Review of the Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES
The year 1971 saw growing confusion and contradictions regarding intergroup-relations issues, once believed to have been settled in principle, if not in practice. Many liberal, middle-class whites, who had been sympathetic to the problems of minorities, now found themselves uncomfortably lined up with segregationists in opposing school busing for integration or the construction of low-income housing in their neighborhoods. In some instances, their view was shared by those minority-group members who argued that, in the face of white opposition, their position could be improved and their racial identity maintained only by some form of separation or community control. A furious debate developed over quotas and preferential treatment, once used to exclude racial and religious minorities, as an appropriate means of broadening opportunities for these groups.

The growing ethnic consciousness, or "New Pluralism," as some called it, raised a series of new questions, or at least new aspects of old questions: the validity of maintaining the ethnic, cultural, or economic character of neighborhoods and schools; the role of government in supporting ethnic or racial identity or improvement; the very real dangers of retribalization in a pluralistic society; the relative deprivation, or feelings of deprivation, of large numbers of first-, second-, and third-generation ethnic groups, which had not been seen as disadvantaged before. Involved in the last question was the growing anger and alienation of "Middle America" and the split between lower middle-class or working-class whites—the "provincials" as some dubbed them—and better-educated, more affluent Americans—the "cosmopolitans"—which was sending shockwaves through the nation's social and political life. New fronts also were opening in the effort to achieve equal rights and opportunities for minorities by means of suburbanization, court decisions on desegregation, and the financing of government services.
As Americans wrestled with these questions, it became evident that problems of intergroup relations had been viewed too simplistically. A number of social scientists were groping for a better understanding of group conflict in our society and improved methods of dealing with it. R. A. Schermerhorn had written a year earlier:

If research has confirmed anything in this area, it is that prejudice is a product of situations, historical situations, economic situations, political situations; it is not a little demon that emerges in people simply because they are deprived. This is not to deny that the subject of prejudice has a genuine importance, but only that it is not central to the explanation of ethnic and race relations.¹

There clearly was emerging a need to do more than root out an endemic racism and improve the attitudes of Americans toward one another: to recognize and work out the necessary adjustments and accommodations of group interests, values, and styles, and conflicts within groups. In short, intergroup relations in 1971 were in a state of flux; Americans were still learning about the nature of a pluralistic society, and how to make it work.

_Ethnic Consciousness and Emergence of Middle America_

The emergence of “Middle America” and the closely related growth of ethnic consciousness now rival the race revolution and the “greening of America” as major currents in American life. (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], pp. 198–204). There was growing confidence among ethnic groups that they need not disappear into the “melting pot”; that they had earned the right to define in their own terms and values what an American is. “Project Pole,” a newspaper and television advertising campaign to elevate the image of the Pole in this country was launched by Edward J. Piszek in Philadelphia and the Very Reverend Walter J. Ziemba, president-rector of a Polish college and seminary in Orchard Lake, Michigan. (Piszek said it would do for Polish-Americans what black power had done for Afro-Americans.)² The Cleveland orchestra, traditionally relying for support on more affluent, upper-class elements, initiated a series of “ethnic nights,” aimed at Hungarian-Americans, Italian-Americans, Czech-Americans, and other groups, which were topped off by ethnic refreshments shared with orchestra members.³ At the request of Jewish students, Temple University in Philadelphia initiated a course in Yiddish,⁴ believed to be the first of its kind in a Pennsylvania college. The number of colleges and universities offering courses in Jewish studies has been steadily increasing since the end of World War II, and, at the close of the year, the B’nai B’rith Hillel Foundation reported such pro-

grams in more than 185 institutions. Utilizing the American Jewish Committee's newly published *Guidelines to Jewish History in Social Studies Instructional Material*, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council met in October with officials of the Association of American Publishers to discuss the general absence, or scant treatment, of Jews in most history textbooks.

Ethnic groups also continued to combat what they regarded as racial slurs on their antecedents. The most aggressive of these campaigns was undertaken by the Italian-American Civil Rights League, founded in 1970 by Joseph A. Colombo, Sr., who, according to federal authorities, was the head of a Mafia family of about 200 members and associates. ("We said there is a conspiracy in this country against all Italian people," Colombo said in an article under his by-line in the Gannett chain of newspapers.) Early in 1971, the league claimed it had 45,000 members, a headquarters in New York City, 25 chapters in the New York area, and new chapters opening in various parts of the country.

By the spring, the league reported a number of accomplishments: The producer of the film adaptation of *The Godfather* agreed to delete references to the Mafia or Cosa Nostra, as did the producers of "The F.B.I." television series. Attorney General John N. Mitchell and Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller muted references to Italian criminal organizations. A popular television commercial featuring the words, "Mamma mia, that's a Some spicy meatball," was discontinued by Alka-Seltzer. In May Colombo appeared with Rabbi Meir Kahane in a news conference to announce that his league had joined forces with Kahane's Jewish Defense League to fight what they called harassment by the federal government.

An attempt on Colombo's life put him out of action; by year's end the Italian American Civil Rights League had dropped out of newspaper headlines. But the Mafia and its alleged activities continued to be discussed widely. Gay Talese's book, *Honor Thy Father*, called the Mafia "part of a national illusory complex." And in one of the most penetrating studies of the group's historical and sociological background, Francis A. J. Iannia reported that Italian-American criminal "families" had weakened after three generations of acculturation and were being replaced in the policy and numbers rackets by Puerto Ricans and blacks as part of the process of ethnic succession.

Public interest in ethnic and working-class groups continued at a high level. The year's writings included *Newsweek* essays on the Jews (March 1) and Catholics (October 4); "The Blueing of America," by Peter and Brigette Berger, in the *New Republic* (April 3); "White Ethnic," by Michael Novak, in *Harper's* (September), and "Are the Rules Changing?" by Russell Barta, in *America* (October 30). Social scientists who for many years had been concentrating their attention on race and racial issues were beginning to study

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the problems and implications of the rise of "ethnics" and working-class Americans. Among the books published during the year were *Why Can't They Be Like Us?*, by Andrew M. Greeley; *Over-Coming Middle Class Rage*, edited by Murray Friedman; *The Middle Americans*, by Robert Coles and Jon Erikson; *Blue Collars and Hard Hats*, by Patricia Cayo Sexton and Brendan Sexton; *Blue Collar Workers*, by Sar A. Levitan, and *Nation of Nations: The Ethnic Experience and the Racial Crisis*, by Peter Rose.

In 1971 the Bureau of the Census released 1969 sample-survey data on Americans who identified themselves by ethnic background. Altogether, 56 million Americans described themselves as being of German, Irish, Italian, Polish, or Russian (mostly Jewish) backgrounds; some 11 million were foreign-born. The survey also indicated that marriage partners continued to be selected heavily from within a given ethnic group. Of the five ethnic groups most often associated with the white working class, nearly 20 million people lived in families having annual incomes between $5,000 and $10,000. Six million males over 16 years of age were employed in blue-collar jobs, and another 1.5 million in sales, clerical, and service work.

The growing ethnic consciousness was reflected also in the progress during the year of legislation introduced by Senator Richard Schweiker (R., Pa.) and Congressman Roman Pucinski (D., Ill.), providing for the creation of a number of Ethnic Heritage Studies centers to teach American youth pride in their ethnic background. Passed in the Senate and defeated in the House for economy reasons, the bill was headed at year's end toward a conference committee which was expected to report it out in modified form.

A measure of the interest in, and the impact of, working-class whites was the Columbia Broadcasting System television series, "All in the Family," which premiered early in 1971 and immediately shot up to top rating. *Newsweek* reported that it had some 35 million viewers. Its hero, Archie Bunker, was a beer-swilling, television-addicted, working-class type, who saw himself menaced by "spades," "spics," "schwartzes," "coons," "yids," and "black beauties," among others. The phenomenal success of the series set off considerable discussion on whether the "weekly litany of racial slurs" actually helped fight bigotry by bringing it out into the open, or whether it made prejudice respectable. Laura Z. Hobson, author of *Gentleman's Agreement*, which condemned antisemitism, sharply criticized the program. Whatever one's view, it was clear that the blue-collar stereotype portrayed by Archie Bunker was as much a product of bias, as were his own attitudes.

However, the upsurge of interest in working-class or ethnic Americans on

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the part of the media and "new pluralist" scholars made them appear in the main more sympathetic than, and somewhat at variance with, the prevailing "hard hat" and "white backlash" image. It was recognized that while many had racist attitudes, they also were smarting under social and economic disadvantages and community indifference to them, all of which disposed them to anger toward the blacks and other minorities at the bottom of the social scale. In 1971 grass-roots efforts got underway in ten cities—Boston, Providence, Newark, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, the Gary-Calumet area in Indiana, and Chicago—to organize them so that they could deal more effectively with these problems. Campaigns were initiated to halt an expressway that was threatening to destroy a neighborhood; to restore pride among ethnic groups, and to help make their voices heard on issues such as air and neighborhood pollution, inequitable taxes, inadequate garbage collection, and zoning.

These alliances frequently were spearheaded by civil-rights activists of the 1960s. Father James E. Groppi, leader of the 1967 and 1968 civil-rights marches in Milwaukee, helped organize the city's Italian community. ("I came back to my Italian neighborhood and it was hardly better off than some of the black areas.") At a national press conference held in Washington, D.C., on June 12, plans were announced for a new national coalition of inner-city, largely white ethnic community organizations spearheaded by Msgr. Geno C. Baroni's Catholic Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs. Baroni was allied with the American Jewish Committee's National Project on Ethnic America, which had been focusing public attention on the problems of low-income, white ethnic groups since the late 1960s. In 1971 community-based conferences sponsored by the American Jewish Committee were held in New Jersey, Buffalo, Rochester, and Detroit, and national consultations on ethnicity and mental health, neighborhood government, and the civil-rights implications of ethnic studies in New York.

But the "new pluralism" and discussions of the estrangement of working-class and ethnic groups from the mainstream came under sharp criticism. Mike Royko, columnist and biographer of Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley, saw this movement as an invention of college professors. Some saw ethnic consciousness as a transitory phenomenon. Others feared that a strong emphasis on ethnic identity would turn life in America into an ethnic grab-bag and fragmentize society even more. One of the sharpest attacks came in a review of Greeley's book, *Why Can't They Be Like Us?*, by Naomi Bliven. She wrote:

The philosophical implications of all this primitivism and particularism are deplorable. They are at odds with Christianity, and, for that matter, with any of the first-rate thought of the Western World, which, whether pagan or religious

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or secular, is universal. Ethnicity in our time has been the refuge of the second rate; at best, nationalism; at worst, Fascism.

Supporters and analysts of the new ethnic consciousness responded that it was a deeply-rooted movement representing much more than a cover for racism. They argued that, in an increasingly depersonalized society, many Americans were searching for, and desperately needed, the stability provided by ethnic identification. In a privately circulated memorandum, Greeley wrote:

Mrs. Bliven apparently thinks I want to return to the cave man. . . . But it is not a return to the cave I am suggesting; rather it is a recognition that man is not merely pure reason. He is not an angel without place, without a network of relations, without a history and a heritage, without a language and a culture and a faith that is different from the language and culture and faith of others. . . . That man must strive to transcend these limitations I do not deny. But he does not transcend them by pretending they are not there or by writing them off as immoral. He rather transcends them by using his own particular "place" as ground on which to stand, as a base of operations out of which to work, as a home both to set out from and return to. The religious ecumenists . . . insist that only the person who knows his own heritage and is secure in his relationship with it can engage in constructive dialogue with those from other heritages. This may well be the reason for the . . . finding that those who are more involved in their own ethnic groups are less likely to be prejudiced.

The findings of a 1970 National Opinion Research Center survey concerning the attitudes of white Americans toward the position of black Americans, undertaken by Greeley and Paul B. Sheatsley, seemed to support this last conclusion, although behavior frequently differs from expressed attitudes. The data indicated that Irish and German Catholics in the North, where most live, favored integration more than the typical white Protestant Northerner. Catholics of South European origin (mostly Italian) and Slavic origin (mostly Polish) were only slightly less integrationist than Northern Anglo-Saxon Protestants. According to the study, Irish Catholics were second only to Jews in supporting integration. The survey also showed three of the four ethnic groups—Irish, Germans, and South Europeans, largely Italians—were slightly more likely than Northern Anglo-Saxon Protestants to support open occupancy legislation. Racism seemed to be concentrated among less educated ethnic groups.\(^{13}\)

Crisis of Catholic Church and Its Schools

While Protestants, Jews, and even some blacks belonged to Middle America, its core has been the nation's 48 million Catholics. The year found the Catholic Church in disarray on many fronts. A nationwide Gallup survey of Catholics above the age of 17 found that more than one-third

did not attend Sunday mass regularly; two out of three acknowledged they had not gone to confession in the previous two months. Diversity in theology and life style among Catholics was becoming as great as it was among Protestants and Jews. Only one out of two Catholics wanted the Church to continue its opposition to abortion, and more than two out of three expected it to abandon opposition to divorce. According to a study of the clergy in the United States which was presented to the Vatican in September, the Church was losing, through death, retirement, leaves of absence, or resignation, five priests for every two seminarians ordained. In five years, the Church had moved from a point where the late Cardinal Francis J. Spellman could bless the war in Vietnam as a struggle for "civilization," to where an antiwar Jesuit was sitting in the U.S. Congress, Father Philip and Daniel Berrigan lay in prison for burning draft-board files, and a priest served as speech writer for President Nixon.

The leadership of the Church remained largely in Irish hands. Fifty-seven per cent of the bishops, including most of the nation's cardinals, were of Irish descent at a time when Irish-Americans comprised only 17 per cent of the United States Catholic population. In the past, the Church had recognized its other ethnic constituents by appointing Polish, Italian, and Slavic-American priests as auxiliary bishops. Pressures for recognition by black and Chicano Catholics increased. At the second annual convention of Black Catholics in Detroit during the summer, delegates demanded that the United States hierarchy consecrate a new black bishop, to replace the elderly Patrick Cardinal O'Boyle, head of the predominantly black Washington, D.C., archdiocese. Militant black Catholics also were insisting on a special ecclesiastical rite for U.S. Negroes.

A central issue in the crisis facing the Church was the future of its vast school system. While Jews, Lutherans, and smaller Protestant groups have been maintaining separate schools, the question of the constitutionality of public financial assistance to such schools affects mainly Catholic parochial schools. The future of these institutions has been of particular importance to working class Catholics, who prefer them for their children not only because of religious instruction, but also because of stricter discipline, fear of violence and the increasingly black character of inner-city schools. Wider interest has been focused on these schools also because of the growing financial crisis in the public schools which have been absorbing more parochial school students. And parochial schools in the city have been instrumental in holding a significant number of white ethnics—the largest group of whites—in the city, at a time when large numbers of middle-class families have been moving to the suburbs.

According to church officials, 800 of the 11,350 Catholic elementary and secondary schools did not have the necessary funds to reopen after the

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14 "Has the Church Lost its Soul?", Newsweek, October 4, 1971.
summer recess. A major study of New York State's 1,900 nonpublic schools, conducted by Louis R. Gary for a special commission appointed by Governor Rockefeller and the State Board of Regents, concluded that "the state must anticipate the phasing out" by 1980 of at least 70 per cent of Roman Catholic elementary schools and 50 per cent of Catholic high schools. The National Catholic Educational Association predicted that, without some additional government aid, another 2.1 million pupils—nearly half the current Catholic school enrollment—would end up in already overcrowded public schools. A study of church finances by James Gollin underscored the financial plight of the Church and its school. While the Church appeared to be well organized and even affluent, Gollin reported, it was most inefficient in handling finances. Ninety per cent of its funds, he said, were tied up in economically non-productive assets, such as its schools. Church critics, however, were less sympathetic to the financial difficulties of its schools, and, in fact, said they were exaggerated. Dr. John M. Swomley, Jr., writing in The Christian Century on January 13, maintained that only smaller, less efficient units were closing and that the process underway was actually strengthening the system.

The problems of the parochial schools, in fact, went deeper than the financial issue. A group of scholars working under a grant from the U.S. Office of Education pointed out that, in the last decade, many American Catholics, who had been economically deprived and socially isolated, had become highly acculturated and assimilated. Economically and socially more secure, many Catholics were questioning the meaning of religion, the goals and structures of the Church, and even the validity of the existence of parochial schools. "... I feel that parochial schools have served their exalted purposes," John Deedy, managing editor, of the Catholic lay journal, Commonweal, wrote in the March 13 issue of the New Republic "[and] that they are now a hindrance rather than help to Catholicism." This, too, was part of the crisis of the parochial schools and of the Church itself.

SUPREME COURT RULES ON PAROCHIAL-SCHOOL AID

Since World War II, Catholic groups joined by some Orthodox Jewish and a few other small religious bodies have been pressing for various forms of

18 The National Association of Laity, a 12,000-member liberal Catholic group, released a 100-page report early in 1972 charging that the financial statements of most of the country's dioceses were "incomplete" and "misleading." The group argued the Church was pleading poverty at a time when it was seeking public funds for its school system (Wall Street Journal, January 11, 1972).
government aid to their private schools. These efforts and legislation enacted for such aid have been challenged in the courts by most Protestant and Jewish organizations, along with education and civil-liberties groups, as creating political controversies in various states; violating the provisions for the separation of Church and state of federal and state constitutions, and leading to the destruction of the public schools. In a series of decisions, the first of them the *Everson v. Board of Education* (330 U.S. 1) ruling in 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of various indirect forms of aid, such as the use of government-owned buses to transport students to parochial schools and the loan of state-purchased books to parochial school students under a "child benefit" theory. Encouraged by these decisions, many states enacted aid programs, ranging from busing and free lunches, books, and counseling services to direct salary supplements for parochial-school teachers of secular subjects.

These issues were brought closer to final constitutional resolution on June 28, when the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional, by an 8 to 1 vote, programs in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania reimbursing Roman Catholic and other church-related schools for instruction in nonreligious or secular subjects. (Two days later, the Court issued a brief order affirming the decision of a three-judge district court, which invalidated a Connecticut "purchase of services" statute similar to the Pennsylvania law.) At the same time, the Court upheld, by a 5 to 4 vote, the Federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, under which $240 million in federal funds had been paid for the construction of academic buildings on the campuses of private colleges, including church-related colleges.

The decision on direct state aid to parochial schools marked the first time the Supreme Court struck down a law of this kind. The Rhode Island statute provided for paying up to 15 per cent of the salary of teachers in private schools provided they taught only "secular subjects." In Pennsylvania, the state granted $20 million a year from taxes on cigarettes and horse racing to pay for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for courses in mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical sciences, and physical education.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, President Nixon's first Supreme Court appointment, wrote the majority opinion in the state-aid case and the prevailing opinion in the federal-aid decision (pp. 73–74). In dealing with the former cases, Burger laid down three conditions for testing the constitutionality of a statute: it must have a secular purpose, "a principal or primary

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20 *Farley v. DiCenso* (403 U.S. 602 [1971]).
21 *Lemon v. Kurtzman* (403 U.S. 602 [1971]).
22 *Tilton v. Richardson* (403 U.S. 672 [1971]).
effect” that does not advance or inhibit religion, and does not foster “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court conceded that the condition of purpose was met. It also agreed in principle that secular and religious education are “identifiable and separable.” However, the Court did not find it necessary to judge whether the principal effect of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes was the advancement of religion, since “the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each state involved excessive entanglement between government and religion.”

Distinguishing its earlier decision upholding a textbook law in New York24 the Court said that “teachers have a substantially different ideological character than books” because “a textbook’s content is ascertainable, but a teacher’s handling of a subject is not.” Noting that teachers in religious schools are under the direct supervision of a church, the Court concluded that “religious authority necessarily pervades the school system.” The Court further stated that the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island programs had the further defect of providing state financial aid directly to the church-related school, rather than to the student and his parents, as in both Everson and Allen. The Court also pointed out that annual appropriations to parochial schools could lead to “political division along religious lines [that] was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.”

Chief Justice Burger took great pains to point out why the “entanglement” between church and state in the state-aid program was enough to invalidate it, while the federal program could stand. A key point, he said, is that pre-college church schools are more involved than colleges in religious indoctrination, and that “college students are less impressionable and less susceptible” to such indoctrination. He also found fewer entanglements between church and state in the “one-time, single-purpose construction grant” than in continuing salary supplement programs. Finally, he said, colleges normally do not draw major support from one area, so that bitter state political battles are not likely to erupt over aid to colleges.

Justice Byron R. White, dissenting in the Rhode Island case, argued that parents have an unquestionable right to send their children to sectarian private schools; that these have both religious and secular functions, and that a possible indirect benefit to religion from government aid to a “separable secular function” does not convert that aid into an impermissible establishment of religion.

**OTHER PAROCHIAID ACTIONS**

The Court had put an end to two forms of state aid to parochial schools: salary support and purchase of services. Presumably, it would not back down

24 Board of Education v. Allen (392 U.S. 236 [1968]).
on its rulings on transportation and textbooks. This left open the question whether the Court would disallow financial assistance to the parents of parochial-school children in the form of tuition grants, vouchers, and tax credits. Despite the June rulings, then, efforts continued to obtain the use of tax funds for nonpublic schools. During the year, either before or after the June 28 court decisions, statutes providing for substantial monetary aid to nonpublic schools were adopted for the first time in Illinois, Maryland, and Minnesota, and a bill providing for local option for such aid was adopted in Vermont. Operation of the Maryland law modeled on the voucher idea was suspended when enough signatures were obtained for a petition requiring the measure to be submitted to the voters in the November 1972 election. New York State, which had approved one limited form of parochial aid in 1970, enacted a purchase of services bill appropriating $33 million.  

In Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Ohio, new legislation aimed at avoiding the effect of the Supreme Court rulings was adopted to supplant earlier parochial aid measures. The Pennsylvania bill, authorizing the direct payment to parents of $75 maximum for each child enrolled in a nonpublic elementary school and $150 maximum for each nonpublic high-school student, at an estimated cost of $47 million the first year, was hurried through the legislature and signed by Governor Milton J. Shapp just two months after the June decisions. These new acts were immediately challenged in the courts.

While parochial aid bills were defeated in California, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Dakota, and Wisconsin, measures permitting public-school districts to lend textbooks to children in nonpublic schools were adopted in California and Nebraska. Various forms of aid to colleges and universities, or to their students, were provided in Illinois, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Texas legislation.

A closer examination of current church-state controversies suggests that they were more than differences in legal interpretations of the First Amendment. They were closely tied in with the problem of meeting the staggering costs of both public and private education in the 1970s and with concern about whether public education can absorb large numbers of nonpublic-school children if, as Catholic and other private-school educators have warned, many of the schools should be forced to close. Underlying the debates, too, were the historical experience, and fears and suspicions with which the diverse religious groups viewed one another. These have been

25 On January 11, 1972, a three-judge court held the statute unconstitutional on the basis of the June 28 court decisions.
26 Early in 1972, federal court decisions invalidated tuition-grant legislation in Pennsylvania and Ohio.
muted by the common bond of being Americans and by constitutional arguments, only to surface eventually, since basic group interests and values were involved. Finally, the growth of ethnic consciousness has given rise to the question of the government's role, if any, in group maintenance efforts. Politics and the courts provide a means for dealing with intergroup issues in a pluralistic society and for working out methods for resolving or, at least, accommodating group differences.

President Nixon made it clear that he favored some form of assistance to parochial schools. He assured the Knights of Columbus, a Roman Catholic group, in an August address that they could "count on" his help to stop the large number of nonpublic-school closings. Commissioner of Education Dr. Sidney P. Marland, too, told some 100 Catholic- and public-school superintendents from major cities at a closed meeting in November at Warrenton, Virginia, that the administration's parochiaid plans awaited recommendations by the President's Commission on School Finance and its panel on nonpublic education, scheduled to report in 1972, but that constitutional considerations and recent court decisions gave the federal government "only a limited range to work from."

Among the alternatives carefully studied by the administration was a system of educational vouchers, the so-called "Jenks plan" which would allow parents who were dissatisfied with public schools to receive a rebate on school taxes to help pay for the transfer of their children to other public or private schools. The plan was aimed at helping poor families exercise educational options open to middle-class or upper middle-class families by enabling them to choose better schools. Despite opposition to parochiaid by some educational organizations and religious groups, the Office of Economic Opportunity moved forward with voucher pilot projects in several parts of the country.

Prayer Amendment

On November 8, after intense public and congressional debate, the House of Representatives rejected by a vote of 240 to 162, just 28 votes short of the required two-thirds majority, a proposed constitutional amendment permitting "voluntary" prayers or meditation in public schools. It was a defeat of efforts by small-town, largely Republican, and more fundamentalist elements and Southerners—evangelist Billy Graham supported the amendment—to overturn the 1963 Supreme Court decision holding Bible reading and organized prayers, even nondenominational prayers, unconstitutional. Like parochiaid, the issue was tied in with the revolt of Middle America, pitting "provincials" against "cosmopolitans." Supporters of the amendment, led by Representative Chalmers P. Wylie (R., Ohio), had been successful in getting the House Judiciary Committee, which had initially refused to clear the measure for House floor action, to release it. Leaders of more than
38 mainstream religious denominations and organizations and 343 law school deans and professors had campaigned against the amendment.

**The Jews**

At the close of 1970, sociologist Nathan Glazer wrote that the central problems facing Jews today stem from the contradiction between their growing sense of ethnicity and the gravitational pull of liberal, universalistic goals, and the need to reconcile these forces. While Jews have struggled with these contradictions throughout their history, in 1971 they increasingly opted for ethnicity.

In large measure this attitude seemed to be shaped by the sense of anxiety pervading many segments of the Jewish community. It was fed by the continued threat to Israel's security, the well-publicized danger to the cultural survival of Soviet Jews, and increased concern about antisemitism and other pressures felt by Jews in this country in recent years. A Gallup poll commissioned by *Newsweek* reported that 34 per cent of Jews believed antisemitism had been increasing in the last few years; another 41 per cent thought it had remained at a steady level.

In a widely discussed speech at the annual meeting of the American Jewish Committee in May, *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz noted a weakening of the long-standing "taboo" against the open expression of antisemitism, as indicated by the spread of "anti-Zionist" sentiment among some intellectuals since the six-day war; the surfacing of antisemitism among blacks since the 1968 and 1969 New York City teachers' strikes, and the frequent expressions of resentment within the American literary community over the "dominance" of Jews in American cultural life. Podhoretz reiterated a position, earlier enunciated by the veteran Jewish community-relations specialist Earl Raab, that the Jewish position in the country was threatened by a possible "alliance between the patriciate (upper class WASPs) and the underclass (blacks) against the liberal center." But, Podhoretz added, Jewish security was threatened most directly by the radical left.

Ethnic consciousness took a variety of forms, including a heightened affinity with Jews in the Soviet Union. The World Conference of Jewish Communities on Soviet Jewry, was held in Brussels in February under the aegis of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry in an effort to organize a coordinated worldwide pressure campaign to protest Soviet antisemitism and back efforts of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. "For once Jewish history everywhere coincides," Elie Wiesel, the French-American writer on the holocaust, said. "There are no more Jews of silence." The conference was followed up in the United States with a barrage of publicity in the English-Jewish and general press and numerous local and national

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demonstrations led by Jewish community-relations, rabbinical, and youth groups. These efforts seemed to have borne fruit, as increased numbers of Soviet Jews were obtaining exit visas and leaving for Israel.

Among some Jewish youth there was a resurgence of a sense of community. While this newly found turning inward was a small movement and could not compare with the larger force of indifferentism and universalism, it was nevertheless significant. James A. Sleeper and Alan L. Mintz edited *The New Jews* (Vintage Books, 1971), a book of essays which gave this phenomenon a name. The "new Jews" founded and edited Jewish student magazines and newspapers, organized Jewish Free Universities, and pressed for courses in Yiddish and Jewish studies in colleges and universities. According to Irving Howe, at least 50 distinctly Jewish organizations have sprung up, ranging from left to somewhat left-of-center, to Zionist, but all self-identified as Jewish. "Those who have rediscovered the virtues of ethnicity through their radical or alienated social critiques have begun to converse seriously with those whose Jewish commitment is more firmly rooted in Jewish education," Sleeper and Mintz reported.

As among blacks, segments of the Jewish community also were turning to forms of separatism. The Jewish day-school movement gained in importance, with an increase from 69 schools with 10,000 students at the end of World War II, to 378 schools with 75,000 students. The Gary report on nonpublic schools in New York predicted continued growth in the 1970s. For an increasing number of Jews—17,000 since the six-day war—going on *aliyah*, settlement in Israel, was the answer to how to live a creative, Jewish life.

To some, Jewish anxieties appeared to be exaggerated. Jews, as a group, had reached high social, cultural, and economic status. As 1971 began, a majority of the New York City Board of Estimate members were Jews; the governors of Pennsylvania and Maryland were Jews, as was the mayor of Atlanta and the senior Republican United States senator from New York. While President Nixon had not named Jews to "showcase" positions on the U.S. Supreme Court or in the Cabinet, they held high posts in his administration: Henry Kissinger and Leonard Garment were among his top level advisors; Herbert Stein served as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors; Arthur Burns was chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and Jesse Steinfeld was surgeon general of the United States. At the sub-Cabinet level, Jews filled the posts of undersecretary of labor and assistant secretaries of treasury; defense; health, education and welfare; housing and urban development, and the Office of Management and Budget.30

During the year, President Nixon gave firm support to Israel in its struggle with her Arab neighbors (p. 176). Both the president and Congress continued their interest in the problems of Jews in the Soviet Union. There

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were indications, also, that some segments of Christian leadership in this country were responding more affirmatively to international issues troubling Jews. Their past attitude had been a sore point in the Jewish community since the six-day war. In May the American Jewish Committee released a 48-page listing of "Christian Reactions to the Leningrad Trial of Soviet Jews," documenting the widespread protest elicited by the treason trial and sentencing of eleven Soviet citizens, nine of them Jews, for the attempted hijacking of a plane to take them to Israel. A survey of Christian opinion released by the American Jewish Committee in October contained an impressive listing of public statements, speeches, news articles, and editorials issued by Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Evangelical leaders and organizations opposing the internationalization of Jerusalem and urging that the city remain under Israeli jurisdiction.

EXTREMISM AND JEWS

The issue of black-Jewish relations remained on the back burner, but it simmered there. There was a general absence of large-scale rioting in black slums of which Jewish merchants had been the chief victims. Open and strident antisemitic statements by black militants, as during the New York City school strikes, and widespread media coverage which tended to inflame passions further had stopped. The decline of the Black Panthers, and the group's shift to more moderate strategies (p. 124) brought a change in the tone of their newspaper widely hawked in slums. The year before it had followed an anti-Israel, anti-Jewish line and had encouraged violence against merchants, the police, and other "oppressors."

The New Left remained a greater focal point of antisemitism than the right. However, as the movement lost ground in this country, its anti-Israel, anti-Zionist campaign with its distinct antisemitic overtones declined as well. Arab propaganda also slowed down somewhat, partly because of the "loss of face" of Arab terrorist forces, primarily al-Fatah, after being crushed in a series of encounters with Jordanian forces. Action, the publication of the Action Committee on American Arab Relations in New York, editorially complained in its April 19 issue about the lack of concern, and certainly of political action, by Palestinians living in this country.

OTHER PRESSURES ON JEWS

And yet, Jewish anxieties were not without foundation. As a group, they still were comparative newcomers to financial security and status. Many saw their advances, won at great effort and cost, imperiled by various contemporary currents in American life. Historically, Jews have had a stake in

civility, and this had been eroded in recent years. Many were beginning to fear that blacks, Chicanos, and other minorities were seeking to move up in American life by tactics foreign to the Jewish temperament and style, including the use of violence and ethnic displacement. In his 1971 novel, The Tenants, Bernard Malamud expresses this fear in the words of black writer Willie Spearmint: “It isn’t that I hate the Jews. The way to black freedom is against them.”

The use of quotas and preferential treatment as a means of broadening opportunities for blacks and other disadvantaged minorities, though generally not directed against Jews, increasingly was seen as creating a special problem for them.32 A notice in November of job openings in the New York City Department of Health, which declared that “we are particularly anxious to get qualified Black or Puerto Rican staff,” was attacked by the American Jewish Congress. The latter charged that the Department of Health indicated an intention to prefer black or Puerto Rican applicants “solely because of their ethnic identification over other candidates who are equally qualified or more qualified.” The notice was later withdrawn. The B’nai B’rith Hillel Foundation (along with the Newman Center for Catholic students) at Brooklyn College protested as “an invasion of privacy”, the distribution of an official college questionnaire asking students to list their ethnic origin and religious preference, even though responses were optional. The school’s president explained the survey was part of the effort to “expand educational opportunity for all persons regardless of their racial or religious or economic background.”

Much of the concern felt by Jews with regard to quotas and preferential treatment applied to the field of education, which traditionally had given them the opportunity for economic and social advancements when other areas of American life had not. A move to eliminate a number of San Francisco administrative positions limited to whites, which later was cancelled by court action as prejudicial, would have hit Jews hardest. A group of Jewish faculty members at Harvard, who suspected that the number of Jewish students was being reduced, met with the dean of admissions during the year. He told them that there had been no reduction in the quota of admissions in any special area of the country, but that this did not apply to “the doughnuts around the big cities.” When it was pointed out that these included such areas as Westchester County and Long Island, N.Y., suburban New Jersey, and Shaker Heights, Ohio, the Crimson reported, one faculty member stood up and said, “... those aren’t doughnuts, they’re bagels.”33 A group of Jewish faculty members, among them Nathan Glazer

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33 Dorothy Rabinowitz, “Are Jewish Students Different?,” Change, Summer 1971.
and Seymour Martin Lipset, denied in a letter to the Boston Jewish Advocate that Harvard was “discriminating against Jews in admissions.” However, they pointed out that, “Since Harvard is trying to increase the numbers of student recruits from disadvantaged backgrounds, and is not expanding, very likely the number of other backgrounds will decline.”

The University of Wisconsin continued to come under charges of anti-semitism, made by Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, local newspapers, and the Madison Jewish community during the year, when it was reported that Jewish out-of-state enrollment and applications for admission had dropped markedly. Following campus unrest believed to have been caused by “radical outsiders,” the state regents began in 1967 to limit students from other states; initially from those with large Jewish populations, like New York and Pennsylvania. Earlier, the regents also had sharply increased tuition for out-of-state students, giving as the reason mounting costs. In a letter to the National Jewish Post and Opinion, on October 22, an associate vice president of the university denied charges of anti-semitism, maintaining that applications for admission had not declined, that 1971 enrollment of nonresidents did not reach the quota limits, and that loss of faculty was due to low salaries. His assertions were challenged in another letter to the paper’s editor by a professor of mathematics at Wisconsin, who said, “a newly respectable anti-Semitic mood is growing at the University of Wisconsin, and that the University is doing nothing about it except to deny its existence.”

Masada, a Jewish youth organization, pointed out that 3,137 freshmen at the university indicated Jewish on a religious preference card in 1967, whereas only 1,150 did so in 1970.

Jews also were dismayed by anti-Jewish remarks made in the United Nations by Soviet and Arab delegates after shots had been fired into the Soviet Mission building in New York. While not condoning the shooting, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council declared, “The vicious attacks in the United Nations debate last week against the United States and Jews have shocked all decent Americans. The violent accusations made by the Soviet delegate and some Arab delegates disgraced the halls of that world organization whose forums are supposedly dedicated to seeking international peace and reconciliation.”

Insensitivity to Jewish feelings, as well as historical inaccuracies, marked the “rock opera,” Jesus Christ Superstar, by Andrew Lloyd Webber and Tim Rice. It opened on Broadway, traveled to a number of cities in various versions, and a recording of it was sold widely. Concerned that the Passion of Jesus once again had become a vehicle of anti-Jewish bias, the American Jewish Committee released an analysis of the show and its impact on Christian-Jewish relations by a Presbyterian educator and authority on

intergroup relations in Christian education.\textsuperscript{36} It charged that \textit{Jesus Christ Superstar} was "less than fair" in depicting the role of Jews and Jewish behavior in the Passion of Jesus by making them more sinister than the Gospel record warrants. While conceding that the play avoided some of the cruder interpretations in earlier works of its kind, the analysis concluded it was "insufficiently thoughtful, potentially mischievous and possibly a backward step on the road toward improved Christian-Jewish relations." Walter Kerr and Father Malcolm Boyd, writing in the New York \textit{Times}, October 24, concurred in these findings.

Anxieties and pressures were felt most sharply among poorer, lower middle-class, and more ethnically conscious Jews, many of whom resented the "liberalism" of their more fortunate coreligionists. Merchants and businessmen attempting to do business in violence-prone slums, elderly Orthodox Jews living and worshiping in transitional areas, and teachers and school administrators struggling with the problems of ethnic succession in the schools were less sympathetic to efforts of blacks and other minorities to improve their position. Better educated and more affluent Jews tended to remain more sympathetic and willing to overlook, or trace to larger causes, more extreme tactics of militants.

Established Jewish organizations showed greater concern over the problems of angry and alienated Jews. An American Jewish Committee report,\textsuperscript{37} which received wide coverage in the English-Jewish press, discussed the "myth" of Jewish affluence. It noted that 15.3 per cent of Jewish households, some 700,000 to 750,000 people, had incomes of $3,000; and that, if the figures for the "near poor," those earning under $4,500, were added, the number of Jewish poor would exceed 900,000. In December the American Jewish Committee convened a two-day National Consultation on Poverty in the Jewish community. Held in New York City, it was attended by 87 government officials, social workers, and agency heads, who came from major cities across the country to explore the dimensions of the problem and to consider programs for dealing with it.

The American Jewish Congress charged that the Jewish poor were, in effect, excluded from the benefits of the Federal Economic Opportunity Act and New York City's antipoverty program. It stated that money for these programs was designated for poverty areas and intended for young people, and many of the Jewish poor, who were mainly older persons and generally did not live in poverty areas, did not qualify for benefits.\textsuperscript{38} The agency therefore called for 18 changes in the poverty programs. The criticism was acknowledged by an Office of Economic Opportunity report, which conceded that the "allegation that Jews are systematically excluded from New

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Gerald S. Strober, "\textit{Jesus Christ Superstar}": The "Rock Opera" and Christian-Jewish Relations (New York: October 1971).
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Delivered by staff specialist Ann Wolfe in Chicago.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Philadelphia \textit{Jewish Exponent}, November 12, 1971.
\end{itemize}
York's poverty program participation, while imprecise, is not totally devoid of validity.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE}

The Jewish Defense League continued to draw its members largely from angry and alienated segments of the Jewish community, for which it claimed to speak and act. On December 23, 17 JDL officials and members demonstrating against vandalism in synagogues in the Logan section of Philadelphia, where many elderly Jews live, were arrested by police for law violations. JDL members also invaded and wrecked the office of the New York Board of Rabbis for its alleged inaction on certain Jewish issues and unwillingness to provide bail for a JDL official arrested for falsifying statements in a passport application. The league also attempted to make contact with other white, ethnic groups, and announcement of an alliance with the Italian American Civil Rights League was made during the year.

The main effort of JDL, however, was given over to dramatizing the problem of Jews wishing to leave the USSR, by holding rallies, threatening violence, and harassing Soviet diplomats and their families in New York and Washington. Incidents involving the Soviets included a brick thrown through the window of Aeroflot, a Soviet airline office in New York, which also was the scene of a pipe-bomb explosion, and a bomb explosion outside the Soviet Embassy's cultural offices in Washington, D.C. Ammonia fumes disrupted a performance by the Siberian Dancers and Singers of Omsk at Carnegie Hall. JDL denied outright acts of terrorism. In Moscow, Russians retaliated by deflating the tires of cars owned by Americans.

The most celebrated incident occurred in October when four shots were fired into an apartment in the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York at a time when, Soviet officials said, four children were in it. Commenting on the incident in an interview with Walter Goodman,\textsuperscript{40} Rabbi Meir Kahane, leader of the group, acknowledged "an escalation of this entire war between the Soviets and the Jews." Secretary of State William P. Rogers phoned Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin to express his shock and dismay in connection with the Soviet Mission episode. Several days after the shooting in a chance meeting between Kahane and the United States representative at the UN, George Bush, the latter is reported to have said, "You have damaged your country's cause, the cause of Soviet Jews and the name of American Jewry."\textsuperscript{41} Bush refused Kahane's request for a dialogue.

\textsuperscript{39} Naomi Levine and Martin Hochbaum, "Jewish Poor and the War Against Poverty, Report and Recommendations," Commission on Urban Affairs, American Jewish Congress, November, 1971.


\textsuperscript{41} New York Times, October 26, 1971.
Rabbi Kahane also said in the Goodman interview that JDL was following what he called "our Soviet-Southern strategy" to alert world attention to the Soviet Jewish problem by doing "outrageous things" and getting on page one of the New York Times. The group hoped that such tactics might spur established Jewish groups into more aggressive action; also that in view of the detente sought by the Soviet Union and the United States, JDL actions would force the USSR to make some concessions to its Jews.

Despite widespread attention, JDL made no significant progress, either in membership or acceptance. It continued to be denounced in the sharpest terms by virtually every major Jewish organization and religious group. A Gallup poll commissioned by Newsweek reported, on March 1, that 71 per cent of Jews in this country disapproved of JDL efforts to help Soviet Jewry by harassing Soviet diplomats; only 14 per cent indicated approval, and 11 per cent approved with qualifications. At the close of 1971, JDL claimed a membership of a little over 10,000 in 51 chapters in the New York metropolitan area, only 14,500 nationally. It said it had groups in Boston, Philadelphia, Miami, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, St. Louis, Houston, Albuquerque, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, as well as branches in Montreal and Toronto and even in London and Antwerp. Kahane, himself suffered a number of setbacks. He was given a five-year suspended sentence for his part in the group's attempt to make bombs. In February Belgium expelled him after he tried to crash the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry meeting in Brussels. In July, he moved his wife and four children to Jerusalem and began commuting, spending alternate months in Israel and in the United States.

As the year drew to a close a new Jewish organization, the National Jewish Community Security Committee, was launched in New York by 50 Jewish community leaders, in an effort to overcome the "crisis of confidence" in some Jewish community organizations. These, the group's statement of principles asserted, "are, to date, disturbingly unresponsive to the needs of large constituencies of Jews. It behooves Jewish organizations to be sensitive to the legitimate fears and aspirations of the masses of Jews." Prominent among its founders were Dr. Abraham Joshua Heschel, who had participated in civil rights marches in the 1960s, Prof. Fritz Rothschild of the Jewish Theological Seminary, Arthur Finkelstein, a political analyst, and Rabbi Wolfe Kelman, executive vice president of the Rabbinical Assembly of America (the Conservative branch of Judaism). The council's president was Professor Seymour Siegel of the Jewish Theological Seminary, its honorary president was Elie Wiesel. Among other specific purposes listed by the council were: to help preserve the security and character of Jewish communities and neighborhoods in the large urban centers, to oppose all quota systems which try to limit job and professional opportunities of any group, and to publish a rating system of political candidates, based on their efforts to preserve communities and on their sensitivity to Jewish rights.
FOREST HILLS CONTROVERSY

The various factors that went into the making of the Jewish community personality in 1971—a growing sense of anxiety, especially about crime and violence, ethnic assertiveness, liberal guilt, and middle-class rage—all came together in the Forest Hills controversy in New York. It resembled the Ocean Hill-Brownsville (AJYB, 1969 [Vol. 70], p. 79) confrontation in community divisiveness and growing tension between blacks and Jews.

Following discussion and argument before the City Planning Commission, the Board of Estimate, and the courts, New York City decided to go forward with plans to build three 24-story low-income houses with 840 apartment units in the white middle-class Forest Hills area of Queens. The project would bring in approximately 3,000 persons including elderly whites. Forty per cent of the apartments were to be reserved for the aged. The decision reflected the conviction of many civil-rights advocates that housing low-income families in middle-class neighborhoods would raise their sights, improve behavior, especially of the children, and socialize them generally. Supporters of the project believed also that it would help resolve a whole array of difficult civil-rights issues, including integration of schools and jobs, a view backed by newly promulgated federal guidelines requiring low-income housing to be “located so as to provide housing opportunities for minority groups outside areas of minority concentration.”

The Forest Hills neighborhood selected consisted of one- and two-family houses nestled among newer, high-rise apartments. According to the 1970 census, its population was about 38,000, only 393 of whom were blacks. The area was particularly attractive to higher-income Conservative and Orthodox Jews, who, in the comparatively short time they were living there, put down roots in the community. They established a network of special religious and cultural facilities and put up buildings, including synagogues to which they could walk and Jewish day schools. This involved considerable financial investment much of which, many residents believed, would be lost if the neighborhood changed and they decided to move elsewhere.

Opposition to the proposed low-income housing developed immediately. Many whites, who had moved to Forest Hills after long years of working for it, feared there would be an increase in crime, crowded schools, congested streets, and a breakdown of their stable, economically and racially homogeneous neighborhood. “They're transplanting a malignant tumor to a healthy, viable community,” Jerry Birbach, president of the Forest Hills Residents’ Association, said. Some saw the project as part of a pattern of asking lower- and middle-income groups to pay the costs of social and racial change, while more affluent groups living in more fashionable sections of the city and suburbs won moral points for standing for principle and racial

justice. Mayor John Lindsay, a chief proponent of the Forest Hills project, was accused by residents of failing to press for low-income housing on Manhattan's fashionable East Side or in the Riverdale section of the Bronx.

The controversy was marked by mass picketing and demonstrations, an injunction to prevent interference with construction, reluctantly obeyed by residents, and rock-throwing reminiscent of racial struggles in the South. At the time, the Board of Estimate voted down another low-income project of 559 apartments, proposed for the Lindenwood area of Queens, which it had previously approved on two occasions. Besides the mayor, the Forest Hills project was supported by Senator Jacob K. Javits, Representatives Herman Badillo, Bella Abzug, and Emanuel Celler; civil-rights groups, and a small number of residents. Standing in opposition with most of the area's whites were Conservative-Republican Senator James L. Buckley and Assemblyman Vito Batista. An initial appeal to HUD Secretary George Romney to halt the project was refused. Critics of the project urged that, at the very least, it should be scaled down to fit the character of the neighborhood. Supporters, however, noted that this would make it too costly and, in effect, cause its abandonment.

The Jewish community was sharply divided on the project. Both the American Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith supported the project, though the latter qualified that such housing should be "according to the character and needs of the community." The American Jewish Committee's New York Chapter tried to bring the parties to the dispute into direct negotiation. Opposition was led by the Queens Jewish Community Council which was joined by most Orthodox rabbis. A few Conservative and reform rabbis supported the project. Meeting in December, the Synagogue Council of America, representative body of the three wings of Judaism, adopted a resolution favoring scatter-site housing, but at the same time calling for a halt to the Forest Hills project to allow time for consultation. The political implications of the controversy came into play immediately. The Forest Hills Residents' Association took advertisements in the daily press in Miami blaming Mayor Lindsay for various problems plaguing New York City, particularly the Forest Hills project. JDL vowed a national campaign directed against his presidential aspirations.43

Despite the tensions, there was no widespread and open antisemitism. When an article in the December issue of The Voice of SEEK at Queens College charged that "once again the white bigots are predominantly Jews" and that "Jews and other white imps from the Mayflower cannot decide where black people are to live," it was quickly denounced by six black students in the SEEK program in a two-page statement, which pointed out that the author, though a Queens College student, was not in the SEEK program.44

The Forest Hills controversy gave rise to all the questions, ambiguities, and confusion that surrounded intergroup relations in 1971. In a time of heightened ethnic consciousness, how should a neighborhood respond to the inclusion of large numbers of people from different racial and economic backgrounds? If groups have a right to preserve their identities, what about the rights of the disadvantaged and victims of discrimination to improve their condition by moving to more favored areas? Since the need for neighborhood control, especially for black, Puerto Rican, and other disadvantaged groups, has been given increased attention in recent years, does such control apply also to other ethnic and economic segments of the population? And how does government, as the voice and arm of the total community, pick and choose legally, as well as morally, among the conflicting claims?

An overriding question for many people was the degree of racism involved in the resistance to the project. The local NAACP and other civil-rights groups, put this at the center of the struggle. Others disagreed. "... I would no more want to live down the block from 3,000 poor whites in a city-sponsored ant hill than I would from 3,000 blacks," John P. Roche, the Brandeis political scientist, wrote in his syndicated column. "And I will lay you dollars to doughnuts that middle class Negroes of Forest Hills share my sentiments completely. There is nothing racist about it."\(^{45}\) Nathan Glazer suggested that safety, not racism, was the key issue. "No one can spend any time in New York City without discovering that this is the overwhelming concern of its citizens, rich and poor, dedicated and sophisticated, Negroes and Puerto Ricans as well as Jews, Italians, the Irish and the WASPs," he wrote.\(^{46}\) Glazer warned that if the decision of blacks and whites to move out of violent neighborhoods is denounced as "racist," as it so often is, the "danger is that the confusion in the minds of some, that black does equal crime, which it is in the best interest of all to unravel and straighten out, becomes only deeper." Persons confronted with a choice between jeopardizing personal safety or being called racist for seeking to escape danger will opt for the latter. According to Glazer, this will encourage black militants to see crime as a form of social protest, as Eldridge Cleaver and George Jackson have done, and, therefore, justifiable. While he believed the city could have done a better job in Forest Hills, he thought, in sum, that the government's policies were "the best we can devise in view of the city's overwhelming social problems."

As the year ended, workers at the construction site were in the initial stages of driving experimental piles into the project's foundations. But the episode had contributed to undermining group relations in New York.


Black America

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS

Information about blacks, first made available from Census Bureau data in 1970 and later in various 1971 reports, presented a clearer picture of the black community. The movement of blacks from the rural South to industrial cities of the North and West that resumed after World War II, and accelerated in the 1950s, continued throughout the following decade. California and New York had a combined in-migration of nearly 700,000 black Americans in the decade, and New Jersey, Michigan, and Illinois attracted more than 100,000 each. Southern New England, New Jersey and Maryland also proved to be attractive, with a combined net in-migration of 272,000 from 1960 to 1970, as compared with about 200,000 in the previous decade. In all, the 1970 Census reported 22.6 million blacks, who constituted 11 per cent of the total population.47 These figures were criticized, however, by some black leaders and others, who estimated it to be about 10 per cent higher.

While 30 years ago three-fourths of all black Americans lived in the South, mostly in rural areas, in 1970 about one-half lived there and only about a million remained on the farm. Seven out of ten lived in cities. Negroes constituted more than 50 per cent of the population in four large cities (Washington, D.C., Gary, Ind., Newark, N.J., and Atlanta, Ga.), only one of them in the South, and were approaching majorities in others. Blacks also were beginning to leave the city for suburbia. While the movement was small—only 4.5 per cent of the total suburban population in the country's 66 metropolitan areas—still, the total number was 2.5 million. Twenty-seven per cent of young black families with children under 18 now lived in suburbia, as against 17 per cent of young black couples without children.

In the 1960s, blacks scored substantial gains in health, education, employment, and income. Employment in professional, technical, and clerical occupations doubled. Median family income rose by 50 per cent, but still stood at $5,998 as compared to $9,794 for all white families. For young black couples living outside the Southern states, the annual median income jumped to $8,859, or 91 per cent of the income of similar white families. The percentage of black families with annual incomes above $10,000 rose from 9 to 24 per cent. The number of blacks who completed high school, attended college, entered professions, and won political office, all rose sharply.

The number of blacks entering freshman classes of the country's medical schools rose by 26 per cent in one year.

Although a considerable number of blacks had achieved working- or middle-class status, their improved condition did not necessarily relieve racial tension. "It is precisely because Black Americans have achieved so much in the past twenty years that so many of them are so dissatisfied," wrote Raymond W. Mack, director of the Center for Urban Affairs at Northwestern University. "Real access to equality of opportunity no longer seems impossible. Perhaps worse, it seems delayed."48

Census Bureau data showing these gains also reported that the situation of the majority of black Americans who entered the decade in poverty had not improved by year's end. They had a shorter life expectancy, lower incomes, and worse living conditions than whites. They also earned less than persons of Spanish-speaking background with poorer educations.49 A National Center for Health Statistics report on death rates showed that young black males aged 25 to 29 died at nearly three times the rate of white males of the same age. Although this was partly due to violence in the slums, a more important factor was disease related to childhood malnutrition. At the lowest end of the socioeconomic spectrum, the position of blacks continued to remain grim.

The most ominous statistics concerned the black family, a fact Daniel Patrick Moynihan had brought to public attention in 1965 in his controversial report, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. Families headed by women increased in the 1960s from 22 to 29 per cent. Approximately one-half of these women were separated or divorced from their husbands. These figures indicated, a New York Times editorial of November 28 suggested, that a disproportionate number of young black children were growing up in homes with only one parent and were therefore more vulnerable to adverse events and influences of urban life.

These figures were put into fuller context by Robert B. Hill in The Strengths of Black Families, a report issued by the National Urban League. He challenged the widespread view that black families were matriarchal, disorganized, pathological, and disintegrating. He rather described them as having "adaptability of family roles, strong kinship bonds, strong work orientation, strong religious orientation, and strong achievement orientation." In 1969, the report said, "about 90% of the Black babies born out of wedlock were kept by the parent and kin in existing families"; only 7 per cent of these infants, as compared with 67 per cent of the illegitimate white babies, were formally adopted or placed in foster homes. These findings reinforced what Elliot Liebow and other critics of the Moynihan report


49 In the first national comparative study of its kind, the Census Bureau reported that the typical 1970 income for families of Spanish origin was $7,330; for blacks, it was $6,280. New York Times, October 18, 1971.
had been saying for some time: that the critical issue in the pathology of the slum was availability of decent, well-paying jobs for black fathers and young men.

The problem of poverty among blacks was exacerbated by the economic downturn. Unemployment figures for November 1971 indicated a rate exceeding 10 per cent for all blacks, and 38 per cent for teenagers, the highest since 1963. The rise in unemployment was taking place at a time when taxpayers revolted against soaring costs of welfare in a period of inflation. The national cost of welfare, according to a series in the Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, had reached $16 billion annually, almost double what it was four years earlier. If current trends continued until 1975, it was predicted, the cost would reach $25 billion a year. According to the *Bulletin*, 27 states had taken action in 1970 to cut welfare payments, crack down on fraud, or require welfare recipients to work for their benefits. Early in May, the Brownsville section of New York City, where four out of five residents were on welfare, was the scene of two days of violence following weeks of petitioning by parent groups and the Brownsville Community Council of legislators in Albany against proposed state-budget cuts that would decrease funds for public assistance, Medicaid, education, and anti-narcotics programs. The results of the disorder were 84 fines, 25 looted stores, 46 arrests and 33 injuries.

At year’s end, President Nixon signed into law a bill requiring most able-bodied welfare recipients to register for employment or job training. However, this did not take into account the absence of jobs or the problems of mothers with small children who could not go to work because of the lack of day-care centers to look after the children. The missing ingredient was an adequate minimum income for welfare families and the working poor. The Family Assistance Plan, initiated by the administration as a first step in this direction, was under attack from critics who either felt it was too modest or too socialistic. It had been passed twice in the House of Representatives, but languished in the Senate Finance Committee. And, in December, President Nixon vetoed a comprehensive child-care program that provided day-care facilities, charging it would commit the national government to “communal approaches to child rearing against the family-centered approach.”

**THE BLACK MOVEMENT**

There was a noticeable decline in militancy, revolutionary rhetoric, and protest-type activity. Interest among black and white students in separatist Black Studies or Afro-American programs also waned. Social and economic gains by growing numbers of blacks, the increase in the number of black political office holders, and genuine progress in school desegregation in the

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50 November 14, 1971.
South no doubt played a role in this decline of militancy. A measure of the new mood were the problems facing black private and state colleges. Created in an era of segregation and lacking the means of providing a really first-class education, they now faced the possibility of extinction, as more and more blacks enrolled in white institutions.

This was not to say that revolutionary ardor was entirely missing. Angela Davis, who was scheduled to go on trial early in 1972 for murder, kidnapping, and criminal conspiracy, continued to remain a household word in many slum areas. And the fatal shooting by a San Quentin prison guard of George Jackson, one of the Soledad Brothers, in August, allegedly for attempting to escape, shocked many blacks, who identified his imprisonment and death with their own life experience. Isolated acts of public defiance continued. In December, by a 5 to 0 vote (four blacks and one Puerto Rican voting yes; three whites and one black absent and not voting), the Newark Board of Education agreed to hang the black liberation flag in all schools and classrooms where black students were in the majority. Playwright Imamu Baraka (LeRoi Jones), one of the leaders of the Congress of African-American Peoples, was reported to have called for a black political party to organize the black masses for revolution. However, at a Labor Day gathering of the group, he urged that delegates elect more black candidates and exert maximum influence in the Democratic party.

There were signs that the black movement was moving, in Bayard Rustin's words, from protest to politics and from national to local activity. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) chapters were emphasizing political action for ghetto problems, with less reliance on court action. National groups, like NAACP and the National Urban League, were drawing their membership increasingly from low-income blacks.

Dead or gone from the scene as major forces were such charismatic figures as Dr. Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, James Farmer, Stokely Carmichael, and H. Rap Brown. (At the close of the year, Brown was being held in $200,000 bail after pleading innocent to charges of attempted murder and robbery in a bar holdup and shootout with the police.) Symptomatic of the decentralization—some called it fragmentation—of the black movement was Reverend Jesse L. Jackson's resignation from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) after he had been suspended, and his decision to create his own organization. The young and flamboyant Jackson had headed Operation Breadbasket, the SCLC's successful black business cooperative in Chicago. Local black leaders were coming into their own and black united fronts were formed in Washington, D.C., Boston, Cairo, Ill., and other cities. "We have no superstars at the moment in terms of the

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51 *Currents*, Trends Analysis Division, American Jewish Committee, November, 1971.
civil rights . . . movement,” Ivanhoe Donaldson, a Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington said in summarizing the situation. “And maybe there’s no need for one.”

BLACK PANTHERS

Another indication of the new mood in the black community was the marked decline of the Black Panthers. They were rarely seen in the streets handing out leaflets or selling copies of their party newspaper. There was less talk of breakfast programs for children and community control of the police. Surveying the movement, the New York Times on March 1 reported that in Los Angeles, where the Panthers once had three offices, they no longer had a telephone listing; in Washington, D.C., too, they no longer had telephones, and in New York City the party was said to be virtually nonexistent. The Justice Department estimated its current membership at under 1,000.

Like other radical movements, the Panthers had been torn by ideological divisions. This erupted publicly, in February, in a telephone debate between Huey P. Newton, the party’s highest-ranking officer, in San Francisco, and Eldridge Cleaver, the fugitive Panther minister of information, speaking from Algeria. The two men disagreed sharply and, at one point, Cleaver remarked, “the party has fallen apart at the seams.” Newton, who spent two years in prison, stood trial three times, and finally, in December, won dismissal of charges of having killed an Oakland policeman, adopted a new position of moderation. He said the party had made an about-face, would avoid police confrontations, promote church attendance, and seek new support in the black community. In a speech taped by the Oakland Tribune, Newton said, “When we moved in the manner we did and to the extent we did we lost the favor of the black community and left it far behind . . . We cannot jump from A to Z as some thought . . . Our intention to operate with reality does not mean we accept it. We’ll operate within the system so we can change it.”

Newton’s stock also declined among blacks when it became widely known that he was living in a $650-a-month penthouse in Oakland, even though the Panthers said this was necessary for reasons of security. The Panthers also lost moral and financial support from white supporters, many of whom did not condone Panther rhetoric and tactics, but had been sympathetic to the movement because of alleged “harassment” and killings of Panther leaders by the police in suspicious circumstances. An article in the New Yorker cast serious doubt on charges by Panther leaders that 19 or more party members had been killed by the police in a “genocide” campaign. The detailed examination of each of these cases found the police

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had no involvement in nine of the cases, and that in six others the Panthers were shot only after they had seriously wounded the policemen involved. The article reported only one instance of questionable police conduct, in the killing of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark by the Chicago police in December 1969. It concluded that, while even one death must be a matter of serious concern, the issue of police brutality against black and black militants "can be neither understood nor resolved in an atmosphere of exaggerated charges."

The fact that the Panthers could receive justice at the hands of a hostile "establishment" was reinforced by the dismissal of murder charges against Bobby Seale, the organization's chairman. When a jury in New Haven, Conn., deadlocked over whether he ordered the torture slaying of a suspected police informer who had allegedly infiltrated the party, the trial judge ordered the charge dismissed, saying it would be impossible to find an unbiased jury for a second trial.

VIOLENCE

Incidents that once triggered violence now were met with a new pragmatism and determined efforts by local black groups to contain the situation. The various governmental and private agencies monitoring racial troubles thought the summer of 1971 the least violent in many years. The Justice Department's "civil disturbance center" reported that while there were 11 major disorders in the first eight months (through August), there had been 19 in the same period the year before. The figures for minor disorders were 32 and 49, respectively. At year's end, the Greater Newark Urban Coalition, born out of the devastating 1967 riots, stood ready to close its doors because contributions had ceased coming in.

Among the reasons given for the decline of racial disorders by the Brandeis University Lemberg Center on the Study of Violence, the Urban Coalition, and other groups were: the belief that blacks have found more constructive ways to channel their energies, including political and community action; the growth of racial pride; increased skill by police and government officials in handling incidents that might trigger violence; more sensitive media coverage, particularly by television; growing recognition by blacks of the terrible cost to them in lives and property damage, and a decrease in promises that cannot be realized easily, and result in greater frustration. However, it was clear that civil disorders (as the Kerner Commission had pointed out) remained "unusual, irregular, complex, and unpredictable events." Summing up the situation Ralph Lewis, research director of the Lemberg Center, said, "It's more apparent that the old reasons cited—unemployment, poverty, frustration—don't necessarily cause riots."

PRISON PROTEST MOVEMENT

Violent protest moved from city streets and rural areas to the nation's prisons. Major outbreaks occurred at San Quentin, Attica, Rahway, N.J., and elsewhere. The Attica outbreak resulted in the death of 46 inmates and prison employees. As the situation in the nation's prisons was examined more closely, it was discovered that, in recent years, there had been many such disturbances that had not made headlines.

The prison protest movement was led mainly by blacks and members of other minority groups because more of them are arrested and imprisoned. In California, the nonwhite prison population was 45 per cent of the total; in Attica, it was 85 per cent. While it is widely believed that the nation's prisons hold the dregs of society, in some instances they house attractive and aggressive elements among minorities ready to buck an oppressive society. Such individuals became increasingly unwilling to tolerate the conditions in the prisons. As one Attica inmate shouted during the disturbance, "We want to be human beings, we will be treated as human beings."

Prisons also have tended to feed militant protest by providing "universities for political education" of blacks. From these "universities" have emerged some of the great documents of the race revolution, as well as important leadership, including Eldridge Cleaver (Soul on Ice), Malcolm X (The Autobiography of Malcolm X), and George Jackson (Soledad Brother). Prison experience, Jackson wrote in his book, had helped transform him "from a young, naively conservative thief" to a "committed revolutionary," who took upon himself "to right the wrong, lift the burden from the backs of future generations."

While the prison protest movement helped society understand the need for changing conditions both inside and outside the prisons, it also encouraged a semi-Marxist view of inmates as "victims" rather than culprits. This tended to ennoble for them and for others at the bottom of the social and economic scale what for society-at-large are simple criminal acts, and polarized even further racial tensions and divisions.

Another aspect of violence with distinct racial overtones was the continued guerrilla warfare between the police and elements of the poor. The FBI reported in October that 87 county and state law enforcement officers had been slain during the first nine months of the year, 11 more than in 1970. At year's end, 11 policemen had been killed in New York City, more than in any single year since 1930. Most were slain in the line of duty; but a considerable number met death in what the International Association of Chiefs of Police now called "ambushes." This gave rise to a belief among law enforcement officials and Congressional investigators that there was a conspiracy against policemen.

Thus crime and the fear of crime remained for most Americans a central, perhaps the central, community and intergroup-relations issue.
released by the FBI in December showed that, during the first nine months of the year, some 4,426,000 major crimes had been reported to the police throughout the country, an increase of about 250,000 for the comparable period in 1970. Street crimes, a source of much public concern, rose by 10 per cent during this time. Of the ten largest cities, Philadelphia reported the highest increase in serious crime—38.9 per cent—which, according to some observers, was a primary reason for the election of hard-line Police Commissioner Frank L. Rizzo as the city's mayor in November. Significantly, the number of crimes rose nearly three times as fast in suburban areas than in cities over one million. However, Attorney General John N. Mitchell noted serious crimes were only 6 per cent higher than in 1970, and this was the smallest percentage increase in five years.

While most civil-rights and civil-liberties groups remained on the defensive with regard to crime and violence, the National Alliance on Shaping Safer Cities (AJYB, 1971 [Vol. 72], p. 148) made some progress in its work to bridge community fears through efforts to reform the criminal justice system. The organization now consisted of 57 national and regional groups, including the National Urban League, the AFL-CIO, the American Jewish Committee and National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, and local alliances were being formed, or had become active, in a number of cities. The Alliance for a Safer New York was voted a one-year grant from the New York City Criminal Justice Coordinating Council. All these groups were pressing for prison reform, the elimination of victim-less crimes, such as drunkenness, from police jurisdiction, improvement of federal gun-control laws, and creation of job opportunities for ex-convicts.56

EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

The year was one of decision for many Northern and Southern cities and for opening up new fronts regarding equal educational opportunity for minority groups. Since the Supreme Court in 1954 ruled racial segregation in public education unconstitutional, most of the pressure for change occurred in Southern and border states; desegregation in the North and West was largely voluntary and token. In the late 1960s, the Federal government moved against some Northern districts which did not comply with civil-rights laws, while civil-rights groups continued to go into the courts. This was a slower process because plaintiffs had to prove a governmental policy of segregation or exclusion.

As a result of these efforts, HEW reported, the percentage of blacks attending schools with whites in the 11 states of the Old Confederacy more than doubled, from 18 to 39, between 1968 and the fall of 1970. In the 32 Northern and Western states it remained unchanged, at 28 per cent. For the

first time, more black students were attending all black schools in the North than in the South. Just over 9 per cent of the black pupils in the 11 Southern states were enrolled in all-black schools, as compared with 68 per cent in 1968. This, HEW noted, compared with 11.2 per cent in the 32 Northern and Western states and 24.2 per cent in the border states. Officials said that busing was one of the reasons for the desegregation gains made in the South.

In the light of resistance to school desegregation in the South over the years, the relative calm with which change took place was especially notable. Symbolic of the acceptance was the decision of Governor Linwood Holton of Virginia, where “massive resistance” to Supreme Court school desegregation edicts first began, to send his four children to mixed or predominantly black public schools. At the November Southern Governors’ Conference meeting in Atlanta a resolution identical with an anti-busing statement adopted the year before was pushed through. However, the governors also said that a provision in Congress barring the use of federal desegregation funds for court-ordered busing would only place financial hardship on the states. The new attitude toward desegregation in the South was reflected in the findings of a study of how white Southern university students felt about blacks on their campuses. At the University of Alabama, 92.2 per cent of the students were willing to attend classes with blacks, and 75 per cent were willing to share dormitory facilities with them.57

However, the Civil Rights Digest Annual Review (December 1971), pointed out that the figures on desegregation in the South did not take into account the still existing serious and subtle aspects of segregation and discrimination: segregation of activities and facilities within schools; racial discrimination in the use of discipline; demotion and dismissal of minority faculty and school administrators; increase of private schools where whites could escape desegregation, and growth of Northern-style suburbanization. “These problems,” the Digest predicted, “represent forms of discrimination which almost inevitably will become the focus of legal and administrative action in the seventies.”

The HEW survey also found that more than 750,000 Spanish-surnamed children, 468,000 of whom were in five Southwestern states, remained in ethnically imbalanced schools. In many of the larger, non-Southern cities, desegregation had actually declined between 1968 and the fall of 1970. In New York, the percentage of blacks in majority white schools dropped from 19.7 to 16.3; in Detroit, from 9 to 5.8; in Philadelphia, from 9.6 to 7.4; in St. Louis, from 7.1 to 2.5, and in Boston, from 23.3 to 18.

However, the fall of 1971 saw, for the first time, substantial school desegregation in cities outside the South and the border states. Integration plans stemming from court orders, voluntary action, or pressures from state governments went into effect in Northern and Western cities stretching from

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Providence, R.I., to San Francisco. The old line of distinction between \textit{de facto} and \textit{de jure} segregation was being seriously challenged. Civil-rights activists charged—and their view was finding its way into lower-court decisions, as in San Francisco—that no segregation could take place without government connivance, and that failure to move against existing segregation meant, in effect, government connivance to maintain it.

\textit{School Busing for Desegregation}

School desegregation during the year was accompanied by considerable controversy over the use of busing. An October Gallup survey revealed that 76 per cent of respondents opposed busing, almost as many in the East (71), Midwest (77), and West (72) as in the South (82). In fact, it was found that more blacks opposed than supported busing (47, as against 45 per cent).

On April 20, however, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld, in \textit{Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg (N.C.) Board of Education} (399 U.S. 926 [1971]), the constitutionality of a plan calling for busing as a means to "dismantle the dual system in the South." The plan sought white-black enrollment in each school approximating the over-all enrollment ratio in the district. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger said busing was appropriate as one tool for achieving integration unless "the time or distance is so great as to risk either the health of the children or significantly impinges on the educational process." He added that this decision applied only to "racial discrimination through official action" and excluded so-called de facto, Northern-style segregation on which the Court had not as yet ruled.

On September 1, Justice Burger clarified this action further in an opinion accompanying a refusal to stay a lower-court action, explicitly stating that the decision in the \textit{Swann} case did not require busing or even "a fixed racial balance."

In the debate over busing and desegregation, and action taken by HEW with regard to these issues, President Nixon played a critical but ambiguous role. During the year, he seemed to want to placate his important Southern constituency and other supporters, looking toward the 1972 election. In the \textit{Swann} decision, the Supreme Court overruled arguments of the Nixon administration and the Justice Department that Southern school systems, like their Northern counterparts, should be allowed to assign students to schools in their own neighborhoods, even if this slowed the pace of desegregation. Announcing that he was "against busing as the term is commonly used," Nixon asked the Justice Department, on August 3, to appeal a federal court ruling that upheld an Austin, Tex., school-board plan providing for extensive crosstown busing to desegregate the city's public schools. In the process, he overruled a HEW-drafted plan. At the end of that month, the President also directed the Attorney General and Secretary of HEW to "work with individual school districts to hold busing to the minimum
required by law.” To underscore this, he asked that the administration-sponsored $1.5 billion Emergency School Assistance Act to help districts desegregate be amended to forbid the use of funds for busing. Early in November a coalition of Northern and Southern congressmen pushed through such an amendment, adding a rider which encouraged school districts not to comply with court busing orders until all legal appeals were exhausted, and prohibiting federal agencies from urging local officials to use their own money for busing. At year’s end, the Senate had not yet acted on the House bill. More than 100 congressmen also announced their support of an amendment to prohibit busing.

At the same time, the administration backed up court-ordered desegregation. In mid-August, Attorney General John N. Mitchell indicated it was time to use HEW’s statutory power to deny federal funds to school districts refusing to meet the prevailing desegregation standards. And, on December 1, after an 18-month study, HEW notified the Boston board of education that it was violating the 1964 Civil Rights Act and faced court action and loss of federal school funds unless it designed an acceptable plan for desegregating the 93,000-student system. The department had never taken such action in a large city outside the South. A New York Times analyst pointed out on May 23 that, by 1972, “more desegregation will have been achieved under Mr. Nixon’s reign than under any of his predecessors . . .” This was disputed by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, which, in its November report, scored HEW’s efforts in elementary- and secondary-school education as “marginal” (out of four possibilities, “poor,” “marginal,” “adequate,” and “good”).

The most dramatic incident involving school busing occurred in Pontiac, Mich., where a district judge ordered the busing of 9,000 of the city’s 24,000 school children. On the eve of the opening of schools in September, ten school buses were firebombed; later, five members of the Michigan Ku Klux Klan were charged with the crime. A group of white parents, led by a housewife, Mrs. Irene McCabe, formed a National Action Group, which organized a boycott that kept 35 per cent of Pontiac white children home on the first school day. The group soon claimed a membership of 100,000, with 71 branches in Pontiac and new units springing up in other Midwestern states.

Attacks on busing came not only from whites. Parents in San Francisco’s Chinatown, arguing that neighborhood schools were vital to their culture, sued to prevent their children from being bused. After losing the first round of the court test, they began a boycott of school buses, and eventually 30 to 40 per cent of the city’s 7,000 Chinese-American children were enrolled in private schools. Many black parents also opposed busing, as indicated by the testimony of residents of the largely black South Jamaica section of Queens before the New York City Planning Commission. Some liberals, too, 58

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58 The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort: One Year Later, Clearinghouse Publication, No. 34.
now viewed busing as ill-advised. In an editorial, on November 20, *The New Republic* called it "disruptive and fraught with costs that are not always offset by the benefits it brings. It is therefore foolhardy to concentrate on massive school integration, and the promise that busing can produce it, as the chief objective in public education." The editorial approvingly quoted black political scientist Charles Hamilton's view that the community should concentrate on quality education and not on mingling black and white students.

Opposition to busing was muted in some smaller cities, where the number of children involved was small, and in many parts of the South. While the Gallup survey showed over-all strong opposition to busing, the percentage was down five points from the year before. However, on the assumption that busing offers many blacks not only release from segregation but prospects of a better education, NAACP's legal defense fund announced plans to bring busing suits in at least 12 cities in each of the next three years.\(^5^9\)

It was clear that busing would have limited impact in major cities, such as Washington, D.C. (95 per cent black), Newark (72 per cent black), and Detroit (64 per cent black). And for this reason civil-rights activists have been looking more closely at suburbia for assistance with desegregation. In September Federal Judge Stephen J. Roth, who found that Detroit school segregation had been abetted by board of education policies, noted that all-white suburban havens had been promoted by official actions—in Detroit, by Federal Housing Administration policy. The judge suggested that suburbia would have to overcome imbalance, perhaps by a student exchange between it and the racial ghetto, and ordered the state board of education to produce a plan for a new metropolitan school district. Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff of Connecticut reintroduced legislation requiring metropolitan-wide desegregation of schools, but the Senate again voted it down.

**Property Tax and Equal Educational Opportunity**

An entirely new area was opened in the debate over how to achieve equal educational opportunity by a trail-blazing *Serrano v. Priest* decision of the California Supreme Court, in August. By a vote of 6-1, it struck down the state's public-school financing system, which heavily relied on property tax and, thus, the vagaries of local wealth. According to the court, this funding scheme—used in every state except Hawaii—"invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors." In rich Beverly Hills, the decision pointed out, a 2.3 per cent tax provided $1,231 worth of education per pupil in 1969-70, while in nearby Baldwin Park, a lower-middle class district, 5.4 per cent tax rate provided only $577 worth of education per pupil. Similar decisions were handed down by a Minnesota federal court in October and by a three-judge federal panel in Texas in

December. The panel ordered the Texas legislature to devise a new system to meet the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Initially, the Serrano and other decisions were hailed by civil-rights leaders and educators as opening the door to "revolutionary change" in rectifying inferior educational opportunities, especially for black, Spanish-surnamed, and other minority children. Former U.S. Commissioner of Education Harold Howe II noted that Middle America had much to gain, since many of the most troubled school districts were new middle-income, blue-collar suburbs whose school funds were raised almost exclusively by taxes on housing.\textsuperscript{60} If school financing could be equalized, it was believed, there would be less need to leave the city in the first place.

Late in 1971, however, there were some second thoughts on the impact of the decision. The concern was that in some areas the poor, not the rich, will suffer most from tax reform. If reform meant uniform spending without special provision for what legal scholars call "municipal overburden," big cities like New York and San Francisco, which currently spend more than the state-wide average, would hurt quite a bit. Daniel Moynihan noted also "the extraordinarily weak influence which school 'inputs' such as per pupil expenditure seem to have on educational 'outputs.'" He quoted one scholar as having said that, given the state of our knowledge, the least promising thing we could do in education would be to spend more money on it.\textsuperscript{61}

**Civil Rights**

Civil-rights groups and government agencies responsible for implementing nondiscrimination programs felt growing impatience in 1971 with both the pace and role of government in removing barriers. The United States Civil Rights Commission followed up its 1970 study, which found a "major breakdown" in the enforcement of federal laws and executive orders against discrimination, with further reports in June and November. The last analysis showed that, while there was improvement in some of the departments and agencies in the previous six months, performance still ranged from "poor" to "marginal," at best. "Most agencies seem determined to avoid upsetting the status quo for the sake of assuring equal rights," the Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, Commission chairman, said. The report held the President responsible for this situation because he had failed to instill a sense of urgency. The Commission felt that his opposition to busing to facilitate school desegregation, "by failing to offer a realistic alternative, may well be interpreted as a sign to slow-down in the Federal desegregation effort."\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort: One Year Later}, Clearinghouse Publication, No. 34.
The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the nation's largest civil-rights coalition, accused the Nixon administration in December of subsidizing racial discrimination by handing millions of dollars to state and local law enforcement agencies without regard to equal employment practices. An Equal Employment Opportunity Commission examiner, brought in by the Civil Service Commission at the request of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), accused one of the department's own agencies, the Federal Housing Administration, of persistent racial discrimination in employment practices, going back to the 1930s. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported also that Mexican-American students in five Southwestern states were receiving an inferior education; that one of every three of such students—120,000 out of 330,000—would fail to graduate from high school. Similar deprivations were found among Indian and black pupils in the area.

During the year, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) held its first inquiry into job discrimination by industry, with hearings on the employment practices of gas and electric companies. On the basis of industry-supplied figures it was found that, while women held 34 per cent of all jobs in industry, only 15 per cent of these were in utilities; Spanish-surnamed Americans held 3.6 per cent of jobs in private industry, and only 1.6 per cent in utilities. Moreover, 79 of the 152 largest gas and electric companies had no black officers and managers, and 99 had no black sales people. The hearings were highlighted by the dramatic story of how Consolidated Edison increased its minority percentage from 8 per cent in 1966 to 17.2 per cent in 1971 by aggressive recruitment and work with minority organizations.

Considered one of the weaker government tools for obtaining equal employment opportunity because of its lack of enforcement powers, EEOC attempted to broaden its efforts by giving up its case-by-case attack and going after "target industries" and "corporate giants." Thus its report, in December, on the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the nation's largest private employer, charged widespread discrimination against blacks, Spanish-speaking people, and women, and concluded that the company was "the largest oppressor of women workers in the United States." In the latter part of the year, efforts were underway to strengthen EEOC's enforcement powers. A bill was pending in the Senate to give it cease-and-desist powers, like those of the National Labor Relations Board in unfair labor practice cases. A weaker, but still strong version permitting it to take cases to court, had been passed by the House.

In response to criticism of its civil-rights record, the administration reported a number of positive developments. Secretary of Labor James D.

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63 *City*, Winter 1971.
64 *The Unfinished Education*, Report 11, Mexican American series.
Hodgson released figures on the results of its "Philadelphia Plan" requiring bidders on federally-involved construction contracts of over $500,000 to submit affirmative-action plans setting goals and timetables for employing minorities in six construction trades. Since the program's inception in September 1969, it was pointed out, average minority employment in these construction crafts was running above the second year goals set by government. Minority workers accounted for 14.2 per cent of the 287,777 total man-hours of construction work for the period June 1 through August 1, 1971. At year's end, the program was being extended to 19 other major cities.

(The U.S. Supreme Court, in October, rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the plan by refusing to review rulings by lower courts that it utilized "goals," not quotas. Since this was the first test of the controversial new concept in minority hiring, the action was widely accepted as an indication that the method is constitutional.)

In December, Attorney General Mitchell announced that 21 federal agencies had proposed regulations to strengthen federal prohibitions against racial discrimination in federally-assisted programs. One was that no recipient of federal funds may select a site for a new facility with the purpose or effect of excluding anyone on the grounds of race, color or national origin.

Countering attacks on the sincerity and scope of federal programs to combat discrimination, Nathan Glazer cited figures for 1962 to 1967 to show in the five-year period the following increase in black employment: 2.5-fold in Civil Service; 6.5-fold in the better-paid positions in the wage board group; 6-fold in the higher grades of the postal field service, which actively recruited for workers on Negro campuses in the South. Thus, Glazer argued, there had been, in fact, substantial and rapid improvement in federal employment practices. As for higher-level Civil-Service positions requiring advanced degrees and many years of experience, it was difficult to ease this situation because blacks had been deprived for so long of equal educational opportunities. Glazer urged a more realistic view both of the progress made and of remaining problems. This was necessary, he said, so that efforts to overcome discrimination would not lose credibility with most Americans and reinforce the pessimistic view in some quarters that our society does not work.68

EXECUTIVE SUITE DISCRIMINATION

Efforts of more than a decade by Jewish agencies to increase the employment of Jews and other minorities in managerial positions in major industrial and financial organizations were beginning to yield results. A feature article by Marylin Bender in the New York Times, October 31, 1971, reported that an educated, able professional manager was now capable of advancing to the top of a corporation, although he may not belong to the traditional

leadership class. It cited as examples names that stood out "in ethnic soli-
tude" in the WASP big-business, power elite, such as Iacocca of Ford, Riccardo of Chrysler, Halaby of Pan Am, Piore of IBM, and Goldman of Xerox. Among the reasons cited for this change were the race revolution, which has forced big business to lump all whites together, and "the bluing of America," as Peter and Brigette Berger called it, which was forcing busi-
ness to look increasingly to working-class and ethnic segments of the popu-
lation for leadership, now that many in the traditional upper classes were
turning from corporate careers and life-styles. A survey released during the year by the Philadelphia chapter of the American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Employment and Vocational Service, covering their ten-year-
old program, showed the percentage of Jews in commercial banking and
industrial corporations in the area had risen from 0.5 per cent to 3.5 and
7 per cent, respectively.\textsuperscript{67}

Jewish agencies were now being joined in their efforts to break through
at the management level of major finance and industry also by other ethnic
groups. A survey of Italian-Americans in the Chicago area by the Joint Civic Committee reported that no member of the group was an officer, and
only one a director in the four leading banks; that 440 officers and 457
directors in industrial companies, only 11 and 12 respectively were Italians,
and only 3 of 71 officers and 1 out of 83 directors in the transportation
companies belonged to that group. The Illinois chapter of the Polish Ameri-
can Congress, conducting a poll it called "Opening the Door to the Execu-
tive Suite," found that "one and a half percent maximum" of the officers
and directors in Chicago-based companies were Polish American.

During its hearing on employment practices of gas and electric com-
panies, EEOC and other federal agencies were charged by the Anti-Defama-
ton League with failure to follow up on complaints of religious discrimina-
tion. ADL reported that, despite the high educational attainments of Jews,
it found that of 1,111 executives and directors of 38 utilities in urban centers
only 15 were Jews. It cited Consolidated Edison as an exception, with 9
Jews among its corporate officers.\textsuperscript{68}

In response to criticism voiced by Jewish agencies for several years, Labor
Secretary Hodgson issued a policy statement calling the attention of all
federal contractors and subcontractors to the problem of discrimination
based on religion and national origin. It noted studies which showed the
exclusion from the executive and managerial levels of industry "mainly [of]
Jews, and to a lesser extent, Catholics," who "are entitled to attention and
redress in the form of effective affirmative action programs."\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{67} Steven Appelbaum, "Eliminating Bias Against Jews in the 'Executive Suite'

\textsuperscript{68} Business Week, November 20, 1971.

\textsuperscript{69} Memorandum to Heads of All Agencies, Subject: Executive Order 11246—
Statement on Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Religion and National
followed up with publication in the *Federal Register* on December 29 of proposed "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion or National Origin" asking federal contractors to furnish proof that these groups were represented in management-level positions. However, Jewish agencies considered this a step backward, for they noted, among other criticisms, that the Guidelines replaced the mandatory requirements for overcoming barriers contained in Hodgson’s statement with voluntary action.

**SOCIAL CLUB DISCRIMINATION**

Civil-rights groups continued to attack social-club discrimination because it was related to hiring and promotion to higher-level jobs and decision-making in the community. In April the American Jewish Committee released Terry Morris’s *Better Than You*, a comprehensive analysis of the history of club bias and current efforts to overcome it. According to the study, efforts were under way in four states—Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maryland, and the state of Washington—to revoke the liquor licenses or tax-exempt status of private clubs excluding specific racial or religious groups. In Washington, a coalition of over 20 organizations petitioned the State Board Against Discrimination and initiated a lawsuit to deprive discriminatory clubs of special liquor licenses which entitle them to large discounts in buying alcoholic beverages. The United States Supreme Court announced late in March that it would review a three-judge federal court decision that a Harrisburg, Pa., Moose Lodge was not entitled to a liquor license because it refused to serve a black man who was the guest of a member. The ruling was expected to set a precedent for the more than 2,000 Moose lodges in the country, as well as for the Eagles, Elks, and other private clubs (AJYB, 1971 [Vol. 72], p. 136).

While Jews have been the main target of club bias, the report noted, Orientals, blacks, and Spanish-speaking Americans were “scarcely in the picture at all.” Leaders of white ethnic groups also were becoming increasingly disturbed about exclusionary patterns. The William Paca Society of Buffalo (named after one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence who had been of Italian descent) surveyed the city’s social clubs and bank managements, and found only token representation of Italian-Americans. Judge Joseph S. Mattina, the society’s former chairman, said its members met with Buffalo business leaders in an effort to overcome barriers in Erie County, whose population is some 15 to 20 per cent Italian in origin.

An increasing number of private clubs, however, were beginning to admit Jews, white ethnics, and, in some instances, blacks. The Morris report indicated that the Duquesne Club in Pittsburgh and the Detroit Club now have Jewish members, while the Union League in Chicago has a black member. Other private clubs, including the Chicago Club; the Cliff Dwellers and Arts Clubs, also in Chicago; the Houston Club, the Union League in Philadelphia and the Canton (Ohio) City Club, all had substantial numbers of Jewish
or black members, or both. There had been less progress, however, among fraternal lodges. The Improved Order of Red Men did not accept American Indians as members; the Elks and Moose explicitly barred non-Caucasians.

Quotas and Preferential Treatment

In the course of 1971, a major public debate began over the use of quotas, preferential treatment, and other affirmative-action efforts as techniques for broadening the involvement of minorities in employment, higher level jobs, and in other areas of American life. Affirmative action had begun in the 1960s during the Johnson administration. A major article, "The Galbraith Plan to Promote the Minorities," by John Kenneth Galbraith, Edwin Kuh, and Lester C. Thurow in the *New York Times Magazine* of August 22, 1971, gave the impetus for a vastly expanded program. The plan advocated that major firms be required by law to put a stated percentage of people drawn from "minority groups" into $15,000 a year or more jobs.

Efforts to discuss or to develop affirmative action programs provoked charges of "reverse discrimination," public protest, and legal action in various parts of the country. In Pittsburgh, a dispute broke out between the University of Pittsburgh and the local Building and Construction Trades Council over a plan to retain newly-hired black craft workers and lay off white workers with greater seniority. The black employees had been hired so that the university could qualify for $26 million in government grants. The university later agreed to recall the white workers. In the State of Washington, a superior court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection clause barred the University of Washington Law School from giving admission preference to minority applicants over better qualified white applicants. "Policies of discrimination will inevitably lead to reprisals," Judge Lloyd Shorett said. "In my opinion, the only safe rule is to treat all races alike and I feel that is what is required under the equal protection clause."

In San Francisco, a furor developed over the decision of the school board to eliminate 125 administrative positions, but to exempt eight designated minority groups from the deselection process, which therefore was limited to whites. However, demotions were prevented by court action. The superintendent of schools also announced a plan "whereby no more than 20 percent of ‘Other Whites’ would be hired or promoted to administrative positions in the first year, no more than 10 percent in the second year, and no ‘Other Whites’ at all in ensuing years until ethnic and racial proportions among administrators equal the respective proportions in the school population."

In Philadelphia, on the other hand, a Temple University Law School

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70 Washington Superior Court King County: *De Funis v. Odegaard*, September 22, 1971.

71 Earl Raab, "Quotas by Any Other Name," *op. cit.*
decision to readmit 14 black and Puerto Rican students dropped for academic reasons after a complaint charging "wholesale discrimination," and the announcement that 60 black or Puerto Rican first-year students would be admitted in the fall of 1972, passed virtually unnoticed. (The school, located in a heavily black neighborhood, indicated there were fewer than 30 black and Puerto Rican students among its approximately 1,000 students.)

Some of the sharpest controversy over preferential treatment revolved around the hiring and promotion practices of colleges and universities. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) temporarily withheld at least $668,000 in federal contracts from Columbia University and threatened to suspend $1,994,643 because of the university's alleged failure to comply with HEW minority-hiring guidelines and employ sufficient numbers of women and members of minority groups. At Livingston College, New Brunswick, N.J., there was strong opposition to a proposal by a faculty committee on appointments and promotions that a candidate for contract renewal or promotion to tenure have supporting letters of recommendation from "one white, one black and one Puerto Rican and one letter from someone of the opposite sex."

In an article on the Op-Ed Page of the New York Times, November 5, Professor Sidney Hook charged that the HEW Office of Civil Rights unfairly picked on institutions of higher learning and was proceeding to ruin them by forcing them to hire unqualified women and minority faculty. The director of the office denied this in a letter to the New York Times, December 18, arguing that it simply wished to compel universities, which had discriminated in the past, to permit members of minority groups and women to compete on an equal footing and that "qualifications" remained "the primary standard for hiring."

The debate over affirmative action and preferential treatment illustrated the dilemma of attempting to assure equal opportunity for blacks and other minorities and the need to protect individual rights and the merit principle. Critics of preferential treatment, many of whom supported affirmative-action programs to give minorities an edge in competition feared that a trend was under way to eliminate competition altogether. Earl Raab summed up this view:

One of the marks of the free society is the ascendance of performance over ancestry—or, to put it more comprehensively, the ascendance of achieved status over ascribed status. Aristocracies and racist societies confer status on the basis of heredity... a principle of ascribed equality—a kind of perverse hereditary theory—would be as insidiously destructive of the individual and of individual freedom as a principle of ascribed inequality.72

In his criticism of the Civil Rights Commission, Nathan Glazer noted that, in effect, it was asking for "a quota, based not on the total number of

72 Ibid., p. 42.
eligible or qualified black candidates but on the total number of blacks. Implicitly, the Commission's test for discrimination has become whether minority group members are found in employment, at every level, in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."\textsuperscript{73} This would institutionalize group rights. He pointed out that efforts by the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League to crack the "executive suite" of business and industry were based on the number of well trained Jews available, rather than their proportion in the population.

There was also the issue of maintaining standards in American life. The open admissions policy of the New York Board of Higher Education (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], pp. 220-21) was described as a tentative success. According to one analysis however, an institution like the City College of New York was beset by problems arising from the decline in the number of high-achieving high-school graduates who selected it as the college of their first choice and the dissatisfaction of an academically distinguished faculty confronted with teaching students who were a product of ghetto schools.\textsuperscript{74}

In this respect, supporters of quotas at times have been insensitive to the interests and values of "blacklash" white groups. Galbraith and his associates explicitly excluded white ethnics from their plan. ("Although these ethnic groups [described as 'Italians, Poles, Germans, Jews'] think of themselves as minorities," they wrote "and, on occasion, believe themselves subject to discrimination, United States Census studies show that they have higher incomes than fully rooted Americans.") This, too, made for a "white backlash."

Supporters of quotas and preferential treatment, even many of those who opposed their use to achieve equal opportunities, suggested that a reexamination of "standards" was clearly in order. They pointed to the need for a clearer and fairer definition of qualifications, often used to exclude racial minorities; a review of testing systems to prevent unfair discrimination against persons coming from different cultural backgrounds, and greater focus on compensatory education and treatment. While quality and qualifications are important to the future of Americans, so, too, is the need for disadvantaged Americans to catch up. This is not only fair, but central to assuring community peace in a pluralistic society.

The controversy over quotas and preferential treatment was related, in the final analysis, to the state of the nation's economic health. In the expanding economy of the 1960s, affirmative-action programs could slip over into "ascriptive action" without too much opposition. But in the tight economy of 1971, competition for jobs made nonwhite groups regard these special arrangements with alarm and led to heightened intergroup tensions.

\textsuperscript{73} Glazer, "A Breakdown . . . ," op. cit.

Supreme Court Appointments

Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court, since 1954, one of the nation's major weapons in the battle against discrimination, became a subject of controversy with announcements of the resignations of Justices Hugo L. Black and John Marshall Harlan. A group of names, including that of Congressman Richard H. Poff of Virginia, were initially submitted to the American Bar Association (ABA) for review. When public debate and the possibility of a negative evaluation by ABA developed because of Poff's segregationist views earlier in his career, he withdrew. Ignoring ABA, President Nixon in November submitted to the Senate for approval the names of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a Richmond, Va., moderate, and William Rehnquist, a Western, activist conservative. Sharp debate immediately arose over Rehnquist who was accused of having a "black record on racial equality, civil liberties and the overweening power of government to coerce private individuals in the name of order and security." As late as 1964-65, he publicly opposed the passage of the Phoenix municipal ordinance and the Arizona state law requiring nondiscriminatory racial policies in public accommodation. Also, a 1952 memorandum was unearthed in which Rehnquist, then law clerk to former Justice Robert Jackson, urged the latter not to support what was to become the 1954 decision in the school cases.

Rehnquist told the Senate Judiciary Committee that his own teenage children were "better off" for attending schools with blacks in suburban Virginia, as long as they were neighborhood schools, and denied he had ever been a member of a right-wing organization. In a letter to Senator James Eastland he stated that his memorandum to Jackson merely stated the justice's views, not his own. He added that he unequivocally supported "the legal reasoning and the rightness from the standpoint of fundamental fairness of the Brown decision."

By a vote of 89-1 for Powell and 68 to 26 for Rehnquist, the Senate approved their nominations. Opponents who had successfully turned back the appointments of Judges Haynsworth and Carswell a year earlier explained their failure with regard to Rehnquist as due to bad timing. They said they were unable to dig up the facts, pass them around to potential allies, and mobilize public opposition, as effectively as they had done before.

Public Opinion

In December Andrew M. Greeley and Paul B. Sheatsley presented their third report, covering a period of 30 years of public-opinion sampling by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) on the position Americans thought blacks should occupy in American life. Despite the almost two-decade of racial turmoil and struggles, they stated, "the trend has been distinctly
and strongly toward increased approval of integration." Some of the most significant shifts had taken place among whites in the South, who now heavily favored (67 per cent) integrated transportation, so that this issue became virtually nonexistent. More significantly, the per cent now (1970) favoring school integration increased from 2 to almost 50. In the North, 8 out of 10 persons favored school integration. On the basis of these figures, Greeley and Sheatsley predicted that by 1977 a majority of the population in every region would accept integrated education, and desegregated schools would cease to be an issue. Only neighborhood integration and mixed marriages still divided white Americans almost equally. But, they noted, a majority of white Americans would accept even these before long, if current trends continued.

In summarizing the results of the NORC survey data, Greeley and Sheatsley acknowledged a considerable difference between people's expressed attitudes and their behavior. (The article took no cognizance, for example, of the strong opposition to busing to achieve integration.) They also conceded that respondents may have told interviewers what they thought they ought to say, rather than what they actually believed. However, the authors stated that mere recognition of what is thought to be acceptable behavior creates a climate which makes behavioral change possible. In short changing attitudes over a 30-year period, they said, were "a sign of progress" and created "an environment for effective social reform."

"Battle of Suburbia"

During the year, public attention, which had focused on racial difficulties in the cities, increasingly shifted to suburbia. Census Bureau data revealed that, for the first time, more Americans (76 million) lived in suburbs than in cities (59 million) or in predominantly rural regions outside metropolitan areas (71 million). The central cities also were becoming more black. In the preceding decade, they lost 2.5 million whites and gained 3 million blacks, while suburbs gained 12 million whites and only 800,000 blacks. In addition, a sharp growth of industry, chiefly manufacturing, had occurred and was continuing on the outskirts of many American cities.

Changes in population and economic patterns tended to exacerbate urban and intergroup-relations problems. Higher income people were moving from the cities to suburbia, leaving behind those with few or no skills. Frequently, the latter were members of minorities and lower-income white ethnics. It was estimated that 150,000 of the 750,000 new jobs created between 1960 and 1970 in the New York suburbs were for blue-collar workers, but only 50,000 of them were able to find homes here. Land costs had skyrocketed and many areas were zoned for half-, one-, or two-acre housing and single-

75 "Attitudes Toward Racial Integration," op. cit.
family residential use which prevented the building of apartment houses and small homes. Thus the “white noose” had grown even tighter.

This problem was compounded by the increasingly poor results yielded by programs for low-income housing in downtown slums. “In city after city there has been set in motion a pattern of poor maintenance, defaults on rent and mortgage payments, abandonment and foreclosure to federal authorities,” columnist Joseph Kraft wrote. “As a result, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney is rapidly becoming the country’s No. 1 slumlord.”76 And substandard housing contributed to declining levels of education and dried-up employment opportunities.

In light of these developments, intergroup-relations activities came to center increasingly around efforts to broaden housing opportunities in cities and suburbs, in the latter by changing zoning laws and regulations. These efforts led to a realignment of forces pushing for change, among them not only blacks who were anxious to get out of the slums, but also low-income whites, suburbanites priced out of the housing market, and large developers who sought to serve this market. These elements, together with social planners and civil-rights activists, pressed forward in the courts in an effort to widen equal opportunities.

In 1971 a series of decisions were handed down by courts in Chicago, Atlanta, and Philadelphia, which appeared to move forward greater integration of minority groups. In the Fairmount Manor case involving the construction of a 110-unit garden apartment complex in a heavily black area of Philadelphia, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge John J. Gibbons ruled, on January 4, that HUD had an obligation to consider whether a program increased or maintained segregation in weighing applications for mortgage insurance or rent supplements. He said HUD could not support projects intensifying segregation, unless it found that the need for the physical rehabilitation of a slum, or additional minority housing in slums, “clearly outweighs the disadvantage of increasing or perpetuating racial concentration.” In the Atlanta and Chicago cases, the courts ruled it was a denial of constitutional rights for local housing authorities to concentrate low-income housing projects only in the ghetto, and ordered the preparation of metropolitan-wide housing plans to embrace both the central city and suburbs.

President Nixon acquiesced in these rulings, and HUD followed them up with new national guidelines for opening up opportunities for non-segregated housing, effective early in January 1972. Federal criteria for assistance now included need, improved location for all lower-income families, and the creation of job or business opportunities for minorities. This was significant since the role of government became increasingly important in housing: federally-subsidized housing starts in 1970 rose to 470,000 units, whereas construction of nonsubsidized units fell to 1.4 million.77

77 Civil Rights Digest, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, December 1971.
Resistance to court and federal actions mounted. Facing an election, Chicago's Mayor Richard J. Daley refused to release the list of white neighborhoods selected for subsidized housing for the poor unless ordered to do so by a federal judge. In Philadelphia, housing officials felt Judge Gibbons' decision would lead to the end of subsidized housing in the central cities. At year's end, HUD officials admitted that very little housing for low-income families was being built in white neighborhoods of big cities. Since the suburbs remained largely closed to the poor, low-income groups, and racial minorities, it appeared that, in the near future, these groups would be no better, and probably worse off, as a result of court and federal actions. Therefore, groups like the National Tenants Organization ignored the issue of expanded housing-choice in the suburbs and sought immediate relief for minority families in the inner city. In February HUD announced the release of model lease and grievance procedures, based on required minimum standards to be adopted by local public housing authorities, which the National Tenants Organization helped draft.

The impasse in housing for the poor and racial minorities threw into sharper focus the effort to overcome restricting zoning laws, building codes, and other antidevelopment legislation. Court battles took place in suburbs as different and far apart as Madison Township, N.J.; Lima, Ohio; Troy, Mich.; New Canaan, Conn.; Lake Natomas Heights, Wash., and Black Jack, Mo. The thrust of this attack was described by Linda and Paul Davidoff and Neil N. Gold, urban planners with the Suburban Action Institute, who have been among the chief theoreticians in the development of this strategy. They argued that restrictive zoning was a form of *de jure* segregation and in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The land supply in metropolitan areas, they wrote, was being kept off the market not by private acts, but by public enactment, a situation leading to "Ivy League Socialism," a term for excessive government interference on behalf of the rich. The racial consequences of this have been well known for more than a decade. "It is a certainty," they concluded, "that the planners and public officials who draft and enact zoning ordinances restricting land development to single-family, detached structures on plots of an acre or more do so in full awareness that, as a consequence, almost all blacks will be excluded from such zones."  

The Suburban Action Institute sought to induce federal regulatory agencies to take action against corporations planning moves to the suburbs. It filed complaints against Radio Corporation of America, American Telephone and Telegraph, and General Electric for attempting to move to the acreage-zoned communities of New Canaan, Conn., Bernards Township, N.J., and Fairfield, Conn. It argued that these companies were helping to create segregated employment because their minority employees could not find housing in the same communities. In view of this complaint, R.C.A. temporarily dropped its plan to build offices for 1,000 people in New Canaan.

The effort to achieve nondiscrimination in housing received a severe setback on April 26, when the U.S. Supreme Court, in *Valtierra v. San Jose*, upheld the constitutionality of a California referendum law permitting a majority of the voters in a community to block construction of low-rent housing for the poor. In the 5–3 decision written by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court reversed a ruling by a federal district court in a case brought by 41 welfare families. He said the Fourteenth Amendment sought to outlaw legal distinctions based on race, but there was no evidence that the California law was aimed at any racial minority. The National Urban Coalition, one of the groups that had filed an *amicus curiae* brief seeking to strike down the California law, declared the decision "may have rendered meaningless" the unanimous decision of the Court a week earlier (in *Swann*) approving busing to desegregate urban schools.

Public protest against exclusionary suburban housing caused President Nixon to attempt to clarify his national housing policy. In a 15-page statement "On Federal Policies Relative to Equal Housing Opportunity," issued on June 11, he made a distinction between economic and racial discrimination. "We will not seek to impose economic integration upon an existing local jurisdiction," he said, but added, "At the same time, we will not countenance any use of economic measures as a subterfuge for racial discrimination." In other words, a community would not be punished for keeping out the poor, only for acting to keep out members of minority groups.

The statement was seen as ambiguous by civil-rights groups and by many critics of the President. Three days later, however, the Justice Department surprised the latter by bringing suit against the tiny St. Louis bedroom suburb of Black Jack. Faced with a federally-assisted, low-income, and racially integrated housing project in 1969, the town was incorporated, formed a zoning board, and banned all multi-family housing. The Justice Department charged that Black Jack's zoning action against the proposed housing project deprived prospective residents of their right to fair housing under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act. However, as the administration's housing strategy began to take shape, it became evident that it would try to open up suburbia by means of federal grants and other assistance, rather than by applying pressure and penalties. In Dayton, Ohio, HUD brought together the housing authorities of the inner city and five surrounding counties, and a plan was proposed for sharing low- and moderate-income housing on a pro rata basis. The Dayton Plan was accepted despite some controversy, and a similar arrangement for public housing was reached with Washington, D.C., and its adjoining suburbs.

On the legislative front, efforts were more aggressive. Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut reintroduced the proposed Government Facilities Location Act of 1970 providing that no federal installation may move to an area that does not provide land for the housing of its workers. While the bill did not apply to private industry, its impact would be felt in this segment
of the economy in communities bidding for federal assistance in the form of shipyards, research facilities, and other economic benefits.

The "battle of suburbia" brought forth all the confusion and ambiguity that characterized intergroup relations in 1971. Close observers debated whether racism or a desire to preserve income and social-class homogeneity was the central factor behind resistance here. A Harris poll report that the same affluent suburbs which oppose low-income housing by a ratio of more than 3 to 1, would welcome blacks by 50 to 32 per cent. According to urban-ologist George Sternlieb, it was more difficult to obtain a social class mix than a racial mix: "... economic integration, cheek by jowl, the rich and the poor—that's tougher than race and it's hardening the lines against middle class blacks who have made it. Now these are two substantially different struggles. I think we can win on one. I don't think we can win the second one." Vigorous opposition to federally-sponsored, low-income housing in suburbia developed during the year among middle-class blacks as well in various parts of the country.

Metropolitan strategies also were affected by separatist tendencies, especially among the younger and more militant blacks. They sought to build a black economic and power base in the Bedford-Stuyvesants and Harlems of the country. Blacks in Richmond, Va., sued the municipality for annexing suburban Chesterfield County, thereby tipping the city's racial balance from 51 to 58 per cent white. Their attorneys argued the move violated the constitutional rights of blacks, as well as the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and was designed to keep political control in the hands of whites.

The role of suburbia in "rescuing" the city from a myriad of racial and other problems has been obscured by a two-decade accumulation of myths. Social scientists were beginning to point out that suburbia was more than bedroom cities and towns composed of middle- and upper-class executives, who ride commuter trains to work in the city, and wives, who carpool children to school in the morning and play bridge in the afternoon. There are older and less affluent working-class suburbs, as well as more affluent ones, and these, too, have been experiencing many pressures of modern urban life including a sharp rise in crime in 1971. Moreover, many of the modest-sized towns and cities making up suburbia no longer house transients, but people who put down roots more than a decade ago and built communities. These are Americans who, political scientist Daniel J. Elazar pointed out, have sought and, in many respects, have found an older and more personal way of life combining urban and rural styles. This is not unlike the decen-

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tralization for which many blacks and their white allies in the large urban centers have been pressing. In the complex process of intergroup bargaining both the needs and values of suburbia, as well as the urgent and legitimate claims of racial minorities to expand their opportunities, would have to be taken into consideration.

**Extremism**

Despite student and racial discontent that found expression in violence, the breakdown in traditional values, and other signs of fragmentation in our society in recent years, the majority of Americans continued to remain firmly planted in the center of the sociopolitical spectrum eschewing appeals from both the radical right and the left.

The right survived in 1971, but was much less active and affluent than in the 1960s. Isolated as it was, it sought more respectable auspices and popular issues to latch on to. The sporadically active Ku Klux Klan in the North and South received its greatest attention when six members of the Pontiac, Mich., unit, including the Grand Dragon, were arrested by the FBI in connection with the fire-bombing in August of ten school buses used to implement a court-ordered integration plan. The candidacy of George Wallace provided a rallying point for the Klan, as well as for the alive, but static, John Birch Society. The lead article in the December issue of the Society’s magazine, *American Opinion*, was “What I Believe,” by Wallace.\(^82\) But the far right was also somewhat wary of him because the growing populist character of his campaign and certain indications that he was becoming more moderate clashed somewhat with its extremist ideology. (Wallace asserted at the annual Southern Governors Conference that he was just as moderate as the so-called “new breed” of progressive Democratic governors in the Deep South.)

What little lease on life the far right had in 1971 was provided by President Nixon’s projected trip to China. The John Birch Society declared that Nixon, “by openly courting if not espousing the Communism of which for many years he was thought to be a leading adversary . . . has disillusioned millions who voted for him in 1968 . . .”\(^83\) Lunatic-fringe elements were particularly angered. “The whole scenario,” said the August issue of *White Power*, published by the National Socialist White Peoples Party, successor to George Lincoln Rockwell’s American Nazi Party, “was written by the President’s ‘Zionist advisor’ Henry Kissinger.”

The more responsible conservative side, represented by the *National Review, Human Events*, the American Conservative Union, and leaders of the New York Conservative party, also was critical. It was angered not only by the President’s China probing and “softness” on international Communism,

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but by his welfare plan, action on civil rights, and "excessive" spending. In May, Young Americans for Freedom announced the opening of a Houston office to build delegate strength for Ronald Reagan at the 1972 Republican National Convention, only to be quickly rebuffed by him. Conservative anger came into greater focus when, in December, Congressman John M. Ashbrook (R. Ohio), ranking member on the House Committee on Internal Security, announced his intention to challenge President Nixon in the New Hampshire and Florida GOP primaries. He warned American conservatives to "beware of those peddling anti-Semitic nostrums." Said Ashbrook, "I . . . have never said that all the un-Americans are on the left. Unfortunately many on the American right are pure and simple anti-Semitic."

The radical left was also suffering from "the cooling of America." To the degree that it remained an active force, it gave its attention increasingly to domestic problems. These included poverty, hunger, abortion reform, ecology, Women’s Liberation, and the Free Angela Davis campaign. The emergence of the Christian Peace movement and the arrest and indictment of Father Philip Berrigan and his associates gave the New Left an emotional issue and a vehicle for launching attacks against the government of the United States.84

Unlike the year before, 1971 saw an almost total absence of violence on campuses across the land. Street demonstrations were generally smaller and extremist candidates fared badly in off-year elections.85 In a statement reminiscent of Bernadine Dohrn’s comment late in 1970 that the Weathermen had made "the military error" of considering only bombings and "picking up the gun" (AJYB, 1971 [Vol. 72], p. 141), Jerry Rubin called for a sharp reversal of tactics. He now urged everyone "from Yippies to liberals, to further South liberals" to register to vote in an effort to defeat Nixon. Said Rubin: ". . . whereas in Chicago we had a goal of chaos [in San Diego] nonviolence is the only tactic that will be effective."86

Despite the Sturm und Drang of recent years and considerable unhappiness with political processes and institutions, most Americans were not dissatisfied with their personal lives. As of August, 81 per cent reported they were satisfied with their jobs, 78 per cent with the quality of life, 74 per cent with housing, and 62 per cent with family income. Whites were more positive than blacks but the percentage of blacks who expressed satisfaction had not declined significantly since 1963, when Gallup surveys started to ask these questions. These responses pointed up the split between the large mass of Americans who were generally satisfied with their lot and segments of the intellectual community who stressed how the country was failing to live up to its promise: the clash between the "provincials" and the "cosmopolitans."

The decline in extremism was further evidence of the "centrist" character of American society.

Politics and Intergroup Relations

In 1971 there was further evidence of long-range, political changes altering the composition and strength of the Democratic and Republican parties. These were affected by, and in turn were affecting, group relations. In an examination of 1952–1968 survey research data, several social scientists reported that the Democratic party no longer was representative of the working class; it now was competing with GOP for the "massive middle class of this age of affluence." They reported a shift in the "ethnocultural frontiers." Whereas the earlier line-up had been Protestant (old-stock West European) versus Catholic (new-stock East and South European), political issues now were revolving more around blacks versus whites.

Equally significant was the movement upward economically of Catholics, the single largest denominational group in the country, and the political implications that flowed from their needs and values.\(^{87}\) (This last finding was reinforced by the fact that, for the first time in American history, Catholics, with 113 members in the House and Senate, had become the single largest religious group in Congress.) Yet, older religious-ethnic-racial political patterns remained tenacious. The same study that noted "A New Political Alignment" showed that, in 1968, Catholics continued to describe themselves as Democratic or independent; white Protestants outside the South demonstrated a substantial Republican plurality, and Southern and black Protestants throughout the country were heavily Democratic. And more than 8 out of 10 Jewish voters ended up in the Humphrey-Muskie column in 1968, although Jews were showing signs of growing conservatism.\(^{88}\)

President Nixon continued to bend his programs and appeals to take advantage of any new political realignment and, especially, to win over blue-collar workers and the growing Catholic population.\(^{89}\) He indicated support of some form of aid to parochial schools (p. 108) and said he was opposed to abortion as "a means of population control." His public statements stressing strong opposition to busing to achieve school desegregation and to welfare recipients who could, but did not work, attempted to reassure his Southern constituency, as well as working-class and ethnic groups in the city and suburbs. He further assured the rapidly burgeoning suburban population that he would not use the leverage of the federal government to change the economic character of their neighborhoods.


It was not surprising, therefore, that the Nixon administration, which, from the first, had small appeal for blacks, witnessed the departure of a number of high-level black officials, including Arthur A. Fletcher who, as assistant secretary of labor, strongly advocated the Philadelphia Plan. Black supporters of President Nixon argued, however, that his efforts on behalf of black businessmen and appointments of blacks, both in the military and government service, would increase the Nixon vote among them in 1972.

The role of suburbia in politics and intergroup relations came under scrutiny by Robert Lehne in a book review of *The Emerging Republican Majority*, by Kevin P. Phillips, and *The Real Majority*, by Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg. Lehne agreed with the authors that suburbia now occupied a central place in the political arena; that, by 1972, more congressmen would come from suburban areas than from either cities or rural districts. Using ratings of Americans for Democratic Action and Americans for Constitutional Action, as well as of the *Congressional Quarterly*, he argued that suburban congressmen stood somewhere between the city representatives, with their liberal voting patterns, and the more conservative rural representatives. On issues like the family-assistance program, freedom-of-choice busing and voting rights, he wrote, their vote tended to be more like that of central-city representatives.90

The off-year elections presented no conclusive evidence of these variously reported trends, although there were some indications that "law and order," anti-welfare appeals, ethnic consciousness, and racial polarization continued to remain powerful issues. Representative Louise Day Hicks, archfoe of school busing, was defeated in Boston's mayoral election by incumbent Kevin H. White. Earlier in the year, Mayor Richard G. Hatcher, a black, won redesignation in the Democratic primary over a black opponent, which was tantamount to reelection. In Cleveland, however, a black candidate supported by retiring Mayor Carl B. Stokes was defeated by Ralph J. Perk, who became the first Republican mayor in 30 years. Shortly after taking office, Perk, who was of Czech descent, ordered the cancellation of 18 building permits for scatter-site public housing in the "great ethnic Ward 9" and elsewhere, fulfilling a campaign pledge not to permit such housing in any area where residents do not want it. (The ethnic character of Perk's victory was one of the salient features of the election. His campaign director was executive director of the American Nationalities Movement in the city, and there were charges by his staff that Cuyahoga County, 40 per cent of ethnic descent, had no ethnic representation.)

In the Philadelphia race for mayor, former Police Commissioner Frank L. Rizzo, running as a Democrat, defeated youthful, liberal Congressman William Green and a black opponent, Hardy Williams, in the primary, and went on to defeat his patrician liberal Republican opponent, Thacher Longstreth, by a margin of 53 to 47 per cent. The primary and election,

which received national attention, revealed the deep racial polarization, "provincials" versus "cosmopolitan" split, and the growth of ethnic consciousness. Rizzo was the first Italian-American and only the second Catholic to become mayor of the city. He ran as an urban populist on a platform of making the city's streets safe again, holding the line on taxes, and opposing what he called excessive permissiveness in the schools and other areas of community life. In response to these appeals, he gained approximately two of every three white votes; 70 per cent of the blacks voted for Longstreth.

A study of the Jewish voting pattern in the Philadelphia mayoralty election showed Jews split almost exactly down the middle. Social class appeared to be the chief factor determining how they voted. Older, lower middle-class Jews, who lived or worked in closer proximity to the urban crisis, voted more heavily for Rizzo; their younger, better-educated, and more affluent brethren tended to support Longstreth. However, the study provided evidence that, in a period of "backlash," Jews backlashed less than other white groups. In the Democratic primary Green, Williams, and a third "liberal" candidate who later dropped out, were supported by 58 per cent of the Jewish voters, while 42 per cent supported Rizzo.91

Black Political Power

The year saw growing indications that the black community was moving from protest to politics. In the words of Congressman William Clay (D., Mo.), a member of the Black Caucus, "We are going to set the tone for the black liberation struggle in the country."92 Between 1962 and 1970, the number of blacks in Congress increased from 4 to 13 in the House and to one in the Senate; the number elected to state legislatures rose from 52 to 198. There were now almost 1,900 blacks in elective state and local offices, about half in the South; four years earlier, there had been 475. States with the largest number of black officials were Michigan, New York, Alabama, Illinois, and Ohio, all having at least 100.93

The steady growth of grass-roots black political strength, as measured by the National Roster of Black Elected Officials, published by the Joint Center for Political Studies at Howard University, was especially impressive. The number of black mayors and vice mayors was now 81, as against 41 the year before. Since February 1970, representation in state legislatures

had increased by 18 per cent; county commissioners by 34 per cent; mayors and vice mayors by 69 per cent; councilmen and aldermen, who constituted almost 35 per cent of the total of black elected officials, by 18 per cent. The number of black judges increased by 30 per cent.

The growth of black political power was a result of increased political sophistication: the ability of blacks to recognize and vote for what they believed was in their best interests. In the Philadelphia election, the 70–30 support for Longstreth marked a major break with past strong Democratic commitments. In discussing the psychological growth of black people, Alfred Poussaint, a Negro and associate dean of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, said, "We have moved from a mentality of myself, to my family, to my block, to my community, to my people, to my nation."94

As the 1972 elections approached, therefore, blacks were flexing their political muscles. The Black Caucus, consisting of the 13 black members of the U.S. House of Representatives, together with a professional staff, was lodged in a permanent headquarters in Washington, D.C., and black state legislators in various parts of the country were setting up local counterparts. The Caucus, meeting with President Nixon in March, presented him with 60 demands for aid to minorities. (In May he issued a 112-page response rejecting some of their major proposals, but saying he agreed with several others.) One of its members, Brooklyn Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, announced she would enter several primaries and seek the Democratic presidential nomination. Caucus members also visited ten widely separated military bases and returned to Washington to hold three days of hearings on charges of racism in the military. Although the hearings were "unofficial," they brought to public attention charges of racial discrimination and concluded with recommendations for the Pentagon.

Throughout the year, there were secret and semisecret meetings of black leaders in various parts of the country to discuss how black political power could best be exerted, particularly in connection with the 1972 presidential race. These focused on whether a single black candidate should be pushed to run for the Democratic nomination for president and whether that candidate should be Representative Chisholm; whether regional politicians should run as favorite-son candidates in various primaries, and whether a national black political convention should be held before the Democratic National Convention. During one of these sessions, Mayor Hatcher reported that the Black Caucus had made a number of requests of Democratic leadership, including expansion of the Democratic National Committee to reflect a 20 per cent minority involvement and a pledge that 20 per cent of the delegate slate in Presidential primary states would "reflect black participation."95 The contention of black politicians, who met with Democratic party chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien, was that the 20 per cent figure reflected black

Democratic voter participation in the 1968 election, not the black population percentage. Following meetings of 200 black elected officials and political theorists in Washington, D.C., the Black Caucus issued a call in November for a national black political convention in the spring of 1972 to develop "a national black agenda" and crystallize "a national black strategy for the 1972 elections and beyond."

The growth of black political power has great symbolic as well as practical importance. It provides, for example, the ability to obtain federal monies for the needs of the black urban poor. However, this is not a cure in and of itself for the assorted ills plaguing the slum blacks. Despite his success in obtaining federal grants, Mayor Hatcher, as author Thomas R. Brooks said,\textsuperscript{96} was no more successful than any other politician, black or white, in halting the rise of crime in his city. And Mayor Carl Stokes, along with an increasing number of white mayors, declined to run for reelection, in part because of the "ungovernability" of cities.

Moreover, the growth of black political power can be exaggerated. While some 29 major American cities are already at least one-quarter black, only six have a black majority and in only eight others do blacks approach a majority. In the 66 largest metropolitan areas accounting for half the United States population, according to Thomas Brooks, the average has grown from 18 per cent black in 1960 to only 24 per cent black in 1970. Blacks are still a minority and need allies to carry out their goals and programs. "Blacks can initiate change and provoke a reaction, as they have on several occasions with great effectiveness, but the decisive factor will be the direction of the majority," Bayard Rustin has pointed out. "The political objective . . . must, therefore, be the creation of a progressive majority in the form of a coalition."\textsuperscript{97}

The most dramatic example of growing black political strength (as well as of other forces at work here) was the "new breed" of moderate Southern governors, who took control in 1971 of state houses in Georgia, Florida, Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, and Mississippi. In their inaugural addresses Governors Reubin O. Askew of Florida and Jimmy Carter of Georgia pledged to end racial discrimination and to achieve equal opportunity for whites and blacks. Carter, who succeeded segregationist Lester G. Maddox (now lieutenant governor) declared:

\begin{quote}
I say to you quite frankly that the time for racial discrimination is over. Our people have already made this major and difficult decision, but we cannot underestimate the challenge of hundreds of minor decisions yet to come. No poor, rural, weak or black person should ever have to bear the additional burden of being deprived of the opportunity of an education, a job or simple justice.\textsuperscript{98}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{96} "Big City Politics . . . ," \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{97} Quoted in \textit{ibid.}
Governor John C. West of South Carolina appointed a black man to his personal staff. He also named to his inaugural committee the former field director of the NAACP state unit. One of the first speaking engagements accepted by Arkansas Governor Dale Bumpers, was to address the integrationist state Council for Human Relations.

When the Southern Governors Conference met in Atlanta in November, it was under the complete and undisputed control of racial moderates. Mississippi Governor William Waller, elected in November to succeed archsegregationist John Bell Williams and heir to the political tradition of Theodore Bilbo and Ross Barnett, declared that Wallace could no longer take the vote of Mississippians for granted in a national contest. "I'm not sure if [Wallace] is running from within or without the party, or if he is running on a constructive, positive platform or something that could be termed negative."99

MURRAY FRIEDMAN


Note: Quotations from statements by Professor Seymour Siegel and Henry Schwartzschild in Philip Perlmutter's article, "Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States" (AJYB, 1971 [Vol. 72], p. 155), were taken from the November 27 and December 4, 1971, issues of the Jewish Post and Opinion, respectively.
The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

There was much diplomatic maneuvering but no real movement toward peace in the Middle East during 1971. The energetic efforts of American and United Nations envoys failed to produce agreement on the terms of either a general settlement or a more limited agreement to reopen the Suez Canal. Despite the repeated warnings by Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat that 1971 was "the year of decision" and that he would resort to military action if there was no progress toward Israeli withdrawal, the year ended indecisively, with neither war nor peace.

The Israelis were relatively content to maintain the status quo and tended to look with skepticism on the value of "paper promises" as a substitute for continued Israeli military control over the strategic areas occupied during the 1967 war. The Arabs were bitter and frustrated, but their internal political divisions and military ineffectiveness prevented them from dislodging the Israelis.

Soviet-Egyptian Relations

The Soviet Union continued to supply modern weapons to Egypt and to support the Egyptian diplomatic campaign to achieve a favorable political settlement. However, the Russians reportedly urged the Egyptians to exercise military restraint. They warned Sadat, during his visit to Moscow in October, that they did not yet consider his forces capable of crossing the Suez Canal and pushing back the Israelis on their own. Sadat concluded that the Soviet Union had no intention of risking a confrontation with the United States on the eve of the forthcoming Moscow summit by sending in Soviet forces to save the Egyptians from another defeat. Two other reasons for postponing the "zero-hour" with Israel, cited by Sadat in a speech to the Egyptian officers and troops in Aswan in January 1972, were: the Indo-Pakistani war in December, which distracted world attention from the Middle East and kept the Soviet Union busy aiding India; the disclosure, during the same month, that the United States would supply Israel with some 40 new Phantoms and 80 Skyhawks, which, Sadat estimated, would increase Israel's Air Force by one-third and enable it to fly between 1,000 and 1,200 sorties a day against the Egyptian front.

Inter-Arab Tensions

Sadat's Arab allies were in even worse shape. The eastern front of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan was in disarray. The Iraqis quietly pulled out their forces
from Jordan after having stood on the sidelines while the Jordanian army crushed the Palestinian guerrillas in the September 1970 civil war. When the Jordanian army proceeded to mop up the remaining guerrilla outposts in the north of Jordan in the summer of 1971, Syria closed the land frontier with Jordan, barred overflights from Lebanon, and, finally, broke off relations with Jordan. While the ostensible purpose of these moves was to isolate King Hussein economically and politically and to demonstrate Syria's solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, some observers suspected the land frontier was closed primarily to prevent the fleeing guerrillas from entering Syria, or their Syrian supporters from going to their aid. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was vocal in lending moral support to the Palestinian liberation movements; but he kept a close rein on the Palestinians at home to prevent a repetition of the mistake made by his predecessor, who, in 1970, had allowed Syria to become embroiled in the Jordanian civil war, with humiliating consequences (AJYB, 1971 [Vol. 72], pp. 170–71).

One effect of the closed border with Syria was the bizarre spectacle of more than a hundred Palestinian guerrillas seeking asylum among their sworn enemies, the Israelis, in preference to falling into the hands of Hussein's army. The only nearby place where the guerrillas still maintained some operational bases was southern Lebanon, although a 1969 agreement between the Lebanese government and al-Fatah leader Yassir Arafat forbade them from launching attacks against Israel from Lebanese soil. Relations between the Palestinians and local villagers became increasingly strained when guerrilla attacks in violation of the agreement provoked Israeli retaliatory raids. The Lebanese government formally protested the Israeli incursions; but the guerrillas charged collusion between Beirut and the Israelis, because they managed with impunity to carve out new roads in the mountainous southern Lebanon and to begin regular patrols of "Fatahland," which reduced the guerrillas to a minor nuisance.

**Jordanian-Israeli Relations**

The apparent stalemate in Arab efforts to liberate the occupied territories led King Hussein to denounce publicly Arab bellicose statements as folly and to declare that Jordan would not again allow itself to be dragged into a hopeless battle. The Arab attempts to isolate him economically and politically also prompted Hussein to seek de facto normalization of relations with Israel. During 1971 there were scarcely any incidents along the Jordan, and the bridges across the river carried a steady and growing stream of goods and Arab visitors in both directions. Agreement was also reached on such technical matters as coordination of civilian air flights to avoid accidents in the narrow air corridor in the Negev.

However, Israel and Jordan were unable to reach a formal peace agreement because they remained far apart in their territorial demands, with Jerusalem a major issue. Israeli leaders insisted on Israel sovereignty over
the entire reunified city, although some officials hinted that they were prepared to grant Hussein a role as custodian of Moslem holy places. Hussein insisted on Jordanian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, but indicated he would not again erect the physical barriers that had divided the city for two decades; he now favored an open city, with free access to all, including the Jews.

Jerusalem

Frustrated by their inability to stop Israeli housing projects in East Jerusalem and other measures indicating Israel's intention to unify the city permanently and irrevocably, the Jordanians threatened in the spring to bring the issue before the United Nations. For several months the United States managed to dissuade the Jordanians from taking action, arguing that acrimonious debate in the United Nations might jeopardize its delicate diplomatic efforts to achieve an interim agreement on reopening the Suez Canal.

In September Jordanian Ambassador Baha Toukan brought the issue to the Security Council, demanding that sanctions be imposed on Israel to stop it from flouting UN decisions and "to prevent a fait accompli in Jerusalem from interfering in the just solution which must ultimately be reached." Israel Ambassador Yosef Tekoah replied that the charge of an Israeli effort to "Judaize" Jerusalem was a "gratuitous and malicious" attempt to prevent the city's normal growth and development, since Jews had constituted the majority of the city's population for generations and Jerusalem was "the center of the Jewish people's existence, civilization, unity." He accused Jordan of publicly raising the issue at this time to "divert attention from her internal and inter-Arab difficulties."

The Security Council, on September 25, adopted a resolution deploiring Israel's failure to respect previous United Nations resolutions concerning Jerusalem (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 182–3; 1970 [Vol. 71], pp. 251–3); confirmed "in the clearest possible terms that legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of population and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section are totally invalid and cannot change that status"; urgently called on Israel to take no further steps and, in accordance with an amendment offered by Syria, demanded that Israel "rescind all previous measures and actions." The resolution was adopted by a vote of 14 to 0. The United States abstained on the Syrian amendment, but, when it was approved, voted in favor of the resolution as a whole. Syria abstained, since it wanted a stronger resolution containing sanctions.

The resolution asked that the UN secretary-general report to the Council within 60 days on its implementation, and authorized him to set up a mission or other instrumentality of his choosing for this purpose. The Israelis let it be known that they would not welcome a mission, and U Thant reluctantly
dropped the idea. On November 15, shortly before the end of the two-month
deadline, Foreign Minister Abba Eban sent a lengthy reply to the secretary-
general, detailing the improvements the Israelis had made in the running
of the city and declaring that the Israel policies in Jerusalem were consistent
with the UN Charter and designed to further the welfare of all religious
and ethnic groups in the city.

U. S. Position

During the debate, U.S. delegate George Bush reaffirmed the American
position that "the ultimate status of Jerusalem should be determined through
negotiation and agreement between the governments of Israel and Jordan in
the context of an overall peace settlement, taking into account the interests
of its inhabitants, of the international religious communities who hold it
sacred and of other countries in the area." He said the United States had
repeatedly stressed to Israel "the need to take more fully into account the
sensitivities and concerns of others." Though he characterized the Israeli
response as "disappointing," he declared that "we believe Israel's respect for
the Holy Places has indeed been exemplary." At the same time he warned
that an "Israeli occupation policy of unilaterally determined practices cannot
help promote a just and lasting peace any more than that cause was served
by the status quo in Jerusalem prior to June 1967." Bush emphasized that
the United States did not advocate a return to the artificially divided city,
but favored the maintenance of a unified city with free access for all.

Assassination of Jordan's Premier

If one of King Hussein's objectives in raising the Jerusalem issue at the
United Nations was to reassert his leadership on the Palestine question and
to distract world attention from his conflict with the militant Palestinians, his
success was short-lived. On November 28 four young Palestinians carrying
Syrian passports assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister and Minister of
Defense Wasfi Tal while he was in Cairo to attend Arab League Joint De-
fense Council strategy sessions. The assassins claimed they belonged to the
"Black September" organizations, a commando group recently formed to
avenge the September 1970 Jordanian crack-down on the guerrillas. In
Beirut, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine issued a com-
muniqué claiming credit for the assassination. Al-Fatah, the Palestinian Na-
tional Liberation Movement, issued a statement declaring the four assas-
sins "represent the will of the Palestinian revolution to eliminate" all
opponents, and calling on all Arab and patriotic elements to ask Sadat to
release them. The Association of Palestinian Lawyers declared that the
Palestinian revolution had a legal and moral right to crush its enemies and
that consequently the death of Wasfi Tal "was a legal act . . . an act of
political warfare and not a crime."
Jordanian officials accused Fatah of engineering Tal's assassination as well as the attempted assassination of the Jordanian ambassador in London, Zayd al-Rifai, in mid-December. They hinted at Egyptian complicity in the crime, noting that two of the assassins had been arrested upon their arrival in Cairo airport for possession of weapons, but had then been released. Jordan also was upset at indications that Egypt intended to be lenient to the accused, whom it released on bail, and that it planned to introduce the background of Jordanian-Palestinian conflict at their trial to mitigate, if not completely justify, their terrorist action. The Tal assassination effectively killed the abortive efforts of the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian governments to mediate between Hussein and the Palestinian commandos.

**Persian Gulf Independence**

Further east, Britain's anticipated withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, after more than 150 years of preeminence in managing the defense and foreign relations of the Gulf sheikhdoms, led to the formation of new political entities and a scramble for power in this strategic and oil-rich region. The Sultanate of Oman and the sheikhdoms of Bahrain and Qatar declared their independence. Six of the smaller sheikhdoms formed the Union of Arab Emirates in December. The four new Persian Gulf states were admitted to the United Nations, although their combined population barely totalled a million. This raised to 18 the number of Arab UN members.

As the British prepared to leave, Iranian troops, on November 30, occupied three disputed islands commanding the Strait of Hormuz, the channel through which Iranian and other Persian Gulf oil is shipped. Iraq broke diplomatic relations with Iran for its "aggression" and violation of "Arab sovereignty," and broke off relations with Britain for its alleged collusion in the Iranian action. Libya, in a show of solidarity, took measures against the British Petroleum Company. Western oil companies also faced demands from the Middle Eastern producing states for higher payments, increased production, and a share in the ownership of the companies. An added concern was the emergence of the Soviet Union as a growing factor in Middle East oil competition, beginning with a partnership agreement between Moscow and Baghdad to explore a concession area previously assigned to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

**Mutiny in Morocco**

In North Africa, several Arab countries saw themselves threatened by domestic coups and foreign-supported conspiracies. In Morocco, in June, pro-Western King Hassan II began the trial of 193 opposition leftists, who were accused of plotting to overthrow the government through a terrorist campaign inspired, financed, and directed by the Baathist regime in Syria.
On July 10 mutinous army troops attacked the summer palace and briefly held the King hostage until he was freed by loyal troops. Hassan charged that radical Libya had incited the revolt and that Cairo had harbored anti-monarchical Moroccans. Before learning of the coup's failure, the Libyan government announced that it had mobilized its armed forces and was ready to send paratroopers and aircraft to assist the Moroccan Army "against any foreign interference." Presumably, this threat was intended to prevent assistance to the royalists by other pro-Western Arab monarchs, or by the United States. Washington was particularly concerned, since Morocco was the largest African recipient of United States economic and military aid and the only remaining country in North Africa to allow the United States to maintain air and military communications facilities, after the Libyan revolutionaries had forced the closing of American bases in that country.

Two days after the unsuccessful coup, Libyan government radio broadcasts continued to urge the Moroccan people "to pursue their struggle" against the King, declaring that the attempt to depose the "feudal, reactionary and corrupt" monarchy should have been undertaken years ago. This resulted in a rupture of diplomatic relations between Libya and Morocco. The Egyptians were more pragmatic. Seeing that the coup had failed, President Sadat sent a personal envoy to Rabat to congratulate the King on his survival. Hassan pointedly kept the envoy waiting for two days. King Hussein, a like-minded pro-Western monarch, came in person and was royally welcomed. In August, Hassan appointed a new cabinet which pledged reforms in education, justice, and the economy to remove corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency.

Federation of Arab Republics

The announcement in Benghazi, Libya, on April 17 of agreement on a federal union of Egypt, Libya, and Syria appeared to usher in a new era of Arab unity and cooperation. A plebiscite was scheduled for September 1. President Sadat announced that the union would have "one president, one flag, one anthem and one federal capital." The ideology of the federation would be "democratic socialism" and the new name—Federation of Arab Republics (FAR) — implied that monarchies would not be welcome to join. It would have a federal military command, with authority to deploy troops and equipment in the three countries. The planned federation was hailed as a "blow to Israel," and, presumably in response to the prodding of his more outspokenly militant Libyan and Syrian allies, Sadat declared:

There will be no negotiations or peace agreement with Israel, no abandoning of one inch of Arab territories and no relinquishing or bargaining on the rights of the Palestine cause.

However, it soon became apparent that Egypt was not really prepared to relinquish its sovereignty in crucial decisions to its federation partners.
The provision of the draft statutes setting up a council of the presidents of the three countries with power to select a chairman and make decisions by majority vote was strongly opposed by Egypt, because its more than 34 million people could be outvoted by Libya, with less than two million people, and Syria, with fewer than six million. Besides, many Egyptians considered Libyan Premier Muammar al-Qaddafi, the prime mover behind the federation, to be impetuous, unpredictable, and given to fanatical and extremist positions. They also were mindful of the failure of the earlier union with Syria, which had lasted only from February 1958 to September 1961 and left a residue of mutual suspicion and acrimony. These concerns were voiced during the sometimes heated discussion of the proposed federation in April in the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Egypt's only legal political organization. In consequence, Egypt got its partners to agree to amend the statutes to require unanimity for federal executive decisions and the selection of a federal president. Other amendments decreased the areas of competence of the proposed federal legislature and judiciary.

The sovereignty of the separate states was further safeguarded in the federation's constitution signed in Damascus on August 20. Major policy questions, such as making war or peace, required unanimity. Even on lesser matters, each president retained veto power for a two-year period after the constitution went into effect, upon approval by plebiscite in September. Sadat was named president of the federation, and the United Arab Republic officially returned to its pre-1958 name of Egypt. The three states maintained their separate UN memberships.

In a joint declaration on August 20, the presidents of the three states reiterated the "three nos" of the 1967 Khartoum Arab summit: "There will be no peace or negotiation with the Zionist enemy, no yielding an inch of Arab territory, no bargaining on the Palestinian cause."

Taken literally, this would shut the door to a negotiated settlement with Israel, which United States envoys had been strenuously promoting. State Department officials tended to dismiss the statement as an Egyptian rhetorical concession to the militant Libyan and Syrian leaders. They noted that, under the federation, Cairo retained control over its own foreign and defense policies, and President Sadat had privately indicated his interest in pursuing discussions with the United States on a political settlement, although he was increasingly annoyed at American failure to wring concessions from Israel. However, other observers, while conceding that Egyptian veto power could prevent Cairo from being unwillingly dragged into premature conflict by its allies, believed that, reciprocally, Libya and Syria might veto any formal peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.

Crisis in Cairo

President Sadat's foreign policies during 1971 provoked the most serious challenge to his authority at home. Vice-President Ali Sabry was dismissed
on May 2, two days before U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers was scheduled to arrive in Cairo in pursuit of Egyptian-Israeli agreement on an interim Suez Canal agreement. Some saw in the timing a calculated move by Sadat to demonstrate his independence of Moscow and an effort to return to the earlier policy of "positive neutrality," when he managed to have Washington and Moscow bidding against each other for Egypt's favor. Sabry has long been regarded as sympathetic to Russia, and, when Soviet missile crews and pilots were stationed in Egypt, he was given the important post of liaison official on military matters with the Russians. Sabry reportedly opposed Sadat's acceptance of the American mediation effort. The main public focus of his challenge to Sadat, however, was over the proposed federation with Syria and Libya, since many Egyptians had misgivings about it. Behind these policy differences, there was also a personal struggle for power.

On May 13 six leading cabinet members and three high ASU officials resigned. The following day, Sadat arrested them and many of their supporters on the charge of attempting to bring about the "collapse" of his regime. In a broadcast to the nation, Sadat said that he was stunned by the "attempted coup" and especially pained by the realization that "my own house had been bugged." The bugging device was installed by the security police on order of Interior Minister Sharawy Gomaa, one of those who had resigned. Sadat announced a prohibition on arbitrary police power, election rigging, and any surveillance of citizens and recording of telephone calls, except in judicially approved criminal and national security investigations. Although there was a public burning of tape-recordings, the destruction apparently was selective, since tape-recordings were introduced by the government prosecutor as evidence in the trials against the accused plotters.

Ninety-one persons were charged with high treason and attempting to establish rival centers of power. Besides Sabry, who was accused of masterminding the plot, these included Minister of War Lieutenant General Mohammed Fawzi; Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Sami Sharaf; Minister of Information Mohammed Fayek, and Farid Abdel Karim, secretary of ASU.

**Soviet-Egyptian Treaty**

Since many of the accused were known for their leftist leanings and their opposition to the American mediation effort, there was considerable and scarcely veiled tension between Cairo and Moscow. The Russians denied any role in the attempt to unseat Sadat. They decided to abandon Sabry and his supporters to their fate and to concentrate instead on strengthening Soviet-Egyptian ties. Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny rushed to Cairo and, after two days of intensive consultations, he and Sadat signed a 15-year treaty of friendship and cooperation. It pledged the strengthening of cooperation in political, economic, scientific, and cultural affairs, based on the
principle of "noninterference in the internal affairs" of each state and respect for its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality. While such clauses are routine, they were significant for Sadat in the light of the attempted coup and the forthcoming trial.

From the Soviet standpoint the treaty was useful both because it formally strengthened the ties between the two countries for a 15-year period, irrespective of possible changes in leadership, and because of its ideological coloration. The preamble described both countries as "inspired by the ideals of the struggle against imperialism and colonialism," and, in the operative articles, they pledged unswerving battle against all forms of imperialism and colonialism. The section on cooperation in economic and social development, referred to the Soviet Union as "a socialist state," and Egypt as having "set itself the aim of reconstructing society along socialist lines."

The treaty provided for regular consultations on all important questions affecting the interests of the two states, and for consultations to "concert their positions" in case of any threat to peace or violation of peace. The Soviet Union pledged continued military cooperation to "strengthen the defense capacity" of Egypt, including specifically "assistance in the training" of Egyptian military personnel "in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the United Arab Republic with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as its ability to stand up to aggression in general." This provision can be seen as a Soviet attempt to assure for its personnel a continuing role in Egypt's military, and thus its foreign policy, decisions.

Among the reasons for Moscow's coolness to the American mediation effort was that a formal Egyptian-Israeli agreement, which would eliminate the likelihood of renewed fighting, would give Russia little excuse to maintain upwards of 15,000 advisers, experts, and other military personnel in Egypt. The Russians were finding, as had the British, French, and Americans before them in Egypt and other countries, that foreign "advisers" soon tended to be resented by "the natives." Indeed, the author found during a visit to Cairo in July that Egyptians were quite open and unanimous in expressing their dissatisfaction with the Soviet personnel, whom they considered arrogant and abrasive. However, most Egyptians regarded them as necessary until Egypt mastered the new Soviet equipment and produced its own, or the United States succeeded in pressuring Israel to withdraw from Sinai.

The joint communiqué accompanying the signing of the treaty condemned "Israel's imperialist aggression" and its "persistent expansionist policy," criticized the United States for supporting the Israeli actions, and pledged Soviet assistance to Egypt and Arab countries for the recovery in the nearest future of "all Arab territories occupied by Israel." However, the statement stopped short of threatening war; it emphasized instead that "Egypt's constructive policies for a peaceful settlement" had created "the
proper atmosphere for establishing a just and permanent peace in the area.” In other words, Moscow was not prepared to endorse the more belligerent approach of Sadat’s Libyan and Syrian allies.

The government prosecutor asked for the death penalty for ten of the plotters. In December the three-man Revolutionary Tribunal imposed death sentences on Sabry, Gomaa, Sharaf, and Abdel Karim, which Sadat commuted to life imprisonment at hard labor. General Fawzi’s life sentence was reduced by Sadat to 15 years at hard labor because of the general’s role in rebuilding the Egyptian army after the 1967 defeat. Fourteen of the defendants were acquitted, 14 others received one-year suspended sentences and the rest were given prison terms of varying lengths.

The Sudan

The dramatic events in the Sudan in July were another illustration of the interaction of domestic politics with inter-Arab relations and the great power rivalries in the Middle East.

A group of left-wing army officers seized control of Khartoum and deposed the government of Major General Gaafar al-Nimeiry. Major Hashem al-Ata, a leader of the group had been one of the main organizers of the military coup that brought Nimeiry to power in May 1969. Ata and several of his co-conspirators were ousted from the government in November 1970, for opposing Nimeiry’s plan to bring the Sudan into a projected federation with Egypt and Libya. Opposition to the federation was centered in the influential Sudanese Communist party, which feared the effect of a union with militantly anti-Communist Libya, and among the non-Moslem black African tribes of the south. The blacks, who constituted a majority in the country had been waging a bitter civil war against the Moslem Arabs of the north who have long dominated political and economic life. The African tribesmen now feared that if the Sudan joined the federation they would become a permanently oppressed minority in the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic body. In the face of the strong opposition, Nimeiry was forced to defer participation in the Federation of Arab Republics.

The leaders of the military coup in July immediately dissolved the Sudanese Socialist Union, formed after the model of Egypt, released Communists from prison, and announced that the Sudan would become a “democratic independent republic with full sovereignty for the people.” Major Ata pledged to link the Sudan more closely with Communist and Socialist countries, and indicated that he would bring Communists into the government in a coalition of “all truly progressive and nationalist forces.”

However, General Nimeiry staged a countercoup and, with Libyan and Egyptian help, quickly returned to power. The leaders of the abortive coup, among them Abdel Khalek Mahgoub, head of the Communist party, were summarily tried by a military court and executed. Although Mahgoub
vigorously denied the accusation that he had masterminded the coup, Nimeiry proceeded to crack down on the Communist party, arresting many of its leaders and suspected sympathizers.

Some of the anti-Communist sentiment among Nimeiry's followers appeared to have spilled over into incidents against Soviet personnel in the Sudan. On July 25 Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny protested the anti-Communist campaign and asked Nimeiry to refrain from inflicting harsh or extreme sentences on the accused, but with little effect. The Soviet press agency Tass carried a statement which Soviet leaders sent to Nimeiry, expressing "grave concern over the reign of terror" in the Sudan. While denying that Moscow had anything to do with the plot and disavowing any intention of interfering in the Sudan's domestic affairs, the statement warned that unfriendly actions such as "threats and acts of violence against Soviet officials in Khartoum" and their property endangered relations between the two countries. Except for Yugoslavia, the other East European nations joined in the criticism.

Nimeiry's hand was strengthened by the efforts of the Soviet Union's great power rivals to exploit the deterioration in Soviet-Sudanese relations. It was announced in Khartoum that the People's Republic of China pledged full support for Sudan's independence "against all pressures," and in August Sudanese Foreign Minister Mansour Khaled pointedly emphasized the Sudan's "particularly good" ties with Peking, especially an imminent agreement under which China would finance development projects in the Sudan. The Sudan had previously concluded an economic and technical cooperation agreement with China providing for $45 million in aid, but this had not yet been utilized. General Nimeiry later disclosed that the Sudan had secretly been receiving Chinese-made MIG jets, tanks and other heavy arms under an agreement he had reached with Chairman Mao in 1970.

Meanwhile, the United States quietly informed the Sudanese government that Washington was willing to resume full diplomatic relations or, in any event, to discuss new economic, humanitarian, and cultural ties. The Sudan had broken formal diplomatic relations with the United States at the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war in a show of solidarity with its Arab neighbors. However, like Egypt, it maintained diplomatic contacts through the U.S. diplomatic mission in Khartoum, which officially functioned as part of the Netherlands embassy. At a press conference on August 5, Foreign Minister Khaled said that while formal ties would not be restored as long as Washington continued to "support" Israel, "economic and cultural ties with the United States continue with the possibility of improvement." Since 1967 U.S. aid was limited to small amounts of relief supplies channeled through UNICEF.

While Soviet-Sudanese relations continued to be strained, no complete rupture occurred. Moscow limited itself to verbal chiding, and the Sudanese government, though concerned to assert its independence and crush its
domestic enemies, was also not interested in entirely cutting itself off from
Soviet support. The Soviet Union had been providing more than $20 million
in economic assistance annually and the Sudanese army had relied heavily
on Soviet supplies and advisers. Representatives of the Anyanya organization
of the Southern Sudanese black rebels, charged that Soviet equipment and
Soviet advisers in fact played a major role in the government's military
campaign against them.

The events of July emphasized the need to deal with the underlying
problems that had provoked them. Nimeiry quietly began efforts, with
Ethiopian mediation, to settle the civil war by providing a measure of
autonomy to the southern regions. At the same time, however, the Sudanese
Arab Socialist Union was revived, and the Nimeiry government promulgated
a temporary constitution providing for a People's Council and other institu-
tions paralleling those in Egypt and Syria. Parliament was assigned the
task of drafting a permanent constitution. Observers believed it would be
exceedingly difficult to produce a document that allayed the fears of the
southern blacks while keeping the door open to federation with the Arab
states to the north.

Peace Efforts

On January 5 Ambassador Jarring resumed his discussions at United
Nations headquarters in New York with the representatives of Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Israel on the establishment of lasting peace. Upon the invita-
tion of the government of Israel, Jarring briefly visited Israel from January
8 to 10, meeting with Prime Minister Golda Meir and other high officials.
The Israelis presented him with a paper outlining their views on the "essen-
tials of peace." He passed these on to Egypt and Jordan and received their
reactions and counterproposals.

At the beginning of February UN Secretary-General U Thant expressed
"cautious optimism" over the renewal of this indirect exchange of views
and appealed for continuation of the cease-fire. Israel agreed to an un-
limited extension on the basis of reciprocity, while Egypt announced, on
February 4, agreement to a 30-day extension, which was subsequently
renewed.

Jarring soon found, however, that the parties were not only far apart in
their specific demands, but that each insisted that the other side make certain
commitments before it would be prepared to spell out its own final terms
in detail. As Mrs. Meir told the Keneset on February 9, Israel was not
satisfied with a vague general statement of Egypt's preparedness to respect
the territorial integrity and independence of all states in the region, since
this formula had been used in the past to exclude peace with Israel. Egypt,
in turn, informed Jarring that, while it was prepared to carry out its obliga-
tions under the provisions of UN Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967
(AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 38–40) if Israel did likewise, Egypt interpreted
the resolution as requiring Israel to agree to total withdrawal from all occu-
pied territory as a prerequisite to peace. The Egyptians also complained that
Israel had not committed itself to implement prior resolutions concerning
a just settlement of the Arab refugee problem.

The papers received from Israel and Jordan showed a similar divergence
of views. Israel stressed the importance of a Jordanian peace agreement with
Israel, which would specify the direct and reciprocal obligations of each
side. Jordan emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by
war and stated that a commitment by Israel to evacuate all Arab territories
occupied in the 1967 war, including East Jerusalem, was the essential first
step toward peace.

THE JARRING MEMORANDUM

Jarring concluded, and Thant agreed, that the only way to break the
imminent Egyptian-Israeli deadlock on priority of commitments and under-
takings was for Jarring to seek from each side “parallel and simultaneous
commitments,” which would serve as basis for specific agreements on all
outstanding issues, including the refugee problem. Accordingly, on February
8, Jarring handed identical aides-mémoire to the representatives of Israel and
Egypt. He asked Israel to give a commitment to withdraw its forces from
occupied United Arab Republic territory “to the former international bound-
ary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine.” This meant Israeli
withdrawal from all of Sinai. The Gaza Strip was not specifically mentioned
because it had not legally been part of Egypt; but Jarring made it clear to
Israel that this omission was not to be interpreted as implying that it could
retain the Strip. Its future, including its possible incorporation in a Jordanian
or Palestinian state, would be determined during the peace negotiations.
The Israeli commitment was to be given on the understanding that there
were satisfactory arrangements for establishing demilitarized zones; practical
security measures in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to guarantee freedom of
navigation through the Strait of Tiran, and freedom of navigation through
the Suez Canal.

The Israelis were critical of Jarring’s memorandum, contending he ex-
ceeded his authority by presenting his own views on the territorial settlement
to be achieved. They pointed out that the 1967 Security Council resolution
had carefully omitted any qualifying word such as “the” or “all” when
calling for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces “from territories occupied in
the recent conflict.” The resolution’s American and British drafters insisted
on this wording to leave open the possibility of some adjustments in the
frontier lines. Jarring, in his memorandum, endorsed the Egyptian and
Soviet interpretation that the resolution called for total withdrawal.

In Thant’s view, Jarring’s action was within the framework of his man-
date to promote agreement. State Department officials in Washington agreed, and also noted that Jarring made Israel's withdrawal contingent on security arrangements in Sinai and provisions for Israeli maritime rights. It was an open secret in United Nations circles that Jarring consulted with the American government before drafting his memorandum. He let it be known privately that Israeli anger should be directed not at him but at the United States government, for the suggestion of an Israeli withdrawal to the international frontier with Egypt originated not with Jarring, but with Secretary of State William P. Rogers (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], pp. 13–15). Israel decided to ignore the memorandum and to respond instead to Egypt's reply to Jarring.

GREAT POWER GUARANTEES

The Israelis were also disturbed by the resumption of talks in February by the British, French, United States, and Soviet ambassadors to the UN about great-power guarantees of an Arab-Israeli settlement. Mrs. Meir told the Keneset, February 9, that Egypt sought to endow the Big Four with authority to impose a settlement and that the Soviet Union demanded that the Big Four give Jarring instructions. This, she said, was "incompatible" with Jarring's mandate, and was designed "to sabotage his mission." She declared:

The government of Israel rejects any idea of regarding these concepts of international guarantees, or of a police force sponsored by any international authority whatever, as a substitute for a contractual and binding peace that includes defensible borders to be agreed upon in free negotiations between Israel and its neighbors. . . . The government of Israel will be prepared to discuss additional security arrangements only after agreed security borders, specified in a peace treaty, have been determined.

Premature discussion of guarantees, Mrs. Meir said, fed the illusion among Arab leaders that they could evade the necessity of making peace with Israel. Therefore, Israel would continue to "demand firmly" that the United States refrain from supporting any such evasive moves. She made it clear that Israel was prepared to resist great-power pressures, declaring that, "like any independent state of any free nation, Israel will not allow its fate to be determined by anyone but itself." She called on Sadat to declare "plainly and clearly" that Egypt was ready to make peace with Israel.

EGYPT'S REPLY

On February 15 the Egyptian government replied to Dr. Jarring that it "accepts to carry out on a reciprocal basis all its obligations" under the November 1967 UN Security Council resolution on condition that Israel carried out all its obligations contained in the resolution. It concluded, "when
Israel gives these commitments, the UAR will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel.” United Nations and American officials immediately hailed the Egyptian reply as “positive” and “constructive.”

ISRAEL’S RESPONSE

The Israel government, in a communiqué issued February 21, said that “Israel views favorably the expression of the readiness of the government of Egypt to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and expresses its own readiness for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries.” However, Israel expressed disappointment over the many conditions attached to the Egyptian agreement, which, it said, demonstrated “the substantial gap” between Egypt and Israel on a variety of issues, particularly on borders and refugees. Moreover, it said, the Egyptian government did not simply accept the Jarring formulations but amended them in potentially significant ways.

MARITIME RIGHTS

Regarding the arrangements for freedom of navigation, the Egyptian reply stated that “it insures the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention.” (Italics indicate words added by Egypt to the Jarring text.) While the UN Security Council ruled already in September 1951 that Israel had a right to use the Canal, Egypt ignored this resolution and interpreted the Constantinople Convention as giving it the right to bar Israeli shipping as long as a state of war existed. Similarly, the Egyptian reply said “It insures the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran in accordance with the principles of international law.” (Emphasis added.) Here, too, there was a dispute. Israel, relying on the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, asserted that its rights in the Strait of Tiran were firmly grounded in international law, an assertion the Egyptians contested in the past. Consequently, while some observers saw the Egyptian amendments as mere legal niceties, the Israelis suspected they were intended to bar Israeli shipping until a formal and final Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in all its details was signed and ratified.

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The parties also were far apart on practical security arrangements in the Sinai Peninsula. While Israel favored some form of joint Egyptian-Israeli arrangement, with a definite Israeli military presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt replied that it accepted the stationing of a United Nations peacekeeping force “in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.” Egypt referred here to Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, since Nationalist China, which was then still in the UN, had not taken an active role in Middle East affairs.
The Egyptians also proposed the establishment of "demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances." Observers noted that if all Egyptian forces were to be withdrawn from Sinai, as Israel insisted, then the Egyptian formula would require the demilitarization of all of Israel, and part of Lebanon and Syria in the north.

REFUGEES

The Egyptian memorandum also called for an Israeli commitment to the "achievement of a just settlement for the Palestinian refugees' problem in accordance with UN resolutions." (Emphasis added.) The reference to more than one resolution implied support for earlier resolutions on which the Palestinians based their claim to the right of repatriation for all refugees wishing to return to Israel, which Israel was not prepared to grant on any large scale.

The Israeli reply to Jarring noted that "both parties had claims," since there were also hundreds of thousands of Jews who had come to Israel as refugees from Arab lands. Israel said it was prepared "to negotiate with the governments directly involved" on "the payment of compensation for abandoned lands and property" and "participation in the planning of the rehabilitation of the refugees in the region."

TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

On the crucial territorial issue, the Egyptian note called for an Israeli commitment to the "withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip." In the concluding paragraph of the Egyptian reply, this was further broadened to give support to Syria's and Jordan's claims to total Israeli withdrawal. It said the UAR considered that a just and lasting peace cannot be realized without "full and scrupulous" implementation of the 1967 Security Council resolution "and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since the fifth of June 1967."

In its reply to Jarring, Israel committed itself to "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel-UAR cease-fire line to the secure, recognized, and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement." It stressed, however, that "Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines." Many observers in the United States and other countries were critical of the insertion of the last sentence, which they regarded as effectively shutting the door to the continuation of the Jarring mission. They asked why Israel had not simply reiterated the earlier formula contained in the previous sentence, which left the extent of withdrawal unspecified and subject to negotiation.

Israelis offered a variety of explanations for the additional sentence: First, since Jarring demanded a commitment of withdrawal to a precise line, the Israelis now felt obligated to make it clear that they would not make any prior commitment to total withdrawal. By making such a commitment, they
would lose one of their main bargaining points. Secondly, there was strong sentiment in Israel that an Israeli presence in Sharm el-Sheikh was vital to the country's security, and that it would have been unrealistic for Israel to leave the Egyptians with any illusions that it was prepared to withdraw completely from Sinai. Thirdly, even if Israel was prepared to agree eventually to formal Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai, to say so would have been tactically unwise. Such a revelation would generate tremendous pressure on Jordan and Syria to demand total withdrawal from their occupied territories, thereby greatly complicating any possible negotiated settlement. Finally, the Israel government had to consider domestic public opinion, which, a Time-Louis Harris poll confirmed, was overwhelmingly opposed to withdrawal from certain areas of either strategic or national significance, such as the Golan Heights (86 per cent of Jewish Israelis supporting its retention) and the Old City of Jerusalem (90 per cent).

PEACE PRINCIPLES

Whatever the reasons, the Egyptian and Israeli replies were so at variance that Jarring suspended his activities. However, he refused to withdraw or disavow his memorandum of February 8, and Israel refused to accept it as binding. While press coverage naturally emphasized the points of disagreement, Egypt and Israel did agree on five basic principles set out by Jarring as part of a final peace treaty, though the Israeli reply suggested more comprehensive wording for some. As phrased by Jarring and accepted by Egypt, these five principles were:

1. "Termination of all claims or states of belligerency." (Israel suggested an explicit declaration by the parties to regard the conflict as finally ended and to terminate "all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between Israel and the UAR.")

2. "Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's independence." (Israel offered on a reciprocal basis "respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the UAR.")

3. "Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live within secure and recognized boundaries."

4. "Responsibility to do all in their power to insure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from, or are not committed from, within their respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party." (This was particularly important to Israel in view of the history of Egyptian support of guerrilla attacks against Israel by fedayeen and other para-military groups. Consequently, the Israeli version omitted the phrase "to do all in their power" as offering a possible loophole. Instead, Israel agreed to assume absolute responsibility on condition that Egypt did likewise. Israel undertook: "The responsibility for insuring that no warlike act, or act of violence by any organization, group or individual originates from, or is committed in, the territory of Israel against the population, armed forces or property of the UAR.")

5. "Noninterference in each other's domestic affairs."
Since Egypt was contemplating a federation with Libya and Syria, both still openly hostile to Israel, Israel suggested an additional provision that neither side would participate in hostile alliances against the other and each would prohibit the stationing of troops of states maintaining belligerency against the other. Israel also asked for an explicit Egyptian undertaking to guarantee free passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the termination of the boycott and other forms of economic and political warfare.

INTERIM AGREEMENT

With the Jarring talks for an over-all settlement at a standstill, attention focused on the possibility of reaching a more limited and interim agreement, which would provide for reopening the Suez Canal, restoration of civilian life in the Egyptian cities on both banks of the Canal, and a withdrawal of Israeli forces some distance from the Canal. The idea was first mentioned by Israel Defense Minister Moshe Dayan the year before. When Sadat revived the idea in February, the United States quickly began intensive efforts to bring about an agreement. American diplomats saw merit in it as a means to gain time and as a first step toward defusing the military confrontation along the Canal. If the plan succeeded it might help overcome deepseated suspicions and begin to build a climate of mutual trust, a prerequisite to achieving permanent peace.

ROGERS TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST

In May, Secretary Rogers went to Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel to explore the prospects for agreement. He was the second American secretary of state to tour the area. (John Foster Dulles had been the first, in May 1953.) Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, Rogers met with Sadat. Sadat quoted Rogers as having told him that "Egypt has done all it can," and that Washington was not asking for additional concessions from Cairo. To the Israelis Rogers said he was convinced that Sadat was sincere in his desire for peace. The Israelis countered by suggesting that Sadat demonstrate his sincerity by meeting directly with the Israelis, which Sadat said he would refuse to do as long as Egyptian territory was occupied.

There was hope of an imminent breakthrough when Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joseph J. Sisco flew back to Cairo after a meeting with Dayan. But no practical results developed from this trip or from a subsequent visit by Sisco to Israel late in July.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

Six major issues separating Egypt and Israel over the terms of an interim agreement were outlined by Secretary Rogers in an address to the UN
General Assembly on October 4. These were the relationship between an interim agreement and an over-all settlement; duration of the cease-fire; extent of withdrawal; Egyptian crossing; supervisory arrangements, and Israeli use of the Canal.

With regard to the first issue, the Egyptians were insisting on a prior Israeli commitment to total withdrawal, including a definite timetable. As reiterated by Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad to the UN on October 6, the interim agreement would involve a limited Israeli withdrawal followed immediately by Egyptian clearing and reopening of the Suez Canal, and subsequent withdrawal of Israel from all territory within a period of six months. The Israeli position, as stated by Foreign Minister Abba Eban at the UN on September 30, was that the interim agreement “would stand on its own feet” and would be of unlimited duration. Israeli forces would be withdrawn to an agreed distance, but this line “would not be considered final. When agreement on a final boundary is reached in the framework of the peace settlement Israeli forces will withdraw to it.”

Rogers' presentation at the UN displeased both the Egyptians and the Israelis. President Sadat complained that Rogers was giving Israel “all she wants” and that the United States was “playing on Egypt’s nerves.” Among the things that had annoyed the Egyptians was Rogers’ statement that “neither side can realistically expect to achieve, as part of an interim agreement, complete agreement on the terms of an overall settlement.” In other words, he sided with the Israeli contention that no prior commitment to total withdrawal should be required to begin the interim agreement. On the other hand, he prefaced this statement with the judgment that a “Suez Canal agreement is merely a step toward complete implementation of Resolution 242 within a reasonable period of time and not an end in itself.” This disappointed Mrs. Meir, who said on October 6 that she had hoped Rogers would continue to try to convince the Egyptians of the value of a self-sustaining agreement on reopening the Canal.

The parties also were unhappy over Rogers’ view on the duration of the cease-fire. He declared that, while the ultimate objective was a permanent end to belligerency, “such a commitment is not realizable in the context of an interim agreement.” Mrs. Meir indicated that she considered this statement a disservice to the prospect for peace, since the Egyptian rulers could find in it “support for their stubborn resistance to the demand for a cease-fire of unlimited duration.” The Egyptians were displeased with Rogers’ next sentence that “Neither would a cease-fire of a short duration be realistic.” According to press reports, Rogers was thinking in terms of an 18-month cease-fire.

Egypt and Israel were miles apart, too, on the extent of the initial withdrawal. The Egyptians feared that if the Israelis withdrew only a short distance and retained aerial control over the Canal, most of Sinai would permanently remain under effective Israeli control. Since the Russians were
eager to have the Canal reopened for both strategic and economic reasons, the Egyptians were concerned that once the Canal was open there would no longer be an incentive for the Russians to help push the Israelis back, and the Egyptians would find it militarily difficult and politically unwise to threaten to resume shooting. Consequently, the Egyptians wanted the initial withdrawal to take Israeli forces far from the Canal. Sadat declared that as the Israelis withdrew, Egyptian military forces would replace them to assume "their national responsibilities."

The Israelis naturally wanted to withdraw only a few miles from their strategic positions along the Bar-Lev line paralleling the Canal. They argued that this in itself was a major concession, since it was technically possible to reopen the Canal without any withdrawal. While they were willing to allow Egyptian civilian technicians and even local policemen to cross the Canal, they were unalterably opposed to having Egyptian armed forces do so, for their only purpose would be to add military threat to diplomatic pressure for Israel's further withdrawal.

Rogers noted that the question of an Egyptian military presence east of the Canal "is one on which the parties hold opposite views." But here too, he said, "the possibilities of some compromise are not negative." This statement angered the Israelis; as far as they were concerned, there could be no compromise on the principle of no return of Egyptian armed forces to Sinai. Indeed, Rogers himself had said that a major aim of the interim settlement was to separate the belligerents. Whereas the Israelis had welcomed the American offer of good offices to bring the parties together, they accused Rogers of not merely defining the position of the opposing sides but of injecting his own views of what was desirable. His statement, they felt, could only lead the Egyptians to conclude either that the Israelis were in fact prepared to compromise on the question of an Egyptian military presence, or that the United States believed they should agree to an Egyptian troop crossing.

In Egyptian thinking, this amounted to the same thing. Sadat declared in May that what mattered was not the position of Israel but the attitude of the United States: "If the United States wants peace, then it must squeeze Israel." The Israelis regarded Rogers' speech as a not-too-subtle means of exerting some diplomatic pressure on them. However, Sadat greatly exaggerated the American ability to force Israel to yield on matters it considered vital to its security or other national interests.

Despite repeated American declarations that United States arms supplies to Israel were based strictly on an assessment of the arms balance in the region and were not linked to Israel's acceptance of American political terms for an interim or over-all agreement, the Israelis were convinced that the two issues were in fact being linked; that the long delay in responding to Israel's arms requests was intended to influence its negotiating position. Consequently, the Israelis decided to do some linking of their own. Foreign
Minister Eban and Defense Minister Dayan both let it be known that Israel was not prepared to negotiate an interim agreement, with all the attendant risks, unless the United States first assured Israel it would be given the additional military equipment it required.

**Arms Race**

Buttressing the Israeli demand for additional aircraft and other military supplies were reports of continuing Soviet shipments to Egypt. According to a study by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Soviet Union in 1970 sent to Egypt 200 pilots and 150 MIG-21 fighter-interceptors and supplied a total of $2.5 billion in arms aid. The Institute noted that no other non-Communist state had ever received such a level of arms in such a short period. Some of the advanced equipment provided to Egypt had not yet been given by Moscow even to North Vietnam or any other country outside the Warsaw Pact. The study said that Egypt now had the most powerful air-defense system outside NATO, with some 75 to 85 SAM-3 missile complexes. The number of Soviet military personnel of various kinds was put at close to 20,000. At the end of November 1971, it was reported that Israel had only 85 F-4 Phantom supersonic jets because of the continuing U.S. embargo on additional shipments. Israel's total combat aircraft numbered 422, against Egypt's more than 900; the combined aircraft of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq numbered 1,389. Against Israel's 1,375 tanks, Egypt had nearly 2,000, and the four Arab states together had over 4,000. In addition, Libya had already received some 40 of a scheduled 110 French Mirage jets. Some State and Defense Department officials conceded the Arab numerical strength, but contended it was more than outweighed by Israel's qualitative superiority. When told that Israel's pilots were considered the best in the world, Mrs. Meir commented wryly, "Apparently they are so good, they don't even need planes to fly!"

**Congressional Support for Israel**

Israel's arms requests received strong backing in Congress. In the beginning of October six Republicans and six Democrats introduced a resolution in the Senate, declaring that it was the policy of the United States, as expressed by the President, to maintain the arms balance in the Middle East; that the continuing Soviet supply of sophisticated weapons to Egypt and other Arab states "seriously affected the military balance" in the Middle East and encouraged certain Arab states to resist peace negotiations and to threaten the resumption of war, and that the grave threat to peace in the Middle East was "prejudicial to the vital interests of the United States." It therefore asked the administration (1) immediately to "take affirmative action on Israel's pending request for F-4 Phantom aircraft, and provide such support-
ing equipment and assistance as are essential to maintain Israel's deterrent capability," and to (2) "oppose any attempts at the United Nations to alter the meaning and effect of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, and . . . reaffirm the importance of secure and defensible borders as a vital element in a peace settlement to be negotiated by the parties themselves."

The resolution quickly obtained 78 cosponsors in the Senate and 257 in the House. The Senate sponsors included many Republican leaders and all those who had been mentioned as Democratic presidential contenders.

In November Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) introduced an amendment to the foreign military aid bill authorizing a $500 million credit for Israel, of which $250 million were to be earmarked for Phantom jets. In supporting the bill, Senator George McGovern declared:

The Administration's reluctance to grant Israel's request for Phantoms to counteract Soviet arms to the Arabs is unconscionable. If our foreign policy is to have any moral underpinnings we must not let that country, Israel, be crushed. I say unequivocably that even if there were no Soviet presence in the Middle East we would be morally obligated to aid Israel.

Congress finally approved $300 million in military credits and a $50 million grant as "supporting assistance" for Israel, this being the first outright U.S. economic grant Israel had received since 1959.

Because the public debate focused on the issue of the Phantoms, the impression mistakenly arose that there was a total embargo on American arms supplies to Israel. This was not at all the case. On the contrary, the administration had been furnishing Israel with a steady supply of modern weapons, including electronic devices to counteract Soviet missiles in Egypt, some Skyhawk subsonic jet planes, tanks, and other equipment. However, the Phantoms, aside from their obvious military value, had become for both Israel and Egypt an important symbol of American intentions.

**Nixon-Meir Meeting**

The issue was apparently resolved between Prime Minister Meir and President Nixon at a private meeting at the White House on December 2. Mrs. Meir refused to make a statement on the matter, replying to press questions only that Israel wanted "aircraft" and not "publicity." On her return to Israel, on December 13, Mrs. Meir said she had discussed all of Israel's problems with President Nixon and "I found him most understanding." She had found "unlimited friendship for Israel and a readiness to help us" both in the White House and Congress, she said, adding that all past presidential promises had been kept. The statement issued by White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler after the meeting said the President "recognized that Israeli forces must maintain a long-term program of modernization and that the United States will participate in this process."
At year's end it was revealed that the United States had agreed to furnish Israel with the Phantoms. Possibly even more significant was the signing of contracts in the following months which provided the Israel Government with all the military supplies it had requested, with deliveries scheduled into 1974. Not only did this greatly reassure the Israelis that their defense needs would be met, but it demonstrated that Mrs. Meir had won her point in her Washington meetings that the withholding of arms supplies should not be used as a means of pressuring Israel to accept American views on the terms of a political settlement.

Once the arms supply question was resolved, the Israel government announced its preparedness to enter into the close-proximity talks suggested by the United States in the fall of 1971. Under this procedural plan, the representatives of Israel and Egypt would each occupy suites in the same hotel in New York and an American official, presumably Assistant Secretary of State Sisco, would shuttle back and forth between the two sides conveying their proposals and counterproposals. It was hoped that these talks eventually would develop into direct negotiations. The Egyptians did not reject the idea in principle, but maintained their original insistence that such talks could only begin after Israel formally committed itself to total withdrawal.

United Nations Supports Jarring

While American pressure on Israel was relaxing, international pressure at the United Nations was intensifying to interpret the November 1967 resolution as requiring total Israeli withdrawal. On December 13 the General Assembly adopted an Afro-Asian resolution endorsed by Egypt and most of the Arab states. It declared that the 1967 resolution should "be implemented immediately in all its parts"; expressed grave concern over "the continuation of Israel's occupation of the Arab territories since 5 June 1967"; reaffirmed that "the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored," and reiterated the two principles of the 1967 resolution on withdrawal and the right of every state to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. The resolution then went on to express "its full support for all the efforts" of Ambassador Jarring, mentioning explicitly his aide-mémoire of February 8, 1971. It noted "with appreciation the positive reply given by Egypt," and called on Israel "to respond favorably" to this peace initiative of the special representative. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 79 to 7 (Israel and six Latin American states), with 36 states, including the United States, abstaining.

The United States had supported a Senegalese amendment, which would have deleted the reference to the restoration of occupied territories and replaced the reference to the Egyptian and Israeli responses to the Jarring memorandum with a statement that the Assembly considered the responses
of Egypt and Israel to the memorandum of the Commission of the African heads of State "sufficiently positive" to permit a resumption of Jarring's mission. The Israelis favored the amendment as a way of getting around the prior commitment to withdrawal that Jarring demanded. (Israel had informed the African mission that it was prepared to negotiate on all issues without prior conditions by either side [p. 561]). The Senegalese amendment was defeated by a vote of 63 to 21, with 38 abstentions. Two later amendments, which would have softened the resolution and made it acceptable to Israel, were overwhelmingly defeated. The United States abstained on both. The United Nations also passed resolutions, similar to those adopted in previous years, reaffirming the rights of the Palestinians and condemning Israel for alleged violations of human rights in the occupied territories.

The Israelis were not particularly distressed by the United Nations resolutions. They tended to dismiss the UN as essentially a propaganda forum with a built-in pro-Arab bias. The UN proved ineffective except when its action had the concerted backing of the major powers. With the Soviet Union unwilling to risk a major confrontation with the United States over the Middle East, with both superpowers looking to improve relations in the forthcoming May 1972 Moscow summit conference, and with the newfound understanding between Washington and Jerusalem being given concrete form, 1971 ended with the likelihood of major conflict in the Middle East within the near future considerably lessened. Whether the absence of war would lead to genuine progress toward lasting peace, was, however, far less certain.

George E. Gruen
The Reconstitution of the Jewish Agency: A Political Analysis

"An event of historic significance in Jewish life"—this is how its organizers and not a few among the participants described the founding assembly of the Reconstituted Jewish Agency, which took place in Jerusalem in June 1971. Only the future can either vindicate this evaluation, or consign it to the realm of yesteryear's convention hyperbole. In the meantime, there can be no question but that the assembly and the work that preceded it represent an ambitious effort to achieve a more balanced relationship than has existed thus far between diaspora Jewry and Israel, at least on the material plane.

For the Jewish Agency is the chief instrument through which the vast sums collected on behalf of Israel by the United Jewish Appeal and similar campaigns throughout the world are expended; its reconstitution (actually, that of its governing bodies) is designed to give a meaningful role in that process to those who contribute and "raise" the funds.

**Enlarged Jewish Agency of 1929**

What lent heightened significance to the Jerusalem proceedings was the fact that a strikingly similar attempt was made more than 40 years earlier, when, in August of 1929, a meeting of world Jewish leaders called together in Switzerland by Dr. Chaim Weizmann resulted in the creation of what was then called the Enlarged Jewish Agency. It is inevitable that the chances for success of the new attempt should be weighed in the light of the earlier failure. In both instances, the effort aimed at overcoming ideological differences through a complex organizational arrangement, in the hope that the structure would permit the ideas held in common to become the operative ones. Yet along with the obvious parallels that can be drawn, it is also true that changes in circumstances on both sides since 1929 are so far-reaching as to rule out a simplistic comparison.

The term “Jewish agency” first appeared in the League of Nations mandate for Palestine, which incorporated Zionist proposals that “an appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine.” The World Zionist Organization requested that the British government recognize it as serving this function, and the mandate, as ratified by the League Council in 1922, explicitly granted this request in Article 4.
But it soon became apparent that the World Zionist Organization, as then constituted, was incapable of raising the funds needed to finance the development of the National Home at a pace commensurate with the vision. The WZO president, Dr. Weizmann, therefore pursued the idea, broached earlier by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, of recruiting prominent non-Zionists for the task and making room for them within a wider organizational structure, which would transcend the framework of the financially-limited Zionist circle. It took him six years to accomplish his goal; years spent not only in negotiations with the prospective partners, but also in persuading his Zionist constituency that his policy would not result in non-Zionist hegemony over the new organization.

The Zionist Congress, the governing body of WZO, finally approved Weizmann's proposal, and the constituent meeting of the enlarged Jewish Agency took place in Zurich in August 1929. It was a brilliant occasion: "the most spectacular Jewish gathering in centuries," as one participant described it. Louis Marshall, long-term president of the American Jewish Committee and representative of the non-Zionist side in the negotiations with Weizmann, more soberly yet with unmistakable pride, characterized the meeting as "co-extensive with the Jewish people everywhere." With such luminaries as Albert Einstein, Léon Blum, Lord Samuel and Shalom Asch lending their presence and enthusiastic endorsement, it was difficult not to envisage a bright future for the new body. The Zurich meeting was technically the plenary of the council of the Jewish Agency, which was to have a membership of 224 equally divided between Zionists and non-Zionists. The same principle of parity also governed the composition of the smaller administrative committee and of the executive committee charged with carrying on the Agency's day-to-day affairs.

**Zionists Better Organized**

In retrospect it is clear that the parity principle, embodied in the Agency's constitution and at the time widely hailed as a guarantee of an equitable balance of influence, actually contributed to the experiment's failure.¹ For the Zionist half was bound to dominate the institution through its consistent ideology, which enabled it to present a united front regardless of party-political and geographical differences among its members. While WZO served as an effective coordinating body for its delegates, the non-Zionists functioned as individuals, with no common secretariat. A number of them were prominently associated with such bodies as the American Jewish Committee, the Anglo-Jewish Association, and the Alliance Israélite Universelle;

¹ But it was *force majeure* which dogged the new creation by a series of misfortunes, beginning with the Arab rioting, which broke out barely two weeks after the signing of the compact; followed, in September, by the death of Louis Marshall, the central personality on the non-Zionist side; and climaxed by the stock-market crash and the world-wide depression.
but none of these groups were ready to involve themselves collectively in the work. Also, in the division of the Jewish world into the two groups, Eretz Israel, like the Diaspora, was presumed to harbor both, and the non-Zionist component of the Jewish Agency comprised representatives of the Palestine *yishuv* who often saw their real community of interest with the Zionist side. This, too, adversely affected the parity principle, and among those non-Zionists who viewed it as the heart of the agreement, its infringement (if not in the letter, then in spirit) engendered resentment.

The thrust of the Zionist ideology soon came to be directed toward sovereignty, and this was unacceptable to the non-Zionists, whose rationale for joining had been philanthropic rather than political. When, in 1937, WZO appeared disposed to accept the Peel Commission's partition plan, which would have provided for a Jewish state in a part of Palestine, the non-Zionists went into vehement opposition and all but ceased participation in the joint body. True, there was a readiness to restore the shattered unity in the face of the White Paper of 1939, but the outbreak of war made further joint meetings impracticable.

*Agency Reverts to Exclusive Zionist Control*

No effort was made to revive the enlarged Agency after the war, and WZO once more found itself acting as the sole custodian of the Jewish Agency concept, as it did before 1929. In the course of time, it came to be taken for granted that the terms World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency were synonymous, and Israel's Keneset gave official recognition to that proposition when it enacted, in 1952, the World Zionist Organisation—Jewish Agency (Status) Law. Paragraph 3 of the law explicitly provides: “The World Zionist Organisation, which is also the Jewish Agency, takes care as before of immigration and directs absorption and settlement projects in the State.”

With the attainment of sovereignty, the functions of the (WZO) Jewish Agency then had undergone a drastic reorientation. As the government of Israel understandably insisted on exclusive jurisdiction in the political sphere, the Agency was left in charge of those responsibilities—mainly the reception of immigrants and their resettlement—which the non-Zionist partners all along had seen as its proper concern. But the partnership had gone by default, and the role of the non-Zionists now consisted exclusively of providing the funds for the Jewish Agency to spend.

*The Waning of Non-Zionism*

This, in the simplest terms, was the situation which the reconstitution, 23 years after the establishment of the State, came to rectify. The new attempt has the advantage of no longer having to contend with the split between Zionists and non-Zionists over the question of sovereignty, which has long since been settled. Not only had the ideological non-Zionist individuals dis-
appeared from the scene, but the American Jewish organizations that had opposed the idea of a Jewish state in the 1920s and 1930s—the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee foremost among them—had undergone a profound change as well. It would be an anachronism, therefore, to see the new arrangement as one aiming at parity between Zionists and non-Zionists. At most, one can speak of a fifty-fifty division between delegates representing WZO, on the one hand, and those designated by organizations not formally part of WZO, on the other.

These organizations—the United Israel Appeal in the United States and similar drives in other parts of the world—are the ones that raise funds on behalf of the Agency. They are thus not only entirely in accord with the purposes of Zionism, but also provide the money for its projects. While the individuals chosen by these groups to represent them in the Jewish Agency technically may be non-Zionist, it would be wrong to classify the organizations themselves as non-Zionist. Indeed, the campaigns outside the United States are coordinated by the Keren Ha-yesod central office in Jerusalem, which is the fund-raising arm of the Zionist movement.

It is apparent, therefore, that there is little chance of control slipping into the hands of non-Zionists. In sum: rather than underscoring dividing lines between Zionists and non-Zionists, which are delicately balanced by parity, the new plan sets out to attenuate differences, probably with the aim of eventually blurring them altogether. In a sense, it vindicates former Prime Minister David Ben Gurion’s long-held thesis that in the Diaspora, “there are no Zionists, only Jews.”

The fact that WZO chose fund-raising bodies as its counterpart points to another essential difference from 1929. Then, Dr. Weizmann courted the non-Zionists in order to open up new sources of income to the sorely-pressed Zionist movement. This time, the people who were already providing the resources were being asked to join formally in the body that determines the spending. Whatever immediate material results were expected from the new arrangement, therefore, would not be immediate: the Jews of America, England, and many other countries had, for several years, been exerting great efforts without formal recognition of their role through participation in the Jewish Agency.

Both Sides Seek New Arrangement

Still another significant departure from the 1929 pattern has already been alluded to: then, the effort began as a process of unilateral wooing by the Zionist side; this time, the pressure for a new structural arrangement came from the non-Zionist side as well. Looking first at the forces at work within the Zionist movement, itself: attempts had been made since the early sixties

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2 In his address to the preparatory meeting, the chairman of the Agency Executive, Louis A. Pincus, put it somewhat differently: “Soon all the non-Zionists will also be Zionists.”
to instill new vigor into the Jewish Agency by broadening its base. This
took two forms: (1) the opening up of the World Zionist Organization to
"territorial" (i.e., nonparty) Zionist bodies and to non-Zionist organizations
which subscribed to the Zionist program; and (2) through the co-optation
of some non-Zionist individuals to the Executive. But neither of these
moves had much practical effect. The constitutional dilemma—how non-
Zionists could function as part of a body which was totally responsible to
the World Zionist Organization—was not resolved.

What, then, did WZO-Jewish Agency—which at the time was headed by the
late Moshe Sharett, as Jewish Agency chairman, and by Dr. Nahum Gold-
mann, as WZO president—seek to accomplish by these moves? Permitting
nonparty-affiliated Zionists to join WZO had a two-fold aim: it was meant to
break the stranglehold of the Zionist parties on the movement, dominated as
they were by their Israeli branches, and also to give individuals an op-
portunity to be "unhyphenated" Zionists, i.e., without being, at the same
time, adherents of Mapai, Mapam, or Mizrahi. Goldmann, in particular,
had for some time been intent on prying loose the Zionist movement from
its traditional tie to the party structure, and thereby from the control of
the Israeli power center. Indeed, one gathers from a careful reading of his
speeches and policies that one of his goals was the creation of a counterweight
to the Israeli establishment, which would be capable of exerting some in-
fluence on the shape of Israel's development.³

The co-optation of non-Zionist individuals to the Executive had the addi-
tional purpose of restoring a more general Jewish complexion to the Jewish
Agency Executive than came with being merely the executive arm of the
World Zionist Organization. It was to counteract the impression, widely
prevalent in Israel, that the Zionist movement was neither representative
of diaspora Jewry numerically, nor primarily responsible for raising the
money. This led to a pronounced decline in the prestige of the WZO-
Jewish Agency, particularly after the pace of immigration had slackened and
questions were being raised as to the function of the organization and its
considerable bureaucracy. Goldmann and others were wont to blame Ben
Gurion's vendetta against the Zionist movement for the decline in its
prestige. It is more likely that Ben Gurion was only giving expression to
a disenchantment that was quite deeply rooted in public opinion and
stemmed from the attrition of the movement's functions in the wake of
independence, and the emasculation of its once substantial political role.

Levi Eshkol, who succeeded Ben Gurion as prime minister in 1963, came
in with a more sympathetic attitude toward the Zionist movement and its

³ Goldmann's efforts in that direction have not been confined to the Zionist
movement, of course. They no doubt played a role—as did his unorthodoxy
regarding Israel's foreign policy—in the controversial position he occupies among
leading Israeli politicians.
executive body. (He had, for a number of years, served concurrently as finance minister in the government and as chairman of the Agency's land settlement department.) Nevertheless, it was during his incumbency that the government decided to establish a new body charged with conducting relations with the Diaspora—on the nonmaterial plane. Although officially under the joint auspices of the government and the WZO-Jewish Agency, the Merkaz le-Tfutzot (Center for the Diaspora) clearly constituted a bypassing of the latter's area of competence as defined in the Status Law. It was, from the first, unwelcome to the Agency, and it was the Agency's passive resistance, coupled with the government's subsequent loss of interest, which led to its demise by the end of the decade.

One may conclude, then, that a main consideration for broadening the base of the Zionist movement was to implement the provision of the Status Law, which made it incumbent upon the WZO-Jewish Agency to become more representative of world Jewry as a whole in its relationship with Israel, and thereby to strengthen the Agency's position vis-à-vis the government. For it had become clear that nonfulfillment of the Agency's mission, as provided for in the law, would lead the government to seek other channels of contact with diaspora Jewry.

Ben Gurion, himself, had opposed the Status Law. In his concept of mamlakhtiyut (a difficult-to-translate expression signifying the supremacy of the state over factional interests) there was no room for a competing power center that did not derive its influence from factors within the state. There was also a party-political aspect to his coolness toward WZO: while in Israel the preponderance of the Labor parties was unchallenged, diaspora Zionism had traditionally been dominated by the bourgeois parties. Therefore, control at the source by diaspora Zionists of monies raised for the Jewish Agency could lead to an unwelcome influence in Israel's affairs. Indeed, in a brief contest for key positions in UJA in the early fifties, Ben Gurion had intervened to prevent this from happening.

Thereafter, the Labor party leadership—including its representatives on the Agency executive—was content to see the direction of UJA in the hands of non-Zionist lay leaders and professional executives, rather than of ideologically-committed but party-affiliated Zionists. Since the United Jewish Appeal was, in effect, a contractual arrangement between its two beneficiaries, the United Israel Appeal representing the needs of the Jewish Agency through the latter's financial arm, the Keren Ha-yesod; and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, a partnership in which the UIA-Jewish Agency side had the majority “interest,” the Israelis felt assured against any undue interference on that level.

Role of Welfare Funds

But if the UJA, itself, was not likely to demand a say in the disbursement of funds, where then did the pressure for reconstitution originate on the
American side? Behind UJA in the local communities stood the Jewish federations and welfare funds, and it was here that the mainspring of the drive for greater participation was to be found. It expressed itself in the attempt to bring the operations of the Jewish Agency within the scrutiny of the Large Cities Budgeting Conference (LCBC), an instrumentality of the welfare funds designed to review the budgets of agencies receiving allocations. This attempt was resisted vigorously by the WZO-Jewish Agency leadership, to whom it represented a throwback to an earlier welfare funds initiative called "national budgeting," which had been abandoned due to opposition by both Zionist and non-Zionist beneficiary agencies. Other unpleasant memories of conflicts between the Zionist fund-raising bodies and local philanthropic interests in the twenties and thirties also colored the Zionist apperception of the role of the welfare funds which, in the fifties, continued to be basically negative, approximately as follows:

1) The federations and welfare funds in fact represented the interests of their local institutions, and retained an undue proportion of the funds they collected for distribution locally.

2) Even though these campaigns were being conducted by local welfare funds, most of the giving was motivated by the needs of Israel.

3) Through their nationwide association, the welfare funds were intent on creating a powerbase from which to standardize the local allocations procedure—a domain which was not legitimately theirs.

4) The welfare-fund leadership was concerned only with the "philanthropic" aspect of aid to Israel, and was opposed to allocating funds to the Zionist side of the Jewish Agency's program, such as Jewish education in the Diaspora.

As a result of this analysis, and the attitudes it engendered, a relationship which was in essence based on cooperation toward a common goal, namely the maximizing of income from the welfare-fund campaigns on behalf of both local causes and UJA—was in actuality shot through with tensions. And it was further complicated by the awareness of the Zionist organizational leadership in the United States of its own marginal role in the fund-raising effort, with resulting feelings of frustration and antagonism.

**Origins of United Israel Appeal**

This marginality was the result of a process of mergers and consolidation which had begun in the 1930s, when the various funds active on behalf of the Zionist movement in United States combined to form the United Palestine Appeal (later United Israel Appeal). With the outbreak of World

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4 The principals in the merger were Keren Ha-yesod (Palestine Foundation Fund, already mentioned as the financial arm of the Jewish Agency), and Keren Kayyemet, or Jewish National Fund. Lesser partners were the funds conducted by political parties in Palestine for their so-called "constructive enterprises." These
War II, the United Palestine Appeal and the Joint Distribution Committee overcame their long-standing ideological differences and rivalry for the contributor's dollar to join together in the United Jewish Appeal. UJA, in turn, concluded agreements with the federations and welfare funds for a percentage of the campaign proceeds in each community.

As the receipts of the campaigns increased dramatically in response to the growing needs, most of the donors responsible for the increments were non-Zionists, as was the professional personnel in the local and national fund-raising bodies. Inevitably, the emphasis in the campaigns was on humanitarianism and rescue work, rather than on Zionist ideology. Simultaneously, the Zionist funds, which had been at the core of the process, became submerged and their identities blurred. Although this produced dismay among Zionist leaders, the financial results made an alternative structure unthinkable.

**Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc.**

However, a breakthrough affecting the Zionist-welfare fund relationship occurred in 1960, with a structural reorganization that was the first step leading to the reconstituted Jewish Agency, and to greater harmony. To comply with a new interpretation of U.S. government regulations on tax-deductible gifts to charitable organizations, a new body was created in the United States to supervise disbursement in Israel of funds raised by the United Jewish Appeal. The new group, called the Jewish Agency for Israel, Incorporated (JAFI, Inc.), had a 21-member board of directors (later enlarged to 27) on which, for the first time since the enlarged Jewish Agency of 1929, Zionists sat with non-Zionists, who were active in fund raising, to decide on the use of funds in Israel. The new group designated the Jerusalem Jewish Agency as its agent for implementing the programs for which UJA funds were allocated and, to monitor these expenditures, it opened a representative office in Jerusalem, with the prominent economist Isador Lubin as consultant.

The Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds enthusiastically endorsed this development. At its 1960 General Assembly, one of the local welfare fund executives summed up the feeling of many delegates with his statement that “the era of the blank check” was at an end; that communities now insisted on detailed information on and participation in the spending of the funds.

However, the actual changes brought about by this new development were received allocations from the United Israel Appeal until the early 1960s, when objections to their political complexion brought about their exclusion from UIA in the United States. It is worth noting that the Labor parties had traditionally conducted their own Histadrut campaign in the United States and were therefore not a partner in the United Israel Appeal. This ties in with the earlier preponderance of the “bourgeois” Zionist element in the UJA leadership, discussed above.
not far-reaching. The "Inc.," as it came to be called, by and large accepted
the principles by which the Jewish Agency had been operating and allocating
its funds. The composition of the new group ensured that, in case of serious
disagreement, the Zionist and pro-Zionist element would be determining.
After an initial flurry, in part sustained by the welfare funds, which
anticipated innovative approaches within the new structure, public interest
in the reorganization declined. The Jewish Agency had insisted that the new
body retain the old nomenclature, and the resulting multiplication of
agencies bearing similar names was confusing to all but the initiates.

JAFI, Inc. Into UIA, Inc.

To the contributor and man-in-the-Jewish-street this meant little more
than the addition of still another body to the already arcane roster of
organizations; the more so, since the Jewish Agency Executive continued
to maintain a branch in the U.S., known as the Jewish Agency—American
Section, Inc., which bore no relationship to the Jewish Agency for Israel,
Inc. The United Israel Appeal, now shorn of meaningful function, continued
a somewhat shadowy existence until, in 1966, JAFI, Inc., changed its name
to United Israel Appeal, Inc. This somewhat cleared up the semantic
confusion by letting the Jewish Agency title revert to its original holders
exclusively. It also filled the all but empty shell of the United Israel Appeal
with new content.

UIA was endowed with a board of trustees of 210 members, of whom
100 were drawn from names submitted by the federations and welfare funds
and 100 designated by American Zionist organizations (ten were chosen
"at large"). The board of trustees, in turn, designated two-thirds of the 27-
member board of directors, with the remaining one-third appointed by the
Jewish Agency-American Section. Severed from the Keren Ha-yesod, UIA
now became an autonomous American body.

The United Israel Appeal, Inc., later was given a key function in the
Agency's reconstitution, in addition to its role as the group authorized to
determine the manner in which UJA funds are spent by the Jewish Agency.
Under the reconstitution agreement, the UIA designates the 30 per cent of
the Jewish Agency assembly, allotted to non-Zionists from the United States.\(^5\)

Louis Pincus's Role

Two events gave the needed impetus to progress from the plane of UIA,
Inc. to that of the Reconstituted Jewish Agency. One was the selection
of Louis Pincus to succeed Moshe Sharett as chairman of the Executive
upon the latter's death in 1965; the other was the June 1967 war.

\(^5\) To ensure broad representation among those prominent in fund raising, both
on the community and national levels, UIA made up the list in close consultation
with the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds.
Pincus, a lawyer from South Africa and former managing director of El Al Airlines, had joined the Jewish Agency as its treasurer in 1960, at about the time the "Inc." was brought into being. While his predecessor and others on the Executive had viewed the reorganization as a necessity foisted upon the Agency by the income-tax laws of the United States, Pincus took a positive attitude toward the JAFI, Inc., in his role as ex-officio member of its board. Frequent trips to the United States gave him the opportunity to gain a realistic picture of the constellation of forces within the American Jewish community. His conclusions doubtless were similar to those of Weizmann in his day: that much useful energy was being wasted by confrontation, and that co-optation of a wide range of factors in the community would make it possible to harness more resources in Israel's behalf. In the workings of JAFI, Inc., he was able to note that differences with those active in the local welfare funds were marginal rather than substantial, and that the adaptation of the existing machinery could give sense of participation to all involved.

**Effects of 1967 War**

But it took the 1967 war and the accompanying upsurge in the Diaspora’s contributions to Israel to provide the decisive leverage toward reconstitution. Two figures will suffice to mirror the impact in financial terms: in 1966, the net amount made available to the Jewish Agency from worldwide campaigns was $60 million; in 1967, it was $346 million.

Paradoxically, the initial effect of the war was to jeopardize, rather than buttress, Jewish Agency autonomy. Its role in handling the flood of volunteers during the crisis had given rise to dissatisfaction; the fact that most of these young people soon returned to their countries of origin was seen as a wasted opportunity for tapping a ready reservoir of potential immigrants. Once again, it appeared to some Israeli officials that the government should become more deeply involved in the Agency’s policies and operations. Since the early 1960s, the Agency’s programs in the areas of immigrant absorption, agricultural settlement, etc., already had been closely coordinated with government policy through a joint standing committee. The Ministries of Housing, Health, Education and Welfare had carried much of the responsibility for immigrant integration in their respective fields, with financing from government budgets.

**Ministry of Immigrant Absorption**

In June of 1968 the government also decided on the creation of a new Ministry of Immigrant Absorption (Klitah) with which the Agency would henceforth have to share its central function. The *modus operandi* provided for continued Jewish Agency responsibility for the staging of immigration abroad, while the new ministry was to deal with most areas of reception and
integration within the country. The first incumbent was Yigal Allon, and it was anticipated that his ministry would eventually unite under one roof the "absorption" functions not only of the Jewish Agency but also of the various government ministries—and to do so more effectively. But this was not to be, for two reasons. First, the service ministries affected, having been unwilling to cede any of their functions to the Jewish Agency, were now equally reluctant to turn them over to the Absorption Ministry; and, second, the Agency was able to marshal a potent argument in support of its continued independent existence: the fact that contributions of American Jewry (and of some other communities, as well) must be disbursed by a nongovernmental, voluntary organization in order to enjoy exemption from income taxes. The UJA-UIA leadership in the United States also protested vigorously to the officials involved against any plan to transfer additional responsibilities from the Agency to the government, arguing that it would jeopardize the fund-raising structure in the United States. Their reasoning proved convincing, above all to Minister of Finance Pinhas Sapir, and the integrity of the Agency was maintained.

The Israel government later transferred some of its own activities to the Agency, rather than the other way round. Among the programs which had previously been financed by government and which now became the responsibility of the Jewish Agency was the subsidizing of Israel's institutions of higher learning. Other programs in the fields of health, welfare, immigrant housing, and education, which involve substantial outlays for immigrants, also became the Agency's financial, but not operational, responsibility.

Separation of WZO from Jewish Agency

While the reconstitution thus measurably strengthened the position of the Jewish Agency, it also called for a major concession by the Zionist organization: to separate once and for all WZO from the Jewish Agency, in both structure and function. Under the reconstitution agreement, WZO was to give up its status of virtual identity with the Jewish Agency, that had been granted legitimacy by the 1952 Status Law, and to become once again a limited partner in the Agency.

With the establishment of the Jewish Agency, Inc., in 1960, a de jure separation already had taken place on the budgetary level. Since the JAFI Inc. (later UIA, Inc.) could make allocations only for those activities of the Jewish Agency which were entitled to tax exemption under United States law as interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service, it was decided to separate out those activities which were ineligible or doubtful from the tax point of view and to group them in a separate World Zionist Organization budget. These were mainly programs not specifically aimed at new immigrants, some of them for countries other than Israel, such as education in the Diaspora, organization and information, and youth work. Together,
the cost of these activities amounted to about 10 per cent of the Agency's expenditures.

With all JAFI, Inc. funds earmarked for the Jewish Agency proper, the WZO budget was financed by contributions to Keren Ha-yesod in other countries, as well as by miscellaneous sources of income. Under this arrangement, though the budgets were separate, the same Executive directed the programs of both Agency and WZO. Thus, for the general public at least, the identity of the two bodies continued as heretofore. But in the negotiations leading to the reconstitution, effective separation of the Jewish Agency from WZO was a sine qua non for many of the leading non-Zionists. The Zionists conceded the point in principle, but were deeply concerned about the funding of the WZO budget. Eventually, a formula was agreed upon whereby the financial needs of WZO were to be met from funds that did not come under the restrictive provision of tax-exempt gifts in the United States and elsewhere. At the same time, WZO would not have to conduct a campaign of its own, which would have represented an undesirable interference with fund raising for the Jewish Agency. The fact that the Zionist leadership was able to persuade the non-Zionists to accept this arrangement would indicate that it was able to make a strong case for the legitimacy of Zionist work.

1967 War Brings Change in Attitudes

No doubt the drastic change in non-Zionist attitudes that occurred in the wake of the 1967 war played a role in this. The wave of enthusiasm engulfing everything related to Israel broke down traditional attitudes to the extent that even the notion of aliya from the United States had become acceptable to many non-Zionists. During the crisis itself, the results of the campaigns on behalf of Israel had been such that there was enough credit for everyone, and past organizational rivalries gave way to close cooperation. The much-disputed ratio between local and overseas allocations became a thing of the past as the Israel Emergency Fund tipped the scales overwhelmingly in Israel's favor.6 There was no quibbling by the welfare funds over the principle that all monies collected over and above the regular campaign proceeds should go to UJA. Consequently, a Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds delegation, which visited Israel in September 1967, was able to report that "we found the warmest of welcomes, based upon new recognition of the extraordinary work our federations and welfare funds

6 The welfare funds raised $145 million in 1967 through their regular campaigns, of which UJA received about 50 per cent. An additional $173 million in pledges was raised through the Emergency Fund, all of which was earmarked for UJA. In 1968 the respective amounts were $153 and $80 million. (Figures from the American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 71 [1970], p. 182.)
had accomplished for the Israel Emergency Fund (in cooperation with UJA) and, even more fundamentally, a new understanding of the continuing central role of our community organizations in American and worldwide Jewish life."

It was in this atmosphere of mutual good feeling that the plans for the reconstitution of the Jewish Agency gathered support.

**The Conference on Human Needs**

Indicative of the spirit of cooperation seeking an outlet in tangible form even before the new structure was worked out was the Conference on Human Needs (COHN), which took place in Jerusalem in 1969 under joint government-Agency auspices. The delegates were professional and lay specialists in such fields as housing, agriculture, education, and welfare, who held several days of discussions on Israel's problems and programs in those areas with their Israeli counterparts. The latter apparently came away from the conference convinced that here was a model for future association with diaspora Jewry.

The new symbiotic relationship was perhaps best exemplified by the fact that a single individual, Max M. Fisher of Detroit, was both president of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds and chairman of the United Israel Appeal. Later, he was also chosen chairman of the board of governors of the reconstituted Jewish Agency. Finally, Fisher was also chairman of the executive committee of the American Jewish Committee, whose leading member in the 1920s was Louis Marshall.

In his speech to the planning committee in August 1970, Pincus said that he had "warned Max Fisher that the day will come when I shall call him a Zionist too, when that gap is closed completely, and we will be unable to differentiate in the approach to the problems of Israel between those who come from here or there." But in the same address Pincus made it clear that the Zionist organization did not intend to take a back seat under the new arrangement: "We are now entering a joint and equal partnership; fifty-fifty on the organizational basis. In the discussions it was clear to everybody that if we had to count card-carrying Zionists as it were, versus non-card-carrying Zionists, there is a Zionist majority—that must be in the nature of things. I hope that the fact there is a majority or a minority will play no role beyond what I have just said." Pincus left no room for doubt that the WZO saw in the separation a necessary evil, and not a desideratum, as did some of the non-Zionists. He concluded, "I also know that nothing will be done by any responsible Jewish leader, in the creation of the expanded Jewish Agency, that will denigrate or derogate, not only from the past of the world Zionist movement, but from its ongoing activities, in the role that it still has to play in Jewish life, and in seeking the realization of our ultimate dream."
Three Tiers Retained in New Structure

The planning committee, which met in Jerusalem in August 1970, initialed the agreement for the reconstitution, which was later approved by the founding assembly in June 1971. At that time, the planning committee, itself, was named as the board of governors of the Agency, the centerpiece in the tier of governing bodies retained from the 1929 structure (although with somewhat different nomenclature). By all indications, the board will be the effective policy-making group. The agreement stipulates that it “shall manage the affairs of the Agency and control its activities.” It also is empowered to elect the members of the Executive. Its members are to be elected by the assembly as follows: 50 per cent from among the members of the assembly, designated by WZO; 30 per cent from among those designated by the United Israel Appeal, Inc.; 20 per cent to be designated outside of Israel and the United States. (An annex to the agreement specifies that, among the latter, two are to be from England; one each from Canada, Western Europe, and South Africa; two from South America, of whom one is to be from Argentina and the other, in rotation, from one of four other countries.)

The number of members of the board of governors was augmented from 38, as stipulated in the draft agreement, to 40, apparently in order to preserve a delicate balance and also to accommodate more individuals and localities. It is noteworthy that the 50-30-20 ratio is operative as regards Zionist-non-Zionist relationship, as well as geographically. There are 20 Zionists, 12 American non-Zionists, and eight non-Zionists from other countries. But among the Zionists there are also eight Americans, so that the total number of Americans on the board is 20, as compared to 12 Israelis, and eight from other countries. Without analyzing the Board’s composition in detail, the names of the American unit will be of interest. The non-Zionists (some prefer to be called non-WZO members) are Albert Adelman, Milwaukee, Wisc.; Victor Carter, Los Angeles, Calif.; Melvin Dubinsky, St. Louis, Mo.; Max M. Fisher, Detroit, Mich.; Edward Ginsberg, Cleveland, Ohio; Morris Levinson, New York City; Joseph Meyerhoff, Baltimore, Md.; Robert Russell, Miami, Fla.; Louis Stern, Essex County, N.J.; Dewey D. Stone, Brockton, Mass.; Jack Weiler, New York City, and Paul Zuckerman, Detroit, Mich. Those representing Zionist organizations in the United States are Arthur Hertzberg, Englewood, N.J.; Richard Hirsch, Washington, D.C.; Mrs. Charlotte Jacobson, New York City; Israel Miller, New York City; Allen Pollack, New York City; Emanuel Rackman, New York City; Kalman Sultanik, New York City, and Jacques Torczyner, New York City.

The board of governors is to meet not less than three times a year, one of the meetings to take place in conjunction with the annual meeting of the assembly.

Aside from appointing the board of governors, the functions of the
assembly are described in the agreement as follows: to receive reports from the board of governors and the Executive; to review needs and programs; to determine basic policies; to consider and act upon budgets submitted by the board of governors. However, the main purpose of the assembly would seem to be that of constituting a forum for discussion. The 50-30-20 ratio also applies to the composition of the assembly, whose 296 members are to be designated by the signatory organizations.

As for the Executive, the agreement states that it "shall be responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Agency, subject to the control of the board of governors." It further stipulates that the Executive shall consist of persons elected *ad personam* by the board of governors, so that the 50-30-20 formula does not apply in this case. Further, according to the agreement, the chairman of the Jewish Agency (who also shall be chairman of the assembly), as well as the heads of its four major departments and the chairman of Keren Ha-yesod, shall be members of the Executive, as are three members of the board of governors not designated by WZO (two of them to be designated by UIA, Inc.). Since the heads of Agency departments will in all likelihood come from Zionist ranks, this provision would appear to ensure a Zionist preponderance on the Executive. The principal offices of the Executive will be located in Jerusalem, which makes it unlikely that the non-Israeli members will participate in day-to-day business.

The actual makeup of the first Executive shows, however, that four, rather than three, non-Zionists were appointed: Dubinsky, Fisher, and Ginsberg of the United States, and Michael Sacher of Britain. In addition, Gottlieb Hammer, executive vice president of UIA, and Philip Bernstein, executive vice president of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, were designated associate members without a vote (the agreement states that up to three associate members may be appointed).

**Decision-making Consensus**

In its actual functioning so far, the reconstituted Jewish Agency has borne out the expectation that decisions would be arrived at by consensus, rather than by vote. A mood of comradeship and optimism pervaded the planning sessions in 1970, the founding assembly in 1971, and the meeting of the board of governors held in London in February 1972. It was a mood shared by all the participants, regardless of the camp to which they belonged. While the non-Zionists showed understanding of the limitations imposed upon their own role as well as on that of the Jewish Agency in the larger institutional structure of Israel, they were nevertheless eager to utilize the opportunities for exerting influence, which the new framework offered. The influence—if the present pattern continues—will not flow from the weight of their numerical representation, but rather from their own stature and authority. This will be so even in areas where the Jewish Agency must share
control with the government, as the new structure opens up regular channels of communication with policy-makers in the various ministries. An example is public housing, on which strong (and expert) American views on the applicability of novel construction methods to the conservative Israeli housing industry have already made their impact.

To the extent that the leading non-Zionists succeed in impressing their stamp upon the Jewish Agency, it is inevitable that the future role of the World Zionist Organization will be put to the test. In the short run, the buttressing of the Agency's position through reconstitution has, by indirection, strengthened WZO as well. But in the longer term, WZO will have to evolve a new image for itself, both as far as its relationship to the Agency and its own independent tasks are concerned; it will not be able to maintain its accustomed stance of identity with the Jewish Agency. At the World Zionist Congress, which took place in Jerusalem in February 1972, only perfunctory notice was taken of the new development, and of WZO's changed status vis-à-vis the Jewish Agency. An observer at the Congress could have gained the impression that the reconstitution was but another in a series of modifications, which left the basic structure unchanged.

This is certainly not the view of most American non-Zionist delegates to the Agency's governing bodies. Through their conscientious approach to the Agency's problems, their vigorous insistence on information, and their incisive questioning, they showed that they take the new structure and their task in it seriously.

Ernest Stock