North Africa

Tunisia

In 1965 Tunisia experienced serious economic difficulties as a result of the disruption of economic relations with France, following President Habib Bourguiba's unilateral nationalization of French-owned land in May 1964 (p. 433). In response to this violation of the Franco-Tunisian agreements of 1963, France had stopped her budgetary aid to Tunisia in June, and in September canceled the commercial agreement which gave Tunisia a preferential status. At the beginning of 1965 Tunisia was seeking a rapprochement. Mohamed Masmoudi, well-known for his francophile sentiments, was named ambassador to Paris. The Tunisian government also made numerous other goodwill gestures, such as a proposal that the French colonists be indemnified in accordance with a procedure to be established jointly.

In May the French government rejected these efforts: "In the present conditions, there is no reason to reestablish special relations between Tunisia and France," it declared. Tunisia was extremely disappointed but did not burn its bridges, for Bourguiba did not wish to endanger the technical and cultural assistance still being received from France. In May the cultural agreement was renewed for a year, France agreeing to furnish Tunisia with 2,500 teachers for the academic year 1965–66. In November an agreement on social security was also signed between the two countries. Bourguiba was obviously waiting for the French presidential elections before renewing the dialogue. In view of President Charles de Gaulle's intransigence, it seemed likely that his reelection would mean that France would insist on a return to the 1963 agreements.

Strained relations with France led Tunisia to look for other Western partners. In the spring it was granted loans by the German Federal Republic, and some German businessmen came to investigate conditions. Krupp showed interest in the economic conversion of the Bizerte base, and trade between the two countries increased.

Politically, the economic agreement with the United States (AJYB, 1964

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[Vol. 65], p. 322) remained one of the basic elements of Tunisian diplomacy. At a Ford Foundation conference in Tunisia in June, President Bourguiba declared: “The friendship which Tunisia feels for the United States dates back to the dark days of the war after 1940. Our sympathy has been increased by the role played by the United States in the preservation of world peace. If the Chinese Communist waves have not yet burst upon the world, the credit belongs to the Americans.” This attitude of Bourguiba’s was again demonstrated on July 4, when he denounced Chinese colonialism in an interview for German television; he repeated this attack on November 23. Peking sent a note of protest, which he rejected. In December Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., declared that relations with Peking were near a break.

In February Bourguiba undertook a tour of the Middle East which appeared intended to confirm Tunisian friendship with the United Arab Republic. The Tunisian president was, in fact, received in Cairo with full honors but, after visiting the Arab refugees in Jordan in March, he dropped a diplomatic bomb by proposing a confederation of Middle Eastern states which would include Israel (p. 396). “The Palestinian question,” he said, “requires a peaceful solution in which there will be neither victor nor vanquished.” He made the same proposal in Jordanian Jerusalem, in Beirut, in Libya, in Greece, and on French television. In July the Paris correspondent of the Israeli paper Ma’ariv asserted that former French Premier Pierre Mendès-France, who had been Bourguiba’s host in June and had accepted an invitation from Israeli Deputy Premier Abba Eban for August, had been entrusted with a mission between Israel and Tunisia. But in an interview with the London Observer the Tunisian President declared: “My compromise plan has failed. Neither the Arabs nor Israel want anything to do with it. I do not intend to take the leadership of a movement to press for a settlement.” Nevertheless, the World Jewish Congress, meeting at Strasbourg in September, paid tribute to Bourguiba “for his realistic attitude toward Israel.” It should be noted that Bourguiba’s proposals had already been advanced in 1964 by Bechir Ben Yahmed (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 473) editor in chief of Jeune Afrique and the former Tunisian minister of information.

On July 19 Tunisia was absent when the 13-nation Arab International Boycott Commission on Israel opened its 22nd meeting in Tripoli (p. 443). Nor was Tunisia represented at the Casablanca conference of the Arab League leaders later, on September 13. A few hours before the conference opened, Bourguiba, in a memorandum that was distributed to its participants, attacked President Gamal Abdul Nasser of the United Arab Republic: “... the interference of Egyptian leaders in the internal affairs of other Arab countries is unacceptable and we will refuse to cooperate with the Arab League as long as it does not show respect for the member states.” On November 20 Nasser counterattacked, referring to Bourguiba as “the valet of the USA.”

On September 19 Bourguiba received a representative of General Mustafa
Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish rebellion against the government of Iraq. On October 22 Tunisia took part in the African conference at Accra. In November and December Bourguiba visited the African countries of Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast.

President Bourguiba reacted favorably to the fall of Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella (p. 441) with whom his relations had been cool ever since Algerian independence. He emphasized that, as a result of Ben Bella's fall, "Egyptian influence will greatly diminish in the Maghreb [Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria] which, while forming a part of the Arab world, refuses to be made into a satellite."

**Domestic Affairs**

There was little change in the government. Bourguiba reaffirmed his authority within the ruling Socialist Constitutional party (Parti socialiste destourien, formerly Neo-Destour) by appointing four new members to its central committee. The four, all unconditional Bourguibists, were Caid Es-Sebsi, Abdallah Farhat, Mohamed Jeddi, and Bechir Bellagha.

There was an open crisis between the government and the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT). Its former secretary-general, Ahmed Tlili, who attended the Amsterdam congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (July 5–6) as an observer, made a strong anti-Bourguiba statement at a meeting of its executive board. "The Tunisian government," he charged, "wants to liquidate the trade unions completely and absorb everything into the unity of the party." Tlili was arrested, and Habib Achour, the secretary-general then in office, was dismissed in the same month. He was replaced by Bechir Bellagha, in whom Bourguiba had complete confidence. There was also a mild demonstration of independence by the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET), which refused to merge with the National Federation of Destourian Students.

In November a law was passed legalizing abortion, in the Tunisian effort to check overpopulation. Half of Tunisia's people were under 20; one-fifth were under 14 years of age. The annual rate of increase was 2.1 per cent. Contraceptives had been on sale since 1961, and in 1965, with the aid of the Ford Foundation, the government launched a pilot project to instruct women in their use. Twelve rural centers were set up at a cost of $379,000, shared by the government and the foundation. In respect to the emancipation of women, Tunisia was thus placed at the head of all African nations.

**Economy**

The year 1965 was a particularly difficult one for the country's economy. Wages had been frozen since 1956, while the cost of living had risen first gradually and then, abruptly, after the devaluation of the dinar and the cancellation of the commercial agreements with France in September 1964. The prices of some imported goods doubled then, as did the deficit in the trade
balance with France. Imports increased more rapidly than exports. The end of the commercial agreements with France meant a loss of 1,366,000 dinars in grain exports and 3,491,000 in wine exports. There were about fifty million gallons of wine in storage in the converted cisterns at Bizerte.

To remedy the situation, Finance Minister Ahmed Ben Salah attempted in October to set up a “club” for foreign assistance to Tunisia, to include Germany, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, the United States, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland. But for the time being this “club” was not functioning, and it did not seem likely to be more than a palliative.

The United States Agency for International Development granted Tunisia a loan of $10 million in 1965 to pay for imports of American goods and also released $6.5 million for the construction and repair of more than 6,000 miles of road. In November the International Monetary Fund extended to Tunisia a credit of $5.6 million.

Tunisia was making a major effort to attract tourists. A Hilton Hotel opened in the capital, and several palatial hotels constructed since independence quoted much lower rates than comparable places in Europe.

JEWISH COMMUNITY

At the end of 1965 there were an estimated 8,000 to 12,000 Jews in Tunisia, out of a total population of 4,500,000 (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 472). About 6,000 to 8,000 Jews were in Tunis and the rest were in Bizerte, Nabaul, Sousse, Sfax, Djerba, and the interior. About 100,000 Jews had left Tunisia since independence. In 1965, for various reasons, the rate of emigration decreased.

Attitude Toward the Jews

During the first years of independence Bourguiba was an enemy of Nasser, and many Jews held high posts in the government. But after the Bizerte tragedy in 1960 (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], pp. 432–33), Bourguiba abruptly reversed his course. He ranged himself with the Arab League, ironed out his differences with Nasser, and burned his bridges to France.

Even though the legal status of all Tunisian citizens was the same, the Jews did not feel secure in their position. Bourguiba had given them equal rights with Moslems. There was a Jewish deputy, Albert Bessis, and theoretically Jews were eligible for all government positions except that of president, which was reserved for a Moslem. But in fact, in the course of ten years, Jews were more and more being eliminated from important positions (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 473). In their daily life, too, they often met with unfriendly attitudes. The worsening economic situation made it increasingly difficult for Jewish merchants to obtain import licenses, for which Moslems had priority. And Western culture, of which the Jews were partisans, was losing ground in the face of Arabization.
Emigration

While 30,000 to 40,000 Jews had left Tunisia from 1960 to 1962, and about 10,000 in 1963 and again in 1964, the number who left in 1965 do not seem to have exceeded 4,000. Businessmen, lawyers, physicians, and later the bulk of the working population gradually had left for Europe and Israel. The departures took place in a friendly atmosphere and without bloodshed; but Bourguiba saw to it that the emigrants could carry away with them not even a small part of their property. Most of the Jews remaining in Tunisia were old people, who would have found it difficult to adjust in Europe and who felt that they would only be a burden to Israel. But they remained for other reasons as well.

Although the very name of Israel continued to be suspect in Tunisia (not only books dealing with Israel, but also French reference works mentioning it were banned) and Tunisia carried out to the letter the Arab League’s decisions in such matters as the withdrawal of passports from all persons with Israeli visas, still the president had recognized the existence of Israel. He had courageously proposed the coexistence of the Arab states and Israel, and for this the Jews of Tunisia were grateful to him. They also supported the sharp break between Bourguiba and Nasser in 1965, which followed the conciliatory attitude of the previous year, as well as Tunisian efforts for a rapprochement with France.

Communal Activities

Since 1958, when a Provisional Administrative Committee for the Jewish Religion was established, there had been no official Jewish community organization. The communal elections that were to have been held that year had evidently been postponed indefinitely (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 261–62).

The activities of the Provisional Committee, headed by Simon Zana, consisted largely of maintaining the synagogues and offering courses in religious education which were attended by many young Jews. Funds for these programs came from taxes on kosher meat, sacramental wine, and matzot for Passover, and from funerals.

Tunisia had a total of six Alliance Israélite Universelle schools, with an enrolment of 543 Jewish students (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 473).

Gilbert Cohen-Tanugi
In 1965 the continued economic depression contributed to the government's difficulties at home. In January the budget of the ministry of public works was rejected in parliament by a vote of 56 to 41; fourteen members of the pro-government Mouvement Populaire voted with the opposition Istiqlal and National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). In March, student demonstrations against certain policies of the ministry of education touched off rioting in the major cities, and at least seven persons were killed and 700 arrested. Large numbers of unemployed joined the students, and the demonstrations soon assumed a general political character. The government blamed "left-wing elements"—the Union of Popular Forces and the allied, but independent, Moroccan Labor Union (UMT)—and its first reaction was a large-scale use of force. On April 1 King Hassan ordered the release of most of those arrested. While at the time of the riots fourteen persons who had been convicted in 1964 of attempting to overthrow the government (in 1963) were executed, other political prisoners, including sixty also convicted in 1964, were amnestied in May. It was not clear whether King Hassan was using conciliation to balance repression, or whether the two policies reflected a conflict within his administration.

Immediately after the amnesty King Hassan met with the various political groups—those supporting the government, Istiqlal, UNFP, and the trade unions—to discuss the formation of a government of national unity. He proposed a "minimum program" based on the government's rather vague three-year plan of economic development. Istiqlal replied by demanding new elections, while the moderate wing of the UNFP, represented by Abderahim Bouabid, called for the formation of a "homogeneous government" and a royal promise that this government would be permitted to carry out its policies. UMT and the left-wing of UNFP demanded basic structural reforms as a condition for cooperation. Another UNFP demand was a pardon for their exiled leader Mehdi Ben Barka, who had twice been sentenced to death in absentia, so that he might return to take part in the negotiations.

The negotiations failed to produce results, and in June the King dismissed Prime Minister Ahmed Bahmini and his cabinet, dissolved the parliament, and announced that he was temporarily taking over all executive and legislative power. Most of the cabinet members he then appointed were holdovers from the Bahmini government; besides the prime minister, he dropped only the minister of education, whose policies had precipitated the March riots. A promise to revise the constitution was regarded as a concession to UNFP, and informal conversations between the King and the opposition continued.

* The section reviewing general political developments was prepared in the office of the American Jewish Year Book.
On October 29 Mehdi Ben Barka was kidnapped in Paris; UNFP leaders asserted that King Hassan had been about to pardon Ben Barka so that he could join in negotiations in Morocco, and that the kidnapping was therefore aimed at wrecking these negotiations. An investigation in France soon disclosed that Ben Barka had been held at the home of a French gangster where he had been questioned and tortured by Moroccan Interior Minister Mohammed Oufkir. It was widely assumed that he had been killed, although there was no definite proof. The French government asked General Oufkir to testify in the investigation; when he failed to do so, it issued an international warrant for his arrest. King Hassan refused to surrender the general or to drop him from the cabinet.

In November the UMT called a 36-hour general strike which its Secretary-General Mahjoub Ben Seddiq called a protest against the government's policies, "of which the kidnapping of Mehdi Ben Barka is in our view a direct consequence." French newspaper reports of the investigation were repeatedly barred in Morocco, and on November 27 the government recalled its ambassadors to Lebanon and Syria to protest press coverage of the Ben Barka case there. Diplomatic relations with Syria were broken off on December 7; by the end of the year, relations with France too were close to a break.

Relations with North African states however, improved markedly. Moroccan territorial claims against Algeria were allowed to lapse, and after the overthrow of Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria relations between the two countries were cordial. While irredentist claims against Mauritania were not formally abandoned, they were not pressed. A number of Mauritians who had held posts in the Moroccan government and had supported Moroccan claims to that country announced that they now backed Mauritanian independence.

In July an agreement between Morocco and Libya provided for the employment of several thousand Moroccan workers in the Libyan oil fields, which somewhat relieved Moroccan unemployment and helped the balance of payments. Progress was made in coordinating the economies of the Maghreb states and Libya with regard to development projects and exports.

During the year Morocco received aid from several countries: The United States supplied several hundred thousand tons of grain on credit; France continued various forms of assistance, and Spain agreed to construct certain factories in Morocco. The International Monetary Fund announced in October that Morocco would be granted a credit of $45 million. Among private foreign investors were an increased number of German firms as well as the Occidental Petroleum Company of California, which in April announced the formation of a $100-million Moroccan-American chemical company.

The unification of Morocco's judicial system was completed in December 1965. Henceforth only Moroccan citizens could function as judges, and Arabic was made the official language of the courts. Former French magistrates could serve only as advisers to Moroccan judges; French lawyers could continue to practice, but had to take Moroccan partners if they did not know Arabic.
JEWISH COMMUNITY

There were about 70,000 Jews in Morocco at the end of 1965, about 75 per cent of whom lived in Casablanca, the economic capital. Jews continued to leave the country, with emigration rising and falling in cycles, increasing whenever the country underwent a political or economic crisis. Some went to Israel, but many settled in or near the major cities of France, especially Paris, Toulouse, Lyons, and Marseilles. In the Moroccan mellahs, the ancient Jewish quarters, a Moslem sub-proletariat was now installed and Jews usually constituted only a tiny fraction of the population.

Communal Activities

For almost three years Jewish institutions had been quiescent. The Council of Jewish Communities, the coordinating body of the Jewish organization in the various cities, no longer met. In its eyes, silence was the best policy. The voluntary suspension of the Jewish community’s organ La Voix des Communautés, the only Jewish journal left in Arab territory (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 475–76), was followed in July 1965 by the ending of the Jewish broadcast on the Moroccan radio. This program was suspended by the Moroccan minister of information without advance notice to the Council of Jewish Communities because of the Arab League meeting which was to take place in Casablanca in September. The program, which was purely religious in character, had been broadcast for fifteen years. The broadcasting of Israeli recordings had been prohibited since 1957. Another program, broadcast in 1960 over the privately-owned Tangiers radio under the direction of Victor Malka, had been prohibited by the government in 1961.

Jewish Education

The activities of Jewish institutions were for the most part wrapped in obscurity. Constant emigration greatly reduced their scope. The Alliance Israélite Universelle served fewer than 10,000 Jewish students; four years earlier there had been over 30,000. ORT, OSE, JDC and the department for the education of Jewish youth (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 476) were still functioning, but on a reduced scale. The Jewish Committee which heads the Casablanca community, recorded the loss of more than half its members and confined itself to day-to-day activities. There was nevertheless a great revival of interest in Jewish all-day schools, especially the Otzar Ha-torah schools, and Lubavitcher yeshivot, which the young people attended voluntarily. Jewish lycées were established, and these, as well as the AIU-sponsored Ecole Normale Hébraïque of Casablanca, enjoyed success.
Religious Life

This institutional decay did not spare even the most respected Jewish institution, the Grand Rabbinate. The Moroccan government, unlike that of Tunisia in 1960, never actually suppressed the rabbinical courts by a stroke of the pen. On the contrary, it always showed them a certain respect and regarded them as the true representatives of Moroccan Jewry. Thus whenever King Hassan II gave an audience to Jewish leaders, Grand Rabbi Saïd Danan was invited to attend. But the Moroccan judicial reforms entailed certain consequences for the rabbinical courts, which had hitherto functioned with complete autonomy. The rabbinical judges who had administered justice in their own courthouses in Jewish neighborhoods were now given space in the regular Moroccan courthouses. All proceedings were henceforth to be in Arabic, while previously they could have been in French or Hebrew.

The most significant aspect of the reform was the abolition of the Supreme Rabbinical Tribunal at Rabat, which had functioned as the highest court of appeal. While the reform simply provided for the disappearance of this tribunal, two of its members—Rabbi Michael Encaoua and its president, Rabbi Danan—were appointed to the Moroccan supreme court without definitely assigned functions. The third member, Simon Cohen, was still awaiting transfer.

Certain rabbinical judges (who had jurisdiction only in matters of personal status and inheritance in municipal courts of first instance and in five regional courts) were assigned by the minister of justice to sit also as advisers with Moslem judges in Moroccan penal courts in Casablanca. The administrator of the court called on them to uncover their heads during hearings. They refused.

Moslem-Jewish Relations

There was constant fear of a renewal of the riots of March (p. 436). These were the worst disturbances since Morocco had become independent. However, it should be noted that although there was rioting in a Jewish district, the demonstrators made no attacks on Jews as Jews. A Jewish bookstore was looted and a synagogue was burned to the ground, but all the stores near the bookstore were also destroyed, and the fire spread to the synagogue from a store belonging to a Moslem.

Jews were beset by serious fears before the Arab League meeting of September 13 (p. 432). They remembered that they had experienced one of their most unhappy periods when the Arab League met in Casablanca in January 1961 (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 440–41), and they feared a recurrence of hatred. But the Moroccan authorities took preventive measures. To be sure, all Jewish employees of the Casablanca municipality, where the meeting took place, and of the hotels where the Arab heads of state were staying, were invited to take several days’ leave. Jewish journalists who
sought accreditation to the conference were systematically turned down, and some young people suspected of "activism" were asked to report to the police. But things went no further. The chief rabbis of Casablanca were invited, together with all the leading Moroccan personalities, to pay their respects to the Arab leaders, and nothing untoward happened. Moreover, it was a Jewish physician of Casablanca, Dr. Raoul Cohen, who attended President Abdel Salam Arif of Iraq when the latter was slightly indisposed.

Several days after the meeting, the press of the Istiqlal party published extracts from the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which were currently enjoying a considerable vogue in the Arab countries and had become the backbone of a new Arab antisemitism. In general, there had been little antisemitism in Morocco, and Jews and Arabs had always lived in harmony. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1965 there was an anti-Jewish press campaign, conducted simultaneously by three parties. The government-backed Democratic Socialist party wrote: "The Jews, although vile and essentially traitorous, have been better treated by Islam than by Jewry itself." Even the left-of-center National Union of Popular Forces, largely based on the trade unions, took part in this anti-Jewish campaign.

In December 1964, AH Bengelloun, Moroccan ambassador to the United States, declared, at a dinner arranged by the American Jewish Committee, that "the independence of our country contributed to the strengthening of the relationships between Jews and Moslems, and will permit the integration of Jews of Morocco into the political life of the country with the same rights and the same obligation as those of their Moslem compatriots." The authorities made great efforts to give reality to the rights formally guaranteed by the constitution, including the right to travel.

Ministers and other high government officials took part in all major celebrations of Jewish institutions. Once a year, on Yom Kippur, the king's representative visited the synagogue. There were still numerous Jews in the higher echelons of the administration, a fact which drew criticism from anti-Jewish political groups such as Istiqlal.

It was generally accepted that the position of the Palace in Rabat on the conflict between Israel and the Arab states was close to that of Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba. On the other hand, both Istiqlal, under the leadership of Allal al Fassi, and the left, led by Abderahim Bouabid and Mehdi Ben Barka, reacted violently to the statements of the Tunisian president (p. 432). Ben Barka had frequently expressed a liberal attitude toward Israel in private conversations, but his public statements were violently anti-Israel.

It was difficult to predict future developments, but if the trend continued the Jewish population of Morocco seemed likely to be eventually stabilized at about 25,000.

Victor Malka
Algeria

EARLY on June 19 President Ahmed Ben Bella was arrested in his bedroom by his vice president and defense minister, Colonel Houari Boumediene, and the chief of staff, Major Tahar Zbiri. On the same morning his deposition was proclaimed, and he was charged with wasting public funds, despotism, arbitrary rule, and even treason. Colonel Boumedienne placed himself at the head of a new cabinet which included most of its old members, among them Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, whom Ben Bella had tried to oust. It was announced that a new constitution would be promulgated and that a white book would be published on the misdeeds of the Ben Bella regime.

The event took the world by surprise and produced a major sensation. At the time of the coup, Ben Bella had been preparing to welcome the delegates of numerous nations of the “third world” to an Afro-Asian conference, the so-called “second Bandung,” which was to have started on June 29.

Among the new Algerian politicians who had come out of the maquis of the Kabyle mountains, the French prisons, and political exile, Boumedienne had the reputation of being more strongly imbued with the spirit of Islam and Arab culture than most of his colleagues. Some expected an immediate reinforcement of the pan-Arab trend in Algerian policy, despite the clearly anti-Nasser tendency of the June 19 coup. Quick recognition of the new regime came from the Ba’ath government of Syria, and from Communist China, which was always ready to back the most extreme and intransigent elements in the “anti-imperialist camp.”

The last-minute postponement of the Afro-Asian conference by the delegates who had already arrived for the meeting, despite stubborn Chinese efforts to have it held on schedule, was a slap at the Boumedienne government and hindered its efforts to consolidate its position. It was faced with demonstrations of hostile students and youths, who paraded in the streets of Algiers shouting, “Long live Ben Bella!” Cairo and Moscow also showed their opposition. The Communists set up an underground resistance and attempted in vain to bring about a repression which they could then denounce as fascist.

Nevertheless, the Boumedienne government was able to establish itself after a short while. It quickly showed that it was disinclined to step up its pan-Arabism, which would have implied, among other things, a more intensive anti-Israel campaign. On the contrary, although there was no question about its adherence to the principle of solidarity with the Arab world or its allegiance to the Arab League, one could detect a relative moderation in statement regarding Israel, which contrasted sharply with Ben Bella’s violence.

The new rulers of Algeria gave first consideration to the deteriorating eco-
nomic situation—large-scale unemployment among the urban proletariat and huge deficits in the autonomous “socialist” enterprises, especially the more or less collectivized farms. Boumedienne placed particular emphasis on maintaining close relations with France in order to retain the priority in receiving technical assistance and large-scale financial aid which Ben Bella had obtained for Algeria. This was part of the program of assistance to the newly independent countries of the “third world,” by which President Charles de Gaulle had constituted France as their protector and, to some extent, partner.

Franco-Algerian relations were not affected when a number of French Marxists, who had come to Algeria in connection with the technical-assistance program, supported the Communist resistance because of their sympathies for Ben Bella. These were kept in prison for a time and then sent back to France. Their discomfiture did not seriously disturb French public opinion or discredit the Boumedienne regime in France.

The signing in July 1965 of the Franco-Algerian oil agreements, after 18 months of negotiations, was a success for Boumedienne which largely made up for the postponement of the Afro-Asian conference. The new arrangements were advantageous to Algeria, for they brought most of the benefits of a nationalization of mineral resources without its costs, which were shouldered by France.

Nothing came of the regime’s hopes and efforts to bring about greater rapprochement with the liberal bourgeoisie and the non-socialists. Discussions for this purpose were held with Ferhat Abbas, once the leader of the provisional government of the Algerian republic and later president of the National Assembly, whom Ben Bella had disgraced, violently denounced as an agent of the bourgeoisie, and finally placed in forced residence. From these discussions it was apparent that there was no possibility of an agreement, and that a development similar to that of Tunisia under Bourguiba could not as yet be expected. (Boumedienne did, however, show a genuine desire for unity of the Maghreb. This had been completely abandoned by Ben Bella, who made war on Morocco and constituted himself the champion of revolutions all over the world.)

Boumedienne had no greater success in making peace with Ben Bella’s “socialist” opponents, such as the followers of Hocine Aït-Ahmed (condemned to death but pardoned by Ben Bella in April), who had been in a state of permanent insurrection (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 479). But there was nevertheless a sort of armistice with the rebels, and there was no longer an armed guerrilla movement such as had existed throughout the latter part of Ben Bella’s regime. Boumedienne’s Communist-line opponents did not have enough popular support to set up armed underground groups and were unable to do more than harass the government. By comparison with the political repression which existed under Ben Bella, with its use of torture and summary justice, the methods used and the sentences imposed by the Boumedienne regime against Ben Bella’s followers and the Communists could not be regarded as very severe.

At the end of 1965 the regime still lacked a constitutional basis or dem-
ocratic sanction, or even a conventional structure. Ben Bella, in secret confinement was legally still president of the republic. Yet, the regime sought to respect the norms of justice, mindful that the principal justification for the coup had been Ben Bella’s despotism and arbitrary rule.

In November the Afro-Asian conference was formally postponed by the Afro-Asian foreign ministers, this time indefinitely. But this could hardly be considered as a reversal for Boumedienne, since Algeria was not responsible for it. The postponement was related to the Soviet diplomatic victory over Peking when Nasser advocated Russia’s admission to the conference, and to Chinese maneuvers to secure Afro-Asian unity on an anti-American basis.

The attitude of the Algerians at the Arab summit conference in Casablanca was one of relative moderation (p. 432), and, although their hostility toward Israel did not diminish, it showed a commendable difference from Ben Bella’s outspoken belligerency. It may also be noted that the Algerian press took a moderate line in the Arab world’s attack on President Bourguiba of Tunisia for daring to contemplate the possibility of peace with Israel. Several semi-official sources stated that Boumedienne preferred Morocco’s and Tunisia’s position of maintaining relations with West Germany after Bonn established diplomatic relations with Israel. But Ben Bella had broken off relations, and Boumedienne was committed to continue this policy.

In December Colonel Boumedienne went to Moscow for negotiations on military aid and technical assistance. This official visit indicated that the Soviet Union had more or less abandoned hope for the return to power of its Lenin Peace Prize winner, Ben Bella. Communist anti-Boumedienne propaganda immediately diminished.

Islam

A number of young Moslems who had acquired the habit of publicly drinking alcoholic beverages in violation of Koranic law were prosecuted in November. Dozens of cafés were closed, and several persons were tried and convicted for serving alcohol to Moslems. A press campaign was unleashed not only against the proscribed drinking, but also against nihilism, hedonism, and the unreserved adoption by some young Algerians of the “dissolute” ways of the West. There was insistence that Islamic morality was an essential part of the Algerian personality, and that a bad Moslem was therefore a bad Algerian. Even the French-language press of FLN, the official government party, stressed the necessity of an Islamic revival. This campaign contrasted sharply with the situation in neighboring Tunisia, where the authorities encouraged an anti-traditionalist modernism, especially extensive freedom for women.

What was happening in Algeria was an understandable outgrowth of a developing national consciousness. Under the French regime, there had been a significant de-Islamization of the cities. Since, according to a stubbornly maintained myth, Algeria was part of France, the dominant morality was secularist. Islamic law was religious, with no power of compulsion, and Moslems could violate it with immunity by serving and drinking alcohol,
eating during the Ramadan fast, etc. Such violations occurred only rarely in small communities, where social pressure was strong, but they were more and more frequent in the anonymity of the great cities during the last phase of the colonial regime, which saw a general relaxation of morals.

The regime that came to power in June 1965, wishing to be a government of stabilization and sobriety, naturally turned to the law of the Prophet as the basis of all morality in an Islamic land. The rehabilitation of Islam opened the way to a general revalidation of religious ethics. It had its effect also on the small remaining Jewish community by serving as a stimulus to the preservation of Judaism, to the extent that this is possible among Algeria's Jews.

**Jewish Community**

In 1965 there was no notable change in the Jewish community (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 481–82). The political events of June did not directly affect the Jews. The Jewish youth of Algiers and Oran did not take part in the tumultuous student demonstrations for Ben Bella. Occasionally Jewish names appeared in connection with anti-Boumedienne activities, but those involved were dejudaized and pro-Communist intellectuals who had no contact with the Jewish community.

On the whole, the change of regime was received with relief by the Jews, since under Boumedienne there were no longer incessant anti-Israel tirades or spectacular and venomous "Palestine weeks," as in February 1964 (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 479). To be sure, the virulent anti-Zionism of Ben Bella had never seriously affected them. But it created a constant uneasiness, and one never knew where it might lead.

The number of Jews in Algeria was estimated to be about 4,000. No one attempted a systematic count. Aside from its regular members, the community knew only those who for one reason or another made themselves known to it. Isolated Jews were lost in the small communities. In 1965 there were some departures for France, mainly for economic reasons.

Charles Hababou continued to serve as president of the Federation of Communities, whose activities were strictly confined to religion and philanthropy. Whenever requests for assistance were received, Rabbi Gilbert Seror traveled from Algiers to all parts of the country to perform circumcisions and officiate at bar mitzvahs, marriages, and funerals. Kosher meat was supplied principally from Oran.

Sabbath services were possible only in the large cities of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. On all the Jewish holidays services were held in the few synagogues still open. Services were usually attended by older men and women. In the large cities, with a thousand or more Jews, they made every effort to hand down their religious tradition to their children. But a Jewish child born in 1960 in a medium-sized city such as Philippeville or Tiaret, and remaining there, had little chance of learning to decipher even one word of Hebrew.

**Arnold Mandel**
Southern Africa

Political Developments

A major event of 1965, which significantly involved all the countries of the region, was the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the white minority government of the British colony of Rhodesia. In the Republic of South Africa, the Nationalists of Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd appeared to be more firmly in control than ever. The government extended somewhat its legislation for the suppression of dissent, the non-white opponents had been driven almost entirely underground, and the white critics appeared to be losing ground steadily. The economic boom continued, but the rate of growth fell slightly and inflationary developments worried the government.

Zambia and Malawi made significant economic progress in their first full year of independence, the former using the rising income from great mineral resources to develop and diversify the economy and the latter developing agriculture with British aid. The situation in Rhodesia posed major political and economic problems for both. Zambia's internal political development continued along democratic lines under the leadership of President Kenneth Kaunda. In Malawi, however, President Hastings Kamuzu Banda resorted to increasingly drastic methods to suppress the frequently violent opposition of supporters of cabinet ministers whom he had ousted (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 488). The High Commission territories of Basutoland and Bechuanaland held elections and became largely self-governing, as Swaziland had become in 1964. Britain retained control of foreign relations, defense, and internal security for an interim period, but both territories were to become completely independent in 1966.

Rhodesia

Prime Minister Ian Smith had postponed his plans for independence in 1964 in the face of the new British Labor government's adamant opposition. Repeated attempts to negotiate a settlement broke down over British demands that any proposals for independence be approved by all sections of the population and include provisions for an eventual transition to majority rule.
In the May elections Smith’s Rhodesian Front won all fifty seats allotted to the overwhelmingly white voters of the “A roll.” The opposition Rhodesia party, formerly led by Sir Roy Welensky and Sir Edgar Whitehead, won ten of the fifteen representing the predominantly African voters of the “B roll,” and the five remaining seats went to independents. (The outlawed nationalist parties had boycotted the elections, and most eligible Africans therefore did not vote.) Because all the candidates it elected were Africans, the Rhodesia party changed its name to United People’s party, and an African, Josiah Gondo, became its leader. Within the rather narrow limits permitted by the government, it sought to defend the interests of the African majority.

Throughout the year the Smith government prepared for a unilateral declaration of independence, while seeking to secure independence by agreement with Britain. It sent diplomatic representatives to Portugal and South Africa—whose assistance would be vital if Britain imposed sanctions—but under British pressure they were refused official recognition. It appeared, however, that both countries negotiated with them unofficially. Smith also sought alternative markets for Rhodesian products, especially tobacco, in case of British sanctions, and he made every effort to remove Rhodesia’s external assets from British control. At home the Smith government tried to prevent effective opposition to UDI. It continued the ban on the major African nationalist groups, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and confined their leaders in remote sections of the country. The Zimbabwe African Congress of Trade Unions was banned in February, and the Rhodesian branch of Zambia’s governing United National Independence party in July. Some European opponents of government policy were similarly treated; former Prime Minister Garfield Todd was arrested in October as he was about to board a plane for London, and confined for a year to the immediate vicinity of his ranch.

Meanwhile, numerous resolutions by the Organization of African Unity and by various United Nations bodies, including both the General Assembly and the Security Council, called on Great Britain to prevent Rhodesia from attaining independence before a system of majority rule had been established (p. 309). Several resolutions asked Britain to suspend the Rhodesian constitution and protect the rights of the African majority. This the British government refused to do on the ground that it had no legal authority to interfere in the internal affairs of a self-governing colony. It sought to find a basis for agreement with the Smith government by declaring that it did not ask for the immediate establishment of majority rule, but for guarantees that this would eventually come about. Last-minute negotiations between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Smith failed, and on November 11 the Smith government declared Rhodesia’s independence. Britain responded by declaring the Smith regime in rebellion and entrusting the government to Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs, who officially dismissed the Smith cabinet from office. Smith in turn dismissed the governor and cut off his phone.

Within Rhodesia Smith’s regime was in de facto control. A number of
strikes by African workers were quickly broken; an exiled African leader noted that half of the African workers in Rhodesia were from other countries, and were reluctant to leave their jobs despite their sympathy for the Rhodesian Africans. Protestant Episcopal and Roman Catholic bishops condemned the government’s policies and questioned its legitimacy, as did a number of university teachers. Chief Justice Sir Hugh Beadle moved into Government House with Sir Humphrey Gibbs, and many other judges and some army officers were believed to be loyal to Britain. The Smith government removed the latter from key posts and threatened to establish revolutionary tribunals if the courts failed to support its laws. The opposition of most Africans and a part of the white élite did not alter the fact that Smith, supported by a large majority of the European population, was in control.

In the Organization of African Unity and in the United Nations the African states pressed Britain to remove the Smith regime by force. The British argued that force would be harmful and was unnecessary since economic sanctions would soon bring the rebellious Rhodesians to terms. In the UN Security Council a compromise resolution, adopted on November 20 by a vote of 10 to 0, with France abstaining, called on all states to refuse to recognize the Smith regime, to impose economic sanctions, including an oil embargo, and ban all arms shipments to Rhodesia, and it called on Britain to oust the Smith government by “all other appropriate measures.” Although Britain had voted for the resolution, she did not in fact impose an oil embargo against Rhodesia until December 17, after a tanker of the government-controlled British Petroleum Company had delivered a cargo of oil for Rhodesia at Portuguese Mozambique.

Britain did, however, immediately impose economic sanctions on Rhodesia. The most effective was the seizure of title to Rhodesia’s external assets by replacing the officers of the Bank of Rhodesia with others responsible to Britain. Even South Africa nominally recognized the seizure, but gave the Smith regime credits against the security of the blocked Rhodesian funds. By the end of 1965 most British exports to and imports from Rhodesia had been forbidden. The United States fully supported these measures and went so far as to ban a shipment of Rhodesian sugar already en route. The United States position, as stated by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams in December, was against the continuance of the “illegal Southern Rhodesian regime,” which could jeopardize the “rights, prestige, and good relations” of some one and a half million other “whites of European origin—a term that includes Americans—who live in areas of Africa other than Southern Africa” and could “lead to the downfall of responsible, friendly African governments . . .” and to a “bitter war along racial lines in southern Africa—a struggle that could spread swiftly to other continents.” He likened Smith’s measures for staying in power and controlling the people to those of “totalitarian regimes of the 1930s, against whom we fought in World War II.”

At the end of the year no decisive developments had taken place. Most African states called on Britain to use force in unseating the Smith regime
and several had severed relations with Britain at the bidding of the Organization of African Unity because Britain failed to suppress the rebellion. South Africa and Portugal, though politically sympathetic to Smith, avoided direct conflict with Britain by limiting their aid to what could be given more or less clandestinely. If sanctions succeeded in bringing down the Smith regime, they might be the next victims, since various international bodies had already proposed such action. On the other hand, they feared that if they helped Rhodesia too openly, Britain and the United States might resort to the immediate extension of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal, in order to make them work against Rhodesia.

**South Africa**

In South Africa the principal political development in 1965 was the increasing tendency of the opposition United party—which had once represented what in South African terms could be considered moderation on the race question—to outbid the Nationalists on the issue of white supremacy. The United party's leader Sir De Villiers Graaff charged that by establishing "Bantustans" (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 484) with self-governing institutions, described as a policy of "separate development," the government was appeasing "dangerous African nationalism." "Separate development" seemed in fact to be atrophying. The Transkei remained the only Bantustan, and the 1965 appropriation of $1.4 million for its development was not likely to give it economic self-sufficiency. Border industries, established with public and private funds to give employment to its inhabitants, were all at least thirty miles outside its territory.

Meanwhile the growing demand for industrial labor resulted in a 15-percent increase of the urban African population in three years. Indeed, in the metal industry, which employed 250,000 workers, all regulations concerning hiring on a racial basis were suspended. Other industries also made skilled jobs available to black workers—though always at much lower wages than whites. A plan for upgrading African workers in the key mining industry, which had the support of the government, employers, and the white mine-workers' union, had to be abandoned because of opposition from white miners. At the same time, both European immigration and the white birth-rate were falling, while the emigration of Europeans sharply increased.

In provincial elections, in March, the Nationalists won nine seats from the United party, which had based its campaign on the contention that the Bantustans were a threat to white supremacy. Four of the Nationalist gains were in Natal, the United party's one remaining stronghold. The Progressive party, advocating gradual progress towards racial equality, lost in all white constituencies, but defeated two United party incumbents in two Cape province constituencies where Coloured voters were permitted to elect white candidates.

A number of whites and non-whites were put under arrest under the Suppression of Communism and Sabotage acts, and several were executed.
Thousands of persons, mainly non-European, remained in custody under various administrative regulations, under house arrest, or restricted to certain areas. An amendment to the Suppression of Communism act forbade the publication of any statement made anywhere in the world “furthering the aims of Communism”—the official description of the advocacy of racial equality, among other things. In the parliamentary debate on the question, however, the government gave assurances that the provision would not apply to statements by citizens of foreign nations. The “90-day clause” under which persons could be held incommunicado for questioning and which had aroused wide opposition (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 485), was suspended, as promised, in January, but in June a bill was introduced giving the government authority to hold witnesses for up to six months, and the government retained almost unlimited power to order administrative detention under other legislation already in effect.

The Rand Daily Mail and the Sunday Times of Johannesburg published statements by former political prisoner Harald Strachan and by prison warders that political prisoners had been tortured. The government responded by raiding the offices of the Mail in a search for documents and by prosecuting those who had made the charges. Some convictions were obtained, mainly on the basis of statements by other warders that there had been no abuse of prisoners.

South Africa continued to encounter difficulties in her international relations. Various UN bodies considered the imposition of sanctions to force South Africa to change her racial policies. These policies frequently strained relations with other countries, as in May, when the United States canceled a visit of the aircraft carrier Independence because South Africa would permit only white fliers to land at its airports. In June Verwoerd declared that his government would continue to boycott the racially-mixed receptions held by the United States Embassy, and that no American Negroes could be stationed at the two United States missile tracking stations in South Africa. Since these statements were made in a speech, and not in a diplomatic communication, the United States took no official notice of them. American officials declared that there would be no discrimination in the assignment of personnel to the stations, but no non-whites were assigned either before or after the incident.

Zambia and Malawi

In Zambia President Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence party (UNIP) continued in firm control and the country prospered in 1965. Rising copper production and prices helped Zambia finance a large-scale development program, purchase interests in some existing foreign-owned industries, and still add substantially to its foreign exchange reserves. The government and copper companies developed plans to make Zambia less dependent on Rhodesia for imports and transit facilities. Some tensions continued between African and white workers in the mines and on the Zambian
section of the Rhodesian railway, causing some short strikes. The government threatened to prosecute trade union leaders it charged with accepting foreign bribes and it banned a number of publications of the Communist-line World Federation of Trade Unions, as well as other foreign Communist publications. Alice Lenshina, leader of the fanatical Lumpa sect which had provoked disorders (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 488), remained in protective custody and a temporary ban on the sect’s activities remained in effect. A government-appointed investigating commission reported that both the Lumpas and members of UNIP had been at fault in the disorders of the previous year.

In Malawi supporters of several cabinet ministers, ousted by Prime Minister H. Kamuzu Banda in September 1964 on charges of having conspired against him with Communist China (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 488), were imprisoned or detained. The activities of political refugees from Malawi caused tensions with Tanzania and Zambia. Banda charged that they were preparing his overthrow, and were receiving aid from the Tanzanian government. Tanzania denied this, and both Tanzanian and Zambian authorities stated that they would continue to admit refugees. Both countries expelled some Banda supporters for creating disorders.

With British assistance, Malawi sharply increased her agricultural production, greatly reducing her long-standing unfavorable trade balance. Like Zambia, Malawi was largely dependent on Rhodesia for imports and for access to other countries, but Malawi also had an alternate route through the Portuguese colony of Mozambique.

Maurice J. Goldbloom
South African Jewish Community

The 1960 census in South Africa reported 116,066 Jews in a white (European) population of 3,088,492 and a total population of 16,002,797—58,224 male and 59,842 female. There were 57,707 Jews in Johannesburg, 23,866 in Cape Town and Peninsula, 5,231 in Durban-Pinetown, 3,576 in Pretoria, 2,811 in Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage, and the rest scattered throughout more than a hundred smaller communities.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>73,547</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>36,574</td>
<td>37,647</td>
<td>74,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>31,719</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>16,534</td>
<td>15,855</td>
<td>32,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>6,199</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3,437</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>6,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
<td>2,999</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>1,679</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>3,190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CIVIC AND POLITICAL STATUS

Jews continued to participate in all branches of national life. Ten Jews were elected to provincial councils in the March 1965 elections (in the outgoing there had been 13). One Jew was returned to the senate by the provincial electoral colleges in November (in the outgoing Senate there had been two). Nine Jews continued to serve as members of parliament. Aleck Jaffe was elected mayor of Johannesburg and Walter Gradner mayor of Cape Town; there were Jewish mayors in 13 other towns and Jewish deputy mayors in eight towns.

Antisemitism

South African Jewry's Zionist affiliations and Israel's vote against South Africa at the United Nations, evoked some discussion in the general press on whether South African Jews had "dual loyalties." In September, on the occasion of Rosh Ha-shanah, Dirk Richard, editor of the Afrikaans weekly Dagbreek, asked in his "personal opinion" column: "Where does the Jew stand in the white man's struggle for survival?" He said that many Nationalists questioned whether Jews were well disposed toward Prime Minister Verwoerd's party and its apartheid policy, whether they could be relied on if South Africa had to be "defended to the last ditch," and why African Jewry had not taken a stand, as a community, against Israel's anti-South African attitude at the UN.

The reply of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, central repre-


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sentative organization of the community, deplored attempts to drag "the Jews into the political arena," pointed out that "the Jewish community has never constituted a political entity," that Jews functioned in politics as individual citizens, whose diverse views were reflected in membership in different political parties, and that it deeply resented Richard's slur on their loyalty to South Africa, which was beyond question. The Board's statement warned that it was a "dangerous fallacy" to suggest (as was apparently implied by Richard) that failure to agree with the political viewpoint or racial ideology of the party in power "is equivalent to disloyalty to the country."

In a second article Richard said that it had not been his intention to imply that membership in the National party was the sole proof of patriotism; acknowledged the loyalty of the Opposition, and of the average South African Jew, and conceded that Zionism was based on religious sentiment and, as such, deserved respect. But he quoted the Yom Kippur sermon of Rabbi Solomon Poupko—who had come from the United States in 1964 to take the pulpit in the Johannesburg Sydenham-Highlands North Hebrew congregation, one of the largest in the country—which criticized South African Zionism as a "disease" and local Zionist youth as "storm-troopers." This sermon, Richard continued, made one wonder whether there was not also a political element—"the uncertainty over double loyalty"—in Zionist ties with Israel. In a letter to Dagbreek, Chief Rabbi Bernard Casper gave assurances that this was not the case and Rabbi Poupko published an "unreserved apology" for his remarks.

At the 24th biennial congress of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies in June, Arthur Suzman, chairman of its public relations committee, declared that "the present government, since it came to power in 1948, has expressly repudiated antisemitism, and has indeed exercised a welcome restraining influence against those of its followers who, from time to time, have sought to air or exploit their antisemitic sentiments."

However, there were still occasions (like the Richards matter, above) when public controversy relating to Jews flared up. There was also evidence of deliberate anti-Jewish incitement through foreign and locally-inspired propaganda. Hard-core right-wing groups in South Africa turned for inspiration to kindred groups abroad—especially in the United States—which sought to link Jews with Communism. In March a West German visitor, Prince Hubertus von und zu Loewenstein, warned in a press interview that a group of German neo-Nazis which, according to R. Ernst, press attaché to the West German legation, had been organized by the Hanover Deutsche Wochenzeitung, was touring South Africa. Ernst emphasized that the embassy was in no way involved in the group's visit.

In September 12 tombstones in the Jewish section of the old Pretoria cemetery were daubed with antisemitic slogans and swastikas. Police investigations failed to trace the perpetrators.
COMMUNAL ORGANIZATION

The biennial congress of the Board of Deputies authorized the Board to expand its services in public relations, cultural activities, work for youth and students, and assistance to small rural communities, and to secure greater communal coordination and discipline, particularly in fund raising. Teddy Schneider, outgoing chairman, was elected president and Maurice Porter, formerly vice-chairman, chairman.

The Union of Jewish Women of Southern Africa, an organization with 59 branches, decided in June to expand its programs of adult education, aid to the hospitalized, “friendship clubs” for the old and lonely, and other goodwill and philanthropic endeavors.

Fund Raising

Although government withdrawal of a special concession for the transfer of Zionist funds to Israel (AJYB, 1963 [Vol. 64], p. 418) greatly reduced amounts that could be sent within the national currency restrictions, campaigning for the Israeli United Appeal continued as before. Funds in excess of transfer permits were banked against future commitments.

The United Communal Fund, which helped finance the activities of the main national Jewish organizations, continued to struggle with the problem of too many obligations and not enough funds to meet them. Harry Serebro, its national chairman, resigned after ten years’ service and was succeeded by Namie Philips, who relinquished the presidency of the Board of Deputies. Philips warned participating organizations that unless they made greater fund-raising efforts, their allocations would have to be reviewed.

In February Trude Weiss-Rosmarin, editor of the New York Jewish Spectator, opened the South African Women’s United Communal Fund campaign, under the auspices of the Union of Jewish Women.

The Judge Kuper Foundation Trust, established in 1964 to finance the King David Jewish Day Schools in Johannesburg (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 493), reached the half-way mark in its R1,000,000 ($1,400,000) campaign goal in April. Speakers at its fund-raising dinners included Evelyn de Rothschild, Neville Laski, and Victor Mishcon of England and Rabbi Louis Rabinowitz, formerly chief rabbi of Johannesburg, of Israel.

Religion

In June an agreement for cooperation between Chief Rabbi Casper and Reform Rabbi Arthur Super terminated the conflict which had existed between Rabbi Ahron Opher, the former chief minister of the Johannesburg United Progressive Jewish congregation, and the local Orthodox rabbinate (AJYB, 1964 [Vol. 65], p. 343). Feelings abated after Rabbi Opher’s resignation and return to the United States in July 1964, and early in 1965 Teddy Schneider, then chairman of the Board of Deputies, brought Rabbis Casper
and Super together informally to explore the possibility of an accommodation. The Casper-Super agreement, while acknowledging the irreconcilable theological differences between Orthodoxy and Reform, provided a formula for prayers at general communal occasions, such as banquets, conferences, and memorial meetings, by consent of both groups. It also provided that the Orthodox rabbinate, recognized by the army as the official representative of the Jews in matters concerning the chaplaincy, would arrange with the military authorities that Reform rabbis be permitted to minister to Reform Jews in the armed services. The agreement was approved for the Orthodox by the Federation of Synagogues, Mizrahi, and the Rabbis and Ministers Association, and for the Reform by the United Progressive Jewish congregation of Johannesburg. After the congress of the Board of Deputies, however, the national coordinating Reform body, the Union for Progressive Judaism, disassociated itself from the agreement and a controversy developed among Reform rabbis in the Jewish press. However, the agreement was put into effect in Johannesburg, removing a major cause of friction.

A splinter group broke off from Johannesburg's United Progressive Jewish congregation and in August established a small new congregation, Temple Beth El.

New synagogues were dedicated in 1965 in the Cyrildene suburb of Johannesburg (Orthodox); in Bloemfontein (an Orthodox synagogue and a Reform temple); and Germiston (Reform).

Education

In May the South African board of Jewish education published the report of Zvi Adar, professor of education at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, of his 1964 survey of the Hebrew schools maintained by the Board (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 395). It reviewed the structure of Jewish education in South Africa and the historical development which determined the national-traditional character of the schools, and applauded the progress achieved through wide communal support and modern facilities. But it criticized communal tensions over education: the isolation of the Cape, with its own board of Jewish education; rigidity in prayer and the teaching of religion in the day schools, and the disruption of numerous plans as a result of the tendency among Jewish leaders to bring their political and ideological arguments into discussions on education. One such instance was the dispute between those who believed in "education towards the synagogue" and those more interested in the teaching of modern Hebrew. Adar made a number of recommendations for changes, better coordination, and the training of teachers.

The Rabbi Judah Leib Zlotnik Seminary, established in 1944 by the board of Jewish education, graduated its 100th Hebrew teacher.

Under the aegis of the Cape board of Jewish education, the foundation stone was laid in August in Cape Town of a R120,000 ($168,000) hostel to accommodate 50 children of the Herzlia day schools.
Zionism and Relations with Israel

The 29th biennial South African Zionist conference, held in Johannesburg in September, undertook a reappraisal of objectives and techniques after keynote addresses by Louis Pincus, acting chairman of the Jewish Agency and former South African Zionist leader; Rose Halprin of the American section of the Jewish Agency, and Professor Sol Liptzin, a retired American scholar now heading the humanities department at the Technion in Israel. Delegates emphasized the need for correcting organizational shortcomings, developing new methods to mobilize the full Zionist potential of South African Jewry, especially among younger people, encouraging Hebrew education, and stimulating aliyah. A special commission was set up to make recommendations for change, and Israel Maisels was named chairman. The conference reelected Edel Horwitz as chairman of the Zionist Federation and Maisels as honorary president.

Social Services

It was disclosed at the annual meeting of the Transvaal Jewish Welfare Council in August that tighter credit controls and the higher cost of living had resulted in the need for increased assistance grants. The Witwatersrand Hebrew Benevolent Association granted 180 interest-free loans, totaling R162,274 ($220,083) in 1965, R40,000 ($56,000) more than in 1964. A similar situation calling for wider assistance and larger grants faced the Jewish Board of Guardians in Cape Town. The Johannesburg Hevra Kaddisha, the largest Jewish welfare agency in South Africa, estimated that in 1965 it had distributed R129,000 ($180,600), as compared to R187,315 ($262,241) in 1964, for relief and rehabilitation.

Cultural Activities

Cultural activities included the People’s College lecture programs, operated jointly by the Board of Deputies and the Zionist Federation; courses and lectures of the Yiddish Cultural Federation and Histadruth Ivrith; adult education programs of the Union of Jewish Women, and seminars conducted by Zionist groups. There were lecture tours by Trude Weiss-Rosmarin of New York, Sol Liptzin of the Haifa Technion, and Meyer Passow, lecturer in history at Bar Ilan University in Tel-Aviv.

Rabbi Solomon Rappaport was installed as professor of Hebrew at the University of the Witwatersrand in March.

Books by South African Jews published in 1965 included: Paaneah Zafenat, a commentary of Eleazar Ashkenazi Ben-Nathan Ha-Bavli on the Pentateuch, edited by Rabbi Solomon Rappaport; Maor Gadol, Talmudic studies by Rabbi Moses Romm; The Eternal Quest, sermons by Rabbi Jacob Newman; Goodbye Dear England, a novel by Sarah Gertrude Millin; Four People, a novel by Gerald Gordon; A Soho Address, memoirs of Chaim Lewis;
Dvinsk: Its Rise and Decline, memoirs of Moishe Levin; Personalities and Places, essays by Bernard Sachs; Baron von Ludwig and the Ludwig’s-Burg Garden, a historical study by Frank Bradlow; Apartheid and Survival, essays by Henry Katzew; Floating Island, a book of verse by Ruth Miller; Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa (second edition), compiled and edited by Eric Rosenthal of New York; and South African Jewry 1965, edited by Leon Feldberg, a reference work containing historical studies, communal directory, and a who’s who.

**Personalia**

Losses suffered by South African Jewry in 1965 included the Zionist leader Bernard Gering (in Johannesburg, February); Isaac Frank, Cape Town civic and communal leader (February); Barney Moshal, a Durban communal leader (March); Jimmy Green, veteran Johannesburg labor leader (March); the Rand pioneers and leading Johannesburg communal workers Isidor Heyman (April) and Sebia Wunsh (August); the Zionist leader Nicolai Kirschner (in London, May); Benjamin Weinbren, leading Johannesburg anaesthetist (November), and Harry Robert Schewitz, communal leader and national organizer of the United Communal Fund (December).

EDGAR BERNSTEIN