North Africa

Tunisia*

BIZERTE CRISIS

A long-smoldering Franco-Tunisian dispute over the key air and naval base of Bizerte (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 346), the last bit of Tunisian territory still under French control, erupted into open fighting on July 28, 1961. The resulting crisis was the most important faced by the Tunisian state in its five years of independent existence. The French position was that, in principle, France agreed to turn over Bizerte, but that this could not be done so long as there was a Soviet threat to the West. Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba had over the years alternated between threats to take the base by force and assurances that he would wait for the problem to be settled by negotiation. His tactics had secured some gains for Tunisia, including French withdrawal from the city of Bizerte to the base proper. Prospects for a peaceful solution seemed particularly good after a meeting between French President Charles de Gaulle and Bourguiba in February 1961. This notably eased the tensions then existing, including those caused by a dispute over Tunisian demolition in 1960 of a wall around the French ambassador's home (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 346). But in July the French military lengthened an airstrip by a few yards. Tunisia saw this as evidence that the French had no intention of leaving, and Tunisian troops and young volunteers surrounded the base. After a French helicopter was fired upon, French paratroops seized much of the city in bitter fighting. Hundreds of Tunisians, including civilians, were killed. President Bourguiba charged that the paratroopers had shot many prisoners in cold blood and committed other atrocities.

Shocked and indignant, Tunisia went into mourning and a state of alert. Police with submachine guns patrolled city streets and set up road blocks. All amusements were banned. A national solidarity fund was established, to which the Jewish community of Tunis gave over $70,000 within a fortnight. A number of French civilians were arrested, and thousands of others

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 497.
left the country, the conviction on both sides being that Franco-Tunisian relations could never be the same again. Public opinion turned violently anti-French, and anti-Western as well. The authorities proclaimed that only French departure from Bizerte could resolve the crisis and that Tunisians were ready to fight to the death if need be. In the ensuing month, Tunisia won resounding diplomatic victories in the United Nations and at the Belgrade conference of nonaligned nations. But the French refused to budge, as de Gaulle made clear in a press conference in Paris on September 5. Then, to the astonishment of even his closest political associates, Bourguiba suddenly reversed himself, declaring that the de Gaulle statement provided the basis for a Bizerte settlement. Some weeks later French troops evacuated the city and withdrew to the base.

**Political Consequences**

The internal and external consequences of Bizerte were many. Bourguiba's personal prestige and influence fell sharply. The clash seemed to many to mark the failure of "Bourguibism," i.e., active cooperation with the Western powers to get their economic and political support, and firm but peaceful pressures for concessions such as those desired at Bizerte. Tunisian ambitions for part of the Sahara, pressed at the same time as Bizerte with a brief military foray (in which some observers saw the real reason for Bourguiba's bringing the Bizerte issue to a head), also met with a setback. Internally, there was muted but undeniable criticism of Bourguiba for the bloody consequences of the Bizerte attack, on the one hand, and for not having carried it through, once begun, on the other. Moreover, leading intellectuals in Bourguiba's Neo-Destour party, including Information Minister Mohammed Masmoudi, chafed openly in print against Bourguiba's virtual one-man rule.

The crisis pointed up Tunisia's economic weakness and dependence on outside aid, and particularly on the French government's help. The Tunisian currency, the dinar, was artificially supported by the French, royalties of about $29 million annually from the French Edjele pipeline passing through Tunisia (cut off during the crisis) represented a significant part of the national income, and Tunisian products, long tied to French markets, had little outlet outside the franc zone. Efforts to create new economic ties with the Communist bloc, and promises of help from other Moslem and neutralist states, had relatively meager practical results. French and United States aid—Tunisia got some $90 millions of aid from the United States during the year under review—remained the major pillars of the economy, particularly as drought severely affected the major Tunisian crops.

Conscious of the nation's basic economic weakness, the Bourguiba government turned increasingly to state planning. The former labor leader Ahmed Ben Salah was placed in charge of economic planning and in January 1961 was also named minister of finance and commerce. Unemployment and underemployment continued high.

Even before the Bizerte crisis, the Tunisian regime was making a major
effort to improve its relations with all countries, and particularly with the Arab League and UAR President Gamal Abdul Nasser, whose press and radio had for years been exchanging insults with Tunisia's. One of the major points of discord between Bourguiba and Nasser had been the latter's hospitality to Salah Ben Youssef (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 347), who had broken with Bourguiba and fled to Egypt shortly after Tunisia became independent, and claimed to be head of a Tunisian government in exile. After the rapprochement between Nasser and Bourguiba, Ben Youssef left Egypt, where his activities were no longer welcome. He was assassinated by unknown assailants in August 1961, in a hotel in Frankfurt, West Germany.

In January 1961 Tunisia resumed participation in the Arab League. February brought the long-sought Bourguiba meeting with de Gaulle. In March differences with Morocco were patched up, and in April Yugoslavia's Marshal Josip Broz Tito and Queen Mother Elizabeth of Great Britain visited Tunisia. In May President Bourguiba visited Canada and the United States, where he received very friendly receptions.

The situation in neighboring Algeria continued to be a primary preoccupation of the Tunisian government. On occasion, Tunisian leaders sought to act as intermediaries between the French and GPRA, the provisional government of the Republic of Algeria. GPRA's headquarters were in Tunis and it used Tunisia as a base of operations against the French.

**Effect on Jewish Community**

The Bizerte crisis had a special impact on the Jewish community. One of the constants in the thinking of Tunisian Jewry had always been that "while Bourguiba is here, we are safe," in view of the pro-Western attitude and policy of the Tunisian premier. It was with increasing apprehension, therefore, that Tunisian Jewry saw the Bourguiba government improve relations with Nasser and welcome Abdel Khalik Hassouna, secretary of the Arab League, when he visited Tunis in March 1961. One consequence of Tunisian ties with the Arab League was disruption of postal communications between Tunisia and Israel, where many Tunisian Jews had relatives. A further cause for concern was a gratuitous attack on Israel by President Bourguiba at a press conference in New York during his May visit to the United States. Bourguiba said:

> Israel has never been willing to respect the decisions taken by the international organizations . . . but this seems to me secondary to the main problem posed by the existence of Israel. . . . Israel constitutes a colonial problem of a new kind; not domination over one people by another, but still worse, the substitution of one people for another. The people who were in the country now find themselves in the situation that the Jews were in during the war when they were ill-treated and persecuted by the Nazis. They are in concentration camps close to their country. . . . This is a problem for which no solution has been found, and it cannot be solved on points of detail. So long as there is no agreement between the Arabs and the Jews and they come from Europe or Central Europe the existence of Israel is precarious.
I think that if the international bodies are not in a position to find a just and suitable solution to this problem, then sooner or later, if not today or tomorrow, then the day after, in a year or ten years, there will be armed struggle in Palestine. . . .

This led many Jews to ask whether Tunisia would follow other Arab lands in discriminating against Jews and in shutting off their freedom of movement. Bourguiba had made similar anti-Israel statements on two occasions during previous months, but to local audiences and in circumstances in which they could be considered as lip service to Moslem sentiment; now he was addressing an international audience and stating a conviction.

Of the estimated 55 to 60 thousand Jews in Tunisia, some 10 to 15 thousand were French citizens; as such, they directly felt the impact of anti-French feeling during the Bizerte crisis. But Jewish Tunisian nationals were by no means exempt. Among Moslems, rumors flew about that the Jews of Tunisia were French sympathizers (one Arab-language newspaper, Es-Sabah [July 23, 1961], made the charge in its columns), and even that Jews had helped the French paratroops at Bizerte by firing on Moslems. A group of Tunis students marching through the streets in a post-Bizerte rally added the cry “Death to the Jews!” to their other slogans. Jews would be stopped at road blocks and their cars thoroughly inspected, while Moslems would be waved through. Occasional arbitrary arrests and harassment of Jews were also reported. In certain areas the local Neo-Destour party cells felt it necessary to hold meetings at which it was declared that Tunisian Jews were Tunisian citizens like everybody else, and that a stop should be put to anti-Jewish rumors and attitudes.

The greatest shock to Tunisian Jewry was probably psychological. Of all Moslem lands, Tunisia had probably been the most secure for Jews; now there was the feeling that this security was quite fragile. And Tunisian Jews, introduced to Western culture by the French and increasingly a part of it, had taken comfort in Bourguiba’s pro-Western policy, but Bizerte seemed to indicate that this could shift radically. Concern about the future for Jews in Tunisia stimulated interest in emigration. There was, in fact, an increase in emigration, both to France and to Israel. Movement from Tunisia continued to be free, the Bourguiba policy over the years having been that anyone who desired to leave the country was free to do so, but that those who stayed were expected to be good Tunisians, not having “their head in one place and their heart in another.”

Economic changes planned by Minister Ahmed Ben Salah seemed certain to hit Tunisian Jews hard. This was so not because the changes were directed against them as Jews, but simply because of the effect they would have on the merchant class, in which Jews were heavily represented. Merchants had already been hard hit by the departure from the country in past years of some 125,000 Frenchmen, who made up the bulk of the middle-class market. A government decree of September 1961 declared that foreign nationals could no longer be brokers, insurance agents, or building managers unless exempted by terms of agreements between their governments and
Tunisia, clearly impossible in the case of France at this time, and so affecting French Jews in Tunisia. From January 1962 onward, moreover, even Tunisian nationals would need the approval of the authorities to engage in such activities. Government planning set to become effective as of January 1962 implied tighter control over all commercial activity. Imports were, in principle, to be limited to necessities for the national economy, and specified major imports (e.g., textiles, foodstuffs, electrical equipment) were to be taken over directly by the government. Finally, there were reports that employers were getting verbal orders from certain government ministries to employ at least 75 per cent of their help from among Moslem Tunisian nationals.

There was, however, no public discrimination of any kind against Jews. Articles and letters to editors about Jews, in influential papers like *Afrique Action*, were, on the whole, rather favorable. A new magazine entitled *Technique et Hommes*, which appeared early in 1961, was antisemitic, anti-American, and anti-Bourguiba, and was closed down by the authorities. During the Jewish High Holy Days, Bourguiba sent the Tunisian director of protocol to represent him at the synagogue.

**COMMUNAL ACTIVITY**

All but about 7,000 Jews lived in Tunis and its suburbs; the other centers were Sfax, Sousse, and Djerba. The interim administrative committee of the Jewish community of Tunis (AIJB, 1959 [Vol. 60], p. 261; 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 349) continued to sponsor a full gamut of Jewish activity, even strengthening and improving certain institutions despite increasing financial difficulties. (The committee had originally been appointed by the government in July 1958, supposedly for three months, until community elections could be held under the terms of a new charter to be handed down by the minister of interior.) Some of the committee members, fatigued with the duties of an office they had never sought, virtually retired. Besides its regular welfare work, the committee organized a profitable manufacture and sale of *matzot* for Passover; sponsored a successful Purim festival; instituted elementary-school classes for young girls in a building next to the local community house; modernized the courses in the Hevrat Talmud Yeshivah, and decided to open a new kindergarten, all in the fall of 1961. It was also decided to complete the unfinished community house building on rue Glatigny. Help in all these projects, and for welfare aid, came from JDC, which estimated that, directly or indirectly, it was helping some 14,000 Jews in Tunisia. JDC also distributed some $85,000 worth of American surplus food products during the year.

The five Alliance Israélite Universelle institutions in Tunisia taught over 3,500 children. ORT schools gave vocational training to another 1,500, often in the same premises as the Alliance. These were in addition to the five-grade elementary school at Or Torah, established by the interim committee a year earlier, and the new classes referred to above, started in September 1961 and supported by the same organization. Every Jewish child in Tunisia received some kind of education.
The interim committee planned to enlarge the Borgel Jewish cemetery on the city outskirts. But the required land bordered on the road from Tunis to the El Aouna airport, one of the regime's showpiece achievements, and authorities were reluctant to have a cemetery there. The committee proposed to set up a screen of trees along the road, but whether this would satisfy the authorities remained to be seen.

A section of the hara, the centuries-old Jewish quarter of Tunis, was demolished in the spring of 1961 to make room for much-needed roads in the heart of the city. This caused some temporary housing difficulties for scores of Jewish families.

Morocco*

The sudden death of King Mohammed V on February 26, 1961, was the outstanding occurrence in a year (August 1960–July 1961) eventful for Morocco and its 160,000 Jews. All other activity was suspended for more than a week as the entire country mourned the passing of its monarch, symbol of national unity and of the independence gained from the French six years earlier. For the first time in Moroccan history the Jews publically participated in popular mourning for a sovereign. In 1942 King Mohammed had refused to permit application of the anti-Jewish measures of the Pétain-Vichy government, although Morocco was then a French protectorate, and only a few days before his death he had assured Moroccan Jewish leaders of his solicitude for their community and of his intention to protect their rights and equality. The king's death was followed within a few weeks by that of Embarek Si Bekkai, minister of the interior and former premier, who had been understanding of Jewish problems. Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, ascending to the throne of Hassan II and lacking his father's personal prestige and popularity, faced difficult tasks in a Morocco beset by economic difficulties and riven by political dissension.

In February 1961 Morocco received a gift of 15 MIG planes from the Soviet Union. At the same time it continued to get considerable help from the United States, half of its development budget of $51 million coming from America. United States airbases in Morocco were due to shut down by the end of 1962.

Politics

Moroccan political life revolved around three forces. One was the conservative Istiqlal party, whose major strength was to be found in the Moroccan bled, or hinterland, among the more orthodox and traditional Mos-
lems, and among sections of the commercial class. Sharply opposed to it was the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP), which had split off from the Istiqlal and found support among the growing urban proletariat and intellectuals; its strongest base was the well-organized Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT), the labor federation headed by Mahjoub ben Seddik. The third political force was the monarchy itself. Mohammed V had always kept careful control of key ministries, like the interior, and of the police and army, and he tried to maintain the throne as an independent power above party strife. Even for him, however, this proved impossible. When he dismissed young UNFP Premier Abdallah Ibrahim at the end of May 1960, he took over personal direction of the government, with Moulay Hassan as vice premier. The official explanation for Ibrahim’s dismissal was that he had completed the task for which his cabinet had been designed, preparation of the first communal elections ever held in Morocco. Actually it was because UNFP, in power for over a year, had been consolidating its strength and was seeking to capture the key policy and security posts from “the king’s men.” In June the king invited UNFP and Istiqlal to join a “national unity” cabinet. The UNFP refused, preferring to go into the opposition, but Istiqlal accepted, and its members were given several leading government posts.

One of Hassan II’s first acts, on ascending the throne in March 1961, was to try again to form a national-unity government. UNFP’s refusal was even more categorical than before. Bitter differences between Moulay Hassan and UNFP, when it had been in the government, had at one point almost led to open civil strife, and UNFP leader Mehdi Ben Barka, fearing arrest, had fled the country. Fundamentally opposed to the monarchy, UNFP wanted at the least to curtail its powers—a solution that Hassan II was hardly prepared to accept. UNFP also wished to recast Moroccan economic and political institutions entirely, seeking tight government controls and planning, as opposed to the laissez-faire policies of the Istiqlal.

For several months, therefore, Hassan II retained unaltered the Istiqlal-dominated cabinet he had inherited from his father. Poor crops, an agricultural scandal, mounting unemployment, a general sense of drift, and increased discontent, fanned by the UNFP, were among the factors which led to a reshuffle in May 1961. Istiqlal’s two most important figures, Allal al Fassi and Ahmed Balafrej, joined the cabinet, and the leaders of some smaller parties were brought in to broaden the base of government. But the political cleavage continued to grow. UNFP charged the government with police brutality, oppression, and violation of such basic rights as freedom of press and speech. One of the most insistent UNFP demands was for national elections to an effective constituent assembly.

“Interim Constitution”

Meanwhile, government was still by fiat and all authority was centered in the person of the king. A constituent assembly had actually been appointed some years before by Mohammed V, but had foundered almost immediately on Istiqlal-UNFP dissension. In June 1961, in a surprise move, Hassan II’s government issued a so-called “Fundamental Law of the Kingdom,” which
it characterized as an interim constitution. Several articles of the fundamental law insisted on Morocco’s Moslem and Arab character: Article 1 declared that Morocco was “an Arab and Moslem kingdom . . . on the road to the institution of a constitutional monarchy”; Articles 2 and 3, that Islam was the official state religion and Arabic the official and national language; Article 14, that the state “must give education according to a national Arab and Islamic orientation,” and Article 15, that Morocco was loyal “to the Arab League, which it will strive to strengthen.” A dahir (royal decree), serving as a preamble to the fundamental law, declared that “authentic democracy finds its basis in the teachings of Islam.”

Articles 7 through 11 were about human rights: Moroccans were equal, with the same rights and duties; the state “should protect” the individual against the abuse of power and guarantee his dignity of person, the exercise of public and private liberties, and the administration of justice. Article 6, on the other hand, stressed “national union” as imperative and called for the elimination of anything “susceptible of sowing division among the national community.” Other articles gave wide economic powers to the state, calling for the “Moroccanization of national riches” and authorizing the “mobilization of nationals” to carry out state economic plans. In foreign affairs the fundamental law declared Morocco’s attachment to neutralist aims and particularly to the charter of the Casablanca conference of January 1961 (see below).

UNFP denounced the fundamental law as a mere pretense of a constitution and was particularly critical of the powers given the government under the “national unity” provisions of Article 6. There were many in Morocco who felt that the interim constitution was not really meant for implementation but was rather an attempt to answer the criticism that there was no constitution at all. Yet, considered even only as a statement of aims, it raised many important questions for Moroccan Jews. Could they be truly equal where there was such stress on Islam, on attachment to the Arab League, on the concept that education must be Mohammedan and Arab nationalist? Might not Jewish institutions come to be regarded as divisive of national unity?

**Territorial Claims**

Moroccan territorial claims, on which all political parties were agreed, aroused much popular feeling. Morocco wished to extend its sovereignty to Mauritania to the south, to the remaining small Spanish enclaves in North Africa, and to part of the Sahara desert, on the ground that these had once been a part of a Moroccan empire.

The proclamation of an independent Mauritania on November 27, 1960, was a blow to Moroccan aspirations, and the official radio put the blame on “the machinations of de Gaulle, Ben-Gurion, and Bourguiba.” Relations with Tunisia, previously embraced as a Maghreb partner, were virtually severed. There was increased coolness towards France, because it had supported Mauritanian independence, and great disappointment in the United States.
because in October 1961 it supported the vote for Mauritanian admittance to the UN. The already strong tendency toward neutralism was reinforced since it was among the neutralist countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab League that Morocco now hoped to find support for its claims on Mauritania.

It was in part to achieve this end that the Casablanca conference was convened in January 1961. Present were the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and the leaders of the Algerian national liberation movement. (Subsequent developments were to reveal the conference to be a rather weak diplomatic reed, and its second meeting, in August 1961, was poorly attended.) In a marked sharpening of opposition to Israel, Morocco supported conference resolutions attacking Israel as an agent of Western imperialism and colonialism. While relations between the two countries had been broken off several years before (including postal relations, which imposed particularly severe hardships on Moroccan Jewry—AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], p. 268; 1960 [Vol. 61], p. 324), and while attacks on Israel by Moroccan political leaders were common enough, the Moroccan government itself had by and large avoided such attacks before the first Casablanca meeting.

**Hostility to Jews**

During the year under review, Moroccan foreign and internal policies had definite and sometimes dramatic effects on the Jewish population. Two events in January 1961 called world attention to the altered situation of Moroccan Jewry and, in particular, to the virtual prohibition of Jewish emigration.

The first shock came in connection with the January Casablanca conference. An Arab League meeting had been held in Casablanca some 15 months earlier (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 352) without a single incident. Yet during the January conference instances of police abuse, arrests, and imprisonment of Jews ran into the hundreds, including the serious beating up of Neve Shalom yeshivah students and the torture of the yeshivah's director, Meyer Wrechner, a Swiss citizen who was released only after his government intervened on his behalf. Police actions were based on ridiculous charges. Persons who happened to be wearing any combination of blue and white clothing were arrested as "secret Zionists," while those wearing black skullcaps or garments were accused of "displaying signs of mourning" at Nasser's coming. Morning worshipers on their way to synagogues were rounded up as prime suspects, as were 150 Jews in cafes and shops near the Casablanca mellah one night. Casablanca Jewish leaders, including former Minister of Posts, Telegraph, and Telephone Léon Benzaquen, protested vigorously to the local governor, presenting him with a list of persons who had required medical treatment after police beatings. A week later Jewish leaders met with Prince Moulay Hassen in Rabat. He promised that those responsible would be "severely punished." And indeed there were some transfers of Casablanca police in the months that followed.

The second shock came with the sinking of the vessel *Pisces* in a storm.
off Alhucemas on January 11, with 42 Jewish men, women, and children aboard. The ship, it seemed evident, had been Gibraltar-bound, carrying Moroccan Jews (none survived) who had left Morocco clandestinely in the hope of reaching Israel. There was widespread and profound reaction. Among Moroccan Jews the feeling of being hemmed in became more acute than ever. The Moroccan press, radio, and government spokesmen expressed indignation at what they termed “Zionist activities,” and some Arab newspapers went so far as to urge that Jews be assigned a special status distinct from that of Moroccan citizens. Outside Morocco, in many Western lands, there was condemnation of policies that could lead to events like the Pisces tragedy.

Less than a month later the situation deteriorated even further with the occurrence of something unparalleled in Moroccan experience—the anonymous mass distribution throughout the land, in a single night, of a leaflet. The leaflet urged Jews not to despair, called for mourning for the Pisces victims, and compared Moroccan policies to those of Hitler and Amalek. A score of Jews were imprisoned in various cities on the charge of having participated in the pamphlet distribution and several of them, it was later learned, were beaten severely. Moslem indignation reached a new high and Jewish morale a new low. It was at this point, in a completely unexpected move, that Jewish community leaders were summoned in February 1961 to see Minister of the Interior Si Bekkai. He declared that firm instructions were being given to all local authorities that no obstacles should be put in the way of Jews seeking passports. He also informed them that they were to have an audience with Mohammed V and should prepare a statement of their grievances.

Mohammed V, warm and sympathetic, reminded the Jewish leaders of his record during the Vichy era and reproached them for not having come to him earlier. He indicated clearly that Moroccan foreign policy would not influence Morocco's treatment of its Jews, declaring that Nasser did not decide internal Moroccan policies. He said that Si Bekkai's orders regarding passports had been issued upon his personal instructions and he expressed the hope that his own grandchildren and those of the Moroccan Jews would still, in the future, be working together for the well-being of the country.

There was rejoicing in the synagogues that week as Jewish leaders relayed the king's message to the congregations. Only ten days later, however, Mohammed V was dead. Hassan II was known to be friendly and reasonable in his attitude toward Jews. He had several times represented his father at Rosh ha-Shanah services and had even attended the so-called Mediterranean colloquiums in Florence, Italy, which brought together Moslems, Christians, and Jews (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 181, 270). Because of the disorganization accompanying the change of regime and the death of Si Bekkai in April, however, the assurances of Mohammed V remained largely unfulfilled until July 1961. In July there was a sudden shift and passports were freely issued in certain Moroccan cities. Whether this meant a basic revision in Moroccan policies or was only a temporary improvement remained unclear at the time of writing.
A government census completed in 1960 reported 161,000 Jews in Morocco, representing 1.4 per cent of the total population of 11,626,000. About 45 per cent of Moroccan Jews—72,000—lived in Casablanca, which thus had the largest Jewish community in any Moslem country. Other cities with important Jewish populations were Rabat and Meknès, 11,000 each; Marrakesh, 10,000; Fez, 8,700, and Tangiers, 6,200. In 1960 the Moroccan Jewish population was 95 per cent urban, and there was continued movement into the larger cities from the hinterland and smaller cities. Emigration had been permitted freely until 1956 and had resulted in the departure of 90,000 Jews between 1948 and 1956. The number of Jews therefore decreased in every province except Rabat, although the natural rate of increase of the Jewish population was estimated at 1.4 per cent per year.

In contrast to the immediate post-independence years, the Council of Jewish Communities under the leadership of Secretary General David Amar was active and vigorous during the period under review. It sought to protect the rights of Jews and to achieve a recognized Jewish community structure. Thus, in July 1960, it presented a memorandum to the ministry of interior urging that the government permit Jewish community elections, which had not been held since 1953; that steps be taken to end discrimination against Jews in the issuance of passports; that a solution be found to the problem of postal relations between Morocco and Israel, and that Jewish minor girls be protected from forced marriages with Moslems and conversion to Islam, as had happened in a number of instances in small towns. The memorandum also expressed concern about the then pending Moroccan government plans for the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle and expressed the hope that a solution would be found “taking into account national and confessional imperatives.” In February 1961 the Council of Communities resumed publication of the monthly *La Voix des Communautés*, voluntarily suspended in 1956.

In March 1961 the government gave permission for a nationwide Jewish congress, the first since independence, under the auspices of the Council of Communities. Minister of the Interior Bekkai opened the meeting with a brief but meaningful message from King Hassan II:

> The decisions emanating from the present discussion of your problems will be studied with benevolence by His Majesty King Hassan II and his government in the degree that they are consistent with the general interest. Following the example of his august father, Hassan II is determined to recognize you as full citizens, and this depends only on you.

The major work of the congress was the adoption of a “Draft Dahir Concerning Reorganization of Jewish Community Councils” for submission to the government. In general, this draft confirmed the rights of the local Jewish communities to carry on their religious, welfare, and educational activities. It proposed that the Council of Communities be authorized to present
and explain recommendations to the government on subjects of Jewish interest, as the occasion arose.

The March meeting sharply pointed up internal conflicts within the Jewish community, reflecting personality clashes and differences of approach to Jewish problems. Among these was the longstanding unhappy relationship between the Casablanca council and the Council of Communities. It was uncertain whether Casablanca was even officially present at the March meeting in Rabat, since Casablanca President Meyer Obadia and about half of his council were opposed to attending, while the other half was in favor, and it was never clear which group had won the final vote; still, those in favor did appear at Rabat. There were also serious differences between Secretary General Amar and Léon Benzaquen on how best to approach Morrocian authorities on questions of Jewish concern, and these too were reflected at the meeting. Finally, the right of the congress to represent Moroccan Jewry was challenged by a small number of Jewish intellectuals and government employees, who threatened to hold a congress of their own. They accused the council of too close relations with foreign Jewish organizations and urged relinquishing all aspects of Jewish identity save the religious.

Internal Jewish feuding spilled over into general Moroccan life. Thus the heads of two factions on the Casablanca council, Meyer Obadia and David Azoulay, ran on opposing political tickets for a place in the Casablanca Chamber of Commerce, each seeking to pull Jewish votes, with UNFP Azoulay defeating Istiqlal Obadia. The dissidents at the March congress took their complaints to Avant Garde, weekly French-language organ of the powerful UMT labor union. In two successive editorials the newspaper blasted the Council of Communities as the supporter of “separatist institutions and principles established by the French protectorate” which, it charged, the council sought to maintain by “all means, including those most injurious to the unity of the country.” Moroccan Jewry, said the paper, should have “no other representatives than those elected or chosen within a national framework.”

Jewish Education and Social Welfare

Basic Jewish religious, welfare, and educational institutions continued to operate, but sometimes with increased difficulties. Major readjustment faced the century-old Alliance Israélite Universelle school system after it was partially nationalized in October 1960. About a third of the Alliance schools—18 institutions, with 200 teachers, serving nearly 10,000 children, of a total of 74 schools serving 26,000 Jewish children in Morocco—were integrated into the state educational system, and absorbed about 4,500 additional Moslem children. Government subsidies to the Alliance were slashed by about two-thirds and the authorities insisted that the Paris-based network operate in Morocco as a local institution. Otzar ha-Torah, Lubavitcher, and other Jewish schools educated 10,000 children. ORT provided vocational training to 4,000 persons, including about 300 Moslems.

In February 1961, without any previous warning, the government arrested and expelled Morocco ORT Director Bernard Wand-Polak, a French
citizen, alleging that he had furthered Zionist activities. Morocco ORT President Jules Senouf was attacked by the organ of the pro-Istiqlal Moroccan trade union, UGMT, which charged that ORT had fired one of its organizers in order to curry favor with its rival, UMT. The ORT program, however, was not affected.

OSE cared for 8,000 patients in 26 clinics. Working with and aiding all these institutions was JDC, whose Moroccan program directly or indirectly helped over 65,000 persons, about a third of the total Moroccan Jewish population.

Algeria*

SOME DAYS after the breakdown of the Melun conversations of June 25–29, 1960 (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], pp. 357–58), which were the first official contacts between representatives of the French government and the Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN), General Charles de Gaulle outlined his ideas on the future of Algeria in a speech in Normandy. He said that once a cease-fire had been obtained, there should be a pacification, that eventually there would be a vote, and that France would accept its outcome in advance. He was convinced the vote would result in an “Algerian Algeria”, “linked to France” but possessing broad autonomy.

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSIONS

To help found this new Algeria, he speeded up preparations for the establishment of commissions of elected representatives. These commissions, according to a decree published in the Journal Officiel on July 19, were to give advice on Algerian matters when solicited. There were to be four commissions, composed of 33 members.

Fourth Commission Report

The fourth commission was concerned with relations between the communities and to it was assigned the only Jew among those chosen. He was Alexandre Amouyal, a Socialist councilor general of the department of Oran, and he played an important part in its work. The general report of the fourth commission was made public in March 1961. Discussing the relations between the various sections of the Algerian population, it divided them into two basic groups. The first was the “united, indivisible” Moslem community, including the Arabs, the Kabyles, the Chaouias, and the Moabites. The other was the non-Moslem community, consisting of “the French by descent, the Jews, and the French-assimilated Mediterraneans.” These

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 497.
more realistic definitions were to replace the hitherto current but improper usage of "Europeans" (which included the Jews, although they were indigenious) and "Moslems." Citing the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, the commission's report specified that

the full unfolding of the human personality and the friendship of those groups which compose the communities can never be realized in the new Algeria unless every citizen, whatever his community, is assured of finding respect for the use of his language and guarantees of free access to the culture of his community.

The report further stated that "the fundamental rights of the human personality . . . require measures to help and protect those Algerians who regard themselves as the weakest or most threatened."

**FURTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS**

In a press conference in September 1960 President de Gaulle rejected absolutely any United Nations intervention in Algeria, declaring that he held to the policy of self-determination and was willing to enter into discussions with all groups, including FLN leaders, but not with them alone as sole representatives of all Algeria. The prerequisite for discussion was an end to the fighting and killing.

In a radio and television speech in November, he spoke for the first time of the "Algerian republic [which] will some day exist." This new formulation appeared to rule out the possibility of Algeria's integration into France, one of the three options which he had offered the Algerians in his speech of September 16, 1959. Although still hoping to see Algeria linked to France, he did not rule out the possibility of a total break, and he stressed anew that France would not oppose any solution, whatever it might be, freely voted by the Algerian peoples. In case of a break, he said, all necessary measures would be taken to safeguard those Algerians who wanted to remain French. He also made known his intention "to go directly to the country by way of a referendum" for approval of his Algerian policy, as the constitution allowed him to do.

At the end of November a ministry of state for Algerian affairs was established under Louis Joxe. Jean Morin became delegate general in Algeria, subject to the authority of Joxe, succeeding Paul Delouvrier who had been directly responsible to de Gaulle.

On December 7 and 8 the French National Assembly heatedly debated Algerian policy. Some speakers demanded measures prohibiting "a policy of abandonment." Others opposed the idea of replacing one set of provisional political institutions for Algeria with another and, while approving the policy of self-determination, urged immediate peace negotiation with the rebel provisional government. Prime Minister Michel Debré pledged that "whatever may be the results of self-determination, they will not place in question the citizenship of any person, whatever his community of origin, who desires to be French."

On December 9 General de Gaulle went to Algeria to explain his policy
to the people. Grave disorders, for which young Europeans were primarily responsible, especially in Algiers and Oran, provoked the Moslem community, and there was a confrontation of the two communities. The ensuing riots on December 10 and 11 resulted in at least a hundred deaths, mostly Moslem, and hundreds of wounded. The riots widened the gulf between the two populations, which was perhaps the objective of the extremists in both camps. The riots also appear to have been linked in the minds of some with a larger-scale action, looking to the seizure of power in Paris, in the absence of the chief of state, and to a complete change of policy. The eruption of thousands of marching Moslem demonstrators, chanting the slogans and waving the banners of nationalism, was the decisive fact of those days. It was during these events that the looting of the Great Synagogue of Algiers occurred (see below). On the whole, however, most Europeans, like most Moslems, remained quiet, and the Moslems in the cities visited by General de Gaulle showed their confidence that he would restore peace.

De Gaulle went ahead with his plan for the establishment of provisional political institutions in Algeria, associating the Moslems with the responsibilities of a new Algeria, with a view to bypassing FLN if necessary. This was the essence of the referendum which he submitted on January 8, 1961, to metropolitan France and Algeria for approval. The text of the question read: "Do you approve of the proposed law submitted to the French people by the president of the Republic, relating to self-determination for the peoples of Algeria and the organization of public authority in Algeria before self-determination?" The result, a heavy vote in favor of his Algerian policy, was a clear victory for the president. In metropolitan France, 75 per cent of the votes cast were "yes" (see p. 300). Even in Algeria 70 per cent of the votes cast were "yes," although the great majority of the Europeans voted "no"; there were 767,546 "no" votes. (Whereas in Algeria most of the "no" votes were in favor of Algérie française, in metropolitan France they often expressed the convictions of those who believed that it was useless to set up provisional institutions in Algeria, opposed any unilateral statute, and were convinced that only negotiation with FLN could permit a return to peace.) In response to the directives of FLN, a large number of Moslems in the cities abstained; of the 4,470,215 eligible to vote in Algeria, about 40 per cent abstained.

In a declaration published in Tunis on January 16, FLN, which rejected the referendum, denied the right of the French government to impose a statute unilaterally and threatened to punish as traitors those Algerian Moslems who might agree to take part in the provisional institutions. At the same time it affirmed anew its readiness "to engage in negotiations with the French government on the condition of a free consultation of the Algerian people." This appeal for direct negotiation marked a change in the attitude of FLN, which seemed after Melun to have renounced bilateral conversations as a means of resolving the conflict, in favor of recourse to the UN.

On February 27 President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, invited to France by President de Gaulle, visited the latter at the Château de Rambouillet.
During their meeting they discussed the Algerian question and their communiqué looked forward to a "rapid and positive evolution" of the problem, which Bourguiba interpreted as meaning that there would be new developments soon. Secret contacts were established in Switzerland between representatives of the French government and FLN, and on March 15 the French cabinet officially indicated its readiness to open negotiations with FLN. The latter responded positively two days later, and shortly afterwards both parties announced that negotiations would begin on April 7 at Evian-les-Bains. Many thought that the curtain was about to fall on the Algerian tragedy.

On March 31 Mayor Camille Blanc of Evian-les-Bains was killed by the explosion of a plastic bomb, planted by an organization of "ultras" (European extremists). On the same day FLN, citing a declaration by Minister of State Joxe that the French government intended to consult with the leaders of the rival nationalist MNA (Algerian National Movement, led by Messali Hadj), as well as those of FLN, declared that it could not come to Evian on the assigned date. Thus it affirmed its claim to exclusive negotiating rights with the French government.

The United States publicly recommended negotiation, hoping that the solution resulting from the conversations would keep Algeria in the Western camp, and the American ambassador in Tunis received the FLN representatives. The Soviet Union, for its part, did not oppose negotiations, hoping that an independent Algeria would join the neutralist camp.

Coup

At the moment when it seemed that conversations were about to begin, the Algerian coup erupted. During the night of April 21–22, a group of generals including Raoul Salan and reserve Air Force General Maurice Challe seized power in Algeria. They had the complicity of other generals and high officers and the support of a number of units, notably the parachutists of the Foreign Legion. They arrested a number of officials, including the new delegate general and the commander-in-chief in Algeria, General Fernand Gambiez, declaring that their basic aim was to keep the army's oath to preserve Algeria for France.

The great majority of the army in Algeria remained loyal to the legal authorities, or at least passive, and the draftees expressed their profound hostility to the coup. Except for the members of a new European extremist group, OAS (Secret Army Organization), the European civilian population took no part in the coup, which remained confined to the military.

A threatened invasion of Paris never materialized, and after four days the coup collapsed in the face of the unbending firmness of the president, who had the near-unanimous support of the nation, and the lack of encouragement from abroad. General Challe and his aide, reserve General André Zeller, surrendered, and Salan and other leaders of the putsch disappeared. Challe and Zeller were stripped of their ranks and brought before a special High Military Tribunal, each receiving a 15-year prison sentence. Other rebel officers also received prison sentences.
Evian-les-Bains Talks

On May 10 it was announced that the Evian conversations, originally scheduled for April 7, would begin on May 20. In a radio and television speech on May 8, de Gaulle declared that the purpose of the conference was not to determine the fate of Algeria but to organize the popular vote which would permit the people of Algeria to choose for themselves between independence in organic association with France and a complete break. Actually, however, the conferees discussed several basic questions relating to the future of Algeria.

The French delegation to the conference was headed by Louis Joxe and the Algerian by Belkacem Krim, foreign minister of the rebel Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). On the day the conference opened the French government ordered a unilateral cease-fire—i.e., a cessation of all offensive operations in every part of Algerian territory in which normal movement of individuals had been restored and in which the Moslem population had been relocated—and announced its decision to free 6,000 detainees and to transfer five imprisoned FLN leaders to the Château de Turquant, where they would have greater freedom to communicate with their colleagues.

On several basic problems the negotiators were completely opposed to each other. Regarding the territorial limits of the future Algerian state, i.e., the fate of the Sahara, Joxe stated that France, which had made that desert valuable, intended to exploit it in cooperation with the bordering countries for their common enrichment. FLN, on the other hand, considered the Sahara to be an integral part of Algerian territory whose future should be decided by self-determination. It was ready, however, to discuss the exploitation of the Sahara once France recognized the sovereignty of the Algerian people in the area.

In regard to the million persons of French descent, Jews, and gallicized Mediterraneans, who considered Algeria as their country, Joxe declared on May 26: “Algeria is nine million Moslems and a million non-Moslems. It is hence necessary to establish a stable system under which the two communities can live with respect for liberty and in conformity with the principles of international law; the minorities must never feel themselves in danger of being wiped out. This presupposes the recognition of rights and freedoms and guarantees, particularly in the fields of education and justice. . . .” He added: “French nationality can be lost only at the request of those concerned.”

FLN declared itself ready to give guarantees to the non-Moslems as individuals, but not as a community. It recognized the existence, on the one hand, of an Algerian people and, on the other, of a population of European origin, differing from the Algerian people in respect to origin, religion, civilization, culture, and personal status, but undeniably attached to Algeria. In a press conference on June 6 Reda Malek, spokesman for the delegation, declared: “FLN states that it does not intend to make any distinction between Algerians of European origin and Algerians of indigenous origin. All will
have the same rights and the same duties." The special characteristics of the Europeans would be taken into consideration within the limits of the sovereignty of a free and independent country. Those Europeans who did not wish to renounce their original citizenship would have the status of foreigners. They would be precluded from participation in political and administrative affairs, but special guarantees might be accorded them within the framework of a Franco-Algerian agreement.

The FLN delegates indicated their readiness to protect French bases and other military interests, but held that agreement on this, as well as on the question of eventual association between Algeria and France, would have to wait on the outcome of the referendum on self-determination.

FLN refused to respond to the French declaration of a truce with a similar gesture. Its rejection of the cease-fire and its numerous terrorist attacks on individuals, matched on the other side by the plastic bombs of OAS, overhung the negotiations and contributed to the supercharged atmosphere in Algeria.

After 13 sessions stretched out over 24 days had failed to break the deadlock between the two delegations, it was decided at Joxe's insistence to suspend the conversations for a "pause for reflection."

While continuing to hope that association, "the sensible solution," would win out, the French government considered a partition plan if it should lose. General de Gaulle described a formula under which those desiring to remain French would be regrouped in certain areas such as Algiers and Oran. This was regarded as a last resort, which many regarded as not viable, which the FLN categorically rejected, and to which the French side would turn only if the negotiations went on the rocks.

In the economic field, uncertainty as to the future led to a perceptible reduction in purchases, a growing exodus of private funds, a very sharp decrease in private expenditures for capital goods and business investments, and a significant slowing of the rate of industrialization. These were, to some extent, offset by military expenditures and the continuance of public investments. In the agricultural sector, an unusually severe drought resulted in a poor grain crop, causing large-scale imports and a major decline in livestock. While there was a tendency for many Europeans to consider leaving the country, it could not yet be described as a mass exodus.

**JEWISH COMMUNITY**

In the absence of any census, there was no way of obtaining precise figures on the number of Jews in Algeria, but they probably numbered about 120,000. They had received French citizenship *en bloc* by the Crémieux decree of October 24, 1870. Not affected by the decree was a group of Jews in southern Algeria called the M'Zab, which was not at that time under French rule. On July 11, 1961, the French National Assembly voted to bring this group of about 2,500 under the civil status of French law. Only a small minority of the deputies, among whom were the Communists, opposed this measure.
The Crémieux decree was now of only historical interest, as the Jews of Algeria had since become French citizens under the normal rules of the French nationality code. This was recalled by the Algerian Jewish journalist and lawyer Emile Touati in a well-documented article in the February 1961 Information Juive, at a time when there were unfounded rumors that the Crémieux decree would be revoked. (Information Juive, published monthly by the Comité Juif Algérien d'Etudes Sociales, was the only Jewish publication in Algeria.)

Throughout the seven-year-old Algerian crisis, Jewish leaders had consistently sought to achieve peace and reconciliation, with respect for the legitimate interests of all, condemning all excesses, regardless of origin. These sentiments were frequently given public expression, particularly in the period under review.

The Jews of Algeria did not wish to be considered as an ethnic minority. As suggested in an editorial in the French Jewish L'Arche of February 1961, this "would imply for the Jews the right to be represented in the various bodies being formed, but would enrol them in a human category which, whatever its sociological and historical validity, would not at the present time be justified on the juridical, political, or psychological plane."

In regard to the future status of Algeria, Jews were free, like other citizens, to hold any opinion. Some actively supported the policies of President de Gaulle, while others were among those arrested on charges of participation in the activities of FLN and OAS. (Jews were also among the victims of both organizations.) Former Premier René Mayer, a native of Constantine, was prominent among the partisans of Algérie française; former Premier Pierre Mendès-France and Raymond Aron were among the outstanding French champions of Algerian self-determination, and Noémi Clayman and Giselle Halemi were active in the legal defense of imprisoned Moslem nationalists.

No Jewish organization either wanted or claimed to speak in the name of a group which, as was often recalled, had among its members persons of all opinions. (See particularly the November 1956 declaration of the Comité Juif Algérien d'Etudes Sociales—AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 277–78.) This position was repeatedly and unequivocally stated by the principal Jewish organizations and in the editorials of Information Juive.

A similar position was expressed at a press conference by Mendès-France in April 1961:

I often receive echoes of the sentiments which the Jews of Algeria now hold. They feel that they are at home in Algeria; they have lived there for generations; they were there long before the French arrived. They consider themselves native to the country, with the same right as anyone else to live there and work there. But at the same time they do not forget that in 1870, by the Crémieux decree, French nationality was given them, and that it assured them of an advancement and substantial advantages which they fully enjoyed in the generations which followed. And bonds of a very real and deep intimacy have been established between that Jewish population and France, as shown by the number of young Algerian Jews who went to fight in France both in 1914 and in 1939. The future
of the Jewish population of Algeria is in consequence a delicate problem, and one which the negotiators of tomorrow cannot forget.

We discussed this question recently, during the Grenoble Colloquy,\(^1\) where I presented a position which I want to repeat. When a definitive settlement for Algeria is reached, when a new state is established, all the people who live there should have the right to practice their own self-determination. Those who want to be French—I do not speak only of Jews, but it is self-evident that I include Jews—those who want to be French should under all conditions have the right to be French; those who want to become Algerian citizens and play that part in the new Algerian state should have the right to do so. I do not think that the Jews of Algeria should be considered as a community whose fate will be decided _en bloc_ by decisions taken in their absence. Every individual, every Jew (and, I add, every non-Jew) in Algeria should have the right to choose his own destiny. This is the most human solution, the one which best respects the rights of one group and another, and this is the position that the French negotiators should defend when the moment comes.

President de Gaulle, Premier Debré, and Minister of State for Algerian Affairs Joxe had all affirmed the right of all French citizens in Algeria to remain French if they so desired. Joxe stated officially, in discussions with leaders of Algerian, French, and foreign Jewish organizations: "The French citizenship of those who claim it will never be placed in question by France."

The position of FLN in regard to the Jewish minority was defined in various articles and statements in the FLN organ _El Moudjahid_ and in pamphlets published by it, especially "Tous Algériens," released in March 1961. Almost from the beginning, FLN had regularly proclaimed its opinion that it was improper to equate the status of the Jews of Algeria with that of the Europeans, because the Jews were an indigenous group, many of them descended from people settled in Algeria before the Arabs. For FLN, the Jews had never ceased to be Algerians, in spite of the "colonialist" decree of 1870, and it laid claim to all of them.

But in an interview with Jules Roy, published in the Paris weekly _L'Express_ for February 16, 1961, Ferhat Abbas, at that time GPRA president, presented a more flexible position. He declared:

The Algerian revolution considers the Jews as Algerians. Algeria has always been their fatherland. Many of them want to become citizens of the Algerian republic. Some want to remain French. What I can tell you is that we are not fiercely intransigent on anything but the fundamental aims of the Algerian revolution. For the rest, we are not afraid of discussion or evolution. New situations can present themselves, and we will study them in a spirit of political realism which nobody has a right to doubt.

In his press conference of June 6, 1961, at Geneva, in the context of the Evian discussions, FLN spokesman Reda Malek further redefined the GPRA

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\(^1\) The Grenoble Colloquy was organized on March 3 and 4, 1961, by the Association for the Preservation of Judicial Institutions and the Defense of Individual Liberties. Among those participating were numerous leading figures from politics, the trade unions, the bar, the judiciary, and the universities. The discussion centered on the question of guarantees for the minorities in Algeria, and the Comité Juif Algérien d’Études Sociales sent observers. The situation of the Jewish community was explained by a well-known lawyer, Rabi.
attitude toward the Jewish community. Reaffirming FLN’s non-recognition of the Crémieux decree and its view that the Jewish minority was indigenous and hence Algerian, he emphasized that nevertheless those Jews who wanted to remain French would be considered as foreigners in Algeria on the same basis as the Europeans, without any interference from the FLN.

Finally, an FLN spokesman hinted to certain American Jewish leaders during an interview in New York that it would be desirable for those Jews who wanted to leave Algeria for Israel to do so before independence, implying that this possibility would be excluded in an independent Algeria. This problem of free emigration, as well as of maintaining contact with Israel and preserving the Jewish communal structure and institutions—problems which posed themselves in each newly independent Arab state—all bore on the possibility of Jewish existence in an independent Algeria.

Excesses Affecting the Jewish Community

The looting of the Great Synagogue of Algiers during the riots of December 1960 aroused intense feeling in the Jewish community of Algeria. This synagogue, situated in the Casbah, was the most beautiful in Algiers and was always open for worship. Built by Napoleon III and presented to the community, it contained many objects of very great value, notably a Sefer Torah reputedly brought from Spain centuries ago. It was taken by storm on December 11 by a mob of youths flying the FLN flag, who sacked the building and its contents. Scrolls and prayerbooks were profaned—thrown on the floor, torn, trampled. Of this architectural jewel and its ornaments, all that remained were the soiled walls, covered with FLN slogans and anti-Jewish inscriptions. There were, fortunately, no victims to be mourned, and numerous Moslems of the district showed their sympathy with their Jewish neighbors during these tragic hours and extended them the hospitality of their homes. (Some FLN elements asserted that they had been shot upon from the synagogue during the demonstration.) Some of the Jewish families evacuated from the area were housed temporarily in the buildings of the Maimonides school and the Federation of Jewish Communities of Algeria.

Expressing the feeling of the whole Jewish community, the Federation of Communities, Algerian Chief Rabbi David Askenazi, the Jewish Consistory of Algeria, and the rabbis of the country issued "an indignant protest against such unjustifiable acts." The representatives of the various religions in Algeria condemned the vandalism and exhorted the people to "fraternal love." On December 26 the Jews of Algeria observed a collective fast, and the Scrolls of the Law and the damaged religious objects were buried in the cemetery according to the prescribed rites in the presence of a considerable crowd.

Numerous Jews were killed or wounded by FLN and OAS terrorists. (About ten were killed throughout the country in July 1961 alone, when the unilateral truce declaration was followed by a recrudescence of terrorism.) Strong feeling was aroused by the assassination on June 22, in the
Jewish quarter of Constantine, of Raymond Leyris, one of the masters of oriental music, a man universally admired by both the Jewish and Moslem communities. In November 1961 alone, OAS bullets took the lives of three prominent Jews: Joseph Cohen, a liberal Algiers physician not associated with any group, was shot in front of his home on November 2, after having twice been the victim of plastic-bomb attacks; David Zermati, a lawyer and leader of the Jewish community of Sétif, was assassinated on November 3, and on November 20 the secretary of the Algiers federation of the French Socialist party, William Lévy—one of whose sons had been killed by FLN in 1956—was assassinated by OAS in the Bab-el-Oued district of Algiers.

**Emigration**

During the period under review there was a marked increase in departures, especially for France. It was difficult to estimate the number involved, but the departures did not seem proportionately larger than those among other sections of the European population. Some Moslems also left.

There was also a noticeable increase in aliya to Israel. Whereas in previous years the average had been about a hundred a year, in the first half of 1961 about 350 registered every month. In the circumstances, this figure might appear low. However, aliya from Algeria remained a matter of individuals rather than masses, and usually affected those on a rather high economic level, such as merchants, artisans, professionals, and civil servants. Each of them had his specific problems, and their integration into Israel could not be handled like that of emigrants who had abandoned everything in the face of catastrophic developments. In any case, the Aliyah department of the Jewish Agency carried on its work and Agency representatives regularly visited the communities.

Representatives of UHS also visited Algeria during the period and assured the leaders of Jewish organizations of their support.

**Community Activities**

Despite the difficulties of the situation, the Jewish organizations of Algeria continued, on the whole, to carry on their traditional activities. The Federation of Jewish Communities, with 16 consistories modeled on those of France, held its annual general assembly in June 1961. After the resignation of the president and the secretary general, because of their final departure for France, a new executive was elected and Joseph Biton of Oran was named president. David Askenzai of Oran, grand rabbi of the federation, resigned during the year from his post as grand rabbi of Algiers.

The Comité Juif Algérien d'Etudes Sociales, entrusted by agreement with the principal Jewish organizations with the defense of the rights of the Jewish population of Algeria, intervened in various matters for this purpose. It also arranged private information meetings for the joint consideration of Algerian developments and their repercussions on the Jewish community.

The North African bureau of WJC continued its cultural activity. The educational departments of the Jewish Agency were also active in this field.
The Jewish cultural center of Oran organized a very successful "Jewish cultural fortnight" from March 23 to April 7 in various communities of that district. The French radio in Algeria carried a 20-minute Jewish cultural program every Monday evening. A similar Jewish cultural program was broadcast every Friday by Radio Colomb-Béchar in the Sahara, primarily for the benefit of soldiers in southern Algeria.

The Maimonides college had for some time been the only full-time Jewish school in Algeria. It was sponsored by the Federation of Jewish Communities in Algiers, and included a boarding school. Its secondary classes, for children between the ages of 11 and 15, increased to 60 students.

The ORT technical schools in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine were recognized by the French ministries of labor and education and received government subsidies. In the school year 1960–61 they taught 334 boys and 124 girls, offering courses in mechanics, electricity, industrial design, secretarial work, and stenography and typing, with 114 students graduating and working at their trades. There were some non-Jewish students at the ORT schools.

JDC continued to aid various organizations, especially the Federation of Jewish Communities and the social services of the consistories of Algiers and Constantine. It also subsidized the vacation camps of the youth movements.

The Zionist federation continued its traditional activities, being particularly active in the West Algerian district of Oran. Its president, André Narboni, was appointed Sephardi representative to the executive of the Jewish Agency in July 1961. Five delegates from Algeria took part in the 25th World Zionist Congress in Jerusalem in December 1960–January 1961. The federation maintained close relations with the union of Algerian emigrants in Israel.

Keren Kayyemet le-Yisrael was also active. WIZO, especially its Algiers section, sponsored a full complement of activities, both in fund raising and in the cultural field. In particular, the kindergarten which it established in 1959 cared for 30 children daily.

As in preceding years, the Jews of Algeria remained in close contact with the major Jewish organizations, especially WJC, a delegation from which visited Algeria in February 1961 and made contact with community leaders in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine at meetings convened for that purpose. The Algerian community was also in close touch with the Jewish organizations of metropolitan France and was regularly represented at their annual congresses.

Personalia

On July 17, 1960, Albert Zermati died in Paris at the age of 83. For many years, including the Vichy period, he was president of the Jewish Consistory of Sétif, in eastern Algeria. A large-scale agriculturalist, he specialized in the breeding of pure English cattle and introduced the Merino sheep to Algeria.
The period from July 1960 to June 1961 was one of domestic tension and increasing international isolation for the Union of South Africa. The government continued its application of apartheid and completed the transformation of the country from a dominion into a republic. Both policies had international as well as domestic repercussions. Nevertheless, the regime of Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd was even more firmly entrenched at the end of the period than at its beginning.

Problems of the New Republic

One of the questions that had to be settled after the referendum in favor of a republic in October 1960 (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], pp. 365–66), was the effect that the change in the country's status would have on its membership in the British Commonwealth. Continued membership after the change required the consent of the other members, and some of the Asian and African countries in the Commonwealth were pressing for South Africa's exclusion, as were important groups in such countries as England and Canada. The British government, however, sought a basis for continued South African membership, and at the Commonwealth Conference in London in March 1961 succeeded in persuading the other members to accept the new republic in return for a conference resolution condemning racial discrimination. Unwilling to accept such a Commonwealth declaration of principle, Prime Minister Verwoerd withdrew South Africa's application for continued membership. While this development was greeted with satisfaction by the Asian and African members of the Commonwealth, Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies of Australia declared that South Africa had been "pushed out" and that in Verwoerd's place he "would have left certainly not later than he did." British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan expressed "deep regret" at the severance of South Africa's ties to the Commonwealth, while declaring that apartheid was abhorrent to the ideals of mankind.

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 497.
On April 12, 1961, the lower house of the South African parliament voted, 90–51, to establish a republic on May 31, and the senate quickly followed. On May 10, by a vote of 139–71, the electoral college chose Governor General Charles Robberts Swart to be the republic's first president. When nonwhite groups called for protest strikes to coincide with the institution of the republic, the government responded with large-scale raids and thousands of arrests of potential strike leaders. This in turn, led to some protest demonstrations. The government also banned all meetings and called up the reserves. It succeeded in crippling the strike movement, except in Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. On June 6 the ban on meetings was ended.

Apartheid

The state of emergency which had been declared in March 1960, at the height of the anti-pass campaign (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], pp. 363 ff.), had already been somewhat relaxed at the beginning of the period under review. The government officially ended it, and released the last of some 2,000 persons who had been detained without trial under emergency regulations, on August 31, 1960. The sentences imposed on a number of Africans for their participation in the anti-pass campaign were, however, upheld by the appeals court in October. In January 1961 an official commission investigating a major anti-pass demonstration at Sharpeville (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 363) reported that it was unable to reach a conclusion as to the responsibility for the killings there, while another commission, investigating the shootings at Langa, was highly critical of the police, although holding that they had been provoked. Both commissions were headed by judges.

Various African and Asian countries introduced official boycotts of South African goods, denied use of their harbors and airports to South African ships and planes, and took other measures to protest South African racial policies. Thus, Ghana refused entry to South African citizens unless they signed declarations repudiating apartheid. Some South Africans signed despite threats from their government that they would be liable to prosecution for disloyalty. (Actually, no prosecutions were instituted.)

The government's preparations for setting up an African substate in the Transkeian native reserve continued, but government-appointed chiefs were denounced by many Africans as puppets. Organized resistance was strong, especially in the Pondoland district, where an organization called the "Hill" had widespread support. A number of Africans were killed by police and hundreds arrested, but resistance continued.

For the first time, nonwhites in South Africa borrowed the sit-in technique from the United States to protest segregation. A few sit-ins were staged in Cape Town, a United States sailor participating in one of these. In some instances demonstrators succeeded in obtaining service in hitherto segregated restaurants. A few demonstrators were arrested.

Treason Trial

In March 1961 the mass treason trial, initiated by the government more than four years earlier (AJYB, 1958–61 [Vols. 59–62]) against a large group
of opponents of its racial policies, came to an end when the last 28 defendants were unanimously acquitted by a three-judge court in Pretoria. Charges against hundreds of other defendants had been dismissed by the court or dropped by the government. The court found that there was no evidence that the African National Congress was Communist-dominated or had ever plotted to overthrow the government by violence. Immediately thereafter, in a move widely interpreted as a declaration of its intention to continue to suppress nonwhite opposition, the government banned meetings of the (predominantly African) South African Trade Union Congress.

**South-West Africa Dispute**

The status of South-West Africa continued to be a source of controversy between the Union of South Africa and the UN. In November 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia brought suit before the World Court, charging that South African administration of South-West Africa violated the terms of its mandate. In December the South African delegation boycotted the UN debate on the question on the ground that it was before the court. By a vote of 78-0 the UN General Assembly called for an end to segregation in South-West Africa and voted to send an investigating committee to the scene. This committee was refused admission to South-West Africa by the South African authorities in February 1961, but took testimony from refugees from the area. In March the UN General Assembly again condemned the Union’s policies in South-West Africa by a vote of 74-0. (Other resolutions of the General Assembly of UN committees during the year condemned South Africa’s internal racial policies.) In the same month an election in South-West Africa, in which only the white inhabitants were allowed to vote, gave the Nationalist party 16 seats out of 18.

**Economic Repercussions**

South Africa’s racial problems had economic and demographic repercussions. The government reported that in the first six months of 1960 European (i.e., white) emigrants had exceeded immigrants by 1,535. Many of the emigrants were from the professions. Potential investors as well as immigrants were deterred by fears about the country’s future stability, and there was a substantial flight of domestic capital in the months after Sharpeville. South Africa’s reserves fell precipitously, and there was a sharp drop in security prices. The government reacted by imposing import and currency controls, and with the aid of substantial foreign loans (including one from the International Monetary Fund) was having some success in restoring its financial position at the end of the period under review. Nevertheless, the country’s economic expansion received a severe setback.

Maurice J. Goldbloom
South African Jewish Community*

SOUTH AFRICAN Jewry reaffirmed its allegiance to the state, when the country became a republic on May 31, 1961. The South African Jewish Board of Deputies congratulated Charles Robberts Swart, formerly governor general of the Union of South Africa, on his election as first president of the republic, declaring: “As loyal citizens of South Africa, the Jewish community will continue to play their part in the well-being and progress of the state.” Prayers for the republic were offered in synagogues throughout the country.

Defining the position of the Jewish community in the republic, Chief Rabbi Louis Isaac Rabinowitz told the second national conference of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations, which met in Johannesburg May 11–13, 1961:

The Jew has an undivided loyalty to the country of which he is a citizen, irrespective of whether it is a monarchy or a republic, and we will give the same loyalty to the Republic of South Africa outside the Commonwealth as we gave to the Union of South Africa within the Commonwealth.

The conference unanimously pledged loyalty to the Republic.

The Jewish community was represented at the state ceremony in Pretoria, which inaugurated the republic, by Chief Rabbi Rabinowitz, Orthodox, and Rabbi Michael Elton, Progressive (Reform). Uniformed Zionist youth contingents participated with Boy Scouts and their Afrikaner equivalents, the Voortrekkers, in the guard of honor which lined the route of the presidential procession.

JEWSH POPULATION

Figures for the Jewish community in the census of September 6, 1960, were not yet available at the time of writing. The 1951 census put the Jewish population at 108,496, out of a European (white) population of 2,588,933 and a total population (all races) of 12,437,277.

CIVIC AND POLITICAL STATUS

Jews remained full and equal citizens when South Africa became a republic. There were two Jews in the national senate and six in the house of assembly. Sixteen Jews were members of provincial councils, and 15 were town mayors. Five Jews were judges of the supreme court.

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 497.
Conscience Clause

A private member's bill, introduced into parliament on behalf of the University of the Orange Free State (Bloemfontein), sought to exempt that institution from the provisions of the so-called conscience clause in South African university legislation, forbidding any test of religious belief in appointments (AJYB, 1960 [Vol. 61], p. 339). The university argued that it had always been Protestant in character and that the conscience clause prevented its council from taking this into account in making appointments.

In February 1961 the South African Jewish Board of Deputies sent members of parliament a memorandum opposing the bill, on the ground that it would introduce religious discrimination in appointments. The memorandum was widely supported in the press and was cited when the bill was debated in parliament in April 1961. The Rev. B. H. M. Brown, president of the Christian Council of South Africa, representing 27 Protestant denominations and missions, repudiated the bill on behalf of the council.

In the parliamentary debate it was stressed that this was a private member's bill, having no connection with government policy, and would be left to a free vote of the house. The bill remained among the session's unfinished business, with the possibility that it might be dropped.

Antisemitism

Antisemitic agitation during the period under review was of an isolated character, but there were indications that undercover hate groups were attempting to increase their activities.

A batch of circulars was found in Johannesburg in February 1961, soliciting members for the Ku Klux Klan on an anti-Jewish, anti-Catholic, and anti-Negro basis. Police traced them to Raymond Rudman of Pietermaritzburg, a veteran peddler of anti-Jewish pamphlets who had ties with antisemites abroad (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 366). Rudman, who claimed to be the “green dragon” of the KKK in Natal, denied disseminating the circulars, which he said were for Klan members only. An attempted armed attack on a Durban solicitor, Roly Arenstein, was alleged to have been made by local Klan members.

Copies of a Hungarian-language paper, Cel, containing antisemitic libels, were found in Johannesburg in March 1961 and handed to the police. It was suspected that a Hungarian immigrant was importing them from Argentina for local dissemination.

On January 15, 1961, an explosion damaged the Great Synagogue of Johannesburg. It occurred in the middle of the night, during a severe electric storm, and no trace of explosives was found. Police experts differed in their findings, one of them blaming the lightning. Offers of a substantial reward by the insurance underwriters failed to produce any clues.

There were a few sporadic incidents of swastika daubings. Police who investigated the incidents believed them to be unrelated acts of hooliganism.
Eichmann Trial

The Eichmann trial received extensive press coverage. Some papers published analytical articles, there was considerable editorial comment, and there were letters in the correspondence columns. Editorials, reserved at first, shifted to shocked and sympathetic comment as the evidence unfolded. Some letters questioned Israel’s right to try Eichmann, while others supported it. Few attempted any defense of Eichmann.

Public reaction, particularly in church circles, was sympathetic to the Jews, but there were isolated exceptions. Johan Schoeman, a rich Transvaal farmer who had in previous years published defenses of Nazi war criminals, issued a pamphlet entitled Eichmann Is Not Guilty and sent Eichmann’s defense attorney, Robert Servatius, a cable offering £100* towards Eichmann’s defense. He received no reply.

COMMUNAL ORGANIZATION

Communal budgets were tighter, as a result of general economic conditions. Coordination to eliminate duplication of activities, assign priorities to major projects, and cut unnecessary expenditures were the subjects of a special session of the 22nd biennial congress of the Board of Deputies, held in Johannesburg in September 1960. Gustav Saron, general secretary of the board, urged consultation between communal bodies before new building projects were initiated.

The need for agreement on communal priorities was stressed in the reports of the Herbst and Kuper commissions on the financing of Jewish education (see below). The Herbst commission recommended a commission with powers to survey the whole communal structure and make recommendations for closer coordination and the assignment of communal priorities.

The Union of Jewish Women of Southern Africa, with 65 branches in the republic and in Rhodesia, was active in many communal undertakings and in interfaith work and adult education. Its adult-education division initiated new programs for study groups and made increasing use of modern audio-visual techniques.

The annual memorial meetings sponsored by the Board of Deputies for the European Jewish martyrs coincided with the beginning of the Eichmann trial and were well attended.

Youth Programs

The student program of the Board of Deputies ran into difficulties. No student adviser was found to succeed Leo W. Schwarz of the United States, who had been in charge during the preceding two years (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 368). In Johannesburg, which had the largest Jewish student body, student interest declined so much that it was decided to close the Hillel

* £1 = $2.80.
house and operate a more restricted program for the time being. In Cape Town, where no successor was found for Samuel Almog (an Israeli youth *shaliach* who had acted as local student adviser until June 1960), there was also some decrease of interest.

At Rhodes University in Grahamstown, the Board of Deputies was able to establish a Hillel house for Jewish students, of whom 150 were in residence at the university hostel, and this became the focus of successful Jewish student activity.

Through its youth department, the Board of Deputies steadily expanded its services to non-student Jewish youth in response to increasing requests from affiliated clubs and groups for programming and other assistance.

Other youth programs were operated by Zionist and religious organizations. The programs included holiday camps and seminars, which attracted increasing numbers.

**Fund Raising**

Fund raising again presented major problems during the period under review, as the economic recession of the previous year continued. The United Communal Fund again had to reduce allocations to the local organizations affiliated to it, and the Israeli United Appeal reported lower totals than in previous IUA campaigns. The problem of raising funds for Jewish education (see below) also became acute.

**Religion**

At the second national conference of the Orthodox Hebrew Congregations, held in Johannesburg in May 1961, difficulty was reported in filling 12 vacancies for ministers, some in large towns. Six ministers left South Africa during the year. New ministers were reluctant to come from overseas, and insufficient recruits were studying for the Jewish ministry in South Africa. The small rural centers were experiencing the greatest difficulties.

Louis Isaac Rabinowitz, for 16 years chief rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregation of Johannesburg and of the Federation of Synagogues of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, as well as head of the Johannesburg Beth Din and professor of Hebrew at Witwatersrand University, had served notice in March 1960 of his intention to settle in Israel in 1961. At the request of his congregation, he agreed to remain until Yom Kippur in 1961. While on leave in England and the United States early in 1961, he interviewed rabbis with a view to recommending a successor, and recommended Rabbi Nahum Rabinovitch of Charleston, S. C., who visited South Africa as the guest of the Federation of Synagogues in May 1961. Rabbi Hillel Medalie of Leeds, England, visited South Africa in August 1961. Other rabbis were also under consideration. At the time of writing no decision had been reached.

New youth congregations were formed and camps and seminars for religious youth, sponsored by the Federation of Synagogues, attracted increasing numbers.

In June 1961 a commission of the Federation of Synagogues recom-
mended measures to reduce the price of kosher meat and to extend Beth Din supervision of kosher butchers. The Johannesburg Kosher Butchers' Association replied in July 1961 with the report of an investigation by the Witwatersrand Retail Master Butchers Association in support of the prevailing price structure.

The reform movement, centering in the South African Union for Progressive Judaism, continued to grow. During the year a new temple was dedicated in Springs, Transvaal, and new Hebrew-school premises in Johannesburg.

Education

While Jewish education continued to expand, its financial difficulties reached crisis proportions.

The 12th national conference of the South African Board of Jewish Education, meeting in Johannesburg in October 1960, appointed a commission, under the chairmanship of Judge Simon Kuper, to investigate and recommend a course of action. A similar commission, under the chairmanship of Judge Joseph Herbstein, was already at work in Cape Town for the Cape Board of Jewish Education.

In the area served by the South African Board of Jewish Education there were 36 nursery schools, with 2,047 pupils; Johannesburg's United Hebrew Schools (Talmud Torahs), with 2,000 pupils; 50 Talmud Torahs outside Johannesburg, with 3,500 pupils; the King David Jewish day schools in Johannesburg (primary and secondary), with 1,683 pupils; the Bernard Patley junior school (Johannesburg), with 138 pupils; the Herber House Hostel (Johannesburg), with accommodations for 46 pupils; the Judah Leib Zlotnik Seminary (Johannesburg), for training Hebrew teachers; the Sharon day school in Durban, with 160 pupils; the Carmel day school in Pretoria, with 50 pupils, and the Carmel day school in Port Elizabeth, with 21 pupils.

The major institutions under the supervision of the Cape Board of Jewish Education were the Herzlia day school in Cape Town, with 800 pupils; the Weizmann school at Sea Point, with 300 pupils; the United Talmud Torahs, with 1,400 pupils, and several Hebrew nursery schools.

The Kuper commission published its report in April 1961. It recommended that the South African Board of Jewish Education's annual expenditure of £126,216 be reduced some £24,000 by a reorganization; that the United Communal Fund allocation of £2,400 per month and a supplementary Education Fund Drive conducted in Johannesburg by the Board of Education should continue, and that the Israeli United Appeal should be asked for a £500,000 loan to finance the Jewish day-school program throughout South Africa.

The Herbstein commission's report, published in May 1961, proposed that a commission examine communal bodies and budgets, to eliminate duplication and tighten expenditures; that priority be given to raising funds which would stabilize Hebrew education; that a moratorium be imposed on other communal spending, especially on all but essential new building projects;
that the United Communal Fund campaigns be intensified and an additional campaign introduced for the Herzlia day school in Cape Town, similar to the Education Drive in Johannesburg, and that the Israeli United Appeal not be asked to appropriate money for Jewish education.

The two reports were turned over to the South African Zionist Conference, meeting in Johannesburg in August–September 1961. That body decided that each community was to retain responsibility for financing education, including day schools, in its own area. The Zionist federation, however, was to help the Cape and South African boards of Jewish education meet administrative and teacher-training costs, as well as the cost of transporting teachers from Israel.

Jewish Agency treasurer Louis Pincus introduced the proviso that this arrangement be treated as a temporary expedient, to be reviewed after two years, and that money from the Israeli United Appeal used for Hebrew education be considered as a loan to be repaid when possible.

Progressive (Reform) Hebrew schools and the Yiddish schools run by the Yiddish Cultural Federation were not included in this arrangement, but continued to raise their own funds to supplement allocations from the United Communal Fund.

### Zionism and Relations with Israel

Cordial relations continued between the South African government and the government of Israel. Katriel Salmon, who had been Israeli minister to South Africa since November 1959, was transferred in March 1961 to a similar post in Bucharest and was succeeded by Simhah Pratt.

In July 1961 Israeli Premier David Ben-Gurion and Upper Volta President Maurice Yameogo, announcing a treaty of friendship between their two countries, jointly stated that the Africans, who formed the majority of South Africa's population, had a fundamental right to respect for their dignity. This caused some resentment in South Africa. *Die Transvaler*, a leading pro-government daily, in an editorial generally well-disposed to Israel, declared that the comment was unfair to a country which had demonstrated its friendship towards Israel in practical ways. It asked how Israel would feel if the South African government "gratuitously concerned itself with the Arab-refugee question" and invited South African Jewry to "do a little enlightenment work in Jerusalem."

For the second year in succession, the Israel Pavilion won a gold medal at the Rand Easter Show (South Africa's biggest trade fair) in Johannesburg in March 1961.

The biennial South African Zionist conference, meeting in Johannesburg in August–September 1961, was attended by 700 delegates and observers from all parts of the republic and Rhodesia. Over 3,000 South Africans were reported as settled in Israel. The Zionist Federation included the Women's Zionist Organization, with 17,000 members; Zionist Youth, 6,000, and Mac-cabi, 6,000. Jewish National Fund and Israeli United Appeals activities were also conducted as departments of the federation.
At the conference the Revisionists were readmitted to the federation, after being expelled in 1957 for conducting a separate fund campaign (AJYB, 1958 [Vol. 59], pp. 371-72). Their return followed an agreement on fund allocations between WZO and its affiliated parties, which obviated the need for separate campaigning. Revisionist Joseph Daleski was elected a vice chairman of the federation, and Edel Horwitz (nonparty) was reelected chairman.

In response to an address by Jewish Agency treasurer Louis Pincus, himself a former South African, it was resolved to launch a special campaign to help the Jewish Agency settle an anticipated increased number of immigrants. Substantial pledges towards this campaign were made by delegates.

**Social Services**

Prime Minister Verwoerd, congratulating the Cape Jewish Orphanage on its golden jubilee in July 1961, wrote: "It is well known that the Jewish community is outstanding in its attention to the needs of those from its ranks who need a helping hand. This feeling of mutual obligation between members of the same religion should not only be admired, but also encouraged."

The tightening economic situation imposed increasing demands on Jewish social services. At the annual general meeting of the Johannesburg Hevrah Kaddisha (the largest Jewish welfare organization) in September 1960, the chairman, Oscar Getz, disclosed that while the previous year had produced the largest income (£127,983) in the society's 70 years, this was counterbalanced by its highest expenditure (£153,676), as a result of increased loans and grants.

The Witwatersrand Hebrew Benevolent Association reported granting loans totaling £80,263 for the year, at its general meeting in December 1960. Other Jewish benevolent associations also reported increased calls for aid.

Employment-placement services run by the Board of Deputies and the South African ORT-OSE continued their activities. ORT-OSE also furnished vocational guidance and vocational-training grants and scholarships.

**Cultural Activities**

Cultural activity during the year again included the People's College and Jewish Book Month programs of the Board of Deputies, the adult-education program of the Union of Jewish Women, and the lecture and education programs conducted by the Yiddish Cultural Federation and Histadrut 'Ivrit. Cultural events included lecture tours by the Yiddish writer Mendel Mann and by Professor Sol Liptzin of New York.

Books by South African Jews published during the year included Hosea Concepts in Midrash and Talmud by Rabbi Shalom Coleman; The Challenge of Destiny (essays and addresses) by Rabbi Michael Elton; The Road to Sharpeville (political analysis) by Bernard Sachs; Crisis in Evolution (cultural analysis) by Leslie Simon, and Friday's Footprint and Other Stories by Nadine Gordimer.
Personalia

Israel Maisels, communal leader and former president of the Board of Deputies, was appointed a judge on the Southern Rhodesian bench in May 1961.

Losses suffered by South African Jewry during the year included Harry Lourie, veteran Johannesburg Zionist leader (September 1960); Hirsch Hillman, former Durban communal leader (October 1960); Alfred Markman, Port Elizabeth civic leader and ex-mayor (November 1960); David Dainow, veteran Johannesburg journalist and former editor of the Zionist Record (January 1961); Bernard Patley, veteran Johannesburg congregational leader (February 1961), and Samuel Hirschmann, leading Johannesburg Zionist (July 1961).

EDGAR BERNSTEIN