

Review
of the
Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES

Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States

IN 1966 intergroup relations showed marked variations. The areas in which discrimination against Jews was manifested became fewer. Overt antisemitism was rare, despite disquieting incidents and portentous possibilities. There were few signs of organized antisemitism. Several important studies probing antisemitism and anti-Jewish attitudes were published during the year. The relative tranquility of the Jewish situation contrasted sharply to that of Negroes. Their accelerated drive for civil rights, marked by violence and counterviolence, exacerbated Negro-white tensions, especially in the period preceding the November elections. Relations between Negroes and Jews grew noticeably acrimonious. Interreligious relations, principally between Catholics and Jews, which had been improving as a consequence of the ecumenical movement among all religious groups, suffered a setback because of tensions generated by explosive differences over church-state issues.

ANTISEMITISM

The constant preoccupation of American Jews with discrimination and antisemitism often appeared neurotic and obsessive to non-Jews. They saw Jews as mainly well-to-do, highly educated, and standing relatively high in socio-economic status and occupational rank.¹ Nevertheless, Jews themselves believed that in the perspective of Jewish history and with the memory of the annihilation of six million European Jews still painfully alive, their concern with antisemitism was rational and precautionous. The immensity of the United States and the diversity of its people made it possible for the country to harbor simultaneously contradictory and antithetical attitudes of acceptance

Note: I wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Mrs. Lotte Zajac, of AJC's Clipping Service, in the preparation of this review.

¹ The most recent socio-economic data comparing Jews, Protestants, and Catholics, appear in Norval D. Glenn and Ruth Hyland, "Religious Preference and Worldly Success: Some Evidence from National Surveys," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (1967), pp 73-85.

and rejection, of tolerance and hostility towards Jews. This coexistence of good and bad, this ambiguity reinforced Jewish feelings of insecurity and intensified the desire among Jews to fathom the mysteries of non-Jewish attitudes towards them.

Executive-Suite Discrimination

The extent to which Jews have been accepted in the United States was dramatically evident in the access they gained to institutions and occupations that in earlier times were barred to them. Quotas restricting the enrolment of Jewish students at prestige schools, colleges, and universities became curiosities of the past. Jews were occasionally excluded from living in some upper-class communities dominated by America's untitled Protestant aristocracy, and seldom had entrée to the social clubs of this elite group; but in most other places they were accepted. In employment, most barriers have fallen, even in fields once closed to Jews. This change was effected partly by the greater tolerance in American society, and partly by the changing character of the American economy in which more people were now employed in service industries than in manufacturing. The explosion of the knowledge and information industry pushed open occupational doors previously closed to Jews as, for instance, in publishing and in the universities.

Yet the employment of Jews in managerial and executive positions in various fields of business and industry lagged. The American Jewish Committee and, subsequently, other Jewish organizations undertook programs to combat this type of anti-Jewish discrimination. By 1966 these efforts had already achieved some success.

Early in 1966 federal agencies began a quiet campaign against religious discrimination in executive positions in insurance companies in response to a complaint filed in 1965 by the American Jewish Committee with Labor Secretary W. Willard Wirtz. The Social Security Administration, in its relations with insurance companies selected to distribute Medicare funds, also began to require the same compliance procedures with regard to religious affiliation, as for race, color, and national origin.

On May 14, 1966 the AJCommittee released a study showing that, though Jews made up 10–12 per cent of the student bodies and faculties at 775 non-sectarian senior colleges and universities, fewer than one per cent of the presidents of these institutions were Jewish.² The study concluded that, in the absence of any other conclusive factor, bias was at work. It showed that almost a generation had elapsed since Jews in significant numbers had begun to attain full professorships—the rank from which deans and college presidents were chosen. Hence, the earlier exclusion of Jews from faculties and the ensuing time lag did not sufficiently explain the paucity of Jews among top college and university administrators.

² The American Jewish Committee, *Jews in College and University Administration* (New York: Institute of Human Relations, May 1966), 9 pp. (Processed.)

Another American Jewish Committee study, released September 1, 1966, investigated the virtual absence of Jews from executive positions in America's 50 leading commercial banks.³ According to the study, 45 of these banks had no Jewish senior officers; four banks had one each, and one bank had four Jewish senior officers. The study further identified only 32 Jews out of 3,438 executives in the middle-management level. Therefore the conclusion was inescapable that bias was one of the factors at work in keeping Jews from policy-making positions in commercial banks. The study was made public a few days after the United States Treasury Department announced that approximately 95 per cent of the nation's 15,000 commercial banks would be considered government contractors under federal fair-employment regulations to go into effect November 30, 1966 and, as such, would be required not to discriminate in their hiring policies for reasons of race, color, creed, or national origin.

Discrimination against Jews in executive posts in New York City commercial banks was regarded as particularly extreme. Nine of the 50 banks under study were in New York, and in these only one of 173 senior officers and only nine of 927 middle-management executives were identified as Jewish. Reacting to the study's findings, New York City Finance Administrator Roy M. Goodman proposed on the WNBC-TV "Direct Line" program on September 4 that the city withhold the millions of dollars of city funds from deposit in commercial banks found to be practicing discrimination. On September 24 two New York City council members announced that they would introduce in the city council a proposal to amend section 421 of the city charter. Hearings on the bill were held in November, but no action was taken by the council.

The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) announced in October that it would work jointly with the Bell Telephone System to end the "under-utilization of Jews" in the company's executive and managerial positions. The plan involved ADL participation in Bell's recruitment programs, "educating its recruitment staff to the best potential available among Jewish college students."

On October 26 John R. Bunting, Jr., executive vice-president of the First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Company, announced at a meeting of AJCommittee's Philadelphia chapter that his bank, the largest in that city and the nineteenth largest in the country, was actively looking for Jewish applicants who might eventually qualify for top positions.⁴

New York City's 50 mutual-savings banks were the subject of a follow-up review by AJCommittee's New York chapter, released October 30. This review charged that a year after the publication of the original study showing *de facto* discrimination against Jews in their executive posts, the mutual-sav-

³ The American Jewish Committee, *Patterns of Exclusion from the Executive Suite: Commercial Banking* (New York: Institute of Human Relations, August 1966), 12 pp. (Processed.)

⁴ Frederick C. Klein, "Jews and Jobs: Religious Groups Push to Get Firms to Hire Jewish Executives," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 26, 1966.

ings banks had increased the number of their Jewish trustees, but the number of their Jewish executive officers remained substantially the same.

A quite different area of executive-suite discrimination receiving public attention in 1966 was top administration of art museums. A leading publication in the field editorialized:

Because most American museums were founded by Old Money—the town's country-club set, established bankers, merchants, landlords—their boards of trustees retain a distinctive coloration chiefly marked by a suspicion of—let's say, snobbishness to—the New Rich. Which suggests a reason for one of the more curious anomalies in the museum world: its anti-semitism—the most widely known, unspoken fact in the field.⁵

Surveys and Studies of Antisemitism

A survey of religion in the United States and of attitudes of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews towards each other, conducted by George Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion in 1966 on behalf of the *Catholic Digest*, revealed considerable distrust among the religious groups for one another.⁶ In the main, more Protestants than Catholics thought ill of Jews or expressed hostility to them. Only 70 per cent of Protestants thought Jews were as loyal to the United States as they, or more loyal, compared to 85 per cent of Catholics. Only 74 per cent of Protestants said they would just as soon live next to Jews, compared to 88 per cent of Catholics. Only 51 per cent of Protestants said they would vote for a Jew as president, compared to 83 per cent of Catholics. Unreciprocally, Jews were far more distrustful of, and hostile to, Catholics than they were to Protestants.

A sample survey of Lutheran youth in St. Louis and Detroit showed that 20.3 per cent felt Jewish businessmen to be not as honest as other businessmen.⁷ No appreciable difference in attitude was evident between young Lutherans who had received all their education in Lutheran parochial schools and those who had attended public schools.

Two surveys of Catholic parochial-school students exposed considerable anti-Jewish bias, though the surveyors could not determine whether home, school, church, society, or a combination of these shaped or encouraged that bias.⁸ The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) study found that

5 T. B. H., "Notes on American Museums," *Art News*, November 1966, p. 27.

6 Published in monthly instalments beginning June 1966, and continuing well into 1967. Four articles dealt with intergroup attitudes: "Who is Loyal?" (August 1966); "What We Think of Each Other" (November 1966); "Do Americans Get Along Together?" (February 1967); and "Religion in American Politics" (April 1967).

7 Ronald L. Johnstone, *The Effectiveness of Lutheran Elementary and Secondary Schools as Agencies of Christian Education: An Empirical Evaluation Study of the Impact of Lutheran Parochial Schools on the Beliefs, Attitudes, and Behavior of Lutheran Youth* (St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Seminary, School for Graduate Studies, 1966), 188 pp. Only this one question probed attitudes towards Jews.

8 Andrew M. Greeley and Peter H. Rossi, *The Education of Catholic Americans* (Chicago, 1966), xxii, 368 pp. (National Opinion Research Center monograph in social research, No. 6.) See especially pp. 121-137.

Reginald A. Neuwien, ed., *Catholic Schools in Action: A Report: The Notre Dame Study of Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools in the United States* (Notre Dame, Ind., and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), xv, 328 pp. See especially pp. 189-201.

only 40–45 per cent of parochial students expressed tolerant attitudes towards Jews, but that public-school Catholics were even less tolerant. The Notre Dame study, based on a questionnaire administered to parochial-school students, found that only 47 per cent of their respondents disagreed with the statement that “there is something strange and different about Jews; it is hard to know what they are thinking or planning, or what makes them tick.” The study disclosed also that persons of high social class and high education had less bias toward both Jews and Negroes than those of low social class and low education.

In April *Christan Beliefs and Anti-Semitism* by Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark (Harper & Row, xxi, 266, 24 pp.), the first book in a series of studies on prejudice and antisemitism, sponsored by ADL and produced by the University of California Survey Research Center, appeared. This study was based on responses of a random sample of nearly 3,000 North California church members, who filled out a questionnaire about their religious beliefs, reinforced by nearly 2,000 interviews, representing a modified random sample of the national adult population, which asked about some of the more important items in the written questionnaire. The study concluded that 25 to nearly 50 per cent of the respondents held hostile religious images of modern Jews, regarding them as Christ-killers, beyond salvation, and in need of conversion to Christianity. While these views were rather uncommon among more liberal Protestant groups, they were almost unanimously held among more conservative Protestant groups like Missouri Synod Lutherans and Southern Baptists. The authors concluded that religious hostility toward the modern Jew provided the link between religious dogmatism and antisemitism, that the “contemptuous religious image of Jews predisposes Christians to embrace a purely secular variety of antisemitism as well.”

A second ADL-sponsored study analyzed the public response to the Eichmann trial. In 1961, when the Eichmann trial was nearly over, 436 persons in Oakland, Cal., (a representative sample) were interviewed about their familiarity with the trial and their attitudes towards Jews.⁹ The findings were inconclusive: “Anti-Semitism seemed to play no role in determining respondents’ over-all evaluations of the trial.” The investigators found, however, that only 36 per cent of the white respondents knew the official estimate of the number of Jews killed by the German (six million), and that only about half of these regarded that estimate as valid. The authors concluded that antisemitism in some way accounted for the rejection of that particular item of knowledge, among both informed and uninformed alike.

The AJCommittee sponsored a two-part study on antisemitism in the United States, entitled *Jews in the Mind of America* (New York, 1966; xiv, 413 pp.). The first part, by Charles Herbert Stember, analyzed public-opinion polls from 1937 to 1962 that directly or indirectly probed attitudes towards Jews. The second part consisted of papers presented at a conference of social

⁹ Charles Y. Glock, Gertrude J. Selznick, Joe L. Spaeth, *The Apathetic Majority* (New York, 1966), xii, 222 pp.

scientists to discuss Stember's findings and a summary of the conference proceedings. From his analysis of the polls Stember concluded that "anti-Semitism in all its forms massively declined in the United States between the prewar or war years and the early 1960s." However, conference participants were reluctant to accept at their surface level these public-opinion findings of a 25-year period, in the light of the 2000-year persistence of antisemitism in the Western world and of the historic tensions between Jews and gentiles. Thomas F. O'Dea, professor of sociology in the department of religion at Columbia University, asserted that the poll findings represented merely a temporary lull in the long history of antisemitism, a lull characteristic also for past periods in European history, and that the possibility of renewed antisemitism still lurked in the background. Ben Halpern, associate professor of Near Eastern and Judaic studies at Brandeis University, expressed the view that the striking changes in attitudes, as registered in the polls, reflected not the prevalence of antisemitism, but rather its lack of respectability. Halpern advanced the concept of the perennial "hostility-tolerance syndrome" which determined the conditions of Jewish existence. Viewed in this historical perspective, the situation of Jews in America, however unique it has appeared in comparison to European Jewish history, remained, according to Halpern, "confined within the traditional framework of ambivalence between anti-Semitism and toleration."

Vandalism and Violence

No reliable estimate of the extent of antisemitic vandalism and violence could be made, partly because the data were imprecise and insufficient, and the social and psychological factors involved were often obscure. From time to time, most public, identifiably Jewish institutions have been defaced; synagogues and other Jewish buildings have been smeared with anti-Jewish and obscene slogans. Only a very small proportion were reported to the police or publicized since they were generally regarded as trivial and yet also inevitable and, except when repeated persistently, aroused relatively little anxiety. Year after year, vigilant Jewish organizations reported that there was no evidence to indicate the existence of an organized antisemitic conspiracy behind these incidents, which were attributed to "crackpots," "nuts," the mentally unstable, and to irresponsible and/or delinquent teenagers bent on "kicks."

Vandalism was presumed to fall into two categories: (1) vindictive antisemitic vandalism, usually perpetrated by organized youth gangs, and (2) wanton vandalism, more likely committed by less closely knit groups, usually neighborhood cliques.¹⁰ The perpetrators were seldom found. Property damage was generally insubstantial and seldom commensurate with the police work required to track down the offenders.

¹⁰ Ann G. Wolfe, *Why the Swastika?: A Study of Young American Vandals* (New York: Institute of Human Relations Press, 1962), 39 pp.

A list of some of the antisemitic incidents reported in the press in 1966 showed the usual pattern.

January: Swastikas and antisemitic slogans were painted on the Liberty Jewish Center in Baltimore, Md.

March: Fires were set to three synagogues and two hospitals under Jewish auspices in Chicago, Ill.; antisemitic slogans were smeared on the walls of the Chizuk Amuno synagogue in Baltimore, Md.

April: Garages and automobiles were smeared with swastikas and obscene antisemitic slogans in Oak Park, a predominantly Jewish suburb of Detroit, Mich.; vandals damaged a menorah on the outside wall of Congregation B'nai Jacob in Jersey City, N.J.

May: The homes of two Jewish refugees from Germany, the only Jews in a rural area north of Utica, N.Y., were daubed with swastikas and Nazi slogans; vandals set fire to Congregation Beth Israel in the East Flatbush section of Brooklyn, N.Y.

June: A Jewish War Veterans post in Queens, N.Y., was stoned and smeared with swastikas; vandals desecrated the Blue Hill Shul in Boston, Mass., and then assaulted a synagogue official who came upon them; the Petah Tikvah synagogue and the building of the Independent Order Brith Sholom in Baltimore were defaced with antisemitic and obscene inscriptions and burglarized.

July: For the second time in six months, the Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Somers, N.Y., was desecrated and defaced with swastikas and obscene antisemitic slogans.

August: The Young Israel Shomrai Emunah synagogue in Hyattsville, Md., was vandalized four times in a five-day period; four teenagers were arrested for defacing and painting swastikas on Congregation Beth Sholom synagogue in Teaneck, N.J.

October: Vandals set small fires in the Beth Israel synagogue in Vineland, N.J., and scrawled swastikas and antisemitic slogans on its walls.

November: For two months the hasidic Vurka synagogue in the Flatbush-Borough Park area of Brooklyn, N.Y., was stoned and vandalized.

Antisemitism for "Kicks"

The increasing restiveness among youth and the accelerated craving for "kicks" appeared to have had an impact on anti-Jewish vandalism of a more serious nature. On January 25 Thomas Alfred Ruppert, a 17-year-old Youth Corps enrollee, was arrested and accused of having set fire, on December 20, 1965, to the Yonkers Jewish Community Center in which nine children and three adults were burned to death. Ruppert confessed having started the fire for a thrill. On May 19 he was indicted for murder and arson by a Westchester county grand jury.

The quest for "kicks," multiplying violence, vandalism, as well as anti-semitism, has been received in some quarters with permissiveness and unex-

pected tolerance. Riots, violence, and looting among Negroes have been condoned, and even praised, by some segments of the civil-rights movement as liberating expressions of selfhood. Elsewhere, the sit-ins, lie-ins, and demonstrations characteristic of leftist-student movements have been justified as exercises of liberty. Violence and lawlessness among lower-class whites—motorcycle gangs, for example—have been analyzed, and even romanticized, as an escape from the boredom and emptiness of their lives. Antisemitism has been a perceived factor among some of these groups; others have exploited antisemitism as a perverse amusement.

George Lincoln Rockwell, founder and leader of the American Nazi party, who has called for the mass-murder of the Jews and whom New York's former mayor, Robert F. Wagner, once characterized as a "half-penny Hitler," continued to accept invitations from college students to address ("entertain" and "instruct") campus groups. In 1966 Rockwell's college tour included Rice University, Houston, Tex.; Columbia University, New York City (where he was arrested on an old charge before he could speak); New Mexico Highlands University, Las Vegas, N.M.; Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.; Brown University, Providence, R.I.; Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.; and New York State University College, Oneonta, N.Y. (He had been invited to speak at several other colleges, but the invitations were subsequently canceled.)

For about five years, Rockwell has enjoyed some popularity on college campuses. He was invited usually by liberal student groups and advocates of unlimited free speech, who got their "kicks" from the outrage with which their invitation to Rockwell has been greeted by Jews (parents, faculty, other students) and university officials. As a "compromise" or a "concession" to "fairmindedness," some student groups offered a platform also to Gus Hall, general secretary of the Communist party, U.S.A. Max Lerner commented on Rockwell's appearance in the Harvard Law School auditorium:

I wondered what we were all doing there, and how insane a people could get in a democracy, to have the flower of their youth listening to plans for mass murder, and treating him as if he represented some substantial body of rational if wrong-headed opinion.¹¹

Georgetown University's basketball team provided another example of perverted student humor. A Nazi-uniformed cheerleader accompanying the team closed his performance with a Nazi salute and "Sieg Heil" cheer. This particular brand of humor was lost on New York University students, many of them Jewish, who played Georgetown on February 5. (But the Rev. Anthony Zeits, director of Georgetown's student personnel, thought the "Nazi" cheerleader amusing.) More than a week later the Georgetown students, in a burst of ecumenism, apologized to the NYU students, describing the incident as "innocent in origin, but which had possibly offensive implications."

Among lower-class youth, German and Nazi insignia and slogans have

¹¹ "A Sick Evening," *New York Post*, September 28, 1966.

become status symbols. Motorcycle gangs, particularly, have appropriated many elements of Nazi youth groups that proliferated some years ago, especially in big-city high schools. The more notorious of these lawless, disreputable, and irresponsible motorcycle gangs, which intermixed lawlessness and violence with elements of Nazism, included the Pagans of Newark and Washington, D.C., the Misfits of New York, the Aliens of Queens, the Deuces of Cleveland, and Hell's Angels and Satan's Slaves of California. On November 27 members of the New York-based Misfits wearing helmets with Nazi emblems marched in front of a Jewish restaurant in Los Angeles's predominantly Jewish neighborhood of Fairfax, shouting "Heil Hitler." They were arrested and served an 82-day jail term. An investigation into anti-semitic activity in the Fairfax area was authorized by the Los Angeles city council.

The Cleveland Deuces, whose leader calls himself Adolf Hitler, vowed allegiance to George Lincoln Rockwell's American Nazi party. Their activities have aggravated racial disturbances in Cleveland's central city.

In New York, a police raid on a Greenwich Village apartment, on December 9, uncovered hundreds of thousands of dollars of stolen goods, burglars' tools, pornographic photographs and films, marijuana, torture devices, and Nazi literature and paraphernalia. The apartment itself was decorated with Hitler's photograph and a huge Nazi flag. One of the arrested men, a German-born, naturalized American citizen, belonged to the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang. Hell's Angels have been described as desperate men, without education, jobs, status, mobility (despite their motorcycles), and without a future: "In a world increasingly geared to specialists, technicians, and fantastically complicated machinery, the Hell's Angels are obvious losers, and it bugs them."¹²

These motorcycle gangs disturbingly recall the motorcycle cult of pre-Hitlerian Germany, the uprooted jobless and violent men of the *Frei Korps*, the toughs, drinkers, and brawlers, with a yen for pornography and blood, who became the brawn of Hitler's first army, the brown-shirted *Sturmabteilung*. In 1966 the violent motorcycle gangs were numbered in the hundreds, perhaps a few thousands,¹³ but they may be the warning signals of a changing society. In an increasingly technological society, in which education more than any other single factor determines mobility, the lazy, the stupid, the incompetent, the dropouts are consigned to the dreariest jobs or left without jobs. Automation, also, gives them more leisure than they can consume. The boredom of their existence, then, drives them to sadism in sex, spurred by the rise in sadistic-pornographic literature, to drug addiction, and to violence in politics.¹⁴ The relationship between pornographic sadism and

¹² Hunter S. Thompson, *Hell's Angels: A Strange and Terrible Saga* (New York, 1967), 278 pp.

¹³ The American Motorcycle Association, with a membership of over 75,000, claims that these gangs are only one per cent of all motorcycle riders.

¹⁴ See Pamela Hansford Johnson, *On Iniquity* (New York, 1967), 142 pp. In reporting on the gruesome and sadistic Brady-Hindley Moors murders in England in 1966, Miss Johnson noted the murderers had an interest in both sado-masochistic and Nazi books.

political sadism brought about the "cult of despotism" among early Italian Fascist and German Nazis. George Steiner calling attention to the coincidence in time of "the new barbarism and the breakdown of verbal and pictorial taboos" cited the enormous mass of sadistic and antisemitic erotica which preceded the Nazi period. Céline, "the virtuoso of scatological narrative" was also Céline, "the prophetic advocate of the 'final solution.'"¹⁵

Passivity and "Tolerance"

The passivity and tolerance with which democratic society treated extreme antisemitism was evident in February, when J. Lee Rankin, New York City corporation counsel, informed the Board of Education that, under its regulations, it had to extend its facilities for after-class-hours meetings to the National Renaissance party, a miniscule but viciously Nazi and antisemitic group. The rationale for the ruling was that the group was a political party. ADL attacked this decision: "To accept this lunatic-fringe clique's definition of itself as a political party is to pervert the meaning of the term" (*New York Times*, February 16, 1966). The National Renaissance party used the auditorium of a junior high school, on March 18, for a meeting at which its founder and leader, James H. Madole, denounced Jews, Negroes, Communists and the United States.

Another instance of democratic permissiveness was a decision handed down, June 19, by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to renew the license of radio station KTYM in Inglewood, Cal. A complaint had been filed by ADL that the station had broadcast several antisemitic programs and that its owners declined to halt these programs. By a 5 to 1 vote, the commissioners held that radio was "a medium of free speech" and that they could not censor programming. They also denied a public hearing on the issue. Nevertheless, they admitted that the broadcasts "did contain statements that can be regarded as anti-Semitic, and that will surely be highly offensive to many persons of the Jewish faith as well as to fair-minded people of other faiths." Kenneth A. Cox, the dissenting commissioner, termed the decision "incredible," declaring that "in light of the history of the world in our century, these programs stand as a bald attack upon the lives, the fortunes, and the sacred honor of our fellow countrymen."

A month later, in a similar case, the FCC ruled to renew provisionally for one year the license of radio station WXUR at Media, Pa., a Philadelphia suburb, and agreed to hold a public hearing on the charges that the station broadcast antisemitic and anti-Negro programs.

An editorial in AJCommittee's *Newsletter* (November-December 1966) called attention to the "talk-back" radio and television programs which, in their desire for sensationalism, provided large audiences to bigots, racists, antisemites, and a variety of questionable characters. The editorial stated: "We bar the airwaves to frauds, slanderers and pornographers. Why, then, open

¹⁵ George Steiner, "Pornography & the Consequences," *Encounter*, March 1966, pp. 46-47.

them to bigots, who often represent no one but their own warped selves, and whose invited appearances on certain programs are meant only to irritate, not educate?" In one of the programs cited, a notorious bigot had said that Jews had plotted to drag the United States into World War I so as to win support for the idea of a Jewish homeland! Another program broadcast crude antisemitic propaganda, ostensibly in a discussion of Negro anti-semitism.

Racism and Antisemitism

Anti-Negro demonstrations provided an avenue for open antisemitism. In Baltimore, July 28, the racist Maryland National States Rights party held a rally at which the speakers made anti-Negro and antisemitic remarks and incited gangs of white youths to riot. During racial disorders in July in Brooklyn, N.Y., James Madole made an appearance to harangue white customers in a tavern. In Chicago, August 20–21, counter-demonstrants to Martin Luther King's open-housing marches openly derided and reviled Jews. In working-class areas where residents of Lithuanian, Polish, Bohemian, and Italian background predominated, local speakers and outside agitators called to arms against "nigger scum" and "Jew Commies." One native Chicagoan of German descent told a reporter: "All these whites in these demonstrations are Communists, and I've noticed that a lot of them are Jews. The only loyalty Jews have is to Israel" (*New York Times*, August 21, 1966). The following day George Lincoln Rockwell and leaders of the National States Rights party and the Ku Klux Klan were haranguing white mobs in Chicago's Marquette park. Robert Jacobs, a reporter for Columbia Broadcasting System, became the target of a volley of bricks thrown by an angry crowd after someone shouted, "He's a dirty Jew—get him."

Rockwell was arrested on August 29 in Chicago for disorderly conduct, and on September 10 for marching without a permit. On September 11 Christopher Vidnjevich, Chicago leader of the American Nazi party, threatened to lead a march into a Jewish neighborhood: "The Jews are the real troublemakers." Rockwell himself subsequently announced plans to march into Jewish neighborhoods during the High Holy Days to "convince the Jews not to support the Negroes and the Communists." On the petition of the Jewish War Veterans, Federal District Judge Joseph Sam Perry issued first a temporary and then, on September 30, a permanent restraining order forbidding the Nazis to parade near synagogues on the Sabbath and Jewish holidays. Rockwell then asked for, and received, assistance from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to appeal the order. (Rabbi Ralph Simon, leading Conservative rabbi of Chicago, resigned from the ACLU when he learned of its "regrettable decision" to defend Rockwell. Jay A. Miller, the local union's executive director, deplored Simon's resignation and argued that the best defense against fascism would be to devote "all of our resources

to alleviating the underlying causes of poverty, ignorance and lack of identification that produce this dangerous condition.”¹⁶)

Racial troubles in the North and South boosted the membership of Ku Klux Klan organizations throughout the country and multiplied their activities. An ADL report, released in September, claimed that Klan membership rose by about 10,000 since the beginning of 1966 to a new high of nearly 30,000. Some of the new recruits were in the North and the West.

Antisemitism has been a staple in Southern racism;¹⁷ it manifested itself also in other places. At a rally of a revived KKK in Soledad Canyon, Los Angeles county, Klan leader William V. Fowler rallied his small following against the “dirty kikes” and “niggers,” and promised: “Jesus beat the Jews from the market steps and we’re going to beat the Jews out of the Federal Reserve System.”¹⁸

The Radical Right

Racial issues dominated the activities of radical-right organizations and sparked their membership recruitment. Before the November elections, the John Birch Society released a 75-minute film it had produced, *Anarchy, U.S.A.*, whose purpose was to smear the civil-rights movement as influenced and directed by Communists. It insinuated that the sympathy of high government officials (President Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey, the late President John F. Kennedy) for the civil-rights movement involved them in a “communist conspiracy.”¹⁹

Concern about the growth of extremism, particularly by organizations in the orbit of the Birch Society, led to the formation of the Institute for American Democracy on November 18. Its committee consisted of 48 prominent leaders in church affairs, business, education, labor unions, and public service, under the chairmanship of Iowa Wesleyan College President Franklin H. Littell. Jewish leaders on the committee included Morris B. Abram, president of the AJCommittee, and Dore Schary, chairman of ADL.

The radical right was the subject of several scientific papers published in 1966. These included: Irving Crespi, “The Structural Basis for Right-wing Conservatism: The Goldwater Case,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter 1965–66, pp. 523–543; James McEvoy, *Letters from the Right: Content-Analysis of a Letter Writing Campaign* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Research on Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, University of Michigan, April 1966), 58 pp. (processed); Lawrence F. Schiff, “Dynamic Young-Fogies—

¹⁶ *The Sentinel* (Chicago), December 15, 1966; January 26, 1967.

¹⁷ Ben H. Bagdikian, “Justice on the Bench in Mississippi,” *The New Republic*, February 18, 1967, pp. 12–13, describes the antisemitism of Mississippi judges. Tom Wicker, “George Wallace: A Gross and Simple Heart,” *Harper’s Magazine*, April 1967, pp. 41–49, quotes George Wallace, “. . . I don’t believe all this talk about poor folks turning Communist. It’s the damn rich who turn Communist. You ever see a poor Communist? Like them Rosenberg folks and all. They were moneyed people.”

¹⁸ Jerry Goldberg, “KKK,” *The New West Magazine*, November 1966, pp. 42–43.

¹⁹ Martin Hayes Bickham, “New Film Smears Civil Rights Cause,” *The Christian Century*, December 14, 1966, pp. 1553–54.

Rebels on the Right," *Trans-action*, November 1966, pp. 31-36; Everett C. Ladd, Jr., "The Radical Right: The White-Collar Extremists," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Summer 1966, pp. 314-324.

Meanwhile, more evidence accumulated to indicate that, despite its denials to the contrary, the Birch Society harbored antisemites and used antisemitic propaganda. Early in 1966 ADL released a study on the Birch Society which charged that the society was strongly "contributing to anti-Semitism and waging an all-out war against the civil-rights movement."²⁰ Birch Society publications contained the writings of antisemites and and the society's bookstores distributed antisemitic books and pamphlets. On July 28 Alan Cranston, then California controller, released a report which charged that the Birch Society was soiled "with the muck of anti-Semitism and racism, and a smattering of anti-Catholicism," and that "anti-Semitism and racism, intentional or inadvertent, abound at all levels of the society and in all its outlets—from its founder on down."²¹

To discredit charges of its antisemitism, the society tried to organize a Jewish branch, the Jewish Society of Americanists, but only seven Jews turned up at the first national meeting called in Chicago in April.

The annual New England Rally for God, Family, and Country, held in Boston, July 2, 1966, was dominated by Birchers, in addition to Klansmen and Southern racists. One of the rally's main speakers was Revilo P. Oliver, one of the Birch Society's original eleven founders, a member of its governing council, and an associate editor of its monthly *American Opinion*. Oliver addressed the rally on a subject he has written frequently about in *American Opinion*—the "Jewish conspiracy," which he believed to be the conspiracy behind the conspiracy. Shortly thereafter, Oliver resigned from the society, presumably in a dispute with Robert H. W. Welch over the public and undisguised expression of antisemitism (*New York Times*, August 16, 1966).

The Minutemen, a paramilitary racist and antisemitic spinoff of the Birch Society, believed its members must be armed to ward off the "Communist conspiracy."²² Robert B. DePugh, founder and head of the Minutemen, also attempted to form his own party. In July he held a convention in Kansas City, where he founded the Patriotic party. Kenneth Goff, a notorious anti-semitite and former aide of Gerald L. K. Smith, was a featured speaker. (Goff heads his own extremist, paramilitary Soldiers of the Cross, which is closely associated with the Minutemen.)

On October 30 New York City and upstate police raided the Minutemen's New York organization. They arrested nineteen Minutemen and seized an enormous arsenal of rifles, bombs, mortars, machine guns, hand guns, knives,

²⁰ Benjamin R. Epstein and Arnold Forster, *Report on the John Birch Society 1966* (New York, 1966), xi, 112 pp.

²¹ Alan Cranston, *The John Birch Society: A Soiled Slip Is Showing: A Report* (July 28, 1966), 26 pp. (Processed.)

²² The relationship is documented in a film in possession of the police. It shows a baseball game between Minutemen and Birchites. See Jerome Bakst, "America's Latter-Day Minutemen," *The Wiener Library Bulletin*, Winter 1966-67, pp. 29-31. See also William W. Turner, "The Minutemen," *Ramparts*, January 1967, pp. 69-76.

grenades and grenade launchers, mortar shells, and more than one million rounds of ammunition. (Minutemen are advised to join the National Rifle Association and to form or join NRA clubs, so they can buy weapons below market price and be eligible for free ammunition.) Besides the arms cache, the police seized large quantities of racist literature and the classic antisemitic "document," *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. California police have several times confiscated large weapons arsenals collected by Minutemen.

On November 14 DePugh was convicted in Kansas City of conspiracy and violation of the National Firearms Act. A prosecution witness in the case testified that his membership application was accepted after he declared that he was already a Birch Society member, and that it was his opinion that "the last Jew administration started selling us down the tube and the present one will complete the job."²³

The disclosure, on January 26, of an antisemitic and racist clique, called Rat Finks, within the New Jersey Young Republicans proved even more disquieting to Jews than the arsenals of the Minutemen. The existence of the Rat Finks documented the intimate, indeed integral, relationship between antisemitism and the political right. A year earlier, at a New Jersey state convention and at a national convention of Young Republicans, the Rat Finks amused themselves with their own mimeographed antisemitic and racist songbooks and songfests. The lyrics to one such song, to the tune of "Jingle Bells," were:

Riding through the Reich in a Mercedes-Benz,
Shooting all the kikes, making lots of friends.
Rat tat-tat-tat-tat, mow the bastards down,
Oh what fun it is to have the Nazis back in town.

Investigations were started by the Young Republicans on state, regional (Mid-Atlantic), and national levels of their organization and also by New Jersey Attorney General Arthur J. Sills (Democrat). Sills had recently been investigating the state's Minutemen, who were reportedly associated with the Rat Finks. Thomas Van Sickle, Young Republican national chairman, was himself accused of having been closely associated with the Rat Finks. On February 23 Episcopal Bishop Alfred L. Banyard threatened possible excommunication for any member of the diocese (14 southern N.J. counties) who had participated in distributing or singing the antisemitic and racist Rat Fink songs. In June the state Young Republicans expelled seven county units for being controlled by the Rat Finks. Sharply divided but under continued public pressure to purge itself of the Rat Finks, the executive committee of the national Young Republican Federation, on August 13, reached a compromise by a vote of 25 to 19. Richard F. Plechner, leader of the New Jersey faction, was absolved of charges of racism and bigotry, but his resignation as vice chairman of the national Young Republican Federation was

²³ Milton Ellerin, *The Minutemen—An Appraisal* (New York: The American Jewish Committee, January 1967), 28 pp. (Typescript.)

demanded in return for the conditional reinstatement of the seven expelled New Jersey county units. To be eligible for reinstatement, each unit had to resolve, by at least a two-thirds vote, to dissociate itself from the Rat Finks, Exterminators (anti-Rat Fink), John Birch Society, or any other factional group.

Negro Antisemitism

Antisemitism among Negroes erupted as a serious concern in 1966. It exploded publicly on February 3, when Clifford A. Brown, a Westchester county probation officer and educational chairman of the Mount Vernon chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), shouted at a meeting of the Mount Vernon Board of Education that "Hitler made one mistake when he didn't kill enough of you [Jews]." The occasion was an ongoing dispute on school policies to end *de facto* segregation in the public schools. Four days later, James Farmer, then CORE's national director, termed Brown's antisemitic remark "intolerable," said an investigation had been ordered to determine the context in which the remark had been made, and added that "also intolerable" were the school board's "delaying tactics" on racial imbalance in the schools.

The slowness of CORE's repudiation of Brown's antisemitism and Farmer's equation of Auschwitz with Mount Vernon served to intensify Jewish reaction against CORE. Will Maslow, executive director of the American Jewish Congress, resigned his membership on CORE's national board, accusing it of a "tepid and ambiguous response" to Brown's "horrifying" remark. "I cannot continue," Maslow said, "an association with a group whose moral fiber is so flabby as to respond in an equivocal manner to the horrifying and racist public statement" made by Brown. On February 9, after Farmer's intervention, CORE's Mount Vernon chapter accepted Brown's resignation "with great sadness."

The only public Negro response criticizing Brown came from Jackie Robinson in his column "We Also Have Black Bigots" (*Amsterdam News*, February 19, 1966), in which he deplored also the absence of any "spontaneous rebuke from other Negro leaders and civil rights organizations."

Finally, on May 27, after continued dissension over antisemitism, CORE expelled its Mount Vernon chapter, which meanwhile had moved to reelect Brown as an officer. CORE's dilatory responses resulted in the substantial withdrawal of financial support by CORE's Jewish contributors. Lincoln Lynch, CORE's associate national director, admitted that contributions had fallen sharply after the Mount Vernon incident. About 80 per cent of CORE's support came from the white community and, Lynch added, "you could say that Jewish contributions have been predominant."²⁴ On December 21, Bayard Rustin, executive director of the A. Philip Randolph Insti-

²⁴ Edward C. Burks, "Militant Rights Groups Feel Pinch as Gifts Drop," *The New York Times*, July 25, 1966.

tute, told the national executive committee of the Jewish Labor Committee that he was deeply ashamed of the antisemitism among Negroes, but urged Jews to continue to give their support to the civil-rights movement.

Negro accusations against merchants, mostly Jewish, of unfair marketing and pricing practices, coupled with Negro looting and burning of white-owned (mostly Jewish-owned) retail stores in Negro neighborhoods, focused attention on the economic aspects of Negro-Jewish tensions. Populist Negro leaders like Stokely Carmichael of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), with anti-capitalist and anti-urban views, agitated their Negro followers against the Jewish shopkeepers: "It was . . . the exploitation by Jewish landlords and merchants which first created black resentment toward Jews—not Judaism."²⁵ Negro author LeRoi Jones threatened: "It is almost common knowledge that the Jews, etc., will go the next time there's a large 'disturbance,' like they say."²⁶

In Chicago on January 7, Donald Jackson, a Negro with a criminal record, shot and killed Sidney and Edward Fohrman, brothers in the used-car business, and Albert Sizer, their salesman. Jackson had been in three accidents and had become involved in a dispute with the Fohrman brothers over a \$100-deductible insurance policy. A Chicago Negro alderman and Negro press and TV commentators justified the brutal murders and cheered the murderer because used-car dealers charged high interest rates.²⁷

The defense made by some Negro writers and radicals on behalf of six Negro boys found guilty of murdering, without any apparent motive, Mrs. Margit Sugar, a Hungarian Jewish refugee, in her tailor shop was even more implausible. William Epton, a leader of the Maoist Progressive Labor party, became involved in the belated defense and appeal of the six, who were believed to have been connected with a terrorist group called the Five Percenters. In November James Baldwin wrote a petition, opening the drive for a new trial, which declared that "what is at issue here is not their guilt or innocence" but "the manner of their arrest."²⁸

Another senseless action against Jewish merchants was a SNCC-led boycott of their shops in Washington, D.C., protesting the failure of Congress to vote home rule for residents of the District of Columbia. On March 21 the Jewish Community Council of Washington, D.C., criticized SNCC and the Free D.C. Movement for boycotting these merchants. While the Metropolitan Board of Trade had opposed home rule, the boycott of the local merchants, the council said, was irrelevant to the issue and a violation of their privacy.

Looting, burning, and destruction of many Jewish businesses in Negro neighborhoods continued during the 1966 summer riots (pp. 83-84). De-

²⁵ Stokely Carmichael, "What We Want," *The New York Review of Books*, September 22, 1966, pp. 5-8.

²⁶ LeRoi Jones, *Home: Social Essays* (New York, 1966), p. 249.

²⁷ *The Sentinel*, Chicago, February 10, 1966; Sidney J. Jacobs, "The Comfort of Eliphaz," *The Reconstructionist*, March 4, 1966, pp. 21-28.

²⁸ Joan Hanauer, "Baldwin Opens Drive to Win New Death Trial for 'Harlem Six,'" *World Journal Tribune*, November 12, 1966.

spite reports by Jewish community organizations in Chicago and Cleveland that antisemitism was not a factor, Jewish businessmen suffered considerable property losses and were subjected to physical danger. In Minneapolis, following rioting in August in a Negro area once predominantly Jewish, many Jewish businessmen began to display "for sale" signs. The *American Jewish World*, Minneapolis's Jewish weekly, editorially commented that while everything possible was being done to aid the Negro residents, nothing was being done to help the victimized businessmen, nearly all of whom were Jewish.

The greater awareness of Negro antisemitism pointed up the lack of hard data about Negro attitudes towards Jews and whether present feelings represented a rise in hostility or merely its more public, uncontrolled expression. A preliminary report on an ADL-sponsored study underway at the University of California Survey Research Center in Berkeley showed that more Negroes preferred to do business with Jews than with non-Jews; but most Negroes saw no difference between Jews and non-Jews.²⁹ *Midstream* published a symposium on Negro-Jewish relations, with twenty-four Jewish participants, most of whom were actively engaged in the Jewish community; a few were primarily associated with labor or civil-liberties institutions. Only two symposiasts were Negroes, and one was a white Protestant. Diverse assessments about Negro antisemitism were made, and many contributors probed the historical, economic, and religious causes for Negro-Jewish tensions.³⁰

PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AMERICAN JEWS, AND VIETNAM

The greatest disquiet experienced by American Jews in 1966 came as a consequence of President Johnson's criticism of Jewish attitudes towards the war in Vietnam. The incident began on September 6, when Malcolm A. Tarlov, newly elected national commander of the Jewish War Veterans (JWV), and several other JWV officers paid a courtesy call on President Johnson as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.³¹ The JWV delegation used this routine occasion to express to the President its organization's support of the government's policies in Vietnam. In his response, President Johnson voiced his disturbance over the lack of support for the war among the Jewish community. According to Tarlov, who reported the conversation to the *JTA* (September 7, 1966), President Johnson compared American commitments to Vietnam with those to Israel, and drew a parallel between the political principles involved in American relations with both countries. He seemed also to have suggested that American support for Israel would de-

²⁹ Oscar Cohen, "'Negro Antisemitism' Analysed," *The Wiener Library Bulletin*, Winter 1966-67, pp. 13-15, 38.

³⁰ "Negro-Jewish Relations in America: A Symposium," *Midstream*, December 1966, pp. 1-91.

³¹ For the detailed story, see Phil Baum, "Johnson, Vietnam and the Jews," *Congress Bi-Weekly*, October 24, 1966, pp. 7-9.

pend on Jewish support of administration policies in Vietnam. A substantiating account in the *New York Times* (September 11) of this meeting intensified Jewish anxiety, consternation, and also outrage over the President's remarks and his singling out the Jews as a group to be a target of his displeasure.

A flurry of denials and counterdenials followed; a B'nai B'rith delegation, which had called on the President for clarification, issued a vague but reassuring statement. In an effort to learn what the President had actually said and what the implications of that statement were, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations met on September 13 with U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg. Ambassador Goldberg reportedly reassured the Jewish delegation that no government official had intended to stifle dissent over Vietnam, and that no *quid pro quo* had been expected or desired when the President had compared American responsibilities toward Vietnam with those toward Israel. (Ambassador Goldberg said then, and several times later repeated, that he acted entirely on his own, that he had not discussed this matter with President Johnson, and that he was in no way the President's intermediary.³²)

The only word from the White House came in a letter written by Harry C. McPherson, Jr., special counsel to the President, in response to an inquiry by a Cleveland college student and reported in the *JTA*, October 7, 1966: "Any inference in news stories that the President linked American Jewish support for this country's struggle in Vietnam with continued United States support for Israel is wholly fanciful."

On November 5 the Texas White House (President Johnson was in Johnson City for the weekend) announced that the United States would lend Israel \$6 million for expansion of electric-power facilities. The release specifically stated that President Johnson had made the decision in an apparent effort to prove that the President's unhappiness over Jewish attitudes towards the war in Vietnam did not affect his commitments to Israel.

The anxiety provoked by the episode found little public expression. Jews limited themselves almost entirely to insisting on their right to dissent and to disclaiming any monolithic Jewish position on Vietnam. As proof they cited a Gallup poll, released September 21, which showed that national opinion was about evenly divided on the Vietnam war and that the Jewish respondents did not differ significantly from the national or Protestant sample. Jewish fears that criticism by the highest official in the country of political views held by some or many of them could open the floodgates of prejudice went unvoiced. (The incident, however, created a comic-pacifist button slogan: "You don't have to be Jewish to be against the war in Vietnam.")

The public positions taken by some Jewish organizations on the war in

32 "Goldberg Says Role in Talk Was His Own," *New York Times*, September 19, 1966. A sensitive appreciation of Ambassador Goldberg's position as "the Administration's ambassador to the Jews, and the Jews' tribune in the government" is Andrew Kopkind, "The Adventures of Arthur Goldberg," *The New Republic*, October 8, 1966, pp. 15-18.

Vietnam remained unaffected by the incident. Politically and religiously liberal organizations, like the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC) and the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), continued to oppose the war, and justified their position by recourse to Jewish ethical teachings. Politically and religiously conservative groups, like JWV and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (UOJCA), supported the war. UOJCA, at its national biennial convention in November, adopted a resolution supporting the war and America's determination to resist Communist aggression anywhere in the world.

RACIAL TENSIONS

Public-opinion polls conducted in the second half of 1966 showed a continuing decline in discriminatory attitudes on the part of most white people (including Southerners) toward Negroes, but increasing resentment and opposition to civil-rights demonstrations and racial violence. A midsummer public-opinion survey by Louis Harris of white and Negro attitudes showed that 46 per cent of white respondents would mind if a Negro family moved next door (51 per cent in 1963). But it also showed that 63 per cent of whites thought all civil-rights demonstrations were harmful (50 per cent in 1963). In contrast, most Negroes thought demonstrations were helpful. Furthermore, over 75 per cent of the whites said riots had harmed the Negro cause, and 70 per cent thought Negroes were "trying to move too fast" (64 per cent in 1963).³³

A Gallup poll, released September 28, showed that 52 per cent of a national sample (the highest since May 1962) thought the Johnson administration was pushing integration too fast. Only 5 per cent of the Negro respondents thought so. According to a Harris poll conducted in October, 59 per cent of white respondents in big cities felt personally uneasy over racial violence; 85 per cent of all whites thought Negro demonstrations hurt the civil-rights cause.³⁴ A survey of 8,500 United Church of Christ members in 151 congregations found that 62 per cent of metropolitan-area church members felt Negroes were moving too fast in demanding their civil rights, but only 45 per cent of the Great Plains church members (where Negroes were fewer and less militant) felt that way.³⁵

This growing disaffection of whites was widely attributed to the emergence of "black power" as a slogan and philosophy in the civil-rights movement and to an increase in racial violence.

Black Power

"Black power" as a civil-rights slogan first made headlines in the nation's press during the second lap of the James H. Meredith march into Mississippi.

³³ "Crisis of Color, '66," *Newsweek*, August 22, 1966, pp. 11, 20-59.

³⁴ Louis Harris, "White Backlash Mounting," *New York Post*, October 10, 1966.

³⁵ "White UCC Members Studied: Little Zeal for Rights Drive," *Religious News Service*, October 25, 1966.

Meredith, the first Negro to attend the University of Mississippi from which he was graduated in 1963, began the march on June 5 to inspire Mississippi Negroes to conquer their fear of living in that state and to register to vote. The next day, just south of Hernando, Miss., he was shot in the back from ambush and wounded. Within a day, the march was resumed by the Rev. Martin Luther King, head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Floyd McKissick, national director of CORE, and Stokely Carmichael, chairman of SNCC, though they had not responded to Meredith's original call. Enlarging on Meredith's purpose of a "march against fear," these leaders introduced a more militant tone in their demands. In the course of the march, which many youthful Southern Negroes joined, Carmichael introduced the simplistic and appealing slogan of "black power," which the marchers appropriated as a chant.³⁶

It was often not clear what "black power" meant or what it was intended to achieve. McKissick, who first introduced the concept as a militant racial philosophy at a CORE convention in 1965, defined it as a form of social and political autonomy: "Black people should have the right to determine what courses" of action they were going to take, he said. "We're going to control our movement, and we're going to call the shots."³⁷ Carmichael, too, defined black power as "nothing more than black people coming together as a political, economic and social force and forcing their representatives or electing their representatives to speak to their needs." Notwithstanding these unexceptionable definitions, this do-it-yourself philosophy articulated also more strident and discordant outlooks: racism, black separatism, and, above all, a mystique of violence. A position paper prepared some months earlier by dissidents in SNCC, which had been used to exclude whites from policy-making and organizational positions in the organization, had expressed this extremist position.³⁸ Black-power advocates were ambiguous about the use of violence. Carmichael put it this way:

As for initiating the use of violence, we hope that such programs as ours will make this unnecessary; but it is not for us to tell black communities whether they can or cannot use any particular form of action to resolve their problems. Responsibility for the use of violence by black men, whether in self-defense or initiated by them, lies with the white community.³⁹

This ambiguity exacerbated the distrust and cleavage already marked in the civil-rights movement and intensified suspicion and alarm among whites, particularly among Jews grown sensitive to the antisemitism within militant civil-rights groups. "Black power is a dangerous and retrogressive step cre-

³⁶ For a sympathetic account of the march, see "Talk of the Town," *The New Yorker*, July 16, 1966, pp. 21-25.

³⁷ "Black Power—Six Views," *New York Post*, July 30, 1966. McKissick elaborated on his views in an interview for a Communist journal (Alvin Simon, "Black Power and Cambodia: A Dialog with Floyd B. McKissick," *American Dialog*, Nov.-Dec. 1966, pp. 15-18.)

³⁸ Gene Roberts, "Black Power Idea Long in Planning," *New York Times*, August 5, 1966.

³⁹ Stokely Carmichael, *loc. cit.*

ating a vacuum in the civil-rights movement," one well-to-do white contributor explained the withdrawal of her rather extensive support of CORE.⁴⁰

The deleterious effect of the black-power slogan on the civil-rights movement and the fear that it would provoke political backlash in the elections spurred responsible Negro leaders to repudiate it. On October 14 the leaders of seven major Negro national organizations issued an anti-black-power manifesto.⁴¹ Entitled "Crisis and Commitment," the statement rejected violence and strategies of violence, and reaffirmed their commitment to the democratic process and to integration as a goal of American Negroes.

Racial Violence

In 1966 racial violence was more widespread and turbulent in the North than in the South. Except for the violence endemic to Mississippi (visible even in the beating of little Negro children trying to attend a white public school in Grenada in September) and incidents in St. Petersburg and Atlanta, the most rampageous racial strife in the North was that of Negroes rioting in their own neighborhoods. On a smaller scale, less destructive but equally deplorable, were anti-Negro disturbances perpetrated by bigots and youth gangs.

The Negro riots during the long, hot summer of 1966 were, in most cases, touched off by tensions between Negroes and the police or between Negro and white teen-agers. In most instances, the rioting and consequent looting and burning appeared to be nothing more than irresponsible, criminal behavior, though civil-rights leaders, sociologists, and social workers tried to interpret that behavior as the distress signal which inarticulate and disorganized Negro masses used to call attention to their plight. In many communities in which rioting and looting occurred, the National Guard was called in to reinforce the police. Serious racial outbreaks took place in Brooklyn, N.Y.; Benton Harbor, Mich.; Chicago, Ill.; Cleveland and Dayton, Ohio; Jackson, Mich.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Minneapolis, Minn.; Muskegon, Mich.; North Amityville, L.I.; Omaha, Neb.; St. Louis, Mo.; San Francisco, Cal., and Waukegan, Ill.

White counter-rioting occurred in Baltimore, Md., Brooklyn, Chicago, Cleveland, and Kensington, Pa.⁴² The whites involved were mostly low-income workers living near Negro neighborhoods. In the Northern industrial

⁴⁰ Lee Berton, "Black Power Impact," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 22, 1966.

⁴¹ The signers were: Dorothy Height, president, National Council of Negro Women; A. Philip Randolph, president, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, AFL-CIO; Bayard Rustin, director, A. Philip Randolph Institute; Roy Wilkins, executive director, NAACP; Whitney M. Young, Jr., executive director, National Urban League; Amos T. Hall, executive secretary, Conference of Grand Master of Prince Hall Masons of America; and Hobson R. Reynolds, Grand Exalted Ruler, Improved Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks of the World.

Martin Luther King did not sign the statement, but, at a news conference in Atlanta on October 14, he said he endorsed its principles.

⁴² For an analysis of the last, see Murray Friedman, *The Kensington Riot of 1966—A Look at the Underlying Factors*, paper read at the Lutheran Settlement House, Kensington, Pa., February 3, 1967. (Mimeographed.)

cities, they were predominantly Catholics of Irish, Italian, and Polish origin. The white Chicago rioters against Martin Luther King's open-housing demonstrations were overwhelmingly Catholic.⁴³ Their furious anti-Negro hostility was believed to have accounted for Archbishop John Patrick Cody's plea on August 10 to desist, addressed not to the rioters, but calling on the Chicago Freedom Movement to suspend their civil-rights marches.

President Johnson himself appealed to these groups to resist prejudice and extend a helping hand to Negroes. Addressing the annual Columbus Day dinner of the Italian-American Professional and Businessmen's Association on October 12 in Brooklyn, N.Y., he said that "it hasn't been too many years since Italian-Americans felt the raw pain of discrimination in America." On October 16 in Doylestown, Pa., the President participated in a ceremony consecrating the new Roman Catholic Shrine of Our Lady of Czestochowa. On that occasion, he reminded his predominantly Polish-American audience that Thaddeus Kosciuszko, the Polish volunteer who had fought in the American Revolution, had bought slaves only in order to free them. "We need that spirit in America today—perhaps more than ever before," he said.

On November 19 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a pastoral statement on race relations and poverty, reaffirming Catholic teachings that discrimination was "contrary to right reason and to Christian teaching" and stressing that "we are all the children of God."

Civil-Rights Legislation

The stridency of the black-power advocates and racial violence frustrated the passage of the civil-rights bill of 1966 in the Senate. (The House had passed the bill August 9, by a vote of 259 to 157, in the full awareness that it would not emerge from the Senate.) On September 19, after twelve days of debate over a motion to consider the bill, the Senate failed for the second time to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority for cloture. (Two years earlier the less liberal Senate of the 88th Congress had mustered more than the required two-thirds vote, had ended the filibuster, and passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.) The most controversial section of the 1966 bill was its open-housing provision. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), unwilling to blame Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen (R., Ill.), who had opposed that section of bill, for the failure to shut off debate, singled out for censure the "demagogues" on both sides of the civil-rights struggle, and the "rioting, marches, shootings and inflammatory statements which have characterized this simmering summer." He strongly attacked also the black-power advocates who "in the name of racial equality or perhaps more accurately in the name of a new racial superiority, have not advocated further civil-rights legislation, but, in fact, have actively spoken and fought against it."

Nevertheless, the 90th Congress passed other bills designed to help Negroes,

⁴³ Michael E. Schiltz, "Catholics and the Chicago Riots," *Commonweal*, November 11, 1966, pp. 159-163. See also "An Exchange of Views," *loc. cit.* (December 16, 1966), pp. 321-324.

particularly the poor. These represented a pragmatic economic approach rather than the political-legal. Two rent-supplement appropriations were approved (for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for fiscal 1967), providing subsidies to enable poor families to live in decent housing outside the slums. On September 7, 1966, when President Johnson signed the 1967 appropriations bill containing the \$22-million rent-supplement program, he praised it as "the single most important breakthrough in the history of public housing." On October 20 Congress gave final approval to three important measures: an extension of the Economic Opportunity Act (anti-poverty program) for one year; an authorization of \$6.2 billion in federal aid, extending the Elementary and Secondary Education Act for two more years, and the new Demonstration Cities Act of 1966, providing \$1.3 billion to fight urban blight and suburban sprawl. The law provided that funds would be distributed over a five-year period to some 60 or 70 cities meeting a set of federal criteria. The thrust of the law was to bring together a wide variety of resources, and to apply them to a program for the combined physical, social, and economic rehabilitation of a single blighted neighborhood.

Social and Community Action

In 1966 there was a growing awareness that many problems facing American Negroes were more susceptible to solution by economic, social, and community action than by political or legislative action. A leading advocate of this shift in civil-rights strategy was Bayard Rustin, who conceived the grandiose Freedom Budget. Released in October by the A. Philip Randolph Institute over the signatures of nearly 200 Americans, white and Negro, the Freedom Budget asked the federal government to provide an additional \$185 billion in the federal budget in the next ten years to achieve "freedom from want" by 1975.⁴⁴ Its basic objectives included full employment, with a federal minimum wage, a new farm program, a guaranteed annual income for those who could not or should not be employed, and demands for decent housing, medical care, and education. It was not clear what steps were being planned to implement these demands.

Three related proposals for slum rehabilitation emerged late in 1966, all combining the efforts of private business with federal financial backing. On November 4 the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) submitted a plan to the President for a nationwide, nonprofit corporation which would merge private and public resources to rehabilitate urban slums. Established and staffed by HUD, this corporation would operate like the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), in that its board would be headed by industrial management, and labor, academic and government leaders. On December 16 Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D., N.Y.) announced

⁴⁴ A "Freedom Budget" For All Americans: *Budgeting Our Resources, 1966-1975 To Achieve "Freedom from Want"* (New York: A. Philip Randolph Institute, October 1966), 84 pp.

the impending formation of two corporations, one of community leaders and the other of businessmen, to cooperate in the redevelopment of Bedford-Stuyvesant, a heavily Negro neighborhood in Brooklyn, N.Y. Besides housing, this plan incorporated also a variety of social and economic programs (anti-poverty, job training, recreational facilities, etc.), a thrust similar to that envisaged in the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966. Senator Jacob E. Javits (Rep., N.Y.) also proposed a plan which emphasized greater utilization of business and which provided financing of the corporation's program through sales of shares to the public.

The question of equal educational opportunities for Negro and other minority children continued to agitate the civil-rights movement. In New York City, Philadelphia, and elsewhere, militant black-nationalist groups demanded control over both personnel and educational policies in schools attended mostly by Negro children. In many instances they demonstrated, demanding the replacement of white (Jewish) school principals with Negroes. In New York City, parents and community groups organized mass demonstrations and a short-lived boycott at the opening in September of Intermediate School 201, a new, air-conditioned school in Harlem, with many features designed to bring superior education to its pupils. Because no white children were attracted to the school, the parent-community groups (including black-nationalist and Maoist elements) demanded first the resignation of the Jewish principal (antisemitic remarks were common in the controversy), and then communal control over the school. After some negotiations, the Board of Education proposed to set up an advisory panel of parents, community representatives, teachers, and supervisors. The parent-community group rejected this and also a subsequent board proposal to establish a task force of educators, public officials, and community leaders to recommend ways of improving Negro schools. By the end of the year, this dispute had not been resolved and no action had been taken. The Jewish principal remained.

In July United States Commissioner of Education Harold Howe II released a survey, authorized under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to assess "the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities" by reason of "race, color, religion, or national origin" in the country's public schools. Entitled *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, the study was conducted by the National Center for Educational Statistics of the United States Office of Education, with Professor of Sociology James S. Coleman of Johns Hopkins University largely responsible for its design, administration, and analysis.⁴⁵ The findings were based on responses to questionnaires by, and educational tests of, over 645,000 public-school pupils in 4,000 schools in five different grades in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, as well as on questionnaires answered by 60,000 teachers, principals, and district school superintendents. The survey analyzed six racial and ethnic groups: Negroes, American Indians, Oriental Americans, Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, and

⁴⁵ James S. Coleman, et al., *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), 737 pp.

whites. It made important regional, urban-rural, and class distinctions. Its unprecedented scope and seriousness of purpose made it perhaps the most significant piece of educational research in recent years, but it appeared to have been little noticed.

The findings of the study indicated that "the sources of inequality of educational opportunity appear to lie first in the home itself and the cultural influences immediately surrounding the home; then they lie in the schools' ineffectiveness to free achievement from the impact of the home, and in the schools' cultural homogeneity which perpetuates the social influences of the home and its environs."⁴⁶ One important finding was that Negroes who had self-confidence and a sense of control of their own fate did better on tests than whites who had less self-confidence; this attitude was more highly related to achievement than any other factor in the student's background or school. Professor Coleman concluded, therefore, that "internal changes in the Negro, changes in his conception of himself in relation to his environment, may have more effect on Negro achievement than any other single factor."

The reluctance of most civil-rights groups to deal with the internal social problems of the Negro community was most apparent in the controversy surrounding the Moynihan report (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 99-101). The White House Conference "To Fulfill These Rights," held June 1-2, had originally been conceived to deal with problems arising from the pathology of the Negro family and its impact on the fulfilment of Negro equality. But the violent objection of civil-rights leaders and social workers to this approach turned the conference into a more traditional and familiar civil-rights meeting presenting a bulging package of recommendations on employment, education, housing, and legal justice.⁴⁷

The conference, generally regarded as ineffective, represented an artificial consensus on civil rights. Boycotted by SNCC pickets on the outside, it failed to generate interest, discussion, or a true interchange of ideas inside. Daniel P. Moynihan, whose report was not mentioned at the conference, later charged that the civil-rights movement had lost an opportunity for an unparalleled national effort to deal more effectively with the problems of Negro equality.⁴⁸ A study of this controversy concluded that the Moynihan *report* had provided a strong justification for a government that wanted to move vigorously on social and economic reform to benefit Negroes, but that the Moynihan *controversy* justified the government's inaction and its withdrawal from expanded commitments.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ James S. Coleman, "Equal Schools Or Equal Students?" *The Public Interest*, Summer 1966, pp. 70-75.

⁴⁷ White House Conference "To Fulfill These Rights," *The Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), 177 pp.

⁴⁸ Daniel P. Moynihan, "The President & the Negro: The Moment Lost," *Commentary*, February 1967, pp. 31-45.

⁴⁹ Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), xviii, 493 pp.

Racial Tensions in Politics

"White backlash," reprisal by white voters against pro-civil-rights candidates, was widely predicted as a major factor in the 1966 election. Backlash in the North had been provoked chiefly by open-housing legislation, school busing, concern over crime and public safety, black-power militancy, and Negro riots and violence. Backlash in the South had been exacerbated by conflicts over federal guidelines for school desegregation issued under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and by the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Nevertheless, a study of the results of the election showed that backlash materialized only in the Deep South, where race still remained *the* salient issue in politics.⁵⁰ The study found that the white backlash succeeded in electing governors in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. It failed dramatically in the gubernatorial races in Arkansas and Maryland, and in the senatorial race in Massachusetts. There, 61 per cent of the voters in a normally Democratic stronghold elected Republican Edward W. Brooke, a Negro, to the Senate. He was the first Northern Negro senator in the nation's history and the first Negro elected since Reconstruction.

The election in Maryland was a dramatic illustration of group tensions over racial issues. The conflict began in September in the Democratic primary. In the rough-and-tough power struggle between two contending Democratic slates, a third contender, George F. Mahoney, a millionaire paving contractor who six times before had unsuccessfully run for state office, managed to win the party's gubernatorial nomination with a minority of the votes. A racist, Mahoney appealed to the same body of voters who had given Wallace over 44 per cent of their vote in Maryland's Democratic presidential primary in 1964.

In the primary, Mahoney received 46 per cent of the white vote in Baltimore city and Baltimore county, 60 per cent of the labor vote, and 68 per cent of the Slavic (Polish) vote. Jews gave Mahoney only 15 per cent, with 50 per cent voting for Rep. Carlton R. Sickles and 22 per cent for Maryland's Attorney General Thomas B. Finan. Negroes gave Sickles nearly 70 per cent of their vote.⁵¹

Mahoney targeted his campaign in the general election to the potential backlash vote. His slogan was "Your home is your castle," and his crude bigotry provoked nearly all important Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clergymen to denounce him. Responsible, civic-minded Democrats, moderates and liberals alike, switched to the Republican candidate Spiro T. Agnew, chief executive of Baltimore county and a racial moderate with political experience and competence. A third, independent, candidate was City Con-

⁵⁰ Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The 1966 Elections: A Political Patchwork* (New York: The American Jewish Committee, April 1967), 26 pp. (Processed.) Much of the following section is drawn from this study.

⁵¹ Robert D. Loevy, *Computer Analysis of 1966 Democratic Gubernatorial Primary in Baltimore City and Baltimore County* (Maryland: Field Politics Center, Goucher College, October 3, 1966), 3 pp. (Processed.)

troller Hyman C. Pressman, a racial liberal. The gubernatorial race brought out over 913,000 voters, a record for a nonpresidential year. Agnew won with 49 per cent of the vote; Mahoney drew about 41 per cent, and Pressman about 10 per cent.

Mahoney's support came from two types of backlash voters. One consisted predominantly of white working-class voters in and around Baltimore, overwhelmingly native-stock Southern migrants, Poles, Italians, and Irish, poorly educated, with incomes in the low-middle range. The second group was made up of white voters in Maryland's southern and Eastern Shore counties. These counties had given Wallace substantial majorities (69 to 82 per cent) in 1964. Now they voted for Mahoney, but not quite so heavily as they had for Wallace. The fall-off was most marked in the Eastern Shore counties which were solidly Fundamentalist and anti-Catholic. Thus, Roman Catholic Mahoney himself became a victim of sub-backlash from the back-lashers. In the southern counties, however, two of which were predominantly Catholic, the vote for Mahoney remained solid.

Other normally Democratic voters, including Jews, Negroes, middle- and upper-middle-income white Protestants, government officials, and professionals, voted overwhelmingly for Agnew. Montgomery county (suburban Washington), normally narrowly Republican, gave Agnew over 70 per cent of its vote. In 24 predominantly Jewish precincts, 46 per cent voted for Agnew, 23 per cent for Mahoney, and 31 per cent for Pressman. Some Jews no doubt voted for Pressman because he was a Jew, but Pressman probably benefited from the votes of Democrats who could not bring themselves to vote for Mahoney, but for whom voting Republican would have been equally traumatic. They solved their dilemma by voting for Pressman.

In 19 of 26 contests for House seats where backlash had been predicted, the more liberal candidates on civil rights were elected, though in some cases with diminished margins. The impotence of backlash as the decisive factor was particularly evident in four Chicago congressional races, mainly in working-class districts where civil-rights marches and violence had occurred and which were sensitive to backlash. In these districts the four liberal Democratic incumbents were reelected, three of them by a large margin. All had voted for the 1966 civil-rights bill, with its open-housing provisions. In the 3rd C.D., Democrat William T. Murphy defeated Albert F. Manion, with 52 per cent of the vote. In the 6th C.D., Democrat Daniel J. Ronan defeated Samuel A. Decaro, with 57 per cent of the vote. In the 8th C.D., Democrat Daniel D. Rostenkowski defeated John H. Leszynski, with 60 per cent of the vote. In the 11th C.D., Democrat Roman G. Pucinski squeaked by with less than a 4,000-vote plurality over Chicago's most indefatigable backlasher, John J. Hoellen, who had inherited his aldermanic seat from his father and, for 19 years, had been the "vigilante alderman."

It could not be stated categorically that backlash accounted for the defeat of other liberal candidates. In most contests, party loyalty, economic interest, and voting traditions were more persuasive factors than racial bias. This was

especially apparent in the contest for the House seat in the 6th congressional district in Wisconsin's dairyland territory. The Republican candidate William A. Steiger, a state assemblyman for six years and a racial liberal, had been co-author of Wisconsin's 1965 fair-housing law. The Democrat, incumbent John A. Race, had barely won the 6th C.D.'s House seat in the 1964 anti-Goldwater landslide, with 50.7 per cent of the vote. That was the first time since the 1930's that the district had sent a Democrat to Congress. In his eagerness to build up voter support, Race began to vote against the policies and programs of the man on whose coattails he had been elected. He voted against foreign aid, and was the only congressman in the Wisconsin delegation (6 Democrats and 5 Republicans) to vote against the 1966 civil-rights bill. The 6th C.D., with only about 100 Negroes, had been one of three that had given Wallace substantial support in the 1964 primary. Presumably counting on that backlash vote, Race used the slogan popularized by Mahoney in Maryland, "A man's home is his castle." But Steiger won the election, with 52.4 per cent of the vote and a plurality of about 7,000. Party loyalty reasserted itself in the 6th C.D. and that, along with class interest, was more decisive than the racial issue in determining the outcome of the election.

Attention had focused also on the referendum in New York City to abolish civilian review of the police. The campaign reflected tensions between Negroes and police and also the widespread concern among all New Yorkers about crime and the need for greater police protection. A survey conducted in August among New York Negroes found that the 1,200 respondents were concerned more about police protection than about police brutality.⁵² But the campaign, as conducted by the proponents of civilian review, turned it into an issue of symbolic significance to the Negroes, while the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association conducted an emotional campaign around the issue of crime in the streets and confidence in the police. Thus, both sides contributed to the polarization of attitudes which seemed to pit the Negroes against the police and, hence, against law and order. The results were disastrous for supporters of civilian review: 63 per cent of the voters favored abolishing the civilian-review board.

About six weeks before the election, a public-opinion poll was conducted for Federated Associations for Impartial Review (FAIR), the organization campaigning for civilian review. That poll showed that two-thirds of the respondents thought safety in the streets a most important city problem, while only a little over one-third thought the civilian-review board a most important problem. Only the Irish among the various ethnic, religious, and racial groups thought that the civilian-review-board issue was *the* most important issue. They listed safety in the streets as second most important. But most Italians, Puerto Ricans, Jews, and Negroes uniformly cited safety in the streets as the most important city problem. Out of nine issues, civilian

⁵² Robert B. Semple, Jr., "Negroes in Poll Ask More Police," *New York Times*, September 4, 1966.

review was rated fourth by the Italians, fifth by the Puerto Ricans, and sixth by both Jews and Negroes. The Irish, then, perceived civilian review of the police as a most threatening issue. After all, most policemen are Irish and the Irish in America have had long and intimate associations with both police and politics. These, they felt, were now endangered.

Civilian review had been introduced and was being vigorously defended by a reform Republican mayor who had upset the traditional political arrangements in New York. John V. Lindsay was not merely Republican, but also Anglo-Saxon and Protestant. This mayor had challenged the historic Irish Catholic hegemony in New York City's police department. On the issue of civilian review, he forced out Police Commissioner Vincent L. Broderick. Then, the new Police Commissioner Howard B. Leary, shortly after taking office, promoted Sanford D. Garelik, a Jew, to chief inspector of the police department and Lloyd G. Sealy, a Negro, to assistant chief inspector, giving rise to accusations that the promotions were directed by City Hall. The Irish began to feel beleaguered.

While less than 10 per cent of all respondents perceived the civilian-review board as an instrument "to protect or satisfy minority groups," 22 per cent of the Irish perceived that as the board's purpose. Eighty-six per cent of the Irish respondents said they would vote against the civilian-review board, as compared with 72 per cent of the Italians, 50 per cent of the Jews, 30 per cent of the Puerto Ricans, and 10 per cent of the Negroes.

The actual vote generally bore out the poll's findings. German, Irish, and Italian voters voted heavily to abolish the civilian-review board. Jewish voters split. The more affluent, more educated, and younger Jews tended to vote on principle (or ideology), and supported civilian review. The poorer, older, and less educated voted against—they wanted more police protection. The civilian-review board lost by considerably smaller margins in districts with large numbers of Jews than in densely Irish, German, or Italian districts.⁵³ There was a correlation between a high vote to abolish the civilian-review board and a high vote for the Conservative party (mostly German and Irish voters). Similarly, a low vote against civilian review was often paired with a high vote for the Liberal party (mostly Jewish voters). Major-party affiliations, however, had no bearing on how people voted.

INTERRELIGIOUS TENSIONS ON CHURCH-STATE ISSUES

Efforts at mutual understanding between Catholics and Jews, growing out of Vatican Council II, were often canceled by Catholic-Jewish tensions over questions of church and state. These were particularly rancorous in the conflict over federal and state aid to sectarian nonpublic schools. Protestants were divided among themselves denominationally and on issues. Some liberal

⁵³ See also Milton Himmelfarb, "Are Jews Still Liberals?" *Commentary*, April 1967, pp. 67-72.

Protestant church groups favored federal aid and opposed prayer in the schools, while conservative (Fundamentalist) groups adamantly opposed federal aid to parochial schools and vigorously argued for prayer and Bible reading in public schools. Within the Jewish community, the most bitter divisions were between Orthodox organizations ranged in favor of federal aid, and nearly all other Jewish organizations who opposed it. An off-the-record church-state conference, convened by the joint advisory committee of the Synagogue Council of America and the National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC), reinforced that division. The proceedings revealed deep divisions between Orthodox and non-Orthodox and angry suspicion on the part of the secularists and non-Orthodox that the Orthodox, in insisting on their need for federal funds to support their institutions, were intent on robbing the public treasury.

The strongest Jewish criticism of the Jewish separationist position was made by Milton Himmelfarb in *Commentary* and aroused critical comment from separationists.⁵⁴ Himmelfarb provided his own summary of his views: "It is not true that freedom is most secure where church and state are separated; separation and separationism are not the same; even in America, separationism is potentially tyrannical; separationism needlessly repels some from the democratic consensus; it is harsh to those who prefer nonpublic schools for conscience' sake; and it stands in the way of a more important good (and a more important safeguard of Jewish security), the best possible education for all."

Federal Aid to Education

Separationists, who had given only reluctant support to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 because of its provisions for federal aid to children attending nonpublic schools (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 133-141), in 1966 viewed all such aid with the utmost suspicion. They believed that such aid was given at the expense of children in public schools. In fact, according to an early report of the Office of Education's accomplishments in distributing grants, only seven per cent of the children receiving such aid were in sectarian nonpublic schools, though these schools accounted for 15 per cent of the total school population.⁵⁵ (Reliable statistics about the proportion of nonpublic-school pupils receiving federal aid were generally unavailable.)

Representatives of the National Council of Churches and of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs met with U.S. Commissioner of Education Howe in April to ask for firmer federal guidelines and regulations regarding funds allocated for pupils in sectarian nonpublic schools. The AJCongress, ACLU, and Protestants and Other Americans United for the

⁵⁴ "Church and State: How High a Wall?" *Commentary*, July 1966, pp. 23-29. See also Ivan Shapiro and Milton Himmelfarb, "Controversy: Church & State," *loc. cit.*, December, 1966, pp. 79-89.

⁵⁵ Jonathan Spivak, "Education's Challenge," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 19, 1966.

Separation of Church and State (POAU) continued their unyielding opposition to any form of aid to pupils in these schools. Leo Pfeffer, special counsel of the AJCongress, testifying before the education subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, April 19, charged there was "grave reason to fear" that federal aid was being used "to finance a private and parochial school system paralleling the American public school system." The aggressive attacks of these three organizations against all forms of aid to parochial-school children earned them the opprobrium of both Catholic and Orthodox Jewish groups. Father Virgil C. Blum, professor of political science at Marquette University, described AJCongress, ACLU, and POAU as "doctrinaire separationists" who were "carrying forward the crusade of the 19th-century Nativists and Know-Nothings."⁵⁶

Tensions over the distribution of federal funds to nonpublic sectarian schools were particularly abrasive in New York. The Board of Education was subjected for several months to intense pressure about a proposed allocation of \$65 million in federal funds under Title I of ESEA. About \$15 million had originally been earmarked for 213 nonpublic sectarian schools, mostly Catholic, but including also fifty or more Jewish day schools and some Greek Orthodox, Lutheran, and Episcopalian schools. After months of haggling, the Board of Education approved the program on August 31, with criteria that restricted aid to the nonpublic-school pupils more than originally planned and with considerably reduced allocations to them. As a consequence, both the opponents and supporters of federal aid to nonpublic-school pupils were dissatisfied.

On June 13 the POAU chapter in Dayton, Ohio, filed suit in the U.S. District Court, aimed at declaring unconstitutional ESEA's Title II (provision of books and library materials to nonpublic-school pupils). On November 14 a group of taxpayers, sponsored by POAU, filed suit in Philadelphia, attacking Title I's provisions of aid to nonpublic-school pupils.

On December 1 Leo Pfeffer, on behalf of the AJCongress, the New York CLU, the United Parents Associations, and the United Federation of Teachers, filed two suits in New York state and federal courts. One charged that ESEA's aid to pupils in sectarian nonpublic schools was unconstitutional. The other charged that New York City public-school officials, in administering programs under ESEA, discriminated in favor of nonpublic-school pupils. Both suits provoked angry statements from Orthodox Jewish organizations and an announcement that they would defend the education program against these suits. Rabbi Morris Scherer, director of Agudath Israel of America, charged that the AJCongress was damaging Jewish interests and that its court action would "serve as grist for the mills of those elements who would defame the Jewish people by characterizing it as a nonreligious secularist group."

A bill to permit judicial review of nine specifically designated acts pro-

⁵⁶ Virgil C. Blum, "This Heartless Business," *America*, September 10, 1966, pp. 247-249.

viding federal funds to sectarian institutions was passed by the Senate by voice vote on July 29, but died in the House judiciary committee. Its chairman, Rep. Emanuel Celler (Dem., N.Y.) had long opposed such a measure on the ground that, under existing law, public agencies could obtain a Supreme Court test on the constitutionality of these laws. The AJCommittee, AJCongress, and many other Jewish organizations favored judicial review and submitted statements to that effect during the Senate hearings. The National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA), representing the interests of Orthodox Jewish organizations, submitted a statement opposing judicial review.

State Aid

Early in 1966 the school board of East Greenbush, N.Y., filed suit in the State Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of the New York State Textbook Loan Law of 1965, to go into effect September 1, 1966. Under that law, school boards were required to supply nonpublic-school pupils in grades 7 to 12 with textbooks requested from a list of approved public-school textbooks. The school boards were to be reimbursed by the state up to \$10 per pupil. (After that suit had been filed, the New York State legislature, on May 18, passed a bill providing an increase in the state's reimbursement to school boards to \$25 for each pupil's first year in school and \$10 for each year thereafter. Under pressure from the bill's separationist opponents and then from its supporters, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, on June 27, prevailed upon the legislature to amend the bill to provide a maximum state reimbursement of \$15 per pupil for the first three years in school and \$10 thereafter.)

On August 19 New York State Supreme Court Justice T. Paul Kane, ruling on the East Greenbush suit, declared the textbook-loan law unconstitutional and "in violation of both the establishment clause and the free-exercise clause." The following week Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz appealed the decision to the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court. The state meanwhile received a stay on the court's restraining order to carry out the law. On September 1 New York State school districts were informed they could receive funds under the law; two weeks later, the New York City Board of Education announced that it would purchase textbooks for parochial-school pupils under the law, at an estimated cost of \$2,250,000.

Amicus curiae briefs in support of the state's appeal were filed by the Agudath Israel of America and COLPA. On December 31 all five justices of the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court declared the Textbook Loan Law constitutional. Because they held that the plaintiffs had no standing to bring suit, three justices did not base their decision upon constitutional arguments, though they said they believed the law was constitutional. The other two justices supported the law's constitutionality primarily on the basis of the child-benefit theory: "The availability of books to students at nonsecular schools is little different from the availability of books in the

public library, which are loaned to individuals, regardless of race, color or creed."

Public-bus transportation for parochial-school pupils was at issue in several states. On January 20 the New York State Supreme Court expanded the public-school district's obligation to provide transportation to pupils in parochial schools, even outside their own school district. In March four organizations (Jewish, Unitarian, Baptist, and Presbyterian) filed suit, contending that the 1965 Pennsylvania School Bus law was unconstitutional in its provision of service to parochial-school pupils. On February 2 Delaware Governor Charles L. Terry vetoed a bill that would have provided transportation for parochial- and private-school pupils who lived along established bus routes. He based himself upon a State Supreme Court advisory opinion that the law would violate the state constitution. In a Nebraska statewide referendum, November 8, a bill proposing local options for the public transportation of nonpublic-school pupils was defeated 250,000 to 190,000. The campaign was marked by crude anti-Catholic propaganda including a cartoon of the Pope driving a bus.

Prayer in the Schools

Except for the Bible-belt Southern states, most schools were complying with the Supreme Court rulings forbidding Bible reading and prayer in the public schools. On September 13 Oklahoma's State Attorney General Charles Nesbitt ruled that the continuing Bible reading and prayer in Oklahoma City's public schools were unconstitutional. (He added that he personally did not agree with the Supreme Court decisions.) His ruling did not appreciably affect school boards in Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and elsewhere in the state, which continued their practices of school prayer and Bible reading.

On September 21 the Senate failed to provide the necessary two-thirds majority to pass Senator Everett M. Dirksen's (Rep., Ill.) constitutional amendment to permit prayer in the public school.

Higher Education

On June 2 the Maryland Court of Appeals handed down a ruling on the constitutionality of state grants of \$2.5 million to four church-related colleges, two Catholic, one Methodist, and one United Church of Christ. In 1965 a lower court had upheld the grants as constitutional (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 142). The Court of Appeals, in 4-3 decision, held that the grants to the Catholic and Methodist colleges were invalid because of the schools' pervasively sectarian character. The grant to Hood College (United Church of Christ) was ruled constitutional: "We are unable to say that the college is sectarian in a legal sense under the First Amendment, or to a degree that renders the grant invalid." State Attorney General Thomas B. Finan then appealed the case to the Supreme Court. But, on November 14, the Supreme Court declined to review the case, leaving in effect the Court of

Appeals ruling that public grants to sectarian colleges, even for nonreligious purposes, were unconstitutional. The next day the legislative specialist of the U.S. Office of Education said that the Supreme Court's refusal to review the Maryland case did not affect federal-aid programs to church-affiliated colleges and universities and that such programs would continue as before. The Maryland case involved only Maryland law, he ruled, and the federal government had not been a party to the litigation.

In July Michigan Governor George Romney signed a law designed to equalize tuition costs for students at private and public colleges. Sponsored by the predominantly Catholic Citizens for Educational Freedom and endorsed by the state Board of Education as well as the state's Protestant and Catholic colleges, the law provided tuition grants of \$100 to \$500 a year, based on need. Opponents of the law had included the Michigan and Detroit Council of Churches, various Protestant groups, JWV, and ACLU.

Sabbath Observance

On March 28 a Jewish employee of New York City's Department of Welfare since 1938 brought suit in the State Supreme Court against the city, challenging the scheduling of civil-service examinations on Saturday. He complained that, as an Orthodox Jew, he had unfairly been denied promotion because he was unable to take the examinations on the Sabbath. On May 11 Justice Samuel J. Silverman dismissed the case on the grounds that the city authorities had not violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the petitioner.

The state legislature, on May 22, enacted a law providing that Sabbath observers be permitted to take civil-service examinations scheduled for the Sabbath or a religious holiday on some other, mutually convenient, day.

The federal Equal Opportunity Commission issued, in June, guidelines on Sabbath observance, declaring that it was not religious discrimination for an employer to require his employees to work on Saturday. This ruling was issued in response to about 70 complaints received by the commission during the first year of its operation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In August a delegation from the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada met with Dr. Luther Holcomb, chairman of the commission, requesting him to revise the guidelines in such a way that Sabbath observers might be enabled to adhere to their day of rest without being dismissed from their jobs.

LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ

The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, in 1966, prospects of Arab unity once again dwindled, as conflicting national interests reasserted themselves.

The increasing division of the Arab world into opposing camps presented the United States government with a difficult dilemma: If it maintained its traditional policy of nonintervention in local disputes, it ran the risk of having friendly regimes overthrown and important American interests jeopardized. If, on the other hand, it gave them the needed military and diplomatic support, it ran the risk of becoming identified with one side, a situation that would have exacerbated local and great power rivalries and thus furthered the very polarization that it had striven to avoid. The pressure of events forced the United States to take a more active role than it may have desired.

Revolution vs. Tradition in the Arab World

At the beginning of the year King Faisal of Saudi Arabia embarked on a personal diplomatic offensive, visiting the Middle East and North Africa, from Morocco to Pakistan and from Turkey to the Sudan, in an effort to promote a vague and loosely structured Islamic alignment as a counterweight to the Egyptian-centered Arab League. He found varying degrees of support and common interest among the more conservative, pro-Western states, such as Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, and Tunisia. These shared Saudi Arabia's concern over President Gamal Abdel Nasser's regional ambitions and his heavy dependence on Soviet arms and political support.

Nasser quickly responded by branding Faisal a tool of reactionary elements and an agent of Western imperialism which, he charged, was using the Islamic coalition to block the path of revolutionary Arab socialist regimes. He declared, in February, that "progressive forces must increasingly unite and be vigilant" in order to counteract the reactionary alignments in the Arab world and beyond.

The break became even sharper when Nasser, on June 15, announced the end of the policy of peaceful coexistence among all Arab states irrespective of ideology, a policy he had championed since early 1964 when he convened the first of a series of Arab summit conferences to coordinate Arab policy against Israel. He had now become convinced, he said, that the "progressive forces," among which he usually counted the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Algeria, Syria, and Iraq, could no longer march together with "Arab reactionary elements" (an obvious allusion to Jordan and Saudi Arabia), "even if the road leads to the liberation of Palestine." Nasser regarded the reactionaries as "a danger even greater than Israel itself," and stressed the need to "liquidate Arab reaction, Arab reactionary regimes and reactionary lead-

ers" before Palestine could be liberated. Subsequently, the 1966 Arab summit erupted into a heated dispute, fanned by Cairo and Damascus propaganda and countercharges by Riyadh and Amman, in which Nasser was accused of subservience to Soviet Communist policy and abandoning the struggle against Israel.

South Arabia—New Focus of Middle East Rivalry

While Nasser's hostility to Israel in no way diminished, his preoccupations multiplied in 1966. The British decision to cut its commitments east of Suez and to withdraw from Aden in 1968 had greatly raised the stakes in the stalemated civil war in neighboring Yemen. In an August 1965 agreement with Saudi Arabia, Nasser had promised to withdraw his troops (reported to number 50,000), which were keeping in power an Egyptian-picked Republican regime. But in March 1966 Nasser reversed himself and announced that he would not do so "until the Yemeni revolution is able to defend itself against the conspiracies of imperialism and reaction," and declared his readiness to stay in Yemen for five and even twenty more years, if necessary. (What he did not announce was that he intended to defend Yemen not only against the Royalist faction supported by Saudi Arabia, but also against prominent Yemeni Republican leaders who had become disillusioned with Egyptian domination and who found themselves placed under house arrest when they came to Cairo in September to plead for greater independence.)

The international scramble to fill the vacuum being left by Britain's disengagement in Aden intensified in 1966. A look at the map reveals the reasons. Strategically placed, Aden controls the southern exit from the Red Sea and thus the passage to East Africa, India, and the Far East. Moreover, Aden, as well as the South Arabian Federation of sultanates and sheikhdoms with which it is being united, border on both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. A firm foothold in Yemen and Aden could serve as a useful base for extending influence and eventual control to the oil-rich regions of the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf. The Cairo-backed Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen increased three-fold its terrorist campaign in Aden, and toward the end of the year a series of explosions, for which Saudi officials held pro-Nasserist Yemeni infiltrators responsible, occurred within Saudi Arabia itself, in Jidda, Riyadh, and along the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) pipeline.

The great powers did not remain indifferent. The removal of Western bases from the strategic Middle East had long been a basic aim of Moscow's policy, and Nasser's decision to remain in Yemen was widely rumored to have been reached with Soviet approval. Massive shipments of modern Russian arms into Egypt continued, and Moscow joined Cairo in condemning Faisal's diplomatic initiative as a new version of the unsuccessful Baghdad Pact, engineered by Washington and London.

For its part, the United States on several occasions reaffirmed its opposi-

tion to the use of force, or the threat of force, to change the *status quo* in the Middle East. The American commitment to the preservation of Saudi Arabia's independence and her territorial integrity was dramatized by the official state visit of King Faisal to the United States in June. It was given concrete expression by the start of delivery in 1966 of U.S.-Hawk anti-aircraft missiles (together with British Lightning and Hunter fighter planes) in a \$400 million Saudi air defense system. The United States also agreed, in September, to sell Saudi Arabia \$100 million in armored personnel carriers, trucks, and other vehicles for the modernization of the Saudi army. (The extent of international rivalry for influence in southern Arabia is also indicated by the competition in providing aid and "advisors" in Yemen. The Soviet Union has built a hospital, a school, an airfield and a port; the United States has built roads and installed waterworks; Communist China has built a textile factory and some roads, and East Germany and India have furnished telecommunications and water-pumping equipment.)

The polarization of the Arab world was increased by the February military coup in Syria, which brought into power the most leftist elements of the army and the Ba'ath party. The new regime, which accused ousted President Amin Hafez of having abandoned socialism and watering down the earlier nationalization decrees, was Marxist in ideology and almost Maoist in its doctrinaire style and militant fervor. It received substantial military aid and diplomatic support from the Soviet Union.

Syria's relations with Egypt had been strained since the dissolution of the United Arab Republic in 1961, and relations with Iraq (which was still preoccupied with the Kurdish rebellion) and with Jordan were hardly better. The Soviet Union was eager to help Syria break out of its isolation, and Nasser was looking for allies to bolster the revolutionary camp. Accordingly, during Syrian Premier Yussuf Zu'ayen's visit to Moscow, in April, and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's journey to Cairo, in May, Kosygin worked to bring about a reconciliation which culminated in November in an Egyptian-Syrian mutual defense pact. While some observers feared that Syria would move Egypt to adopt a more militantly anti-Israel posture, others saw in this agreement less of a commitment by Nasser to aid Syria, than an attempt to restrain the hotheads in Damascus from prematurely embroiling the Arab world in a clash with Israel.

There was also some evidence that the Soviet Union, while continuing to denounce the policies of Israel, was not prepared to support the extreme Arab demands for its liquidation. Soviet opposition to any renewal of hostilities in the Middle East was emphasized in a communiqué issued on December 27 at the conclusion of Premier Kosygin's visit to Turkey.

Anti-Israel Terrorist Activities

Nasser's indefinite postponement of the war against Israel brought no decline in Arab-Israel tension. On the contrary, the Arab states' realization that

they were not ready to attack Israel led to an intensification of terrorist activities by paramilitary guerrilla bands. While disclaiming official responsibility for these activities, Syria espoused the doctrine of a people's war and gave aid and support to various Palestinian Arab terrorist bands, the most active of which was al-Fatah. Meanwhile, the United Arab Republic continued to support the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of Ahmed Shukairy, although the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza served as a buffer between his men and Israel.

The other "revolutionary" Arab states, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and Republican Yemen, also gave varying degrees of support to the PLO. Indeed, one point they shared in common was a sympathy for "liberation" movements. Thus, in 1966, they all issued statements supporting the South Vietnamese Liberation Front (Vietcong) and condemning American policy in Vietnam. These were usually reciprocated by Communist Chinese and Vietcong statements of support for the Arabs' struggle against "Western imperialism" and for the "Palestine Arab liberation" movement. Egypt continued to be a major foreign diplomatic outpost for the Vietcong, and the Vietnamese Liberation Front, in October, increased to eight the staff of its political office in Cairo, headed by a member of the Vietcong Central Committee. Shukairy announced, in June, that members of his Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) would go to North Vietnam for guerrilla training and, in December, he stated that PLA trainees had returned from Communist China. Western journalists reported from Cairo that Communist China had been supplying Shukairy with light weapons under a 1965 agreement.

United States Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, in a June 1966 statement to the Jewish Press Association, confirmed the presence of "a militant type of Communist action in the Middle East, much of it directed from Peking," with which "Communist China seeks to infiltrate, to assist, to generate more trouble in the Palestine Liberation movement." The State Department, however, stated that it had no evidence Shukairy was receiving substantial Chinese support. The PLA also had some Soviet equipment, but it was not clear whether it was obtained directly from Moscow or from Nasser's stockpiles.

The PLO and Jordan

In the Arab world Shukairy found growing opposition from some of the more pro-Western Arab states. Tunisia continued publicly to disassociate itself from the "unrealistic" plans to destroy Israel. Although King Hussein of Jordan had originally welcomed the PLO and allowed it to establish headquarters in Jordanian Jerusalem, he and Shukairy soon clashed over PLO plans to impose its own taxes on Palestinians in Jordan and to set up a separate PLA among the refugees. Both Jordan and neighboring Lebanon refused to allow Shukairy to establish training camps or to recruit refugees.

In January Hussein attacked the PLO for its "treasonable" attempts to

undermine Jordanian unity. A pro-PLO demonstration in Jericho a few days later and the discovery of arms caches in Hebron and Jerusalem led to the arrest of some PLO supporters. Discussions, in March, between Shukaairy and Hussein led to an agreement giving the PLO facilities and quasi-diplomatic status in Jordan. But the basic differences could not be resolved, and, in April, scores of PLO officials were arrested on charges of illegal activities.

In June King Hussein publicly denounced the PLO leaders and their Arab supporters for their "subservience to international communism." He ruled out cooperation with the PLO because of its attempts to destroy the unity of the Jordanian people "who constitute the majority of Palestinians." (Jordan has more Palestinian Arabs than all the other Arab states combined; two-thirds of its population is of Palestinian origin.) Shukaairy replied in a Cairo radio broadcast, calling for the overthrow of the Jordanian government.

In October Hussein sent Nasser an official protest against PLO use of Egyptian territory to launch its attacks on Jordan. Following widespread anti-government demonstrations, triggered by an Israeli retaliatory raid and fanned by PLO agitators, King Hussein in November ordered the arrest of hundreds of suspected PLO followers and the seizure of PLO headquarters in Jerusalem and branches in other cities. Shukaairy responded by announcing, at the end of December, that he was creating an underground revolutionary council whose membership and activities would be secret. He called for a virtual holy war against Hussein, the "tyrant of Amman who has betrayed God, the Prophet and Palestine."

The rapprochement with Egypt moved Syria to intensify its anti-Hussein stand. At a rally of Palestinians in Damascus in December, Syrian President Nureddin Attassi urged all "revolutionary forces in Jordan" to close ranks in the "decisive battle against the traitor king." He pledged support and "sufficient arms" to bring about "today the liberation of Jordan; tomorrow, the liberation of Palestine." Early in December King Hussein reported the capture of several Syrian infiltrators, identified as al-Fatah "stormtroopers," after clashes with Jordanian troops. At year's end explosions were set off near government buildings in Amman and Jerusalem, and three members of a Syrian army patrol were arrested. In an interview with *U.S. News and World Report* (December 26, 1966) King Hussein called the infiltration of Syrian commandos via Jordan into Israel "contrary to what was agreed on at Arab summit conferences," that the Arab states were to "prevent anyone from crossing into Israel at this stage." Hussein noted that, for some time, these activities were being directed against Jordan even more than against the Israelis. "We have captured shipments of arms coming into Jordanian territory," he said, "and people have crossed over the border to create trouble here to spread the idea of assassination . . . to create chaos wherever and whenever possible." As a result, Hussein warned, Soviet Communist influence was coming in "through the back door," and posing a "very serious threat to the future of Arabism." He claimed that Moscow had already achieved a position of substantial control over Egypt and Syria.

United States Military Aid

The United States announced in December the shipment of additional arms "to strengthen the defensive capability of the Jordanian armed forces" and to enable Jordan "to assure its security, and thus to contribute further to the stability of the area." The new arms reportedly consisted of \$5 million worth of armored trucks and related equipment to increase the army's strength and mobility along the borders with Israel and Syria. The State Department also let it be known that the United States would expedite the delivery of 36 supersonic F-104 fighter-bombers, which it had agreed to sell to Jordan in April, but which had not yet been shipped because of the exigencies of the Vietnam war. Shukairy denounced the United States for its continued support of Jordan.

In addition to the arms supplies to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the United States in 1966 significantly increased its arms sales to Israel. State Department announcements during the year continued to repeat that the established United States policy was "to refrain from becoming a major supplier of arms" to Middle East countries. Exceptions were made, the Department explained in an official statement on February 5, only for "occasional, selective sales," which were deemed necessary to a state's defense and which "would not be a destabilizing factor." However, in response to developments in the Middle East and the reported overriding of State Department objections by the Pentagon and the White House, sufficient exceptions were made to transform the United States into an important, if not a major, supplier of arms to Israel and the pro-Western Arab states.

In January 1966 the shipment of American Patton tanks to Jordan and of Hawk missiles to Saudi Arabia, as well as the continued flow of Soviet arms to Egypt, evoked public demands by 75 congressmen and 21 major American Jewish organizations for American action to assure Israel's security. As a result, the State Department officially disclosed in February that the United States had, in fact, recently supplied Israel with various items of military equipment "to meet modernization requirements," including the same type Patton tanks furnished to Jordan in 1965. In response to the oft-repeated proposal that the United States seek to persuade the Soviet Union and the other arms suppliers to end the Middle East arms race, the Department revealed that the United States had, over the years, made "repeated quiet efforts" to limit arms buildups in the area. Until those efforts bore fruit, however, the United States could not be indifferent to "the potentially destabilizing effect of massive Soviet sales of arms to the area."

The State Department announcement was welcomed in Israel and denounced by the Arab League in Cairo. Egypt's anger was also aroused by a similarly worded statement, in April, announcing the supply of jets to Jordan, in accordance with "our policy of preventing instability developing" in the Middle East and of maintaining an arms balance. An editorial in the authoritative Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram* expressed "surprise and resentment"

at the American action. Cairo was most offended by United States expression of continued regret at "the massive Soviet sales of arms to certain countries of the Near East which have intensified the arms race in that area"—an obvious allusion to Egypt. *Al Ahrām* also took umbrage at the implication that the United States was concerned with "the arms balance between the UAR and Jordan." The United States-Jordan transaction marked the failure of Cairo's efforts to convince Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon to switch to Soviet arms, ostensibly in order to unify all Arab weapons systems. (Lebanon had just purchased French Mirage jet fighters.)

In mid-May it was revealed that the United States had also agreed to sell Israel some "tactical" jet bombers, of the kind given to Jordan, to serve as a deterrent to the numerically superior air power of the Arab states. The State Department had urged that the transaction be kept secret, and reluctantly acceded to Israel's request to make the sale known when Premier Eshkol's government came under opposition fire for not reacting to the American arms shipments to Israel's Arab neighbors. While Israel hailed the agreement as "a positive step towards the maintenance of stability in the Near East," the Arab states, joined by the Soviet press, attacked it as an American attempt to drive a wedge between the Arab states. Military observers called the transaction a significant departure from past American practice of providing Israel only with strictly defensive missiles, and indicated Washington's acceptance of the view that Israel needed bombers capable of striking at Arab bases and other distant targets to deter the Arabs from launching a sneak air attack. Other sources emphasized that the agreement was proof of America's firm intention to take concrete measures to assure Israel's security.

United States Reaffirms Commitment to Israel

The American concern for Israel's welfare was further demonstrated by the cordial reception President Zalman Shazar received in Washington in August on what the State Department termed a "private and informal visit" at the conclusion of his Latin American tour. President Johnson, however, received him with virtually all the pomp and circumstance of a formal state visit. At a White House state dinner on August 2, Mr. Johnson, in a toast, recalled the American commitment to Middle East peace made by the late President John F. Kennedy on May 8, 1963 "as a declaration of the leader of this country and as a spokesman for this land." Quoting Kennedy's words, "We strongly support the security of both Israel and her neighbors. . . We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East," President Johnson added: "We subscribe to that policy."

An Israeli retaliatory raid into Jordan in November provoked American condemnation, but only briefly clouded the amicable relations. In December Vice President Humphrey noted "the great potential for conflict in the Middle East," and again emphasized United States commitment to oppose aggression which could threaten Middle East peace and to secure "the integrity of Israel as an independent state."

In the nonpolitical field, the close ties between Israel and the United States were strengthened by the announcement, in January 1966 at Independence, Mo., of a \$4.1 million Harry S. Truman Center for the Advancement of Peace, to be built in Jerusalem with American private contributions; the dedication on July 4 of a striking monument to President Kennedy atop a hill in the outskirts of Jerusalem in the center of the Kennedy Peace Forest, and the announcement, in November, by Jacob Blaustein that he was donating \$500,000 for the construction of a Center for American Studies at the University in Jerusalem, which will accommodate 1,500 students and house a specialized library, document archives, and audio-visual facilities (p. 427).

United States Aid to Israel

However, Israel officials found it increasingly difficult to convince the United States government that Israel still required economic aid. During their visits to the United States, Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Finance Minister Phineas Sappir pointed out that Israel's extraordinarily heavy defense burdens and unabsorbed immigrant population made such aid necessary. In December 1965 Sappir had presented to Washington requests for a \$39 million loan for development of industry, communications, and electrical power, and for \$70 million in surplus foods to be delivered over the next two years. The previous food-aid agreement had expired on June 30, 1965, as had a similar but larger-scale United States agreement with the UAR (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 262).

After lengthy negotiations, two new Food for Peace agreements were concluded in Washington in June to provide Israel with \$32 million worth of agricultural commodities during the year. Under one agreement Israel was to pay \$23.5 million in her own currency for feedgrains, wheat, cottonseed, and soybean oil. Seventy per cent of the Israel currency generated from the sale was to be used for approved social and economic development projects in Israel; 25 per cent by the United States government for its expenses, and the remaining 5 per cent for loans to private American and Israeli firms. The other agreement provided for the purchase on long-term credit of \$8.5 million worth of feedgrains to be paid for in dollars. In addition, Israel has been buying annually an average of \$50 million worth of food from private sources in the United States. As Israel's government-directed "moderation" of the inflationary economic boom began to boomerang into a recession, Sappir said, in September, that he would try to convince the United States to sell more food to Israel for local currency because the dollar cost "has now become a heavy burden on Israel's foreign currency balance." On September 29, at a Washington dinner, Sappir received pledges of \$336,000 for Capital for Israel, Inc., a new holding corporation seeking to attract \$20 million in private United States investments. In May Israel completed repayment of its first independence bond issue.

A request for allocation of I£3 million (\$1 million) from United States counterpart funds in Israel for the Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem was at

first denied by the United States government. The appropriation was later included, with bi-partisan congressional support, in the foreign aid act after testimony in the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Mrs. Mortimer Jacobson, Hadassah's national president.

Israel was granted a \$10 million United States development loan in May, and in November President Johnson announced that \$6 million of a previous AID development loan had been earmarked for expansion of electric power facilities in Tel Aviv. Discussions continued during the year on the proposed \$200 million nuclear-fueled desalination and electric power plant in Israel. However, in view of unresolved economic and political questions, no firm agreement was reached.

Aid to the United Arab Republic

President Johnson opened the way for resumption of United States aid to Egypt when he informed Secretary of State Rusk, on December 29, 1965, that "I hereby determine that it is essential to the national interest of the United States to finance export sales of surplus agricultural commodities to the United Arab Republic." An irate Congress had earlier barred all aid to Egypt unless the President specifically made such a determination.

In January 1966 an agreement was signed in Cairo under which the United States was to provide Egypt with \$55 million of surplus wheat, cooking oil, tobacco, and frozen chickens. The terms were somewhat stiffer than earlier agreements. One-fourth of this amount, \$13.75 million for wheat, was to be repaid in dollars over a period of 20 years at a low 2½ per cent interest. The remainder was to be paid in Egyptian currency, with 75 per cent of United States counterpart funds to be used for mutually acceptable development projects in Egypt. These terms were similar to those in the subsequent agreement with Israel, but the agreement with Israel was for a whole year while that with the UAR was limited to six months.

In addition to the usual provisions of aid agreements, requiring that the commodities be used for domestic consumption and forbidding the export of these or like commodities to "nations unfriendly to the United States," the United States also set the special condition that the total cotton acreage planted in the UAR in the coming year would not be higher than "the present acreage." This was interpreted as an indirect effort by the United States government to help curb the arms race, since President Nasser in recent years had been increasing his cotton acreage to pay for the more than \$1 billion in Soviet arms shipments. One of the major Congressional arguments against aid for Egypt was that American wheat enabled Egypt to use its land to grow cotton for Russian arms instead of food for its own people. An editorial in *Al Ahram* acknowledged that six of every ten loaves of bread eaten in Egypt were made of American wheat.

In response to Representative Leonard Farbstein's (Dem., N.Y.) protest against the resumption of aid to Egypt, Assistant Secretary of State Douglas MacArthur II wrote on February 1 that the administration had acted be-

cause of the improvement in relations with the UAR; Egypt's "increasing attention to internal problems of economic and social development," and the "constructive and helpful role the UAR has played in several current international issues"—apparently a reference to Cairo's unsuccessful efforts to intercede with North Vietnam for the release of American prisoners.

In February the United States turned over to Egypt the second half of its \$12 million contribution to the fund for saving the Temple of Abu Simbel. In September a \$40 million electric power plant, which doubled the energy available to Cairo, was inaugurated. The plant, the largest American industrial aid project in Egypt, had been authorized by President Kennedy under a 40-year loan with interest at only $\frac{3}{4}$ of 1 per cent. Another symbol of improving relations was the official visit to Washington in February of Anwar Sadat, speaker of the Egyptian national assembly and one of the group of army officers who overthrew King Farouk in 1952. Sadat was the first member of President Nasser's inner circle to visit Washington.

However, the era of good relations did not last. The very day Sadat arrived in Washington, Nasser lashed out at the United States for its support of Israel and his "reactionary" Arab enemies, condemned American policy in Vietnam, and announced his determination to stay in Yemen. The domestic economic reform measures, cited by Secretary MacArthur, soon proved disappointing. Premier Zakariya Mohieddine was hampered in his efforts to reform the Egyptian economy through austerity measures, cutting of the bureaucracy, and shifting the emphasis from prestigious but unproductive industrial projects to expansion of agriculture on a scientific basis. Mohieddine was also opposed by the doctrinaire Socialists in the Nasser regime for trying to encourage Western private investment in the newly discovered oil deposits and in a free trade zone at Port Said. In part to offset concessions granted to two American firms—Pan-American Oil (a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana) and Phillips Petroleum Company—the UAR in February concluded a technical agreement with the Soviet Union to help the Egyptian government-owned General Petroleum Corporation search for oil. This agreement was used to block the bids for oil rights submitted by other Western firms.

An urgent request by the Egyptian government in the spring for a \$70 million loan from the International Monetary Fund was rejected in August because of Cairo's failure to undertake recommended economic measures, including the devaluation of the Egyptian pound and a sharp cut in inflationary government deficit spending. A team of Russian economists gave Nasser much the same advice in October. The Fund was also concerned over the continuing economic drain of the Yemen war, conservatively estimated to cost more than \$40 million annually, as well as the expenditure of roughly \$650 million a year for military and security services.

For these and other reasons, Washington also refused to act on Nasser's request for \$150 million in additional surplus food after the January agreement ran out. The ouster in September of Premier Mohieddine and his team

of experienced economic advisors; the appointment of the more leftist Mohammed Sidky Solaiman as premier, and the inclusion of additional army officers in the cabinet, were interpreted in the West as signs that Nasser was again turning to more centralized control of the economy and the adoption of other policies unfavorable to foreign investment.

Another complicating factor was the change in the United States foreign-aid legislation introduced in 1966, barring United States wheat to countries trading with North Vietnam. Egypt had exported a small quantity of cotton to North Vietnam during 1966.

In addition to the wheat it received from the United States under the January aid agreement, the UAR during 1966 imported \$58 million from American commercial sources, for which it has to pay dollars within three years, and from Western European suppliers. But by the end of the year, Egypt's foreign exchange shortage had become so acute that it had to sell one-third of its dwindling gold reserves and defaulted on payments due on its loans to foreign creditors, including the United States and the International Monetary Fund.

United States Revises its Aid Policy

In December it was reported from Cairo that the Soviet Union, which had had a bumper crop of grain, had promised to provide wheat to Egypt which had almost depleted its stock. The United States did not move to match the Russian offer, as it would have done previously, because of a basic reappraisal of its approach to foreign food aid. The reasons were that doubts had been raised as to the value of aid as a means of political influence, and that a growing population and past aid shipments had virtually eaten up the American food stockpile. Accordingly, under the revised Food for Peace program, the United States placed major emphasis on encouraging underdeveloped countries to develop their own agriculture. At the same time, the United States prodded the other developed countries to join in providing technical assistance and supplying food aid. Moreover, Washington viewed the serious famine in India as a more urgent problem.

The new thinking was reflected in the overall drop in American aid to Israel and to 12 Arab states from \$402 million (of which \$267 million was surplus food) in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, to \$262 million (\$154 million in food) in the 1966 fiscal year. The only country continuing to receive large-scale grants in 1966 was Jordan, which got \$35.6 million in grants plus \$7.9 million in loans. Algeria received \$25.4 million and Morocco \$40.3 million, mostly in surplus commodities; Sudan received \$17.4 million and Tunisia \$18.9 million, mostly in development loans. Other Arab states received less than \$5 million each.

Jordan Water Dispute

One of the heralded creations of the Arab summit conferences of 1964

and 1965 was the Arab Authority for the Exploitation of the Jordan River and Its Tributaries, for the proclaimed purpose of diverting the sources of the Jordan before they could flow into Israel (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 254). With the widening split in the Arab world in 1966, the diversion authority lost much of its impetus, and probably much of its financial backing as well. General Ali Ali Amer, the Egyptian commander-in-chief of the Unified Arab Command (UAC), disclosed in Cairo that Arab League members had paid only 26 per cent of the 1966 budget for the UAC, which was created primarily for the military defense of the Arab diversion works against possible Israeli attack.

The individual riparian states continued their various diversion schemes. In May King Hussein laid the foundation stone for the Mukheiba Dam on the Yarmuk River, the principal tributary of the lower Jordan (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 256). In his dedication speech, Hussein appealed to the Arab states to bury their differences and cooperate "to eliminate the Zionist threat." The official reaction in Israel was that the dam's projected capacity (200 million cubic meters) was consistent with Jordan's allocation of Yarmuk water under the 1955 Johnston Plan (AJYB, 1955 [Vol. 56], p. 288; 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 256), and thus not in conflict with Israel's own national water carrier.

Israel was far less sanguine, however, regarding the diversion activities in Syria. Prime Minister Eshkol, on several occasions, reaffirmed Israel's willingness to adhere to its obligations under the Johnston Plan if the Arab states did likewise. In a radio broadcast on April 23, in an obvious reference to Israel's shelling of Syrian diversion works in 1965 (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 255), he noted that "with firmness and commendable efficacy, the Israel Defense Forces frustrated the beginning of a diversion plan" by neighboring states "aimed at robbing us of water due to us by virtue of elementary justice and international law."

On July 14, Israel air force jets, in an unusual daylight raid, penetrated 10 miles into Syria and attacked engineering installations, earth-moving equipment, and tractors near the north-eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, which Israel said were being used "to divert the Jordan tributaries." In the air action Israel planes shot down their first Syrian Mig-21. An Israel army spokesman explained that the attack was also in retaliation for 103 Syrian incidents of mining, sabotage, shootings, setting fire to fields, and damage to agricultural equipment, that had caused 16 casualties since February.

The Syrian daily *Al Thawra*, which reflects official thinking, charged that the attack was "part of an over-all imperialist conspiracy against the Syrian revolution." The government-controlled Egyptian press blamed the United States, arguing that U.S. bombing of North Vietnam had encouraged Israel's "provocative aggression" against Syria. The Syrian government vowed to continue its efforts for the "liberation" of Palestine.

In September it was reported that Syria had resumed work on the diversion project, this time with tractors of the Syrian Army's engineering corps.

In December the manager of kibbutz Shamir in northern Israel reported steady progress by the Syrians on a project to divert the waters of the Dufela springs. (The kibbutz's entire water supply comes from the springs located 300 yards within Syria, which the kibbutz has been sharing with Syria under a 1951 agreement.) At the end of the year Israel Minister of Labor Yigal Allon reiterated Israel's warning that she would not allow Syria to deprive her of water.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE

In a rare display of agreement, both Israel and the Arab states publicly urged U Thant to accept an additional term as secretary-general of the United Nations, and subsequently expressed their satisfaction at his reelection. In his annual report to the General Assembly in September, Thant warned that "dangerous tensions persist" in the Middle East and pleaded for peace in the region.

United Nations Emergency Force

In a separate report on the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) stationed along Egypt's Sinai and Gaza Strip border with Israel, Thant noted that the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) had increased its activities and that there had been "differences" between PLA and UNEF personnel. Although serious incidents were avoided with "the help of local authorities," the report emphasized that "the operational deployment of detachments of the Palestine Liberation Army just outside the 500-metre zone of the Armistice demarcation line and increased patrolling and training activity of their units in this area are unavoidably of concern to UNEF and its functioning." It said that, while UNEF had no means of establishing the size of PLA, "public indications by local sources in Gaza have put its strength at 12,000."

UNEF's own strength at the end of June was down to 3,959 and a further reduction to 3,400 was planned for economy reasons on the assumption that "relative quiet" would continue. While there had been no major incidents, the report noted "some disturbing signs recently" that the situation could change, and warned that, in the event of the removal of the UN buffer, "serious fighting would, quite likely, soon be resumed."

After terrorist incursions into Israel and increasingly severe military clashes along the Jordan-Israel and Syrian-Israel borders had escalated in November, Senator Jacob K. Javits (Rep., N.Y.) urged Secretary of State Dean Rusk to ask that UNEF buffer forces be stationed along these Arab-Israel borders as well, a proposal that was rejected by Assistant Secretary MacArthur because of "major difficulties both of a political and financial nature." He noted that neither Israel nor Jordan would accept UN forces on their common borders. In view of this opposition, Washington offered both Israel and Jordan the latest technical devices for detecting infiltrators as a more

effective means of guarding the borders. Reports from Israel indicated that it had, on its own, begun to erect physical barriers along the more troublesome border stretches near urban centers.

A vigorous Israeli dissent to the whole concept of UNEF was presented by Major General Moshe Dayan, commander-in-chief of the Israel Defense Forces in the 1956 Sinai Campaign and more recently a leader of the Rafi party, in an address before the Zionist Organization of America in New York on November 27. Dayan said he would have "preferred to see the Egyptian troops returning to their positions in Sinai," together with a guarantee of Israel shipping through the Strait of Tiran to Elath. He explained:

I prefer the normalization of even hostile relations over artificial arrangements. Arab and Israel farmers should plough their lands right up to the frontier, and get used to living in neighborly proximity. The troops and government of Egypt must reconcile themselves to the fact that Israel is their neighbor. The buffer of foreign troops merely creates a fiction in neighbor-relations, and thereby defers peace.

In response to this criticism, State Department officials made a point of emphasizing that American efforts to improve Arab-Israel border security were not intended to seal Israel off from its neighbors permanently and hermetically.

After a visit to the area, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.) proposed in December that, instead of creating a new UNEF, the personnel of the observer teams of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) be increased five-fold and an attempt be made to organize mixed Arab-Israeli patrols along the Syrian and Jordanian borders. This followed a report to the Security Council by Secretary-General Thant, calling for more cooperation by Israel and the Arab states in providing around-the-clock liaison with UNTSO, more flexibility for its operations, and greater use of experts. He recommended the use of helicopters and speedboats for greater mobility of the observer teams, but noted that this would "substantially increase the cost of operation." MacArthur, in his reply to Javits, stated that "the United States intends fully to support the Secretary-General's proposals."

During the year the deficit-ridden UN again sought, without success, to find an agreed formula for financing its various peace-keeping operations. The cost of UNEF was \$14 million in 1966.

Security Council Debates Border Incidents

As Arab terrorist raids within Israel and armed clashes across the Syrian-Israel and Jordanian-Israel frontiers increased (p. 424), scarcely a week passed without a letter of complaint from one of the parties to the UN Security Council. On three occasions during the year the Security Council engaged in extensive debates after it was formally asked to intervene and adopt resolutions of condemnation.

The first debate grew out of a Syrian complaint in July over Israel's "act

of aggression" against Syrian diversion works on July 14. The following day Israel filed a countercharge, asking the Council to consider "the repeated acts of aggression committed by Syrian armed forces and by armed saboteur groups, and Syrian Government statements openly inciting to war against Israel." After more than a week of deliberations, the Council rejected a draft resolution submitted by Jordan and Mali asking for a condemnation of Israel's air attack. The vote was six in favor (Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, and the USSR), with nine abstentions (Argentina, China, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.) The resolution was not adopted since it failed to receive the requisite nine affirmative votes.

United States delegate Joseph J. Sisco explained that the United States could not support the draft because it pointed blame only in one direction and failed to take into account Syria's responsibility for the mining incidents, which had killed one Israeli and wounded three others in four incidents near the Syrian border during the 48 hours preceding Israel's retaliatory raid. Earlier, during the debate, Sisco rejected the Syrian claim that it had no responsibility to prevent the terrorist raids. He also "deplored" Israel's decision to reply with armed force instead of relying on the UN. Similar views were stated by the other abstainers. Soviet Delegate Nikolai T. Fedorenko charged that Israel's action reflected the "strengthening of the imperialistic policies of the Western powers and their agents in the Near East." The Syrian and Iraqi delegates echoed the charges of American-Israeli collusion. In reply, Sisco insisted that the United States had not been consulted and had no prior knowledge of the air strike.

The second major debate, in October and November, dealt with Israel's complaint against the "renewal of organized and armed infiltration by Syria into Israeli territory," with the dynamiting of two apartment houses in Jerusalem—the 61st major incident since January 1965—and Syria's open incitement of al-Fatah and other terrorist groups to destroy Israel.

United States Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, in his opening statement on October 14, pointed out that there was abundant evidence that al-Fatah had committed a series of acts of violence against Israel, causing loss of life and posing "a constant threat to the citizens of a Member State." The root of the problem, he said, was "the attitude and policy" of the Syrian government, as expressed on October 12 in a statement of the Syrian army's chief of staff, that al-Fatah's operations were "legitimate actions which we should not restrict but should support and abet," and in a Syrian government broadcast a day earlier that "under no circumstances" would it be willing "to hold back the revolution of the expelled and oppressed Palestinian people." Goldberg emphasized that Syria was "bound by solemn commitments" not to support such actions, not only under the UN Charter, but also by its vote in favor of the December 21, 1965 General Assembly resolution providing that " . . . no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent over-

throw of the regime of another State . . .” Most specifically, Syria was bound to refrain from such hostile actions by the terms of the Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement. Goldberg called the activities “Syria has been condoning in violation of these commitments,” very dangerous to peace in the area and urged Syria to ensure that its territory was not used as “a base for terrorism or destruction, with or without the consent of the Syrian Government.”

In the midst of the Security Council debate, 19 members of Brith Trumfeldor (Betar), the Zionist Revisionist youth group, forced their way into the ambassador’s office at the Syrian Mission in New York, where they staged a half-hour sit-in, chanting “End Syrian aggression!” and singing Hebrew songs as well as “We Shall Overcome.” After the police led the demonstrators away, Ambassador Goldberg personally signed a complaint against them on behalf of the United States government. They appeared in criminal court on charges of disorderly conduct, unlawful assembly, failure to disperse, and trespassing. They pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and the other charges were dropped; they were let off with a judicial reprimand. Planned to lend moral support to the presentation of Israel’s case in the Council, the demonstration quickly backfired, enabling the Arab states and their supporters to divert public attention from the issue debated and to focus instead on the Zionist “invasion” and “aggression” perpetrated against the Syrian mission. The demonstration was universally condemned in the Jewish community, and by the Israel mission to the UN.

Although Ambassador Goldberg publicly apologized to Syria for “this highly regrettable incident,” a formal protest on behalf of the UN African-Asian group was delivered to Secretary-General Thant by the representatives of Jordan, Mali, and Turkey. After presenting the protest to Goldberg on November 17, Thant announced that he had received assurances that the United States would fulfill its obligations as host government.

During the Council’s debate later on the same day, George J. Tomeh, the Syrian delegate, charged that Goldberg’s support of the Israel complaint was proof of his “complete identification” with Zionism, not only as a spiritual and cultural heritage (referring to the Goldberg speech of May 1965; AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 273) but also as a “rigid political organization.” Goldberg denied this accusation and noted that he had been quoted out of context, for he had also called for good relations with the Arab states. Goldberg emphasized that more important than his personal statement—but by no means inconsistent with it—were his enunciations of the policies of his government, whose basic position was that “the United States, in keeping with the action taken by the United Nations, supports the independence of all states in the area—Israel, Syria and other countries, all other Arabic countries in the area.”

On October 28, after Arab terrorists had derailed an Israeli freight train near Jerusalem, Goldberg emphasized the need for quick Council action to ease tension and prevent a “showdown.” Had it been a passenger train, he

said, "there would have been a shock wave all through the Middle East with incalculable consequences." Goldberg also expressed his government's approval of Israel's desire to seek assistance through "peaceful political means" by bringing its complaint to the Security Council "where matters such as this should be settled."

A joint American-British resolution moderately critical of Syria, that appeared to have no chance of adoption, was replaced by a milder resolution sponsored by Argentina, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Uganda. This six-power draft deplored the incidents and the loss of life caused by them; invited the government of Syria "to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents that constitute a violation of the General Armistice Agreement" (the Anglo-American draft would have "reminded" Syria "to fulfill its obligations" to prevent the use of its territory as a base for anti-Israeli acts); invited Israel "to cooperate fully with the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission" (Israel had not attended regular meetings since 1951 because of a dispute as to the competence of the MAC to deal with the demilitarized zones), and called on both sides to facilitate the work of the UN Truce Supervision Organization and to refrain from any action that might increase tension.

When put to a vote on November 4, the resolution was supported by 10 members, with China abstaining, and although only 4 voted against (Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali and the USSR) the Soviet Union's veto defeated it. Soviet delegate Fedorenko said that Syrian responsibility had not been proved and repeated the charge that the real threats to peace were "the aggressive policies of Tel Aviv" and "the imperialist circles" which were trying to thwart progressive Arab development.

Despite the veto, Israel officials expressed satisfaction over the moral vindication of their position. Similarly, Ambassador Goldberg noted that widespread support of the resolution on a broadly geographical basis was "a matter of high import not to be ignored," and reemphasized the fundamental United States policy in the Middle East "to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and the maintenance of unbroken peace."

However, on the night of November 12 another sabotage incident occurred on the Jordanian border (p. 426). Israel responded with a large-scale daylight retaliation action, which rapidly escalated as Jordan Arab Legion reinforcements rushed to the scene. In the resulting clash, according to UN observers, 18 Jordanians were killed and 54 injured, with three of the fatalities and 17 of the wounded being civilians. (One Israeli officer was killed and 10 soldiers were wounded.) The UN report stated that more than 150 houses had been destroyed in Es Samu—Israel said that the actual number of buildings demolished was 40. Three days later Jordan called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider Israel's "act of aggression against the citizens and territory of Jordan."

At the Council session on November 16, the three major Western powers joined the Soviet Union in vigorously condemning Israel. Ambassador Gold-

berg declared that the nature of the Israeli raid and its "consequences in human lives and in destruction far surpass the cumulative total" of the Arab terrorist acts. He summed up the general sentiment in the Council when he pointed out that "this deliberate governmental decision must be judged as the conscious act of responsible leaders of a Member State and, therefore, on an entirely different level" than the earlier Arab terrorist incidents, "which we continue to deplore." Moreover, the government of Jordan had not been implicated in the terrorists acts—a point that was stressed by the British and French delegates as well.

At the end of the debate, on November 25, the Security Council censured Israel in its most strongly worded resolution against Israel in more than a decade, which diplomats considered just a step short of a specific threat of economic and other sanctions. It was adopted by a vote of 14 in favor, with New Zealand abstaining. New Zealand refused to support the resolution because it failed to include a fair appraisal of the total situation that moved Israel to retaliate as well as constructive proposals for checking a recurrence of violence. An implied reference to Arab terrorism was made in a preambular clause referring to earlier resolutions "for the cessation of violent incidents across the demarcation line, and not overlooking past incidents of this nature . . . The resolution warned Israel that "actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that if they are repeated, the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts."

United States support of this resolution was partly based on a concern that Israel's action had embarrassed King Hussein, the moderate, pro-Western ruler of Jordan, and jeopardized the stability of his kingdom by providing a rallying point for anti-Hussein Palestinian militants. It took several weeks for Hussein to quell the widespread demonstrations and disturbances that erupted after the Israeli attack and which, Hussein said, had been instigated by the PLO and "Communists and Marxists," with the backing of Syria and Egypt.

ARAB REFUGEES

UNRWA's Financial Difficulties

In his report to the General Assembly for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, Lawrence Michelmore, commissioner-general of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), concluded that "as year succeeds year, there is no sign that the refugees are becoming any less embittered," and that, therefore, the refugee problem's implication for peace and stability in the Middle East "remain as grave as ever."

The number of refugees registered with UNRWA at the end of the period totalled 1,317,749, an increase of nearly 37,000 from the previous year. The decline in the number of ration recipients from 874,594 to 861,122 was al-

most entirely caused by the fact that UNRWA's 12,000 local workers and their families received a cash allowance in place of rations. The number of ration recipients did not rise because UNRWA continued to impose ceilings on the total in each of the four host countries—Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip.

UNRWA also failed to make any substantial progress in resolving its chronic financial problems. An emergency fund-raising trip by Michelmore early in the year brought several additional contributions, including \$2 million from Sweden, which, he said, succeeded "in averting a collapse of the Agency's services" by reducing the 1966 deficit to about \$1 million from the \$4.2 million projected at the start of the year.

Michelmore expected 1967 contributions to fall "more than \$4 million short of the target" for several reasons. To begin with, the 1967 budget was projected at \$39.3 million as against \$37.8 million in 1966, of which \$17.3 million went for relief, \$15.5 million for education, and \$5.0 million for health services. The \$1.5 million increase in 1967 was to meet rising costs and an increase of student enrolment in elementary and preparatory schools. A second factor was a cut in the United States contribution to UNRWA from \$22.9 million to \$22.2 million for the 1966-67 fiscal year, in keeping with the policy of gradual retrenchment instituted by Congress (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 267). At the UNRWA Pledging Conference in December, United States delegate Harding F. Bancroft noted that the United States had contributed more than \$400 million over the years and that Washington believed that its current contribution was still "disproportionately high." The United States further asked that as much of its contribution as possible be used for education and vocational training. Other states, such as Britain, France, Switzerland, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries, specifically earmarked increasing portions of their contributions for education.

The cut in the United States contribution also indicated congressional impatience over UNRWA's failure to rectify its ration rolls and prevent fraud in the relief program. Michelmore conceded in his report that "only limited progress" had been made in this direction in response to the General Assembly's directive of December 1965 calling for equitable distribution of rations on the basis of need. UNRWA considered the state of the ration rolls in Lebanon "reasonably satisfactory." In Gaza the local authorities had helped remove 4,265 ineligible persons from the rolls. Their places were given to children from the waiting list, which had grown to over 27,000. In Syria, UNRWA had been unable to check who was receiving rations or to insure that they were distributed according to proven need.

The greatest problem continued to be Jordan, with more than half of the registered refugees, and with a waiting list of over 205,000 children. Michelmore noted that past attempts to rectify relief abuses in the country, "such as the activities of the so-called merchants, who traffic in ration cards and ration commodities and who have a vested interest in the existing inaccuracies in the rolls, have also often failed, owing to adverse reactions among

the refugees." A potentially significant step forward was an agreement concluded in June between Jordan and UNRWA, providing for the exchange of all existing ration cards for new ones, the personal appearance of heads of families showing proof of their identity, and the investigation of suspected false or duplicate registrations by a joint Jordanian-UNRWA committee. Jordan, the only Arab host country to grant the Palestinian refugees full citizenship and equal rights, has quietly taken measures to facilitate their economic rehabilitation. A further sign of realistic approach to the refugees' integration within Jordanian society was a statement by King Hussein on June 14, condemning the maintenance of the refugees in a state of poverty "in their camps surrounded by barbed wire" so that Arab delegates could justify their "continued begging" for funds at the UN. He declared:

People living on charity lose their dignity and their cause. To say that this misery produces hatred and that hatred, ignorance and starvation lead to victory is nonsense and absolutely illogical. The victors will be those who live proudly on their land and the land of their family and brothers where they are given a chance to become physically and mentally fit.

Shukairy's answer was a denunciation of the King over Cairo radio, with shouts from the audience calling on the Jordanians to revolt and kill Hussein. The strength of the refugee opposition may have prompted Jordan to ask UNRWA, later in the summer, to defer "temporarily" implementation of the rectification agreement.

UNRWA and the Palestine Liberation Army

Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on refugees and escapees, reported in June that members of his staff, who had just completed an on-the-spot investigation, found that PLA recruits were still receiving UNRWA rations in Gaza and Syria, and that such aid was "incompatible with United States policy and with the fundamental concept of the United Nations." At the same time, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved an amendment by Rep. Leonard Farbstein (Dem., N.Y.) to the Foreign Assistance Act, banning further United States contributions to UNRWA unless it takes "all possible measures to assure that no part of the United States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving training as a member of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army."

In testimony before the Kennedy subcommittee on July 20, Raymond A. Hare, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs—though critical of relief abuses and the continued presence on UNRWA lists of refugees in Gaza and Syria serving in the PLA—asked the Senate to restore the \$700,000 cut by the House on the ground that this might force UNRWA to make reductions in its vital health and education services. Kennedy proposed that the \$700,000 in question be earmarked to

build a vocational training school to be operated by one of the Arab host governments for the benefit of both refugee and nonrefugee students. However, the committee failed to adopt the Kennedy proposal and the Senate approved the cut made by the House. The Senate also endorsed the House ban on the use of United States aid to feed PLA recruits.

UNRWA officials claimed that it was impossible for them to screen out PLA recruits in the absence of both accurate relief rolls and active cooperation by the local Arab authorities. Officials in Gaza and Syria continued to refuse access to PLA trainees lists on the ground that this was classified military information. To meet the objections by the United States and other governments, Michelmores announced, he had arranged for "special added donations"—subsequently revealed to have come from Arab sources—in the amount of \$150,000, "which meets the total cost of any rations consumed" by refugees in the PLA. He said, in conclusion, that these arrangements "provide a practical means of disposing of the problem insofar as the Agency is concerned."

However, during the annual debate in the UN Special Political Committee in the fall, several states took issue with Michelmores's approach. Frank Corner of New Zealand remarked pointedly that, while the commissioner-general's arrangement might provide a practical solution for the agency, "it does not dispose of the issue of principle so far as Governments are concerned." He stressed that no UN agency could give "any support, direct or indirect," to a group like the PLO, since "the extremist demands of the refugees" to annihilate Israel, "whether by direct attack by regular forces, or by a so-called war of national liberation by irregular forces, would represent a threat to international peace and security and, by implication, a threat to all United Nations members." Ambassador Michael Comay of Israel stated that PLA recruits in the Gaza Strip were "openly and officially recruited and trained, and even march in public parades." And since a certain age group had been conscripted (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 266), Comay suggested that the ration cards of all men in that group be suspended, and the burden of proving which of them had been exempted from recruitment be placed on the authorities, or the refugees concerned.

In the debate, U.S. Ambassador Bancroft reiterated American opposition to UNRWA aid to the PLA, even through Michelmores's financial arrangements. As a matter "of principle," he said, the UN "should not give the impression that it condones or regards with indifference the involvement of any United Nations agency with an organization" dedicated to the use of armed force. He also emphasized that "much more" needs to be done to rectify relief rolls and also called on UNRWA to act "promptly and vigorously" to "stop the trafficking in ration cards and ration commodities." He called it "outrageous to allow a few profiteers to cheat needy refugees out of benefits provided by the international community." The announcement at the December pledging conference of the American contribution to UNRWA for fiscal 1967 indicated, however, the United States govern-

ment's apparent tacit acceptance of the view that the commissioner-general's arrangement did not violate the letter of the congressional injunction against United States aid to the PLA.

UNRWA Debate at the UN

The UNRWA debate in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee generally took the lines of earlier years. All Arab League UN members, except Tunisia, joined in a request to give a hearing to a spokesman of the PLO, which was followed by a similar request from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Palestine Arab Delegation, a rival refugee group backed by the Arab Higher Committee of Haj Amin el-Husseini, former Mufti of Jerusalem. As in the previous year, the committee agreed to hear individual speakers from both groups with the understanding that such authorization did not imply UN recognition. On November 14 the committee adopted a United States draft resolution, similar to that adopted in 1965. The resolution contained three amendments proposed by Somalia, which 1. eliminated the implied criticism of the Arab states for impeding progress in rectifying relief rolls; 2. specifically appealed to "non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions" (although the number of UNRWA contributors had increased considerably in the past two years, and some states had increased their aid, two-thirds of all UN members, including the Soviet Union, refused support), and 3. substituted for the draft's expression of regret that the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) had been unable to achieve any "progress on implementation of paragraph 11" of a 1948 resolution on the repatriation or resettlement of the refugees, "because of the unchanged situation in the area," a request that the CCP "intensify its efforts" for implementation. (This ran counter to the CCP's own admission, in its report of September 30, 1966, that it saw no way out of the present impasse without "substantial changes" in the underlying political climate—and that "there was no evidence that such changes were taking place.")

A fourth Somali amendment, which would have singled out Israel instead of calling on all the parties to cooperate with the CCP, was defeated by a vote of 39 to 33, with 38 abstentions. The committee also rejected (by a vote of 38 to 36, with 36 abstentions) a separate resolution by Afghanistan, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Somalia, calling for the appointment of a UN custodian "to protect and administer" and to collect income from Arab refugee property in Israel. (While the sponsors had picked up two more votes than in 1965, the number of abstentions had increased by 13, reflecting the reluctance of the newly independent states to support a precedent undermining a state's exclusive jurisdiction within its own territory.)

The United States resolution, as amended, was adopted by a vote of 65 to 0, with 45 abstentions. Israel, which had cast the sole negative vote in 1965, decided to abstain, as did all the Arab states. Comay explained that

Israel would have voted for a separate resolution continuing UNRWA's relief and welfare services—especially in view of the resolution's call for rectification and the stated opposition of the United States and other delegations to UNRWA aid to the PLA—but did not do so because it considered the reference to the controversial paragraph 11 superfluous, ill-advised, and an obstacle to progress. Comay asked the UN to concentrate, "without prejudice to political attitudes," on the economic and social rehabilitation and integration of the refugees, for which massive funds should be placed at its disposal. At the same time, he reiterated Israel's willingness to pay compensation within the framework of a settlement of the refugee problem.

ARAB ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

The Arab Boycott

In his January 1966 report to Congress on United States foreign aid during fiscal 1965, President Johnson stated that "there has been some success in mitigating the effects of the Arab boycott on certain American firms and individuals." As for travel restrictions imposed against United States citizens on religious grounds, which had been gradually reduced in recent years, he noted that "there was little progress in fiscal 1965." During 1966 the same inconclusive pattern emerged as the continued Arab efforts to intimidate American businessmen from dealing with Israel met with varying degrees of resistance.

Under an amendment to the Export Control Act, adopted by Congress in 1965 (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 270-72), American exporters for the first time were required to report to the Commerce Department's office of export control whenever they received a request for information or action relating to the boycott. But the law did not prohibit American firms from replying to the boycott questionnaires or complying with boycott demands if they wished to do so.

The department reported that it had received 5,235 reports reflecting restrictive trade practices between October 7, 1965, when the regulations first went into effect, until June 30, 1966. Of these, 4,095 were Arab demands directed against Israel, with about a third of these involving certification of goods as not of Israeli origin. The rest were Arab restrictions on the use of ships of Israeli registry, or other ships stopping in Israeli ports or appearing on the boycott blacklist. In October the department stated that shipping restrictions aimed only at insuring the safe delivery of goods were not restrictive trade practices within the intent of the law, and henceforth need not be reported.

Earlier in March, after the publication of the first quarterly report by the Commerce Department, Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (Dem., N.J.) and Senator Jacob K. Javits (Rep., N.Y.), the sponsors of the antiboycott amendment, wrote to Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor, objecting

that the regulations "weaken the intent of the law" because they gratuitously pointed out that businessmen "are not legally prohibited" from complying with boycott requests, and that the report gave only a bare statistical tally of boycott requests received without indicating what response was made either by United States government agencies or the businessmen concerned. The regulations were not modified, and the department reports grew less specific; the one for the last quarter of 1966 stated, without explanation or breakdown, that 1,146 reports has been received. No reference was made to the reaction in the business community subsequent to the report for the first quarter of 1966, which said that a preliminary analysis indicated "a general pattern of refusal" by American firms to comply with boycott requests.

In a letter to Secretary Connor, in April, Representative Seymour Halpern (Rep., N.Y.) called for congressional hearings on the implementation of the law. He asked that American firms be formally prohibited from replying to boycott demands. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Mark C. Feer replied that the department was "opposed to any amendment which would require a fixed course of action to be taken by the Executive Branch" irrespective of other foreign policy considerations.

The boycott continued to be much in the news during 1966. In December 1965 it had been revealed that the American President Lines had cancelled the scheduled Haifa stop of the *S.S. President Roosevelt*, on its round-the-world cruise from San Francisco, out of fear that the ship would not be allowed through the Suez Canal. After congressional protests, a demand by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) that the United States government's \$30 million annual subsidy to the line be cut off if it yielded to Arab pressure, and private discussions with the State Department and United Arab Republic officials, the company restored the Israel stop in January 1966, with the explanation that it had "misinterpreted" instructions from its Alexandria agent.

In April an ADL report accused the Coca-Cola Company of bowing to the Arab boycott by refusing to grant a franchise to an Israeli bottler, the Tempo Soft Drinks Company Ltd. In response to Coca-Cola's assertion that its decision was based on "economic and market conditions rather than political considerations," ADL pointed to special financial and operating requirements established for the Israeli bottler, in an "assiduous attempt to camouflage its submission" to the boycott. Coca-Cola, in turn, said that it did not operate in other Middle Eastern states, such as Jordan, Syria, and Afghanistan because it was not profitable to do so. In April a counterboycott of Coca-Cola by various enterprises and consumers in the United States brought a lengthy statement from James A. Farley, chairman of the board of the Coca-Cola Export Corporation, calling the charges "completely unfair and unfounded" and assuring the public that the company "has not and will not conduct its affairs in response to any boycott, and that includes the so-called Arab boycott." After negotiations, in which Morris B. Abram, the president of the American Jewish Committee, participated, Coca-Cola an-

nounced that it had made an agreement with Abraham Feinberg, an American industrialist, to "sign a letter of intent as a first step in the establishment of a bottling plant for Coca-Cola in Israel." Feinberg had originally obtained the Israel franchise from Coca-Cola in 1949, but the Israel government had denied a permit "because of the difficult hard currency situation at that time."

Mahmoud Mahgoub, commissioner general of the central Arab boycott office in Damascus, announced in May that Coca-Cola was being given three months to cancel its arrangements with Israel or face expulsion from the Arab world. Coca-Cola went ahead with its plans for Israel although the November conference in Kuwait of boycott directors from 12 Arab League members and five Persian gulf sheikhdoms unanimously voted for the boycott. A month later Mahgoub announced that the Arab Coca-Cola plants would be given a nine-months grace period to "re-adjust their position" before the ban would take effect.

The Kuwait conference also decided to ban the Ford Motor Company and its subsidiaries, and the Radio Corporation of America from the Arab world. Ford was blacklisted because it had licensed its Israeli dealer, Palestine Automobile Corporation, Ltd., to assemble British and American Ford trucks and tractors. Henry Ford II reaffirmed that "we are definitely going ahead with our plans for Israel. We feel we have the unchallenged right to compete in any market of the world willing to accept us as an industrial citizen." Although the reason for the ban on RCA was not officially stated, it was generally reported to be the company's licensing of an Israeli firm to press phonograph records under the RCA label. In December the company denied a Beirut press report that it was suspending its business with Israel. The Zenith Radio Corporation was blacklisted earlier in the year after it had contracted to establish a television assembly plant in Israel. Another major American firm that continued to resist the boycott was the Sheraton Hotels Corporation, which signed an agreement with the Israel Ministry of Tourism in June for construction of a new luxury hotel in Jerusalem. In September the Israel cabinet approved an agreement with the Columbia Broadcasting System, under which CBS was to serve as technical consultant in setting up general television in Israel for a fee of \$150,000 in the first year. There was no report of Arab reaction.

Arab Restrictions on American Jews

An intimation that American personnel of Jewish faith were not assigned to posts in Arab countries was contained in a letter of January 14 from Assistant Secretary of State MacArthur to Representative Richard S. Schweiker (Rep., Pa.). He wrote that, while the United States did not normally "take into account the religion of its employees in assigning them for duty abroad, this is regrettably a factor which cannot be ignored in the case of certain countries whose policies in this respect we cannot control, however much we disagree with them." After the American Jewish Committee and

the American Jewish Congress wrote Secretary Rusk and met with State Department officials to protest this acquiescence in Arab discriminatory policies, the department gradually clarified its position. It first stated that it did not inquire into religion, but carefully assessed all factors affecting an employee's effectiveness. As Assistant Secretary of State Raymond A. Hare explained in his March 7 letter to Morris B. Abram, "while religion is not a criterion in personnel assignments, the Department would not deliberately place any employee in a position in which he could not fully and effectively discharge the duties of his job or practice his personal beliefs without hindrance or embarrassment."

Finally, Deputy Undersecretary of State for Administration William J. Crockett declared that MacArthur's original letter was "in error with respect to policy and practice," and reaffirmed in a letter of May 19 to Joachim Prinz, past president of the American Jewish Congress, that "assignments are made on the basis of need or merit, without in any way taking into account race or religion." Crockett stressed, as had Hare, that our embassies had been active in making "clear our opposition to any policies of foreign countries that discriminate against Americans because of their religion."

Among such acts of discrimination cited by the Jewish organizations in their discussions with the State Department were the travel restrictions still imposed by some Arab states on American Jews.

The continuing tendency of some Arab leaders to equate American Jews, Zionists, and Israelis as objects of their hostility was dramatized by a widely publicized incident that occurred on June 22 during the visit of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to Washington. Asked at a Women's National Press Club luncheon about the Arab boycott of American firms dealing with Israel, King Faisal replied: "Unfortunately, Jews support Israel and we consider those who provide assistance to our enemies as our own enemies." In response to an earlier question as to whether he considered Israel or the United Arab Republic the greater enemy, the king insisted that despite some differences with Cairo, he viewed the UAR as a "sister republic" and the Egyptians as "our brethren." The "enemy" were the Zionists, whose "aggression" had dispossessed the Palestinian Arabs. Some diplomatic observers thought that the king's response to this embarrassing question was dictated by considerations of public opinion in the Arab world. They found it significant that he backed away from a statement widely attributed to his predecessor by stressing that "it was never our aim to exterminate the Jews and drive them into the sea." However, Faisal's statement that he considered American Jews who supported Israel his enemies outraged the Jewish community, and the public outcry was echoed in Congress and in New York, where Mayor John V. Lindsay cancelled an official dinner in the king's honor because he viewed the remark as "extremely offensive, not just to Jews, but to all citizens of New York." Governor Nelson Rockefeller also officially snubbed Faisal, although his brother David, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, played host to the king at his Tarrytown estate.

While public condemnation was almost universal, some in the Jewish community shared the view of Secretary Rusk and Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem., Ark.) that King Faisal was a guest in this country and, as such, should be treated with courtesy even though his remarks offended his hosts.

In retaliation for the snub to the king, the representatives of 12 Arab League states, including the UAR, declared in September that they would boycott a dinner-dance sponsored by Mayor Lindsay in honor of diplomats attending the UN General Assembly session. A month later, the local diplomatic crisis had apparently eased, for Cairo's UN ambassador, Mohamed el-Kony, was found seated next to Lindsay in the mayor's box at a concert in Carnegie Hall.

GEORGE E. GRUEN