Tunisia*

AFTERMATH OF BIZERTE

The effects of the Bizerte crisis (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], pp. 432-36) reverberated throughout the year under review (June 30, 1961, to July 1, 1962). In January 1962 France and Tunisia resumed negotiations and Tunisia ceased vaunting its adherence to the Arab League. The solution of the Algerian problem, to which President Bourguiba responded with congratulations to France, further relaxed the atmosphere. In March the Tunisian delegate to the Arab League was officially instructed not to mix in “problems which did not concern him,” i.e., he was to remain a spectator as far as the intrigues of the League were concerned. On June 20 the southern part of Bizerte was officially restored to Tunisian control, and at the same time diplomatic relations with France were resumed.

In July 1961 Tunisia had been isolated in the Arab world, treated with reserve by the unaligned nations because of her too close friendship with France, and suspected by the Communist countries because of President Bourguiba’s personal pro-Westernism. In July 1962, without having lost—indeed, having strengthened—her technical and cultural ties with France, Tunisia had nevertheless gained the Bizerte base, regained her place in the Arab world, reestablished her prestige among the unaligned nations, and improved relations with the Soviet Union.

Relations with Other Countries

Difficulties had arisen between Tunisia and her two neighbors in the Maghreb. The official establishment on Moroccan soil of a Tunisian opposition group, the first extra-territorial opposition group to be formed since the departure of Salah ben Youssef from Egypt (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 434), was a severe shock to the Tunisian authorities. The Tunisian press hastened to denounce the Moroccan government and was, in turn, barred from Moroccan territory. A break between the two governments seemed in prospect.

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 433.
But the rapid development of the Algerian crisis soon relegated the Moroccan dispute to a secondary place. There were a number of public clashes, the last of which occurred in June, when Bourguiba attributed the pro-Castro position of the Algerian provisional government's leaders to the undue influence of the French newspapers _l'Express_ or _France Observateur_. The provisional government reacted with "surprise that the President of the Tunisian Republic could thus interfere in [their] internal affairs." The presence in Tunisia of the FLN army, moreover, did not contribute to the peace of mind of the Jewish community, despite the feeling of reassurance which stemmed from the improvement of relations between France and Tunisia.

There was no significant change in Tunisian relations with the United States or the Soviet Union, although at the height of the Bizerte crisis Tunisian leaders indicated that they felt the United States had failed to give them the support to which they were entitled. Closer relations between Tunisia and Italy found expression in the visit of Italian Premier Amintore Fanfani in June 1962.

Domestic Affairs

Domestically, the year saw the vague beginnings of an opposition party headed by the former ministers of information, Mohammed Masmoudi and Bèchir Ben Yahmid. The most serious development was the increasingly sharp divergence between President Bourguiba's views and those of Tunisian students.

Five years of poor or average harvests had upset the precarious balance of the Tunisian economy. For the first two months of 1962 there was a deficit of 8 million dinars as against one of 5,732,000 dinars for the first two months of 1961. The Tunisian budget was balanced by virtue of subsidies and loans. In the first place, France had tacitly continued its cultural and technical agreement with Tunisia, abrogation of which would have effected a shut-down of all French schools. Likewise, the resumption of royalty payments for the Edjelé pipeline, amounting to 14 million dinars a year, which had been momentarily interrupted during the Bizerte crisis, substantially helped the Tunisian economy. Other countries similarly came to Tunisia's assistance. From July 1, 1961, to June 30, 1962, United States help amounted to $27.5 million: $11.2 million, economic assistance; $10 million, development loan, and $6.3 million, development aid. The Soviet Union granted a loan of 12 million dinars for the construction of a dam, the Tunisian University, and a technical institute.

On May 31, 1962, President Bourguiba signed a law providing for a three-year plan designed to replace private initiative with state monopolies or cooperatives in the principal fields of economic activity. The plan provided for the establishment of 200 agricultural cooperatives in northern Tunisia, but was in other respects a continuation of the policy in effect since independence. Despite Tunisian efforts to reduce France's share of the country's

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1 1 dinar = $2.39.
trade, which was some 60 per cent of the total, there was no noticeable change. In the hope of broadening Tunisia's markets, Planning Minister Ahmed Ben Salah made a number of trips to the United States and to the countries of the Soviet bloc. Work on the conversion of the Bizerte base into an oil refinery and steel mill began in April 1962; it was expected that this would be done in cooperation with one of the subsidiaries of the Italian state oil agency (ENI; Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi).

The most notable change in Tunisia's social structure during the year was the sharp reduction in the long-established Jewish (both Tunisian and European) and Italian communities. The Italian community, according to official figures, fell from 53,000 to 33,000 in three years of which a loss of 15,000 occurred after July 20, 1961, partly because of the economic depression and partly because of the Bizerte crisis and the consequent general exodus of Europeans. (The Italian government adopted measures on behalf of its repatriated citizens similar to those adopted by France.) This loss was an important one for Tunisia, since the Italians were very active in the Tunisian economy and furnished the bulk of all building and vineyard workers; it was discussed during Premier Fanfani's visit to Tunis.

The Jewish community also dropped sharply; although exact figures were hard to get, departures during the year under review were probably between 15,000 and 25,000.

JEWISH COMMUNITY

Since the last population statistics for Tunisia dated back to 1955, it was possible to arrive at approximate Jewish population figures only by calculation. Thus, on the basis of a natural increase of 2.1 per cent a year for the Moslem population, the Tunisian population on July 1, 1961, was estimated to have been 4,200,000, while the Jewish community was estimated at 55,000 to 60,000, with 35,000 to 40,000 in Tunis and almost all the rest in Sfax, Sousse, and Djerba. On July 1, 1962, the population of Tunisia was estimated at 4,280,000, while the Jewish community fell to between 30,000 and 40,000. There were 20,000 to 25,000 in Tunis and about 3,500 in Djerba, 3,000 in Sfax, and 1,500 altogether in Gabès and Zarziz. About the only Jewish community which did not undergo important changes as a result of the Bizerte events was that of two villages on the island of Djerba, Hara Seguira and Hara Khébira. This community had a very special character and was believed to have been established thousands of years ago.

Jews played a major role in the liberal professions, furnishing 40 per cent of the doctors and lawyers, and above all in trade and banking. Some had important government positions.

Emigration

The causes of emigration were both long- and short-range. Tunisia was traditionally one of the Arab countries most favorably disposed towards the Jews. As far back as one could trace Tunisian history, Jews had been there—
perhaps even from the foundation of Carthage. There were numerous signs of a Jewish presence during the Roman period, such as synagogues and tombstones. Jews were eminent in the pre-Arab and pre-Moslem Tunisia of the Berbers, and after the Arabs and Islam came. Tunisia often served as a refuge for Jews driven from Spain, France, and Italy.

The large-scale Jewish emigration from Tunisia was unquestionably precipitated by the fortnight during the Bizerte crisis when it appeared that Bourguiba had completely reversed his pro-Western policy and had effectuated an enthusiastic reconciliation with Nasser and a total break with France. The Jews of Tunisia had the feeling of being caught in the net of Islamic Arab nationalism. Fundamentally, however, Tunisia had always followed a line of hostility to Israel, although the conflict between Bourguiba and Nasser had to a large extent masked it. Now their union suddenly threw into relief the anti-Israel policy of Tunisia, expressed by President Bourguiba in his speech at the United Nations in May 1961. It suddenly became impossible to be at the same time Tunisian and pro-Israeli.

Another cause of emigration was the economic situation in Tunisia. The three-year plan involved a rigid control of import licenses and a policy of austerity. Combined with foreign aid and investments, this might eventually raise the standard of living, but the existing situation was one of unemployment and underemployment. French colonialism, for all its faults, had sustained an economic boom from which the Jewish community had greatly profited. But now, as time passed, the key positions which the Jews had held in the economy disappeared one after another. State monopolies took over in precious metals and the grain market, soft goods, and olive oil and wine.

Exact figures on emigration were difficult to obtain. Tunisian statistics were in terms not of religious groups but of nationalities. From July 28, 1961, to January 1, 1962, the Fonds Social Juif Unifié (FSJU) reception bureau in Marseilles handled the cases of more than 4,000 Tunisian Jews (of whom 1,000 were sent to Israel) and 3,000 French Jews from Tunisia. In January 1962, 237 Tunisian Jews arrived, 134 of whom went to Israel; in February, the corresponding figures were 152 and 104; in March, 227 and 208; in April, 206 and 136; in May, 240 and 160. Between January and May the bureau helped about a hundred French Jews. Since most of the emigrants were middle-class, it can be assumed that many did not turn to FSJU, and were therefore not included in these figures. It may be estimated that between July 1, 1961, and June 30, 1962, 15,000 to 25,000 Jews left Tunisia.

While the Tunisian government, more flexible than that of Morocco, closed its eyes to this emigration, it did not permit the Jewish Agency to have an office in Tunisia, so that the agency had no official representation there. But the FSJU office in Marseilles functioned well. In addition, centers in Paris found work for the emigrants, helped them to find lodgings, regularized the status of the Tunisian Jews, and informed the French Jews of their rights.
Attitude Toward the Jews

Public opinion in Tunisia, after passing through something of an anti-semitic phase in the weeks following the Bizerte crisis, appeared at the time of writing to have quieted down. The charges leveled against Tunisian Jews suspected of having collaborated with the French at Bizerte lost their point when Franco-Tunisian relations were resumed. Nevertheless there was undeniably some alteration in the relations between Tunisian Moslems and Jews. Before Bizerte, Tunisian independence had involved genuine advancement even for the Jews. They were admitted to government employment, and some held important positions. There had even been a Jewish cabinet minister, André Barouch. Jews were active in Tunisian cultural and artistic life. Only in matters pertaining to Israel was the situation uncomfortable.

After Bizerte the two groups were much less close. Many Moslems felt that the Jews had shown that their first loyalty was to Israel and the West and many Jews felt that Moslems had shown that their westernism was only superficial and that their primary attachment was to Islam, with all that could imply in the way of fanaticism. Each group felt it could not count on the other. Such was the gap that Bizerte had opened. Nevertheless, anti-semitism found no official expression either in law or in fact. If no Jewish functionary was promoted to an important position during the year, those who had such positions retained them. A distinction was made between Jewish and Israeli. Everything which had to do with the Jewish religion was acceptable. Everything which might involve pro-Israeli behavior was forbidden. The grand rabbi took part in all official ceremonies, and the whole press noted his presence. On major Jewish holidays President Bourguiba sent telegrams of congratulations. The Jewish pilgrimage of the Ghriba, on the island of Djerba, was opened by the governor of the island and reported in detail by the Tunisian newspapers. The semi-official weekly *Jeune Afrique* devoted two pages to it, as it had each year.

In 1957 the rabbinical and Koranic tribunals were replaced by secular courts; since that time there had been no legal distinction between Jews and other Tunisian citizens. The suppression of polygamy and of divorce by repudiation, like the modification of the laws of inheritance, applied equally to all. The only civil distinction between Jew and Moslem was that, since Islam was the state religion of Tunisia, a Jew could never be president. But he had the right to vote, to be elected a municipal councilor or deputy, etc. But in fact these rights were little exercised. In the municipal elections less than 2 per cent of the Jews voted. The majority, indeed, did not even receive their voting cards.

There was no systematic discrimination against Jews in respect to employment. In private business they were sought for their competence. In public employment, however, the situation was not as good. There were instances in which Jewish employees were summarily dismissed. (In one case the law librarian, who had held her position for 12 years, was dismissed on one day’s notice without compensation.) And certain things that were done
had the earmarks of antisemitism. Thus, the fiscal controls imposed immediately after Bizerte were applied mainly to Jews, both Tunisian and French, who were forced to pay fines which were not always justified and which came to as much as 10,000 dinars. The control over firearms led to arrests on grounds whose flimsiness the Tunisian press did not conceal. (Thus two revolvers buried in a garden since 1934 led to the imprisonment of a Tunisian Jew for three months.) There were also other arrests, including some of Frenchmen and of Tunisian Moslems, which seriously shook the confidence of Tunisian Jews in Tunisian justice. The most spectacular, and the one which aroused the greatest feeling in liberal circles in the capital, was that of the leader of the bar Chedly Khelladi, who had a reputation for integrity far beyond the frontiers of the country. Jews were legally but not actually eligible for military service; there was not a single Jew in the Tunisian army.

Communal Activities

The Provisional Committee set up in 1958 to handle Jewish communal affairs for a period of three months never subsequently secured a definitive status (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 436). It had a directorate of six, chosen from among the notables of the community. Its function, officially, was purely religious. Its budget was met essentially from the proceeds of taxes on the slaughtering of kosher meat and on the baking of matzot, and from gifts. In its recently acquired office in the rue Glatigny, it offered several courses in Hebrew and biblical history, attended by a hundred students. It also sponsored a preparatory class for ORT-school candidates, and a course in French. The only large-scale activity of the year was the Purim ball in a major hotel in the capital, featuring the election of a Queen Esther.

Almost all Jews in Tunisia, whether of Tunisian or Italian or French nationality, were Sephardi. Tunisia had over 300 synagogues; there were no plans for constructing any new ones.

In 1961–62, the five schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle had 3,768 students, of whom 1,833 were girls. At the end of the school year the number of students had fallen, as a result of departures during the year, to 3,543, of whom 2,082 were Jews. The rue Malta Srira school had 868 students and 36 teachers; the El Mechnaka school 913 and 32, respectively; the Hafsia school 718 and 20; the Sousse school 178 and 7, and the Sfax school 414 and 8. The ORT-Alliance School had 452 students, of whom 15 per cent were Arabs and 10 per cent Europeans. In all the elementary grades there were five hours of instruction in Hebrew weekly, as well as supplementary instruction in French, in addition to the normal program of the public schools. Instruction in Hebrew was provided by five teachers from the Hebrew Normal school of Casablanca. The Alliance paid the overhead expenses and the cost of Hebrew and French instruction, while the Tunisian government paid the teachers' salaries. The ORT school, in addition to its vocational courses, provided weekly two hours of Hebrew and one of Jewish history which were compulsory for Jews. According to the director, this
school was not expanding. It was expected that there would be an increasing number of Moslem students.

No Zionist movement was permitted in Tunisia, and all previously existing Zionist groups had been dissolved subsequent to independence. Even such youth movements as the Union of Jewish Youth, the Jewish Students of Tunisia, and the Jewish Scouts also disappeared. The Jews of Tunisia had very little contact with Israel.

The only Jewish communal organizations which officially existed were certain philanthropic agencies. The Garderie (for children) and Nos Petits were both included in the Tunis municipal budget, receiving together 100 dinars subsidy for the period between October 1961 and October 1962. OSE continued its activities in preventive medicine, vaccination, prenatal consultations, etc., and assisted in the resettlement of people leaving the communities of southern Tunisia for the cities of the north. Its great problem was that of personnel, since a number of its staff members (including the director, Lucien Tahar), were leaving Tunisia.

GILBERT COHEN-TANUGI

Morocco*

JEWISH COMMUNITY

According to official Moroccan figures, the Jewish population of Morocco in July 1960 was about 160,000, or 1.4 per cent of the total Moroccan population. Moroccan Jews were mostly urban. Demographically they were like the Moroccan Moslems, with a natural increase of over 2 per cent a year. Half of the Jews were below the age of 20. Jews furnished 10 per cent of the personnel of Moroccan commerce, 8 per cent of the industrial personnel and artisans, and 5 per cent of those in administrative posts and the liberal professions. Almost half the Jews of Morocco lived in Casablanca, the country’s economic capital. Although only 30 per cent of the country’s population were employed in the modern part of the country’s economy, 99 per cent of Jews were.

Recent political events, and especially those of January 1961 (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], pp. 40–41), produced a large emigration of Moroccan Jews to Israel. In mid-1962 the Moroccan Jewish community probably numbered about 130,000. It remained by far the largest Jewish community of North Africa.

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 433.
Attitudes Toward the Jews

Before the proclamation of Moroccan independence in 1956, the country's Jews had the status of dhimmis, that is, non-Moslems living on Islamic territory under the protection of the government and paying taxes. On his return from exile, King Mohammed V declared the Jews to be full citizens. The king had always shown particular solicitude for the country's Jews; under the Vichy regime, he had protected them from the antisemitic laws. After Mohammed's death, King Hassan II reaffirmed the legal equality of Jews and Moslems. The official position of the Moroccan state that Jews and Moslems are equal before the law, however, was not always actually practiced. Some types of more or less official discrimination were increasing. Certain administrative posts had always been completely closed to Moroccan jews, e.g., in the ministry of foreign affairs and in the police department. But Jews in other high posts were gradually being eliminated, and few were left.

Since independence, government circles had exhibited distrust toward Moroccan Jews, who were regarded as having done nothing for independence, or actually fearing it. Mutual mistrust increased after the Casablanca conference in January 1961 (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 440), in which President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt personally took part. Jews were arrested, imprisoned, tortured, kidnapped, and the prospects were dim. The reassuring statements of the Crown Prince Moulay Hassan and Interior Minister Si Bekkai—as they then were—had no effect (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], pp. 440–41).

Nevertheless, there was no systematic antisemitism, and the ordinary Moroccan Moslem got on very well with his Jewish neighbors. If there was antisemitism, it was latent and confined to certain well-defined circles, such as the weekly Akhbar Ad-Dounia, which was financed by Egypt. In an issue which had just appeared at the time of writing, it carried a eulogy of Hitler and Eichmann.

Emigration

After the sinking of the Pisces (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 440), middle-class and even rich Jews began to follow the lower-class Jews, many of whom had previously emigrated. It was estimated that up to the time of writing, total Jewish emigration from Morocco to Israel was about 100,000. (There was little emigration to France.) In November 1961, after the visit of Marcel Franco, president of the American Friends of the Alliance Israelite Universelle (during which he was received by King Hassan II), a modus vivendi was reached with the Moroccan government for the resumption of legal emigration, which had been stopped. Thousands of persons sought the assistance of UHS, which was in charge of organizing the departures.

The Moroccan opposition party, the left of center Union Nationale des Forces Populaire (UNFP), headed by the former president of the National Consultative Assembly, Mehdi Ben Barka, exploited the Jewish emigration
issue for political purposes. Every day its newspaper *At-Tahrir* published articles criticizing King Hassan II for allowing the Jews to leave, and demanding strict adherence to the terms of the Arab League charter. The press campaign, which disturbed the Moroccan government, because it felt itself discredited in the eyes of the other Arab states, eventually bore fruit.

The activities of an international swindler named George Harrar furnished the government with a pretext for action. In June 1962 he was arrested for trafficking in passports, which he illegally obtained from corrupt functionaries and sold for about 50,000 francs each. The day after Harrar's arrest Casablanca Governor Driss Ibn Omar, notwithstanding the fact that he was known to be a friend of the Jews, closed the offices of UHS. The interior ministry supported his action, and at the end of August 1962 the UHS offices were still closed. The only emigration taking place was that of people who succeeded in obtaining proper passports. This was not as difficult as it had been some months earlier. Although the orders were not always carried out, Colonel Driss did give orders that Jews were to have normal access to passports.

In a statement to Moroccan students in March 1962, Minister of Islamic Affairs Allal al Fassi, leader of the right-wing Istiqlal party, declared that as full Moroccans in a democratic state, Jews had the right to go wherever they saw fit. This statement was received with great relief by the Jews. Since the Istiqlal party was far from pro-Jewish and its newspapers on various occasions expressed unfavorable opinions on the Jewish community of Morocco, Allal al Fassi's statement was explicable only in terms of his party's desire to preserve the solidarity of the government on the question of Jewish emigration.

**Communal Activities**

In April 1962 the Council of Jewish Communities met for the first time since March 1961 (*AJYB*, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 442-43). Léon Benzaquen, minister of posts and telegraphs in the first independent Moroccan government and a leading Jewish personality, who in 1961 had been in conflict with the majority of representatives, was named honorary president of the federation. David Amar was chosen president, and President Meyer Obadia of the Casablanca Jewish community became secretary general.

Two major problems faced the Jewish community of Morocco. The first was that of the prohibition of mail exchange with Israel, important because every Moroccan Jew had relatives in Israel. The second, even more serious problem was posed by the compulsory conversions of young Jewish girls to Islam, under pressure of the minister of Islamic affairs, who was zealous to convert the greatest possible number of Jews to Islam. Representations by David Amar to the ministry of justice received no reply. In June 1962 the communal monthly *La Voix des Communautés* devoted a special issue to the problem of forced conversions and called on the grand rabbis of Morocco to make a firm stand. As paid state functionaries, however, concerned with the dispensation of justice in matters pertaining to personal status and in-
inheritance and with religious education among Jews, the grand rabbis were unable to take a position.

There was not, properly speaking, any spiritual head of the Jewish community of Morocco. At the time of writing there were 40 rabbis, headed by Saïd Danan, president of the Supreme Rabbinic Tribunal and a descendant of Maimonides. The Institut des Hautes Etudes Rabbiniques, financed by the government, was still functioning but no longer trained chief rabbis. There was also a school at Casablanca which trained Hebrew teachers for the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. And there were some 15 yeshivot, five of them in Casablanca.

Most Moroccan Jews were poor. The committees of the various Jewish communities served as welfare organizations, giving assistance to the needy and sick, with the financial aid of JDC.

VICTOR MALKA

Algeria *

INDEPENDENCE AND EXODUS

AFTER THE defeat of the French generals' putsch in April 1961 (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 301, 447), a polarization took place which entirely eliminated as a political factor the European liberal element which favored a compromise solution. In the exasperation which followed the quick capitulation of Generals Maurice Challe and André Zeller, the "blackfeet" (Europeans indigenous to Algeria for several generations) lost all hope of arousing a sense of solidarity with the Metropolitan French. Hence they felt themselves betrayed by France, isolated and abandoned, dug in with their backs to the sea. They often compared their plight to that of Israel in 1948.

OAS and Jews

For the most part, the Jews of Algeria had supported the liberal groups until 1961. They had thought that somehow matters would ultimately be arranged without recourse to a complete overturn, placing their hopes in partition or dual nationality. Now they were confronted with an immediate problem which seemed to promise more terrible consequences for them than for the European Christians. They feared that the revenge of the formerly subject populace would be directed against them, not only as Europeans but also as Jews and as friends of Israel.

Hence the majority of Algerian Jews slipped bit by bit into the camp of the ultras and even, in the last period before the signing of the Evian agreement (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], pp. 448-49), into that of the Secret Army

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 433.
Organization (OAS). This was particularly true in the city of Oran, where many of the 35,000 Jewish inhabitants were of Spanish descent, and the general atmosphere had always been rather Iberian. Nevertheless, Jewish support for OAS would have been much less had the Jews not shared the European conviction that their bloody tactics would eventually force the French government and international opinion to bow to the refusal of the Europeans of Algeria to accept a transfer of power to Arab nationalism. Like inmates of a prison, OAS supporters were subject to the most absurd rumors. Thus they had the illusion that when the showdown came the army would unanimously back the OAS demand for an Algérie française, and they expected active support from Spain, Portugal, the Union of South Africa, and Israel.

Confidence in OAS was reinforced by the fact that shortly after the defeat of the 1961 putsch, the supposedly vanquished OAS managed for all practical purposes to seize power in all of the cities inhabited by Europeans. In Algiers and Oran they met little or no resistance from the police and there was no serious attempt to prevent their “pirate” propaganda telecasts. Flights from Oran or Algiers to Paris required an OAS visa. Resistance to OAS orders was punished by death. Almost all blackfeet civil servants served as voluntary or involuntary OAS accomplices. In these conditions, loyal French officials operated perforce in the manner of subversive secret agents. The police of the anti-terrorist brigades assigned to Algiers were hunted down in the streets, the cafes, and even in their own rooms. On Yom Kippur 1961 Commissioner Alexei Goldenberg of the anti-OAS brigades, a veteran of the French Jewish resistance, was assassinated on the Algiers University campus. The OAS was in control and the “Gaullist agents”—the representatives of the Paris government—were their quarry. Excited by the repeated substantiations of slogans such as “OAS is watching” and “OAS strikes when it wishes, where it wishes, whom it wishes,” the Europeans failed to recognize that the situation from which they seemed to be profiting was actually hastening Algeria’s progress to independence, in so far as it demonstrated that the French government was incapable of preserving order or even itself.

European Status of Jews Reaffirmed

Meanwhile, negotiations and soundings were taking place regarding the status of the Jews under the agreements being negotiated at Evian. Up to a certain point, the Front of National Liberation (FLN) insisted categorically that the Jews were of indigenous origin and were therefore to receive the same consideration as native Algerian Moslems, rather than Europeans. From this point of view, Jews remaining in Algeria, unlike Europeans, would be denied the option of French citizenship; if they chose France, they would, like Moslems, forfeit the right to return to Algeria. The Algerian Jewish community, which had never as such taken an official position against independence, nevertheless insisted on its claim to French nationality. In March 1961 a delegation from the Comité Juif Algérien d’Etudes Sociales urged that
in the negotiations then in prospect, the French government secure the recognition of the French character of the Algerian Jewish community. They argued that the Crémieux decree of 1870, which had conferred French nationality on all the indigenous Jews of Algeria by collective naturalization, was irrevocable and could not again be annulled as it had been by Vichy under Nazi pressure. General de Gaulle, Premier Michel Debré, and the government accepted this principle. The Alliance Israélite Universelle and other Jewish organizations took the question up internationally and it was discussed with Algerian nationalist leaders by non-French quarters. Certain Jews who had lent support to the FLN, some of whom were under Communist discipline, had declared that they were "Algerians like the others"—i.e., like the Moslems. At first FLN cited these declarations. Later, nationalist circles took the position that it was to the interest of the new Algeria to raise the "Jewish question" as little as possible. Hence FLN and the Algerian provisional government (GPRA) agreed not to claim the entire Jewish population of Algeria as indigenous, and it was agreed at Evian to treat the Jews as Europeans.

Terror Mounts

The OAS reign of terror which began in the spring of 1961 was intensified and extended with almost incredible violence during the winter of 1962, with catastrophic consequences for the Algerian Jews. As elsewhere in North Africa, the Jewish quarters often straddled the Arab and European sections, and there were many Jewish enclaves in the Arab quarters and the reverse. Attacks by European terrorists sometimes evoked prompt Moslem reprisals, and it was naturally the non-Moslems of the "frontier" areas, the residents of the Jewish quarters, who sustained the first and frequently the only shock. This resulted in a mutual antagonism which often degenerated into battles between Jews and Arabs, especially between the youth of the two groups. On the second day of Rosh ha-Shanah 1961, in reprisal for the assassination by some Moslems of a Jew in the Jewish quarter of Oran, the Jewish youth launched a counterattack which quickly developed into a massacre of every Moslem within revolver range; the pattern had been set by the European youths of Oran and Bab-el-Oued, the working-class district of Algiers. It was the first time the Jews as such had participated in this type of action, which, particularly in Oran, had previously been the specialty of the young neo-French of Spanish origin. The novel fact that there had been a species of Jewish pogrom against the Arabs, albeit in reprisal, created consternation in the Jewish communities both of Algeria and of France. In a proclamation published in the August-September 1961 issue of Information juive, the organ of the Algerian Jewish community, these acts were clearly condemned and all anti-Moslem racism was energetically denounced. Nevertheless, some sensational Paris papers, notably the illustrated weekly Match, spotlighted the deplorable Jewish New Year in Oran with enormous exaggerations.

After these incidents, FLN issued several directives warning the Moslem population against letting itself be diverted into a war against the Jews. All
the evidence indicates that FLN sought to prevent the development of a fatal chain of pogroms and counter-pogroms. It also sought to influence international public opinion, and especially American public opinion, in this direction. Unfortunately, the FLN instructions in this respect, as in others, were not always followed by the uneducated and impulsive masses. Particularly in Constantine in late 1961, when the war between OAS and FLN reached its height, the large Jewish quarter was subjected to repeated Moslem attacks. The complete insecurity of the Jews of Constantine caused large-scale departures, amounting almost to an evacuation, even before the exodus of the Jews from other sections of Algeria began. OAS exploited the distress of the Jews of Constantine and, according to disclosures published in the Paris _Le Monde_ of July 22-23, 1962, had even appealed for the aid of Israeli army officers. The OAS terror had meanwhile completely ruined the numerous small Jewish merchants who catered to Moslems, and even substantial medium-sized businesses collapsed under the impact of the continual bombings and the enormous “taxes” and “contributions” exacted by the OAS terrorists.

**Demise of the Jewish Community**

The structure of the Algerian Jewish community was formally the same as that of France, centering around the “religous associations” sanctioned by the law of 1905 but not subsidized or otherwise favored by the state. In fact, however, the ancient Jewish kehillah, directed by its president and rabbi, functioned autonomously, and the Federation of Jewish Communities united some 60 communities. (There were considerably more in Algeria, especially if one includes those of the Jews of the M’Zab and other southern territories [AJYB, 1962 (Vol. 63), p. 449].)

After the resignation of Benjamin Heller from the presidency of the Federation of Jewish Communities in 1961, the communal structure suffered a progressive disintegration, and community life was primarily a function of local customs and traditions. A number of shelihim and immigration experts from Israel had tried to recruit candidates for ‘aliyah, but had had little success.

Departures increased during the winter of 1961–62. In Constantine panic and a precipitate rush to ship and plane had already begun after the murder in June 1961 of Raymond Leyris, an oriental singer popular among Jews and Moslems. An Arab Christian converted to Judaism, he was also a thoroughly loyal partisan of FLN who had signed a manifesto disavowing any Jewish need or desire for guarantees in an independent Algeria. Many Constantine Jews had counted on Leyris and the few other FLN-aligned Jews to protect them. Yet Leyris was murdered by Moslems, not by OAS. It was the signal for the Jews to flee.

At about the same time the situation deteriorated seriously in the port of Bône, where the conflict between Europeans and Moslems at times became as violent as in Oran itself. Nevertheless, Chief Rabbi Rahamim Naouri, a man of unusual energy, decided to preserve the Bône community at all costs
in spite of the large-scale departures. At the end of June 1962 the Jewish community of Bône was one of the few in the country which still survived, and Chief Rabbi Naouri declared that he would remain as long as there was still a minyan in the synagogue.

In February and March panic seized the Jews of the extreme south, where there were few Europeans and where FLN had more or less installed its administration even before the provisional government's legal accession to power. The Jews of the city of Ghardaïa liquidated their goldsmiths', slipper-makers', and tanners' shops at sacrifice prices and, still dressed in their native costume and speaking little or no French (their language was Judeo-Arabic), set out for faraway Algiers to await passage to France.

In Algiers and Oran OAS violence daily exacted 50 to 60 Moslem lives. Departures were made difficult or even impossible by the OAS "police," who "mobilized" the entire European and Jewish population.

Yet it was in the small cities of the interior, where relations between most Jews and Moslems had been close, that the fear was greatest. Here the Jews had sources of information which were not quite as available to the Jews of Algiers and Oran. Thus the Moslem friends of the Jews of Tiaret and Ain-Temouchent, or Saida and Relizane (whose Moslem mayor, a close friend of the Jews, was assassinated by OAS), advised their Jewish friends to leave. Because of the long months of ferocious violence by the sadistic racists of OAS, it was expected that the proclamation of independence would be the signal for an outburst of Moslem violence. The flight of the Jews was not now, as it had been a few months earlier, merely the result of pessimism concerning social and economic prospects for the Jews in an independent Algeria. It was prompted purely and simply by fear of a pogrom.

Just as there were many and at times absurd contradictions in the actions and reactions of the Europeans of Algeria as a whole during the "last quarter of an hour," so there were contradictions in the attitudes of the Jews, even in the midst of their panic. While the majority of the Jews saw no alternative to an exodus, others tried last-minute approaches to the new transitional authorities, the members of the provisional executive installed by the French in the new administrative city called Rocher Noir. This provisional executive, whose president Abderrahman Farès was released from prison in Paris when he was named to it, was in the nature of a caretaker government, pending the election of a constituent assembly, planned for August 1962. A majority of the members of the executive, including Chawki Mostefai, who later negotiated an armistice and even a sort of peace with OAS, were representatives of FLN or otherwise obedient to it. Europeans such as the Gaullist mayor of Philippeville, Roger Roth, not compromised by the violence of the ultras and wanting to "play the game," were also represented. It was suggested to the executive that it coopt a representative of the Jewish population as a symbol of the brotherhood of Algerian patriots of the three religions, in the spirit of Mohammed V of Morocco who had made a point of naming a Jew to his government upon the proclamation of Morocco's independence. But nothing came of these proposals, very probably because of an FLN veto. Chief Rabbi
Naouri of Bône, who was at one time proposed as the Jewish member of the executive, never set foot in Rocher Noir. The failure of this project was considered as symptomatic even by Jews who did not make a habit of looking for anti-Jewish intentions on the part of FLN. It added to the atmosphere of depression and speeded up the rate of departures.

A fortnight after his release from internment in France in April 1962, and before he had even set foot in Algeria, Vice Premier Ahmed Ben Bella of the Algerian provisional government—whose conflict with the then Premier Yussuf Ben Khedda was not yet out in the open—was reported to have made a violent anti-Israel statement in an interview with a reporter for a leading Cairo newspaper. He reportedly declared that the Algerian revolution would not be complete until Algeria had contributed its armed assistance to the “liberation” of Palestine and promised to place 100,000 Algerian soldiers at the disposal of the Arab states in a future war against Israel. This statement, despite attempts to explain it away or deny it, further depressed the spirits of the Algerian Jews and caused many to flee who had hitherto hesitated. They reasoned that if the Algerian government should officially align itself with the belligerent Arab attitude towards Israel, the Algerian Jews would at best find themselves in similar straits to those of Morocco. Like them, they would have little or no freedom of movement, be denied passports, face closed frontiers, and be deprived of any contact with Israel. Psychologically, the many precipitate departures of Algerian Jews for France could be considered as a sort of advance escape of prisoners.

Prospect and Retrospect

On June 30, 1962, Algeria was on the verge of a referendum whose result—an overwhelming vote for an independent Algeria, cooperating in principle with France—was a foregone conclusion. At this last moment of the 132 years of l’Algérie française, Jacques Susini, a principal leader of OAS and former secretary general of the association of Algerian students, threw his support to the independent Algeria of FLN in return for a promise of amnesty for his followers, unofficially negotiated with leading members of the provisional executive. Susini had been the organizer of the large-scale racist assassinations of Arabs and the systematic campaign to murder all educated Moslems, especially physicians and pharmacists. At the end, he and his followers had applied scorched-earth tactics in an effort to “return” Algeria to the precise state in which it had been in 1830, on the eve of French colonization. It was in accordance with this policy that the buildings of the University of Algiers, including its precious library of tens of thousands of volumes, were burned. For several days after Susini’s capitulation, terrorist attacks in Algiers ceased entirely. They continued for a while in Oran, but soon ceased there as well.

It was at this point that the sharp conflict between the leaders of the provisional government on the one hand, and the Army of National Liberation and Ben Bella on the other, came into the open. Ben Bella took a plane from Tunis to Tripoli and then Cairo, in order to avoid arrest by his colleagues of
the provisional government. Because Ben Bella still held strong cards, the conflict further complicated a situation already complex and confused enough.

By the end of July 1962 some 70,000 Jews had left Algeria for France; in addition, an estimated 5,000 had gone to Israel since Passover 1962, and some from Western Algeria had gone to Spain in the wake of thousands of settlers of Spanish origin from the Oran region. Some 6,000 of Oran's 35,000 Jews remained there. There was no longer a minyan in the Great Synagogue, much less in the small prayer-houses. The Oran Jewish community had long lacked a titular chief rabbi. Its former chief rabbi, David Askenazi, had been named chief rabbi of Algiers and Algeria, had later resigned his functions, and finally had departed for France. There were no candidates for the chief rabbinate of Oran sufficiently well qualified to win acceptance. The several thousand Jews who remained were almost completely without communal services. One of the assistant rabbis of the city, Rabbi Cohen, attempted to reconstitute a sort of community life in the context of the new situation. Together with Catholic priests, Protestant pastors, and the Moslem imam he took part in a solemn assembly of reconciliation sponsored by FLN. But some days later he received threats and left hastily for France.

In Algiers some 10,000 Jews remained of an estimated 30,000 before the exodus. Here a relative anonymity afforded some protection to the rank and file. But as in Oran, no Jewish organizations or institutions survived. The Great Synagogue in the ancient Jewish quarter at the foot of the Casbah, ravaged in the Christmas Eve riots of 1960, had been only temporarily restored. The Maimonides rabbinical college had not been functioning for some time. The offices of the World Jewish Congress and the Comité Juif Algérien d'Etudes Sociales had closed their doors. During the French army's search of Bab-el-Oued in March and April 1962, in reprisal for the machine-gunning of French soldiers by the local OAS, the synagogue of that quarter was ravaged in its turn. Algiers had long been without a chief rabbi.

In Constantine the large Jewish quarter in the very heart of the city had been completely evacuated, its empty buildings awaiting the installation of Moslem families. Of the city's 20,000 Jews, only a thousand remained. All of the score of synagogues were closed. This ancient stronghold of North African Jewish piety no longer had a shohet or a mohel. The mass departures from Constantine had been taking place since the beginning of the winter, and Passover was celebrated in a desolation appropriate to the 9th of Ab.

The eight to ten thousand Jews of Tlemcen had left; this city, too, had been a religious center with a famous Jewish holy place called the "Tomb of Raab" which had been for centuries the object of pilgrimages from all over North Africa, not only by Jews but also by Moslems and even Christians. At the last moment, the leading Jewish professional men and community leaders had hastily left Mostaganem, Relizane, and Tiaret, three of the more important cities of the Oran region. Almost all the Jews of the large community in Ain-Temouchement, between Oran and Tlemcen, were also gone.
Thus on the eve of independence close to half the Jewish population had left Algeria (pp. 424, 428), while others were planning to depart as soon as they had settled their affairs.\(^1\) In contrast, the exodus of the European Christians, despite the extreme tension between Europeans and Moslems during the period of OAS domination, came to only a little more than a third of the total; it was about 300,000. Jews were almost a quarter of those “repatriated” from Algeria to France, although they had been only about 15 per cent of the non-Moslem population.

Among those who left were the Jewish communal leaders, the young, and the educated. Those who remained were largely either middle-class people whose businesses were dependent on geography, such as the date-exporters in the cities near the southern oases, and some (but very far from all) of the poor and uneducated with no connections in France. The Jews who remained were without leadership or organization. Practically nothing Jewish of importance remained in Algeria. Those who had not left made themselves as inconspicuous as possible and took no part in civic affairs. In mid-June FLN issued an appeal to the Jews to break away from “the criminals of the OAS.” The last issue of the Algiers Information juive appeared in April 1962. This periodical, edited on a high level by Jacques Lazarus, had, despite its rigid attitude of neutrality and discretion in regard to Algerian politics, nevertheless served as a sort of spokesman and had provided guidance, even if this could only be read between the lines.

In Algeria and in the Algerian Jewish colony of France there were known to be a small number of new leaders and functionaries for “Jewish matters” who sought to re-orient the structure and point of view of the Algerian Jewish community in accordance with the new “revolutionary” times. These were the FLN Jews, including Communists and “progressives.” For the most part, they had not previously been identified with Jewish interests or aspirations. They were chosen or chose themselves as the right men for the present situation, particularly because of their opposition to Zionism and the state of Israel. There was little reason to expect that as in Morocco, where the nucleus and cadres of the community had never disappeared, the new Algerian Jewish leaders would include people sincerely concerned with the survival and continuity of Judaism or the aims of Jewish welfare.

In recent years the long lethargy of Algerian Jewry, partly assimilated and partly immersed in conservatism, had begun to show signs of giving way to a spiritual renaissance. This was especially true among the youth, who had been inspired by the awakening of the Moslems and Arabs to affirm the Jewish content of their culture. This was now at an end.

The birth of an independent Algeria after a fierce and chaotic war lasting seven years was certainly one of the positive achievements of our era. In the last analysis, even if it was accomplished through a nationalism that was

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1 No accurate figures were available as to the number of Jews in Algeria before the exodus. The figure of 130,000, based on the census of 1941 taken under the Vichy regime, was almost certainly too low, since there had been a fairly high rate of natural increase in the interim, especially among the Jews of the south. On the other hand, the estimate of 200,000 given by some Algerian Jewish sources in 1961 was almost certainly an overestimate.
often excessive and unjust, it represented a victory for human dignity, which could no longer accommodate itself to colonialism, however modified or attenuated. The majority of the people of the world fully understood this, as did President de Gaulle, who schemed and fought to confront his own country with a *fait accompli* and its justification. The State of Israel itself, in a telegram to de Gaulle in July 1962, hailed Algerian independence. Nevertheless, as has so often been true of Jews in the past, the Jews of North Africa were confronted by tragedy in the wake of an event which in itself called for rejoicing.

Arnold Mandel
Southern Africa

Political Developments

The year from July 1961 to June 1962 was marked by an increasing political polarization. In the Republic of South Africa the Nationalist regime of Premier Hendrik F. Verwoerd further intrenched itself politically and added to its arsenal of legal instruments of repression, while taking additional steps in the development of its program of apartheid. Resistance to its policies on the part of the non-white majority of the population continued, and to some extent appeared to be taking more violent forms. To the north, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland appeared to be moving toward dissolution despite the efforts of Federal Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky to preserve it. In two of its components, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, a transfer of power to African opponents of federation was under way. In the third, Southern Rhodesia, African political leaders announced that they would boycott elections under a new constitution which, while for the first time it provided some parliamentary representation for Africans, continued the white minority in control of the government. And in the British protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland—enclaves in South African territory coveted by the South African Republic—the British government began to take steps designed to lead to eventual independence under African rule.

South Africa's first national elections since the proclamation of the republic on May 31, 1961, took place in October 1961. The Nationalists increased their popular vote by approximately ten per cent and won 105 seats, a gain of three over their strength at the end of the outgoing parliament. The opposition United party carried 49 constituencies, for a loss of four. The strongly anti-apartheid Progressive party elected Helen Suzman in a Johannesburg suburb. Jacob D. D. Basson, who had broken with the Nationalists because of his opposition to apartheid and formed the National Union party, retained his seat from a Cape Province constituency.

In January 1962 Prime Minister Verwoerd announced that, as a step in the implementation of apartheid, self-government would be given to the

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 433.
million-and-a-half Africans of the Transkei area. This self-government was somewhat limited by the fact that it was to be exercised through chiefs appointed by the South African government, and was not recognized by at least a large part of the African population of the area. The plan was criticized by United party leader Sir De Villiers Graaff, who advocated the formation of a federation of self-governing African and white states. According to the New York Times (January 31, 1962), the area allotted to the proposed "Bantustans," or self-governing African areas, under the Verwoerd plan, was capable of supporting only a half-million of the 11 million Africans in the republic. Further developments in the imposition of apartheid were foreshadowed in August 1961 when a member of the cabinet, Pieter Botha, said that the government planned to segregate Africans from "Colored" persons, that is, those of mixed blood. In February 1962 the government ruled that Japanese were to be considered as white. The government hoped to expand trade with Japan.

In July 1961, four months after the acquittal of the last defendants in the mass treason trial which had begun in 1957, the government formally announced that it was closing the case (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 456). There were, however, numerous other arrests in the course of the year and while there were some prosecutions, administrative internments and banishments to remote areas under the government's various special powers were more usual. The orders banning the African National Congress and the Pan-African Congress remained in force and were extended for a year in April 1962. In October 1961 the leader of the African National Congress, Chief Albert Luthuli, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. After some hesitation the government permitted him to leave the small village to which he had been confined, but only long enough to go to Stockholm for the award.

Some of the government's non-white opponents, despairing of the possibility of effecting change by peaceful means in view of the government's suppression of all African political activity, turned to violence; there were a number of bombings and other acts of sabotage during the year. The government responded by imposing new and more stringent security regulations, and in May it introduced a "Sabotage Bill" which so defined sabotage as to include strikes, trespass (e.g., sit-in demonstrations), and numerous other forms of protest. The penalties provided under the bill ranged up to death. The "Sabotage Bill" was passed by the lower house of parliament by a vote of 78-50 in May, and after passage by the upper house went into effect on June 28. The New Zealander Sir Leslie Munro, secretary general of the International Commission of Jurists and former president of the UN General Assembly, described it as a "ruthless attempt to enforce apartheid." Another government measure, introduced in June and under consideration at the close of the period under review, provided for the imprisonment of persons posting or painting anti-government slogans. In June also, the government announced that the borders with the protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland—to which many of its opponents had fled—would be sealed. It also decreed that citizens of Commonwealth countries were to be
considered as aliens after January 1, 1963; this was a consequence of South Africa's break with the Commonwealth. In the same month it expelled to Southern Rhodesia two thousand basket weavers of the Mashona tribe who had lived in South Africa for years but did not have South African nationality.

In October 1961 the United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 67 to 1, with 9 abstentions (including the United States and Great Britain), censured South African Foreign Minister Eric Louw for a speech he had made there defending apartheid and attacking some of South Africa's critics (p. 416). In February 1962 the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa voted to drop South Africa from its membership. In May 1962 the government permitted a United Nations delegation, consisting of Victorio D. Carpio of the Philippines and Salvador Martinez de Alva of Mexico, to visit Southwest Africa. While the delegates were in the territory, a statement was issued in their names to the effect that they had found no threat to the peace and no policy of exterminating the native population, as had been charged. Several days later Carpio, who had meanwhile left Southwest Africa, denied having had any part in drafting the communiqué and said he had been in the hospital at the time. Martinez de Alva later contradicted Carpio's version. In July they submitted an official report to the United Nations in which they declared that the Republic of South Africa showed no intention of abandoning the policy of apartheid in Southwest Africa, that the territory was dominated by a small European minority, that the great majority of the African population wanted UN administration, and that the UN should consider the imposition of sanctions if South Africa failed to abide by UN resolutions in regard to the territory.

Despite the continued domestic and international tension, the economy of the country recovered from the decline of the previous year. South Africa's balance of payments improved and South African bonds rose sharply on the international market. Emigration continued high among the professional classes, however, and the English-language universities had many vacant posts for which they were unable to find suitable candidates.

During the period under review the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was in the midst of constitutional developments whose full extent was not yet clear, but which seemed almost certain to result in the Federation's dissolution or at least drastic alteration. The first parliamentary elections in the Protectorate of Nyasaland were held in August 1961 and resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Malawi Congress party of Dr. Hastings Banda, who shortly thereafter was named to head the government. Dr. Banda was committed to secession from the Federation, and received a pledge from the British government that this would be possible. This would not in itself have been fatal to the Federation, since Nyasaland was a deficit area requiring assistance from the Federal treasury. But the bulk of the Federation's revenues came from the copper industry of Northern Rhodesia, where during the year negotiations for a new constitution reached a stage which showed that it, too, would soon have an African-controlled government committed
to secession. Since Southern Rhodesia was economically dependent on its ties with Northern Rhodesia, there was doubt that it would be able to continue as a viable entity if it continued to preserve white supremacy after an African government took over in Northern Rhodesia. Anticipating difficulties, some commercial interests began to shift their bases of operations from Southern to Northern Rhodesia. At the same time, an increasing number of Southern Rhodesian whites sought to escape from the impasse by pushing for closer relations between their territory and the Republic of South Africa. Meanwhile, Federal Prime Minister Welensky and his ally, Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead, fought to preserve the Federation against overwhelming African and increasing white opposition.

Maurice J. Goldbloom

South African Jewish Community*

There were 110,000 Jews estimated to be living in South Africa, of whom 54,000 were in Johannesburg, 8,000 in adjoining Reef towns, 20,000 in Cape Town, and 13,000 divided among Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, and East London, in that order. The rest were scattered through the countryside, in communities varying from Vereeniging's 700 and Kimberley's 580 to villages with only a couple of Jewish families. There was a tendency for Jews in the smaller communities to migrate to the main towns.

The results of the census of 1960 were still awaited at the time of writing, October 1962. The census of 1951 reported 108,496 Jews, representing 4.18 per cent of a European (white) population of 2,588,933, in a total population (all races) of 12,437,277.

Civic and Political Status

Jews were full citizens of the Republic of South Africa, participating in all aspects of national life. Seven Jews were elected to parliament in the general election of October 18, 1961: Ephraim Fisher (Johannesburg—Rosettenville), Major Edgar Baden Isaacs (Durban—Musgrave), Solomon Emdin (Johannesburg—Parktown), Alec Gorshel (Johannesburg—Hospital), and Len Taurog (Springs), all United party; Helen Suzman (Johannesburg—Houghton), Progressive party, and Solomon Frank (Omaruru—South West Africa) National party. Fisher, Taurog, and Frank were returned unopposed. In addition, Charles Barnett and Abe Bloomberg had been elected earlier to

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 433.
represent Cape Colored voters (Bloomberg unopposed). Ephraim Woolf and Major Abraham Berman continued as members of the national senate. Sixteen Jews continued to serve as members of provincial councils. Alfred Honikman was elected mayor of Cape Town, and there were also Jewish mayors in other towns.

Solly Miller was named to the supreme court in December 1961, bringing the number of sitting Jewish judges to six—Joseph Herbstein and Hyman Bloch in the Cape, Simon Kuper and Oscar Galgut in the Transvaal, Edgar Henochsberg in Natal, and Miller in the Orange Free State. Percy Yutar became deputy attorney general of the Transvaal.

Political Developments Affecting the Jewish Community

When at the 1961 session of the United Nations General Assembly, a group of Afro-Asian states moved to censure South African Foreign Minister Eric Louw for his speech of October 10 defending apartheid, all the Western states except Holland and Israel abstained. The Netherlands and Israel joined the Afro-Asian states, the Soviet bloc, and some Latin American states in voting for the censure motion.

In a broadcast from New York on October 13, 1961, Louw sharply criticized the Netherlands vote. On October 14, South African Premier Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd expressed “deep shock” at the attitude taken by the Netherlands government, adding that its only Western ally in this attitude was the government of Israel. The general election of October 18 being imminent, government leaders suspended further comment to keep the matter out of the election. (As in all elections since they had come to power, they avoided any suggestion of a Jewish issue.)

South African Jews were disconcerted by Israel’s vote. The Zionist Record, organ of the South African Zionist Federation, editorially criticized Israel’s support of the censure motion. So did the Revisionist Jewish Herald. The independent Southern African Jewish Times felt that Israel voted against South Africa “with reluctance” and could contend “that too much was involved for her, the Middle East, and the whole African continent, to have pursued any other course.”

In another broadcast in New York on October 20, 1961, Foreign Minister Louw criticized various countries which had voted against South Africa. He said that he did not expect Israel to support South Africa, but he had expected an abstention “in view of the fact that the South African government and also individual members of the cabinet have in the past gone out of their way to foster good relations with Israel.” He mentioned instances of South African assistance to Israel and expressed the hope that South African Jews would “disapprove of the hostile and ungrateful action of the Israeli delegation to the United Nations.”

In response to inquiries from newspapers, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, central representative organization of the community, said that “Israel’s vote of censure on Louw’s speech had given rise to strong criticism among many South African Jews.” It declared:
It is recognized that Israel, in determining her international policies, must take into account delicate and complex factors upon which she alone is competent to judge. Nevertheless, it is felt that this was a case where the issue was a simple one: the question of freedom of speech in the international forum.

In these circumstances, Israel should have joined the Western nations in abstaining from voting on the Afro-Asian motion of censure.

The board's spokesman added that it was sincerely hoped that the incident would not mar the very friendly relations which had hitherto existed between Israel and South Africa. Jewish citizens of this country warmly appreciated the many manifestations of friendship by this country to Israel and sincerely trust that the relations between the two countries will continue on the same friendly basis.

The monthly meeting of deputies in Johannesburg on October 29, 1961, supported the board's action, while stressing that this was not in any way a reflection on Israel's right, as a sovereign state, "to determine its policies in terms of its own principles and interests," respecting which South African Jews, as citizens of a different state, had no locus standi.

In mid-November 1961, the Johannesburg Sunday Times published a private letter from Premier Verwoerd in reply to a private letter deploring Israel's vote by a Cape Town Jew, Sydney East. Verwoerd's letter, written by his secretary, said the prime minister agreed with East that

the attitude taken up by Israel in the United Nations is a tragedy for Jews in South Africa. Fortunately the reaction of many Jews and Jewish organizations was such that what might have been worse was relieved to a certain extent by this pro-South African reaction.

The letter commented on the effect which Israel's vote must have on pro-Israel feeling in South Africa, and added:

The fact that during the last election so many Jews supported the Progressive party and so few the National party did not pass unnoticed, and this act of Israel, coming at the same time, together with other attacks on the policy of separate development, is, as you say, really a tragedy.

The English-language press (mostly anti-government) sharply criticized the letter as a threat to the Jewish community and an attempt to hold local Jewry hostage for the actions of Israel. The Afrikaans press (mostly pro-government) charged that English press comment exaggerated the issue and was motivated more by opposition to the government than concern with the facts. The Jewish press, without taking political sides, criticized the letter as representing an attitude which was either mistaken and in need of correction, or minatory and requiring firm opposition.

Verwoerd took swift steps to remove what he claimed was a misrepresentation of his attitude. Addressing the Witwatersrand conference of his party in Johannesburg on November 22, he told the large assembly of delegates, which included several Jews, that he had merely "replied in simple, polite letters to persons who had written . . . on matters about which they
felt unhappy. It was very sad that just someone of Jewish origin had broken the usual confidence of an exchange of letters.” He denied that his letter was minatory. “I do not want to threaten. I want to gather together everybody in the best interests of the country, no matter what their language, religion or country of origin.” He said it would be stupid of him or any Nationalist to try to alienate any section of the population. “There had been times when one could have spoken of antisemitism in South Africa, but during the government’s thirteen years of office, there had not been one single action against Jews.” He appealed to everybody to maintain that position. “Nobody must allow himself to be impelled by propaganda to participate in the arousing of racial hatred.” He warned that “neither deeds of the State of Israel nor the actions of certain persons in this country must be allowed to conduce to antisemitism.” Defining his policy toward Israel, he said: “Israel had always represented something in which the Afrikander believed.” Finally, he drew a parallel between Israel’s policy in maintaining itself as a Jewish state in an Arab Middle East, and South Africa’s policy of separate development.

Both the Jewish and general press welcomed the prime minister’s statement as clearing the air and removing any suggestion of antisemitism. Teddy Schneider, chairman of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, told the monthly meeting of deputies in Johannesburg in November 1961 that he hoped that with the prime minister’s reaffirmation of the democratic rights of Jewish citizens, his dissociation of South African Jewry from the political actions of Israel, and his appeal to all to continue to keep the country free from antisemitism, the controversy would be allowed to end. Schneider’s statement received extensive press publicity and the controversy subsided.

Subsequently, after Israel voted in November for the resolution to impose sanctions on South Africa which was next put forward by the Afro-Asian states at the United Nations, the treasury informed the South African Zionist Federation that the special permission which the government had since 1950 given the federation, to transmit Zionist gift funds to Israel in excess of foreign-currency restrictions, was being withdrawn, and that henceforth transfer of funds to Israel would come under the same restrictions as applied to other countries.

Edel Horwitz, chairman of the Zionist Federation, interviewed Finance Minister Ebenezer Donges in December 1961 in an endeavor to get the concession restored, and in March 1962 Joseph Daleski, acting chairman of the federation, and Namie Philips, president of the Board of Deputies, had a further interview with Donges. Both missions were unsuccessful, though the minister made it clear that if circumstances changed, the government would be prepared to reconsider the situation.

Conscience Clause

There were further developments in regard to the private members’ bill, introduced into parliament in 1961 on behalf of the University of the Orange Free State (Bloemfontein), which sought to exempt that institution from
the so-called "conscience clause" provision against any test of religious belief in making staff appointments. Early in 1961 the Board of Deputies and the president of the Christian Council of South Africa had made representations against the bill, and people thought it would be dropped (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 459). Later in the year the synod of the Cape Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk adopted a resolution putting it into line with its sister churches in the Transvaal and Orange Free State in opposition to the "conscience clause" and supporting the effort to get it withdrawn from the OFS University. It also adopted a resolution urging that only Christian teachers should be appointed in state schools.

In November 1961 the Board of Deputies issued a statement opposing this attitude, not only as affecting the rights of Jewish citizens but also as affecting the principle of freedom of conscience at state educational institutions, and tracing the history of the "conscience clause" in South African university legislation as a provision expressly designed to maintain this principle. The board's statement was widely publicized. Spokesmen for the universities of Cape Town, Witwatersrand, and Pretoria supported the retention of the "conscience clause," which was also backed by editorial comment in many newspapers. The senate of the OFS University (comprising the teaching staff) voted 20 to 18 against the removal of the "conscience clause." The Bloemfontein branch of the Medical Association (interested in a projected graduate medical school at the university) resolved, with only one dissenting vote, to oppose withdrawal of the clause. In February 1962, the council of the university decided to drop the part of their bill which sought withdrawal of the "conscience clause." The remaining aspects of the bill were not controversial and were unanimously approved by parliament.

**Antisemitism**

While antisemitic agitation was still confined to fringe elements, known Jew-baiters were endeavoring to expand their activities. Several newspapers reported an increase in undercover antisemitic organization. There were indications, particularly in the type of material circulated in connection with Eichmann's trial and execution, of links with antisemitic agitators in other lands. Raymond Rudman of Pietermaritzburg (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 459), active in peddling antisemitism since the 1930's and linked with the Ku Klux Klan, claimed increased membership for his "Boerenasie" organization and its English counterpart, the "S.A. Anglo-Nordic Union"; whether they had any real strength was doubtful. Johan Schoeman of Broederstroom, near Pretoria, continued distributing pamphlets entitled *Eichmann is Not Guilty and Whose is the Hidden Hand?* Robey Leibrandt, once convicted for wartime treason as a Nazi agent, announced the establishment of an "Anti-Communist Protection Front" with a "private army." Minister of Justice John Vorster said in reply to questions in parliament that he knew nothing of this "private army" and gave the assurance that he would "carry out the law in all circumstances where one group in contravention of the provisions of the existing laws incites racial feeling between races."
There were a few instances of swastika daubings on synagogues during the period under review, and on June 13, 1962, an attempt was made to dynamite the monument to martyred European Jewry at Johannesburg's Westpark cemetery. The damage was not extensive.

The 23rd biennial congress of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, meeting in Johannesburg in August and September 1962, expressed concern at "what appears to be increased antisemitic activity in the Republic" and urged the introduction of legislation to make "the incitement of violence, hostility or ill-will against any racial or religious group" a punishable offense.

**Jews and Racial Problems**

On South Africa’s racial problems, the Board of Deputies' congress unanimously adopted a resolution stating:

> Congress, recognizing that the fundamental racial problems of South Africa concern members of the Jewish community as vitally as they do all other sections of the population, urges every Jewish citizen to make his individual contribution, in accordance with the teachings and precepts of Judaism, towards the promotion of understanding, goodwill and cooperation between the various races, peoples and groups in South Africa and towards the achievement of a peaceful and secure future for all the inhabitants of the country based on the principles of justice and the dignity of the individual.

At the same time, the board deplored any attempts, from within or outside the Jewish community, to introduce Jewish issues into the political controversies of South Africa. It affirms that there is no collective Jewish attitude on political issues and emphasizes that, in common with other South Africans, Jewish citizens as individuals have the right and duty to hold and express views on such questions and to exercise their civic responsibilities through the political party of their free choice.

**COMMUNAL ORGANIZATION**

The Deputies' congress reelected President Namie Philips and Chairman Teddy Schneider.

Mounting budgetary pressures accentuated the need for a wider measure of communal coordination. The Board of Deputies instituted a special committee to study the question, headed by Percy Zelikow, former Jewish Welfare Council chairman. The committee made recommendations for creating the necessary climate for closer coordination.

**Youth Programs**

The board also reviewed work in the youth and student fields. While it was recognized that Zionist youth groups reached a large percentage of South African Jewish youth, stress was laid on the need for bringing into Jewish communal activity the substantial section not affiliated with either Zionist youth or synagogue groups. The board's youth department was given a
mandate to continue its work. The board reported failure thus far to find a successor to Leo W. Schwarz as adviser to Jewish students at South African universities (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 460). How to increase campus facilities for Jewish youth and provide trained guidance for Jewish students remained a major problem for communal leadership.

**Fund Raising**

Unable to pay its way even with a Zionist Federation loan added to its United Communal Fund subsidy, the S.A. Board of Jewish Education continued to seek contributions in Johannesburg for its King David schools. In Cape Town special efforts were made to raise the necessary funds for the Herzlia school. Other large centers asked an increasing percentage of communal campaigns for local needs.

The United Communal Fund, with a stable income, faced the problem of larger needs. In the Israeli United Appeal campaign, too, the call was for larger totals.

**Religion**

Congregational life remained the backbone of the Jewish community. Both Orthodox and Reform sections expanded, despite some losses of key personnel. Orthodox Rabbi Louis Isaac Rabinowitz left Johannesburg at the end of October 1961 to settle in Israel, after having served for 16 years as chief rabbi of Johannesburg's United Hebrew Congregation and for a large part of that time also as chief rabbi of the Federation of Synagogues of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Although he had given more than five years' notice and personally recommended a successor, his departure found both the congregation and the federation unable to decide on who was to replace him. Both posts still remained vacant at the time of writing.

Johannesburg's Great Synagogue, which had been Chief Rabbi Rabinowitz's seat, also lost Chief Cantor Israel Alter at the end of January 1962, when he resigned to settle in the United States.

The first two rabbis to receive ordination in South Africa, Ben Isaacson and Denis Isaacs, both graduates of the local Training College for Rabbis and Ministers which Chief Rabbi Rabinowitz played a leading part in establishing, were raised to the rabbinate in June 1962 by a Semihah board set up by the Training College and the Johannesburg Beth Din.

The administrator of the Transvaal opened Johannesburg's new Oxford synagogue in August 1962. Durban's new synagogue was opened in 1961. Bloemfontein's new synagogue was nearing completion at the time of writing.

Significant congregational anniversaries were celebrated during the year in Port Elizabeth (centenary), Kimberley (diamond jubilee), and Johannesburg's Kensington (silver jubilee).

In August 1962 Aaron Opher of Chicago became chief minister of Johannesburg's United Progressive Jewish congregation, a post vacant since the emigration to Israel of Rabbi Moses Cyrus Weiler in 1957. A new Reform temple was consecrated in Springs, and premises were extended in
Johannesburg. In other centers, Reform congregations continued with increased memberships.

**Education**

The Jewish day-school movement was further expanded. There were, at the time of writing, the King David complex of day schools in Johannesburg; the Carmel day school in Pretoria (which added a new wing during the year); the Herzlia and the Weizmann day schools in Cape Town; the Sharon day school in Durban, and the Theodor Herzl Jewish day school in Port Elizabeth.

The year also saw additions to Johannesburg's Talmud Torah facilities with the opening of the Isaac Lopato Hebrew Education Center and the new Oxford Talmud Torah. The Yiddish folk schools opened their new building. In the Reform sector, the Rabbi Weiler Hebrew school was opened at Johannesburg's Temple Shalom center, the new Temple Emanuel Hebrew school was consecrated, and the Temple Israel Hebrew school was extended. In Cape Town, a new Reform Hebrew school was dedicated at Sea Point.

**Zionism and Relations with Israel**

The 1961 S.A. Zionist conference decided to expand activities in education and aliyah. This was done with increasing success during the period under review. The conference also set up a special commission on Zionist youth work, under the chairmanship of Judge Simon M. Kuper; the report of this commission, recently completed, was not yet public at the time of writing. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's 75th birthday in November 1961 provided the occasion for community-wide celebration, as did Israel's Independence Day six months later.

South African Zionist women sent eleven delegates to the world WIZO conference in Israel in February 1962.

Minister of Information Frank Waring proposed the toast to Israel on behalf of the South African government at the diplomatic reception given in Cape Town on Israel Independence Day by Israel Minister to South Africa Simha Pratt. Israel had a pavilion at the 1962 Rand Easter Show.

**Social Services**

Difficult economic conditions placed added burdens on Jewish and non-Jewish social welfare organizations. At the annual meeting of the Transvaal Jewish Welfare Council in August 1962, the chairman reported that 1,016 families were helped by the council during the year—one in every 20 Jewish families in the Transvaal. Totals disbursed for rehabilitation and relief increased: the Johannesburg Hevrah Kaddisha spent R101,7901 ($142,500) in the first six months of 1962, as against R90,800 ($127,100) in the preceding six months; the Women's Benevolent and Welfare Society, R42,300

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1 R = Rand, the unit of the present South African currency  
R1 = 10 shillings sterling  
R2 = £1 sterling
($59,200) against R35,200 ($49,300). The annual meeting of the Witwatersrand Hebrew Benevolent Association in December 1962 reported loans of R143,885 ($201,400) to 283 borrowers during the year. Annual meetings of other philanthropic societies reflected similar increases.

Other organizations engaged in welfare work—homes for the aged and orphanages in Johannesburg and Cape Town—registered increased expenditures. Bikkur Holim and kosher-kitchen organizations continued their work.

Employment placement services run by the Board of Deputies and the South African ORT-OSE continued. ORT-OSE also furnished vocational-guidance services and grants and scholarships.

Cultural Activities

During the period under review, lecture programs and seminars were offered by several organizations, among them the Zionist Federation, the Board of Deputies, the Union of Jewish Women, the Women's Zionist Council, the Yiddish Cultural Federation, and the Histadrut 'Ivrit. Jewish Book Month was sponsored by the Board of Deputies, and People's College jointly by the Board of Deputies and the Zionist Federation.

Books by South African Jews published during the year included Rabbi Israel Abrahams' English translations of Professor Umberto Cassuto's biblical commentaries, The Documentary Hypothesis and From Adam to Noah; The Cycle of the Jewish Year by Rabbi Jacob Vainstein; A Short History of the Jewish Press and Literature in South Africa by J. A. Poliva; Adventure of Jewish Education by Isaac Goss; Betsel ha-gezacim ("In the Shadow of the Roses") (Hebrew) by N. Levinsky; The Wizard Bird (novel) by Sarah Gertrude Millin; Encyclopaedia of South Africa edited by Eric Rosenthal; Journey Through Hell (life under the Nazis in Hungary) by Reska Weiss; On Human Destiny (philosophy) by E. E. Hirschmann; The Audience is Waiting (reminiscences) by Jack Stodel; My Judaism, My Jews (essays) by Edgar Bernstein.

Personalia

Losses suffered by South African Jewry during the year included Edgar Baden Isaacs, member of Parliament (January 1962); Abe Goldberg, former MP (February 1961); Harry Teeger, veteran Johannesburg communal leader (July 1962); Judith Gluckman, artist (September 1961); Samuel Abraham Rochlin, historian and archivist (November 1961); and Jock Isacowitz, ex-soldiers' leader (February 1962).

EDGAR BERNSTEIN