The Arab-Israel War of 1967
1967 was the year of the six-day war. Here we bring together its impact on Israel and on the Jewish communities in the Arab countries; United States Middle East policy and United Nations deliberations; effects on the East European Communist bloc, its citizens, and its Jewish communities, and American opinion. For discussions of reactions in other parts of the world, see the reviews of individual countries.

The Editors
Almost all aspects of Israel's life in 1967 were dominated by the explosion of hostilities on June 5. Two decades of Arab-Israel tension culminated in a massive combined Arab military threat, which was answered by a swift mobilization of Israel's citizen army and, after a period of waiting for international action, by a powerful offensive against the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian forces, leading to the greatest victory in Jewish military annals.

During the weeks of danger preceding the six-day war, Jewry throughout the world rallied to Israel's aid: immediate financial support was forthcoming on an unprecedented scale, and thousands of young volunteers offered personal participation in Israel's defense, though they arrived too late to affect the issue (see reviews of individual countries).

A new upsurge of national confidence swept away the morale crisis that had accompanied the economic slowdown in 1966. The worldwide Jewish reaction to Israel's danger, and the problems associated with the extension of its military rule over a million more Arabs, led to a reappraisal of attitudes towards diaspora Jewry. It was generally agreed that immigration from the free countries now was of more vital importance than ever before, and much thought was given to adapting the machinery of government and the structure of the Zionist organization to the tasks of attracting immigrants from the West and facilitating their integration.

In the international arena, Israel successfully withstood Arab and Soviet pressure for the unconditional withdrawal of its forces from the areas occupied as a result of the six-day war. But, although there was practically unanimous national support for the government's insistence on peace treaties with the Arab states as a condition of any settlement, there was much public debate on whether Israel should be prepared to barter territories for peace in the event of direct negotiations.

An important by-product of the crisis was the formation of a Cabinet of National Unity and the agreement between Mapai, Ahdut Ha-'avodah and Rafi for the establishment of a united Labor party.

The total population of areas under Israeli control at the end of 1967 was
estimated at 3,767,000: 2,365,000 Jews; 344,000 non-Jews (mainly Arabs and Druzes) in areas within the former armistice lines; 66,000 non-Jews in East Jerusalem, and 992,000 in areas under military administration.

**Arab-Israel Tension Rises**

Tension on the Syrian frontier rose steadily during the early months of 1967. On January 17 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol drew attention to the gravity of the situation: during the first three weeks of the year, there were 23 Syrian attacks, including machine-gun and tank artillery fire on Israeli farmers inside and outside the demilitarized zones, mine-laying on roads and on a village football field, and sabotage of water installations.

Israel and Syria accepted United Nations Secretary General U Thant's proposal for talks, within the framework of an emergency meeting of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (which had been deadlocked since 1959), to discuss "practical arrangements on problems of cultivation on the Armistice Demarcation Line to secure a peaceful atmosphere on the ADL for farmers and civilians in the areas."

At the first meeting, on January 25, an official report by General Odd Bull, United Nations chairman of the commission, stated that both sides "reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from all kinds of hostile or aggressive action, in accordance with the provisions of the UN charter and the general armistice agreements." However, at the second and third meetings, January 29 and February 2, the Syrian delegation insisted on discussing at length questions of principle connected with the status of the demilitarized zones, despite General Bull's appeal to both sides to stick to the agreed agenda. On February 8 President Nur al Din al Atasi of Syria declared:

> Our agreement to participate in the [Mixed Armistice Commission] meeting will in no way influence our attitude concerning the Palestine problem, as well as the real method of liberation. The Palestine problem will be solved only in the heart of the usurped land.

The fourth meeting, set for February 9, was postponed indefinitely at the request of the Syrians. Border violence, mainly in the north, continued, and Israel repeatedly complained to the UN Security Council. Between July 1966 and May 1967, 34 such complaints were submitted.

Foreign Minister Abba Eban denied in the Knesset, on February 4, Soviet and Arab allegations of Israeli opposition to the "revolutionary" nature of the Syrian regime. "We are only interested in changing the aggressive policy of Syria towards Israel," he said. "The nature of Syria's regime and the character of her society are not our concern."

Referring to the border troubles, Israeli Chief of Staff Major General Isaac Rabin, said in Tel Aviv on March 24:

> The solution to this problem involves a number of means—political, military and defensive. We have to react toward the country that encourages incursions
into Israel and take action against the country from which these infiltrators come.

On April 2 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol told the cabinet that recent sabotage attempts were regarded with the utmost gravity. Three days later, Foreign Minister Eban issued another warning to Syria in the Knesset that “the Government of Israel will take and carry out whatever steps it deems necessary to protect its territory and the lives of its citizens.”

On April 7 a serious clash occurred on the northern border, after the Syrians had shelled the villages of Tel Katzir, Ha'on, Ein Gev, and Gadot intermittently for four days, over 200 heavy mortar shells falling on Gadot, where not a single house escaped damage. When the Syrians brought up tanks and heavy artillery, Israeli artillery returned fire, and bombers, covered by Mirage fighters, were sent up to silence their positions. Six Syrian Mig 21s were shot down by Israeli fighters pursuing them as far as Damascus. The Israeli air force action had saved the villages from catastrophe, Eshkol stated in a broadcast on the following day. After several more days of Syrian shooting, Israel again complained to the Security Council, drawing attention to official Syrian communiques that admitted opening fire on Israeli tractors.

In view of rumors of Israeli troop concentrations near the Syrian border, General Bull had proposed to both parties (April 5) an investigation of the situation by UN observers. Israel agreed to this and a further, similar, request in the first week of May, but the Syrians refused. Prime Minister Eshkol invited Soviet Ambassador Dimitri Chuvakhin to tour the border to see for himself, but the envoy declined the invitation.

Addressing a Mapai meeting in Tel Aviv, on May 12, Prime Minister Eshkol said:

In view of the fourteen incidents of sabotage and infiltration perpetrated in the past month alone, Israel may have no other choice but to adopt suitable counter measures against the foci of sabotage and their abettors.

In reply to a question, he emphasized that Israel would continue to thwart any attempt to interfere with shipping to and from Israel through the Red Sea.

On May 13 Soviet Russia informed Egypt that Israel was concentrating troops on its border with Syria with a view to launching an attack within a week. President Gamal Abdel Nasser began moving forces on a large scale through the streets of Cairo and building up Egyptian strength in the Sinai Peninsula. When the news reached Israel during the night of May 14, the government immediately informed the United Nations that Russia's allegations were baseless. Reporting to the Security Council, on May 19, Secretary General U Thant stated:

The Government of Israel very recently has assured me that there are no unusual troop concentrations or movements along the Syrian lines.
from UNTSO observers confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line.

On May 16 Cairo Radio declared:

The existence of Israel has continued too long. We welcome the Israeli aggression, we welcome the battle that we have long awaited. The great hour has come. The battle has come in which we shall destroy Israel.

On the same day the Histadrut Davar reported Prime Minister Eshkol's statement to the government that Egyptian troop movements were meant for show and had more demonstrative than practical significance. However, Israel had mobilized part of its reserves as a precautionary measure.

Also, on May 16, Egypt demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force which had been stationed since 1957 on the border of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, and at Sharm el-Sheikh, commanding the Strait of Tiran, the approach to Israel's Red Sea port of Eilat. U Thant replied that any request for the temporary removal of the force from the border would be regarded as a demand for its complete evacuation, and Egypt thereupon officially requested the evacuation of UNEF from Egyptian territory and the Gaza Strip. On May 19 UNEF commander General Rikhye informed the Israeli authorities that the force ceased to function as of 4 p.m. on that day.

On May 22 Prime Minister Eshkol told the Keneset that Egyptian forces in Sinai had been reinforced from 35,000 to 80,000 men—four divisions of infantry, with armor, artillery and air support. He called upon the great powers "to exercise their full influence in order to remove the danger of a conflagration in the Middle East" and assured the Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Syria, that "we harbor no aggressive designs; we have no possible interest in violating either their security, their territory or their legitimate rights."

On the following day Nasser announced his intention to block the Strait of Tiran to the passage of Israeli ships and ships of other flags carrying "strategic cargoes." Eshkol immediately declared in the Keneset that "Any interference with freedom of passage in the Gulf and the Strait constitutes a gross violation of international law, a blow at the sovereign rights of other nations and an act of aggression against Israel."

On May 25 Foreign Minister Abba Eban left for visits to Washington, London, and Paris, to ask support against the threefold Arab threat: Syrian sabotage and border shooting, the concentration of Egyptian forces in Sinai, and the blocking of the Strait of Tiran. Efforts were made to induce those maritime powers that had proclaimed their support for free passage through the Strait in 1957, to take measures to lift the blockade, but only 4 out of a score responded in the affirmative. On May 26 President Nasser declared, "Sharm el-Sheikh means a confrontation with Israel. After having taken this step, we must be prepared to wage total war on Israel."
Hassanin Heikal, editor of *al-Ahram* and regarded as Nasser's confidant, explained on the same day:

The closing of the Straits of Aqaba is not only a question of the passage of shipping to Eilat, but much more. This is the first time we have succeeded by force in changing the situation in the region. Therefore I say that Israel will have to attack.

On May 28 Prime Minister Eshkol broadcast the text of a declaration approved by the cabinet the day before. Drawing attention to the continuing concentration of Egyptian troops in Sinai and the blockade in the Strait of Tiran, it called the blockade “tantamount to an act of aggression against Israel,” and continued: “We shall defend ourselves against it in time of need by virtue of the right to self-defense which is reserved to every State.” The cabinet, the statement continued, had given instructions for continued diplomatic activity to induce effective measures by “international factors” to safeguard free passage in the Strait, and laid down “lines of activity for the purpose of removing the military concentrations from Israel’s southern border, protecting our sovereign rights and our security on the borders, and averting aggression, so that we shall not have to act in self-defense with military force.”

On the following day Eshkol announced in the Keneset the mobilization of the reserves, which, he said, “are ready and prepared today to frustrate the enemy’s design in all sectors and on all our borders.” He reiterated Israel’s determination “to exercise freedom of passage in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, and defend it in case of need” as “a supreme national interest on which no concession is possible and no compromise is permissible.” He also expressed appreciation of the readiness of the United States, Britain and other maritime states “to effectively support freedom of passage,” and said the government was waiting to see whether these countries would “carry out and coordinate effective action to ensure that the Straits and the Gulf shall be open to the passage of the ships of all nations without discrimination within a short time.”

On May 30 King Hussein of Jordan signed a pact with Egypt, placing his forces under Egyptian control. Egyptian commando forces were flown to Jordan and troops from Iraq, Algeria, and Kuwait were sent to Egypt during the next few days. At the same time Saudi Arabian and Iraqi troops entered Jordan and, on June 4, Iraq signed an agreement with Egypt similar to that concluded by Hussein.

On June 3 Cairo Radio quoted an order of the day by General Murtaji, commander of the Egyptian forces in Sinai:

The eyes of the whole world are upon you in your glorious war against Israeli imperialists on the soil of your homeland. The results of this unique moment are of historic importance for our Arab nation and for the Holy War through which you will restore the rights of the Arabs which have been stolen in Palestine and reconquer the plundered soil of Palestine.
The Six-Day War

At 8:10 a.m. Israel time on June 5 the Israel Defense Forces broadcast the following communique:

Since the early hours of this morning, heavy fighting has been taking place on the southern front between Egyptian armored and aerial forces, which moved against Israel, and our forces, which went into action to check them.

At 10:40 a.m. General Moshe Dayan, the newly appointed Minister of Defense, said in a message to the forces:

We have no aims of conquest. Our only aim is to frustrate the attempt of the Arab armies to conquer our country, and to sever and crush the ring of blockade and aggression which has been created around us.

An hour later Prime Minister Eshkol broadcast to the nation:

We shall not attack any State so long as it does not wage war against us. But anyone attacking us will meet with our full power of self-defense and our capacity to defeat his forces.

Israel gave assurance to Jordan the same morning, that there would be no attack if Jordan did not open hostilities. Nevertheless, Jordanian forces opened fire on Jewish Jerusalem at 11:45 a.m. and expelled the UN observers from their headquarters in the city, while towns and villages all along the armistice lines were shelled by Jordanian artillery and bombarded by Syrian and Iraqi planes.

In a first report, at 1 a.m. on the following morning, Major General Rabin told the press that Israel had achieved air supremacy in the entire area. On the Sinai front, he said, Israeli forces had captured El-Arish and Auja el-Hafir, as well as forward positions at Kuntila. They were moving along the El-Arish—Abu Aweigila road and were fighting in Umm Katef. In the Gaza Strip, they had captured Khan Yunis and were fighting on the outskirts of Gaza. On the Jordanian front, they had taken a number of enemy positions around Jerusalem and were sealing off Jenin. Brigadier Mordecai Hod, Commander of the Israeli air force, added that 374 enemy planes—286 Egyptian, 52 Syrian, 27 Jordanian and 9 Iraqi—had been destroyed; 19 Israeli aircraft had been lost.

On June 6 Israeli forces cleared Abu Aweigila, advanced deep into Sinai and occupied the Gaza Strip. They took further Jordanian strongpoints in and around Jerusalem, and occupied Ramallah, Jenin, Tulkarm and Kalkilya, on the West Bank of the Jordan. On the following day Israeli aircraft and armor destroyed fleeing Egyptian tanks in Sinai, while tanks advanced towards Kantara, took Jebel Libni and Bir Gafgafa, and blocked the Mitla Pass, through which the Egyptian forces were trying to escape. Naval and airborne troops occupied Sharm el-Sheikh and the southern tip of Sinai, opening the Strait of Tiran to all shipping.
Israeli paratroopers broke into the Old City of Jerusalem through St. Stephen's Gate in the eastern wall and took it in hand-to-hand combat, at the cost of heavy casualties to avoid damage to the Holy Places. Israeli forces occupied the rest of the West Bank. The Israeli air force and artillery struck at Jordanian forces and guns in the north.

At a press conference on the same day, General Dayan stated that Israel had achieved her main aims in the campaign. General Rabin emphasized that "all these operations were carried out by the Israel defense forces alone and unaided."

On June 8 Egyptian resistance in Sinai was destroyed and Egypt accepted the UN Security Council's call for a cease-fire. By dawn on the following morning three Israeli columns held positions all along the Suez Canal. On the same day Israeli forces were transferred from the central front to the North, where aircraft, artillery, armor, and infantry broke through the Syrian positions on the Golan Heights, from which Israeli villages in the valley below had been repeatedly harassed and shelled.

On June 10 the Syrians agreed to a cease-fire, but, as they continued to shell Israeli villages, the Israeli forces attacked and occupied the whole of the Golan Heights as far as Kuneitra, 60 kilometers from Damascus. The cease-fire went into force on the northern sector at 16:30 GMT, bringing the six-day war to an end.

On the same day the Soviet Union announced the rupture of diplomatic relations with Israel; Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia followed suit.

On the evening of the 11th, Israeli casualties were announced: 679 killed, 255 with serious or medium injuries, and 2,038 slightly injured. On the same day, the S.S. Dolphin, flying the Israeli flag, passed through the Strait of Tiran and anchored at Eilat.

The Home Front

The mobilization of the reserves placed a severe strain on the economy and public services, but older men, women and schoolchildren volunteered all over the country to perform whatever tasks were required. Workers in factory, field, and office worked overtime without pay to get in the harvest, keep up supplies, and fill export orders, while boys and girls manned the postal services, which remained almost normal.

After a day's rush by housewives to fill their food cupboards, the government announced that ample supplies were available, and kept the warehouses open until late at night so that shops could replenish their stocks.

Following the closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, Menahem Begin, leader of Gahal (Herut-Liberal bloc), Simeon Peres, Secretary-General of Rafi (Israel Labor List) and Moses H. Shapiro, leader of the National Religious party, called for the expansion of the cabinet to fortify public confidence. Peres offered to merge Rafi with Mapai to facilitate the inclusion
of a Rafi representative, but the matter was pursued only after the war ended. Begin first proposed that Ben-Gurion resume the premiership, with Eshkol as deputy; Eshkol said he would be willing to stand down if the people demanded a new premier, but he could not work with Ben-Gurion.

Shapiro, with the support of Gahal, Rafi, and the Independent Liberals, then proposed that Eshkol hand over the defense portfolio to Moshe Dayan of Rafi, but this was opposed by Golda Meir, secretary general of Mapai, and others. Eshkol offered Dayan a senior fighting command, which the latter was willing to accept, and proposed Labor Minister Yigal Allon of Ahdut Ha-'avodah as minister of defense. However, a majority of the Mapai central council insisted on Dayan, and, on June 1, he was coopted as defense minister, as were Begin and Joseph Sapphir, Liberal (June 4) as ministers without portfolio. They took office immediately, though the Keneset formally confirmed the appointments only on June 5.

Reunification of Jerusalem

When Dayan visited the Old City of Jerusalem, on June 7, he said, "We have unified Jerusalem, the divided capital of Israel. We have returned to the holiest of our Holy Places, never to depart from it again." On the same day, Eshkol met with the heads of all religious communities and assured them that no harm would befall the Holy Places. The chief rabbis would be in control of the Western Wall of the Temple Court (the Wailing Wall), and the heads of the Moslem and Christian communities of their Holy Places.

The road to the Western Wall was rapidly cleared of mines, and a number of houses facing it, which left only a narrow lane of access, were demolished after other accommodations were found for the occupants. On the first day of Shavu'ot (Pentecost), June 14, Jews could visit the Wall for the first time in almost twenty years. Some 200,000 persons from all over the country made the pilgrimage, and 100,000 more came the next day. A week later the keys to the Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus, which had been cut off from Jewish Jerusalem for 19 years, were handed over to Mrs. Charlotte Jacobson, national president of American Hadassah. On June 23 some 2,000 Moslems from all over Israel and 3,000 from the West Bank areas met in prayer at the el-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, to which year-round access was now assured.

On June 26 the Government Bureau of Statistics conducted a census in East Jerusalem, which had a total population of 66,000: 54,000 Moslems and 12,000 Christians and others.

A day later the Keneset passed three laws: 1) empowering the government to extend Israeli law and administration to all parts of Eretz Yisrael; 2) authorizing the interior minister to extend the jurisdiction of Israeli municipalities to parts of the area, and 3) providing penalties of up to seven years' imprisonment for the desecration of Holy Places or barring any person from free access to the Holy Places of his religion.
Interior Minister Moses H. Shapiro issued an order on June 28, enlarging the limits of Jerusalem to include the eastern part of the city. At midday on June 29 the 19-year-old barriers between East and West Jerusalem were removed. Thousands of Jews swarmed into the bazaars of the Old City, and Jerusalem's Arabs were now permitted to move freely into all parts of Israel.

On July 3 Minister of Religious Affairs Zerah Warhaftig protested Jordanian desecration of the ancient Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives, from which tombstones had been removed as building material for Jordanian army camps, and the destruction or desecration of the synagogues in the Old City.

At the beginning of July Vatican representative Monsignor Angelo Felici visited Israel, was received by the prime minister and President Shazar, and talked with ministers and officials. When Felici met with Eshkol on July 11, they issued a joint statement that they discussed "in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding, various possible formulae with a view to reaching a satisfactory solution of important questions relating to the Holy Places." It was also stated that Ehud Avriel, Israel ambassador in Rome, would continue the talks with the Vatican.

U Thant's special envoy, Ernesto Thalmann, paid a fact-finding visit to Jerusalem in August. In his report, published on September 12, he said that the outward appearance of the city was calm and apparently normal, although many Arab personalities, mostly former leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization, voiced opposition to Israeli rule over East Jerusalem. In an introduction to the report, U Thant noted that "the Israeli authorities stated unequivocally that the process of integration was irreversible and not negotiable." Commenting on the report, Foreign Minister Eban expressed Israel's "urgent desire to secure appropriate expression of the special interests of the three great religions in Jerusalem."

**Areas Under Military Administration**

According to a census in August and September, the population of the areas that came under Israeli administration as a result of the six-day war totaled about 992,000: 597,000 in the West Bank areas, of whom 60,000 were living in refugee camps; 356,000 in the Gaza Strip, of whom 175,000 were in refugee camps; 33,000 in northern Sinai, and 6,400 in the Golan Heights. Some 956,000 of them were Moslems, 30,000 Christians, and 6,000 (mainly in the Golan Heights) Druzes.

The latest previous Egyptian estimate for the population of the Gaza Strip was 454,000. Since only few left the area after the war, the difference was apparently due to inflated Egyptian statistics. The 1961 Jordanian census figure was 730,000 for the West Bank areas. Here the difference was due to considerable movement to the East Bank and to other Arab countries in the intervening years. Besides, it was well known that the refugee rolls were inflated. A number of Arabs fled during the fighting, among them many in the refugee camps, who would, in any case, receive rations from the UN Relief
and Works Agency and no doubt preferred to live under Arab rule. After the war, many others left, with the permission of the Israeli authorities, to rejoin relatives, safeguard sources of income, or look after business interests.

Military government, staffed mainly by civilians on reserve duty, was established in the occupied areas under area commands. Local government was left intact; all heads of local authorities remained in office. Except for matters of security Israeli policy was to interfere as little as possible while assisting in the restoration and improvement of civilian services and economic activities. The number of Israeli officials was kept down to the minimum: at the end of the year, nine of 4,600 employed in the education system were Jews, seven of 760 in health, and five of 1,400 in agriculture.

Water and electricity installations damaged during the fighting were repaired by September; water supplies were expanded in the main towns, and irrigation networks improved. The Gaza Strip was linked to the Israeli national power grid, and most of the occupied areas were connected with the Israeli telephone system. Equipment and medicine were supplied for hospitals, and serious cases sent to Israel for treatment. Three thousand persons were inoculated against malaria, and infants in the Gaza Strip vaccinated against polio. Social welfare payments were continued under the supervision of the appropriate ministry.

Schools opened on schedule in mid-September in the Gaza area. There was a delay in the West Bank, where many teachers continued to receive their salaries from the Jordanian government, which denounced as traitors teachers remaining at their posts and parents sending their children to school. There was also considerable disquiet over the Israeli government's policy of expunging anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli passages from textbooks. However, after a while the unrest subsided, and schools were opened in the entire area.

The harvest was excellent and all crops were sold. Israel provided machinery, aid, and guidance for the farmers and facilitated free trading between the West Bank and Gaza, and the export of farm produce. In tacit understanding with the Jordanian government, large quantities of agricultural products were dispatched to the East Bank.

Israeli banks opened branches in the occupied areas; local banks could not reopen because most of their assets were held in Amman. Both the Jordanian dinar and the Israel pound were recognized as legal tender in the West Bank; in the Gaza Strip, Egyptian currency was exchanged for Israeli at a favorable rate. Over 8,000 laborers were engaged in public works.

The Refugees

After a brief period when West Bank residents were permitted to cross the Jordan freely, the Israeli cabinet decided that henceforth they must first have the written approval of their mayor, village head, or other local authority, and sign a declaration that they were leaving of their own free will. On July 2 the government announced that residents who left after June 7
would be allowed to return to their homes until August 10, unless they were considered security risks; those leaving after July 4 would not be readmitted. The first group of 52 families, totaling 150 persons, was selected by the International Red Cross on humanitarian grounds to return on July 18.

The Jordanian government held up repatriation by refusing to allow the Red Cross to distribute official Israeli application forms. However, on August 6, an agreement was reached between Israeli and Jordanian representatives, extending the deadline until August 31 and providing for the use of a form in Hebrew, Arabic, and English, that bore the names of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the State of Israel. Thirty-two thousand application forms for 112,000 persons were submitted, and applications for 21,000 persons were approved.

Repatriation started on August 18, but the numbers brought to the crossing points by the Jordanian authorities fell far short of the daily quotas approved by Israel. By the end of the month only 14,000 had crossed, despite appeals channeled by the Red Cross to the Jordanian authorities, to speed up the return. An Israel government communique, on August 24, stated that the deadline would not be extended again:

The return of the West Bank residents was accompanied by violent incitement by the Jordanian authorities against the Israel authorities on the West Bank, as well as by pressure exerted on Arab residents to return even against their will. The Jordanian authorities are exploiting Israel's willingness to solve a humanitarian problem, with the avowed intention of fomenting hatred and unrest. The Government of Israel cannot and will not under any circumstances permit such exploitation.

However, the government did not preclude consideration of further applications for the reunification of families, based on the merits of each case, and the return of former West Bank residents in this category started in November. On September 6 Foreign Minister Eban told the press that the government was also prepared to allow the return, within a fixed period, of those who had not made use of their permits, but Jordanian representatives failed to turn up at meetings called to make the necessary arrangements.

Shortly after hostilities ended, the government appointed two committees to consider the problem of the 1948 refugees: one for dealing with the political aspects and one with rehabilitation and development plans. Speaking on the refugee question in the UN Assembly's Special Political Committee, on December 14, Israeli representative Michael Comay voiced reservations about UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) totals for pre-1967 and post-1967 refugees. He also pointed out only about one-fifth of the number of persons said to have been displaced were living in camps.

Let me state most categorically that none of these people have been expelled or driven out, as has been alleged [he declared]. In the area presently held by Israel, two and a quarter million Jews and one and a quarter million Arabs are co-existing without serious strife.
Comay added that the Israel government has been working since June on “detailed and practical proposals on the Arab refugee problem,” and proposed immediate consultations with the Arab host countries and the main contributing countries to negotiate “a five-year plan for the rehabilitation of the refugees and their final integration in to the economic life of the region.”

**Problems of Peace and Security**

Addressing the emergency session of the UN General Assembly, on June 19, Foreign Minister Eban said:

Our progress must be, not backwards to an armistice regime, which has collapsed under the weight of years and the brunt of hostility; history summons us forward to permanent peace. In free negotiations with each of our neighbors we shall offer durable and just solutions redounding to our mutual advantage and honor.

On the following day, Prime Minister Eshkol said:

I am ready to meet our nearest neighbors, President Nasser, King Hussein and other Arab leaders, at any place and at any time to hold peace talks.

General Odd Bull, former chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization who was appointed by U Thant to supervise the cease-fire, began to station observer teams on both sides of the Suez Canal. In the meantime, a number of clashes took place between Israeli and Egyptian forces in the canal zone, and Jordanian positions repeatedly opened fire on Israeli units and patrols west of the Jordan River.

On July 12 two Egyptian torpedo boats opened fire on an Israeli naval force, including the destroyer *Eilat*, which was on routine patrol some 16 miles off the Sinai coast. The Egyptian vessels were hit and destroyed. Another prolonged clash on July 14-15, brought about by Egyptian artillery and tank fire on Israeli units, ended with the loss of five Egyptian Mig 21 fighters and a Sukhoi-7 bomber.

Dayan told General Bull that unless Israeli vessels also enjoyed free passage, the Suez Canal would remain closed to both sides. On July 27 Israel and Egypt accepted a proposal by Bull that sailing of Israeli and Egyptian boats on the canal be suspended until a new, mutually acceptable arrangement was worked out.

Opening a foreign policy debate in the Kneset, on July 31, Eban declared that the essential test of cessation of belligerency was the readiness of the Arab governments to conduct negotiations with Israel. “The refusal to carry out this elementary requirement,” he said, “means that belligerency has not ceased.” Israel insisted on the observation of the cease-fire, based on “complete equality and reciprocity.” Applying this principle to the Suez Canal, Eban stated that “the cease-fire line passes through the middle.” He hoped that ways and means might be found to reopen the canal, but stressed that it was inconceivable that it be reopened to ships of all nations without Israel
exercising its undiminished right to free passage. Eban also said that "The shape and extent of Israel's borders will be determined by the kind of peace that can be concluded with our Arab neighbors and the security that such a peace could ensure," and added, "Anyone who wants to be informed of Israel's position on this question should sit down at the negotiating table with her." The following resolution summed up the debate on August 1:

The Knesset approved the Government's position in favor of steps leading to direct talks between Israel and the Arab countries on the signing of peace agreements, and reaffirms that so long as peace is not attained Israel will continue to maintain unaltered the situation created by the cease-fire arrangements.

Defense Minister Dayan asserted, on July 19, Israel's capability of holding on to the territories she had occupied during the six-day war pending a complete revision of her relationships with the Arabs and of her own international status. The Sinai coast, the canal, the Golan Heights and the Jordan River line were all more easily defended than the former frontiers, he added.

On August 24 Government House (former UN headquarters) in East Jerusalem was handed back to General Bull, with the Israeli government stipulation that he and his staff were to act only as cease-fire observers, and not in their former capacity under the armistice agreements.

Firing by the Egyptians at Israeli units and planes in the canal area, and at Israeli vessels in the Gulf of Suez and along the Sinai coast led to a number of serious incidents in September and October.

An Egyptian torpedo boat was sunk in an exchange on September 4; serious damage was done on both sides of the cease-fire line on the 12th, and three Egyptian boats were hit in the canal on the 20th. On October 21 the Israeli destroyer *Eilat*, patrolling in international waters some 14 miles from Port Said, was hit and sunk by three missiles from Egyptian Komar-type boats of Soviet manufacture. Of the 198-man crew, 34 were killed and 91 wounded; 13 were missing. Israel protested to the Security Council, and Defense Minister Dayan, on October 23, called Nasser's order to attack the *Eilat* an order to violate the cease-fire and to renew hostilities.

On the following day Israeli guns, replying to Egyptian artillery fire from Port Ibrahim and the town of Suez, hit fuel tanks and oil refineries with an estimated annual capacity of over 5 million tons. Emphasizing that it was the Egyptians who had opened fire, Dayan said, on October 28, "Once the area was under fire, our soldiers looked for better targets and improved their aim."

Meanwhile, shooting by Jordanian forces at Israeli patrols and units across the river continued at intervals. At the same time, civilians and soldiers were injured by mines in the Gaza Strip and West Bank areas. Over 50 young men from the Gaza Strip, believed to be members of Ahmed Shukairy's Palestine Liberation Army, were arrested in August, trying to cross into Jordan. The activities of Syrian-trained and -organized al-Fatah marauders resumed. A train was mined near Tulkarm; factories, installations, and homes were dam-
aged by explosive charges, especially in the Beisan area, the only one where Jewish villages were still close to the border; grenades were thrown in the Gaza Strip. In several instances, the Israeli army demolished houses from which attacks had been carried out or where arms were found.

After several outrages in Jerusalem, damaging a power station, a printing shop, and a radio antenna at UN headquarters, a time-bomb was found in a cinema on October 8 and removed in the nick of time. A police investigation resulted in the arrest of 24 Arabs, charged with responsibility for the outrages.

In a series of patrols and combing-out operations, the army and the border police captured many saboteurs. A group of 11 members of the Palestine Liberation Army, rounded up on October 16, described how they had been trained at a camp near Damascus, escorted to the Jordanian border by a Syrian officer, and briefed by officers of the Jordanian intelligence. Israel complained to the UN Security Council, on November 6, that Jordan, "in flagrant violation" of the cease-fire, was "giving active support and succor to armed marauders using its territory as their base of operations." By the end of the year, some 500 al-Fatah and other infiltrators had been captured, and 70 killed. With few exceptions, the local population in the occupied areas gave them neither aid nor support.

Prime Minister Eshkol declared in the Keneset, on October 30, that in view of the Arabs' continued refusal to recognize or negotiate with Israel, "Israel will continue to maintain in full the situation as it was established in the cease-fire agreements, and will consolidate her position in keeping with the vital needs of her security and development. . Israel is willing and prepared to work for peace with the neighboring Arab countries. She will not acquiesce in boycott and blockade, siege and aggression." He accused the Soviet Union of again causing "the exacerbation of the tension in the area" by arming Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and expressed regret at France's attitude. He stated that the 1949 armistice agreements had been "nullified by [Arab] military provocation and aggression," and called for the determination of "agreed and secure national boundaries within the framework of peace treaties."

During the Keneset debate, on November 13, Eshkol quoted Nasser as having stated at the Khartoum Conference, "We must not only achieve once again the capacity to defend the country, but bring our army at the earliest possible moment to the strength that will make it possible to attack Israel in confidence of victory." And a statement by King Hussein: "After Israel withdraws—the Arabs will be able to renew their pre-war methods of operation." The Keneset approved the government's policy by a vote of 76 to 3.

After the adoption of the Security Council resolution of November 22 (p. 181), Foreign Minister Eban reaffirmed the principles of Israel's policy:

We shall respect and fully maintain the situation embodied in the cease-fire agreements until it is succeeded by peace treaties between Israel and the Arab
States ending the state of war, establishing agreed, recognized and secure territorial boundaries, guaranteeing free navigation for all shipping, including that of Israel, in all waterways leading to and from the Red Sea, committing all signatories to the permanent and mutual recognition and respect of the sovereignty, security and national identity of all Middle Eastern States, and ensuring a stable and mutually guaranteed security. Such a peace settlement, directly negotiated and contractually confirmed, would create conditions in which refugee problems could be justly and effectively solved through international and regional cooperation.

Eshkol stated, December 1, that Israel would cooperate with the special representative of the UN Secretary General, appointed under the terms of the Security Council resolution, “in his task of bringing the parties to direct negotiations.” He expressed profound regret at President de Gaulle’s statements about Israel and the Jewish people at a press conference in Paris, on November 27 (p. 445), but expressed full confidence that “the friendship between France and her people and ourselves is firm and strong enough to endure even despite the present tension.”

Gunnar Jarring, U Thant’s special envoy to the Middle East, visited Israel on December 14 and 26 and met the prime minister and the foreign minister. No details of the talks were published, but it was understood that one of the subjects discussed was the extrication of the 15 ships stranded in the Suez Canal since the six-day war. It was stated in official circles in Jerusalem that Israel was prepared, in principle, to agree to Egyptian vessels using the canal for this purpose, provided that the arrangements were made through the UN cease-fire observers.

Economic Developments

Economic developments during the year were surveyed by Finance Minister Phineas Sappir on January 2, 1968, when he submitted the 1968-69 budget.

The deflationary tendencies that marked the previous year continued during the first quarter of 1967, with a low level of demand, stable prices, and considerable unemployment. During April and the first half of May there were some signs of improvement, partly owing to the increased allocations for development in the 1967-68 budget (AJYB, 1967 [Vol. 68], p. 434): employment was stabilized and began to grow in industry.

This progress was halted by the call-up of reserves, the requisitioning of vehicles, and the other economic consequences of the tension and fighting in May and June. However, in August, as men and equipment were released, economic activity began to return to normal, and there was an encouraging improvement in employment during the last quarter of the year. Besides the larger number of workers in the production of war materiel, industry hired another 15,000 or so.

On November 19, the day after the devaluation of the British currency, the government adjusted the Israel pound to the new value of the sterling,
raising the exchange rate from I£3 to I£3.50 per United States dollar. Finance Minister Sappir explained that the high proportion of Israel's foreign trade conducted with the United Kingdom and other countries tied to sterling made the adjustment necessary. It would not only prevent shrinkage of exports, but would also improve the competitive capacity of Israeli exports in other countries. A price rise of not more than 2 per cent was expected as a result.

The trade gap was reduced from $335 million in 1966 (goods only) to $210 to $220 million in 1967, exports rising from $477 million to $500 million and imports falling from $811 million to $710 million in the same period. Thus the adverse trade balance had fallen by half since 1964, owing mainly to a 50 per-cent rise in exports.

Consumer prices remained stable at the July 1966 level and the interest on the discounting of bills fell from 18 to 14 per cent. Personal savings increased considerably; output per employee was 4 to 5 per cent higher than the average for 1966. The Investment Center approved 235 projects totaling I£950 million, compared with 195 projects and I£480 million in 1966; projects for new industrial enterprises totaled I£400 million as against I£140 million.

In an effort to enlist the aid of Jews abroad in expanding investments, increasing exports, and improving the efficiency of Israel's economy, the government invited some 60 outstanding Jewish industrialists, financiers, and economists to attend an international advisory conference in Jerusalem in August. Prime Minister Eshkol promised that serious attention would be given criticisms of Israeli economic practices voiced at the meeting. Agreement was reached to invite 400 to 500 persons to another conference in April 1968.

A trade agreement, signed in Tel Aviv on December 19 by Gheirgo Chiaro, Rumanian Minister of Foreign Trade, and Israeli Minister of Commerce and Industry Ze'ev Sharef, provided for $14 million worth of trade each way in 1968, double the 1967 figure, with 10 and 15 per cent increases in the two subsequent years. Israel and Rumania also signed an air agreement.

MISHA LOUVISH
Jews in Arab Countries

Aftermath of Six-day War

Paradoxically, the very magnitude of the Israeli victory in the June war was to help keep in power the regimes of the Arab states so soundly trounced by Israel.* Even before the war was over, the Syrian regime hastily pulled back from the front its best tank divisions as protection against a possible internal take-over by its opponents. The government also ordered the execution, on June 26, of Majors Salim Hatum and Badr Dum'a, who had fled the country after involvement in the September 1966 plot to overthrow the government, but returned under the cover of the June conflict.

Egyptian President Abdel Gamal Nasser dramatically announced his resignation on June 9, and just as dramatically returned to office a day later, after popular demonstrations in his favor erupted throughout the country. Marshal Abd al Hakim Amir, who was relieved of his post as commander-in-chief of Egypt's armed forces after the June debacle, was arrested on August 25 on charges of conspiracy, together with some 50 other army officers and former Minister of War Shams al-din Badran. On September 14 Amir committed suicide; some sources believed he was forced to do so.

King Hussein of Jordan, whose country had suffered the greatest losses, maintained his throne by a hasty cabinet reorganization, on June 15 that eliminated the anti-Nasser elements; by purging more than 60 army officers in September, and by permitting Arab groups to use Jordan as their base for raids on Israeli-occupied territory and Israel itself.

Once post-war upheaval had been avoided, the defeated Arab governments and their severely traumatized peoples rallied more vigorously and bitterly than ever round the standard of anti-Israel feeling, in accordance with which the fall of any of the Mid-East regimes would have meant a new victory for Israel, this time on the diplomatic front.

This also was the reason why even the more conservative, monarchical governments—which Nasser had sought to undermine in the past—agreed, at the August Khartoum summit conference of Arab states, to give financial support to the bankrupt Egyptian government. Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait agreed to give to Nasser 95 million pounds sterling annually and to Jordan 40 million, as their contribution to the war effort. Another, unofficial agreement made at Khartoum between Nasser and King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, called for the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from the Yemen war.

Though united in anti-Israel sentiment, there were considerable differences

* The exception was Iraq, where a year later, on July 17, 1968, a right-wing military junta ousted President Abdel Rahman Arif. It was reported that a revolutionary command council, headed by General Ahmen Hassan al-Bakr, a former premier and member of the right-wing Ba'ath Socialist party (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 420), assumed control of Iraq.
of opinion among the Arab leaders on how to try to recoup war-time losses, differences hotly debated at meetings of the Arab foreign ministers at Kuwait in June and at Khartoum in August, and, of course, at the Khartoum summit conference. Iraq, Algeria, and particularly Syria took the most intransigent and extremist line. Egypt and Jordan, very conscious indeed of their near-disastrous positions, were seeking to temporize, while the oil-rich states, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait, were anxious to find some modus vivendi that would allow them to resume oil shipments as before. Egyptian leaders were especially incensed at the Syrian attitude, since there was more than a little feeling that it was Syrian extremism in the months before the June war, which had brought about a conflict for which Egypt really was not ready. Moreover, once combat started, Syria had limited itself to defensive fighting instead of truly seeking to come to Jordan's and Egypt's aid. The Khartoum conference closed with the moderates in control, a situation raising premature hope that some kind of peace with Israel was possible. 

There was no doubt that the Soviet Union influenced the outcome at Khartoum. June and July saw a series of visits to Moscow by the heads of the Iraqi, Algerian, and Syrian states and the trip of USSR chief Nikolai Podgorny to Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad. On August 3 the Soviet party organ Pravda, stated that Arab super-patriots, with hysterical appeals calling for the elimination of Israel, were hurting their own cause. Wholehearted Russian support of the Arab cause in the United Nations and, even more significantly, the vast Soviet arms shipments and economic aid of all kinds to Cairo, bringing Egypt's forces close to pre-war level, permitted Nasser to take a progressively harder stance, as 1967 drew to a close. This, in turn, was an obstacle to often rumored Jordan-Israel peace negotiations (p. 147). French President de Gaulle's hardening position on Israel greatly enhanced France's moral prestige in the Arab states (p. 445). France gained no material advantage from its pro-Arab position. The one notable exception was Iraq, which agreed to let French oil companies drill in part of that country; but here too, France was kept out of the oil-rich Rumalia fields and sulphur fields. On a five-day visit to Paris in mid-December, President Yussef Zuayen caused a diplomatic incident when he attacked Israel in a ceremony at Paris' Hôtel de Ville.

Arab differences, that had been patched up at the Khartoum conference, emerged once again after the adoption of the November 22 UN resolution on the Arab-Israel war (p. 181). Attempts to call a new summit meeting encountered such strong opposition, that, at year's end, it was doubtful that it would be held at all. Yet, despite all difficulties that came in the wake of the June war, the various states had maintained internal order.
JEWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES

JEWISH COMMUNITIES

Even before the six-day war, the Jews still living in the Arab countries were subject to severe discrimination. The war brought in its wake a new round of persecution and suffering for Jews in these lands and severely wracked once-great communities with histories going back to ancient, indeed Biblical times. Jewish life in Aden and Libya came to an end; the disappearance of the Jewish community in Egypt has almost become inevitable; the Jewish community in Lebanon is melting away, and the same probably would occur both in Iraq and Syria but for their ban on Jewish emigration.

Comparison of Jewish populations in the Middle East before the founding of Israel and just before the June conflict shows how Jewish communities in the area already had shriveled under the impact of two decades of Arab-Israeli tension; of Arab nationalism intent upon driving out all colonial and foreign influence (with local Jews being seen as such a foreign influence); of pan-Arab consciousness that continued to grow among Moslems, including non-Arabs, despite all the endemic, perpetual rivalries among the Arab states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jewish Population</th>
<th>Pre-1948</th>
<th>May 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The impact of the war was also felt sharply by Jewish communities in the North African countries of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria (p. 523). A clear distinction, though, must be made between what happened to Jews in these lands and in Near and Middle Eastern countries. In both Morocco and Tunisia the governments tried to protect the Jewish communities from popular feeling and from anti-Jewish sentiment stirred up or utilized by certain political groups. In the Middle Eastern countries, on the other hand, it was the governments themselves that were primarily responsible for the sufferings of the Jews. The situation was similar in Algeria, which had formally declared war on Israel and strongly opposed any political settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict.

Egypt

The Jewish community in Egypt numbered about 2,500 in May 1967, with some 1,400 Jews living in Cairo, 900 in Alexandria, and about 200 (mostly Karaites) in other towns. As the crisis built up in the month of May,
the Egyptian authorities made a new register of the Jewish population. Within
two or three days after war broke out on June 5, the police rounded up the
great majority of Jewish males, in their businesses and homes. Some were
taken to local police stations in their pajamas. Treatment in the various Cairo
and Alexandria police stations varied. It was good in some; in others Jews
were beaten and maltreated. In one commissariat Jewish prisoners were held
for two days without receiving even water. Grand Rabbi Hayyim Douek of
Cairo was put under house arrest; Rabbi Jacques Nefussi of Alexandria was
taken to prison.

Within a week Jews of foreign nationality—about 75 or so—were hand-
cuffed, taken from these jails, packed into army trucks and driven to Alex-
andria where they were put on ships together with non-Jewish Westerners
and foreigners who were leaving Egypt, or were being expelled. The families
of expellees who did not have their passports with them at the time of arrest
knew what was happening because policemen were sent to their homes to
fetch these documents. But most wives and children were left behind without
word, and later made their way out of Egypt.

All other Jews taken into custody were sent to Abou-Zaabal prison, about
an hour's ride from Cairo on the Port Said road. The Jews from Alexandria,
sent to Abou-Zaabal by truck, were almost lynched by an Egyptian mob
which gathered in response to an announcement by the Egyptian Ministry
of Information that the first Jewish prisoners had been captured, leading the
public to believe that they were Israelis. They only were saved by the quick
thinking of some of the army officers accompanying the convoy. On arrival
in Abou-Zaabal prison, all Jews were forced to kneel and put their elbows
on the floor. Prison officers and trustees then jumped up and down on their
backs, kicked them, and beat them with canes and leather straps.

This treatment on arrival was but a foretaste of what was to come in later
weeks. Altogether some 350 Jewish prisoners were housed in five cells of
the Abou-Zaabal House of Correction. In each of these completely bare
cells, originally meant for 20-25 prisoners, were 70 Jews who had to sleep on
the floor in alternate rows with legs overlapping in order to fit into the
available space. For the first five weeks prisoners were kept locked in their
cells; finally they were permitted to take a half-hour daily walk in the prison
courtyard. They received only two aluminum dishes and had to eat with
their fingers or otherwise gulp down their food. Many of the prisoners were
quite old, several over 70; many others were in poor health when summarily
arrested, among them a partially paralyzed lad, one just out of the hospital,
and one taken from an asylum.

In the first month the prisoners were frequently beaten, or required to
stand in two rows and strike each other, or forced to shout in chorus slogans
such as “Up with Nasser, down with Israel” over and over again. On nu-
merous occasions individual prisoners were given 20 to 30 lashes with palm
fronds, often slightly wet so that they drew blood, for some alleged misdeed.
One man was caned so severely on the soles of his feet that he could not stand for weeks. Two others are known to have been thrown into solitary and especially harshly beaten. One young man was saved from being strangled by a prison officer when other officers intervened. There were at least two instances where jailers sought to force prisoners to commit unnatural acts upon each other.

No family member, legal representative, or representative of a foreign government or international organization was permitted to visit Jewish prisoners at Abou-Zaabal. The International Red Cross repeatedly requested permission to visit the prison, and on several occasions was even promised the opportunity to do so, but in fact never got in. For well over a month the prisoners had absolutely no news of what was going on outside. Then they were asked to fill out forms requesting relatives to send them packages containing underwear, towel and soap, but nothing else. They were also permitted to send out and receive messages through the Red Cross, and to receive some money for the prison canteen. From mid-August onward their treatment generally improved somewhat.

Following intervention by numerous government and international agencies, the Egyptian authorities began to release individual prisoners for whom special appeal had been made—about 15 by the end of August. Almost all of these were then summarily expelled from Egypt. Rabbi Nefussi, who was among the very few released, was permitted to stay in Egypt for some months, before his expulsion in December.

In mid-September authorities initiated a process whereby a number of prisoners gradually were transferred from Abou-Zaabal prison, where they were under the jurisdiction of the ministry of the interior, to the Les Barrages jail. Here they were dealt with by the Egyptian Passport Service which released and expelled them.

On October 15, in an interview with New York Times reporter Jay Walz, Grand Rabbi Douek denied through a government official—who was chosen by the Egyptian Information Department to serve as his interpreter—any persecution of Egyptian Jews resulting from the conflict, but admitted that "about 400" Jews had been jailed. "We are Egyptians the same as anyone else," the rabbi was reported as saying. He also mentioned that President Nasser sent greetings to the Jewish community on Rosh Ha-shanah, and emphasized that Egypt permitted full religious freedom.

At about this time (October 10) the Egyptian government denounced "the public appeal by the rabbis of Israel pretending that thousands of Jewish youth are imprisoned or persecuted in Egypt, Iraq and Syria." This appeal, made the day before, was called by the Egyptian Ministry of National Orientation "an attempt to turn public opinion attention away from the atrocities and massacres being perpetrated in the occupied territories."

On December 23 all Jewish prisoners, except those in Les Barrages were transferred to Tourah prison. On that day, according to estimates by Jewish
organizations, such as the United HIAS and the European Office of the American Jewish Committee, 223 remained in jail, five of them in the hospital of Tourah prison near Hellwan, and three still in Les Barrages. One hundred four imprisoned Jews had been expelled from Egypt; another 20 or so of those released were permitted to remain in Egypt. All released Jews were carefully warned that failure to remain silent about their treatment in prison could have serious consequences for their relatives or others still in Egypt. One released prisoner, Berto Farhi, gave a full, harrowing account of prison conditions in an eight-page feature article in the French weekly L’Express, December 25, 1967.

On December 22 Egyptian Minister of the Interior Chaaraoui Gomaa asserted, in an interview in the Cairo daily Al Ahram, that Egyptian President Nasser had given “clear and precise instructions” for the liquidation of internment camps in Egypt. He also claimed that 257 Egyptian Jews had been arrested at the outbreak of the war and declared that “Twenty-three among them already have been released and we are studying the cases of the others with a view to liberating them, now that the circumstances that might necessitate their internment have lost their acuity.” These figures were substantially lower than the ones released by the Jewish organizations.

The situation of the prisoners was discussed with the Egyptian authorities by Nils-Goran Gussing, sent by UN Secretary General Thant to the Middle East as his special representative. He reported to the United Nations that the UAR “expressed the firm opinion that the Security Council resolution [on the question of the treatment of minorities in Middle Eastern countries after the war] did not apply to the Jewish minority in the UAR, declared that Jews of foreign nationality were the responsibility of their respective ambassadors, that stateless Jews came under the mandate of the United Nations’ Commission for Refugees, with its office in Cairo, and that Jews of Egyptian nationality were solely the responsibility of the UAR.” Yet the High Commissioner’s office actually was unable to intervene even in behalf of stateless Jews in Egypt. The Egyptian authorities later charged that Gussing had not properly presented their views with regard to stateless Jews.

Accounts by Jews coming from Egypt seemed to indicate that the Egyptian government wanted all Jews to leave eventually except for a few Jews who had converted to the Moslem religion but also had been arrested and Jewish women married to Moslem men. The imprisoned Jews were told that release was possible (though not necessarily assured) only if they agreed to expulsion.

Jews leaving Egypt were permitted to take with them nothing but five Egyptian pounds and a few personal effects. Currency transfers were impossible. Their passports were stamped with a red Arabic letter indicating they were Jews, to enable customs and police officials to pay special attention to them. The only thing the expellees could do was to sell their properties at auction, at ridiculously low prices, and deposit the proceeds in Egyptian bank
accounts. These accounts were in fact blocked for Jews in Egypt, though no law or administrative decree to this effect was passed. There were also several cases of sequestration of Jewish businesses, whose owners and families could draw up to a maximum of 50 Egyptian pounds per month, depending on the size of the family.

Egyptian Jews lived in fear of popular as well as government reaction to the June war, but, except for few minor incidents in the first weeks, they were not molested by their Arab neighbors. The Jewish community organizations in Cairo and Alexandria were permitted to function. This was fortunate because, with so many of the breadwinners in prison, a number of families needed welfare assistance after the first few months. However, assistance was limited since only a limited amount could be withdrawn from community funds each month.

One serious problem facing the Alexandria community was the maintenance of its home for the aged which cared for some 70 persons, who were 60 years of age or older. Forty-five of these were old and disabled; the others were kept in the home so that they could receive the necessary welfare assistance. Another 70 aged persons were in a home at Heliopolis, outside Cairo; a handful were in Egyptian institutions. In view of what appeared to be the certain disappearance of the official communities, the fate of these persons was a source of great concern.

A problem of another sort was the fate of Jewish incunabula, ancient Torah scrolls, and other Jewish treasures owned by the communities, which were being kept by the Egyptian authorities. Before hostilities began, Jewish community leaders negotiated with the authorities for return of about 40 Torah scrolls that had gotten into the hands of the Egyptian customs authorities. But the conflict put an end to these discussions.

One effect of the June crisis was to bring about what in effect was a merging of the Sephardi Jewish community with the much smaller Ashkenazi and Karaite groups, the latter having always kept pretty much to itself. This was inevitable because the problems of Karaite prisoners were handled together with those of all others by Jewish leaders who were not imprisoned. Among expellees who had been held in Abou-Zaabal prison were Adolph Deutsch, president of the Cairo Ashkenazi community, and Grysca Koslovski, the president of the Alexandria Ashkenazi community. It was estimated in December 1967 that some 1,000 to 1,200 Jews, prisoners included, were still in Egypt.

Libya

The 4,000 Jews in Libya suffered more in death and destruction as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict than any other Jewish community in the Middle East. By end of 1967 all but 220 Jews had fled the country, and these were expected to leave shortly. Thus, mob hatred, arson, and murder put an end to one of the oldest Jewish communities. Before World War II, the com-
Community numbered some 40,000. However, only about 6,000 were left after pogroms in 1945, that resulted in the death of some 130 Jews, and in 1948, shortly after Israel became an independent state.

Another 2,000 left the country in the 1950s and early 1960s when the government adopted a series of anti-Jewish measures. Among these were the special registration of the Jewish population at the request of the Arab Boycott Office; stripping the Jewish Community Council of its autonomy and of all but strictly religious functions, and placing it under the control of a Moslem commissioner; barring the operations of all Jewish welfare organizations such as the Joint Distribution Committee and OSE (which had maintained offices in Libya in the first years after Libya became independent in 1952), and the Alliance Israélite Universelle school; decrees virtually forbidding Jews to complete property transactions. The government also adopted administrative measures making it impossible for Libyan Jews to get passports or documents attesting to their Libyan citizenship. They could acquire, though with considerable difficulty, *laissez-passer*s enabling them to travel abroad on business. But they had to leave behind family members or substantial cash deposits as guarantee for their return. They were also forbidden to emigrate. All Libyan Jews lived in the city of Tripoli, except for some 200 in Benghazi.

During May and the beginning of June extremist Libyan newspapers such as *Ar Raid, At Taliya* and, to a lesser extent, government publications were filled with both anti-Israel and antisemitic articles. There was also wide distribution of pamphlets of this ilk from Cairo and Damascus, including *The Jews in the Koran* containing several passages from *Mein Kampf*. On June 2 Moslem priests in the mosques called for a Jihad, a holy war against the Jews. Their harangues stressing incidents between Mohammed and the Jews were broadcast over the Libyan radio. The week June 5-12 had already been designated a propaganda “Week for Palestine” with demonstrations.

When, at ten o’clock on the morning of June 5 the news came that hostilities had begun, the planned controlled demonstrations exploded into fanatic attacks on and destruction of all things foreign, especially against the Jews: of Jewish shops on Tripoli’s main streets and in the *hara* (ghetto) where the poorer Jews lived. The mob murdered at least ten Jews; Jewish leaders who later reached Italy reported that the Libyan government would never admit to more than two, a butcher pulled out of his shop hacked to death with his knives, and a woman assistant at the home for the aged. Virtually every Jewish shop was burned to the ground, not so much for pillage as out of sheer hatred. Because of the hour at which disorder began, children were in school, family heads in offices and shops. Forced to hide in the nearest available homes that offered refuge, many were cut off for weeks from their families. Jews did not dare to go out. They barricaded themselves in their homes where they received phone calls threatening them with death. The authorities advised them to stay indoors since they could not assure adequate
police protection. Even getting food became a serious problem: several Arabs and Italians who tried to buy bread for their Jewish friends were threatened. Among the buildings destroyed by the mob were the Bet El Synagogue and the Dar Serussi Talmud Torah in the 

The Libyan authorities reacted fairly rapidly to protect the Jews in Benghazi. These were rounded up almost immediately after word of Israel-Arab fighting came and put into protective custody in army barracks outside the city. Action in Tripoli came too late to save Jewish lives and shops, although, on June 6, Jews of the 

The situation of the Libyan Jews somewhat improved in mid-June after community leaders sent a series of appeals to Mufti Sheikh Abdurrachman el Galhud; to the Moslem commissioner of the Jewish community, Haj Mohammed el Koni, and to Prime Minister Hussain Maziq, who took office a week after the riots. Among other things, the Libyan government completely altered its pre-war policies with regard to emigration. An estimated 300 managed to flee in the confused, hectic, immediate post-war days. It is known that, on June 20, the Libyan emigration office began working day and night without interruption to meet requests for travel documents from the Jews still in the country. Mass departure by plane of Jews from the Gurgi camp and Tripoli began on June 28. Libyan authorities also permitted a representative of the International Red Cross to visit the camp, which Jews could leave at will. Conditions at Gurgi were reasonably adequate, refugees reported. The camp was closed down on 24-hours notice at the beginning of December, when only some 100 Jews were left.

Jews leaving Libya in the first four months were allowed to take with them only 20 Libyan pounds each (under $60), and some personal luggage, leaving behind all valuables, homes, businesses and real estate. Later, when almost all the Jews were gone, the amount was raised to 300 Libyan pounds, and a handful actually went back to Libya to try and salvage something by taking out these additional funds.

The fate of Jewish community properties, of the accounts left in Libyan banks, of the assets of an institution known as CABI olim to which many Jews who had left Libya years before had entrusted their funds was not as yet determined. But there was no real hope that anything could be done in these matters in the foreseeable future.

Iraq

Only some 2,500 Jews remained in Iraq at the end of December. Discrimination against Iraqi Jewry began long before the June Israeli-Arab war.
the eve of Israel's birth its Jewish community numbered approximately 120,000, constituting the largest non-Moslem community in the country, and one-fourth the population of Baghdad, the capital.

With the creation of Israel, all Jews were classed as enemy aliens. There were severe repression of Jewish activities and sequestration of Jewish properties and businesses; and emigration was forbidden. When, in March 1950, the Iraqi government opened the gates and announced that it would permit emigration for one year, almost all Jews fled the country, leaving behind about 6,000. Additional anti-Jewish discriminatory legislation was adopted in the years that followed. Premier Abdul Karim Kassim, who headed the Iraqi government from 1960 to 1963, had some of these laws rescinded as discriminatory; they were later re instituted. Jews continued to make their way out of Iraq as best they could. As of May 1967, the still remaining 2,500 Jews already were restricted in their rights of citizenship, travel, and control of property.

Protests to the Iraq government by the International League for the Rights of Man went unanswered; and protests to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations were unavailing despite the fact that rules and regulations adopted by Iraq were in marked contrast to the antidiscriminatory provisions of its own constitution.

The war was to bring a new outbreak of persecution. It has become known that Minister of Interior Rajab 'Abd al-Majid had prepared a plan for the collective arrest of the Jews, who were to be interned as potentially dangerous to the country's security. Intervention by President 'Abd al-Raham Arif, it was believed, prevented the execution of the plan. However, a house-to-house search of all Jewish homes was undertaken and a register compiled of all occupants. Mid-June some 70 Jews were arrested, among them 50 prominent members of the Jewish community and 20 others whose occupations had brought them into some kind of relationship with American, British, or West German business concerns in Iraq. The official reason for detention was "to appease public opinion"; other explanations alleged illegal financial or political activities. Actually, no formal charges were filed against those detained, and they were never brought to trial. Nor was any contact with them allowed, not even by Moslem lawyers retained by their families. While, so far as could be determined, treatment of prisoners was generally decent, some were believed to have been beaten or maltreated.

At this time the government also took other restrictive measures: All Jewish homes were placed under surveillance, and telephones were disconnected. Jews were forbidden to sell personal property; their assets were frozen, except for a small living allowance. Licences to Jews were cancelled. All Iraqi companies received official letters ordering the dismissal of all Jewish employees. Jews were forbidden to travel from their area of residence; many were placed under house arrest. A government order, which later was rescinded, provided for the expulsion of all Jewish college students from
private colleges (they long had been refused admission to government universities). Borders were tightened as never before.

During the course of the June war Iraqi Chief Rabbi Sasson Khadouri, who was well over eighty, appeared on Baghdad television to reaffirm the loyalty of his community and to disassociate it from Israel and Zionism. He also announced a donation by Iraqi Jews to the Iraqi army. One can easily imagine the kind of pressures that led to this move. The Chief Rabbi's statement was rebroadcast many times. At the same time the Baghdad radio and television embarked on a continuing campaign of attacks against Jews, accusing them of being "fifth columnists" and warning Iraqis that contact with Jews would make them guilty by association. Wrote Zut al Arab of June 17: "The Jewish cancer in Iraq constitutes a serious danger for our struggle to exist and for the future of our country. If interest, circumstances, and the law require that we do not hurt them at the present time, it is at least incumbent upon us to place them under stringent surveillance and freeze their activity."

In mid-August, after about two months of detention, some 50 of the 70 Jews under arrest were released. The Iraqi authorities continued to hold the others "for investigation"; numerous appeals by the leaders of the Jewish community for their release were to no avail. Indeed, with the appointment in mid-September of Shamel el Samurai as minister of the interior, the Jews still under arrest were moved to the Central prison from a quondam B'hai temple in which they had been held. Rosh Ha-shanah day, October 5, the 50 Jews, who had been released in August, were thrown into jail, together with 30 other Jewish men, bringing the total to about 100. By this time, virtually all heads of families and men of working age were either in prison, under house arrest, or unemployed as a result of the various restrictions. Apparently as the result of an appeal by Rabbi Khadouri to Iraqi Prime Minister Taher Yahya, most of the prisoners were released. Concern for the 20 or 25 who continued to be held grew as ugly intimations that some kind of treason trial of Jews might be brewing began to appear in the Iraqi press.

While the Iraqi Jewish community formerly always had been able to care for its own and had some fairly wealthy members, a substantial number were now in need of relief. At the end of 1967 Iraqi Jews could neither emigrate (only one or two have managed to escape the country since June) nor receive help from the outside.

**Syria**

There are approximately 4,000 Jews in Syria, 2,500 living in the capital city of Damascus, 1,500 in Aleppo and 40 to 50 families in Kamishli, on the Turkish border. In the first post-war days the government threw troops around the Jewish quarters in the two major cities and imposed a tight curfew which permitted Jews to go out at certain hours for shopping. Paradoxically, the removal of these troops a few weeks later put Jews in greater
danger. The houses and apartments left behind, after the large-scale departure of Jews from Syria in the early 1950s, were taken over by Palestinian Arab refugees. These now outnumbered the Syrian Jews in the one-time Jewish quarter and were a continual threat to them. A number of incidents aroused fear of more serious trouble.

It was scarcely necessary for the Syrian government to take any special measures against Jews; those enforced for years before the Israeli-Arab conflict of June were draconic enough. These measures deprived Jews of the right to sell property and to move about beyond a mile-and-a-half radius from their place of residence without special permit. Jews also had to carry special identity cards. Soldiers and other civil servants were forbidden to trade in Jewish shops.

Emigration of Jews was forbidden; only two families were known to have permission to leave the country since June. The situation was particularly bad in Kamishli, in a military border zone, where Jews always had been under very strict control. Following an incident between Moslems and Jews on September 1, the entire community was put under 24-hour arrest. By the end of the year, the situation of the Jews in Kamishli seemed to have eased somewhat; but fundamentally it was most unfavorable, as it was in Aleppo and Damascus. Yet, the Alliance Israélite Universelle school in Damascus, with an enrollment of 300, was permitted to open as usual in September.

In September a delegation of the Bertrand Russell tribunal commission visited Syria and met with Jews in the presence of the authorities. “You can imagine that if a single Syrian Jew had dared to tell the truth it would have cost him his life,” wrote one Syrian Jew in a letter that reached the West. It urgently appealed for intercession.

An anonymous letter published in the Paris Le Monde (December 27) describing the plight of the Syrian Jews brought a response in the same paper (January 3, 1968) in which the Syrian embassy in Paris—in sharp variance with reports reaching Jewish organizations—denounced the letter as a “pure fantasy.” It denied that there had been manifestations against Jews in Kamishli or elsewhere in Syria or incidents between the Palestinian refugees and their Jewish neighbors, or that there had been curfew. It also asserted that Jews were not excluded from public life, as indicated by the employment of 40 Jewish teachers at the beginning of the 1967–68 school year. The letter further stated that an International Red Cross representative in Damascus had found, on the eve of the Arab-Israel war, that the Jews enjoyed full rights.

**Lebanon**

Lebanon, a country of many minorities, has protected their security, if not always all their rights. The Jews in Lebanon fared better than almost in any other Arab and Moslem countries. However, psychological and economic pressures—the latter brought on by the effects of the war on the economies of most Middle Eastern countries—and various resultant incidents
during the critical spring months convinced many to leave the country. The community shrank from 6,000 in June to roughly 3,000 at the end of 1967. The vast majority were Lebanese nationals, or came from families who had come to Lebanon from Syria, Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries during recent decades. Some of the latter had identification papers stating that their nationality status was "To Be Determined," regardless of how long they may have lived in Lebanon.

Lebanese Jews who wished to emigrate were given *laissez-passers* in place of passports. These were granted freely in the first six weeks after the Israel-Arab conflict. Adverse comment on this policy in the Lebanese press stating that it might be helping Israel, and government concern that Jews might be leaving without paying their debts or taxes, brought a change. *Laissez-passers* could be gotten, but with much more difficulty, by application through the Jewish community, which had to guarantee that emigrants had taken care of all financial obligations.

As the crisis leading to the Israel-Arab war deepened, anti-Jewish feeling and the number of incidents increased. Some Moslem merchants took advantage of the situation by refusing to pay their Jewish creditors; one Jew, Joseph Antebi, was shot to death when he tried to collect a loan. The Jewish community requested protection and, by coincidence, an army guard was placed around the Jewish quarter in the Abou Jamil section of Beirut on the morning of June 5. No limitations of any kind were imposed on Jews except for a ban on travel to Southern Lebanon bordering Israel.

Jewish communal institutions continued to function, including the Alliance Israélite Universelle schools, the Ozer Hatorah, and the Talmud Torah (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 467–69). Jewish investments of community funds continued to provide income for the care of the needy, for a Jewish community hospital, and the maintenance of the three large synagogues in Beirut. Except for a handful in Tripoli and in Sidon all Jews lived in Beirut.

**Aden**

Before 1948 there were approximately 9,000 Jews in what used to be the Aden Protectorate, now the South Yemen Popular Republic. Though Aden was under British control until November 1967, the Jews began to leave the country long before. In October 1965 when serious anti-British riots broke out only 350 Jews were left in Aden, living in the Crater section. During the riots the Jewish Selim school was attacked and an attempt was made to set fire to the community synagogues. The school was closed, most of the Torah scrolls and community archives shipped out of the country. Jews continued to leave in small numbers until the community numbered 138 at the start of the Israel-Arab war.

The outbreak of hostilities, the imminent departure of Britain from Aden, and the continuous struggle among the various Arab nationalist groups for
power when Aden became independent made the situation of the Jews impossible. Rioting Arab mobs attacked the Jewish quarter on June 12, beating the elderly Mayer Shoa to death and looting Jewish shops. A special plane was chartered and all Jewish men, women and children still in Aden were flown to London.

ABRAHAM S. KARLIKOW
THE SIX-DAY WAR brought relations between the United States and Israel into the spotlight of world attention. The American role in the Middle East crisis has been given quite contradictory interpretations. Soviet officials charged that Washington encouraged Israeli “aggression.” President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic fabricated a tale of collusion and direct intervention by United States air and naval forces on Israel’s side during the fighting. On the other hand, some supporters of Israel contended that the United States could have averted the war if it had firmly and effectively demonstrated its commitment to the threatened Jewish state. They argued that Washington’s hesitation, its unwillingness to act alone, and its preoccupation with Vietnam emboldened Nasser to think he could act with impunity and forced Israel into a war to defend its vital interests and its very existence.

In point of fact, the United States was neither active belligerent nor passive observer. While unsuccessful in preventing the war, the United States acted in consultation with the Soviet Union, including the first dramatic exchange of messages on the Moscow-Washington “hot-line,” to prevent a direct military involvement of the superpowers. After the war, the United States firmly and successfully opposed Soviet and Arab attempts at the United Nations to condemn Israel as an aggressor and to put pressure on Israel to give up the fruits of victory before the conclusion of a durable peace settlement.

Despite disagreement between Washington and Jerusalem on some specific issues or tactics, full accord still existed at year’s end on the fundamental principle that Arab acceptance of Israel’s right to exist as a free and secure state was a prerequisite to peace. There was also agreement that Arab-Israel peace depended on reaching a just and equitable settlement of all outstand-
ing issues: the problem of the refugees, freedom of innocent maritime pas-
sage, limitation of the arms race, and mutually recognized boundaries. The
United States therefore opposed any piecemeal approach and rejected "as a
prescription for renewed hostilities" the proposals for unilateral or prior
Israeli concessions, advanced by India, Yugoslavia, Mali, and other friends
of the Arab states.

Israel officials expressed both publicly and in private appreciation of
America's moral and political support and of President Lyndon B. Johnson's
sympathetic understanding for Israel's basic position. However, concern con-
tinued among some government officials in Washington that too close identifi-
cation with Israel would alienate America's remaining friends in the Arab
world, leading to the sharp East-West polarization of the Middle East that
the cautious State Department policy of "even-handedness" had so long
sought to avoid.

It is too early for an assessment of the long-term effects of the war on
American interests in the Middle East. Some of the more extravagant pre-
dictions made in the heat of the crisis have already been disproved. At the
end of May Nasser was showered with pledges of support from such erst-
while enemies as pro-Western King Hussein of Jordan, Saudi Arabia's King
Faisal and Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, after the Egyptian leader had
massed his troops in Sinai, evicted the United Nations Emergency Force,
and closed the Strait of Tiran to ships bound for Israel. At the time, some
editorial writers and Washington pundits warned that Nasser was about to
establish his hegemony throughout the Arab world, and then gain control of
the strategic points and vital oil resources of Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and
even North Africa.

Nasser's personal triumph also was seen as a victory for his Soviet backers.
The prediction was that Moscow would gain a stranglehold on Middle East
oil, as Nasser swept aside the conservative pro-Western regimes in the area.
The view was that Moscow stood to gain no matter what the United States
course. If Washington stood idly by while Israel suffered defeat, other pro-
Western states in the area would conclude that it failed to honor its com-
mitments; if the United States actively intervened in behalf of Israel, no Arab
regime would dare maintain friendly relations with Washington.

Israel's lightning victory over the combined Arab forces rescued Washin-
gton from its dilemma. Many optimistic commentators saw it as a significant
victory for Western interests in the Middle East and a major defeat for Mos-
cow. It was noted that the United Arab Republic and Syria had suffered ig-
nominious defeat despite some $2 billion in Soviet arms and a decade of train-
ing by Russian advisers. No amount of Soviet verbal support could conceal
the crucial fact that Moscow had been unwilling to step in militarily to save
the Arabs from defeat. The failure of the intense Soviet anti-Israel invective
and diplomatic pressure to dislodge the Israelis from the occupied territories
was seen as a further political defeat for Moscow, especially since Premier Alexei N. Kosygin had come personally to lead the Soviet onslaught at the United Nations.

**Middle East Cold War Continues**

The experience of the war and the Glassboro summit talks between Johnson and Kosygin reinforced their mutual desire to avoid a hot war, but it did not lead to agreement on common policy in the Middle East. By year's end it had become clear that, while the Soviet Union may have had a temporary setback, it remained a major contender for influence in the region. Within several months, Moscow replaced an estimated 80 per cent of the Egyptian and Syrian weapons destroyed in the war, and the new shipments came with several thousand Soviet advisers and experts. The war naturally increased the dependence of Cairo and Damascus on Soviet support. Moscow also airlifted supplies to the Yemen Republican regime, hard-pressed by the Saudi-backed Royalists after Nasser's final withdrawal of his troops, which were more urgently needed at home. There were even reports of Soviet pilots flying combat missions for the Republican forces in Yemen. Besides aiding such other radical states as Algeria and Iraq, Moscow also offered arms and economic aid to Jordan, and continued its earlier efforts to woo pro-Western Turkey and Iran.

Most disturbing to America and its NATO allies was the rapid buildup of Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean during and after the June conflict. The frequent and well-publicized "friendship" visits of Soviet naval units to Syrian, Egyptian, and Algerian ports were used to demonstrate Moscow's solidarity with the Arabs. However, the Soviet fleet increase was in reality part of a long-term Soviet strategy, embarked upon years before the June 1967 crisis, to transform the navy from what essentially had been a coast guard into a major striking force. Construction of the first Soviet helicopter assault carrier began in 1963; its so-called shakedown cruise started in the spring of 1967.

The rapid decline of Britain as a naval power, signaled by its previously announced intention to withdraw from Aden by the end of 1967, no doubt influenced Moscow's decision to develop a significant Soviet navy. Deep American involvement in the Far East also may have tempted Moscow to challenge United States naval predominance in the Mediterranean. Whatever the reasons, Soviet Communist party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev declared at a Communist bloc conference in Czechoslovakia in April that there was "no justification for the permanent presence of the United States in the waters washing the shores of Southern Europe," and that the time had come for "loudly demanding the removal of the United States Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean."

The Israeli victory neither eliminated the threat of Soviet penetration of the Middle East, nor ended American influence in the Arab world. The fa-
cade of Arab unity built by anti-Israel fervor soon developed cracks through which the old intra-Arab divisions reappeared. Though Nasser continued to be popular among the masses, his capacity to intervene declined. As a result, the more conservative, pro-Western regimes in the area felt themselves less immediately threatened.

The War and United States-Arab Relations

When the United Arab Republic broke off relations with the United States on June 7, Cairo's example was followed only by Algeria, Iraq, the Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—the five more radical and ostensibly socialist Arab League members. Mauritania, a Moslem state in West Africa, followed suit. Six Arab League states, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia, representing the major oil producers and Nasser's chief political rivals, continued to maintain normal diplomatic relations with the United States. Neutral Lebanon cautiously recalled its ambassador from Washington and asked the American ambassador in Beirut to leave, but otherwise maintained regular diplomatic relations. In September the American ambassador was invited to return.

Even the radical states that formally severed relations with Washington were reluctant to make a complete break. In Cairo, Algiers, and Khartoum, American officials below the ambassadorial rank continued their routine work under the legal flag of Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, respectively. Similar "grey embassies" were maintained in Washington by the Egyptians, Algerians, and Sudanese. The United States lifted the general prohibition of American tourist travel to Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen in September, and to Egypt in November. Only Syria was still barred to Americans at the end of the year. [This restriction was lifted in February 1968.] The ban on travel to Israel and to Arab states not actively involved in the war was lifted a few weeks after the cease-fire.

When hostilities began, the United States imposed an informal freeze on economic and military aid to the region. Economic assistance to Morocco and Tunisia was resumed almost immediately. On humanitarian grounds Washington also approved $5 million in emergency relief to aid persons displaced by the war. In June the United States declared its readiness to renew the agreement to sell to Israel, as part of the Food for Peace program, $27.6 million worth of surplus agricultural products at long-term, low-interest rates. It was signed only on August 4 at a closed State Department ceremony. The delay and lack of publicity were in line with administration efforts to avoid unnecessary Arab antagonism by underplaying what could be considered pro-Israel actions, and balancing them, wherever possible, with similar pro-Arab moves—in this case resumption of aid to Jordan.

After King Hussein's public statement that there was no evidence of American or British involvement in the fighting and that he "mistakenly" accused them of collusion with Israel, the United States in July resumed
financing some development projects already under way. Soon thereafter Washington also resumed its annual $27 million support of the Jordanian budget. Some Congressmen, Representative Edward J. Gurney (Rep., Fla.) among them, opposed resumption of aid before Hussein agreed to make peace with Israel, broke with Nasser, and promised to reject offers of Soviet military aid made during his visit to Moscow in October. However, the administration believed the carrot to be more effective than the stick, and underscored Washington’s desire for warm and close relations with Jordan during Hussein’s visit in November. Officials cited the allegedly more moderate and conciliatory tone of Hussein’s remarks about Israel as evidence that Jordan shared the United States’ own deep concern for peace and stability in the region. Hussein reportedly agreed to maintain his pro-Western stance, and rejected Soviet offers of military aid.

United States Role in the Middle East Arms Race

In 1967 the administration encountered growing congressional opposition to supplying military equipment to underdeveloped countries that were likely to use them not to resist Communist aggression, but to fight their neighbors. The June war found American weapons used on both sides: the Jordanian army used United States-supplied Patton tanks and artillery in its June 5 attack on Israeli cities and settlements, and, when Hussein had failed to heed Israeli appeals to stay out of the war, the Israeli army also used American tanks in their counter-attack.

In July Representative Lester L. Wolff (Dem., N.Y.) revealed that among the Arab officers the United States was continuing to train, were 12 Sudanese, 8 Iraqis, and one Syrian, whose countries had broken diplomatic relations with the United States. In view of these countries’ close ties with the Soviet Union, he regarded this as “a flagrant violation of our national security.” Protests by the House Armed Services Committee and by such prominent senators as Karl E. Mundt (Rep., S. Dak.), moved the Pentagon in August to suspend training of such officers. The Sudanese and Iraqis were allowed to complete their courses to prevent “undue hardship.” The Defense Department stated that most of the approximately 500 Arab officers to be trained in the United States during the 1967–68 fiscal year would come from Libya and Saudi Arabia, where the United States had military installations and oil interests; the others from Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. The training program was intended “to encourage and strengthen these moderate Arab states,” to provide “a useful offset to Soviet influence in the Arab military establishments,” and to expose future Arab military leaders, having “a key role” in many Arab states, to “United States military doctrine and to the democratic way of life in the United States.” Sixty-one Israeli officers were being trained under the program.

Legal obstacles imposed by Congress and opposition in principle prevented
American economic or military assistance to Arab states that had severed diplomatic ties.

As evidence mounted of the rapid rearmament by the Soviet Union of Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and as France continued the embargo on arms to Israel, congressional sentiment grew for the United States to fill the vacuum. For example, Senator Joseph S. Clark (Dem., Pa.) said in December that, as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had been “a persistent opponent of military aid programs,” but that “I consider Israel a special case.” He explained:

The arguments against military aid simply do not apply. Will the arms be used to suppress the aspirations of the people for democratic government? Not in Israel. Will the arms be used in military adventures against peaceful neighboring states? Not by Israel. Are the arms actually needed to offset communist-sponsored military pressure? Definitely yes—particularly since France, formerly Israel’s prime supplier of arms, seems to be shifting its favor to Israel’s adversaries.

Responding to Israel’s request for arms, the administration tried to follow the same “even-handed” approach it had used for economic aid. Thus, though agreement was reached in September to lift the embargo on the delivery to Israel of the 48 Skyhawk A-4 light supersonic jet bombers purchased the year before, the State Department held up the announcement until October 24, so it could be linked to Washington’s decision to resume arms shipments to five pro-Western Arab states. Morocco and Libya were to receive jet fighters, reportedly of the supersonic F-5 type; spare parts and various types of equipment other than planes were to be shipped to Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. In addition to planes, Israel was to receive spare parts, repair equipment, and electronic components. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey emphasized that most of the arms had been ordered before the war and that the limited quantities of “selected items,” were consistent with a “spirit of restraint.” He added that the United States was still seeking an agreement with the Soviet Union to limit the flow of arms to the Middle East, but so far without success. By year’s end Washington had not yet acted on Israel’s request for supersonic F-4 Phantom jets Jerusalem said it needed to counteract the latest Soviet equipment.

As for renewal of United States military assistance to Jordan, Washington publicly agreed only to keep Hussein’s request “under consideration.” The Defense Department reportedly doubted the ability of Hussein’s decimated air force to handle the 36 F-104 supersonic jet fighters promised to Jordan in 1966 (AJYB, 1967 [Vol. 68], p. 102). These misgivings were apparently overruled by State Department fears that Hussein might turn to Moscow for arms, especially if Israel received new United States supplies, and, in December, Amman was quietly informed that Washington had agreed in principle to resume arms shipments.

In December there were reports that Nasser was eager to resume normal
relations with the United States, but that he faced opposition from some of the more radical nationalist elements. Washington was said to be ready to resume relations on condition that Nasser publicly retracted the charge of American-Israeli collusion and agreed to pay compensation for American property damaged by Egyptian mob action in June. In another move to rebuild his bridges to the West, Nasser resumed relations with Britain. Egypt and all other Arab states hailed de Gaulle's "statesmanship" for the French embargo on arms shipments to Israel and the attack on Israeli policy in the crisis. Thus, by the end of 1967, a majority of the Arab states were maintaining normal relations with the United States, and all had some ties with the West.

**Arab Oil**

The six-day war shattered the myth of the indispensability of Arab oil to the free world and its usefulness to the Arabs in forcing political concessions. When the fighting started in June, Nasser blocked the Suez Canal. As an act of solidarity, the oil-producing Arab states stopped all oil shipments for two weeks, and thereafter continued to embargo sales to the United States, Britain, and West Germany. Similar tactics had created a severe fuel shortage in Western Europe during the 1956–57 Suez crisis, and this was one of the reasons for the strong American pressure on Israel to withdraw after the Sinai campaign. However, this time the boycott proved ineffective for several reasons:

1) Many new oil sources were discovered outside the Middle East in the last decade, and existing wells had considerable excess capacity. 2) New supertankers were available for the rapid transport of large quantities of oil. 3) The selective nature of the embargo left obvious loopholes. For example, since exports to France were not forbidden, Arab oil could be sent there, and then trans-shipped to other countries. The major international oil companies rerouted their tankers and entered into various exchange arrangements for providing the most effective distribution. 4) Since it was summer, there was no demand for heavy fuel oil. 5) Iran, one of the largest Middle East producers, disregarded the boycott and increased its own oil production.

Within a few weeks it was apparent that there would be no shortage of oil. The price to the European consumer was somewhat above normal because of the increased costs of shipping around the Cape of Good Hope and the general rise in tanker rates. By far the greatest loss was sustained by the Arab oil producing states in royalties and by Egypt itself in Suez Canal tolls, at an estimated annual rate of $250 million. At the beginning of September the Arab summit conference at Khartoum formally lifted the oil embargo. While Nasser was unsuccessful in using the Suez blockade and the oil embargo to gain concessions from Israel or the West, he did manage to secure a pledge from Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia of £95 million to Egypt and £40 million to Jordan (a total of £135 million or $378 million before de-
valuation of the British pound) in post-war aid, in return for Arab League agreement to lift the embargo. Since payments were to be made quarterly, some observers saw the arrangement as giving the conservative monarchies a moderating influence over Cairo's revolutionary aims.

One of the smaller ironies of the war was that virtually all the American oil companies, both the domestic producers and the international companies with interests in the Middle East, achieved record profits in 1967, despite, and in some measure because of, Arab policies. Indeed, the two American companies drilling for oil in the United Arab Republic were urged by Cairo to resume their normal operations immediately after the cease-fire, and they did so despite the break in diplomatic relations.

Moreover, the new demonstration of the political instability of the Middle East and the unreliability of the Suez Canal as an international waterway, accelerated the trend among oil companies to build more and larger supertankers, some as gigantic as 400,000 tons. Though these are too big to use the shorter route through the Canal, their great capacity makes the trip around Africa more profitable. The crisis also led some companies to concentrate new exploration efforts in politically less volatile regions. These trends should eventually reduce the importance of the Suez Canal and Arab oil.

STEPS LEADING TO CRISIS

The United States Reaction to Border Incidents

At the beginning of 1967 most United States officials shared the appraisal of Israeli authorities and Middle East observers that Nasser decided to put the Palestine question "on the back burner" because of his preoccupation with the civil war in Yemen and his efforts to undermine the conservative, pro-Western Arab regimes. It also was felt that Jordan and Lebanon were eager to avoid any military confrontation with Israel. Washington and Jerusalem focused their concern on Syria, which openly was calling for a war of national liberation against Israel. The shelling of Israeli settlements in the valley below by Syrian army units in the fortified Golan Heights became more frequent and heavy, and, at the beginning of 1967, there was an intensification of sabotage raids by Palestinian Arab terrorist bands, especially by al-Fatah, whose headquarters and training centers were in Syria.

On January 16 Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, United States permanent representative to the United Nations, voiced American concern over increased tension in the area resulting from recent Syrian-Israel border incidents and "the apparent recurrence of terrorist activities." Noting that the United States "consistently endorsed the use of United Nations machinery to maintain peace" in the Middle East, he welcomed UN Secretary General U Thant's initiative in bringing together Syrian and Israeli officials in a meeting of the UN Mixed Armistice Commission, the first in many years. The meet-
ings were to discuss cultivation arrangements in the contested demilitarized zones; they were broken off without progress after several sessions of procedural wrangling (p. 116).

On February 5 the Arab “campaign of terror” against Israel was called “morally reprehensible, politically irresponsible and a primary cause for the recently increased tensions on Israel’s borders” by Rodger P. Davies, the deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. Although Washington understood Israel’s desire “to protect its citizens against murderous assault,” he added, the United States would continue to oppose military retaliation. Davies said that the United States was determined to maintain good relations with all states in the region, to use its “power and influence” to prevent or contain conflict, and to “reinforce trends toward reconciliation.” He emphasized that this policy of “even-handedness” did not mean the “abandonment of principle, and a moral judgement must enter into decision-making on a case-by-case basis.” The United States, he said, took “a forthright position against aggression by either side.”

**Criticism of American Policy and State Department Response**

The practical results of this policy of even-handedness aroused considerable criticism in Congress. In January Senator Jacob K. Javits (Rep., N.Y.), described the American effort to conciliate all states of the region as a dangerous “juggling act—an act of balancing that cannot withstand the tests of time and tension.” He described as unrealistic expectations that the United Nations would effectively deal with the Arab-Israel dispute in light of the Soviet Union’s consistently pro-Arab bias and American policy of even-handedness.

This situation served rather to encourage provocations by the Syrians and other extremist elements, who were likely to feel secure in the knowledge that the Soviet Union would paralyze any action by the Security Council against them. At the same time, Javits continued, they might conclude that United States readiness to condemn Israeli retaliation and the possibility of UN sanctions in the event of another massive Israeli counterattack, would restrain Israel from future retaliation. This situation, he felt, made it imperative for the United States to adopt a more active Middle East policy, one that would “sort out our friends and our foes, and concentrate our aid on those who are our friends.”

In an exchange of letters with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the New York Republican elaborated on the theme that the firmness of the commitment of the United States and its Western allies to preserve peace in the Middle East had been placed in doubt by recent events, among them the rapid decline of British power in the area and the determination of Gaullist France to play a lone hand in international relations. Javits said that “the best vehicle for stability and Western cooperation in the Middle East” had been the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 in which Britain and France had joined with
the United States to guarantee the Armistice Agreements concluded in 1949 between Israel and the four neighboring Arab states. The three powers pledged to oppose an Arab-Israel arms race and the threat of force in the area. Specifically, they promised that, in the event of preparations by any state to violate these borders, they would “immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.”

The basic assumptions on which this declaration rested, that the Western powers would act in concert and that the Soviet Union could be kept out of the area, no longer had validity: Britain and France invaded Egypt in 1956, against American advice, and the Soviet Union embarked on a massive program of military assistance to Egypt and Syria. Javits urged the United States to call a great power summit conference to discuss the growing threats to peace in the Middle East. When the Department replied that this would be futile since there was no evidence that Moscow was prepared to play a moderating and stabilizing role in the Arab-Israel conflict, the Senator called for “a new Tripartite Conference to prevent another Middle East war.” Such a conference, he said, could refute the growing feeling in the area that the three Western powers would be unwilling to act in concert in the event of a crisis.

(A call for the United States, England, and France to reaffirm their tripartite pledge was also included in the Republican party’s “State of the Union” message issued by Congressional leaders Everett Dirksen and Gerald Ford on January 19.)

Secretary of State Rusk replied on February 11 that he was “not aware of any change in the positions of either the British or French Governments which would cast doubt on their adherence to these principles.” It was the Department’s view, therefore, that “there is no need for a new tripartite declaration and a conference.” He also emphasized, that, although the United States worked “whenever feasible in concert with our allies,” this did not prevent it from acting on its own “by quiet diplomacy and a firm public position,” to maintain peace in the Middle East. “Unilateral United States assurances,” he said, “have had considerable impact as a stabilizing influence.”

Secretary Rusk cited President Kennedy’s forthright May 1963 American policy statement: “We support the security of both Israel and her neighbors. We seek to limit the Near East arms race. We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East. In the event of aggression or preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, or adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression.” Rusk noted that President Johnson reaffirmed these principles during Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s visit in 1964 and on later occasions. (The most recent was the President’s message to the Rabbinical Council of America on February 1, 1967. Hailing “the achievements of the Israeli people” through skill and determination, and noting that the United States made it clear that “we will resolutely oppose” the use or threat of force by one Middle East state
against another, the President emphasized: "We intend to live up to that commitment."

**Credibility of the United States Commitment**

Secretary Rusk concluded that "I do not think that any Near Eastern government is in doubt as to the seriousness of these assurances or the fact that we are prepared to back them up with appropriate action should the need arise."

However, doubts about this commitment were the crux of the problem in the 1967 crisis. The admittedly overwhelming power of the United States could be an effective deterrent to violent change in the area only if its willingness to use this power was convincing. In 1967 the United States suffered from a credibility gap.

The United States had last intervened directly in the area in the summer of 1958, when President Eisenhower sent units of the Sixth Fleet to Lebanon at the urgent request of its government to resist an armed revolt, supported by Cairo, Damascus, and Moscow, whose avowed purpose, he said, was "to subordinate the independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic." Eisenhower justified intervention as based on the March 1957 joint resolution of Congress that "the United States regards as vital to the national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East." The mere presence of the American troops, a total of some 14,000 soldiers and marines, which were not involved in combat and were soon withdrawn, acted as a stabilizing factor, leading to a peaceful compromise and the survival of an independent Lebanon. All the Arab League members, including the UAR, solemnly pledged at a special UN session not to interfere in each other's internal affairs.

The memory of the Lebanese incident is generally credited with deterring potential mischiefmakers for several years. But there had been no similar direct American response in any subsequent crisis, such as the massive Egyptian intervention in the Yemen civil war, which erupted in 1962, and which Saudi Arabia saw as a threat to itself.

In early April 1967 Premier Eshkol was asked by a *U. S. News & World Report* interviewer whether he expected help from the United States, and possibly Britain and France, if Israel were attacked in force by its Arab neighbors. Eshkol replied that he would "surely expect such help," especially in view of "all the solemn promises that have been made to Israel." He noted that when Israel asked the United States for arms, Washington officials cited these pledges and told the Israelis, "Don't spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here." Eshkol's reply to this advice was that "the Sixth Fleet might not be available fast enough for one reason or another, so Israel must be strong on its own." For this reason, he said, Israel was spending such a relatively high amount for arms. He added that, in any conflict, Israel would "rely primarily on our own Army. I wouldn't want American mothers
crying about the blood of their sons being shed here.” In any case, he noted rather unprophetically, “I don’t think there will be full-scale war in the next few years” between Israel and any of its Arab neighbors.

Eshkol’s remarks caused a furor in the Arab world. While their thrust was to cast doubt on the reliability and effectiveness of the American commitment, Arab reports cited his remarks, often taken out of context, as evidence that the United States was prepared to aid Israel militarily. Publication of the interview came only a few days after a very serious border clash on April 7 between Syria and Israel, in which Israeli jets shot down six Syrian MIG 21’s and reportedly flew over the outskirts of Damascus itself without effective opposition (p. 117). Chagrined by the bloody nose suffered by the Syrians, the propaganda organs of Moscow, Damascus, and Cairo seized on the Eshkol statement as proof of their oft-repeated charges that Israel was acting as an agent of the “oil magnates of the West” and the “reactionary and imperialist circles” of the United States, which wanted to punish Syria for its recent increase in pipe-line charges and, in the words of Moscow radio, were plotting “to prevent the consolidation of the present progressive Syrian Government” which had chosen “a non-capitalist path” of national independence.

As a consequence of the outcry, the Lebanese government asked the United States to postpone a routine semi-annual visit of Sixth Fleet units to Beirut scheduled for May. According to the Lebanese press, United States Ambassador Dwight Porter gave assurances to Lebanon’s President Charles Helou that Eshkol’s statement did not reflect American policy, and that the United States was not allied with Israel against the Arabs, but would aid any Middle East state that was attacked.

**Nature of United States Commitment**

Indeed, there was no formal treaty committing the United States to defend Israel or any Arab state. After the June war, when Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright wrote Secretary Rusk asking whether the United States had “a national commitment,” other than United Nations obligations, to “come either to the military or economic aid of Israel” or any Arab state in case of attack, Assistant Secretary of State William B. Macomber, Jr., replied (August 15):

> President Johnson and his three predecessors have stated the United States interest and concern in supporting the political independence and territorial integrity of the countries of the Near East. *This is a statement of policy and not a commitment to take particular actions in particular circumstances.* (Author’s emphasis.)

For reasons noted below, Nasser apparently came to the conclusion, in May 1967, that the international situation enabled him to create a particular set of circumstances in which the United States would choose not to act. Since the Suez debacle of 1956, he had been spreading the myth in the Arab
world that the intervention of Britain and France, not the armed forces of Israel, led to the withdrawal of the Egyptians from Sinai. In the spring of 1967 Syrian and Egyptian mass media constantly harped upon the theme that Israel would be powerless to act without American aid and support. Russia, the one superpower that could have told the Arabs the truth and thereby exercised a restraining influence, chose to feed the lie of American-Israeli collusion.

**Soviet Propaganda Links United States to “Israeli Extremists”**

Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, in an English-language broadcast to Africa on April 11, declared that Israel would not have dared attack Syria without American and British backing, and that the decision to unleash the “Israeli extremists” was reached at a just completed “conference of American diplomats and intelligence agents serving in the Near East.” In its regular Arabic broadcast, on the same day, Moscow Radio charged that “American pilots participated in the air raids on Syria” during the April 7 clash, and that “the Syrian authorities were told this by one of the American pilots whose aircraft was shot down while the Israeli attack was being repelled.” An Arabic broadcast from Moscow, later that day repeated the charge, adding that West German aircraft also had been involved.

These Soviet charges, which contained not a shred of truth, certainly helped fan the Arab-Israel tensions, which erupted into war in June. There have been reports that the Soviet Union tried, by quiet diplomatic means, to restrain the Syrians from provoking new border clashes and from encouraging terrorist raids against Israel. However, in all public diplomatic efforts, both in the United Nations and outside, Moscow continued to stress that Syria was blameless in the border incidents and the innocent victim of Israeli-imperialist plots. On April 26 Moscow made public the text of a note it sent to the Israeli ambassador after the April 7 incident, warning that “this risky playing with fire by Israel in an area in direct proximity to the Soviet Union frontiers” was fraught with danger and that Israel would bear “full responsibility” for the consequences of any new “act of aggression.” Soviet Russia, the note continued, expected Israel not to yield to a policy of military adventures serving imperialist forces, warning that such a policy threatened the vital interests of Israel’s people and “the fate of their country.”

**Mounting Terrorism**

Border incidents and terrorist raids continued in April and early May. At a UN press luncheon on May 11, U Thant, reporting that terrorist raids into Israel near the Syrian border had increased in the past few days, called these incidents “very deplorable, especially because, by their nature they seem to indicate” that the terrorists “have had more specialized training than has usually been evidenced in al-Fatah incidents in the past.” This activity, he
said, "is insidious, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agree-
ments and menaces the peace of the area."

On the same day Prime Minister Eshkol warned that, unless the wave of
sabotage and terrorism stopped, Israel would be compelled again to demon-
strate, as it had on April 7, that it could respond at a time and place of its
own choosing against those aiding and harboring the terrorists. Similar warn-
ings by Eshkol and other high government and military officials followed.
However, Eshkol made it quite clear (May 12) that "the Arab States and
the nations of the world ought to know that any border which is tranquil
from their side will also be quiet from our side. If they try to sow unrest
on our border—unrest will come to theirs."

These warnings were intended to impress upon the Syrians and their Soviet
backers that continued terrorism was "insidious and a menace to peace." When Thant realized that his own remarks could be construed as sanctioning
Israeli retaliation in view of the demonstrated impotence of the UN Security
Council to stop or even condemn the terrorism, he issued a postscript on
May 13 saying that his earlier statement "cannot be interpreted as condoning
resort to force by any party."

The State Department reportedly expressed its concern to Israel that recent
Israeli statements were increasing tension in the area. At the same time, offi-
cials in Washington and the United Nations tended to dismiss the far more
incendiary Syrian and other Arab declarations calling almost daily for Israel's
destruction as more or less routine—they had been going on for years—and
as the product of Arab flair for exaggeration. Washington worked behind the
scenes at the United Nations to aid U Thant's efforts to cool the rising tension.

The United States instructed Ambassador Walworth Barbour not to attend
the Israel Independence Day military parade in Jerusalem on May 15, to
which Jordan and Britain objected. Although the Israelis agreed to limit the
military display to equipment permitted in Jerusalem under the armistice
agreement, the ambassadors of the other great powers also boycotted the cere-
mony, as did the UN military observers.

Moscow Charges Israel Plans Invasion of Syria

For reasons that are not yet clear, the Soviet Union at this time again
revived the charge that Israel was massing troops for an imminent invasion
of Syria. Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Federenko made the same charge dur-
ing the October 1966 UN debate, and repeated it after UN observers on the
scene reported the charge baseless. It was again mentioned in the Soviet press
in February. Was Soviet intelligence in the Middle East so ineffective that it
accepted whatever the Syrians said, despite objective evidence to the contrary,
or was the charge a conscious fabrication by the "hawks" of the Soviet
military and intelligence, intended to convince the Soviet leadership that their
heavy investment in Syria was being threatened? Or was the Soviet political
leadership itself eager to use the story as a means of getting Nasser to pledge
greater support to Syria, with which he signed a defense pact in November 1966, at Moscow's urging? Whatever the truth, the Russians acted as if they believed the charge. Thus, Soviet Premier Kosygin at the UN on June 19:

In those days, the Soviet Government, and I believe others too, began receiving information to the effect that the Israeli Government had timed for the end of May a swift stroke at Syria in order to crush it and then carry the fighting over into the territory of the United Arab Republic.

President Nasser in his "resignation" address, June 9, noted that "our friends in the Soviet Union told the [Egyptian] parliamentary delegation which was visiting Moscow early last month that there was a calculated intention" by Israel to invade Syria, confirming Egypt's "own reliable information." Both Kosygin and Nasser failed to mention that Soviet Ambassador Dimitri Chuvakhin in Tel Aviv refused three invitations (on May 12, 19 and 29) by top Israeli officials personally to inspect the area along the Syrian frontier. The "nyet" to the Israeli offer on May 12 was either an act of gross incompetence or, more likely, an ominous sign of Soviet intention to involve the Egyptians more actively in backing Syria. Nasser claimed it was information he received on May 13 of Israel's concentration of "huge armed forces" near the Syrian border that led him to begin sending Egyptian troops into Sinai on the night of May 14.

On May 15 Thant relayed to Cairo a message from the Israel government assuring him that it had no intention of initiating military action (p. 117). However, the Sinai buildup continued and began to assume massive proportions, even after Thant reported to the Security Council on May 19 that, along the Israeli-Syrian frontier, "UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line." Charles W. Yost, veteran United States diplomat in the Middle East and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in Foreign Affairs (January 1968) that "United States representatives in Israel at the time also saw no evidence of the alleged troop concentrations."

Deterioration in United States-Egyptian Relations

There were some, notably David G. Nes, United States chargé d'affaires in Cairo at the time, who argued that Washington could have averted the 1967 crisis if it had continued the economic aid to Egypt which ended in mid-1966. Nes, who has since resigned from the Foreign Service, also contended that the United States could not take effective action because it had no ambassador in Cairo, who could have met with Nasser during the critical period from March to May 21. Others ascribed the deterioration in relations to Nasser's insistence on following policies diametrically opposed to vital United States interests in the area. The administration found it difficult to justify resumption of aid to Egypt in the face of strong congressional displeasure over Nasser's continued call for the overthrow of the pro-Western
governments in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, and Morocco, and his failure to demonstrate a willingness to place the economic needs of his own people ahead of his desire for foreign adventures. The administration itself was angered by Nasser's failure to honor his pledge to withdraw from Yemen. State Department spokesman McCloskey, on May 16, deplored the Egyptian air raids on two Saudi Arabian towns near the Yemeni border, and officially expressed the United States' deep concern over this "escalation of tension between Arab states."

Within a matter of hours, however, this long dragged out war in southern Arabia was to be overshadowed, as Washington and the world focused on the impending Egyptian-Israeli confrontation, precipitated by Nasser's call for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force.

WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

Testimony coming out of the post-war trials of army officers in Cairo contradicted the official version that Nasser was convinced of the Israeli buildup against Syria. Former Egyptian Defense Minister Shams ed-Din Badran told an Egyptian military court in February 1968 that General Mohammed Fawzi, then Egyptian chief of staff, was sent to Damascus in mid-May 1967 and, upon personal investigation, found no evidence of the Syrian and Russian charges of Israeli troop concentrations. He reportedly said, "the Russians must have been having hallucinations."

It is significant that Fawzi arrived in Damascus on May 14 and, after conferring with the Syrian defense minister and chief of staff on "important questions related to joint defense" against Israel, flew back to Cairo on May 15. On the same day Egyptian troops paraded through Cairo on their way to Sinai. Late in the evening of May 16 Major General I. J. Rikhye, Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Gaza, received a message from General Fawzi telling him that Egyptian armed forces "are already concentrated in Sinai on our eastern borders," ready for action against Israel "the moment it might carry out aggressive action against any Arab country."

Ostensibly to insure the safety of "all UN troops which install OPS [Observation Posts] along our borders," General Fawzi asked General Rikhye to issue "orders to withdraw all these troops immediately." The UNEF commander replied he could not do so without authorization from the UN Secretary General. The following morning, May 17, the text of General Fawzi's letter was published in the authoritative Cairo paper Al Ahram.

Thus, if Badran's testimony was accurate, Fawzi and Nasser knew before Egypt asked for the UNEF withdrawal that Israel was not preparing an invasion of Syria. The initial interpretation in both Washington and Jerusalem was that Nasser was not interested in a serious clash with Israel and that
these well-publicized moves were merely intended as a show of solidarity with Syria. Nasser had been subjected to taunts from both Syria and Jordan for his failure to do anything to implement Cairo's defense agreement with Damascus. If Israel did not attack, Nasser could pose as Syria's savior and enhance his prestige in the Arab world. It was recalled that he employed the same stratagem once before, in 1960, mobilizing troops in Sinai and then withdrawing them after the alleged threat was averted.

This time, however, the Egyptians went a crucial step further by demanding the UNEF withdrawal. There has been much speculation about the real intentions of the Egyptians. A vast amount of polemical literature has sprung up concerning the legal, moral, and practical aspects of the UN response.

**Thant's Withdrawal of UNEF**

The UN Secretary General has been subjected to considerable criticism for his handling of the UNEF withdrawal. Thant's critics argued that Nasser was bluffing; that, at most, he sought only a partial or temporary withdrawal of the UNEF units; that he did not really expect the UN to comply so quickly; that had Thant used delaying tactics and called the General Assembly into session, as some argued he was required to do, diplomatic pressure might have been exerted on Nasser to allow the UNEF to remain. In his first statement on the crisis, on May 23, President Johnson said "we are dismayed at the hurried withdrawal [of UNEF] without action by either the General Assembly or the Security Council."

Strong disapproval was voiced in Congress. Senator Henry M. Jackson (Dem., Wash.) charged that Thant's "precipitate action pulled the props out from under the precarious Near East peace," and that he "violated all canons of courage, good sense and responsibility" in failing to call the Assembly and Council into session. Senator Hugh Scott (Rep., Penn.) called Thant's action a "shocking development," while Representative Frank Horton (Rep., N.Y.) accused the UN of "knuckling under to a saber-rattling aggressor."

Yitzhak Rabin, then Israel chief of staff, told *Le Monde* (February 28, 1968), "I do not believe Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to launch an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it." According to Rabin, Nasser unleashed the Aqaba crisis "to save face" after Thant's demand that the UNEF force either be allowed to perform its functions without interference, or be evacuated completely.

The Secretary General replied to his critics on all the basic points in a lengthy report, submitted to the General Assembly on June 20. Our concern here is whether delaying tactics would have made a difference in fact.

UNEF, consisting of 3,400 men, of whom only 1,800 were stationed along the lengthy border, was never intended to be, and could not be, a fighting force for repulsing an attack from either side. Its job was in fact not even
that of a fire brigade, equipped to combat fires. It was primarily a fire alarm system for reporting incidents. If the Egyptian-Israeli border was relatively quiet over the past decade, it was because of the tacit agreement of Egypt and Israel not to create major incidents.

Thant suggested in his report to the Assembly on May 18, that UNEF's border patrol function could be assumed by a reactivated Egyptian-Israeli mixed armistice commission and the UN truce supervisory machinery. This suggestion was subsequently endorsed by the Egyptian UN delegate. But this ignored the vital fact that, in addition to patrolling the armistice line, UNEF had one unique and crucial function at a spot far removed from the Israel-UAR frontier: to occupy Sharm el Sheikh, the former Egyptian outpost on the southern tip of the Sinai peninsula, and, by its presence, prevent the Egyptians from interfering with shipping through the Strait of Tiran to the Israeli port of Eilat.

Did Thant's insistence that Nasser accept all or none of UNEF precipitate the Egyptian blockade, resulting in the June war? An affirmative reply hinges on the assumption that the Egyptians initially only wanted to move into position along the Israeli land frontier, and decided to take Sharm el Sheikh only after Thant presented his demand for an unconditional reply on the evening of May 17. However, the Secretary General noted that, on May 16, an Egyptian officer had already told the UNEF commander of Egypt's intention to take over Sharm el Sheikh that very night.

UNEF's composition facilitated the Egyptian takeover, for its garrison at Sharm el Sheikh consisted solely of a 32-man Yugoslav unit. On May 17 Fawzi informed the UNEF commander that all Yugoslav contingents in Sinai were to be withdrawn within a day. At the same time, the Yugoslav and Indian representatives on the UNEF Advisory Committee told Thant, at a meeting in New York, that all their national contingents were being pulled out in compliance with Egypt's request. Theoretically, their place eventually could have been taken by Canadian or Scandinavian units, whose governments opposed the dismantling of UNEF. But this would have taken time, and it is highly doubtful whether they could have successfully dislodged the Egyptian forces, which had already taken over.

The formal request from Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad for UNEF's total withdrawal was handed to Thant in New York at noon on May 18, which was 6 P.M. in Sinai.

The Secretary General concluded from the sequence of events that the UNEF outpost at Sharm el Sheikh was "in fact rendered ineffective by United Arab Republic troops before the request for withdrawal was received." He added that Cairo had made it entirely clear to him that an appeal for reconsideration of the withdrawal decision "would encounter a firm rebuff" and would be considered an attempt to impose UNEF as an "army of occupation." Nasser, himself, declared in a radio address, on May 22, that the opposition of the United States, Britain, and Canada to withdrawal of UNEF
reflected a campaign to turn it “into a force serving neo-imperialism.” He praised Thant for not yielding to these pressures, and said that Egyptian troops would have “forcibly disarmed” UNEF, if necessary.

In his May 19 report to the Security Council, Thant noted that there had not yet been any major clashes along the Egyptian-Israeli border, but that the renewal of the direct confrontation of the opposing forces after UNEF’s withdrawal “could easily escalate into heavy conflict.” He warned that the situation was more disturbing and “more menacing, than at any time since the fall of 1956.” On May 22 Thant flew to Cairo to confer with President Nasser.

United States Reaction

The withdrawal of UNEF naturally aroused “deep concern” in Washington, and diplomatic efforts to counsel restraint on all parties were intensified. On May 19 Ambassador Goldberg, meeting with U Thant, pledged full United States support “for any UN action required to keep the peace.” However, no meetings of the Security Council or General Assembly were called, and no high level public announcement of the United States position was issued.

The feeling in some quarters in Washington and elsewhere was that Nasser was still engaged in a political grandstand play, for he did not immediately follow the demand for the withdrawal of UNEF with action to reimpose the blockade of the Strait of Tiran. The most optimistic appraisal was given by Richard H. Nolte, the new United States ambassador to the UAR, when he arrived at the airport in Cairo, on May 21, to fill the post that had been vacant during the three preceding months. He reportedly told the press, “There is no crisis in the Middle East. This thing will not amount to much.”

EGYPTIAN BLOCKADE

On May 22, while U Thant was on his way to Cairo, Nasser publicly announced that “the armed forces yesterday occupied Sharm el Sheikh.” Speaking to the UAR Air Force Advance Command, he continued:

What is the meaning of the armed forces’ occupation of Sharm el Sheikh? It is an affirmation of our rights and our sovereignty over the Aqaba Gulf . Under no circumstances will we allow the Israeli flag to pass through the Aqaba Gulf.

Nasser said he realized that this meant “a confrontation with Israel,” and declared, “The Jews threatened war. We tell them: you are welcome, we are ready for war.” He explained that the situation was far different from that in 1956, for the Egyptian air force was now many times stronger. Even then, he claimed, Premier Ben-Gurion had feared the effect of the Egyptian bombers on the “Haifa-Jerusalem-Tel Aviv triangle, which contains one-third
of Israel's population," and insisted on a written guarantee that the French air force would protect Israel before taking action. Nasser emphasized that today Israel did not have the same kind of backing. He indicated that, although the United States "supports it and supplies it with arms," this was only "a political alliance."

Revelations at the Cairo post-war trials indicated that Nasser erred in greatly overestimating the strength of the Egyptian forces. At the same time, he accurately assessed the extent and limits of the American commitment to Israel. Before calling for the withdrawal of UNEF and again before announcing the blockade, Nasser reportedly conferred with his top military advisors, who assured him that the Egyptian forces were prepared if these acts should provoke an Israeli attack. At one point Air Force Chief Lieutenant General Mohammed Sidki Mahmoud apparently suggested to Nasser that Egypt strike first, with well planned raids on Israel. Nasser was said to have objected to this course on the ground that such an attack would lead to intervention by the United States Sixth Fleet. In reply to Nasser's question about what would happen if Israel were allowed to strike first, Sidki reportedly said that "only about 20 per cent of Egypt's air power would be lost" and that the remaining Egyptian bomber and fighter force could make a successful counterattack. After the war, the Israelis disclosed a captured "secret operation order" to the Egyptian air force "to be prepared for a sudden attack on Israel," listing targets but leaving the time open "in conformity with conditions as they develop."

Nasser thus correctly assumed that the United States would be likely to intervene militarily only if Israel were clearly the victim of attack.

Soviet Position

How much support Nasser expected from Moscow is not clear. Unnamed "high Soviet sources" told Western correspondents after the war that although Moscow backed the Egyptian concentration of forces in Sinai, it definitely did not approve the blockade. Whether the Russians agreed to demands for the withdrawal of UNEF is uncertain. Once Nasser reinstated the blockade, the Russians reportedly warned him that the Soviet Union would commit itself only to neutralizing possible United States intervention, and that the degree of Soviet involvement would not be escalated beyond the level of American action.

Nasser stated, on May 29, that Defense Minister Badran, who had just returned from Moscow, brought a message from Premier Kosygin that "the Soviet Union stands with us in this battle and will not allow any country to intervene, so that the state of affairs prevailing before 1956 may be restored." (In subsequent speeches Nasser declared that the Arabs ultimate objective remained restoration of the pre-1948 situation, i.e., the destruction of the State of Israel.)

With the Soviet Union ready to check any direct American intervention,
Nasser apparently was confident that Israel, left to fend for itself, either would have to accept the Egyptian blockade as a fait accompli, or, if it decided to attack, would suffer defeat. To make sure, Nasser mobilized all his reserves and sent seven more divisions into Sinai.

**United States Reaction**

While the declaration of the blockade may have caught Washington by surprise, it convinced even the optimists that Egypt and Israel were on a collision course and that a full-blown crisis was at hand. On May 23 Prime Minister Eshkol declared that the blockade constituted "an act of aggression against Israel" (p. 118).

On the same day, Representative Emanuel Cellar (Dem., N.Y.), read a statement which was later signed by 110 Congressmen, warning that Egyptian and Syrian threats against Israel made war "inevitable unless the United States acts firmly and vigorously to prevent it." Noting that the Soviet Union appeared to be "testing American resolve to defend the peace," the Congressmen pledged their "fullest support to measures which must be taken by the Administration" to demonstrate that "we are now prepared to take whatever action may be necessary to resist aggression against Israel and to preserve the peace."

That evening President Johnson warned on nationwide television that "the purported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping" added "a new and very grave dimension to the Middle East crisis." He explained:

The United States considers the gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the entire international community.

Since it was not yet established that Egypt had in fact taken action to enforce its proclaimed blockade, President Johnson's remark, "the United States is seeking clarification on this point," left the door open for Egypt to back down. Addressing himself to the leaders of all the nations of the Middle East, he reaffirmed "that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area. The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine." In an apparent allusion to Vietnam, Johnson declared that "we have always opposed—and we oppose in other parts of the world at this very moment—the efforts of other nations to resolve their problems by the aggression route. We shall continue to do so."

President Johnson outlined no specific course of action other than calling on all concerned to "observe in a spirit of restraint their solemn responsibilities" under the UN Charter and the Armistice Agreements. He mentioned that he had been in close touch with Ambassador Goldberg at the UN, where "we are now pursuing the matter with great vigor, and we hope that the Security Council can and will act effectively."
This was to prove wishful thinking.

In order to head off the impending explosion, the United States tried to convince the United Arab Republic to revoke, suspend, or at least to limit implementation of its proclaimed blockade, and, at the same time, to restrain both Israel and Egypt from resorting to armed force. An even greater concern was to prevent the crisis from turning into a direct confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers. In its efforts, Washington employed a combination of normal bilateral diplomatic channels and multilateral approaches, ranging from the regular United Nations machinery to proposals for a declaration by the major maritime powers, backed up by a multinational flotilla, to challenge the blockade, if necessary.

According to one report, President Johnson sent Premier Kosygin a personal message the day after the UNEF withdrawal, asking him to join with the United States in convincing both the Arabs and the Israelis to exercise restraint. Ambassador Goldberg also was instructed to impress on Soviet delegate Federenko that the United States was anxious to avoid a frontal clash with the Soviet Union. While the Russian reply handed Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow was considered "reasonably encouraging" with regard to a direct confrontation, Moscow was not prepared to lend its support to a common solution of the crisis.

**UN Security Council Session**

Moscow's reservations quickly became apparent at the first session of the Security Council on May 24, called by Denmark and Canada. Federenko, who previously loudly proclaimed the danger of an imminent crisis created by Israeli and imperialist threats against Syria, completely changed his tune. He questioned the need for "so hastily" convening the Council, and charged that the Western powers "artificially fostered" a "dramatic climate" to justify intervention in the region. Ambassador Goldberg replied that the Council would be burying its head in the sand if it failed to consider a crisis on which world attention focused. He backed the Danish and Canadian suggestion that the Council formally endorse U Thant's peace efforts in Cairo, and announced United States willingness to join with the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France, within and outside the United Nations, in restoring and maintaining peace in the Middle East. Federenko replied that Washington and London could prove their genuine interest in relaxing tensions by withdrawing their fleets from the Mediterranean, as a first step.

Ambassador Awad el Kony of the UAR told the Council that Canada and Denmark were trying to sabotage the Secretary General's mission. The representatives of India, Bulgaria, and Mali joined the Soviet Union in refusing to participate in consultations. The French delegate noted that the Council could not act until the great powers reached agreement. The Council adjourned without action.

On May 27 Thant reported to the Council on his discussions in Cairo.
Although the Egyptian government assured him that it "would not initiate offensive action" against Israel and that its aim was only "to return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956," Thant made it clear that Israel would regard any restriction on innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran as an act of war. He warned the UAR of "the dangerous consequences" of a blockade, which could set off "a general conflict," and expressed his deep concern and hope "that no precipitate action would be taken."

In his report Thant stressed that his major concern at this critical juncture was "to gain time," that a peaceful outcome "will depend on a breathing spell" to allow tensions to subside from their "present explosive level." He urged all parties concerned "to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence and avoid all other actions" that could increase tension, such as terrorist raids and border clashes, so that the Council can deal with the underlying causes of the crisis.

When the Council reconvened on May 29, Goldberg endorsed Thant's appeal. He noted that Nasser had reiterated his intention to enforce the blockade, despite Thant's plea and "strenuous diplomatic efforts" by UN members, including "a parallel appeal" by the United States during Thant's mission in Cairo. Goldberg underscored that "foregoing belligerence" during the breathing spell "must mean foregoing any blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba" and "permitting free and innocent passage of all nations and all flags through the Strait of Tiran to continue as it has during the last 10 years."

Calling for action to strengthen UN machinery for revitalizing the armistice agreements and preventing border clashes and terrorist incursions, he reminded the Council that what it did "will affect not only the peace of the Near East but the good name and standing of the United Nations itself." World public opinion, he concluded, "expects the United Nations to live up to its promise of peace."

But television viewers saw only protracted and sterile debate. The Council could not even agree on a United States resolution, calling on all parties to heed the Secretary General's appeal for a cooling-off period. Federenko always came back to the theme that "the real culprit" in the dangerous aggravation of tensions was Israel. He castigated the United States for its aggressive policies in other parts of the world, and said that its "pious appeals to both sides" in the Middle East conflict only masked its partiality for Israeli extremist circles.

**Soviet-American Behind-the-scenes Diplomacy**

While the United Nations displayed its impotence and reflected the Soviet-American cold war, Washington and Moscow in fact worked behind the scenes to win a breathing pause. On May 23 United States Ambassador-designate Nolte handed Foreign Minister Riad a formal note calling for restraint. (In a speech to the UN on September 29, Riad chastised the United States for not having lived up to the pledge, contained in the note, that
Egypt and the other Arab states could rely on America’s “firm opposition toward aggression in the area in any form.” He failed to mention that the authoritative Egyptian paper, *Al Ahram*, at the time had reported that the American note also proposed retention and reactivation of UNEF forces, about to withdraw from Egypt, pending UN resolution of the question; a ban on UAR forces in Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh until the UAR guaranteed freedom of shipping; and withdrawal of UAR and Israeli forces from the border. The Cairo paper added that these proposals were rejected by Riad.)

Reports that Egypt was about to launch an attack disturbed both Washington and Moscow. Arab public statements approached a peak of anti-Israel fervor, and Nasser himself, in a speech on May 26, declared that Egypt was “ready to embark on a general war with Israel” over the blockade issue, and was confident that “our strength is sufficient to attain victory.” On May 25 Kosygin reportedly sent a message to Johnson, which in effect accepted the President’s earlier suggestion that their governments exert their influence on both sides to prevent war. Nasser later revealed that Johnson, on May 26, presented a message to the Egyptian ambassador in Washington, warning that Egypt “would face serious consequences” if it did not exercise restraint. And a few hours later, Nasser recalled, the Soviet ambassador in Cairo roused him at 3:30 a.m. to tell him that the Soviet government “strongly requested” that “we should not be the first to open fire.”

The United States did not restrict its calls for restraint to the Arab side, though the Arabs and Soviets claimed it did. Public pressure in Israel increased for a quick and forceful reaction by the Israel government to the blockade and the growing concentration of Arab troops on the borders.

When, on May 27, Eban returned to Israel from Washington, London, and Paris with an appeal for more time, the members of the Cabinet were evenly divided between immediate military action and giving diplomacy a further chance. Prime Minister Eshkol adjourned the meeting that lasted all evening until 1 a.m. on May 28, without pressing the vital question to a vote.

Two hours later, Ambassador Chuvakhin roused Eshkol to deliver a letter from Kosygin—reportedly more moderate in tone than Moscow’s public propaganda blasts—asking Israel not to initiate the shooting. This was followed at daybreak by the arrival of a letter from President Johnson, urging Israel to exercise restraint and hinting of the danger of possible Soviet intervention. The Cabinet met again later in the day to consider the Kosygin and Johnson notes. According to Eshkol’s statement, it overwhelmingly voted for continued reliance on “political action in the world arena” to stimulate “international factors to take effective measures to insure free international passage” through the Strait of Tiran.

But Israel was not going to continue indefinitely to allow one of its vital arteries to be cut or to breathe with only one lung, to use Eban’s metaphors. At his Washington and other meetings, Eban spoke of the solemn assurances Israel had received before agreeing to withdraw from Sinai in 1957 (AJYB,
1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 208-13): On February 11, 1957, John Foster Dulles, the then Secretary of State, had handed Ambassador Eban a memorandum expressing the U.S. view that the Gulf of Aqaba "comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto," and pledging that "the United States is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right." On February 20, 1957 President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared, "if, unhappy, Egypt does hereafter violate" its obligation to allow Israel shipping to use the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba "then this should be dealt with firmly by the society of nations." UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold had made it clear in January that any Egyptian resumption of a blockade was contrary to earlier Security Council decisions, according to which "none of the parties to the 1949 Armistice Agreement is entitled to claim belligerent rights, including the application of such rights in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran." During the 1957 UN discussion many of the major maritime powers made similar statements, supporting freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran to Israel's port of Eilat. The legal principle involved was incorporated in Article 16 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

Ambassador Goldberg noted in the Security Council, on May 29, 1967, that both the Soviet Union and the United States were parties to this convention, codifying basic international law. Consequently, he said, the Egyptian attempt to reimpose the blockade jeopardized not only the rights of Israel "but also the rights of all trading nations under international law."

U.S. Hesitates to Break Blockade

When the 1967 crisis erupted there was thus widespread support both in the United States and among the Western maritime powers for the legal correctness of Israel's position and sympathy for its demand of free passage. However, when it came to translate this moral support into effective international action to make Nasser give up the blockade, all the pledges and assurances quickly melted away. Former President Eisenhower reportedly replied to a query from the White House that the United States was bound by a "commitment of honor" to keep the Strait open. In a press conference on May 25, he reaffirmed the U.S. duty to maintain the right of passage for American ships, but weakened the statement by adding that it was a UN problem rather than a strictly American matter. He cautioned that "none of us should hurry to become involved."

Similar hesitation marked the response of the administration and Congressional leaders of both parties. While the President's clearest legal mandate was to use United States flag ships in a direct unilateral challenge of the blockade, political sentiment was strongly opposed to the U.S. going it alone. Senators Harrison A. Williams (Dem., N.J.) and Wayne Morse (Dem.,
Ore.) came out unequivocally in favor of challenging the blockade. Senator Morse said "American ships should be sent through that strait now to make it perfectly clear to Nasser, Russia or any other power" that we will not permit any country to violate our rights on the high seas.

The dominant mood in the Senate was expressed on May 23 by Senator John C. Stennis (Dem., Miss.), head of the preparedness subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, who declared: "By no means should we go it alone." Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (Dem., Mont.) called for "primary emphasis on the United Nations. There should be no question of unilateral military involvement in the Near East." Any action, he said, should be "on a multilateral or collective basis."

After a two-hour briefing of the Foreign Relations Committee by Secretary Rusk, Chairman Fulbright said the situation was a "classic case" for the United Nations because of the "multilateral interests" in the area and the likelihood that an Arab-Israel clash would "bring in the major powers." Two days later Fulbright declared that the Soviet Union held the key to a settlement of the crisis, adding that the United States lacked influence in the Middle East "because of its primary preoccupation with the war in Vietnam." Senator Symington (Dem., Mo.), who long warned that the U.S. had overextended its foreign commitments, said that if the U.S. was called on to defend Israel, it might have to decide whether the Middle East was more important than the Far East to the security of the U.S. In his view it was at least "as important to defend Israel as to defend South Vietnam." But, he concluded, "we have done enough unilateral intervening, and I don't think we should go in unilaterally." Minority leader Dirksen also called for multilateral action, as did Senator Javits, who considered keeping the Gulf open the joint responsibility of all maritime nations. The late Senator Robert F. Kennedy (Dem., N.Y.) suggested the U.S. explore the possibility of a United Nations sea patrol in the Gulf of Aqaba.

**Efforts for Multilateral Action**

Meanwhile the United States was preparing a declaration for the signature of as many maritime powers as possible, affirming the status of the Gulf as an international waterway and implying their readiness to exercise the right of free and innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran. However, the declaration avoided any mention of force and did not obligate the signatories to challenge the blockade. While declaring the blockade "illegal," American official statements failed to call the blockade an act of "aggression," which the U.S. might be expected to oppose with force. Secretary Rusk, on June 1, dismissed a question on the possible use of force to test the blockade as "purely speculative at this point." There were conflicting reports on whether Britain, which strongly backed the maritime declaration, was in fact prepared to use its naval power. Its ships in the area were alerted, but its two aircraft carriers were still about 1,000 miles from the Strait of Tiran when
the war broke out. President de Gaulle insisted that any action required agreement among the Big Four, and when Russia rejected his suggestion for a summit conference, he kept France on the sidelines.

At the same time, tentative plans were being considered in Washington, in consultation with London and other maritime powers, for creating an international flotilla, informally named Red Sea Regatta by its planners, to sweep away mines and provide a naval escort for vessels through the blockaded Strait to Eilat. Among the test cases considered by the Pentagon were a tanker, flying a neutral flag but carrying oil, which Egypt regarded as a strategic cargo, and an unarmed merchant ship, flying the Israeli flag, and exercising the right of innocent passage. Most military specialists thought that the U.S. seaplane tender and two destroyers in the Red Sea, together with some British vessels would be an adequate escort. Thought was also given to sending in the aircraft carrier Intrepid, which had just passed through the Suez Canal on its way to the Far East. The military assumption was that the Egyptians would not fire on this powerful armada, and, if they did, the flotilla would make the necessary “limited and controlled response,” i.e., putting the Egyptian shore batteries at Sharm el Sheikh out of commission.

While a military challenge of the Egyptian blockade seemed a rather simple matter, there were grave fears in Washington and other capitals about the possible political consequences. An Egyptian clash with American or British forces might force the Russians to live up to their pledge to intervene. Defense Department officials testified that any serious or lengthy U.S. involvement in the Middle East would require the calling up of reserves. Washington was also concerned over the effect on its relations with the Arab states. Al Ahram stated that Egypt would regard any attempt to break the blockade as “aggression,” and would retaliate by denying passage through the Suez Canal to the ships of any country that did so. State Department officials felt that pro-American Jordan and Saudi Arabia would be placed in an “impossible” position in the Arab world. Even the Washington Post, normally sympathetic to Israel, qualified its editorial calling for the U.S. to support Israel’s free access to Eilat with the following caution:

But nothing could serve our interests worse than a jingoist, unilateral effort to do so by waving the American flag. This would invite the cutting of pipelines and destruction or nationalization of U.S. and other Western oil interests.

The governments of the other maritime nations had similar fears and hesitations. Premier Eshkol later said that Eban had been assured that some forty or fifty states would sign the maritime declaration. Yet only a handful in principle agreed to do so. At the beginning of June diplomatic efforts appeared deadlocked, and the Red Sea Regatta was becoming a far more exclusive yacht club than its sponsors intended. Besides Britain and the U.S., only Australia and the Netherlands were willing to consider some kind of action to test the blockade.
On May 28 Senator Fulbright suggested that the status of the Strait of Tiran be settled by the International Court of Justice. Most international legal experts believed that the court was almost certain to rule in Israel's favor. But, they pointed out that it took nearly three years to decide the Corfu Channel case, which was the clearest precedent to the present dispute. Moreover, the court had no enforcement powers, and relied for implementation on the Security Council, where Israel again would be faced with the prospect of a Soviet veto.

The announcement on June 4 that UAR Vice President Zakariya Mohieddin had accepted President Johnson's invitation to visit Washington within a few days and that Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey would later return the visit, further indicated to the Israelis that there was little prospect of an effective U.S. challenge of the blockade in the near future.

Meanwhile, the Middle East situation continued to deteriorate. On May 30 King Hussein flew to Cairo, embraced Nasser, and concluded a defense agreement, placing Jordanian forces under Egyptian command in time of war. On June 4 Iraq joined the Egyptian-Jordanian pact. The ring of steel closing around Israel now became an even greater threat than the blockade itself. Eban and Eshkol came under domestic fire for agreeing to a breathing spell that was used by the Arabs to tighten the noose around Israel's neck.

On June 4, two weeks after the blockade was announced, the Israeli Cabinet decided that Israel would have to act alone to break the blockade and the encirclement of Arab troops. General Moshe Dayan, who had been brought into the Cabinet as Defense Minister a few days earlier, told newsmen in an interview on June 3 that he thought the Israel defense forces could take care of themselves and that he "wouldn't like American or British boys getting killed here in order to secure our safety." The interview, relayed by satellite, was seen by American and British television audiences.

THE SIX-DAY WAR

On the morning of June 5 the Israel Air Force launched carefully coordinated air attacks on the major military airports in Egypt. This was quickly followed by a major ground offensive into Sinai and Gaza. The war was extended to Jordan when King Hussein rejected several Israeli appeals through the UN to remain out of the conflict. Fighting also broke out on the Syrian front. According to the official Israeli version, the air force went into action after Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip intensified their shelling of Israeli border settlements and Egyptian armored columns began moving into the Negev during the night of June 4-5 (pp. 120-21).

U.S. Reaction to the Outbreak of War

President Johnson was awakened at 4:30 A.M. and informed that serious fighting had broken out between Egypt and Israel. The official and press re-
ports were sketchy and contradictory. Each side accused the other of having started hostilities, and both claimed heavy damage to the enemy. Shortly after 5 A.M. the President conferred with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. The big question was what Moscow would do. A message was sent to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko through normal diplomatic channels, stating the American position and sounding out the Russians.

At 8 A.M. the first message from Soviet Premier Kosygin to President Johnson came over the hot-line teletype circuit. The President quickly replied in the first of a series of more than twenty messages that continued throughout the week. The texts of the messages were not released. According to the version published in *Newsweek* (February 12, 1968), the exchange involved a potential nuclear showdown "every bit as grim" as the Kennedy-Khrushchev confrontation during the Cuban missile crisis. As the Israeli forces penetrated into Sinai, Kosygin allegedly told Johnson to present to the Israelis an ultimatum that they either withdraw to the armistice line within a specified number of hours, or "the Soviets would come into the fight with everything they had."

President Johnson reportedly stressed in his response that U.S. forces were in no way involved in the fighting, but also let the Russians know that the United States had commitments and was prepared to meet any Soviet attempt at intervention on the Arab side. To underscore the point, the nuclear-armed Sixth Fleet was placed on alert and its units steamed toward the battle area in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet, Johnson was careful to make it clear that the Sixth Fleet's role was only defensive and deterrent. Thus, when planes of the fleet scrambled into action on June 8 to aid the *S.S. Liberty*, a U.S. intelligence communications ship which was attacked by Israeli aircraft and patrol boats, the President immediately informed Kosygin of the reason for the fleet's unusual activity, adding as a postscript the message he had just received from the Israel government, acknowledging responsibility for the incident and officially apologizing for mistakenly attacking an American vessel. The hot-line dialogue, the President later said in his 1968 State of the Union message, permitted the achievement of a cease-fire in the Middle East, "without a major power confrontation."

**Misunderstanding over U.S. Declaration of Neutrality**

The White House issued a statement on the morning of June 5, expressing deep distress at the outbreak of large-scale fighting, and noting that "each side has accused the other of launching aggression," but that "at this time the facts are not clear." It said the United States would devote all its energies to ending the fighting and called upon "all parties to support the Security Council in bringing about an immediate cease-fire."

At a press conference shortly after noon, State Department spokesman McCloskey was asked whether he would reaffirm American neutrality in the light of reports that there had been anti-American rioting in several Arab
capitals. McCloskey replied: "We have tried to steer an even-handed course through this. Our position is neutral in thought, word and deed."

The statement caused consternation among members of Congress and the press, who interpreted it as complete American indifference to what was happening. Many saw it as a sign that the United States was prepared to abandon Israel to its fate—and to those believing Cairo reports that fate appeared grim indeed, with Arab armies allegedly advancing on all fronts and Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem under massive air attacks. Concerned over the impression created by McCloskey that the U.S. was selling out Israel, Johnson called in Rusk, who proceeded to explain to the newsmen that the United States was a "nonbelligerent," and that the "use of this word neutral—which is a great concept of international law—is not an expression of indifference, and indeed indifference is not permitted to us."

Rusk's clarification failed to satisfy some Senators, among them Dirksen, Javits, Hugh Scott (Rep., Pa.) and Joseph S. Clark (Dem., Pa.). Clark declared that "morally, as well as legally, we are an ally of Israel. We are not neutral." Yet, despite the widespread sympathy for Israel on the first day of the war, no Senate leader suggested that the United States take military action to back Israel. The prevailing sentiment on June 5 was forcefully stated by Senator Richard D. Russell (Dem., Ga.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who told reporters that he was "unalterably opposed to any unilateral intervention" in the Middle East. Senator Mansfield indicated that there might have been more sentiment to help Israel, if not for "the situation in Vietnam." The Administration and the Senate, he said, had both "kept their cool" in the crisis.

While McCloskey's remarks may have seemed callous at the time, a clear statement of American neutrality probably was the best support for Israel under the circumstances. By the time McCloskey spoke to the reporters, it was evening in the Middle East and the White House had confirmed intelligence reports that the Israel air force had virtually wiped out the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air forces and now had complete command of the skies. There was no longer any threat to Israel's population centers and therefore no need for American intervention.

**Soviet Reaction**

The only danger to Israel was from direct Soviet intervention. A firm posture of American nonbelligerence was thus useful to counteract the charges of American air support for Israel, which the Arabs propagated to draw in the Russians. When the story continued to be repeated despite Defense Department and State Department protests, Secretary Rusk went before the television cameras, June 6, and angrily and categorically denied the charge, which soon proved to have been invented by Nasser and Hussein in a radiotelephone conversation. According to the account in *The Six Day War* by Randolph S. and Winston S. Churchill, the Russians were also angered by
the story and told the Egyptian and other Arab ambassadors in Moscow that they knew the charge was "a complete fabrication in which the Russians wanted no part." Significantly, the Soviet press omitted all reference to the Arab allegation.

At the same time, the Soviet Union was quick to issue a statement on June 5, accusing Israel of "committing aggression" and calling on Israel "to cease immediately and unconditionally" all military action against the Arab states and "to withdraw its troops behind the armistice line." (Foreign Minister Eban was to point out at the United Nations [June 19] that the Soviet Union previously submitted to the UN a resolution defining aggression, listing the blockade of a state's ports as one of the forms of direct aggression that entitled the victim to act in self-defense.) The Soviet statement went on to declare "firm support" of the Arab states, but gave no hint of direct action. It merely expressed the hope that the other powers and the United Nations would take urgent measures "to put out the fire of war in the Near East and to reestablish peace," and called for UN condemnation of Israeli actions.

UNITED NATIONS DEBATES

Security Council Action

When it became clear that the Arabs were losing and that the United States would not support a resolution condemning Israel or calling for its withdrawal, Moscow dropped its conditions and instructed Federenko to support a simple and unqualified formula that was favored by the United States. On the evening of June 6 the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the governments concerned to take "all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area."

The Arabs were not happy at the Soviet action. Iraqi representative Adnan Pachachi spoke of the cease-fire resolution as a complete surrender to Israel and, in an obvious allusion to the Soviet Union, added that the Arab people would not forget the action of those Council members who, having conceded that the Arabs were the victims of aggression, went along with a resolution that did not require the aggressor to give up the fruits of aggression.

Israel agreed to accept the cease-fire on condition that the Arabs did likewise. Federenko continued to press for a Council resolution condemning Israel with equally notable lack of success. The Council passed a further general resolution on June 7, demanding a cease-fire and setting a time limit. A cease-fire agreement was reached by Jordan and Israel on the same day, and by the United Arab Republic and Israel on June 8. When fighting continued on the Syrian front, the Council on June 9 demanded that "hostili-
ties cease forthwith." The next evening Syria and Israel officially accepted the cease-fire. On June 12 the Security Council unanimously passed a further resolution condemning "any and all violations of the cease-fire." (After the Egyptian sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat and the Israeli shelling of the Suez oil refineries, the Council on October 25 unanimously condemned "the violations of the cease-fire" and demanded that the states concerned "cease immediately all prohibited military activities in the area.")

On June 14 the Council also unanimously adopted a resolution designed to spare the civilian population and prisoners of war additional suffering. It called on the government of Israel "to ensure the safety, welfare and security" of the inhabitants of the occupied areas and "to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities." Addressing itself to all the governments concerned, the Council asked for the "scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war." (Implementing the resolution, Secretary General Thant, in July, appointed Nils-Goran Gussing, a Swedish diplomat working for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as his special representative. Gussing travelled throughout the area from mid-July to the beginning of September and submitted to the UN a detailed report on September 15. Though Thant interpreted Gussing's mandate under the resolution to include an investigation of the treatment of the Jewish minorities in Syria and the UAR, the Arab states resisted this interpretation [p. 133]).

On the conditions for a peace settlement, the United States and the Soviet Union were poles apart in June. The United States opposed the Soviet call for an emergency session of the General Assembly on the formal ground that the Security Council was already seized of the issue and under the Charter had the primary responsibility for peace and security, and for the practical reason, stated by Goldberg, that the imperative need is "not for invective and inflammatory statements, but for constructive proposals and deliberative diplomacy." The Soviet Union won sufficient votes to call the Assembly into session.

United States Peace Proposal

An hour before Premier Kosygin's scheduled address at the UN General Assembly, on June 19, President Johnson stated the American position in a televised address from Washington. The United States, he said, was committed to a peace based on five principles: "The first and greatest principle is that every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live and to have this right respected by its neighbors." The second requirement was "justice for the refugees"; the third, the preservation of "the right of innocent maritime passage for all nations"; the fourth, "limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race." Johnson specifically requested that, as a first step, all UN members report to the UN their arms shipments to the Middle East. To
the fifth principle, "respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all states," the President added an important new qualification:

This principle can be effective in the Middle East only on the basis of peace between the parties. The nations of the region have had only fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years. What they now need are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction and war.

He said, "certainly, troops must be withdrawn," but only if the other principles are also adopted. In his view, the demand for an immediate return to the situation as it was on June 4 was "not a prescription for peace but for renewed hostilities."

While, in the preceding four years, the United States rejected as unrealistic and premature various UN proposals calling for the Arabs and the Israelis to enter into negotiations, Johnson's statement marked a return to the traditional American position of urging negotiated settlements. He declared: "Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace." The United Nations and other outside agencies, he held, might help them "reason together," but the "main responsibility for the peace of the region depends on its own people and its own leaders." He pledged that "in a climate of peace" the nations of the Middle East could count on the United States to "do our full share" to solve the refugee problem, support regional cooperation and economic development, including nuclear powered desalination projects to "make the deserts bloom."

On June 20 Ambassador Goldberg introduced in the General Assembly a resolution incorporating the substance of the President's five principles. It scrupulously avoided casting blame on either party, and called for the achievement of peace "through negotiated agreements with appropriate third-party assistance."

Soviet Demands

The Soviet approach was quite different. Premier Kosygin charged "Israel, backed by bigger imperialist powers," with having committed aggression against its neighbors. He claimed that only severing of diplomatic ties by the Soviet Union and other states and the threat of sanctions had stopped the "unbridled aggressor" from continuing the invasion of Syria and conquering Damascus itself. He spoke of the mounting "atrocities and violence committed by the Israeli invaders," drawing a parallel between the behavior of the Israeli troops and the "heinous crimes perpetrated by the Fascists during World War II," and between the Israeli military governors and the Nazi Gauleiters in occupied Europe. He accused Israel of having long pursued a policy of "conquest and territorial expansion" and of evicting or "even exterminating" the indigenous population. He accused the United States, Britain, and West Germany of having given "direct encouragement" to Israel to commit aggression by bringing pressure to bear on the Arab states before the war.
Premier Kosygin then introduced the Soviet resolution which charged Israel with “premeditated and previously prepared aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan.” It asked the Security Council resolutely to condemn Israel’s acts of aggression; demand that Israel “immediately and without any condition withdraw all its forces” to the pre-June 5 armistice lines; demand that Israel pay in full and within the shortest possible time for “all the damage inflicted” on the neighboring Arab states and their nationals, and to return all seized property; in short, to undertake “immediate effective measures in order to eliminate all consequences” of the Israeli aggression.

In the following weeks these themes were to be repeated countless times in the Assembly debates by Soviet bloc and Arab representatives. Almost buried under the avalanche of anti-Israel invective in Premier Kosygin’s lengthy speech was one potentially significant point that set apart the Soviet position from that of the Arabs. In the midst of his tirade the Soviet Premier paused to note that “the Soviet Union is not against Israel—it is against the aggressive policy pursued by the ruling circles of that state.” He then cited as one of the fundamental principles of Soviet policy the right of “every people . . . to establish an independent national state of its own.” It was this principle, he said, that moved the Soviet Union to support the 1947 UN plan to partition Palestine and to create two independent states, one Jewish and one Arab. “Guided by this fundamental policy,” the Soviet Union recognized Israel and established diplomatic relations with it.

It soon became clear that neither the American nor the Soviet resolution could command the two-thirds majority required for Assembly adoption. On July 4 the Assembly voted on the Soviet resolution, section by section, and rejected all parts.* The United States decided not to press its own resolution to a vote. The resolution submitted by Albania, Communist China’s unofficial spokesman in the UN, was even more extreme than the Soviet in that it contained a condemnation of the United States and Britain for their “incitement, aid and direct participation” in the Israeli aggression, and a proviso, leaving to the UAR “alone to decide whether or not it can permit the passage of vessels of the Israel aggressors through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran.” The Albanian resolution was rejected by a vote of 71 to 22, with 27 abstentions. It was supported by 10 Communist states (with Rumania and Yugoslavia abstaining) and 10 Arab states (with Libya, Morocco and Tunisia abstaining) as well as by Cambodia and Mauritania.

Other Proposals

Anticipating the defeat of its proposals, the Soviet Union threw its weight behind a draft resolution introduced by Yugoslavia and 16 “non-aligned” states. The Yugoslav resolution explicitly called on Israel to withdraw all its

* For tabulation of roll call votes, on July 4, on the Soviet and other resolutions see: UN Monthly Chronicle (United Nations Office of Public Information), July 1967, pp. 78-79.
forces to their positions before June 5, adding a vague request that, after withdrawal was completed, the Security Council consider all aspects of the situation and seek a peaceful solution of outstanding legal, political, and humanitarian problems.

The United States backed a draft, sponsored by 20 Latin American countries, that explicitly coupled the call for withdrawal with one asking the parties to the conflict to end the state of belligerency. It noted that, under the UN Charter, there should be neither acquisition of territory by force nor threats against the integrity or independence of existing states. In calling for an end to belligerency, the Latin American resolution in effect rejected the legal basis for the Arab maritime blockade and economic boycott against Israel. It asked the Security Council, "relying on the presence of the United Nations," to insure withdrawal and the end of belligerency, and to achieve freedom of transit in international waterways and solution of the refugee problem. The resolution also reaffirmed the desirability of internationalizing Jerusalem.

Neither resolution received the necessary two-thirds vote. The Yugoslav and non-aligned draft obtained 53 votes in favor and 46 against, with 20 abstentions. The supporters included the 13 Arab states, 10 predominantly Moslem nations in Asia and Africa, 11 Communist countries, 9 African and 5 Asian non-Moslem states, and France, Spain, Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. The Latin American draft obtained 57 votes in favor and 43 against, with 20 abstentions. Supporters included the United States and all other Western Hemisphere nations, except Cuba, 12 countries from Western Europe and the British Commonwealth, 17 non-Arab African states, and 4 Asian states. Israel abstained.

American-Soviet Compromise Attempt

The obvious deadlock in the Assembly prompted the Soviet Union, in mid-July, to enter into private consultations with the United States for the purpose of finding some mutually acceptable formula that would justify Moscow's dramatic call for the special UN session. In discussions with Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador Goldberg suggested that Premier Kosygin's June 19 statement, recognizing the right of every people to an independent national state, might be the starting point for a suitable resolution. After further discussion, in which Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko joined, Soviet-American agreement was reached on a resolution coupling a call for withdrawal of forces to the positions of June 5 with recognition by all states that every state in the Middle East has the right "to maintain an independent national state of its own and to live in peace and security," free from the threat of acts or claims of war.

The Russians quickly discovered that they not only misjudged their chances of pushing through a condemnation of Israel in the General Assembly, but also miscalculated their influence with the Arab states, which refused to ac-
cept the new draft urged upon them by Gromyko. The Arabs were not prepared to concede Israel's right to exist as the price for Israeli withdrawal. However, the episode was to have one positive result: it demonstrated to Moscow that Washington did not intend to humiliate it and score a propaganda victory, but would support any constructive moves to achieve a just peace settlement in the Middle East.

On July 21 the Assembly adjourned "temporarily," after adopting by a vote of 63 to 26, with 27 abstentions, a resolution requesting the Secretary General to forward the records of the emergency session to the Security Council "to facilitate the resumption by the Council, as a matter of urgency, of its consideration of the tense situation in the Middle East." The Soviet Union and the other Eastern European states, except Albania, joined the United States and most Latin American and West European states in supporting the resolution, the Arab states voted against it, and Israel abstained. On September 18, the day before the opening of the regular fall session of the General Assembly, it met once more in emergency session and unanimously urged the Assembly to give "high priority" to the Middle East crisis. But while the situation in the Middle East figured prominently in the opening speeches of many UN delegates, the Assembly dealt only with the refugee question (p. 184) and left the overall political issues to the Security Council.

Meanwhile, the Arab states had met in a summit conference at Khartoum at the end of August and, while reiterating their refusal to recognize Israel or to negotiate with it, left the door open to UN efforts for an acceptable political settlement. However, Syria and Algeria demanded that military action against Israel be continued.

Security Council Resolution

When the Council resumed discussion in November, after informal behind-the-scenes meetings, there appeared considerable movement toward a consensus. A resolution introduced by India, Nigeria, and Mali, and one subsequently introduced by the Soviet Union acknowledged the need to end the state of belligerency and to allow innocent passage through international waterways. But whereas these resolutions were very specific in laying down the terms for complete Israeli withdrawal and rather vague about the rights and guarantees the Arabs should offer Israel in return, a resolution offered by the United States was vague about the details of withdrawal and clear about the other elements to be included in the peace settlement.

However, all agreed on the desirability of appointing a special UN envoy who would use quiet diplomacy in trying to find a way out of the impasse. The problem was agreement on the principles that should guide him and the scope of his mandate. Here the British stepped in and, making good use of their centuries of diplomatic experience, succeeded in drafting a resolution that was sufficiently clear in principle and vague in detail to permit each side to interpret it as supporting its own position.
The resolution was unanimously adopted by the Council on November 22. Comparison of the text with the positions outlined by President Johnson and Premier Kosygin, on June 19, shows that the resolution, for which the Soviet Union now voted, incorporated four of Johnson's five major points and virtually none of the Soviet demands. It omitted Johnson's point dealing with the arms race.

However, in a statement after the vote, Goldberg expressed satisfaction that the Soviet draft, which was not submitted to a vote, contained a clause, calling on all the states in the area to "take measures to limit the useless and destructive arms race." He reiterated that the United States was eager to work together with the Soviet Union and other states to end the arms race. But, as noted above, there was no sign at the end of the year that the flow of weapons from the arsenals of the rival superpowers to the Middle East had diminished.

In its preamble, the British resolution emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace," enabling every state in the Middle East to "live in security," as well as a commitment by all UN members "to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter." (This article requires, inter alia, that all UN members "settle their international disputes by peaceful means" and refrain "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with" the purposes of the UN.)

In the operative part of the resolution the Security Council:

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
   (i) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
   (ii) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity
   (a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
   (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
   (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; . . .
Secretary General Thant appointed veteran Swedish diplomat Gunnar V. Jarring as his special representative. Egypt, Jordan, and Israel somewhat grudgingly accepted the resolution and welcomed Jarring, who, in December, established headquarters on Cyprus from where he began to shuttle back and forth to meetings in Amman, Cairo, and Jerusalem. He did not go to Damascus, since the Syrian government had denounced the UN resolution and declared that it would have nothing to do with the UN peace envoy.

UNITED STATES POSITION ON JERUSALEM AND REFUGEES

Although the United States and Israel were in general agreement on the principles necessary for the establishment of peace in the Middle East, they did not see eye to eye on some aspects of two important issues that came before the United Nations—Jerusalem and the return of new refugees.

Jerusalem

On June 7, after Israel recaptured the Old City of Jerusalem, Defense Minister Dayan stood beside the Western Wall (Wailing Wall) of the ancient Temple and declared: “We have returned to our holiest of holy places, never to be parted from it again.”

On June 27 the Keneset approved three bills authorizing extension of Israel's laws, jurisdiction, and public administration over the Old City of Jerusalem and some surrounding suburbs, which Jordan had occupied and controlled since the 1948 war. On June 28 Israeli municipal services and jurisdiction were extended to the entire city.

On the same day the White House issued a statement reiterating President Johnson's June 19 pronouncement that any peace settlement must include “adequate recognition of the special interest of the three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem.” The President therefore “assumes that before any unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there will be appropriate consultation with religious leaders and others who are deeply concerned.”

A State Department statement, considerably harsher in tone, declared that Israel's "hasty" action cannot be regarded as determining the future of the Holy Places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them. It noted that the United States "never recognized such unilateral actions by any of the states in the area as governing the international status of Jerusalem." (Washington has never officially recognized either the Jordanian annexation of the Old City or Israel's designation of the new city as its capital. The United States Embassy has remained in Tel Aviv even though the Keneset and most government ministries were moved to Jerusalem shortly after the establishment of the state.)

Foreign Minister Eban explained to the General Assembly the following
day that the administrative measures adopted by Israel were not intended to create new political facts, but were required to restore normal services to a city that had been united throughout history and artificially divided since the 1948 war. He noted that Jordan had not safeguarded universal religious interests in the Holy Places when they were under its control: Jewish synagogues and cemeteries were desecrated; Jews were not allowed to pray at the Western Wall; Israeli Moslem Arabs were excluded from their mosques; pilgrimages of Israeli Christian Arabs were severely restricted. Eban pledged free access to the Holy Places to all, and said that his government was prepared to discuss arrangements for the safeguarding of the Holy Places with those concerned, in Israel and elsewhere.

However, many countries were not satisfied with these assurances. At the General Assembly emergency session, Pakistan introduced a resolution, co-sponsored by Guinea, Iran, Niger, and Turkey, declaring invalid Israeli measures "to change the status of Jerusalem" and calling upon Israel "to rescind all measures already taken" and to desist from future action changing the city's status. The resolution was adopted on July 4, by a vote of 99 to 0, with 20 abstentions. The United States abstained. A follow-up resolution, on July 14, deplored Israel's failure to implement the earlier resolution and reiterated its call to do so. The United States again abstained. Israel did not vote on either resolution, considering them outside the Assembly's competence.

Ambassador Goldberg explained that the United States had been prepared to support a resolution declaring that the UN would not accept any permanent unilateral action affecting the status of Jerusalem and calling on Israel "to desist" from such action. The United States did not support the final text because Washington refused to endorse its implication that Israel's administrative measures in fact constituted annexation. The United States also considered it unrealistic and unfruitful, he said, to deal with "one aspect of the problem of Jerusalem as an isolated issue," and not as part of "the broader arrangements that must be made to restore a just and durable peace."

In line with its opposition to unilateral actions that might prejudice an overall settlement, the United States, on September 26, asked Israel for "clarification" of reports that Israel was setting up permanent Jewish settlement in the occupied areas. Israeli spokesmen replied that the establishment of Nahal (para-military, agricultural) outposts in occupied areas "does not imply a decision by the government of Israel with regard to the future of the area under its control."

Refugee Problem

The basic position of the United States (pp. 176–177) was that the problem of the persons displaced by war must be dealt with in the framework of a general peace settlement. President Johnson noted that both sides had resisted outside mediation efforts "to restore the victims of conflict to their
homes or to find them other proper places to live and work.” He warned that there would be no peace in the Middle East unless the problem “is attacked with new energy by all and, certainly, primarily by those who are immediately concerned.” He added that, “in a climate of peace,” the United States was ready to contribute its “full share” to its solution.

The United States approach was generally consistent with Israel’s own stated position. They differed on the question of the immediate return of the refugees who crossed the Jordan river to the East Bank after the June war. The number of those who left their homes on the West Bank during or in the first weeks after the fighting was estimated at around 150,000. On July 2 Israel announced that it was prepared as a humanitarian act on its part to allow the return of West Bank residents who had left between the outbreak of hostilities on June 5 and July 4 (pp. 123–126).

On July 4 the General Assembly endorsed the Security Council’s resolution on the humanitarian aspects of the war, including the request to Israel to “facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities.” The resolution was adopted by a vote of 116 (including Israel) to 0, Syria and Cuba abstaining.

As a result of a variety of political and practical considerations, which delayed and impeded Israeli-Jordanian cooperation in the return, Israel in the end approved applications for the return of only 20,659 persons out of the 112,250 that had applied. Of these former, only 14,056 actually returned by the August 31 deadline. However, upon the insistent urging of the United States government and the UN, Israel agreed on September 11 to allow permit holders—some 6,600 persons—to come back even after the deadline. In addition, Israel agreed to give “sympathetic consideration” to requests for the return of persons with close relatives in Israel-held territory. Aside from reunion of families, Israel said it was also ready to review the cases of individuals claiming special hardship. Israel rejected the argument of the United States and many other delegations at the UN that Israel allow all those who had left since the six-day war to return.

After the initial Jordanian-Israeli agreement for the return of West Bank residents, Israel stated, according to Gussing, that it was prepared to discuss any outstanding issues with Syria and Egypt—including the return of civilians who had left territories under Israel control—“when talks are initiated” with these states. Gussing reported that Syria was not prepared to discuss the question with Israel, and added that the “intense antagonism between Syria and Israel permeated discussions on every issue and at every level.” Syria insisted that the approximately 100,000 persons who left the Golan Heights would not return until the territory was given back by Israel. By the end of the year no agreement was reached with Egypt concerning the 4,000 persons from the Gaza Strip and some 35,000 from Sinai, who had crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt.

American and UN pressure on Israel was therefore limited to persons
who had crossed into Jordan. Lawrence Michelmore, commissioner-general of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), stated that more than 100,000 of the persons who crossed into Jordan were refugees of the 1948 war or their children, and that about half of them were living in makeshift tent camps on the East Bank. He repeatedly urged that Israel allow those who wished to do so to return to the existing camps on the West Bank, where more or less permanent housing and adequate health and educational facilities existed, especially in the nearly deserted camps around Jericho.

Israeli representatives replied that the exodus from the West Bank had been voluntary and based largely on economic, personal, and, in some cases, political preference. They said it was significant that one-third of the permit holders had apparently changed their minds and not chosen to return. Moreover, a steady stream of persons was continuing to leave the West Bank months after the end of the war—at the rate of 200 to 300 a day—and that even before the war, when both banks were under Jordanian control, there was a steady movement to the East Bank and to other neighboring countries, offering better economic opportunities.

Israeli spokesmen also blamed Jordan for creating the conditions that led Jerusalem to restrict the number of refugees it was willing to allow to return in the absence of a peace settlement. While the return process was under way in August, various statements were issued by Jordanian cabinet ministers and over Amman radio, calling on the returnees to be “a thorn in the aggressor’s flesh.” In a letter to Thant, on August 16, Israel protested the Jordanian “campaign of increasing violence, vituperation and direct incitement, both of the prospective returnees and of the Arabs in Israel-controlled territories.”

On December 14 Ambassador Michael Comay, head of the Israel delegation, told the UN Assembly’s Special Political Committee that Jordan’s actions “converted a humanitarian question into a political and security one, and itself obstructed a general repatriation.” Israel was unable to agree to an “open-door policy,” he said, “unless and until there was a wider Israel-Jordan understanding,” and noted that the refugees themselves were “increasingly reluctant to come back until there was peace.” Comay called it “unrealistic to expect the government of Israel to permit an unrestricted and uncontrolled movement across the cease-fire lines, regardless of the policies, pronouncements or practices” of the Arab states whose citizens were involved. He concluded that the displacement of West Bank residents could best be adjusted “in the context of an honorable settlement with Israel.”

Later, at the same session, Congressman L. H. Fountain (Dem., N.C.), representative of the United States, repeated the United States view that all persons displaced during or since the June war “should be allowed and encouraged to return to their homes.” After the Assembly’s plenary on December 19 unanimously reaffirmed the July resolution, asking Israel to facilitate the return of the new refugees, Fountain reiterated the United States
position that this resolution "must be implemented to the fullest extent possible."

However, the United States continued to support Israel and oppose the Arab states' demand to appoint a United Nations custodian "to protect and administer" the property and other assets left in Israel by the Arab refugees of the 1948 war and to receive income from such properties "on behalf of the rightful owners." As in previous years, the United States delegation rejected this as contrary to international law and outside the UN's authority under the Charter. The United States representative, Ambassador Seymour M. Finger, called the proposal a violation of Israel's sovereignty, and potentially "a very substantial obstacle" to Ambassador Jarring's UN mission.

The custodian proposal was approved in the Special Political Committee by a slim majority, primarily the Communist and Arab blocs and states with large Muslim populations. However, its sponsors decided not to press it to a vote in the plenary session where it could not receive the necessary two-thirds vote.

As the largest contributor to UNRWA, the United States again took the lead in discussing UNRWA's functions and financing. It supported the Assembly's July 4 resolution on humanitarian assistance, endorsing the extension of UNRWA's work "on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure" to persons, other than 1948 refugees, "who are at present displaced and in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities." The resolution hailed the work of other international relief agencies and appealed "to all Governments, as well as organizations and individuals" for special contributions to meet the emergency relief needs. The resolution was unanimously adopted.

At the end of the year Michelmore reported that UNRWA anticipated a record budget of $47.5 million in 1968 to meet its regular and emergency expenses and that, on the basis of pledged and expected contributions, the agency would face a record deficit of over $7 million.

A United States resolution, adopted by the Assembly plenary on December 19, was essentially the same as in 1966, noting with "deep regret" that there had been no substantial progress in the integration of the refugees, either by repatriation or resettlement with compensation. It directed the commissioner-general to continue his efforts of rectifying the relief rolls and taking other measures to assure the most equitable distribution of relief based on need.

**United States and Soviet Aid**

The resolution noted UNRWA's financial plight and called upon all governments "as a matter of urgency" to give generous support to the agency. It specifically urged "non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions." The American delegate, Congressman Fountain, stated the United States opinion that its
contribution, amounting to about 65 per cent of total governmental pledges, was "still entirely too high for a multilateral program." The Soviet Union and other Communist countries, except for Yugoslavia, never contributed to UNRWA. After the resolution was adopted by the Assembly plenary by a vote of 98 to 0, Fountain pointedly noted that "the affirmative votes included those of the Arab States and of the socialist countries."

However, the Soviet Union still has made no contribution. In his speech to the Special Political Committee, on December 14, Soviet delegate Leonid N. Kutakov evaded the issue, stressing instead Moscow's direct assistance to the Arab states, and pledging continued Soviet support "in their struggle for their rights and for the liquidation of the consequences of the Israeli aggression."

This demonstrated yet another of the ironies emerging from the 1967 Middle East crisis. Nasser and other self-styled revolutionary Arab leaders have long criticized the United States for allegedly using its aid as a means of influencing Arab policies, while lauding the Soviet Union for its magnanimity in providing aid without any strings attached. Yet, in 1967, it was Washington which was most eager to avoid any unilateral involvement and sought cooperative international action in both the political and economic fields through the multilateral channels of the United Nations. The Soviet Union utilized the UN only where it could be used to advance Soviet interests, as a propaganda forum and as a means for putting pressure on Israel to withdraw. It chose to continue its traditional pattern of providing only unilateral military and economic assistance directly to selected Arab countries, and left to others the task of meeting the humanitarian needs of the refugees.

While no Arab state wished to become a puppet of either superpower, at the end of 1967 some observers in the Arab world were beginning to question whether the Soviet Union was really altruistic, and whether Soviet aid did not in fact carry with it potential chains far heavier than the strings allegedly attached to American assistance.

George E. Gruen
In the course of 1967 the Soviet Union intensified its anti-Israel propaganda. It would take pages to summarize the constant barrage, in press and on radio. A few examples: In January the Soviet press announced that ten Israelis had been expelled for espionage, Zionist propaganda, and dissemination of "slanderous" information about the life of Soviet Jews. In March Izvestia accused Israel of joining the "imperialist cold war" at the instigation of the World Jewish Congress, which at the time was sponsoring a campaign on the situation of the Jews in the USSR under the general slogan, "A Week on the Soviet Jews." In May Moscow, in an official statement released by Tass, accused Israel of "aggravating the atmosphere of military psychosis" and of following the "colonial oil monopolies and their hangers-on." The statement emphasized Moscow's immediate interest in the region, "which directly adjoins the frontiers of the Soviet Union." Except for its blunt reference to geography and the omission of customary Communist phraseology, there was nothing particularly new in this statement.

It had been the dream of Peter the Great and of successive generations of leaders of imperial Russia to obtain a warm water outlet. The same idea moved Pavel Miliukov, Foreign Minister during the March 1917 revolution and an eminent Russian historian, when he hoped that the Bosporus Strait would fall to Russia as part of the World War I peace settlement. In 1939, Vyacheslav Molotov told Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop that the Soviet Union had an interest in a line "from Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf." After the war, Moscow made an unsuccessful attempt on Azerbaijan and laid claim to some areas under Turkish sovereignty, but these efforts, too, did not succeed.

The Soviet Union maintained its ever-increasing program of supplying arms, particularly to the UAR, Syria, Iraq, and other Arab countries. It has been estimated that, since 1955, Soviet investment in arms to Egypt alone was about $2 billion. The largest part of this sum was expended after the 1964 Cairo summit conference. Access to a large supply of arms, as well as Moscow's constant anti-Israeli statements bolstered President Abdel Gamal Nasser's confidence to the point of moving him to mass troops at Israel's borders, which helped provoke the war.

The outbreak of the war did not surprise the Soviet Union, but the astounding defeat of the Arabs did. Apparently the Russians did not expect the Arabs to be beaten so decisively and in such a short time. Nevertheless, before, during, and after the six-day war, Moscow continued to support the Arabs. An
official Moscow statement, issued when the end of the war was clearly in sight, placed full responsibility for the hostilities on Israel (Pravda, June 6-7, 1967):

In condemning the aggression of Israel, the Soviet government requests that the Israeli government . . . immediately cease, and unconditionally, all military actions against the United Arab Republic, Syria, Jordan, and other Arab lands, and withdraw its troops behind the armistice line.

And, in the course of the deliberations in the United Nations Security Council emergency meeting convened on June 5, Soviet delegate Nikolai Fedorenko made repeated demands for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces (p. 175). Though he told journalists that “some of my best friends and closest companions are Jews,” he did not shrink from using anti-Jewish cliches and suggesting that the Israelis be brought before an international tribunal, as were the Nazis at Nuremberg. Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin came to the United States to regain by diplomacy what the Russians had lost through the defeat of their Arab friends (p. 179). However, when it became apparent that Israel was winning the war, the Soviet Union supported the Security Council’s call for an unconditional cease-fire.

Meanwhile, on the initiative of the Kremlin, at a secret meeting in Moscow on June 9, Communist leaders of the countries of Eastern Europe issued a joint statement pledging to do “everything necessary to help the peoples of Arab countries to administer a resolute rebuff to Israel.” The statement, signed by top government and Party officials of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, reiterated earlier Soviet demands for the unconditional condemnation of Israel as the aggressor and the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the lines existing before the June war. On June 10 the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel because Israel had “ignored Soviet demands for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territory taken during the war.” Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia immediately took similar action.

Regarding the role played by the Soviet Union and its Communist allies, it must be remembered that Moscow was playing for high stakes, and that the Soviet leadership had decided not to widen the Middle East conflict into a hot war that eventually could involve the United States. However, there was no indication of any change in Moscow’s fundamental line. It has continued without interruption its program of replacing planes and other material lost by Egypt and the other Arab states in June. The Kremlin also reportedly increased Soviet advisory personnel in Egypt and Syria, thus penetrating deeper into the military and bureaucratic structures of these countries. Thirty-five Soviet ships were said to be patrolling the Mediterranean. The Russians concluded an agreement with the Iraq National Oil Company, which, for the first time, placed the Soviet Union in the strategic Persian Gulf. Also, the Russian Orthodox Church, through the controlled patriarchate, has in fact
lately revived its keen interest in Mediterranean countries with substantial Greek Orthodox populations.

Although Moscow suffered a great setback and loss of prestige as a result of the Israeli victory in June, it was now not only recuperating from the six-day war, but, through expanded and expensive programs, was spreading its influence and firmly establishing its presence in the Middle East.

Impact on Soviet Jews

Soviet hostility to Israel reached such a pitch that the Soviet press and radio at times became openly anti-Jewish. Its tone was reminiscent of the worst of the Stalinist antisemitic campaigns. The state-controlled communications media indulged in blanket condemnation of Israel and Zionism, and coupled both with Judaism. Some of the propaganda made use of well-known anti-Jewish stereotypes taken from the pogrom writings of the Tsarist Black Hundreds. Articles of this type in the Ukrainian press were particularly obnoxious. One piece referred to international Jewish bankers who were united in a “world conspiracy with an actually unlimited budget,” the “Zionist promises that Jews will rule the world,” “Jahwe’s spirit of vengeance,” and “the reactionary dogmas of the Jewish religion” (Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, September 6, 1967).

Moscow papers, discarding all pretense to factual reporting, accused Israel of perpetrating Nazi-like war crimes. Such pieces appeared in Izvestia (June 15 and 17, 1967), Sovetskaya Rossia (June 15 and 23, 1967), Pravda (June 16, 1967), and Komsomolskaya Pravda (July 5, 1967), among others. K. Ivanov the author of one of the articles, quoted the late Ilya Ehrenburg as having said that “during the Second World War, antisemitism was considered the international language of fascism.” Ivanov further explained that “history knows many cases in which, in the course of time, the persecuted themselves became cruel persecutors,” and added that some “politicians in Tel Aviv are now speaking the language of overt colonial fascism” (Pravda, September 24, 1967). The Stürmer-type cartoons, appearing almost everywhere in the press, were indicative of the character of the Soviet propaganda. Not since the publication of Trofim Kichko’s ill-famed antisemitic book, Judaism without Embellishment (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 425), had such cartoons been printed in the Soviet Union. One portrayed a Jew as a slithering animal with a long nose, holding a smoking revolver and sticking stars of David on the graves of his victims (Krokodil #18, 1967); another showed General Moshe Dayan with a skull covering his right eye, beneath the legend “Moshe Adolphovich [son of Adolph] Dayan” (Krokodil #19, 1967).

Reliable visitors and foreign students, who were in the Soviet Union at the time of the six-day war, reported that the revival of crude anti-Jewish propaganda was openly disapproved in liberal circles of the Soviet intelligentsia. The systematic identification of Israel with Judaism and the Jews created more difficulties for Soviet Jews since the atrocities, of which the Soviet prop-
aganda machine accused Israel, reflected on each and every one of them, even those who long since had severed their ties with the Jewish community. After the six-day war, young Jewish scientists and specialized students were finding it more difficult than before to obtain jobs in sensitive scientific fields and, of course, in institutions connected with the military.

The brutal onslaught of the Stürmer-like propaganda strengthened Jewish consciousness even among marginal Jews. Particularly the young people became painfully aware of their Jewish identity and of the Jewish world outside the Soviet Union. It is interesting that some Israeli-made items were becoming the “hottest” items on the Soviet black market, and the demand for them was increasing.

The break between the USSR and Israel stopped the slow flow of Jewish emigrants to Israel. Since this stoppage came suddenly and unexpectedly, it brought great pain and suffering to those Jews who had already given up their homes, liquidated their belongings, and were ready to leave on short notice. Israel Prime Minister Levi Eshkol told the Keneset that the Kremlin’s complete stoppage of immigration was an inhumane measure devoid of “moral, political, or practical justification.” The faction of the Israeli Communist party, led by Moshe Sneh, castigated Kosygin for equating Israel with Hitler Germany. Kol Ha’am, the Communist daily newspaper, criticized Soviet policy on the Middle East crisis, and called on all “socialist” countries not to follow the Soviet Union on this position. The other faction of the Communist party, headed by Meyer Wilner, expressed its solidarity with the Moscow position.

In the period following the Arab-Israeli war, Soviet Jews were under pressure to express their solidarity with the official anti-Israeli line. The Dushambe Jewish community was reported to have donated 3,000 rubles for the Arab sufferers of the war. Apparently acting under duress still before the conflict, Rabbi Judah Leib Levin of the Moscow synagogue, in a letter to the Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Yitzhak Nissim, reiterated Soviet charges of aggression by Israel, adding that he had asked the Israeli Ambassador to stop Israeli diplomats from “spreading anti-Soviet literature in the synagogue.” In a carefully worded statement in the July 1967 issue, Sovetish Heymland, the only official spokesman for Jewish writers, said, “together with the entire Soviet people we fully support the policy of the Soviet government, which is dedicated to liquidating the conflict, extinguishing the fires of war in the Middle East by peaceful means.” It emphasized that Premier Kosygin made it clear in his UN speech that “the Soviet Union is not against the people of Israel, but against the aggressive policies conducted by the ruling classes of the state [Israel]. . . We appeal to all progressive Yiddish writers to add . . their voices for the establishment of peace in the Middle East, for evacuation of the Israeli army to the line of armistice.” The Sovetish Heymland statement was signed by Aron Vergelis, its editor, Szika Driz, Buzi Miller, and
ten other Yiddish writers. Only six of the paper’s ten-member editorial board were among them.

COMMUNIST BLOC

Although, with the exception of Rumania, all Communist East European countries severed relations with Israel, the degree to which the Jewish communities were affected differed from country to country. Thus, in Bulgaria, where the Jewish community is isolated and without support from outside (AJYB, 1967 [Vol. 68], pp. 411-13), there was no anti-Jewish propaganda.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia’s Tito unexpectedly lined up his policy to agree with that of the USSR. For years Tito had maintained friendly relations with Israel, and there was a lively cultural exchange between the Yugoslav Jewish community and Israel, particularly with labor groups. It would seem that one reason for Tito’s break with Israel was his commitment to the Third World idea which he, Nasser, and the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India tried to organize to give leadership to the less developed countries wishing to achieve some form of native socialism. However, when the chips were down, Tito followed Moscow. Still, Jewish activities continued without restriction and without interference on the part of the state (AJYB, 1967 [Vol. 68], pp. 408-410). Apparently the government did not object to the community’s continued pro-Israel attitude.

Hungary

Following the meeting of Communist leaders of the Eastern bloc, Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter denounced Israel for “aggression against the territories [of] its neighbors.” But, according to reliable reports, Hungary reluctantly severed diplomatic ties with Israel on June 12. It did so only under heavy pressure from the Soviet Union. In fact, differences in the government over the Middle East policies continued. Laszlo Pataki, first secretary of the Gyor-Sopron party committee, stated in an interview with Nepszabadsag (Budapest, September 22, 1967) that the crisis in the Middle East had given rise to a considerable controversy over the handling of this policy and more particularly over its “antisemitic and philosemitic aspects.” Earlier, in a discussion of the Arab-Israeli war at a Writers Union meeting in Budapest (July), the majority of attending members had objected to the government’s anti-Israeli stance.

As a result, the Arab-Israeli conflict had little effect on Jewish communal activities. At the annual meeting of the Central Board of Jewish Communities, its president, Geza Seifert, referred to it in an appeal to the great powers and the United Nations to help solve the conflict “in the spirit of humanism and progress.” (Folks-shtimme, Warsaw, July 18, 1967). And while a piece
in the communal magazine *Uj Élét* (August 1, 1967) accused the “ruling circles of Israel,” as well as the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany, of inciting the Middle East conflict, it called for a peaceful solution of Arab-Israeli differences.

**Poland**

Not only did Poland break off diplomatic relations with Israel, but it used the occasion to denounce that country as an aggressor which had violated the human rights of the Arab population. Speaking on June 19 before the Sixth Congress of Trade Unions in Warsaw, Gomulka harshly criticized Jewish policy before and during the conflict. He also used the occasion to warn Polish Jews who, he said, had organized “drinking bouts” to celebrate the victory of “the Israeli imperialists,” to change their attitude toward Israel.

“. . . every citizen of Poland,” he said, “must have only one fatherland—Poland. With this the great majority of Polish citizens of Jewish nationality agree and they have served their land devotedly.” However, he continued, “we cannot remain calm with respect to those . . . who . . . speak in favor of the aggressor.” He made it clear that those who felt his words were addressed to them, no matter what their nationality, should heed his appeal and draw the necessary conclusions.

This speech, with its clearly anti-Jewish overtones, came as a shock not only to the Jewish population, but to many Poles, who were disturbed by Gomulka’s singling out of Jewish citizens and openly accusing them of constituting a kind of fifth column, dangerous to Polish security. Many Poles, who otherwise were not too sympathetic toward their Jewish fellow citizens, also resented Gomulka’s total submission to the uncompromising Soviet policy. It was reported that the rigid line on the Middle East crisis was seized upon as a pretext by some factions within the Communist leadership for purging individuals of “liberal” leanings, and particularly people of Jewish descent, from the party, the state machinery, and the press.

Many Jews were demoted to inferior positions. Among those purged were Leon Kasman and Viktor Borowski, editor and deputy editor of *Trybuna Ludu*, and Leopold Unger, administrative editor of *Zycie Warszawy*. Poles reportedly considered these steps as a “showdown with the Jews,” an attitude that had been dormant for many years. The spread of anti-Jewish feelings was confirmed by Polish writer-actor Henryk Grynberg, who came to New York in December as a member of the Yiddish State Theater group and chose not to return to Poland where “it is against my dignity to live . . . and to be treated as a second-class citizen.” (New York *Times*, Dec. 30, 1967).

Others also among those recently dismissed were high military officials, including chief of the Polish air defense command, Major General Czeslaw Mankiewicz, and two of his deputies who may have been opposed to the government’s Middle East policy.

No information was available on the initial reaction of the official Jewish
community to the Israeli-Arab war. In July, more than a month after the event, an official statement of the Cultural and Social Union was released to the press. Of course, it is not known whether this statement was made under duress or whether it expressed the feelings of the Jewish Communist elite. Speaking in the name of the Polish Jews, the union’s presidium expressed full solidarity with the anti-Jewish position of the Polish Communist party and its first secretary, Gomulka. The union failed to mention such matters as Nasser’s massing of troops and the blockade of the Strait of Tiran. But it “unequivocally” condemned “the aggressive actions of the ruling circles of Israel,” particularly of “militarists of the Dayan type and the ultra-reactionaries headed by Menahem Beigin” as “alien to the real interests of the people of Israel.” The statement expressed the union’s “full solidarity with the position of our party and the government of our fatherland, Poland,” and requested the Israeli army to “leave the Arab territories and return to the frontiers which existed before June 5, 1967,” and concluded: “We most decisively reject every type of nationalism and chauvinism, and condemn every type of nationalism” (Folks-shtimme, Warsaw, July 15, 1967). No signatures were appended to this document, but it was known that Hersh Smoliar, editor of Folks-shtimme, the writer David Sfard, and the well-known Communist militant J. Mirsky, sat on the presidium.

LEON SHAPIRO

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia closely followed the Soviet lead before, during, and after the six-day war. On June 10 the Prague government broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. On June 15 the official Communist party organ Rudé Právo accused Israeli diplomats in Prague of having engaged in ideological and propaganda activities among “some of Czechoslovakia’s citizens.” Later in June Vladimir Koucký, a party secretary and member of its Presidium, visited Egypt, accompanied by Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Miroslav Smoldas. Their conferences and discussions in Cairo were officially described as having centered on the “situation in the Middle East after Israel’s aggression and on the future economic cooperation between the United Arab Republic and Czechoslovakia.” At the same time, Prague’s Deputy Foreign Minister Václav Pleskot visited Syria. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia had been and continued to be the main suppliers of modern arms to the so-called progressive Arab states of the Middle East.

On August 12, 1967 the New York Times reported that Ladislav Mňáčko, a writer of international renown and Communist party member had gone to Israel in defiance of a travel ban to protest antisemitism in Czechoslovakia and the government’s support of the Arab states. Mňáčko had attracted attention before with his book, Delayed Reports (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 386), which dealt with the Stalinist purges in Czechoslovakia and their anti-Jewish
emphasis. A more recent book of his, Jak chutná moc ("The Taste of Power"), of which only excerpts were permitted to appear in Czechoslovakia, was published in German translation by Fritz Molden in Vienna and in English translation by Frederick A. Praeger in New York.

Mňačko's letter of protest appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on August 11, 1967. An English translation in the October issue of the New York monthly Atlas read in part:

I find it impossible to support a policy which could have led to the eradication of a whole people, and to the liquidation of an entire state. The Czechoslovak government promised unconditional support to the Arab states and their leaders, despite the fact that these same leaders have openly proclaimed their intention to destroy the two and a half million people of Israel. . . . I don't know whether it has been reported abroad that the Egyptian Ambassador in Prague had the audacity to call a press conference reproaching Czech newsmen for writing objectively about the crisis and supporting Israel. He added that this attitude was quite understandable in view of the fact that the Czech press is infested by Jews. I regard this statement as a personal insult. Yet this shocking incident was greeted by total silence in Prague. Neither the government nor a single reporter expressed indignation. I am here to express mine. Since we have no diplomatic relations with Israel, my trip there is naturally a protest. I am fully aware of the consequences of this act, and I am prepared to face them. But I will return to Czechoslovakia as soon as diplomatic relations with Israel are restored. . . .

The government's cancellation in August of preparations for the celebration of the 1,000th year of Jewish life in Prague, its withdrawal of a postage stamp issued for the occasion, and interference for a time with research activities in the Jewish field, were viewed as an aspect of Czech compliance with Soviet policy, before and after the Arab-Israeli war (p. 511).

Rumania

In line with its increasingly independent policy line within Soviet bloc politics, Rumania refused to join a Moscow conference of Communist leaders in condemning Israel as the aggressor in the six-day war or in severing relations with Israel. It was the only East European country to do so. Journalists, writing from Bucharest, ascribed this refusal in part to satisfaction with Israel's victory, but largely to glee at the political discomfiture of the Soviet Union at the hands of a small protagonist. Some Rumanian officials also expressed fear that the annihilation of Israel would be an indirect threat to Rumania's own existence. After the war broke out, First Secretary of the Communist party Nicolae Ceausescu expressed this fear in a condemnation of attempts by outside forces to "interfere in the solution of conflicts in any region on the grounds that any country, however powerful, has the right to interfere in the affairs of another."

Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer further widened the breach with the Com-
munist bloc by calling for negotiations that would lead to a lasting Middle East settlement. At an emergency session of the General Assembly in New York City, the Premier asked that the independence and sovereignty of each state in the area be respected. While Rumania called for Israel's withdrawal from seized territories, it refused to endorse resolutions which condemned Israel alone, or did not acknowledge its existence. On July 21, Maurer issued a joint communique with the Netherlands, calling for direct negotiations between the parties in the conflict.

In the National Assembly in July, Ceausescu publicly explained to his people the government's Middle East position. While reaffirming solidarity with "the Arab peoples who suffered in the war," he criticized those who advocated Israel's destruction, for "history has taught us that no nation can realize its national and socialist aspirations by denying another people's right to exist." Interpreted as anti-Soviet, the remarks remained Rumania's basic policy on the Middle East and were applauded by the Assembly deputies.

To a great extent, Rumania's policy of independence stemmed from a desire to develop friends and commercial links wherever possible and to assure nonintervention in internal affairs. Within the framework of the April "trade and payments pact" between Rumania and Israel (p. 516), the two countries signed an expanded trade agreement in December making Israel Rumania's leading trade partner in the Middle East. They also decided to create specific joint industrial ventures. A separate air pact was signed, providing for the inauguration of services by the Rumanian and Israeli national airlines to stimulate tourism. For the time being, Israel found the trade of little economic advantage, but hoped for higher profits later. However the principal design of the agreement appeared to be political. Israeli officials viewed these agreements as a sign of Rumania's wish to remain friendly despite the continued diplomatic boycott of Israel by the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. To the people of Israel, Rumania became second only to the United States in favor. They showed their friendship by decorating shops with Rumanian flags, and in other ways.

While reaffirming its political neutrality, Rumania pledged long-term credits to the United Arab Republic, despite an old $35 million debt outstanding. Rumanian trade with the Arab world had increased steadily and at the end of the year was valued at about $70 million, twice the 1960 figure. However, after the signing of the April pact, Iraq cancelled licenses for future Rumanian imports.

In December foreign ministers and their deputies from eight East European countries met near Warsaw's Old Town to discuss the Middle East. The conference included Rumania and Yugoslavia, as well as more orthodox supporters of Moscow foreign policy. A communique issued on December 22 indicated that one purpose of the meeting was to end the open division in Communist ranks, that had existed since June, by creating a formula acceptable to Rumania. Under Rumanian influence the declaration assumed
a more moderate line; unlike previous statements, it made no mention of "Israeli aggression." It repeated earlier views that Israel's withdrawal from Arab lands occupied since June was the major condition for peace in the region. It condemned Israel's defiance of UN resolutions but introduced a new note and requested concerned parties to recognize each other's right to exist. Rumania signed the document, along with the other countries.

ATTITUDES SURVEY

In August the American Jewish Committee released the findings of a survey of attitudes in Eastern Europe on the Arab-Israeli crisis. Based on data gathered by public opinion research institutes in West Germany, the survey was made of several hundred citizens from Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania traveling to and from West Europe. Therefore the results obtained reflected attitudes of persons in favored positions, and with free movement, such as trade, government, and academic life.

In general, public opinion was favorable towards Israel, closely paralleling popular sentiments in Western Europe. The results were much alike. The span between the highest and lowest pro-Israeli figures was 8 percentage points. The portion of the population, which refused to respond or take a position, was approximately the same, about 7-10 per cent.

However, an analysis of the findings showed a wide opinion gulf between the people and governments of the countries, except Rumania, since those regimes followed the Soviet Union's official anti-Israel and extreme pro-Arab stand. Among the supporters of the regimes in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, 62 per cent favored the Arabs, 9 per cent favored the Israelis, 17 per cent were neutral, and 12 per cent had no opinion or did not answer. Of those opposing the regimes some 70 per cent favored Israel, 3 per cent favored the Arabs, and 18 per cent remained neutral. In Rumania, only 18 per cent of the supporters of the regime said that their sympathies were with the Arabs. The report concluded that support for the Arab side came mainly from Communist party members, with one significant exception: Rumanian party members tended toward a pro-Israel, or neutral, stance.

JERRY GOODMAN
American Public Opinion

For four weeks, beginning May 15, 1967, when Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq began mobilizing their forces against Israel, until June 10, when the six-day war ended, most Americans were caught up in Middle East events. The Israeli-Arab crisis affected Americans more deeply than any foreign conflict—except, of course, the war in Vietnam—partly because it was a microcosm reflecting the larger conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The conflict aroused in American Jews unpredictedly intense feelings regarding Israel, Jewish survival, and their own sense of Jewish identity. The relatively cool responses from official Catholic and Protestant spokesmen had unforeseen and dramatic consequences for relations between Jews and Christians. Finally, the crisis, especially because of what was called its parallels with the war in Vietnam, created deep and lasting divisions among a wide variety of leftist parties and organizations in the United States.

Public Opinion

Time (June 16, 1967), in a story on the American reaction to the six-day war, asserted that "there was little doubt as to where the majority of Americans stood." To the extent that Americans knew about the crisis, they were in the main on Israel's side.

Public-opinion Polls

The first polls, released when the war was over but obviously taken before the war, showed that public opinion favored Israel. A Gallup poll, released June 11, found that 59 per cent of a national sample were aware of and knew something about the conflict. When asked about their sympathies, 55 per cent said they were with Israel, compared with only four per cent who said their sympathies were with the Arabs. Forty-one per cent were undecided, or expressed no particular sympathy for either side.

A Harris poll taken immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, released June 10, showed that 41 per cent of a national cross section were more sympathetic with the Israelis, 1 per cent was sympathetic with the Arabs, 40 per cent had no strong feelings either way, and 18 per cent were not sure.
Forty-six per cent thought the Israelis were right, while only 4 per cent held that the Arabs were right. When asked which side wanted to start the war, 63 per cent blamed the Arabs, contrasted with only 16 per cent who thought Israel wanted to start the war.

Both polls showed that most Americans did not want the United States to become directly involved in the conflict. According to Gallup, 41 per cent said the United States ought to stay out of the conflict; 16 per cent thought that the United States ought to support Israel short of military involvement; 14 per cent thought the United States ought to negotiate for peace, without specifying how; 11 per cent thought the United States should work through the United Nations. Only 5 per cent thought the United States should send American troops to support Israel. Though the Harris poll showed substantial differences from the Gallup poll in some responses, it reinforced the findings that Americans did not want the United States to become involved in a Middle East war. According to Harris, 77 per cent of the respondents said that the United States should work through the United Nations; ten per cent felt that the United States should send supplies, but not troops, to Israel. When asked if they would favor or oppose America's sending troops and military supplies to back Israel in the war, only 24 per cent said they favored sending American troops to aid Israel, 56 per cent were opposed, and 20 per cent were not sure. Though most Americans thought that the United States should work through the United Nations, 49 per cent believed that the United Nations had not been effective in dealing with the Middle East crisis.

According to a July 8 Gallup poll, 57 per cent of a national sample thought that the Israelis and Arabs ought to work out their own formula for peace; 36 per cent felt that the United Nations should have the final say in peace plans. When asked whether Israel should be required to give back all or some of the Arab land it had occupied during the war, 24 per cent said Israel should keep all the land and 49 per cent said Israel should keep some of it; only 15 per cent said that Israel should give it all back; 12 per cent had no opinion.

A Harris poll, released July 10, showed that a majority of Americans supported Israel's principal conditions for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. Eighty-eight per cent said Israel should be guaranteed the right to send her ships through the Gulf of Aqaba; 86 per cent thought Israel should be given freedom of passage through the Suez Canal; 82 per cent felt that the Arab nations should recognize Israel as a state; and 62 per cent disagreed with a statement that Israel should withdraw all her forces from Arab territory before other issues would be settled. When asked how they felt about Russia's efforts to have the United Nations condemn Israel as an aggressor, 79 per cent expressed disagreement, 7 per cent favored such condemnation, and 14 per cent were not sure.

A Harris poll in July found that 70 per cent of respondents favored having Jerusalem under international control, 10 per cent supported Israel's return-
ing control of the city, and 20 per cent were not sure. But in September, according to a Harris poll released October 9, 43 per cent felt Israel should continue to control Jerusalem, only 33 per cent still favored international control, and 24 per cent were not sure.

Even before the emergence of Israel as an independent state, Americans have generally been more sympathetic to Israel (or to Palestinian Jews aspiring to statehood) than to the Arab states.1 In part, this favorable attitude was the residue of sympathy for Jewish suffering during the Holocaust and for Jewish homelessness. In part, it was elicited by the courage and determination of a little nation vastly outnumbered by aggressive enemies bent on its destruction. The sympathy was reinforced by the image of Israel as an outpost of Western democracy in the Middle East. Over the years, as the Arab states tried to gain worldwide political leverage by playing off Russian against American interests in the Middle East, Americans tended to become even less sympathetic toward the Arabs.

The Press

Israel's spectacular military victory reinforced favorable American attitudes toward Israel. Unlike the Suez-Sinai conflict in 1956, this time the issues were clearly of right against wrong, of aggression versus survival. Furthermore, Russia's strident support of the Arabs and malevolence toward Israel served to strengthen American mistrust of the Arabs and faith in Israel's political integrity. The swift progress of the war and Israel's decisive military victory solidified America's moral support for Israel. Israel had managed to win without the help of American armed forces. Her military feat had given America a remarkable political advantage without any appreciable cost. The Soviet Union had been revealed for all to see as the world power that had been the threat to world peace; the United States appeared as the world power committed to peace and stability.

The nation's press, like national public opinion, did not advocate American military intervention in the Middle East, though there was considerable discussion comparing American interest and commitment in Southeast Asia with American interest and commitment in the Middle East. When war broke out on June 5, editorial sympathy tended toward Israel. The Wall Street Journal which on May 24 declared the Middle East conflict to be peripheral to American interest and a "good place to begin a policy of greater military restraint," was moved to remark, on June 6, despite its coolness for Israel:

It is saddening that at this late stage of human history certain states refuse to recognize the right of another to exist, especially when the Israelis have given numerous indications that they would, if permitted, cooperate with their Arab neighbors in building a better life for the whole area.

The New York *Daily News*, whose anti-foreignism and isolationism are matched only by its anti-Communism, commented the day after war broke out that "most Americans seem likely to sympathize with Israel, a small nation and a brave one." On June 8, the day after Israel had swept within 18 miles of the Suez Canal, captured Sharm-el Sheikh at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, taken the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, and gained control of the West Bank of the Jordan River, the *Daily News* argued editorially that "to the victors belong the spoils." Using the voice of a fictional character, Cussin' Cousin J. Fussen Rasmussen, the editorial declared:

"I mean let the Israelis keep most if not all of the territory they've overrun this week, and the hell with squawks and squeals from Nasser, Syria, Jordan, the UN, or anybody else.

"And I'm not being overly pro-Israeli or anti-Arab. I'm merely talking common sense."

Israel generally enjoyed a favorable press during the conflict, though it was rather cool at the outset, no doubt because editors feared American military intervention. It was in fact more favorable than it had ever been, particularly among conservative newspapers impressed by Israel's military prowess. (Jokes abounded about the possibility of General Moshe Dayan's helping the United States win a victory in Vietnam.)

The most notable gain for Israel in editorial opinion came from the Luce publications, particularly *Time* and *Life*. For years both journals had been consistently pro-Arab, their criticism of Israel focusing on the Arab refugees and the status of Jerusalem. They had frequently criticized United States policy because it appeared to favor Israel over the Arab states. It seemed the six-day war effected a dramatic change in these long-held views. (Or was the change a consequence of Henry Luce's death in March?) A *Time* essay, "On Facing the Reality of Israel" (June 23), concluded:

The sad persistence of the Arab attitude is perhaps the strongest argument for Israel's need to protect itself. Since the U.N. has shown its inability to protect them, Israelis argue that they can give up the real estate they deem essential to their security only if the Arabs agree to peace—and to reality.

Another *Time* essay, "Arabia Decepta: A People Self-Deluded" (July 14), reflected disappointment in the Arabs, taking an unromantic, hardheaded view of them:

... for two decades, Arab leaders have been interested in mounting suicidal wars against Israel. If the Arabs truly weighed their own self-interest after their latest, disastrous defeat, they would face facts—or so a Westerner would reason—accept Israel's extended hand, and join in desert-blooming projects that could lift the whole Middle East to unprecedented heights of peace and prosperity. To begin this process, they would not need suddenly to embrace the Israelis, or grovel to them; they would need only to acknowledge the country's right to exist. What ails them? Are they really a case of arrested development, doomed for generations to the kind of emotional and political instability that makes the Middle East one of the world's danger zones?
Israel's incredible military victory and the Arab defeat generated jokes, cartoons, posters, and comic books, many of dubious taste, which reflected the unexpectedness in associating Jews, typically pacific people, with extraordinary military prowess.

Public Officials

Thousands of Americans, no doubt mostly Jews, addressed an enormous volume of letters and telegrams on behalf of Israel to President Lyndon B. Johnson and to their Congressmen and Senators. The President's standard reply was:

I am grateful that you shared your thoughts and feelings with me during the difficult and anxious days of the crisis in the Middle East.

We worked hard to bring about a cease-fire.

We shall work with all our capacity to try to bring lasting peace in the area.

During the last two weeks of May, dominant opinion in the Senate reflected that in the country at large: the Middle East crisis was one that should be settled by the United Nations. Senator J. W. Fulbright (D., Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on May 23 described the conflict as a "classic case" for the United Nations because of "multilateral interests" in the area. Many Senators agreed, and no one urged unilateral action on behalf of Israel.

According to an Associated Press survey, published June 16, of the 438 members of Congress who answered a questionnaire on the Middle East, 364 (42 Senators and 322 Representatives) expressed the unqualified opinion that Israel should get assurances of national security and access to the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba before withdrawing troops from Arab territory. Of the remainder, 41 gave qualified responses and 33 declined to give any view.

In response to mail from their constituents, both before and after the war, many Congressmen and Senators gave verbal support for Israel, condemned Communism, and praised American nonintervention. Rep. Edward J. Gurney's (D., Fla.) letters of reply read:

The President has my complete support in bringing to bear the full prestige and influence of the United States in bringing peace to the Middle East.

We have two sinister influences at work causing trouble in the Middle East. Egypt's Nasser is a power-bent dictator with dreams of a great Empire in the Middle East with him at the head. He is cut out of the same cloth as every other conquerer throughout history. I hope Israel gives him a good lesson, and it looks as though they are. Nasser is no friend of ours.

The other influence is Russian Communism seeking to stir up trouble in the East while the United States is occupied in Viet Nam. It is certainly not in the interests of the United States to have Russia succeed in her latest efforts of troublemaking.

The President should take a firm stand on freedom of the seas in the Gulf
of Aqaba waters and the Suez Canal, and I would support him in that also.

It looks to me as though the spunky little nation of Israel is well able to take care of herself. I hope so.

The most impressive statement about Israel, inspired by its achievements in the conflict, was made by former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at a luncheon in New York on the occasion of the publication of the second volume of his memoirs, *The Blast of War* (Harper & Row). John Barkham, editor of the *Saturday Review* Book Service for Newspapers, asked about the sort of future Macmillan envisioned for Britain, now that the empire was gone. Should Britain be another Sweden, or another Athens? Macmillan replied:

> Not another Athens. The people who suggest that have not read their history. Athens was based on slave labor, ran a powerful empire, fought great wars, and eventually decayed and died. It may well be that Britain will someday follow in the footsteps of Sweden, but if so I'm glad I won't be here to see it.

> No, the future I hope for Britain is more like that of Israel. In the time of Elizabeth we were only two million people, in the time of Marlborough, only five or six million, in the time of Napoleon, only ten million. The other day, while the world debated, Israel's three million imposed their will on their enemies. They had what any great people need—resolution, courage, determination, pride. These are what really count in men and nations.²

### The Jewish Response

American Jews, like Jews elsewhere in the world outside Israel, experienced a trauma, perhaps best diagnosed as a reliving of the Holocaust in an eerie awareness of once again being put to the ultimate test. In the words of one observer:

> the immediate reaction of American Jewry to the crisis was far more intense and widespread than anyone could have foreseen. Many Jews would never have believed that grave danger to Israel could dominate their thoughts and emotions to the exclusion of all else.³

No study was undertaken at that time, no probing of the inner feelings and thoughts of American Jews. But it is generally agreed that the Holocaust was the underlying catalyst.⁴ American Jews have been afflicted with a deep sense of guilt. With the passage of time, their very survival when millions of others Jews were murdered and, even worse, their failure to rescue more than a miniscule number of European Jews have increasingly tormented them. Long suppressed, these guilt feelings began to emerge in 1961, with the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel. That trial focused discussion not only on German genocide, but also on questions of morality and politics—obe-

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dience to unjust laws and superior orders, as well as the cooperation of Jewish leadership with the Germans and the alleged passivity of the Jewish victims. The publication in 1963 of Hannah Arendt’s *Eichmann in Jerusalem* made exploration of these questions both more painful and disputatious. That discussion, especially on the morality of “obedience to superior orders,” in turn was applied, especially by young people who had not themselves experienced the period of the Holocaust, to American involvement in the war in Vietnam.

American Jews surprised even themselves by their intense response to the six-day war. Yet the surprise itself was a phenomenon of that response. Previous studies have shown a near-universal sentiment for Israel among American Jews. A 1948 survey of Baltimore Jews showed an extraordinary sense of Jewish solidarity: 95 per cent felt that American Jews should help the Jews in Palestine, “even if the United States does not help” them.5 A survey conducted ten years later among Jews living in a highly acculturated Midwestern suburb showed that 65 per cent of the respondents would feel a “very deep” sense of loss “if the Arab nations succeed in carrying out their threat to destroy Israel,” 25 per cent would experience “some” sense of loss; only 10 per cent said they would feel no sense of loss. About 70 per cent explained that sense of loss as an expression of their feeling of Jewish identity.6

As the Arabs began to close in on Israel in the second half of May, American Jews, so frequently accused of indifference and passivity, turned into a passionate, turbulent, clamorous multitude, affirming in unprecedented fashion that they were part of the Jewish people and that Israel’s survival was their survival. The Arabs had pledged Israel’s destruction. Ahmed Shukairy, leader of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army, had declared on June 1, in Amman, Jordan: “When the Arabs take Israel, the surviving Jews will be helped to return to their native countries; but I figure there will be very few survivors.” For the second time in a quarter of a century the Jewish people was facing annihilation. But this time, somehow, things would be different. There would be no passivity, no timidity. That was the mood of American Jews.

**Moods and Feelings**

The moods, feelings, and spontaneous and organized actions of American Jews testified to their sense of Jewish solidarity and their commitment to Jewish survival. At first, anxiety and tension were commonplace reactions. As the crisis deepened, irritability and nervousness became more marked.

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American Jews were sleeping less, listening more and more to radio and television, waiting, worrying, wondering why the Israelis were waiting. Even before war broke out on June 5, the hunger for news seemed insatiable, and during the war it assumed epidemic proportions. The volume of transistor radios on New York's streets, rattling off news reports and bulletins, seemed sometimes almost to drown out the city's habitual noises. Strangers asked each other if there was news. Day and night people sat before their television sets watching the emergency sessions of the United Nations Security Council, whose protocol became familiar and comic, but whose impotence was exasperating, even agonizing.

American Jews with relatives and friends in Israel clogged the telephone lines with long-distance calls; even before war broke out, calls to Israel had to be booked three weeks in advance. The callers were anxious for personal and political news, but, even more, they wanted to communicate to the Jews in Israel their feelings of solidarity.

Jews congregated. They went to more meetings than ever before and they went in unprecedented numbers to the synagogue. Reports from all over the country indicated that attendance on the Sabbaths before and after the war approached that on Yom Kippur. Before the war, Jews went to pray for the survival of Israel, and afterwards, to give thanks. The reunification of Jerusalem and reports that Jews were once again praying at the Western Wall exposed latent religious feelings among American Jews who had regarded themselves as secularists: "With the Israeli war there was a reassertion of an old Jewish feeling about God and Providence, of a kind that we have not seen in many years—in the United States as well as in Israel." 7

Jews kept asking what they could do, always with a frightening sense of impotence, fearful of the fate of a collective Auschwitz for the Jews in Israel. 8 There was talk of airlifting children, women, elderly people out of Israel before the fighting would begin, before the Arab destruction would start. Yet everyone knew that such attempts at rescue, even of children, would be regarded as defeatism, hardly calculated to raise Jewish morale in Israel or elsewhere in the world.

Israel's military victory brought elation and pride, but, even more, release from tension, gratitude, a sense of deliverance. Of course the pride was one of being victorious, a new kind of pride in being Jewish, in the aura that radiated from General Moshe Dayan, his ruggedness, vigor, determination. Many Jews took pride in the changed image of the Jew, no longer seen as victim or the historic typification of a persecuted people. To be sure, there

7 Milton Himmelfarb, "In the Light of Israel's Victory," Commentary, October 1967, pp. 53-61.
8 Expressive of this mood was a letter written June 1, the day after Israel's mobilization, by Rabbi Leonard J. Mervis, of the Oak Park (Ill.) Temple B'nai Abraham Zion, to members of his congregation:

This is the most important letter I have written in my 28 years as Rabbi. . We Jews must get together, not only to be informed, but to consider what we must do to support Israel in this very disturbing situation. If we Jews will not help, who will?
was ridicule at the ignominious performance of the Arab armies and some
gloating and boasting. But more characteristic of the Jewish response was a
rabbi's reminder that "All military victories are purchased with human life,
and this one was no exception." He quoted a Midrash: At the crossing of
the Red Sea, with the Israelites safe on dry land and the Egyptians drowning,
the angels began to sing a hymn of thanksgiving; but the Lord rebuked them,
saying: "The work of My hands are drowning in the sea, and would you sing
hymns?"

The Financial Outpouring

It seemed as if there was nothing American Jews could do except give
money for Israel. This they did on a sacrificial level, surpassing even the
highwater mark of 1948 giving. Not only did they give, but they did not
wait to be solicited. In fact, in hundreds of cities across the country the
givers goaded and stimulated the fund raisers to more, and more intensive,
fund raising. That unsolicited giving was unparalleled in philanthropic ex-
perience. Then there occurred the extraordinary phenomenon of large num-
bers of people personally bringing their contributions to the campaign offices.
They felt compelled to do this physical act, as if by bringing the money they,
too, were participating in a real physical way in the crisis. Perhaps they felt
that writing a check and mailing it was too easy, too uninvolved.

What exactly did people think they were accomplishing with their contribu-
tions? Did they imagine they were buying arms, tanks, planes for Israel? Were
they providing for a new wave of refugees? The speed with which the
war was concluded made it appear unlikely that Jews felt their contributions
would help ensure Israel's physical survival. Perhaps many were not think-
ing realistically of what their money was going to be used for; perhaps for
many their contributions were in expiation for their indifference 25 years
earlier.

In less than a month—from the time the crisis began until the war ended
—UJA raised over $100 million (pp. 305-306). Community after commu-
nity reported that campaign offices were unable to keep pace in tabulating
the contributions that kept pouring in. New York's UJA had been swamped
by contributions beyond the capacity of staff and volunteers. Several banks
made available 40 employees for two days to help UJA catch up with its
receipts. All Jewish organizations postponed their own fund-raising cam-
paigns and urged their members to give for Israel.

No evaluation of the characteristics of contributors and no analysis of size
of contributions were available, but it was obvious that regular contributo-
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9 Rabbi Mark S. Shapiro (Congregation B'nai Yehoshua Beth Elohim, Morton Grove, Ill.),
10 I wish to thank Mr. Marc Tabatchnik of the United Jewish Appeal for giving me access
to UJA teletypes during June 1967 and sharing his impressions with me. I am grateful also to
Mr. Dan S. Rosenberg, of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, for provid-
ing me with the series of Council reports, Israel Crisis (June 5-August 8, 1967).
gave more than they had ever given before and that many new contributors emerged, who were giving to UJA for the first time in their lives. Funds were tripled or quadrupled in comparison to previous years. In St. Louis, for example, a normally generous contributor gave, in addition to the usual amount, $5,000 worth of securities. In San Francisco, a $7,000 contributor gave $30,000; an $8,000 donor gave $20,000.

At a UJA luncheon meeting in New York on the day the war began, a million dollars a minute was pledged within fifteen minutes for the Israel Emergency Fund. That night in Chicago another $2.5 million was raised, in Atlanta the following night $1.1 million more was pledged.

Reports from Philadelphia were typical of the experiences of federations and welfare funds throughout the country. People continued to stream into the offices with their unsolicited contributions. Elderly people without checking accounts came in with cash. Secretaries brought their contributions during lunch hours. Children donated their coin banks and bags of pennies. Students offered to give up their vacations, volunteering their services to the community. Boy Scout troops and youth clubs were turning over their treasuries. Many schools canceled graduation parties and held graduation ceremonies without caps and gowns and gave the savings to the Israel Emergency Fund.

Synagogues in Essex County, N.J., set up telephone squads to reach their members for support of the Israel Emergency Fund. One synagogue, which in its hundred-year history had never had a fund-raising appeal at services, did so for the emergency fund. An Essex County country club closed its golf course on Sunday morning and conducted a fund-raising meeting instead. (That particular strategy was used all over the country. The Board of Directors of the Los Angeles Hillcrest Country Club ruled that all its members must contribute to the Emergency Fund.) Chicago, notoriously laggard in Jewish giving, raised over $9 million for the Israel Emergency Fund. A tremendous outpouring of mass giving supported the large contributors.

As a public service, a Cleveland bank set aside $1,000,000 for loans to individuals, who otherwise would have been unable to pay their UJA pledges, at an interest rate one-half per cent below the prime rate.

In the small Jewish community of Norfolk, Va., over a million dollars was raised at six parlor meetings, more than twice the amount reached in the previous annual campaign. All synagogues scheduled prayer meetings, many immediately followed by fund raising. In Charleston W.Va., another small community, contributors paid up all their past commitments, many borrowing money to do so.

Louis Stulberg, president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, announced on June 8 that his union would purchase a million dollars worth of Israel bonds as an initial step to aid Israel in the present emergency.

It even appeared that some of the top leaders of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism did not remain untouched. On July 16 the New York
Times published an article on the Council. It said that some of the organization's leaders looked upon the June war as an act of Israeli "'aggression,'" and upon the "massive Jewish support for Israel in America as amounting to 'hysteria.'" Three days later the Times reported the repudiation of this position by Donald S. Klopf, vice chairman of Random House; Joseph H. Louchheim, deputy commissioner in charge of the New York city division of the State Department of Social Welfare; John Mosler, chairman of Mosler Safe Company; Walter N. Rothschild, Jr., president of Abraham & Straus department store, and Stanley Marcus, president of Neiman-Marcus company in Dallas. They or their spokesmen emphasized their current sympathy for Israel, backed up by substantial contributions to the Israel Emergency Fund or other Israeli causes during or right after the fighting. Several announced their intention of resigning from the Council; all others said they were reviewing their membership.

The outpouring of contributions was accompanied by anecdotes, accounts, tales about the givers. In Boston a woman about to enter the hospital for major surgery wrote: "Here is my contribution. Give me some cards and I'll make calls from my bed." The owner of two gas stations in New York turned over to the UJA the deeds to the stations as his contribution to the emergency fund. Other contributors donated the cash-surrender values of their life-insurance policies. Another story reported at UJA headquarters concerned a well-dressed man who almost timidly approached a clerk's desk to say he was pledging another $100,000: "I am now going to give my friends a talk. If the Israelis can give their blood, we can give what we have." The day before he had contributed $100,000.

Jewish soldiers in Vietnam donated considerable amounts of money. There were reports of virtually 100 per cent backing and admiration for the Israeli army among the United States troops in Vietnam.

In the New York metropolitan area teen-age volunteers, with coin boxes and shopping bags, solicited contributions at subway and bus-terminal entrances. Four yeshivah students stood at Broadway and 42nd Street, holding the corners of a bedsheets and soliciting funds: "There is no food being produced in Israel. All able-bodied men are at the front. Give for medical supplies, for food and shelter for the children.'

Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York offered to pay the salaries of doctors for up to three months while they served in Israel. Eight doctors immediately volunteered, but only one was able to leave before the war began. The hospital paid the transportation of the Israeli nurses on staff who returned to Israel. It helped obtain critically important medical equipment for Israel. Staff doctors conducted a campaign among their colleagues, as did the medical social workers, collecting many times the usual amounts.

There were numerous reports of people who cashed securities and insurance policies so that they could give larger contributions. All over the country con-
tributions to UJA were made in lieu of customary anniversary, birthday, bar mitzvah, Father's Day, and graduation gifts.

On June 5 Saul H. Lieberman, Professor of Talmud at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, issued the following statement "for all Jews in the world and, in particular, for the members of the Rabbinical Assembly and the congregants of the United Synagogue":

The Jewish people has never in its history passed through an hour of such danger. Its entire existence is gravely threatened. The people of Israel have the privilege to give their lives to preserve the very existence of the nation. The best that we Jews in America can do is to support them with our money. This day is our great opportunity, one that may never repeat itself, to help save *Klal Yisrael*. Mrs. Lieberman and I, in addition to over $5,000 which we have already personally given to the Israel Emergency Fund, are thus adding, in cash, $20,000 more. We call on all Jews for comparable action.

He concluded with a quotation from Psalms (20:8), "Some trust in chariots, and some in horses; But we will make mention of the name of the Lord our God."

**The Organized Jewish Community**

As the Israeli crisis deepened in the last days of May, many Jews, frustrated at the political inactivity, asked their organizations what they could do. In response to such requests, the Boston Jewish Community Council, for instance, issued a leaflet suggesting that people could attend an Israel solidarity rally scheduled for June 4 on the Boston Common; send telegrams to President Johnson; pay their pledges to the UJA; buy Israel Bonds; and urge their friends to give moral and financial support to Israel.

Synagogues and Jewish community centers engaged in a variety of activities. Their personnel put aside their normal tasks and became part of the total community mobilization by helping to organize fund-raising campaigns and providing meeting and working space for volunteers, with hastily installed telephone batteries and office equipment. In St. Louis the Jewish Community Center organized a community-wide rally in its building. A three-mile traffic jam was created by the crowd heading for the rally. Jewish community centers that had never before been open on the Sabbath or festivals were crowded with volunteers working during the emergency, with the blessing of the local rabbis.  

Every Jewish organization worked on behalf of Israel. The American Red Magen David which supplies medical aid to Israel, was swamped with calls from people offering to give blood, donate first-aid supplies, ambulances, and other medical equipment. National Jewish organizations felt that their main function was to influence public opinion and inform the President and Congress what they hoped and expected the United States to do to save Israel.

from annihilation or slow strangulation. They issued information about the
Middle East, fact sheets about Israel, documentation of Arab aggression.
Though many did similar things, cooperation among all organizations was
exceptional.

The central coordinating agency was the Conference of Presidents of
Major American Jewish Organizations, representing 21 national organizations
and their local counterparts. On June 6 Dr. Joachim Prinz, chairman of the
conference, issued a statement on its behalf, asking the United States govern-
ment "to provide all necessary material assistance and political support in
order to put an end for all time to Arab aggression—an aggression which for
20 years has threatened to destroy the State of Israel, imperiled the vital
interests of the United States and jeopardized the peace of the world."

The conference sponsored a "national leadership emergency meeting" in
Washington, D.C., on June 7; its participants visited members of Congress
to mobilize support for Israel. It held a rally on June 8 at which about 40,000
people heard addresses by dozens of prominent Jewish leaders, Senators,
Congressmen, civic and trade-union leaders. News announcements of the
progress of the war and of diplomatic negotiations in the United Nations
punctuated the proceedings, as reported from the platform and from the
transistor radios to which many participants were listening. When Dr. Prinz
announced the news of the first cease-fire, the crowd broke into cheers and
demonstrations of excitement.

In Los Angeles a rally for Israel, held on July 11 at the Hollywood Bowl,
drew 20,000 persons. Over 4,000 large and small gifts were pledged. Top
government officials including Governor Ronald Reagan, Senator George
Murphy, and Mayor Samuel Yorty joined in the rally, along with dozens of
celebrities of the entertainment world.

The American Jewish Committee asked its members to urge non-Jewish
community leaders and the mass media to issue statements, print editorials,
and send telegrams to Washington on behalf of Israel. Influential AJC leaders
in various states visited or wrote to their Senators and Congressmen.

The Jewish Labor Committee puts its main emphasis on generating public
support for Israel in the labor movement. A strongly pro-Israel resolution
was adopted by the San Francisco Labor Council. A number of San Fran-
cisco's largest unions, including the carpenters and teamsters, agreed to co-
sponsor a local rally in support of Israel. On June 2, and again on June 5,
AFL-CIO president George Meany declared that the trade-union movement
would "stand side by side with Israel," and that the labor movement had an
interest in the preservation of Israel "as a democracy in a part of the world
where democracy is largely unknown."

On June 2, the American Association for Jewish Education (AAJE) cir-
cularized all Jewish schools, teachers, and principals, asking them to pledge
all Keren Ami funds for the UJA Israel Emergency Fund. AAJE's estimated
that several hundred thousands of dollars came from these funds. A few
days after the war began, AAJE convened a meeting of Jewish educators for the purpose of compiling a file of available personnel if Israel would require qualified people to assist in teaching and related fields. Several hundred men and women volunteered for such service.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{The Young: Students and Volunteers}

The impact of the Israeli crisis and war on young Jews was intense. Many were perplexed and dismayed that the events did not conform to their political notions. They found that their ideas of war which had been shaped by Vietnam were irrelevant to Israel. Views on pacifism, civil disobedience, resistance to government, and the inherent evil of military might were suddenly questioned. Unlike the confrontation in Vietnam, this was a just war, a war of self-defense against the threat of military genocide.

Some young people discovered the importance of being Jewish, as they found themselves impelled to take a stand. One young writer gave words to these feelings in a letter to the editor of the \textit{Village Voice}:

\begin{quote}
I think it must have been this way for many of my generation, that the Israeli-Arab collision was a moment of truth. For the first time in my grown-up life, I really understood what an enemy was. For the first time, I knew what it was to be us against the killers.

Us. Two weeks ago, Israel was they; now Israel is we. I will not intellectualize it. I will not say that it is only because Israel was in the right during this brief war as I never felt my own country to be in the wars of my own life-time. I will not intellectualize it; I am Jewish; and the we has to do with more or less than the brotherhood of man, the bond of the good; it is a Jewish we. Something happened. I will never again be able to talk about how Judaism is only a religion, and isn't it too bad that there has to be such a thing as a Jewish state. I will never again say as I said two years ago: Yes, I feel sympathetic with Israel, but I would feel the same way if France were involved in this kind of crisis. I will never kid myself that we are only the things we choose to be. Roots count.

And I will never again claim to be a pacifist; I will never again say that if I had been an adult during World War II I might have been for non-intervention, or, if a man, been a conscientious objector. I have lost the purity of the un-tested, and when someday my children are very pure with me about how there is no reason for us not to buy a Porsche, I will argue with them the way my parents have had to argue with me: impurely, from the heart.

I was walking along the street listening to a transistor radio when I first heard that the Israelis, the Jews, had reached the Wailing Wall and with guns slung over their shoulders were praying there. No one was watching me, but I wept anyway. Sometimes even the tear-glands know more than the mind.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

An American girl studying in Israel decided to remain there when war was imminent. In a letter to her parents she wrote:

\begin{quote}
After learning all my life about Hitler and the destruction of the Jews and the rise of a Jewish state, I cannot just run out like this. There is so much to do
\end{quote}


here. We are working with schools, youth groups, kibbutzim, and hospitals to fill the jobs that the men who are sent out from the reserves left vacant. I want to stay and do whatever I can so that the country can continue to function while others may have to fight. I feel it is my duty to my religion, my people, and my country, to stay here and do whatever I can.\(^{14}\)

A UCLA student who had been in Israel during the war wrote:

I've always felt proud to be a Jew. Now I've got Jewish problems. I went to Israel because I owed it to some girl of 22 who might have been in Israel if she hadn't been killed by the Nazis or kept unwillingly in Russia. I am not a Zionist. But now that I'm safely home again, I wonder what I'm doing here. It's so easy to be Jewish in the United States. Jews can live without Israel; but Israel cannot survive without Jews.\(^{15}\)

At the Bronx High School of Science, an elite public high school in New York City whose student body of 3,000 is about 85 per cent Jewish, a teacher reported that during the crisis the “students listened to news on their transistors, argued, prophesied, shouted protest, approval, regret, and joy. Israel seemed very present, their imminent exams worlds away.”\(^{16}\) Some of these students were asked to write brief candid statements about their feelings on the Israeli situation and their own emotional involvement. A girl, now at Brandeis University:

. . I felt terrified. All of a sudden my Jewish background and the existence of Israel became important and I was afraid that Israel would be defeated; I didn’t believe that she could win. I kept thinking of the many hardships that the Jewish people have had to endure and the tragedy that they have had to fight for a country of their own. I refused even to consider the Arabs’ point of view; now, a month later, I can look at things objectively again. When Israel “won” so quickly, I had a strong feeling of pride. Unjustifiably, I felt the superiority of Jews over people of every other religion. I felt strong ties with Israel for the first time.

A serious young man:

Being against the war in Viet Nam (I have taken part in all the protest marches) for reasons of pacifism, I was very disturbed when Israel went to war. How could I be against war in one place and excuse it in another? Still the two wars were not alike. The United States is a big and powerful country which is attacking a small, weak one. The Arabs said over and over that they would destroy Israel. If Israel was not willing to fight, it would have been wiped out.

Still I do not see right only on one side. Arabs who have been living in the country for centuries have been driven from their homes. And I was very upset when it was reported that Israel was using napalm. (I hope it isn't true.) I was confused and I still am.

A student now at City College:

The Israeli-Arab war has had a schizoid effect on my emotions. On the one

\(^{14}\) Read by Carl Reiner at the Hollywood Bowl rally, June 11, 1967.


\(^{16}\) Jack Luria, “As the Young Saw It,” Jewish Frontier, October 1967, pp. 22–25.
hand, I find war and its inherent loss of life revolting and I could not and would not participate. On the other hand, I realize that Israel has been struggling for its existence while surrounded by hostile neighbors bent on her destruction, and I sympathize with Israel. The net result is that I sit home and curse war and the Arabs.

Their teacher concluded that their responses varied according to the strength of their feelings of Jewish identity. Yet none was indifferent, not even the hippies among them, who have been least involved in the real world.

When the Israel crisis was becoming acute, most college students were taking final examinations or preparing to leave campus. On June 5, when war actually broke out, many campuses were deserted, with only scattered groups of students, mostly graduate students, remaining. A survey of the responses of students still on campus showed that they, too, responded strongly and demonstratively: "The spirited concerns, emotional shock waves and eagerness for positive action that swept across the adult Jewish community during the Israel crisis was mirrored in the most striking expression of Jewish identification and responsibility that ever welled up on university and college campuses." 17

Students volunteered to go to Israel for civilian service. They volunteered for local Jewish community service. They gave money and collected money. They signed petitions and solicited signatures. They attended teach-ins, prayer vigils, marches, and mass demonstrations. They wrote letters and sent telegrams to Congressmen and Senators.

Here are a few characteristic episodes. At Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, 500 students jammed the Hillel House to pick up applications for volunteer work in Israel. In fifteen minutes the 200 available applications were gone. One student commented, "My parents feel that Israel is worth saving. They are willing to let me go." Another said, "Being 18, we were born about the same time as the State of Israel. I feel we, in our generation, have an obligation to go." And a third, "I think we are at this moment at the crossroads of Jewish history. We must stand up and be counted."

At Wayne State University, Detroit, there was increased traffic at the Hillel House, where the radios were kept going to provide news. There were constant telephone inquiries. The question was always the same: is there news from Israel?

A thousand students attended a vigil for peace in the Middle East at the University of California at Los Angeles. About 200 students signed up for volunteer service in Israel.

At New York's City College, 100 students signed up in four hours for the Sherut La'am program in Israel. Questioned about his interest in Israel, one confessed to a feeling of guilt for never having done "anything for his people," and volunteered to distribute a leaflet about civilian service in Israel.

He had headed a leftist extremist group on campus, had participated in campus sit-downs, and had even been suspended for participating in an illegal sit-down. Another volunteer said he was acting for moral reasons and because of ethnic ties with Israel. He thought that "in the Hitler era, people had stood aside and not helped," and that he personally intended to help his people where he could.

In all, about 7,500 young people volunteered for civilian service in Israel, though only a small proportion managed to get there before the war. In New York City, 510 volunteers answered a simple questionnaire distributed by the American Zionist Youth Foundation. They were overwhelmingly college students or college graduates. Only seven per cent had not gone to college or were not attending college; a few of these were still in high school. The most significant information elicited from this questionnaire was that 80 per cent (406 respondents) had had some kind of Jewish education. More than half had attended a supplementary Hebrew afternoon school. About half of these had attended for six years or more, most of the others for three to five years. Over 30 per cent of the volunteers had attended all-day Jewish schools, most of them for eight years or more. The remaining volunteers had attended Sunday school, about 40 per cent of them for three to five years. Among volunteers 21 years old or younger, the largest proportion had gone to all-day Jewish schools. Obviously a strong relationship existed between Jewish education and the sense of Jewish identity that impelled these young people to volunteer. Furthermore, the more intensive Jewish education was more likely to produce more committed Jews.

Many volunteers reacted in a visceral way to the crisis. They wanted to do something right away. Once the war was over and the actual physical danger to Israel lessened, many young people no longer felt the same urgency about going overseas. One volunteer wrote:

"I was aware of Israel's danger and wanted to offer my services. Now there is no danger and I cannot go. However, if there is a vital need for me in the future, please inform me."

Besides giving their vital statistics and some facts on their Jewish upbringing, some volunteers tried to explain their feelings. Curiously, those with less Jewish education and less previous Jewish commitment were more likely to explain their decision to volunteer. For example, a 21-year-old man, attending college part time, with four years of Hebrew school, who does not belong to a synagogue, and is not affiliated with any Jewish organization, said:

"When I was driving to work I heard on the radio what had happened. I went to my office and could not work. Chills went through me and I knew that I must go and fight for my people. I am not very religious, but I knew that I had to try and help. I got my passport but I could not get a visa because I had no money."

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18 The questionnaires were kindly made available to the American Jewish Committee by Theodore Comet, the Foundation's director.
of the State Department. Since I would have given up my life for Israel, I would like to spend my next vacation there. I bought Israeli bonds with my vacation money this year.

And a 20-year-old college girl, with minimal Jewish education:

If ever Israel needs people to help I would like you to notify me. Since Israel is no longer in dire need of manpower, I must work in the United States to pay for my college education now.

A 20-year-old college man, with practically no Jewish education, but active in the civil-rights movement:

I consider myself a religious agnostic from a Jewish background. I believe in Israel and feel that several of my ideals may be represented there. It was on the basis of these ideals that I volunteered to fight and die during the past crisis. Someday I'll live in Israel for a while, but I don't want to make a social group out of everyone who wants to congratulate themselves for heroically volunteering to go to Israel.

A 23-year-old college graduate, studying for an MA in business administration, with four years of Hebrew school and no membership in any Jewish group:

It is obvious that I am neither a Zionist nor even a religious Jew. Yet there seemed no ethical alternative to volunteering to serve in Israel. I regret that I cannot participate in the reconstruction, but have every confidence that with God's help it will be successful.

A 29-year-old college graduate, with a wife and small child, no Jewish education and no Jewish group association:

When I first heard that Israel was at war with the Arabs, my being born a Jew meant something more to me than it ever had. I had to do something for the Jewish state of Israel. I served four years in the U.S. Navy. My wife would like to teach and I could work in a hospital or instruct sports.

A 22-year-old college senior, with a Sunday school education:

I called the Israel Embassy to see if I could enlist to fight. I have never in 22 years felt a strong Jewish attraction. As a matter of fact, at times I even rejected my heritage. For the first time in my life I was forced to resolve this problem within myself. I still have doubts as to what the "Zionist" movement stands for, but I felt obliged not just to sit back and see the State of Israel wiped off the map.

A 25-year-old man, studying business administration and law in graduate school, without Jewish education:

I volunteered to defend the existence of Israel but my services were not needed. I can be of greater use to Israel now by working here and donating to the UJA rather than on a kibbutz. But I would like to be apprised of Israel's needs in the future so I may do what I can and that includes my military knowledge. Shalom!
A 22-year-old law student, without Jewish education:

I am not religious, but quite aware of my Jewish identity. I became very upset when Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba. As soon as the fighting broke out, I tried to go to Israel. But then the travel ban was on. I would go to Israel now for six months, but draft and school obligations are in the way.

A 31-year-old married man, with no Jewish education:

At the time of Israel’s crisis I felt, with a passion that I had previously not believed existed within me, the desire to help Israel in her time of peril. However, I now feel that my obligation here in this country is more important to me than whatever contributions I can now make by volunteering for service in Israel.

A 20-year-old pre-medical college student, who had attended an all-day Jewish school and was active in the peace and civil-rights movements:

Just felt the need to volunteer—an impulse based on some knowledge and a great deal of passion.

An 18-year-old high-school girl, without any Jewish background:

As you can see I have not been active in any kind of a group. Now that I am older I realize I would like to do something for my people. Going to Israel to help and work there would mean a great deal to me.

A 20-year-old college student, with Sunday school education and Reform affiliation:

I desire to make a contribution to the nation of my people. This is perhaps the one great chance of doing something really important in my life, something big and vital. Only a fool would turn such an opportunity down. My heart is with Israel and I want to be there.

A 27-year-old college graduate, with ten years of Sunday school and Reform temple membership:

The decision to go to Israel’s aid was among the most important events in my life. In so doing, I was able both to discover and to affirm many aspects of myself.

The Academics

Though alienation from Judaism, the synagogue, and the Jewish community has been most prevalent among academics and intellectuals on college campuses, they responded to the crisis in much the same way as Jews with strong, or stronger, communal ties. At Yale University, for example, Rabbi Richard I. Israel, director of the B’nai B’rith Hillel Foundation, reported that the response of the Jewish faculty to a simple fund-raising appeal was so “incredible” that the experience was difficult to assimilate:

Our Jewish faculty, which in a good year gives between $200 and $400 to the Yale Jewish Appeal, three days after the letter was out had given over $10,000.
I got a call for surgeons and anesthetists at noon on Thursday. By three o'clock that afternoon, thirteen senior faculty people from the medical school were packing their bags for the plane that night. I would never have believed it.\(^\text{19}\)

In the tense days at the end of May, Jewish professors on several campuses began collecting signatures for a variety of petitions to rally opinion on behalf of Israel. A group of Cornell University faculty members, calling itself Ad Hoc Committee of American Professors, contacted colleagues on other campuses for signatures to a statement for publication as an ad in the New York Times. Within three days, 3,700 names were gathered and money was raised to pay for a two-page ad, scheduled to appear on July 8. (An additional 1,500 names came in after the ad went to press.) Meanwhile, war broke out, but the group felt that the statement was still valid because it clearly defined the strong feeling in the intellectual community that the United States was committed to safeguarding the integrity, security, and survival of Israel and its people:

As responsible members of the academic community, we must not stand by in silence in the face of Arab threats, illegal blockades and massive mobilization aimed at the destruction of the people and State of Israel.

It concluded: "Our generation has witnessed the monstrous result of silence," an implicit reference to the passivity of the Western world in the face of the Holocaust.

The professors' experience in gathering signatures encouraged them to establish an ongoing organization, and on July 11, 25 professors from 20 campuses met in New York to form the American Professors for Peace in the Middle East. An announcement of its formation was mailed to the 5,200 signees of the statement. Over 8,000 professors at 170 colleges and universities indicated interest in the committee, with promises of support, contributions, and volunteer assistance. Well-functioning groups were established on Boston, Baltimore-Washington, Los Angeles, Berkeley, Cornell, and other campuses. Elsewhere individual faculty members agreed to undertake responsibility on behalf of the organization. Allen Pollack, associate professor of history at the University of Pittsburgh and a central figure in organizing the American Professors for Peace in the Middle East, became its secretary.

Besides a substantial minority of non-Jews, who believed in the justice of Israel's cause, the organization attracted mostly Jews. Among these were persons closely associated with Hillel and other on- and off-campus Jewish organizations, persons whose Jewish associations had been only lukewarm, and, finally, "new Jews," who had previously never identified themselves with the Jewish community, some who had not even regarded themselves as Jews. American Professors became the agency through which the lukewarm Jews and the "new Jews" could express their sense of identity with Israel and the Jewish community.

\(^{19}\) Saul Goldberg, *loc. cit.*, p. 15.
American Professors undertook educational work to acquaint both the academic community and the American public with the nature of the underlying social and political issues in the Middle East. Faculty members organized speakers' bureaus and themselves spoke on the Middle East situation to campus and community groups. They prepared briefing kits and fact sheets, and produced reprints of useful materials. They wrote articles in their local newspapers, answered letters to the editor, and appeared on local radio and television programs.

On December 9 and 10, American Professors for Peace in the Middle East convened their first annual conference in New York. Several hundred members attended the sessions devoted to “The Middle East in the Contemporary World.”

THE CHRISTIAN RESPONSE

The first public expression of Christian concern about Israel’s fate came on May 28, when eight religious leaders, Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox, appealed to President Johnson to honor American commitments in support of Israel’s right of passage through the Strait of Tiran. A few days later and with four more signatures, that statement, “The Moral Responsibility in the Middle East,” was widely printed in newspapers throughout the United States. Declaring at the outset that “men of conscience must not remain silent at this time,” it called on “Americans of all persuasions and groupings and on the Administration to support the independence, integrity and freedom of Israel.” It concluded that “the people of Israel have the right to live and develop in tranquility and without fear.” It was signed by the Rev. John C. Bennett, president of Union Theological Seminary; the Rev. Robert McAfee Brown, professor of religion at Stanford University; the Rev. Thurston N. Davis, S.J., editor of America; the late Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; Dr. Franklin H. Littell, president of Iowa Wesleyan College; Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, professor emeritus of Christian ethics at Union Theological Seminary; James O’Gara, editor of Commonweal; Dr. Daniel Poling, chaplain of the Interfaith Memorial of the Four Chaplains; the Rev. Alexander Schmemann, dean of St. Vladimir’s Russian Orthodox Seminary; the Rev. John B. Sheerin, C.S.P., editor of the Catholic World; Bishop Stephen Gill Spotswood of Washington, D.C.; and Bishop Lloyd C. Wicke, former president of the Methodist Council of Bishops.

In the days before war broke out, a number of Catholic and Protestant clergymen issued individual or joint statements of conscience in support of Israel.20 But the official Christian church establishments remained ambivalent or silent.

Official Church Responses

At its spring business meeting in Boston, June 1-2, the General Board of the National Council of Churches (NCC) adopted a resolution supporting the United Nations peace-keeping functions in the Middle East. After the start of the war, NCC president Arthur S. Flemming sent to President Johnson a telegram of even-handed neutrality, calling for negotiation of all claims through the United Nations, "with particular attention to national and international rights in the Gulf of Aqaba, the rights of Arab refugees, and the recognition by all of the State of Israel."

R. H. Edwin Espy, NCC's Executive Secretary, who spoke at the pro-Israel rally in Washington, D.C., on June 8, was unable to complete his address when news of the cease-fire was announced. His expression of NCC's neutrality was subsequently published to "clarify the situation," that is, to reaffirm NCC's neutrality:

Our hearts are filled with compassion and concern for the people of Israel and of all the Middle East. Our identification is not of course exclusively with any one community, one belligerent, or one set of national aspirations. . Had we been invited to attend a corresponding meeting of the Arab community in the United States we would have been bound by our principles to bring the identical message—the plea for peace with justice and freedom which we derive from our Judeo-Christian heritage. 21

Meanwhile, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a statement June 8, deploring the war and designating June 11 as a day of special prayer for peace. It was a masterpiece of abstract rhetoric, expressing no more than the bishops' support of Pope Paul's "fervent hope that the United Nations organization will be successful in halting the conflict."

On July 7 the NCC executive committee met in special session to consider the Middle East crisis. It adopted a six-point resolution, sounding deliberately neutral, yet unmistakably pro-Arab. The statement sharply criticized Israel's "territorial expansion by armed force" and "unilateral retention" of occupied lands. It declared that "acceptance by the international community" of the State of Israel was indispensable to peace. As for the Arab refugees, Israel must accept "significant responsibility for solving the refugee problem." NCC specifically expressed its disapproval of Israel's "unilateral annexation of the Jordanian portion of Jerusalem," and declared its support for "the establishment of an international presence" in the city. Its final section, "Reconciliation and Reconstruction," called for a variety of cooperative economic and development projects and, almost casually, endorsed "free trade and with it free access to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal by all countries in the area." 22

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Representing some forty Protestant denominations and ten Orthodox churches, NCC may have had difficulty obtaining unanimity on so complex an issue from so diverse a group with a wide variety of specific interests. Perhaps one reason the NCC statement was so unfeeling with regard to Israel's survival and so carping in its criticism of Israel was that many of its member bodies have vested interests in the Middle East. Most have had active missionary programs for well over fifty years and have established in the area schools, hospitals, institutional homes, missions, and churches. Many own land and other properties. Besides, their close associations with the Arabs over many decades have made Protestant missionaries deeply sympathetic with the Arab cause. Late in June NCC set up a 40-member emergency task force for relief and welfare in the Middle East and most denominations developed their own programs.23

Jewish Disappointment, Christian Resentment

Following Israel's military victory, Jewish religious leaders began to criticize the "organized Christian Church" for having failed to speak out more vigorously when Israel's existence was imperiled. Because Jewish-Christian relations had been exceptionally open and sincere in recent years, as interreligious dialogue had become a channel for intergroup understanding, Jews may have had unrealistically high expectations of Christians, believing that Christians identified with them and shared their outlook.

At the annual meeting of the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), June 22, Rabbi Balfour Brickner, director of its Commission on Interfaith Activities, charged that by failing to support the integrity of Israel, the "Christian establishment" had failed not only Jews, but also "the cause of world peace." Conceding there were notable individual exceptions among Christian clergy, he said the "organized Church seemed unable to take a strong stand on what it considered to be a political issue," though "the survival of the Jewish people [was] not a political issue."

Rabbi Pesach Z. Levovitz, president of the Rabbinical Council of America (RCA), speaking at its annual meeting on June 26, called for a cessation of interfaith discussions until Christian leadership supported the territorial and political integrity of Israel in the Middle East. He expressed deep disappointment over the failure "of major segments of the world and American Christian communities to raise their voices in defense of Israel when before the outbreak of hostilities President Nasser of Egypt was threatening the annihilation of its more than two million Jews."

Some Christian leaders responded angrily to these charges. Msgr. George G. Higgins, secretary to the Commission for Catholic-Jewish Relations of the

23 For details, see Banki, op. cit., pp. 10–12.
Bishops' Committee for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs, charged that the rabbis' "criticism of the Catholic Church in the United States, whether they realize it or not, is a form of ecumenical or interreligious blackmail."

A savage response to the rabbis came from Henry P. Van Dusen, a past president of Union Theological Seminary, in a letter to the New York Times, July 7:

All persons who seek to view the Middle East problem with honesty and objectivity stand aghast at Israel's onslaught, the most violent, ruthless (and successful) aggression since Hitler's blitzkrieg across Western Europe in the summer of 1940, aiming not at victory but at annihilation—the very objective proclaimed by Nasser and his allies which had drawn support to Israel.

Van Dusen condemned Israel for having "consistently refused collaboration with the U.N. in maintaining peace," and for her "callous indifference" to the Arab refugees and for her "appropriation" of "Arab homeland."

The letter shocked many Christian and Jewish readers for its comparison of Jews with Nazis. The Rev. A. Roy Eckardt, a Methodist minister, chairman of the department of religion at Lehigh University, and editor of the Journal of the American Academy of Religion, replied (New York Times, July 13). Addressing himself to Van Dusen's Nazi-Israeli parallel, which he called a sin, Eckardt declared that "the entire Christian community must stand appalled at this unredeemed act of calumny by one of its erstwhile leaders."

The Christian Century, interdenominational Protestant weekly, which for the last twenty years has been pro-Arab more frequently than neutral in the Arab-Israel conflict, completely failed to understand what the discussion was all about. In an editorial, "Israel and the Christian Dilemma" (July 12), the journal self-righteously defended its position of neutrality:

We could not permit our awareness of the perilous state of world peace to be blotted out by strong sympathy for Israel in the present crisis. Nor can we understand those Christian spokesmen who have permitted this to happen. We have read their explanations, but we do not understand nor do we indulge in the rationalistic gymnastics engaged in by Christian leaders who, having worked hard to get U. S. military power out of Vietnam, insist that the power of the United States be unleashed in the Middle East on the side of Israel. With what amazing speed and dexterity, what involuted rationalizations, these sometime doves flew into a telephone booth and emerged as hawks.

The Meaning of Jerusalem

Another reason for Jewish disappointment was the consistently political approach of Christians toward Jerusalem and its reunification. In late June Pope Paul proposed that Jerusalem and its religious shrines be placed under international control to insure their safety and the right of access by members of all faiths. He was supported by the head of the Orthodox Church in Greece and by the Standing Conference of Orthodox Bishops in the Amer-
icas. Protestant leaders of both NCC and the World Council of Churches also favored internationalization.

Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum, national director of the interreligious affairs department of the American Jewish Committee, addressing the Religious Newswriters Association at their annual meeting in early July, claimed that the pressure for internationalizing Jerusalem intensified the politicalization of Middle East problems and failed to take account of the overwhelming role of Jerusalem in Jewish religious experience. Rabbi Brickner explained that, in Judaism, Jerusalem represented the "quintessence and summation of nearly 4,000 years of identity and ethnic being." Was it any wonder, he asked, that Jews throughout the world were "reluctant if not downright unwilling to see Israel yield one inch of that city, a city the destruction of which they carefully avoided during the recent war at the cost of many young Israeli lives." 24

Though the official Christian establishments failed to perceive the centrality of Jerusalem to Jews, some individual Christians did. Sixteen eminent Protestant theologians signed a statement, "Jerusalem Should Remain Unified," that appeared in the New York Times, July 12. The statement grounded its support of a unified Jerusalem under Israel's control on Christian acknowledgment that Judaism "presupposes inextricable ties with the land of Israel and the City of David, without which Judaism cannot be truly itself. Theologically, it is this dimension to the religion of Judaism which leads us to support the reunification of the city of Jerusalem."

Christian Self-criticism

The bitter exchanges between Jews and Christians, and within the Christian community, initiated a process of self-examination among Christians of their attitudes toward Jews, and their understanding of Israel and its meaning to Jews. Thus, an editorial in the Methodist journal Concern (July 1-15) declared:

While Christians may not be able to participate existentially in the community that is Judaism, they must be able to understand what that community means to Jews. And Jews must be able to understand that Christians are never going to allow genocide of the Jews to mar human history again, even though they may not see eye to eye on Middle Eastern issues.

The Rev. A. Roy Eckardt and Mrs. Alice L. Eckardt in two articles subsumed under the title, "Again, Silence in the Churches," addressed themselves to the underlying reasons for Christian silence and indifference to the plight of Israel. The first article ("The Case for Israel," Christian Century, July 26) concluded that in sum "the overwhelming moral force of the case for Israel makes it impossible even to explain or justify the new silence of

the churches through the contention that the evidence is either lacking or equivocal.”

In the second article (“Christian and Arab Ideology,” loc. cit., August 2), the Eckardts suggested that the pathological collective unconscious of Christendom had come to the surface:

Whenever original Israel is assailed, certain suppressed, macabre elements in the Christian soul are stirred to sympathy with the assailants. It is difficult to account in any other way for the vehemence and mendacity of some of the current Christian attacks upon Israel.

Quoting from Karl Barth that “in order to be chosen we must, for good or ill, either be Jews or else be heart and soul on the side of the Jews,” the Eckardts concluded:

It almost seems that the entire history of Christianity, including the churches’ current response to the Middle Eastern crisis, has been an attempt to make Barth's words as irrelevant as is humanly possible. Writing as Christians who oppose that attempt, we say to our Jewish brothers: We too have been shocked by the new silence. And we are greatly saddened. But we have not been surprised. The causes of the silence lie deep in the Christian soul. Therefore we can only mourn and pray and hope.

Another thoughtful analysis of the Christian response to Israel’s crisis was written by Dr. Elwyn A. Smith, professor of religion at Temple University (“Did the June War Damage Jewish-Christian Dialogue?” Journal of Ecumenical Studies, Fall, 1967). Dr. Smith asserted that the American Christian response was in the main secular rather than religious, since, in his view, Christian liberals grasped “ancient but not contemporary Jewish reality.” The shift of sympathy among Christians to the Arabs by the end of June, Professor Smith wrote, “exposed the secular character of the liberal Jewish-Christian coalition. Only a theological sense of sacredness of Israel could rejoice in a great victory for God’s people and sing his praises, even if muted by the tragedy of the deaths of so many.” The “sharp collision between American Christianity and the American Jewish community” was, he concluded, evidence of inadequacy in fundamental understanding; liberal theology, which had contributed much to the causes of civil liberty and church cooperation, was not adequate to the new ecumenism after Vatican II.

Jewish Reevaluation of Dialogue

The cool Christian response to Israel’s crisis stimulated spirited discussion among Jews about the value and/or adequacy of Christian-Jewish dialogue. Many rabbis held that the crisis had revealed great lacunae in Christian understanding, but concluded that dialogue should be continued, not halted, in an effort to improve Christian-Jewish communication. Thus, Rabbi Tanenbaum concluded (“Israel’s Hour of Need and the Jewish-Christian Dialogue,” Conservative Judaism, Winter, 1968) that the rabbis and Jewish teachers had
not sufficiently clarified for Christians the fundamental meaning of Israel to the Jewish people, and that they therefore had before them “a great task of intellectual clarification, and of communication.”

Jacob Neusner, professor of religion at Brown University (“Communications,” Judaism, Summer 1967, p. 363) chided Christian leaders who remained silent because they held that “Israel-Arab relationships constitute a political issue,” though “our support has been solicited by these same people in other issues, such as Vietnam, race relations, and the like which are no less political.” Neusner felt that “the middle ground of religious and theological conversation has been closed by the massive indifference and, I think, craven silence of those from whom some of us hoped for better things.” In his view, “the way forward is likely to lead away from interreligious conversations and cooperation, except in secular, humanitarian ventures . and in scholarly inquiries into historical, literary, and philosophical issues. ”

Rabbi David Polish of Beth Emet, the Free Synagogue, Evanston, Ill., took the view (“Why American Jews Are Disillusioned,” Christian Century, July 26, 1967) that in the light of the Christian “moral failure, the much-touted Christian-Jewish dialogue is revealed as fragile and superficial.” The Jews, he felt, would have to stop instigating dialogue and wait for a true initiative from the Christian side. He concluded, nevertheless, that this should not necessarily mean the end of dialogue, but rather its reexamination. Malcolm L. Diamond, associate professor of religion at Princeton University, analyzed (“Christian Silence on Israel: An End to Dialogue?” Judaism, Fall, 1967) the underlying difference in historical experience that accounted for the variance in Jewish and Christian responses to the June war. He concluded that new developments in theological discussion could provide a more meaningful basis for dialogue than secularist preconditions, though dialogue could be expected to yield only “limited gains in intellectual cooperation and illumination.”

Rabbi Richard L. Rubenstein, director of the B’nai B’rith Hillel Foundation in Pittsburgh, differed from other rabbis in regarding the crisis not in moral terms, but in the perspective of interest and power (“Did Christians Fail Israel?” Commonweal, December 1, 1967). He thought the rabbis were “profoundly mistaken” in their anger at Christian coolness, for Christians ought not to be expected to share Jewish interests. Yet he, too, felt that recent events demonstrated “the greater need for forthright Judaeo-Christian dialogue.”

RESPONSES ON THE LEFT

The old political mythology that the left is hospitable to Jews or, at the very least, anti-antisemitic, was once again revealed as delusory during Israel’s crisis. Many leftists were too committed to their political ideologies to respond to political realities. One leftist journalist described this as “politics
by deference”: “The traditionalist Communists deferred to Moscow; the militant Communists deferred to Peking; the non-Communist leftists deferred to the Third World; and many a Jewish leftist simply deferred to the Arabs.”

Like Caesar’s Gaul, the Left (recently) has been divided into three parts: (1) the democratic independent Left, including the Socialist party and small groups associated with Dissent and New Politics; (2) the nihilistic, anarchistic, or individualistic Left, usually categorized as “New Left,” whose groups mostly align themselves with the so-called Third World; and (3) the totalitarian Left, consisting of the Communist Party, U.S.A. (CPUSA), whose loyalty is to the Soviet Union, and its schismatic spinoff, the Progressive Labor party (PLP), which supports Communist China. Somewhere along this continuum are the black nationalist groups, particularly the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), whose loyalties are sometimes with the Third World and sometimes with Communist China.

Israel and Vietnam

The only issue uniting these diverse leftist groups has been their opposition to America’s involvement in the war in Vietnam. The Israel crisis shattered that agreement. One observer, himself active in the New Left, remarked:

It is precisely because so many of the Left rank-and-file feel both existential and rational ties to the people of Israel, while the radical ideologues at the top are in almost complete sympathy with the politics of Israel’s enemies, that there have developed within every part of the peace and rights constituency fissures shattering the fragile unities cemented by the war in Vietnam.

The fact that many liberals and some leftists appeared to be asking the American government to do in the Middle East what they wanted it to stop doing in Vietnam, threatened the peace movement. The historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., refused to sign a public appeal for American support of Israel (New York Times, June 7, 1967) because he thought it was inconsistent to favor unilateral intervention in one part of the world, while opposing it in another. (Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith and poet Robert Lowell also declined to sign that statement, Lowell because he opposed all wars.)

Just as nationalism and national loyalties had torn apart and paralyzed the Second Socialist International on the eve of World War I, so nationality—in this case, Jewishness and identification with Israel—bitterly divided the Left and the critics of the war in Vietnam. Penn Kemble, chairman of the Young People’s Socialist League, expressed this concern (“Crisis Splits New Left,” New America, June 18):

If the New Left loses the substantial support it once had among the Jews as a result of the Middle East crisis, it might well be a decisive blow.

There are already some elements in the Jewish community who have begun to argue that if the Jews want the United States to help Israel they had better not rock the boat. This means, above all, keeping quiet about Vietnam.

It would be tragic if disillusionment with New Left slogans and a desire to gain U.S. support for Israel were to lead anyone into acceptance of our present Vietnam policy.

Policy-makers of leftist groups and editors of their journals were divided; every journal had to give space to the opinion of whichever side dissented. A moving statement on behalf of Israel, which also tried to clarify the differences between Israel and Vietnam, appeared in the independent socialist journal *Dissent*:

At one point, shortly before the war broke out in the Mideast, it seemed that the very survival of Israel was at stake.

In these circumstances, our first reaction was concern for the survival of Israel. We are not Zionists; or Jewish nationalists; or by any means uncritical of the State of Israel. But we believe that the destruction of Israel, coming after the holocaust of this century, would be intolerable. For it is a simple fact of geography that in a war an Israeli victory would not threaten the survival of Egypt or Syria while an Arab victory could easily signify the end of Israel. And that is why, at the moment of crisis in early June, we hoped that the United States would take a stand in behalf of Israeli sovereignty and her right to innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba.

The editors, defensive about ironical criticism that the Middle East crisis turned them into "doves for war," concluded by contrasting Israel and Vietnam:

Judging the war in Vietnam to be reactionary, we oppose U.S. policy there. But that is surely no reason to claim that this binds us to a policy of inflexible abstentionism in other circumstances. It is all a matter of where, in what way, toward what end, and within what limits. Our hope therefore is that the Mideast crisis will in no way diminish opposition to the Vietnam war.27

Theodor Draper, professor of history at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and a signer of the public appeal in support of Israel, took sharp issue with the underlying assumption of the "doves for war" criticism—that "one must be all hawk or all dove in the United States foreign policy, and there is only one touchstone to determine which one it is—Vietnam." Draper called that a "dangerous and pernicious doctrine." If the Vietnam war were "to become the one determining factor in United States foreign policy halfway across the globe in totally different circumstances," he said, "the result must be war everywhere or paralysis everywhere." He saw "no inherent reason why one cannot criticize the abuse of power in Vietnam and the abdication of power elsewhere." 28


Several thoughtful analyses of leftist rationalizations and perversities were published. Robert Alter dissected the attitudes among leftist intellectuals, particularly "the more self-consciously assimilated and militantly 'progressive' segments of the American Jewish intelligentsia." Some of these less doctrinaire and more reasonable leftists appeared to concede that Israel's existence was actually threatened by the Arabs. But, after Israel's decisive military victory, they came to see the Jewish state as "a breeding-ground of chauvinism and brutal militarism, a callous victimizer of its vulnerable neighbors." This image of a bellicose Israel, according to Alter, was the more readily acceptable to leftists because it fitted so neatly into "a popular New Left mythology of world politics in which the nations are divided into sinister superpowers and innocent, freedom-loving peoples of the Third World."

The Totalitarian Left

In the pro-Russian Communist Party, U.S.A., too, divisions occurred over the Middle East crisis. Some Jews found the party's ideology too much at variance with their feelings of Jewish solidarity at a time of grave danger.

The CPUSA supported Moscow's position on the Israel-Arab conflict. Hyman Lumer, CPUSA's national educational director and associate editor of its theoretical journal, Political Affairs, expounded the party line ("The Middle East Crisis," Political Affairs, July 1967, pp. 1-16). (Lumer is frequently used as Jewish apologist for the party's anti-Jewish positions: he also authored "Soviet Anti-Semitism"—A Cold-War Myth.) He described the Middle East conflict, in traditional Communist terms, as a conflict "between U.S. and British imperialism on one side and the peoples of the Middle East, both Jewish and Arab, on the other," and the issue, he said, was oil. Israel, by threatening an attack on Syria, had forfeited its right of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, and, besides, the blockade was not a serious blow against its economy. As for the Soviet Union, Lumer reasoned that its condemnation of Israel was a service in the cause of peace.

When accused of being anti-Jewish or anti-Israel by some of its own (Jewish) members, the CPUSA defended itself by quoting corroborative statements from the Communist party of Israel. But, back in 1965, the Israeli Communist party had split into two factions, each claiming to be the authentic Communist party. The split was essentially ethnic, though it appeared to be ideological. One faction, headed by Shmuel Mikunis and Moshe Sneh, was Jewish; the other, headed by Meir Vilner and Toufiq Toubi, was Arab. Until the June war, Moscow had permitted both factions to coexist, but favored the Arab group.

That division of the Communist party in Israel proved useful to Communists in the United States. The Worker published statements by the Arab faction (seldom identified as such), while the Communist Yiddish-language daily,

Morning Freiheit, published statements by the Israeli party's Jewish faction. Thus, on August 6, Gus Hall, CPUSA general secretary, sent a letter of solidarity and support to the Arab faction of the Israeli Communist party, enclosing $300 "collected by and from Jewish garment workers in New York as a tribute to your courage and militancy and for your correct Communist stand."

The Morning Freiheit, responsive to the feelings of its Jewish readers supported Israel, but did so by taking cover behind the Jewish faction of the Israeli Communist party. An editorial, "Israel Must Not Become Another Vietnam," (May 26) condemned Egypt, Syria, and the other Arab nations for their "attempt to strangle Israel." The Freiheit even dared to criticize Russia for comparing Israel to the Nazis ("Time to Stop Crying 'Nazis'," July 9):

How can anyone, and particularly representatives of the great Soviet land, the land of Lenin, bring themselves to cry "Nazis" at the fighters of Israel's army who repelled the attempt to drive the Jews of Israel into the sea?

Reports of defection from CPUSA of Jewish members circulated. No one knew how many left. It was also reported that CPUSA had liquidated its Jewish Commission because it was divided over the party's critical attitude towards Israel and Moscow's support of the Arabs.30

Challenge, organ of the Progressive Labor party, Maoist faction in the United States, published a series of wildly irresponsible articles against Israel, based on lurid Arab propaganda. One such article ("Zionists Betray Oppressed Arab and Jew Both," Challenge, July 1967) charged:

Just as the Israeli leaders who betrayed millions of Jews to the Nazi executers now pose as humanitarians and saviors of the oppressed Jews, so they proclaim to the world their desire to live in peace with the Arabs, while arming themselves to the teeth and grabbing more and more land from the Arabs.

The Nihilists

The radical black nationalists and their white supporters outdid Russia, China, and most of the Third World in attacking Israel. SNCC's June-July Newsletter, parroting the crudest Arab propaganda and the oldest anti-semitic canards, accused Jews of committing atrocities against Arabs. Several antisemitic cartoons accompanied the text, one depicting General Moshe Dayan with dollar signs on his epaulets, another showing a hand marked with a Star of David and a dollar sign, tightening a rope around Nasser's neck and Mohammed Ali (Cassius Clay, the heavyweight boxer).

The same black-nationalist, antisemitic radicalism agitated the National Conference of New Politics, meeting Labor Day weekended in Chicago. The "Black Caucus" (a minority of Negro delegates which had bullied the white majority into yielding to them 50 per cent of the conference votes) had in-

sisted on a resolution condemning "the imperialistic Zionist war." Efforts to soften the resolution by recognizing Israel's right to survival failed to win approval. This development caused a serious rupture, several influential Jewish leftists walking out of the conference and, subsequently, severing their connections with New Left groups.

Lucy S. Dawidowicz