Introduction

The years 1960 and 1961 saw an intensified challenge to United States leadership in the hemisphere from Fidel Castro's Cuba, backed by the Communist nations and by strong groups in almost all Latin American countries. Castro and his supporters challenged not only the United States, but also the entrenched economic and social groups which had traditionally dominated most of Latin America. These groups, however, were also under attack from another direction—the United States itself. For increasingly there was a conviction in the United States that Castroism and Communism were the inevitable results of the poverty of large sections of the Latin American peoples, and that raising the Latin American standard of living required not only massive economic aid from abroad but also basic reforms at home, particularly in land tenure and taxation. This attitude cut across political lines in the United States. Even those Americans who looked askance at high taxation for social benefits at home had no desire to see their tax money used to aid countries which collected little or nothing in taxes from their own rich.

Relations Between Cuba and the United States

The political struggle between the United States and Cuba, coupled with the pressure for economic reforms exerted by both, as well as the accumulation of internal discontents and the serious difficulties of many Latin American economies, produced a situation which was often confused and confusing. In much of the hemisphere, economic problems were reflected in political instability, ranging from student riots and chronic labor unrest to land seizures and attempted military coups.

When, at the beginning of July 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered a 95-per-cent reduction in the sugar-import quota from Cuba (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 223), the conflict between the two nations entered a critical phase. The Castro government responded with large-scale seizures of properties owned by United States nationals, and by tightening its economic ties with the Communist bloc. In October the United States in its
turn embargoed all exports to Cuba except food and medical supplies and in January it barred United States citizens from going there without special permission. At the hemisphere conference of foreign ministers in San José, Costa Rica, in August 1960, the United States sought to win joint action against the Castro regime. While this aim was supported by some of the smaller states, especially certain of Cuba's Caribbean neighbors whose governments felt themselves directly threatened, it was opposed by the major Latin American republics. All of them had a strong distaste for the idea of any intervention in a nation’s internal affairs, feeling that there had been too many cases of such intervention in the past. Moreover, Castro had wide popular support and it was politically unwise to antagonize his admirers. In Mexico, former president Lázaro Cárdenas, still widely considered as the most popular political figure in the country, was active on behalf of Cuba. In Brazil Janio da Silva Quadros, then a candidate for the presidency, had publicly stated his admiration for Castro. In Argentina the outlawed Peronists were still the largest single political group, and they were pro-Castro, as were the Communists, most Socialists, and many others, especially among the workers and intellectuals. Hence both at San José and on many other occasions, the governments of the major Latin American states sought to mediate between Castro and the United States.

Despite these efforts, the relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate. In January 1961 Castro gave the United States embassy in Havana 48 hours to reduce its staff to 11. President Eisenhower responded by breaking off diplomatic relations with Cuba altogether. Henceforth the United States rejoinder to mediation proposals was that there was no basis for agreement unless Castro broke his ties with the Communist bloc and the Communists in Cuba. Communism in the hemisphere, it maintained, was not negotiable.

As a result of the differences in approach between the United States and the major Latin American states, the San José conference produced only a compromise resolution, condemning Communist intervention in the hemisphere but not mentioning Cuba, and the establishment of a six-nation investigating and good-offices committee. But the conference did take more decisive action against the regime of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina in the Dominican Republic, which was charged with having organized an assassination attempt against President Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela. For the first time, the nations of the hemisphere joined to impose sanctions against one of their number. The vote was unanimous except for the Dominican delegation, which walked out during the debate, and the Cuban delegation, which abstained.

In September 1960 Premier Castro personally headed the Cuban delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. While in New York he was demonstratively snubbed by the United States government and even more demonstratively greeted by Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, who also had made the Assembly meeting an occasion for a personal appearance. In the United Nations and elsewhere the Castro regime repeatedly charged
that the United States was conducting economic aggression against it in violation of the UN charter and inter-American treaties, and was preparing an invasion. In November the General Assembly refused by a vote of 45 to 29, with 18 abstentions, to debate the Cuban charges, referring them instead to its political committee.

Cuba also became an issue in the United States presidential campaign, when John F. Kennedy charged that the Eisenhower administration had not been sufficiently forceful in its opposition to Castro and proposed support for anti-Castro resistance groups in Cuba. When Republican presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon charged Kennedy with proposing an adventurist policy in violation of international law, Kennedy explained that he advocated moral rather than military support.

**Revolutionary Council of Cuban Exiles**

That such resistance groups did exist in Cuba was demonstrated by frequent sabotage and occasional activities by guerrilla bands. The extent of their popular support was difficult to gauge, and almost all observers agreed that Castro retained the loyalty of a substantial majority of the population. However, he had lost many of his leading original supporters, a number of whom had fled abroad. In March 1961 various exile groups formed the Revolutionary Council, based in the United States and headed by José Miro Cardona, who had been Castro's first premier. It was widely believed that the council would soon become a government in exile, and some expected it to launch an invasion of Cuba and to receive United States recognition as the country's legal government as soon as it had secured a foothold on Cuban soil. But there were strong differences of opinion among Cuban exiles as to the desirability of such an invasion. Thus, the strongest underground group in Cuba, the Revolutionary Movement of the People, headed by Manuel Ray and composed entirely of disillusioned ex-supporters of Castro, was against an invasion and in favor of a gradual buildup of guerrilla resistance.

**Cuban Invasion**

In April an invasion did in fact take place under the nominal leadership of the Revolutionary Council but in fact, it developed, under the direction of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, the members of the Revolutionary Council were held incommunicado by CIA during the actual invasion period, and only learned through radio reports of statements issued in their name. The Revolutionary Movement of the People was kept ignorant of the invasion plans, so that the underground groups in Cuba were unable to cooperate with the invaders. (Even the White House appeared to have been informed only incompletely of the invasion plans. Despite a direct order from President Kennedy that all Batista supporters be eliminated from the invasion force, some were given key roles in it.) At the same time, the United States armed forces did not intervene directly. Lacking either mass support in Cuba or direct United States military support, the invasion was quickly crushed and over a thousand of its participants were taken
prisoner. Subsequently Premier Castro proposed to release most of the prisoners in exchange for a number of tractors. Negotiations for the exchange were undertaken by a committee headed by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, United Automobile Workers' President Walter Reuther, and Milton Eisenhower, brother of the former president, with the support of President Kennedy. In July 1961 the committee announced the discontinuance of its plans and returned nearly 70,000 unopened contributions. The committee issued a statement putting the blame for the failure on Castro's demands for $28 million in cash or its equivalent in tractors, large and costly bulldozers, and the release of "political prisoners" in the United States and other countries.

Within Cuba, the failure of the invasion was followed by an intensified repression, with some estimates of the number arrested during and immediately after the invasion going as high as 200,000. Though most prisoners were soon released, many remained in prison, and executions of persons charged with guerrilla activities or sabotage became frequent. The regime also increasingly expressed its identification with the Communist world. On a number of occasions it came into conflict with the Catholic church, which it charged with obstructing the revolution and plotting with foreign enemies. In May several hundred foreign priests and nuns were deported.

"ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS"

Meanwhile, the United States was seeking to strengthen the economies of the hemisphere nations, both by increasing the flow of private investment supplemented by intergovernmental aid and by encouraging economic reforms. This policy, initiated under the Eisenhower administration, was formalized in March 1961, when President Kennedy offered a ten-year, ten-point program for an "Alliance for Progress." He stressed that aid would be linked with well-conceived programs of economic and social development, including basic reforms where these were needed. In May, Congress approved initial expenditures of $500 million under this program: $394 million to be spent through the Inter-American Development Bank, $100 million directly by the United States International Cooperation Administration, and $6 million through the Organization of American States. Individual countries also received special international assistance, both public and private. Thus, in May 1961 Brazil was enabled to meet a critical financial situation by arranging postponement of payment of $348 million due on previous United States loans, a standby credit of $160 million from the International Monetary Fund, and $150 million in loans from a group of European banks.

Nevertheless, the Alliance for Progress faced a number of obstacles. Few Latin American countries had made much headway in devising adequate development plans by the end of 1961, and resistance to reforms was strong. Thus in December 1960, Argentine President Arturo Frondizi's close associate Rogelio Frigerio told a New York audience that United States
emphasis should be on encouraging private investment rather than social reform. Such land-reform measures as were proposed by various governments were usually far from drastic, and even so, their adoption was often blocked by conservative legislative majorities, as in Chile. Meanwhile peasants in a number of countries were becoming impatient, and instances of their direct action to take over the estates of absentee owners were becoming increasingly frequent. Tax reform was also slow in coming, and many Latin American countries lacked the administrative apparatus for efficient collection of taxes, operation of public services, and preparation or implementation of adequate development programs. At the same time, efforts to control inflation sometimes took the form of keeping wages down while permitting prices to rise. In Argentina, among other countries, this resulted in frequent large-scale strikes. Nor was the situation helped by the tendency of military groups in the various countries to interfere directly in the conduct of government. In Argentina threatened military coups forced repeated changes in the cabinet. In several other countries military revolts, while they failed to produce changes of regime, did contribute to an atmosphere of political insecurity which was unfavorable to economic development. At the end of the period under review it was still doubtful whether the Alliance for Progress would bear fruit quickly and copiously enough to avert other revolutions on the Cuban pattern.

MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM

Argentina*

JEWISH COMMUNITY

According to the 1960 national census the total population of Argentina was about 21,000,000. The Jewish population was estimated at between 400,000 and 420,000, or about two per cent of the total. Somewhat more than two-thirds of the Jewish population was concentrated in Buenos Aires and in its suburbs. Other important centers of Jewish population were Rosario (2,500 families), Santa Fé (1,000 families), Córdoba (1,150 families), Bahía Blanca (850 families), Mendoza (700 families), Moisesville (400 families), Paraná (600 families), and Concordia (750 families).

Of the Buenos Aires Jews, approximately five-sixths were Ashkenazim and one-sixth Sephardim. The proportion of Sephardim in the provinces was estimated to be considerably lower. Approximately 70 per cent of the Jewish population of the entire country were native born. Jewish movement from the smaller towns and cities of the interior to the larger centers of population continued.

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 497.
A recent job study based on an examination of marriages registered by the Kehillah (511 cases), new members of the Kehillah (1,035 cases) and the occupation of pupils' parents in 33 Jewish schools (6,433 cases), indicated the following occupational distribution of the Jews of Argentina:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Marriages</th>
<th>Members of the Kehillah</th>
<th>Pupils' parents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar work</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing (light industry)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal professions</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent artisans and other occupations</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Education**

The Buenos Aires Kehillah played a major role in programming, administering, and financing all levels of Jewish education throughout the country. Its educational arm, the Wa'ad ha-Hinnukh, carried out the supervision and inspection of all Jewish schools, both in Buenos Aires and in the provinces. The Wa'ad ha-Hinnukh was also responsible for preparing salary scales for teachers and for hiring teachers.

For the calendar year 1961 the Kehillah allocated for Jewish education 60 million pesos ($726,000) of its total budget of 129 million. An estimated 140 million pesos were spent for Jewish schools in the country. The Kehillah paid 40 per cent of all school operating budgets, 60 per cent of the salaries of kindergarten and primary-school teachers, and 70 per cent of the salaries of secondary-school teachers. It contributed up to 25 per cent of the capital cost of new Jewish schools.

In Buenos Aires and its surrounding suburbs there were 58 primary schools where the language of instruction was Hebrew, Yiddish, or a mixture of both. There were 69 male teachers and 259 female teachers, and a student enrolment of 7,271. Most of the schools were under the direct charge of local committees which cooperated with the Wa'ad ha-Hinnukh in both finances and general school problems. The children, aged six to ten, attended classes five times weekly for instruction in various Jewish subjects, from two to three hours daily. In addition, 5,195 children at 56 kindergartens received instruction from 30 teachers assisted by 87 aides. There were Jewish secondary schools with an enrolment of 1,198 and a staff of 111 teachers.

The majority of the teachers of the Jewish schools were natives of Argentina and had been trained in the country. The teaching materials were for the most part published locally.
In the interior of the country the Wa'ad ha-Hinnukh supervised 56 primary schools with 2,876 pupils. There were also 27 kindergartens with 747 children, 8 secondary schools with 372 children, and 10 evening courses attended by 128 children up to the age of 14. These schools were staffed by 121 male and female teachers. There were also three day schools which offered, besides the normal government curriculum, subjects such as Jewish history, Bible, Hebrew language, and Israeli geography. Two of these schools conducted instruction in Yiddish and one in Hebrew. As in Buenos Aires, local committees cooperated with the Wa'ad ha-Hinnukh in the administration and financing of the schools.

In the town of Moisesville, one of the Jewish Colonization Association's (ICA) original colonies, the Kehillah opened a seminary to train teachers for the schools in the cities and towns of the interior. The first class was to complete its studies in December 1961.

**Religious Activities**

A severe shortage of religious functionaries continued to be a major problem during the period under review. Major cities like Rosario had no rabbi, shohet, or mohel. Most of the centers of Jewish population were unable to obtain kosher meat, since there were no qualified personnel available. There were only 12 ordained rabbis in the Argentine.

Plans for training rabbis in Buenos Aires were initiated during the period under review by the Kehillah, for Orthodox rabbis, and by the Congregación Israelita de la República Argentina, for Conservative rabbis. The pre-rabbinical yeshivah of the Kehillah, directed by Chief Rabbi Joseph Fink of Buenos Aires, opened its classes in June 1961 with 24 students. The Congregación expected to open its pre-rabbinical training seminary in March 1962.

The exact number of synagogues and minyanim was not known. Buenos Aires had more than a hundred synagogues and minyanim, of which 41 were known to own their own buildings. Besides large temples and synagogues like Paso and Libertad, there were many small synagogues or places of worship, including those of specific groups such as the Hungarians, Agudat Israel and Po'ale Agudat Israel, Mizrahi, Ahdut Israel, and the Sephardi and Oriental communities.

**CJMCAG Allocations**

For 1960–61 CJMCAG allocated and distributed 7.01 million pesos (about $85,000) to ten organizations in Argentina. These were the Asociación Filantrópica Israelita (home for the aged), Círculo Israelita Palomar (community center), Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (teachers' seminary), Asociación Religiosa Concordia Israelita (Jewish primary school), Federación Universitaria Sionista Sudamericana (student seminar), Culto Israelita de Belgrano (community center), three publishing firms, Editorial KIUM, Editorial IDBUJ, Editorial Dos Poilishe Idntum, and ha-Midrashah ha-'Ivrit (Israel-Argentine cultural-exchange institute).
Antisemitism

Antisemitic incidents during the year continued to disturb the Jewish community. These included swastika desecrations and anti-Jewish inscriptions in Jewish neighborhoods and on Jewish school buildings, anti-Jewish hooliganism, attempts to burn and bomb synagogues and Jewish community buildings, distribution of antisemitic leaflets, and demonstrations by antisemitic students at the University of Buenos Aires. A number of these episodes were attributed to the Tacuara movement, a highly organized pro-fascist group composed mainly of high-school students, and the Nationalist Restoration Guard, composed of former Tacuara members.

The near-fatal shooting of a 15-year-old Jewish student in August 1960 (AJYB, 1960 [Vol. 61], p. 216), was attributed to Tacuara members. Jewish community leaders continued to register stern protests at these developments.

Representatives of opposition parties in the congress criticized the government for its lack of action. In September 1961 the senate unanimously denounced Tacuara vandalism and called upon the government to prevent its recurrence. In spite of government promises, no effective steps were taken.

Brazil*

JANIO DA SILVA QUADROS, who won the 1960 elections, started his presidential term in February 1961 with a series of revolutionary measures on both the political and economic fronts. On the international scene he announced an independent policy toward both East and West (not necessarily neutral, but a "fourth position," as he called it), defended Cuba, started to negotiate diplomatic ties with the Soviet satellites, and took steps toward the reestablishment of relations with the USSR. He also indicated that Brazil would vote for Red China's admission to the United Nations.

President Quadros inherited a $1.18-billion internal deficit, arising largely from the building of the spectacular new capital Brasilia, and a $3.8-billion foreign debt. To halt the rapid inflation—prices rose 40 per cent in 1960—he launched an austerity plan, which included a 30-per-cent cut in the ministries' budgets, a slash of $500 million in government spending, and the mass dismissal of all public employees hired after September 1, 1960. Subsequently he set up higher exchange rates for foreign currency in order to discourage imports and promote exports. Coffee still accounted for 65 per cent of the latter.

The new administration promised excess-profit taxes and land reforms designed to end the near-feudalism still prevailing in many rural areas. Through the SUDENE governmental corporation, a plan was also launched.

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 497.
to develop the Northeast, with a population of more than 20 million people having an average per capita income of less than $100 a year.

Janio Quadros resigned unexpectedly on August 24, 1961, leaving a crisis which almost led to civil war. To overcome army objections to the assumption of the presidency by Vice President João Goulart, the congress approved a constitutional amendment establishing a parliamentary regime. Goulart then assumed the presidency and Tancredo Neves was sworn in as prime minister.

President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress was highly praised throughout Brazil, although it was questionable whether American assistance would arrive in time to check the growing unrest. Many observers noted that President Kennedy's program had many similarities to "Operation Pan-America," proposed by Brazil's former President Juscelino Kubitschek.

JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Brazilian Jewish community—between 125,000 and 150,000 Jews—was largely concentrated in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Living in a booming city of four million, the São Paulo community was expanding its activities in all directions. The existence of a kind of welfare fund—the only one in Brazil—permitted the various organizations to devote themselves to their specific program, and to cope with the challenge of absorbing increasingly large numbers of immigrants during the five years preceding the time of writing. The Federation of Jewish Societies of the State of São Paulo—with a budget of 33 million cruzeiros\(^1\) during 1961—helped support the Jewish day schools and several welfare agencies. It also acquired a summer camp in Mairipóra, for Jewish day-school pupils.

The federation in Rio de Janeiro was mainly engaged in public and press relations. Its main problem was lack of financial support from the community. Smaller Jewish communities existed in Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Recife, Salvador, Belem, Fortaleza, Niteroi, Santos, and Manaus.

Immigration

Brazil continued to attract thousands of Jewish immigrants, mainly from Eastern Europe and the Arab countries. UHS cared for 5,995 newcomers during 1957–60 and it was estimated that another 6,000 arrived during the same period without the help of Jewish relief agencies. The local federation of São Paulo established an immigrant-service bureau, an immigrant-employment office, three loan funds, and several other services, in cooperation with CJMCAG and UHS.

The Egyptian Jews in São Paulo, estimated at 5,000, constituted one of the world's largest Jewish communities of that origin.

Welfare Activities

In São Paulo, Linat ha-Tzedek—a shelter for transients—moved to its own modern premises during August 1960. The Organização Feminina

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\(^1\) $1.00 = 200-300 cruzeiros in the free market.
Israelita de Assistência Social, a nonsectarian women's organization created in 1915 to assist mothers and children, opened a new four-story building, with departments of guidance, social work, and medical assistance.

The São Paulo Jewish home for the aged, which opened in 1941 with accommodations for 50 persons, added a fourth wing which brought its capacity to 300. The biggest Jewish welfare project was to be the Albert Einstein Medical Center, a 400-bed hospital and research center, construction of which had begun in November 1959.


**Religious Activities**

The departure of Rio de Janeiro's Chief Rabbi Jacob Fink for Buenos Aires, in August 1960, intensified the shortage of spiritual leadership. Altogether, there were only about ten or eleven rabbis in the whole country.

In July 1960 an Orthodox yeshivah was opened in Rio de Janeiro, under the direction of Rabbi Elimelech Ashkenazi. The last previous yeshivah was in Recife, in the Northeast, more than 300 years earlier.

Several new congregations were established during the period under review. In Rio de Janeiro, Ismael Cohen, the first Brazilian-born rabbi, after being ordained at Yeshiva University in New York became rabbi of the Orthodox congregation Moriah, established in December 1960. A group of newly arrived Egyptian immigrants founded their own congregation and community center, Maimonides, in the Copacabana neighborhood. The Associação Religiosa Israelita (Jewish Religious Association), founded in the 1930s by German Jewish refugees, opened its new synagogue, seating 1,000 people, in June 1961. It was designed by Henrique Mindlin, an internationally-known Brazilian Jewish architect.

The Sociedade Israelita Brasileira of the city of Porto Alegre dedicated its new synagogue in August 1960. The Jewish community of Curitiba, in the state of Paraná, also opened a new synagogue. In São Paulo a group of recently arrived Syrian Jews established their own congregation and were building a synagogue with a capacity of 600. In distant Manaus, on the banks of the Amazon, the small Jewish community of about 60 families was building a new community center.

**Community Centers**

In São Paulo three clubs, Hebraica, Maccabi, and Círculo Israelita, extended their facilities in order to be able to serve their growing membership.

In Rio de Janeiro Hebraica started to build a large community center, while a new club, Monte Sinai, was established by residents of the northern sections of the city.

New leaders, mostly native-born and college-trained and in their middle thirties, were responsible for the dynamic growth of the club and community-center movement. There was, however, a critical scarcity of professional
community workers. The spiraling increase in building costs and the rapid inflation were imposing a financial strain on several community centers.

**Education**

Jewish day schools were a necessity in a country where the high rate of illiteracy (54 per cent) was due mainly to the lack of public schools.

A hundred and forty teachers taught 7,000 students in almost 40 Jewish schools throughout Brazil. The crippling shortage of trained teachers threatened the continuity of this educational work. Many teachers with inadequate training had to be used, and some teachers were brought from Israel, at considerable expense.

There were several Jewish high schools. One of them, the Ginasio Hebreu Brasileiro, celebrated its 30th anniversary during the period under review. The Colegio Israelita Brasileiro in Porto Alegre was regarded as the most modern and best-equipped Jewish school in Brazil. It had classes from the nursery to the high-school level.

**Press**

A new Jewish weekly in Portuguese, Menorá, was launched in Rio de Janeiro by a group of young professional journalists. Other publications appearing regularly included, in São Paulo, O Novo Momento ("New Moment"), a Yiddish biweekly with a Portuguese page; Nossa Voz ("Our Voice"), a Yiddish-Portuguese weekly representing left-wing Jewish groups, and Crônica Israelita ("Jewish Chronicle"), published fortnightly in Portuguese by the Congregação Israelita Paulista (Jewish Congregation of São Paulo).

Rio de Janeiro had Prensa Israelita ("Jewish Press") and Diario Israelita ("Jewish Journal"), two independent Yiddish weeklies, and Jornal Israelita ("Jewish Journal") and Aonde Vamos? ("Whither Are We Going?"), Portuguese-language weeklies. The quarterly Comentário ("Commentary"), was published by the Instituto Brasileiro Judaico de Cultura e Divulgação (Brazilian Jewish Institute for Culture and Information).

**Community Relations**

The Jewish communities of Brazil took an active part in assisting the homeless victims of the floods in the northeastern states of the country. In July 1960 they sent help through Archbishop Helder Câmara of Rio de Janeiro, who headed the relief campaign.

Rabbi Fritz Pinkuss resumed his chair of Hebrew studies at the University of São Paulo. Mackenzie University, a Protestant-supported institution in São Paulo, inaugurated its own courses in Hebrew on August 25, 1960. The Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul in Porto Alegre announced a similar undertaking.

Rabbi Henrique Lemle of Rio de Janeiro was invited by President Quadros to be a member of the Brazilian delegation to the Sixth Congress of the International Union for Freedom of Education, which took place in Rio de Janeiro.
In March 1961 Governor Carlos Lacerda of the state of Guanabara dedicated a public school named for Anne Frank. Former President Janio Quadros pledged his support to the campaign launched by the Brazilian Jewish attorney Fernando Levitzky to remove from Brazilian Portuguese dictionaries all derogatory expressions against Jews, Israelites, Negroes, Marranos, etc. In April 1961 President Quadros requested a revision of the official school dictionary, published by the ministry of education, along such lines. Several private publishers voluntarily agreed to similar revisions, and the new editions of several dictionaries dropped derogatory definitions.

When Governor Lacerda appealed for voluntary public contributions to help remedy the chronic shortage of schools, several Jewish organizations pledged support.

Antisemitism

Antisemitism, although it existed, could be regarded as isolated. During June and July 1961 a series of fires, in manufacturing plants owned mostly by São Paulo Jews, raised the suspicion of an antisemitic plot. The press denounced a supposed Nazi underground organization called Spartacus Band, but no evidence that it really existed was ever found.

Herbert Cukurs, a former high-ranking Latvian Nazi, responsible for the mass killing of 30,000 Jews in Riga ghetto, who found refuge in Brazil after World War II, requested Brazilian naturalization in June 1960. In response to the protests of the Rio de Janeiro Federation of Jewish Societies, President Juscelino Kubitschek and Justice Minister Armando Falcão rejected his application.

When the Eichmann trial started, the Instituto Brasileiro Judaico de Cultura e Divulgação printed a series of booklets and leaflets and issued many press releases. It also sponsored the publication of a book on Eichmann’s crimes for nationwide distribution.

ALFRED HIRSCHBERG
ABRAHAM MONK

Cuba*

THOUGH THE political situation in Cuba during the period under review (July 1960 to June 1961) imposed limitations on the nature of the material included below, the facts presented give a fairly accurate account of Jewish life during the year.

There was no governmental or press-inspired antisemitism. Although Fidel Castro’s references to discrimination never specifically mentioned the Jews, his government strongly combatted racial discrimination and condemned

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 497.
Nazism at every opportunity. Nor did the Castro government’s very friendly relations with the Arab countries affect the Jews of Cuba.

JEWISH POPULATION

Until 1960, Cuba had somewhat more than 8,000 Jews, in a total population of over 6 million. Fewer than 5 per cent of the Jews were industrial workers, most being entrepreneurs in industry and commerce. Some young, native-born Jews continued to work in their fathers’ enterprises and some entered the professions.

In the past the Cuban Jewish community responded generously to the needs of Jews throughout the world. But after the revolution of 1959 Cuban Jews sought and received aid from JDC, UHS, and NYANA, to help solve their new problems. Laws expropriating the rich and partially expropriating the middle class severely affected a community predominantly of merchants and industrialists. Overnight they became impoverished, without any prospects of earning a livelihood. Furthermore, many feared persecution because of their known friendliness to the United States.

Consequently, more than 3,500 emigrated, leaving behind their homes and furnishings. Of those remaining, another 1,000 seemed certain to leave unless prevented from doing so. The rest, about 3,500, seemed likely to stay for a variety of reasons. Some could not obtain American visas. Others were afraid to emigrate in their declining years, without funds, without a trade, and in danger of going begging. Many of these were owners of small businesses which had not yet been expropriated, and they hoped to be allowed to continue unmolested. Some remained to be near their children, who, if they were professionals, were barred from leaving Cuba because the government needed them.

Most of the Jews who left Cuba found temporary homes around Miami. Almost all had tourist visas. The United States government granted them residence rights and the right to work, as it did to all Cubans. About 1,000 of the Jewish refugees found employment in industry or set up small businesses in various cities (see p. 147). About 2,000 had not yet adjusted to the new conditions at the time of writing. Most of these had been prominent businessmen in Cuba and were looking for new enterprises in the United States. A major obstacle to their adjustment was their ignorance of the English language.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN HAVANA AND PROVINCES, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ashkenazim</th>
<th>Sephardim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Havana</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camaguey province</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>370</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matanzas province</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>150</td>
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<td>Oriente province</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>420</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pinar del Rio province</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Clara province</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,450</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,050</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2. JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM CUBA, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Number of Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,800</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Jewish Education**

In June 1961 the government assumed control of all private schools, including the Colegio Hebreo, the only comprehensive Jewish day school in Cuba, sponsored by the old Centro Israelita. The school was virtually the only operation of the Centro Israelita which had not been subsumed by the synagogue and Jewish center of the Patronato (see below). It had had almost 500 pupils, from kindergarten through high school.

At the end of the 1960–61 school year there were only 220 students. Parents had become apprehensive because of a rumor that the government was planning to send thousands of children to Soviet Russia. Many Cubans sent their children to the United States, and Jewish parents followed suit. At the end of the school year, the Jewish high school was virtually empty. Some classes had an attendance of no more than three or four pupils.

Tahkemoni, an all-day school with an enrolment of 100, did not open for the new school year in September 1960 because of financial difficulty. It had previously been supported by contributions from several sources, but these were subsequently discontinued. The (Orthodox) Comunidad Religiosa Hebrea Adath Israel de Cuba contributed several thousand dollars to help the school finish the year, but could not undertake to support it for the new year.

**Religious Activities**

The revolution did not directly hinder the activities of any Jewish institutions. Even in the institutions of learning the government’s plans were still undefined. The religious activities in the Patronato (Bet ha-Keneset ha-Gadol) and of the Comunidad Religiosa Hebrea Adath Israel de Cuba continued as before. On weekdays they barely managed to assemble a minyan, and on the Sabbath only a few more. There was a 60-per-cent drop in attendance. Of the 800 members who had formerly belonged to Adath Israel only 500 remained, and the Patronato, which formerly had 900 members, now had 400.

Temple Beth Israel of the American Jewish colony’s United Hebrew congregation was left with almost no members after the United States severed relations with Cuba. It could no longer conduct Friday-night services, because almost all American Jews had returned to the United States.

**Patronato**

The Patronato, with its synagogue and community center, was a beautiful, modern building. During the period under review it celebrated 24 weddings.
and five *bar mitzvahs*. (Adath Israel was the scene of 18 weddings and 14 *bar mitzvahs*, and Temple Beth Israel, of eight weddings.)

The ladies' auxiliary of the Patronato arranged a musical evening in August 1960, a Hanukkah celebration in December 1960, and a Purim party in March 1961. Together with the Bet ha-Keneset council, the Patronato conducted two community *sedarim* on Passover, with the participation of 140 persons.

The youth club of the Patronato conducted a number of Sabbath celebrations and published 22 issues of its bulletin, as well as a special edition commemorating the 13th anniversary of the establishment of the State of Israel.

The Patronato's library sponsored a comprehensive exhibit of Israeli art and unique sketches on the 13th anniversary of Israeli independence, with Israeli Minister Jonathan Prato in attendance. The library also held a reception honoring the Israeli minister upon his arrival in Cuba, a farewell party for the Argentine Zionist writer Mateo Goldstein, an exhibition of rare books, an exhibit of the works of Anton Chekhov on the 100th anniversary of his birth, an exhibit of the works of Leo Tolstoy on the 50th anniversary of his death, an exhibit of the works of the Jewish historian Simon Dubnow on the 100th anniversary of his birth, and an exhibit of the works of Albert Einstein on the sixth anniversary of his death.

The library had an inventory of 8,987 books: 7,883 in Spanish, 603 in English, and 501 in Yiddish. Circulation declined from 247 a month to 145 during the year under review.

**Jewish Publications**

*Havaner Lebn*, the Yiddish-language newspaper which had been in existence for 27 years under the editorship of S. M. Kaplan and Abraham J. Dubelman, ceased publication on December 31, 1960, as a result of a financial crisis, and the Yiddish typesetters emigrated to the United States. *Havaner Lebn* had been financially dependent on two annual supplements, one commemorating the founding of the State of Israel and the other a Rosh ha-Shanah and Yom Kippur almanac. In 1960 these issues managed to appear, but they were not lucrative. Most of the advertising bills went unpaid because the sponsoring firms had come under new ownership.

**Zionism and Relations with Israel**

The Zionists were not very active. They elected three delegates to the 25th Zionist Congress in Israel: Sender Wolson of the Histadrut, Samuel Zussholz of ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir (Mapam), and Primitivo Ramirez of Betar (Revisionists). The Mapam delegate emigrated to Israel and the delegates from Herut and the Histadrut emigrated to the United States.

WIZO, which had formerly been very active, sponsoring many affairs attended by hundreds of women, lost more than half of its 1,200 members. From time to time, during the period under review, it held teas at which members discussed Israeli problems.

The Israeli government established a legation in Cuba in December 1959
and Minister Jonathan Prato arrived in October 1960. At the end of 1960 Cuba appointed a new minister to Israel, Ricardo Subirana Lobo. During the year under review 500 Cuban Jews departed for Israel.

Israeli statehood celebrations were postponed because of the invasion of Cuba in April 1961. Instead the anniversary was observed in the synagogues and special prayers were said.

**Welfare Activities**

The Asociacion Feminina Hebra de Cuba, a philanthropic organization which formerly had close to 1,000 members, now had only 400. During the year under review they gave aid to 65 needy families.

The Anti-Tuberculose Medical Center lost over half of its 1,000 members. As a result it was compelled to curtail its aid to the needy, limiting itself for the most part to medical aid.

**Communists**

There were about 30 veteran Communists and 100 Cuban-born students and professionals who worked with the Castro government. This handful of 30 veteran Communists tried unsuccessfully to take control of the Jewish community. In December 1960, on the second anniversary of the Castro regime, they sought to publish a Yiddish proclamation in praise of the revolution, but could not find a Jewish printer because the linotypists had fled to the United States. In March 1961 they presented a Sunday radio hour in Yiddish, but they were soon forced to give up their plan.

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**Mexico**

The atmosphere of uncertainty and unrest evoked by political developments in Cuba affected all phases of Mexican life in 1960 and 1961. The Mexican government sought to dissociate itself from the Fidel Castro regime, President Adolfo López Mateos and other high officials stressing that Mexico was conducting its politics independently and that foreign investors had nothing to fear. These reassurances helped to relieve the tension and remove the apprehensions which had been felt in some circles.

**Jewish Population**

The 28,000 Jews were less than .1 per cent of Mexico's population of 34,626,000. About 55 per cent of Mexico's Jews were Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazim. Some 15 per cent were Spanish-speaking Sephardim and 10 per cent were Arabic-speaking Jews from Damascus and Aleppo, in Syria.
German was the mother tongue of 5 per cent of the Jewish population and Hungarian Jews accounted for 3 per cent. There was also a group of English-speaking Jews, organized in the Beth Israel congregation and comprising more than one per cent of the Jewish population. Some two per cent were natives of France, Belgium, Holland, and other West European countries.

About 85 per cent of the Jews were engaged in commerce and industry. By developing new enterprises and factories in Mexico, they made a valuable contribution to domestic industry. About 10 per cent were professionals—physicians, engineers, architects, chemists, etc. (some of them well-known abroad), as well as Jewish communal workers, including teachers and rabbis. Most professionals were of the younger generation and had grown up in Mexico.

Most of the Jews lived in Mexico City, but there were some in about a dozen other cities too. Monterrey had over 100 Jewish families, almost all Ashkenazim. Guadalajara’s 80 Jewish families included both Ashkenazim and Sephardim, who had recently formed a united community center. Puebla, Veracruz, Tampico, Torreón, and San Luis Potosí each had several Jewish families. In Baja California there were several dozen Jewish families in the towns of Tijuana and Ensenada. At other points near the long United States border, opposite Texas, there were Jewish families in Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad Juárez, and Chihuahua. All the Jews outside the Federal district were engaged in trade.

The recession in commerce and industry affected Jews particularly, because of their concentration in those fields. The insecurity engendered by events in Cuba caused a sharp drop in new investment and a crisis in the building industry. Commercial and industrial profits fell drastically. Since most Jews had previously had “seven good years,” they were in a position to survive the emergency.

**Community Activity**

Jewish community life was active, with institutions, organizations, and groups of all shadings, from Agudat Israel to the Jewish Socialist Bund. (A small handful of pro-Soviet activists were completely isolated from Jewish life.)

The Comité Central Israelita de México was the official representative of the community in dealing with the government and with Jewish groups abroad. The well-organized Ashkenazi community, through its annual campaign, contributed to the support of the Jewish schools and philanthropic and social organizations. Unfortunately, the campaign was unable to fulfil all needs, and all the institutions—particularly the Jewish schools—were struggling with large deficits. They were forced to depend on supplementary “secret” campaigns “under the table.” Jewish philanthropic and welfare institutions such as OSE, the Beneficencia Israelita, and the women’s division of the Comité Central were actively engaged in caring for Mexican Jews in need of financial and medical aid.

The non-Ashkenazi Jews had their own philanthropic institutions.
Jewish Education

More than 85 per cent of Jewish children of school age, about 4,700 in all, attended the seven all-day schools of the Jewish community. There were also several yeshivot and Talmud Torahs. A yeshivah serving Mexico and Central America was established in April 1961 by Rabbi Abraham M. Hershberg, formerly of Chicago. He also assumed the post of rabbi of Temple Polanco and published an orthodox journal in Hebrew and one in Spanish. A second very active yeshivah was Yavne, and a third was Etz Hayyim. The largest Jewish school, the Colegio Israelita de México, had more than 1,300 students.

Cultural and Religious Activities

Two Yiddish newspapers appeared regularly—Der Veg, three times a week, and Di Shtimme, twice a week. Two Yiddish fortnightlies were Foroys, published by the Bund, and Dos Vort, published by Po'ale Zion. The Yiddish-Spanish Mexicanner Lebn appeared once a week. Other publications included the monthlies Centro Deportivo Israelita (Spanish-Yiddish) and Tribuna Israelita (Spanish) and the weekly Prensa Israelita (Spanish). The schools published annual almanacs and journals.

Two new rabbis joined the community, Rabbi Hershberg in August 1960 and Rabbi Carol Klein of Arizona in June 1961. Rabbi Klein established the first Conservative temple, Beth El, which attracted some of the younger people active in communal affairs. On the whole, however, the younger generation was not active.

Zionism and Relations with Israel

In general, the Zionist movement was dominant in the Jewish community, and had the support of both the older and younger generations. All Zionist factions were active in the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and assisted in the annual JNF and bond campaigns, which were highly successful. Many Mexican Jews visited Israel, and many expressed their identification with Israel by such means as investments.

The Institute for Cultural Exchange between Mexico and Israel enjoyed the cooperation of well-known Mexican personalities. In May 1961 Israeli Minister of Commerce Phinehas Sappir, on a visit to Mexico, established cordial relationships with the Mexican commerical and industrial communities. Mexican exports to Israel were increasing.

The Jewish community had feared that the Eichmann trial would provoke a wave of antisemistic outbursts, in Latin America in general and in Mexico in particular, but it passed without serious incident. Most Mexican newspapers approved holding the trial in Israel.

Chaim Lazdeiski