obtaining Israeli troop withdrawals as part of the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, they said it appeared to them that "American official policy as evidenced lately by the recent political events assumed a new dimension vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict."

In an attempt to get Syrian concurrence in the lifting of the embargo, the Arab ministers' statement emphasized their support for all the Arab countries "in their just struggle" and for "the Syrian Arab Republic at the present time during which it endeavors to reach the means which would eventually lead to the full liberation of its territory and to the complete liberation of all the Arab-occupied territories, first of which comes Jerusalem." Nevertheless, the Syrian government refused to endorse the decision to lift the embargo, holding to its view that the oil weapon
should have been maintained at least until after Syria, too, had concluded a disengagement agreement with Israel. Libya, keeping to its militant position, declared that it would neither assent to lifting the embargo nor to any production increase.

The embargo against the Netherlands, whose government had been regarded as particularly sympathetic to Israel, was unanimously lifted by OAPEC only on July 10, after the signing of the Golan Heights disengagement between Syria and Israel (p. 401).

Conservation measures, a mild winter in Europe and the United States, and the inflationary and recessionary effects of the fourfold increase in world oil prices, all served to limit demand and thus minimize the disruptive effect of the Arab embargo, both in Holland and the United States. Moreover, not all the Arab states were equally scrupulous in enforcing the embargo. In June Algeria officially announced that it would not abide by the embargo. Iraq had never really gone along with it; United States Commerce Department April figures indicated that some Saudi Arabian and Tunisian oil had continued to arrive several months after the imposition of the embargo. United States government energy officials also privately acknowledged that American oil imports in early 1974 from such countries as Italy, Chile, Columbia, Bolivia, and the Netherlands Antilles, which normally do not supply oil to the United States, probably represented shipments of Arab oil that had been diverted to evade the embargo.

**Power of Petrodollars**

In their March statement, the Arab oil producers warned that they might take "even more severe oil measures" in the future, if Israel did not meet Arab demands. For the time being, however, they were going to concentrate on utilizing their oil "in a positive manner in order to lead to results, the effectiveness of which may surpass those if the oil weapon was used in a negative manner." This was an allusion to the new economic power felt by the Arabs as a consequence of the unprecedented money reserves accumulated by the major oil producers who had quadrupled and, in some cases, quintupled oil prices since 1973.

In addition to financing more sophisticated propaganda and arms purchases amounting to billions of dollars, the new Arab wealth was temptingly dangled before Western industrialized countries as a source of loans, investments, and large-scale development contracts. Some of these offers were explicitly or implicitly linked to compliance by the recipients with Arab-boycott regulations against Israel and sought to exclude Jewish officials or firms regarded as sympathetic to Israel. Although numerous congressional committees began investigations into the problems relating to Arab investments, no comprehensive new legislation was adopted; the exception was a law to conduct a survey of foreign investments in the United States.

Although Saudi Arabian officials privately assured American diplomats that they were working to lower world oil prices, the Saudis refused to take unilateral actions, like major increases in production which would have depressed prices, because of
their overriding desire to maintain a united Arab economic and political front, as well as to preserve the bargaining power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). There was no significant reduction in oil prices in 1974. On the other hand, OPEC refused to accede to the demand of the Shah of Iran for substantially higher oil prices to compensate for the loss of purchasing power of the dollar, the traditional unit for calculating oil prices.

The fact that oil prices stayed high despite the signing of the disengagement agreements and the lifting of the embargo, together with evidence that such non-Arab states as Venezuela and Iran which had defied the embargo by shipping oil to Israel and the United States had been prime movers behind the worldwide OPEC price increases, served to discredit the Arab argument that the reason for high oil prices was Israel's alleged intransigence. This Arab campaign backfired, for 1974 public-opinion polls found that Americans tended to overestimate the degree to which the United States was dependent on Arab oil imports, and consequently placed a heavy share of the blame for the inflation, unemployment, and recession on the Arab states. Nevertheless, there was little public support for the suggested use of American military intervention to take over the Persian Gulf or North African oilfields to force a reduction in oil prices.

**Confronting the OPEC Cartel**

While neither President Ford nor Secretary Kissinger would rule out the ultimate use of force if a new embargo threatened the Western industrialized world with economic "strangulation," both made it clear that the United States hoped to achieve a reduction in oil prices first through cooperative efforts of the consuming countries and then negotiations between the major producers and consumers. Although the administration repeatedly proclaimed its intention to develop a national energy policy which would make the United States independent of foreign sources by 1985, there was division on what measures to take; and once the immediate inconvenience of the gasoline shortage abated, Congress no longer felt the need to enact the many necessarily unpopular measures required for a comprehensive energy-independence program.

On the international front, the United States government was torn between its traditional commitment to multilateral economic cooperation and the fear that it could not afford to remain aloof from the scramble for bilateral arrangements with the major oil producers that France, Japan and other industrial countries were rapidly concluding. Thus the United States in 1974 established with Saudi Arabia a bilateral economic commission for expanded economic cooperation, which included massive American arms and defense-related sales to Saudi Arabia. Similar deals were concluded with Iran. Bilateral commissions were also set up with Egypt and Israel, which helped to minimize the impression that the sole aim was to recycle petrodollars.

On the multinational level, the United States took the lead in November in
establishing the International Energy Agency, which brought together 15 of the major industrial nations to agree to stockpile oil, to allocate oil in emergencies, to encourage conservation, and to sponsor joint research in alternative sources of energy. The new agency was to work under the auspices of the 24-member Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Although France did not formally join, it agreed, after a December meeting between Ford and President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, to coordinate its energy policies with the United States and to participate in a $25 billion multilateral emergency-loan fund proposed by Kissinger to help oil-consuming nations meet financial crises caused by high oil prices. In return, the United States agreed to a French proposal to convene a meeting between major oil producers and consumers in 1975.

In a *Time* interview at the end of the year, Kissinger reiterated that prior evidence of consumer solidarity would help assure the success of such a conference. Softening the U.S. opposition to OPEC demands for "indexing," under which oil prices would rise to reflect inflationary changes in the prices of other major commodities and manufactured goods, Kissinger said the United States would be prepared to consider indexing, but only after oil prices had been reduced from the arbitrarily high levels set by OPEC.

**U.S. Aid to Egypt**

Aside from presumed American leverage on Israel, the major inducement for the Arab states to improve their relations with the United States was the prospect of tapping American scientific and industrial expertise. The United States government's eagerness to assist the Arabs in their economic development was clearly signaled in the Nixon-Sadat joint statement of June 14, which noted that in 1973 Egyptian-American relations had changed "from estrangement to a constructive working relationship," and that they were now in 1974 "moving to a relationship of friendship and broad cooperation." Special working groups under a joint cooperation commission were established to prepare a program having several specific aims: 1) to encourage American private investment in joint enterprises in Egypt in such fields as petrochemicals, transportation, agricultural development, tourism and banking, and to promote trade (projects already "under serious consideration" exceeded $2 billion, but in view of the Nasserist nationalizations and expropriations, which had discouraged foreign investors, a new Egyptian-American investment-guarantee agreement was to be negotiated "immediately"); 2) to increase Egypt's agricultural production; 3) to exchange scientists and foster "technology, research and development in scientific fields, including space;" 4) to develop and strengthen Egypt's medical research treatment and training facilities; 5) to encourage and facilitate cultural exchanges.

In support of these efforts, Nixon pledged that the United States "will make the maximum feasible contribution, in accordance with Congressional authorization, to Egypt's economic development, including clearing the Suez Canal, reconstruction
projects and restoring Egypt's trade." In addition, the United States promised to give "special priority attention" to Egypt's needs for agricultural commodities to help feed its burgeoning population.

Controversy Over Nuclear Reactors

There was general support for this program in the United States Congress, and even the Israelis welcomed American economic aid that encouraged the Egyptians to reorient their priorities from war to peaceful development. However, much opposition was aroused by the dramatic announcement in the joint statement that "the United States is prepared to sell nuclear reactors and fuel to Egypt" to enable it to substantially increase its electric power-generating capacity by the early 1980s. Pending conclusion of an agreement "under agreed safeguards," the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the Egyptian Ministry of Electricity would, within a couple of weeks, conclude a provisional agreement for the sale of nuclear fuel to Egypt.

Congressional and editorial opposition centered on the following points: It was premature and potentially dangerous to supply nuclear technology to Egypt until it had clearly demonstrated its peaceful intentions. The recent explosion of a nuclear device by India, in circumvention of its agreement with Canada, revealed the weakness of existing safeguards against diversion of nuclear fuel byproducts from power generation to weapons production. Once the Egyptians began operating the nuclear reactors and trained a cadre of nuclear scientists, there was nothing to prevent the Egyptians from abrogating whatever commitments they made to the United States.

To minimize the opposition, the United States offered a similar nuclear-power program to Israel during Nixon's stop in Jerusalem on June 17. Proponents of United States nuclear aid to Egypt pointed out that it would be 1980 before the reactor was completed and the first shipment of nuclear fuel was delivered to Egypt. They argued further that Egypt already had two small reactors provided by the Soviet Union; that the Russians were already discussing a Soviet-built nuclear power reactor, and that the American offer would help free Egypt from dependence on the Russians. They held, too, that the Congress could insist on strict safeguards for United States control over the production, shipment, and reprocessing of uranium and plutonium. There were some who suspected that since Israel was far ahead of Egypt in nuclear technology, the American offer to both Egypt and Israel had a dual purpose: to increase American prestige and influence in Egypt and, at the same time, assure strict American supervision over all of Israel's present and projected nuclear reactors. Preliminary ten-year contracts for the sale of United States nuclear fuels and technology were signed by Egypt and Israel in Washington on June 26, and plans were announced for a 600-megawatt plant in each country, providing sufficient power for about 250,000 people.
Military Supply to Israel

Although Richard Nixon had visited Israel earlier, his 1974 trip marked the first time in Israel's history that an American president paid an official visit to the country. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit generally paralleled that issued in Cairo in terms of the offer to provide nuclear power assistance and in the pledges to continue cooperation in the fields of industry, energy production, tourism, aviation, space-technology research, and cultural exchanges. The communiqué further stated that American and Israeli representatives would soon meet to devise ways to insure the supply of oil and other essential raw materials to Israel on "a continuous basis." This was to reassure Israel regarding the problems it might face if it gave up the Abu Rudeis oilfield in Sinai in a new agreement with Egypt, or if Egypt reimposed its blockade at the Bab el Mandeb entrance to the Red Sea and cut off the passage of Iranian oil to Israel's port of Eilat.

Israelis placed special emphasis on that part of the communiqué in which Nixon affirmed "the continuing and long-term nature of the military supply relationship" between the two countries. This was because they had frequently encountered what at times they believed to have been politically motivated delays before arms purchases were concluded. Therefore it was important to Israel to be assured of continuing United States military supplies and economic aid over an extended period if it should agree to any further substantial withdrawal in Sinai. The President also reiterated his view that "strengthening Israel's capacity to defend itself" was essential to prevent further hostilities and "to maintain conditions conducive to progress towards peace." American economic assistance, the communiqué indicated, would continue at a "substantial" level and would be "the subject of long-range planning" between the two countries.

In an apparent allusion to Syrian and Lebanese acquiescence in Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel, the communiqué expressed United States-Israeli agreement on "the duty [of every state] to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands including mercenaries for incursion into the territory of another state."

Congressional Appropriations

AID TO ARAB STATES

The major new American aid to the Arab countries which President Nixon had visited did not receive final congressional approval until well into the 1975 fiscal year. During the 1974 fiscal year Jordan continued to be the main Arab recipient of United States aid, with grants of $55 million in economic supporting assistance, $36 million in military grants, and $6.9 million in agricultural commodities under Public Law 480 Food for Peace soft loans. Smaller sums for military sales credits were provided to Lebanon ($5 million), Morocco ($12 million), and Tunisia ($2.5
While Saudi Arabia received only $200,000 under a military training program, this figure was dwarfed by the billions of dollars Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Persian/Arabian Gulf states were spending in the United States for arms and defense-related technological products and services.

After considerable debate, during which Congress increased the administration proposals for aid to Israel and imposed some strings on aid to some of the Arab states, the U.S. Fiscal Year 1975 (July 1, 1974–June 30, 1975) Foreign Aid Appropriation Act included the following figures: Egypt received a $250 million supporting assistance grant, including part of the cost of clearing the Suez Canal—to which the United States Navy contributed its equipment and skilled personnel—and rehabilitation of the cities along the canal; and $139 million in P.L. 480 soft currency loans for food. Jordan received $100 million in military grants and $30 million in military sales credits, and $77.5 million in grant economic aid. Other Arab recipients of United States military aid, mostly in the form of credits, included: Lebanon ($10.1 million), Morocco ($14.8 million), Tunisia ($3.5 million).

SYRIAN AID CONTROVERSY

The Administration had also asked for a $100 million special requirements fund, which was expected to be used largely for aid to Syria. For many years Syria had refused to accept aid from "imperialistic" America and the new receptivity of Syria to diplomatic relations and economic ties with the United States reflected the more pragmatic approach of the regime of President Hafez al-Assad. While welcoming the reported signs of lessening ideological rigidity in Damascus, Congress was still dubious about Syria's commitment to peace in view of its continued close ties with Moscow, evidenced by the presence of Soviet advisers and the recent arrival of shipments of the most advanced Soviet tanks, planes, and missiles, as well as by active Syrian support of Palestinian liberation groups.

Congress was also deeply concerned over the arbitrary secret-police control and the numerous discriminatory measures to which Syria's estimated 4,500 Jews were subjected, including denial of their right to emigrate, even for purposes of reunion with their families in the United States and other Western countries. Consequently, the Congress approved an amendment to the Near East section of the Foreign Assistance Act, introduced by Representative Jonathan B. Bingham (Dem.-Lib., N.Y.), which declared it to be "the sense of Congress that none of the funds authorized by this Act should be provided to any nation which denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate." The administration regarded this language as not binding upon it. However, Congress included in the act another provision empowering it to disapprove any specific expenditures requested by the administration under the special requirements fund, if the Senate and the House concurrently adopted resolutions opposing such expenditures within 30 days after requests were made.

Syria received a total of $83 million under the special requirements fund, mainly
for improvement of the Damascus water system, the purchase of equipment for agricultural expansion, and student exchanges with the United States. Separately, Syria obtained $28 million in surplus United States agricultural commodities under P.L. 480 soft loans. The administration arguments, which moved Congress reluctantly to go along with the requests, were that the top priority was not to jeopardize the Kissinger peace efforts by antagonizing Syria; that Syria would not ease its emigration policy on threat of an aid cut-off, since it was receiving far more substantial aid from the Soviet Union and the oil-rich Arab states, and that gradual improvement in Syrian-American relations, together with progress on the Syrian-Israel diplomatic front, offered the best hope for improving the status of Syrian Jews.

Representative Stephen Solarz (D., N.Y.), whose district includes most of the 25,000 Syrian Jews in the United States, sent to Secretary Kissinger on February 25, 1975, a letter, cosigned by 81 other representatives, agreeing not to oppose the administration’s initial $25 million request for Syria so as “not to undermine or impair” the United States government’s negotiating position, but also urging the administration to use the opportunity of its diplomatic negotiations to prevail upon the Syrians to reciprocate the United States “expression of good faith” by lifting its emigration restrictions on Syrian Jews.

AID TO ISRAEL

After the Yom Kippur war, the administration had asked Congress to approve a $2.2 billion emergency military-aid package for Israel. Congress gave the President discretion to give up to $1.5 billion of this sum as an outright grant. In April the administration made an initial determination to allocate $1 billion as a grant, and the remainder in long-term, low-interest loans. At the end of June 1974, after his visit to the Middle East, Nixon approved the additional $500 million authorized by Congress as a grant.

During the 1974 fiscal year (July 1, 1973 to June 30, 1974) Israel also received $50 million in grant economic support, about $36 million of the $40 million appropriated to help integrate Russian Jewish refugees, and several small grants totaling a few million dollars to various educational institutions in Israel.

For the fiscal year 1975, Congress increased from $50 million to $324.5 million the administration’s request for a supporting assistance grant. Israel further received $100 million in grants and $200 million in credits to purchase United States military equipment (the administration had initially recommended that the entire $300 million be in credits to be repaid). Under a contract concluded in December 1974, Israel was to receive another estimated $9 million in agricultural commodities under P.L. 480.

Controversy Over U.S. Arms Supply to Israel

In the latter part of 1974 a flurry of articles appearing in the American press alleged that the rapid delivery by the United States of arms to Israel during and after
the 1973 Yom Kippur war had denuded the American arsenal and thus weakened the fighting capacity of the United States armed forces. The charge was largely stimulated by the off-hand remarks in October 1974 by chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. George S. Brown (p. 126). As Air Force chief of staff and in charge of the United States arms airlift to Israel during the Yom Kippur war, Brown had won praise from Prime Minister Rabin for being the man who “probably helped Israel more than anyone else.” Following the incident Brown and other high United States officials denied the allegation read into his remarks by some observers. In Sacramento, Cal., on November 25, General Brown noted that one of America’s national objectives was the continued “viability of the State of Israel,” adding that “if the national decision is made by the Chief Executive and endorsed by Congress, of course this great nation can afford to supply the State of Israel.”

While it was true that at the end of 1974 the United States Army was still some 1,800 tanks short of its authorized strength of 10,000, the 600 tanks supplied to Israel on an emergency basis were acknowledged by the Defense Department officials to be merely a symptom rather than a fundamental cause of the problem. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger curtly told Newsweek that the talk of a great arms drain was “bull. . . .” From the Pentagon’s viewpoint, the 1973 war had the favorable effect of drawing public attention to the need for adequate conventional military forces to counter the Soviet Union’s rapid expansion of such forces which, when lavishly supplied to the Arab states and other Soviet friends, threatened to upset the balance of power in the Middle East and elsewhere. Thus, after the 1973 war had revealed the dangerous degree to which the United States had permitted its production of tanks to fall below that of the Soviet Union, Congress approved a long-standing Army request to increase tank production from 40 to 103 units a month.

Army Chief of Staff General Fred C. Weyand, in an interview with Associated Press correspondent Fred S. Hoffman on December 14, denied that the American supply of tanks and other equipment to Israel and other countries had seriously damaged the Army’s combat readiness. On the contrary, he declared, “the Army is probably in better shape than at any time in its peacetime history.” He confirmed that the main reason for the tank shortage was that “we let our production base deteriorate.” But the shortage had not been serious enough to affect training or morale, and no regular divisions were short of tanks, since overseas shipments had been made from the stocks of the National Guard and reserve units.

THE UNITED NATIONS

Although public attention in 1974 was focused on the anti-Israel resolutions adopted by various United Nations organs, the UN took some positive action. The Security Council established the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which was to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire and serve as a crucial neutral buffer
between Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights. It also renewed the mandate of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai.

Establishment of UNDOF

The creation of UNDOF followed arduous negotiations between Israel and Syria, with Secretary Kissinger as mediator. Initially, Syria agreed to no more than 100 UN observers, while Israel requested a force of 3,000 UNEF troops. After concessions on both sides, the final agreement called for 1,250 men with a new title incorporating the terms "observer," to satisfy the Syrians, and "force," to meet the Israeli wish for a force similar to UNEF in Egypt. UNDOF in fact drew its initial personnel and equipment from the 7,000-man UNEF. The powers and assignments of the two forces were similar. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim told the Security Council in May that, in setting up the Golan Heights force, he would follow the principles approved by the Council the previous October for the Sinai UNEF: that weapons of a defensive character would be provided, that force would not be used except in self-defense, but that any attempts to prevent the enforcement of the Council's mandate would be resisted.

The Soviet Union demanded that, to be technically legal, the Security Council delay the creation of UNDOF until May 31, to follow signing of the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement in Geneva. At that point, it joined the United States in cosponsoring the resolution setting up UNDOF for an initial six-month period, an action interpreted as reflecting Moscow's insistence that, as a cosponsor of the Geneva conference, it must be a partner in any formal peace-making step in the Middle East.

The Council approved UNDOF for a period of six months by a vote of 13 to 0, with China and Iraq "not participating." China dissociated itself from what it called the efforts of two superpowers to establish spheres of influence for themselves in the Middle East at the expense of the Arab states and the Palestinians. Iraq, leading the Arab "rejection front," wanted no part in any agreement based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which implied Israel's right to existence. British delegate Ivor Richard pointed out that since UNDOF and UNEF were established by the Security Council, in contrast to the UNEF which was set up in 1956 after the Sinai Campaign by the General Assembly, the new forces could not be withdrawn without Council approval simply upon demand of one of the belligerents, such as that by Egypt in May 1967.

Renewal of UNEF

However, renewal of the forces was not automatic; it required Council action to extend it for an additional six-month period. In 1974 the Security Council twice voted to do so. The only points of controversy were French and Soviet demands for greater control by the Council's permanent members of the financing and operational efficiency of the force, and the Soviet Union's complaint that Israel be re-
quired to permit the Polish contingent of UNEF to travel freely on the Israeli side of the line. Israel balked at permitting entry by soldiers from countries it considered unfriendly, since they might pose a security risk. Israeli leaders also reportedly feared that if Polish troops were let in, the Soviet Union would press for admission of its 36 military officers who were members of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, which continued to operate side-by-side with the UNEF. The Soviet request that the Council instruct Secretary-General Waldheim to order the Israelis to allow freedom of movement for all UN contingents was not reflected in the compromise resolution adopted on April 8, to extend the force. It merely endorsed the secretary-general's efforts to solve outstanding problems.

In again extending UNEF on October 23, the Council reaffirmed that the force "must be able to function as an integral and efficient military unit in the whole Egypt-Israel section of operation without differentiation" among the various contingents, and asked the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to this end. In response to French and Soviet concern over the $83.6 million cost of the force in its first year of operation, the resolution expressed the Council's confidence that the force "will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy." Thus Moscow and Paris failed in their efforts to exert a greater direct national control over the secretary-general's authority to run this neutral international body.

After some tense moments and protracted last-minute confidential consultations, Syria agreed to the Security Council's renewal of the Golan Heights UNDOF, for another six months by Resolution 363 of November 29. Israel's delegate Yosef Tekoah hailed the Council's action as a "positive development," adding that the continuation of UNDOF was an integral element of the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement and its prohibition on the resort to force, which he stressed, "is not limited in time." Syrian delegate Haissam Kelani emphasized that the disengagement agreement was not a peace agreement, but only "a first step on the road to a just and lasting peace based on resolution 338." Syria, he said, accepted UNDOF's extension to provide "a fresh opportunity" to establish such a peace.

Soviet delegate Yakov Malik declared that although no dates had been set for termination of the disengagement agreements, it was understood that they could not be prolonged indefinitely. He underscored the Soviet position that lasting peace could be achieved only by "the complete liberation of all Arab lands occupied in 1967, the exercise of the lawful right of the Arab people of Palestine to establish their own state, their right to self-determination, and a reliable and authoritative guarantee of the security and independence of all countries involved in the area of conflict," all of which must be achieved within the framework of the Geneva conference. To help satisfy the Soviet and Syrian demands for further rapid progress in negotiations, Resolution 363 reaffirmed that the disengagement agreements were "only a step" toward peace, and sandwiched the decision to extend UNDOF between two paragraphs calling upon the parties "to implement immediately Security Council Resolution 338" and asking the secretary-general to report at the end of six months on measures taken in that direction.
Terrorism

Following a retaliatory raid by Israel against Palestinian guerrilla bases in Lebanon, the Security Council on April 24 adopted a resolution condemning the "violation of Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty" and calling upon Israel "to refrain from further military actions and threats against Lebanon." It also condemned "all acts of violence, especially those which result in the tragic loss of innocent civilian life," but did not explicitly condemn the incident that had provoked the Israeli retaliation, the Arab terrorist attack on the Israeli town of Qiryat Shemona in which 18 persons were killed. A United States amendment to insert a reference to Qiryat Shemona was defeated by a vote of 7 to 6, with 2 abstentions. The United States then joined with 12 other Council members to vote for the resolution as a whole. China and Iraq said they were not participating in the vote, China because it opposed the resolution's endorsement of peace negotiations and Iraq because it considered mere warnings and condemnations inadequate to deter Israel from further "aggression." Tekoah denounced the resolution as another example "of the bias and inequity" prevailing in the UN's Middle East debates.

NO ACTION ON INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS

The issue of international terrorism had been formally raised by Secretary-General Waldheim in 1972 after the murder of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists at the Olympic Games in Munich. Following several years of inconclusive discussion, the General Assembly's Legal Committee on December 10, 1974, recommended that the issue be postponed for yet another year. Although the delay was deplored by the United States, West Germany, and some Latin American countries, only Israel voted against the postponement—a situation reflecting in large part the growing influence of the Arab countries and the reluctance of many states to offend them.

While Eike Bracklo of West Germany and Shabtai Rosenne of Israel stressed the urgent need for international measures to prevent terrorism, the other delegations could not agree on what constituted terrorism and what was part of a legitimate struggle for liberation. The conflict of ideologies was reflected in the exceptionally long official wording of this UN agenda item: "Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes." Burhan Wasfi Hammad of the United Arab Emirates welcomed the postponement because, he said, it would give his delegation time to document the "types of terrorism that the Arab and Palestinian peoples had suffered" at Israeli hands.
UN Invitation to PLO

The Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) long campaign to gain international recognition made spectacular progress in 1974. Ever since 1965 PLO spokesmen had been given permission to speak during the annual UN debate on the Arab refugee question. In the past, however, they could appear only at meetings of the special political committee and under an explicit ruling of the chair that they were permitted to speak "without such authorization implying recognition" of their group. Indeed, the committee usually also granted a hearing to the spokesman of a rival group, the "Palestine Arab Delegation," sponsored by the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, which had been founded by the late Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin el-Husseini (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 265-66).

Contrary to past practice, the UN General Assembly on October 14 passed a resolution declaring the Palestinian people to be "the principal party to the question of Palestine" and inviting "the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings." The resolution, which had been sponsored by 71 countries from the Arab-Afro-Asian and Communist blocs, was approved by a vote of 105 to 4. Only the United States, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic joined Israel in opposing the invitation. Most of the 20 countries which abstained were Western European or Latin American.

In explaining the American negative vote, Ambassador Scali pointed out that it did not reflect lack of sympathy for the Palestinians, but rather concern that the resolution could be interpreted as prejudging the negotiating process, since its implication that only the Palestinian Arabs, and not the Israelis, had any legitimate claim, would make more difficult the attainment of a durable peace. He also expressed "profound concern" over the departure from the longstanding precedent that only representatives of governments be allowed to participate in plenary sessions. "Have we," Scali asked, "created a dangerous precedent which may return to haunt this organization—perhaps cripple its effectiveness?"

The warning had little effect on the voting of other delegations, whose governments automatically supported PLO because of ideological affinity with revolutionary movements, appeals to Muslim and Afro-Asian solidarity, and the prudent calculations of not openly opposing a cause backed by the Arab oil producers. On October 25 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) voted by an overwhelming majority of 80 to 2 (United States and Israel dissenting) to admit PLO as an observer to its general conference. Seventeen others, including France and its eight Common Market partners, abstained.

Earlier, the PLO had managed to gain admittance to various conferences held under UN auspices—the World Food Conference, the World Population Conference, and the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts—under a general formula originally intended to aid the emergent African states. It was used by the conferences as a basis for inviting all "national liberation" movements recognized
by their respective regional organizations, namely, the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States. Its past successes and evidence of the automatic majorities it mustered at international forums won for PLO also an invitation to be a nonvoting observer at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, which met in Caracas in July 1974.

Arab domination of the UN General Assembly was further revealed in the rulings of the Assembly's president, Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Departing from the tradition of nonpartisanship of his predecessors, Bouteflika ordered that PLO leader Arafat be accorded the protocol honors—such as a special armchair—normally reserved for heads of state. Bouteflika then made an unprecedented ruling to limit each delegation to one speech during the forthcoming debate on the "Question of Palestine," which, in effect, muzzled Israel by denying it the right to speak, as it had requested, after each of the 20 Arab-League member states presented its view on this highly controversial issue. Israel and the United States challenged the Algerian's ruling, but he was upheld by a large majority. When the General Assembly on November 12 upheld Bouteflika's ruling which suspended South Africa from participation in the current General Assembly session, he actually arrogated to the Assembly the power to deny membership in violation of the UN Charter, which provides that only the Security Council has the authority to expel or suspend a member.

**PLO Wins UN Observer Status**

On November 22 the General Assembly adopted two resolutions enhancing PLO's international position. The first (Resolution 3236) recognized that "the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination" in accordance with the UN Charter and reaffirmed the "inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine," including self-determination, "national independence and sovereignty," and "return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return." While the resolution "recognizes that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East," it also implicitly endorsed PLO's armed struggle for liberation when it "further recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" (emphasis added). However, some countries which supported the resolution, including Argentina, Mauritius, and Thailand, interpreted the latter clause as meaning that their support of Palestinian sovereignty was not intended to question the statehood of Israel, a UN member entitled to equal sovereign rights under the Charter.

Israel bitterly opposed the resolution, which nowhere mentioned it by name. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 89 to 8 (Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Iceland, Israel, Nicaragua, Norway, United States) with 37 abstentions.

The second resolution (3237) invited PLO to participate as an observer in the
sessions and work of the UN General Assembly, as well as in all international conferences convened under the Assembly’s auspices, and declared PLO entitled to participate in conferences convened by other UN organs. This accorded PLO a position similar to some nonmember states, such as Switzerland and North and South Korea. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 95 to 17, with 19 abstentions. Opposed were Israel, the United States, Canada, and some Western European and Latin American states.

**UNESCO and Israel**

On November 7 the UNESCO Commission for Social Sciences, Humanities and Culture voted to invite the director general to “withhold assistance from Israel in the fields of education, science and culture.” The ostensible reason for the sanction was Israel’s alleged “persistent alteration of the historic features of the city of Jerusalem” and “undertaking excavations which constitute a danger to its monuments, subsequent to its [Israel’s] illegal occupation of the city.” Although a report based on an on-the-spot investigation by a UNESCO technical expert had found the charges essentially groundless, the politically inspired resolution was approved by a vote of 54 to 21, with 25 abstentions. It was formally adopted at the UNESCO General Conference on November 20, by a vote of 64 to 27, with 26 abstentions. The United States, Israel, and most Western European countries, including France, voted against the resolution. The blow to Israel was more psychological than financial, since Israel contributed to UNESCO’s budget more than eight times the amount spent by UNESCO on projects within Israel.

The following day, in a vote dominated by Arab and Communist delegations, UNESCO voted to exclude Israel from its European regional group. Since the Arabs had long opposed Israel’s admission to the Asian group, Israel became the only UNESCO member not to be part of any regional group. Lebanese delegate Salah Stetie was quoted as saying, “Israel belongs nowhere.” Although 33 countries in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere had supported Israel’s admission to the European region, 48 countries now voted its exclusion and 31, including France, abstained. This was followed by a third resolution which was opposed by Israel, calling on UNESCO’s director general to cooperate with the Arab states and PLO to assure education and culture to the Arabs living in Israeli-occupied territory. It was adopted by a vote of 51 to 5 (United States, Israel, Guatemala, Paraguay, New Zealand), with 22 abstentions.

**Backlash Against Arab Politicization of UNESCO**

The Arabs may have overplayed their hand, for the blatant signs that they were intent on politicizing an agency that had long been a symbol of objective scientific and cultural cooperation soon produced an intense backlash among Nobel laureates and cultural luminaries throughout the Western world. Many indicated that they would not participate in UNESCO projects until the agency rescinded its unjustified anti-Israel measures. In the United States, Congress approved an amendment to the
foreign-aid bill, introduced by Senator Clifford Case (R.-N.J.), banning contributions to UNESCO "until the Secretary of State certifies that each resolution passed by UNESCO [which is] not of an educational, scientific or cultural character has been repealed." Thus, while the Arab states succeeded in denying Israel some $24,000 in money assigned to be used for museums, libraries, and restorations, they were responsible for the loss to UNESCO of the usual United States contribution of $16,000,000.

The developments at the United Nations prompted a bipartisan group of 71 senators to reaffirm—in a letter sent to President Ford in December—their commitment to the "survival and integrity" of Israel and to ask that he reiterate that commitment by a policy giving Israel continued military supplies, and diplomatic and economic support. The senators maintained that the prominence given PLO at Rabat and at the UN "poses a direct threat to American foreign policy which must be met vigorously and promptly." They emphasized that Arafat's "espousal of terrorism and his repeated calls for the destruction of Israel as a Jewish homeland must be resolutely opposed by the United States," if it hoped to make progress toward genuine peace in the Middle East. UNESCO's decision to withhold assistance from Israel, they said, was "a shameful example of the transformation of that international humanitarian organization into a political weapon." The letter called on the United States to take the lead in organizing "our friends and allies to resist political and economic blackmail in the future."

John A. Scali, the United States representative to the United Nations, took a similarly tough stance in a speech in the UN General Assembly on December 6. He reminded the Assembly that it was not a true legislature; that most of its resolutions were merely advisory in nature. Pointing out that some resolutions adopted by Assembly majorities "which represent only a small fraction of the world, its wealth or its territory" sometimes "brutally disregard the sensitivity of the minority," Scali predicted that "when the rule of the majority becomes the tyranny of the majority, the minority will cease to respect or obey it." Alluding to the anti-Israel measures adopted by the Assembly and by UNESCO, he emphasized that "neither the American public nor the American Congress believe that such actions can be reconciled with the spirit or letter of the United Nations Charter." His subsequent statement that "my country cannot participate effectively in the United Nations without the support of the American people and of the American Congress," was a clear warning that the substantial United States financial support of the UN was in jeopardy. He then spoke of the threat of the Assembly's action to the very existence of the UN:

If the United Nations ceases to work for the benefit of all its members, it will become increasingly irrelevant. It will fade into the shadow world of rhetoric, abandoning its important role in the real world of negotiation and compromise.

In his concluding remarks, Scali appealed for a renewed commitment to tolerance and harmony and a redoubling of efforts to transform the UN into an effective instrument for compromise and negotiation.

George E. Gruen
The Struggle Over the Jackson Amendment

With the passage by a large majority of the Jackson amendment in the House of Representatives in December 1973 (AJYB, 1974–75 [Vol. 75], pp. 203-34), the stage was set for the final act of a historic struggle aimed at easing Jewish emigration from the USSR through legislation linking the trade benefits of most-favored-nation tariff treatment and credits to the removal of barriers to the right to leave a country. The Nixon administration had strenuously resisted the legislative effort by a variety of means, including attempts to isolate or split Jewish leadership from the congressional sponsors of the legislation. The collapse of this strategy compelled the administration to shift in 1974 to a new approach in the attempt to achieve its overriding objective of winning Senate approval of the Trade Reform Act.

Even if Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger continued to oppose the Jackson amendment as a threat to détente and as “counterproductive” to the aim of emigration, as spelled out in his March testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, he nonetheless had to recognize the political reality that more than three-quarters of the Senate supported the legislation. In that month he, therefore, for the first time, entered into negotiations with the principal sponsors of the amendment, Senators Henry M. Jackson, Abraham A. Ribicoff, and Jacob K. Javits. The purpose of the negotiations which continued throughout the spring was to find a formula, including modification of text, to make the Jackson amendment acceptable to the administration and to the Kremlin.

Ineluctably, the administration was compelled to conduct parallel and interlocking discussions with Soviet officials to determine what concessions the Kremlin was prepared to make to satisfy the Senate. Kissinger frequently met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, and saw Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at Geneva in April and at Cyprus in May, to discuss the matter. It was also reviewed by President Richard M. Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at their meeting in Moscow in June.

Two critical aims were central to these discussions: 1) ending the harassment of Soviet Jews who applied for exit visas; and 2) raising the level of Jewish emigration. (The rate of Jewish emigration during the first half of 1974 had declined since the year before by 40 per cent.) Concerning the first point, Gromyko at Cyprus was prepared to acknowledge that such practices were “inconsistent with Soviet laws.” With reference to the level of emigration, he proposed a figure of 45,000. The three key senators, whom Kissinger advised of the proposal, rejected it as inadequate and suggested 75,000 as a desirable number. The aftermath of the Watergate scandal supplied a powerful impulse to the partially stalled discussions.
The accession of Gerald R. Ford to the presidency on August 9 was a decisive development. Not only was Ford, in the calculations of the Kremlin, an uncertain factor as far as détente was concerned; he had also committed himself, in his first public act, to a “marriage” with Congress, where resistance to trade benefits for the USSR was strongest. The Kremlin moved rapidly to reduce that resistance. Three days after Ford’s inauguration, Dobrynin interrupted his vacation to fly to Washington, and the two met on August 14 to discuss the trade measure.

Precisely what Dobrynin told the President is not known, but the latter was given adequate assurances to enable him to call the three senators to the White House the following morning and offer them his personal guarantee that the Kremlin was prepared to end harassment of Jewish applicants for exit visas and to raise significantly the level of emigration. At a news conference after the meeting, Senator Jackson commented that the President’s “direct intervention in this matter has given it new momentum and new movement.”

Kissinger-Jackson Correspondence

The administration-Senate negotiations now entered their final stage, with the organized Jewish community, principally through the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, playing a valuable role. It spurred the opposing sides to reach agreement, a task that was complicated by personality clashes of the principal antagonists. Initially, the negotiators agreed that Kissinger would write a letter spelling out the Soviet commitment on eased emigration procedures. Upon the insistence of Stanley H. Lowell, chairman of the National Conference, and supported by Jackson, it was agreed that the letter would refer to “assurances” rather than a vaguer term. Jackson would then respond by giving his interpretation of the agreement, indicating a precise figure of 60,000 as the emigration rate—a compromise between the 45,000 mentioned by Gromyko and the 75,000 the Senators had proposed. A third letter from Kissinger to Jackson, accepting Jackson’s interpretation on behalf of the President, would complete the agreement. (The idea of a third letter was later dropped.)

As the negotiations proceeded, the Soviet Union was kept apprised of, and appeared to accept, the understandings which were being reached. Indeed, on September 20 President Ford met successively with Jackson and Foreign Minister Gromyko on the basic content of the proposed exchange of correspondence, and later that day Kissinger and Gromyko talked about it at length. In essence, the Kremlin had become a “silent partner” to an administration-Senate understanding.

Announcement of the understanding was made by Senator Jackson on October 18, when he made public the contents of the correspondence between him and Secretary Kissinger. Kissinger’s letter stated that the administration had been “assured” by the Kremlin that “punitive actions” against would-be emigrants and “unreasonable impediments” placed in the path of applicants for exit visas would no longer obtain. Specifically mentioned as unacceptable was the principal form of
intimidation—job dismissal. Only in the case of persons holding “security clear-
ances” would “limitations of emigration” be imposed, and then only for a designated
time period. As a result of the new “criteria,” Dr. Kissinger’s letter concluded,
“the rate of emigration from the USSR would begin to rise promptly from the 1973
level.

Senator Jackson’s response translated the assurances into specific terms. With
respect to “security clearance” cases, he set a date of three years from the time they
had been exposed to sensitive information. As a “benchmark—a minimum standard
of initial compliance,” Jackson set an emigration figure of 60,000 per annum.
He added that “we understand that the President proposes to use the same bench-
mark.”

Presidential Waiver Amendment

On the basis of these understandings, set down in the exchange of correspon-
dence, Jackson agreed to propose an additional amendment that would authorize
the President to waive, for a period of 18 months, Title IV restrictions with re-
spect to most-favored-nation status and credits. Thereafter, the presidential waiver
authority could be extended, on a one-year basis, by concurrent resolution of both
Houses of Congress. In the event they failed to give this approval and the Presi-
dent continued the waiver on his own, either House of Congress could veto the
presidential action within 45 days. The latter legislative safeguard was regarded as
vital by both the key senators and the Jewish leadership in providing assurances
that the Kremlin could be severely penalized should it choose gross noncompli-
ance with the agreement.

USSR Rejects Conditions

Commenting on the breakthrough in the two-year-old intensive legislative strug-
gle, Jackson said: “I share the joy with which news of this agreement will be greeted
by so many who have waited so long. I hope and pray that we will one day look
back on this agreement as an early step along the road of a genuine détente.” Hope
among Jews in the Soviet Union ran high, as it did within the American Jewish
community. But excessive optimism was dispelled when, during the autumn months
of 1974, the level of emigration of Soviet Jews remained low and harassment
continued.

On November 21 nine prominent Soviet Jewish activists, in a nine-page open
letter to President Ford, received on the eve of his trip to Vladivostok for decisive
meetings with Brezhnev, extensively documented cases of harassment against
would-be emigrants. More importantly, the activists warned, the Kremlin was
already taking “vast precautionary” steps to reduce the number of possible appli-
cants for emigration, once the Trade Reform Act was adopted. They called attention
to a new device introduced in Minsk, the capital of Byelorussia, that required
employees in a number of enterprises to sign a pledge that they would not seek to
emigrate. They feared that "tomorrow, such documents may be distributed throughout the country and hundreds of thousands of Jews will sign them."

The concern of the Soviet Jewish activists, which was echoed by the American Jewish leadership, only testified to the fact that, in the last analysis, Soviet "good faith" had yet to be fully tested.

Subsequent events justified the concern. Even before the Kissinger-Jackson exchange, Brezhnev appeared to suggest that Soviet "assurances" should not be taken for granted. On October 15, at a formal dinner given in the Kremlin for Secretary of the Treasury William Simon and more than a dozen prominent American corporation executives, Brezhnev warned the United States against attaching "utterly irrelevant and unacceptable" conditions to its trade with the Soviet Union. With a clear reference to the link established in the Jackson amendment between trade and emigration, he denounced "such attempts at interference in internal affairs" which will "do nothing but harm" to the "economic relations between our two countries."

A week after the Kissinger-Jackson exchange, Gromyko handed Kissinger, who was then in Moscow, a letter dated October 26, which complained that the letters presented "a distorted picture of our position." It stated that "we resolutely decline" the interpretation of "elucidations that were furnished by us" on emigration practices as involving "some assurances and nearly obligation on our part," and projecting an increase in the rate of emigration, as compared with previous years. In discussing emigration figures with Kissinger, the letter continued, the Kremlin had emphasized a "tendency toward a decrease in the number of persons wishing to leave the USSR." Still, Gromyko indirectly acknowledged that emigration had been discussed and that the USSR had provided "elucidations" of what it was prepared to do.

The Gromyko letter was kept from the Senate, and the public. Kissinger made no reference to it during his crucial testimony in support of the Trade Reform Act before the Senate Finance Committee on December 3. He insisted that the use of the word "assurances" in his letter to Jackson was based on solid evidence. Asked who gave the "assurances," he named Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Dobrynin. At the same time, Kissinger emphasized that the USSR "considered the issue of emigration a matter of its own domestic legislation and practices, not subject to international negotiation," and that, therefore, "if I were to assert here that a formal agreement on emigration from the USSR exists between our Governments, that statement would immediately be repudiated by the Soviet Government."

In the interval between the receipt of Gromyko's letter and Kissinger's testimony, President Ford met, for the first time, with Brezhnev. At the conference which took place in Vladivostok on November 23-24, they reached a groundbreaking agreement on strategic force levels, and also discussed the trade legislation and its linkage to emigration. Judging from the extensive and laudatory Soviet press coverage of the event, Brezhnev appeared to have had no reservations regarding the understandings reached on all sides. Indeed, Kissinger clearly implied in his Senate testimony
that, at Vladivostok, the President was personally given indications that justified the use of the term "assurances" in Kissinger's October 18th letter.

**Congress Acts on Waiver**

On December 13 the Senate, by an overwhelming vote of 88 to 0, approved the waiver provision allowing the President to grant the USSR most-favored-nation tariff treatment and to extend it credits, with the proviso that he certify to the Congress that "he has received assurances that the emigration practices" of the USSR will "henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives" of the Jackson amendment. The entire Trade Reform Act, including the Jackson amendment, was then adopted by a vote of 77 to 4.

Since the House version of the bill differed from the Senate's in that it did not contain the Jackson-sponsored waiver provision, it had to be sent to a Senate-House conference committee for a resolution of the differences. On December 18, only two days before Congress adjourned, the committee finally accepted the Senate version and approved the Trade Reform Act. (On December 20 each chamber of the legislature adopted the conference action.)

**Soviet Publicly Rejects Conditions**

But on the morning of December 18, Moscow suddenly decided to react publicly to the trade measure. Its comments were so unusually negative that they caused anxiety in various quarters. The official Soviet news agency Tass asserted that "leading circles" in the USSR flatly reject as "unacceptable" any attempt to attach conditions to the reduction of tariffs on imports from the Soviet Union or otherwise to "interfere in [its] internal affairs." The statement denied that the Kremlin had given any specific assurances that emigration procedures would be eased in return for American trade concessions and credits. To support its contention, Tass released the Gromyko letter of October 26.

**U.S. Reaction**

Initially taken by surprise at the Moscow statements, the State Department emphasized later that day that Kissinger stood by his October 18 letter to Senator Jackson; that, in fact, the Gromyko letter contained nothing to change the understanding cited in Kissinger's letter. As for Gromyko's denial of an agreement on the numerical level of emigration, the State Department merely commented that the administration "has always made clear" that it had never reached an agreement on this question.

More striking than the claim of the State Department's reaction to the release was the relaxed manner in which key Senators responded. Senator Jackson observed that "we should keep our cool," since failure to liberalize Soviet emigration practices would mean the loss to the Kremlin of the trade benefits provided in the waiver. He even refused to register a complaint that Kissinger had failed to bring the
Gromyko letter to his attention. (Kissinger authorized an aide to say that he had intended to show the letter to Jackson and his colleagues, but "forgot.")

Most members of the Senate-House conference committee were equally unperturbed. In their judgment, the Tass release was merely "face-saving," or meant to serve an internal Soviet purpose. Said the committee's chairman, Senator Russell Long: "I don't pay attention to what the Russians say, anyway." The attitude of the senators was encouraged by Soviet diplomats in Washington, some of whom advised American officials not to be overly excited about the Tass release. One diplomat went out of his way to telephone an Israeli lobbyist to emphasize that it contained "nothing new" and, therefore, warranted no concern. Significantly, at a White House meeting on December 20 between President Ford and Secretary Kissinger and 20 Jewish leaders, headed by Stanley Lowell and Rabbi Israel Miller, chairmen of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, no reference was made to the Jackson amendment as possibly having triggered the Tass story.

**Stevenson Amendment**

The Tass story in fact revealed a totally new attitude in the Kremlin toward the legislation, which initially was not recognized by Washington and which was triggered by a development completely unrelated to the Jackson amendment. It is important to focus on this development because Soviet propaganda since the Tass release, as well as statements emanating from the White House and other Washington circles, have tended to blur the issue. In this connection, it must be reiterated that at no time before December 18 had the Kremlin publicly or privately indicated that it had second thoughts about the understandings reached, as set down in Kissinger's October 18 letter.

By December 16 it had become clear to the Kremlin that the Senate was about to approve an amendment to a bill which extended the life of the U.S. Export-Import Bank for four years. The amendment, sponsored by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III (Dem., Ill.), placed a ceiling of only $300 million on credits to the USSR over that period. (A sub-ceiling of $40 million was placed on projects involving exploration for gas and oil, and no credits were allowed for projects relating to the actual production of gas and oil.) A further provision, which was especially disturbing to both the Russians and the administration, stated that the credit ceiling could be lifted by the President if he believed it to be in the national interest, but only with congressional approval. According to Stevenson, such approval would depend on Soviet moderation not only with respect to emigration, but also to Middle East questions, arms control, and force reduction talks. In Stevenson's view, the United States should not subsidize trade by means of low-interest-bearing credits with a country whose gross national product is second only to that of the United States. The implication was that if more than a minimum subsidy was granted, compensatory political benefits ought to be obtained.

The administration made clear its opposition to the ceiling when it was first
introduced into the House version of the bill in June 1974. And indeed, the Export-Import Bank bill, as passed by the House on August 21, did not contain the amendment. However, since the Senate, on September 19, adopted the Bank bill with the Stevenson amendment, a Senate-House conference met in October to iron out differences in the two versions. The administration's efforts to eliminate the reference to congressional approval for above-ceiling requests for credits by the USSR failed, and on December 12 the Senate-House conference adopted the ceiling and congressional approval provisions. The Senate considered the Senate-House conference report during several sessions, the last time on December 16, before final action. By then, the passage of the amendment was virtually certain.

**Implications for Soviet Union**

As Kissinger later indicated, the amount of credits permitted the USSR under the ceiling was "peanuts in Soviet terms." Moscow had already received close to half a billion dollars since 1972, so that the ceiling constituted a retrogressive act. And, compared to the more than one billion in credits it sought for the next three years, the ceiling was a severe disappointment. Also disturbing was the provision for congressional approval if credits above the ceiling were requested. From the Soviet point of view it meant that, in such event, each Kremlin foreign policy decision, even if unrelated to emigration, would become the subject of political debate in the Congress.

A leading American specialist on Soviet affairs, Professor Vernon Aspaturian, commented that when the Kremlin "added it all up, it was a bum deal." In fact, the ceiling struck at the very heart of the understandings reached on the Jackson amendment. If the understanding is perceived as fundamentally one of exchange of money in the form of credits for bodies, then Moscow was bound to reach the conclusion that the agreed-upon conditions of the bargain had been unfavorably altered. The bargain, after all, established a relationship between emigration to freedom on the one hand, and the largely symbolic most-favored-nation status and the more concrete, rather extensive credits to purchase American technology, on the other.

The bargain had not been easily achieved. For a long time the Kremlin resisted the Jackson amendment as an intrusion into the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union. If it ultimately acquiesced as a silent partner to the Kissinger-Jackson agreement, it was mainly because American credits appeared particularly attractive.

**Soviet Hard-liners Win**

The imposition of the ceiling strengthened the hands of hard-liners in the Soviet party and state bureaucracies who had opposed any relaxation of internal controls. Ever since the beginning of détente discussions and arrangements with the West in early 1971, they had fought a rear-guard action to prevent unrestricted emigration. At various stages they were forced by the supporters of détente to accept compro-
mises, an example being their capitulation on the "diploma" tax which they had chosen as a means to limit emigration. Shortly after the Vladivostok agreement, President Nikolai Podgorny, whose enthusiasm for détente had been clearly less marked than Brezhnev’s, gave expression to the rear-guard resistance effort by asserting that it would be “intolerably shortsighted” not to take “full account” of foreign attempts to interfere in matters of “internal state policy.” With an indirect reference to the Kissinger-Jackson exchange, he emphasized that “our internal affairs have never been, and will never be, a matter for political bargaining.” Significantly, when Kissinger was specifically asked at the Senate Finance Committee hearings on December 3 whether Podgorny was, along with Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Dobrynin, among those who had given “assurances,” he answered in the negative.

On December 16, the very day the Senate ended its consideration of the conference report on the Export-Import Bank bill, a one-day plenum of the Party Central Committee was held in Moscow. At that closed meeting, Podgorny’s supporters, and hard-liners generally, may very well have unleashed a barrage of criticism against Brezhnev’s policy. The Central Committee is composed primarily of provincial party bosses who are inclined to assume a hard-line position to maintain control in local areas. Never particularly sympathetic to unregulated emigration, they must have loudly complained about the “bum deal” flowing from the credit ceiling.

From this meeting emerged two interrelated actions. Ambassador Dobrynin asked on December 18 to meet with Secretary Kissinger. In what was reported to have been a stormy session, Dobrynin lashed out at the credit ceiling and warned that the October 1972 trade agreement would thereby be placed in jeopardy. At the same time, Tass issued its statement denying that “assurance” on emigration had been given. The connection between the two acts was clear. Moscow was saying that if the ceiling on credits was maintained, its deal with the United States going back to October 1972, and later incorporated into the Kissinger-Jackson exchange, was jeopardized.

The target of the actions was the Congress, where final consideration was being given to the conference report on the Bank bill in the Senate as well as in the House of Representatives. The Tass story on the crucial day of December 18 seemed to be a warning to both that adoption of the Stevenson amendment would lead to Soviet rejection of the understandings; and the Dobrynin visit was designed to activate vigorous State Department lobbying against the amendment. It was too late for any reversal in the House; on that day it already had approved the conference report.

**Congress and Foreign Policy-making**

The State Department did lobby intensively in the Senate, but to no avail. A group of senators, led by Frank Church (Dem., Idaho), threatened to kill the entire Eximbank bill if the amendment was dropped. The administration, of course, needed the broad authority of the Eximbank bill to conduct its ramified foreign-
lending policy and, therefore, could not stand up against the strong opposition of the senators. On December 19 the Senate approved the conference report. Belatedly, on that day, the State Department spokesman denounced the Stevenson amendment as "most unwise and unfortunate" because it "greatly reduces the administration's flexibility in utilizing the bank."

The puzzling question is why the administration allowed the matter to develop in such a way that it triggered the powerful Soviet reaction. Kissinger could have alerted public opinion to the issues at stake in the Stevenson amendment, but he did not. He could have advised Jewish organizations what the Soviet response to the legislation might be, but he did not. The striking fact is that the Jewish organizations, which had fought so determinedly for the Jackson amendment, were completely unaware that the Stevenson amendment would, in effect, nullify what they had been striving to realize.

Kissinger was reported to have admitted to his aides that he failed to focus on the Eximbank bill and the Stevenson amendment when he should have done so. The leak of this item to the press raises the question how it had been possible for the secretary of state to overlook an issue involving a vital element in his détente policy. There may have been good reason. State Department lobbying in the Senate-House conference, and later in the Senate, was primarily directed at removing the reference to congressional approval for above-ceiling credits. This suggests that Kissinger may not have had an overriding objection to the ceiling itself, provided the President had the authority to raise it if he thought it to be in the national interest. Presidential authority would have given Kissinger an additional lever in urging Soviet support for certain of his foreign-policy objectives. He probably thought that the congressional approval provision could be easily eliminated from the amendment and, therefore, no public outcry was warranted. In any event, he had clearly lost control over the matter by the time the bill moved toward final passage.

The loss of control was predictable, given the new and growing mood in Congress to exert crucial influence on foreign policy-making. The concept of the "imperial presidency" rapidly eroded in the post-Watergate atmosphere, even as the backlash to the Vietnam involvement through executive action escalated. The new mood was evident in almost all foreign-relations issues, the question of aid to South Korea, Chile, South Vietnam, and Turkey being among the more dramatic illustrations of the executive-legislative confrontation. Insistence upon congressional approval of beyond-ceiling credits to the USSR was merely one symptom.

The failure of the Kremlin warning to alter the congressional drive on credit ceilings inevitably produced a hostile reaction in Moscow. An attack would now be mounted not only against the credit ceiling, but against the entire Jackson amendment to which the ceiling was perceived as being linked. The Kremlin, as Kissinger later noted, had drawn a "balance sheet" of gains and losses to be derived from earlier understandings on the Jackson amendment. With the imposition of the credit ceiling, the losses were seen as outweighing the gains. Kissinger put the matter into perspective when he said, "I think what may have happened is that the Soviet Union looked at the totality of what it could gain in this trading relationship as against
the intrusions in its domestic affairs." The entire set of trade arrangements with the United States was now opened to public bludgeoning.

**New Soviet Propaganda Offensive**

On December 21, one day after the conference report on the Trade Reform Act was approved by the Senate and the House, Tass unleashed a new propaganda offensive. Reiterating the December 18 denial of any understandings, it called both the Trade Reform Act and the Export-Import Bank legislation "attempts at interference in the internal affairs of the USSR." Izvestiia carried the dispatch, while Pravda featured a political cartoon depicting a fat capitalist writing "interference in internal affairs" on a large ball and chain that was attached to a truck labeled "international trade."

The next day, Pravda carried a commentary charging that "advocates of tension" in Congress were trying to "undermine the very foundations of détente" by adding to the trade agreement "far-fetched reservations and conditions running counter to the aims of détente," conditions constituting "an attempt at interference in the internal affairs of the USSR." In a popular radio program that night, three leading Soviet commentators expressed the view that the Gromyko letter should have prepared Washington for the Tass disclaimer of December 18.

On December 25 Literaturnaia Gazeta printed a long dispatch from the New York correspondent of Novosti news agency, contending that the Soviet Union had made no concessions on emigration; that the notion of concessions was concocted by "knights of the cold war" in Congress. They "invented the version" about Soviet concessions, he said, to justify their support of a trade bill that was essential for American business because the economy "is presently in an extremely difficult situation."

Far more serious was an article written by Leonid Zamyatin, the Kremlin's chief spokesman and director-general of Tass. Here, for the first time, a high Soviet official hinted that Soviet adherence to the trade agreement of October 1972 may be cancelled. Though he did not specifically refer to the agreement, the allusion was clear: "In the present situation, the failure of one of the parties to honor its commitments cannot help but affect the commitments assumed by the other party under a series of commercial and financial agreements."

The American commitment to which Zamyatin alluded was granting the USSR most-favored-nation status. In his view, linking trade legislation to emigration was "an absurd and hopeless position" that contravened the American commitment. He also repeated Gromyko's contention that "the question of emigration of citizens from any country is entirely within the competence of the state concerned." He erroneously maintained that the United States, too, places limits on emigration. As for the "assurances" presumably given by the USSR to the United States, they could only be a figment "of the loss of a sense of reality. . . ." That Moscow allegedly made "some sort of agreement" on emigration was dismissed outright.

The article appeared on December 28 in Sovetskaia Rossiia, the organ of the
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The fact that it was carried not in a national publication, but in this provincial, though fairly important one, suggested that the Kremlin had not yet decided to take any definite action. Indeed, the article avoided any indication that such a course of action was projected, or even contemplated. However, the warning of Soviet irritation was severe enough to evoke a United States Administration response designed to diminish Soviet anger. When President Ford finally signed the Trade Reform Act on January 3, 1975, he made the following comment which was in part aimed at a Soviet audience: “I will, of course, abide by the terms of the act, but I must express my reservations about the wisdom of legislative language that can only be seen as objectionable and discriminatory by other sovereign states.”

Implications of New Law

Ford’s comments could not, and did not, appease the Kremlin. On January 10 it informed Secretary of State Kissinger that it had decided to scrap the October 1972 trade agreement with the United States. Kissinger announced the Soviet decision at a press conference four days later. The cancellation of the trade agreement meant that the USSR would not be granted most-favored-nation tariff status (and Eximbank credits). It meant, too, that, for the time being, the leverage provided by the Jackson amendment to ease Soviet emigration practices no longer existed.

Still the Trade Act, as amended, had become law. Besides being the first piece of American legislation to have drawn its inspiration directly from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which specifies in Article 13/2 that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country,” it formally committed United States policy to the principle of free emigration. The policy’s operational effectiveness vis-à-vis the USSR, however, will be determined by other considerations, notably the progress of détente arrangements between the two countries, including the question of the level of credits.

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