
North Africa

TUNISIA *

FROM mid-1958 to mid-1959, Tunisia continued to consolidate its independence. Between July and October 1958 French troops evacuated all Tunisian territory except Bizerte in accordance with an agreed schedule. The French air force gave up its base at El Aouina, four miles from Tunis, in October 1958, but continued to occupy the base of Sidi Hamed, near Bizerte. At the end of the period under review, negotiations between France and Tunisia on the subject of Bizerte had not yet begun.

The Bank of Algeria and Tunisia lost its former privilege of issuing currency, the right of issue being transferred to the new Central Bank of Tunisia, in November 1958.

The new Tunisian currency, the dinar, equal to a thousand French francs, was put into circulation with the establishment of the central bank. It was tied to the franc, but when France devalued the franc in November 1958, Tunisia decided not to follow suit, though remaining in the franc zone. In order to preserve its economic independence, the Tunisian government then undertook the "battle of the dinar." The authorization of the central bank was required for all transfers of capital to France, including payments for imports. Initial difficulties decreased subsequently. Negotiations between France and Tunisia on commercial, tariff, and monetary questions began in January 1959. They were suspended and then resumed, but no agreement had been reached at the end of the period under review. Since the Tunisian negotiators refused to yield on the question of not devaluing the dinar, agreement seemed likely only on commercial and tariff questions.

There were numerous frontier incidents during the year, but none as grave as the bombardment of Sakiët-Sidi-Youssef in February 1958 (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 257-58).

New Constitution

When the text of a new Tunisian constitution was approved and promulgated by the constituent assembly, on June 1, 1959, President Habib Bourguiba recalled that a previous constitution, that of 1857, had been adopted under pressure from foreign consuls, disturbed by the abuse of power to which Moslems and Jews were at that time subject, including a death sentence imposed on a Jewish coachman. The 1959 constitution proclaimed "a republican regime" as representing the "best guarantee of respect for human rights and . . . equality" (Article 8). It guaranteed the basic civil liberties and

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 359.

the rights of unionism and property (Articles 8 and 9). Article 10 guaranteed the right of every citizen "to circulate freely within the territory of the country, to leave it, and to fix his domicile, within the limits foreseen by the law," and Article 11 said that no citizen could be expatriated or forbidden to return to his country. Nevertheless, there were Jews who emigrated to Israel without giving up their Tunisian citizenship and who were not readmitted.

Article 1 of the constitution defined Tunisia as a "free, independent, sovereign state. Its religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its mode of government republican." Representatives of Jewish organizations who had discussed this clause with President Bourguiba while it was in draft form were assured that this did not mean that the Moslem religion was the state religion of Tunisia, but that the clause represented a simple statement of sociological fact. But the preamble to the constitution, going further, asserted the "will of the Tunisian people to remain faithful to the teachings of Islam, to the unity of Arab North Africa, to its membership in the Arab family . . ." (Paragraph 6). Article 37 required the religion of the president to be Islam.

The constitution provided for a strong executive in the president and a single-chamber national assembly.

At the end of December 1958, when President Bourguiba reorganized his cabinet, André Barouch, who had been the only Jewish member (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], p. 257) as secretary of state for public works and housing, was replaced. Barouch had wanted to leave for some time. Two months later he was named president of the administrative council of the republic and director general (representing the Tunisian state) of the Tunisian Navigation Company, then being formed.

Tunisia and the Arab League

A few days after Abdul Jabbar Jomard, at the time foreign minister of Iraq, visited King Mohammed V of Morocco and President Bourguiba, in September 1958, Morocco and Tunisia applied for admission to the Arab League. On October 1, 1958, they were unanimously accepted as members and on October 11 the council of the league met in Cairo. In the course of a speech the head of the Tunisian delegation, Habib al-Chatty, angered the UAR representatives—they walked out—by charging that the league was dominated by delegations from "some big countries." Chatty left Cairo on the following day, and on October 13 the council of the league, meeting behind closed doors, unanimously condemned the attitude of the Tunisian delegation. On October 16 Tunisia broke off relations with the UAR. Tunisian public opinion welcomed the opposition which Tunisia thus demonstrated to UAR President Gamal Abdul Nasser's attempt to assert hegemony over the Arab world.

Public Order

The plot of Salah ben Youssef (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 258-59) was before the high court during November and December 1958, 53 defendants being tried in person and five *in absentia*. The court condemned nine persons to death—four of them (including Salah ben Youssef and Salah Nadjar) *in absentia*—and 39 to hard labor or ordinary imprisonment of 15 to 20 years,

acquitting 10. In December President Bourguiba commuted two of the death sentences to hard labor for life.

The court also tried the cases of two former premiers, Salheddine Baccouche and Mohammed Salah Mzali, for "collaboration" with the French in 1952. In November 1958 it condemned Baccouche to ten years at hard labor and some of his ministers to five years each. One Ben Rais, who had taken refuge in France, was sentenced *in absentia* to death. The ministers were also condemned to national indignity and their properties were confiscated. In February 1959 the high court condemned former Premier Mzali to ten years' imprisonment, confiscation of his properties, and national indignity. Later, on various national holidays, the authorities amnestied some of the condemned men.

Former Premier Tahar ben Amar, prosecuted before the high court on a charge of acquiring property illegally, was fined 30 million francs in September 1958. In October, in the case of the crown jewels (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], p. 259), the court imposed on him penalties which included a fine of ten million francs.

An espionage network centered in the French embassy was discovered in February, involving French technicians in the postal service and certain functionaries of the French embassy. For a time the affair placed some strain on relations between Tunisia and France, but it ended when the prisoners were released in October 1959 in accordance with an agreement between the two governments for the exchange of persons under indictment and in prison.

Economic Situation

Tunisia, an essentially agricultural country, had an average yield of hard wheat, barley, wine, and olive oil.

The country continued to need foreign aid. In May 1959 the U. S. Development Loan Fund lent Tunisia \$6.25 million for a cellulose factory and agreed to lend \$2.4 million more for the Tunisian National Railway Company. In May the U. S. International Cooperation Administration gave Tunisia \$5 million, as the first installment of economic assistance for the year, to maintain the value of the dinar. The United States also gave Tunisia more than 30,000 tons of wheat. Total United States aid to Tunisia in the year, including technical assistance, came to about \$32 million.

In November and December 1958 President Bourguiba announced the government's intention of taking over, for a period of three or four years and in return for fair compensation, all agricultural land held by non-Tunisians. French and other foreign agricultural circles—Italian, Maltese, Swiss, etc.—were disturbed. The value of land in French hands to be recovered under the proposed program was estimated at 90 billion francs (about \$180 million).

Unemployment continued to be a major problem, despite the Tunisianizing of the civil service and various professions. Demographic pressure was very great, the annual population increase coming to about 2 per cent, or 60,000 persons. More than half of the population were under 20, and 45 per cent were under 16. Bad harvests in the south resulted in a shift of population to the north.

No strikes or labor disputes occurred during the year.

Jewish Community

The last general census took place in February 1956. The number of Jews in the year under review was probably between 55,000 and 60,000—out of a total of 3,815,000—of whom three-quarters lived in Tunis and its suburbs.

Emigration, which tended to diminish, was motivated principally by economic considerations. The unemployment affecting the entire Tunisian population did not spare the Jews. Departures for Israel, whose decline was noted last year (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], p. 261), did not come to more than 300 in the period under review. Departures for France could not be estimated exactly, but came to some thousands. UHS continued to furnish efficient and enlightened assistance.

RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT

President Bourguiba's government did not discriminate in any way, and the Tunisian population behaved properly towards Jews.

The Jewish population was affected by the dispossession of its old cemetery (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], p. 262), in the heart of Tunis, which was turned into a park. Jews were distressed because this was done too rapidly to permit proper exhumation and reburial, though it was possible to take out the remains of five venerated rabbis to whose tombs it had been customary to make pilgrimages. There was also a difference of opinion about ownership of the cemetery land, some ten acres in extent. The authorities considered it to be like Moslem cemeteries, which had always been owned by the municipality, but the Jewish plot was actually owned by the community. The question was to be adjudicated in 1960.

The subsidies of 20 million francs (about \$40,000) a year, which the community had formerly received, had not been paid for three years. In November 1958 the Tunis municipal council voted subsidies to several Jewish institutions: Nos Petits, 500,000 francs (\$1,000); OSE, 100,000 (\$200); Garderie Israélite, 200,000 (\$400) and the clothing service, 100,000 (\$200). At Passover the government distributed food to 500 families in Tunis and 200 in its suburbs of La Goulette and L'Ariana. In June 1959 the Jewish community of Sousse received a subsidy of 500 dinars (about \$1,000) from the government.

President Bourguiba sent Yom Kippur greetings to Chief Rabbi Mordecai Meiss Cohen of Tunisia and the Jewish population. Secretary of State for Information Mohammed Masmoudi took part in the ceremonies and festivities connected with the traditional Jewish pilgrimage to Djerba.

"BATTLE OF THE DINAR"

In a speech about the "battle of the dinar," President Bourguiba made special reference to the Jews, as follows:

It is impressive to see the unanimity in all circles, whether they be merchants, producers, farmers, exporters, or importers, Moslems or Jews. I do not doubt that in this regard our Jewish brothers will be sensitive to the imperatives of the hour and will understand that this is the occasion for them to demonstrate their loyalty and attachment to this country that considers them as its children.

This fundamental trait of the regime marks a revolution against the outdated ideas of the past. What I desire and what the country expects of its Jewish sons is that they shall engage in this battle with as much ardor and devotion as all their fellow-citizens, by putting their great resources into action. . . . All reasons—subjective and objective, moral and material—command them not to disappoint us and to mobilize all the means at their disposal. . . .

This singling out troubled the Jews. On February 11, when President Bourguiba received a delegation of representatives of economic organizations, Albert Bessis, a member of the constituent assembly and a former minister (from September 1955 to April 1956), speaking for Tunisian Jewry, thanked President Bourguiba for inviting the Jews to participate in the "battle of the dinar" on the same basis as other sections of the population and emphasized that the Jews would give the president their complete support, since they were citizens without reservation and sought the fusion of all elements of the population.

POLITICAL AND CIVIC STATUS

The Jews of Tunisia continued to enjoy the same rights as their Moslem compatriots. They voted and were eligible for election to all local and national legislative bodies, but as non-Moslems they were ineligible for the presidency. As indicated last year (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], p. 260), the Jews of Tunisia were no longer subject to the Jewish law of personal status, but to the Tunisian code, which was essentially inspired by Moslem law.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

As noted last year (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], p. 261), a law of July 11, 1958, dissolved the Jewish community council of Tunis and the welfare committees of the interior and replaced them with interim administrative committees. The law provided for religious associations with more limited functions than the community councils, whose statutes were to be drawn up by the interim administrative committees. It was not expected at the time that the interim committees would exist for more than a few months, but they were still functioning at the end of the period under review. Although the interim committee of Tunis submitted the proposed statutes for the new religious association to the government in February 1959, they had not yet been discussed by the authorities at the end of June. The interim administrative committee of Tunis continued to carry on the activities of the community council which it replaced, particularly welfare and cultural activities, although there were doubts that the new religious associations yet to be named would be able to do so. The community faced serious financial difficulties because of the government's failure to pay the subsidy, its own inadequate resources, and its heavy expenses. JDC gave it important help.

RELIGION

As in the past, Jewish religious life continued without difficulties. *Shehitah* was provided for in the municipal slaughter houses, and kosher food was served in restaurants under the control of the chief rabbinate. *Matzot*

were baked, the Sabbath and holidays were observed, worship took place both in private and publicly in the synagogues, there were pilgrimages to the tombs of venerated rabbis, and the dead were buried in accordance with the Jewish rite. The Hevrat Talmud, a well-known old yeshivah subsidized by the community of Tunis, continued to function. There was talk of reorganizing it, but no decision was reached.

EDUCATION

All Jewish children received some education. Instruction was carried on in schools under the jurisdiction of the secretariat of national education or of the French cultural mission. By a convention signed between France and Tunisia in April 1959, the French government agreed to furnish Tunisia with necessary educational personnel, to pay between 15 and 45 per cent of the teachers' salaries, and to bar political activity. The convention was to last until September 1960, while a new convention was being negotiated.

Arabic was taught in all schools, and especially in those under the jurisdiction of the secretariat of national education, but French remained the basic language from the third year on. The schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, under the jurisdiction of the secretariat of national education, taught Arabic, but also continued to teach Hebrew. The basic teaching personnel was paid by the Tunisian government, but the Alliance paid the Hebrew teachers, ten ORT instructors, kindergarten personnel, and the housekeeping staff. It also paid for the upkeep of the buildings, which was costly because of their age.

ORT continued to give technical training, valued by Jews and non-Jews alike. In the 1958-59 school year the number of students at the school in L'Ariana rose to 450, of whom 85 per cent were Jewish. The apprenticeship school for adults expanded significantly, serving 900 students, while the girls' school had 75. In the secretariat of national education's examinations for certificates of aptitude, 61 per cent of the candidates from the ORT school at L'Ariana passed, as against 18 per cent of those from other schools; in the French cultural mission's examinations, the respective percentages were 83 and 43.

The interim administrative committee of the Tunis Jewish community supervised the instruction in the schools which came under its authority, i.e., the Or Torah, the Hebrew classes in the schools of the Alliance, and the schools of the Rue Glatigny, La Goulette, and L'Ariana. It decided on certain changes in the status of the teaching personnel, in the curriculum, especially the teaching of modern Hebrew, and in supervision. Carrying out those changes caused certain difficulties with the chief rabbi, which were later smoothed out.

Evening courses in modern Hebrew continued, but the number of students dropped. In the interior, and particularly in certain towns in the south, JDC gave substantial financial and technical assistance.

SOCIAL WELFARE

The interim administrative committee continued to make weekly, monthly, and emergency relief payments. It distributed *matzot*, oil, and rice, provided wine for holidays, and gave scholarships and prizes to students. It also sub-

sidized such organizations as Nos Petits, la Garderie, l'Oeuvre de l'Habillement, l'Oeuvre des Couvertures, l'Oeuvre de la Protection de la Jeune Fille Juive, and l'Oeuvre de Bar Tefillin.

Nos Petits, the most important of these organizations, functioned in Tunis in the Alliance schools and in Or Torah, in the suburban towns of La Goulette and L'Ariana, where there were many Jews, and in certain towns of the interior. It furnished 5,000 poor children, studying on scholarships, with meals and winter clothes, and it gave light clothes to the 1,500 children whom it cared for in vacation camps for three weeks in the summer. This organization received considerable help from JDC.

United States surplus agricultural commodities received through JDC decreased during the year. Supplies of butter, cheese, cottonseed oil, beans, and rice ceased, necessitating a larger cash contribution from JDC.

In January 1959 the ministry of finance and economy wrote JDC in Tunis that it would be permitted to import welfare supplies and materials into the country, but only if these were distributed to all Tunisians without regard to religion. Though this concept had been advanced on various occasions by Tunisian authorities, including President Bourguiba himself, as early as February 1957, it later developed that the ministry's letter did not properly state the position of the government, and supplies continued to come in as before.

OSE worked through dispensaries in Tunis and certain towns of the interior, serving some Moslems as well as Jews. Its principal support came from the World OSE Union.

The Caisse de Relèvement Israélite Economique, established by JDC, made 380 loans totaling more than 25 million francs (\$50,000). It also guaranteed more than 3 million francs (\$6,000) of artisans' commercial paper as part of its fight against usury.

The community house (AJYB, 1957 [Vol. 58], pp. 349-50) was not yet finished because the interim committee did not have enough money, but the completed parts were in use, and the chief rabbinate was able to move in.

ZIONISM AND RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

After Tunisia became independent, in 1957, Zionism was officially branded as a threat to the state, and the government declared Zionists subject to expulsion (*Jewish Chronicle*, London, July 25, 1958).

CULTURAL ACTIVITY

Ha-Kol and the Compagnons des Arts were unable to stage any performances, but their members conducted the weekly half-hour program "Images et Pensées Juives" (Jewish Thought and Image) on the French program of the Tunisian radio. In general, cultural activity was on a much-reduced scale.

MOROCCO *

Politics and Economic Conditions

MOROCCAN political and economic life faced a series of crises during mid-1958 to mid-1959, but internal order and security were strengthened. There was no more open tribal unrest, such as had led to fighting with the royal army the year before, and there were only occasional incidents between members of rival parties or trade unions. In November 1958 the cabinet headed by Ahmed Balafrej of Istiqlal—then virtually the only important party in Morocco—fell after an uneventful six months in office, characterized largely by internal factional squabbling. The reason for his resignation was the growing dissatisfaction, primarily economic, of Istiqlal's left wing. This came to a focus when Minister of Economic Affairs Abderrahim Bouabid quit the cabinet. King Mohammed V, who appointed all ministers and ruled by decree, in the absence of any representative body, chose Abdallah Ibrahim, favored by the Istiqlal left wing, as premier after a month of consultation, and Bouabid returned as economic minister.

In May 1959 the badly riven Istiqlal split in two. The more bourgeois, conservative, and traditional elements headed by Allal al-Fassi kept control of the party's name and part of its machinery. They drew much of their strength from the *bled*, or back country. The more radical wing, headed by Mehdi Ben-Barka and Mohammed al-Basri, formed the New Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). Its support came primarily from the trade unions representing the growing Moroccan urban working class; it also had the support of the premier, and quickly became the outstanding political force in the nation. There was bitter feeling between the two parties, which denounced each other in the press and at party meetings and sometimes clashed physically. Other active political groups included the remnants of the Party of Democratic Independence, much of whose strength had been absorbed by UNFP, and the Popular movement headed by Abd al-Khatib, with former premier Si Bekkai as its honorary president. The Communist party—small but important because of its influence on certain Moroccan intellectuals—was first banned but later won from the country's high court the right to exist as a party. The strength of the different political groups was due to be tested in the communal elections of May 1960, the first elections of any kind in the country.

Morocco's already serious economic difficulties were further complicated in December 1959 when the Ibrahim government refused to follow the French devaluation of the franc, although remaining part of the franc zone. Moroccan money, formerly at a par with the French, now became about 18 per cent more expensive to purchase. Suddenly Moroccan products, including the orange crop so important to the nation's trade balance, found themselves priced out of the French market, and there was considerable confusion. Business, which had been picking up from the near-stagnation point of 1957,

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 359.

slumped once more. This was aggravated by a flow of capital out of Morocco. The governmental policies considered responsible were dropped in October 1959, as one of the conditions for a loan of \$25 million from the World Bank, and the Moroccan franc was set at 506 to the dollar. At the same time the Moroccan government announced an ambitious five-year development plan, tightened economic controls, and called for the registration of all assets owned outside of Morocco by Moroccan nationals. Important elements such as the Moroccan Trade Union (UMT)—which was probably the best-organized institution in the country—advocated schemes calling for greater economic self-sufficiency. Hundreds of thousands were unemployed and many more underemployed, to the point where in April 1959 the government forbade the use of road-building machinery, so as to create more jobs for laborers.

The Ibrahim government strengthened Morocco's ties with the Arab League, which the country had joined in 1958. It sought through pan-Arabism to cement the population around its general policies and programs. It also tended increasingly towards neutralism between East and West. This represented partly a continued reaction against colonialism, with which the West was associated in the popular mind, and partly a growing interest of Moroccan leaders in the example of countries like China and Yugoslavia, believed to have pulled themselves up by their bootstraps. It also came from the conviction that such aid as was coming from the United States would continue anyway, because of the desire to keep Morocco out of the Communist orbit. Morocco demanded that the United States give up its airbases, even though Moroccan leaders recognized the major economic importance of the \$20 million these brought into the country annually. During a visit by Premier Ibrahim to Washington in October 1959, the United States announced that it would evacuate the bases. In the same month the government canceled Tangier's special status as a free port.

Effects on the Jewish Community

Many of the Moroccan government's moves, in both the political and economic spheres, had a pronounced effect on the country's 200,000 Jews—about 2 per cent of a total population of 10,000,000—though they were not adopted with the Jews in mind. The change in atmosphere as a result of the increased emphasis on pan-Arabism and the government's closer ties with the Arab League caused increasing concern to Jews in Morocco.

RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

The leading Moroccan political parties, in their appeals for popular support, manifested their hatred of Israel and Zionism. Morocco's leading Arab-language newspaper, *al-'Alam*, unofficial organ of UNFP, asserted on May 30:

We consider that the Jews of Morocco are citizens with the same rights and duties as Moroccan citizens, and we say so. This has earned us severe reproaches and unfriendly press campaigns from our Arab brethren. . . . But it appears that [Jews] do not see the advantages of our conduct; that, on the contrary, they exploit every occasion to send the goods they have

acquired in our country to Israel and to the Zionist criminal groups who have chased a million Arabs from their homes. . . . If they do not wish to adopt the Arab mentality, it is our duty to reconsider [our attitude].

The next day, asking for stronger action against "the Zionist elements scattered among Moroccan Jewry," the paper accused Jews of bribing government employees to get passports, in order to be able to emigrate. "Everybody knows that the Jews were, and have not stopped being, people who adore money. They collect the goods with which to arrive at their goals, the destruction of the country they have decided to destroy. The history of Morocco is full of such examples. . . ."

The newspaper of the al-Fassi party, *Istiqlal*, made the false charge that a group of Moroccan Jews sent to France by the government for postal training had all promptly taken off for Israel. In August 1959 a Moroccan court sentenced a Jew in Meknès, Solomon Ben-Amram, to a year in prison for possessing a five-year-old Keren Kayyemet calendar, or in some accounts, old receipts. This aroused considerable fear in the Jewish community, even though Ben-Amram was released after 48 hours in prison and given a suspended sentence. Tales flew about that Jews in various localities had been advised not to wear blue and white skullcaps or the Star of David, considered as Zionist insignia. These reports could not be confirmed, but they were symptomatic. Tension was particularly high in September 1959, during an Arab League meeting in Casablanca, but this passed without incident.

The Ibrahim government cut all postal and cable communication with Israel on September 26, 1959. This worked particular hardship on Moroccan Jewry, since in the previous 15 years well over 100,000 Jews from Morocco had emigrated to Israel, and many families had members in both countries. At the time communication was cut, about 20,000 letters a month were flowing between the two lands. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld unsuccessfully urged the Moroccan authorities, on humanitarian grounds, to make some arrangements by which mail could move indirectly between the two lands.

Thus the Moroccan public and government increasingly considered any contact with Israel or sympathy for it as inimical to the Moroccan state. This put Jews in a most difficult position because, apart from any other considerations, family ties and the traditional religious attachment to Israel were very strong in this community. The Moroccan press made much of the Wadi Salib incidents (riots in a Haifa slum by North African Jews against what they considered to be discrimination against them) in Israel in the summer of 1959, as proof of the thesis, popular in Morocco, that Israel wanted Moroccan Jews only as a cheap labor force and was mistreating them. King Mohammed V told a group of three Moroccan businessmen to whom he gave audience in Geneva in July 1959 that he could not permit his Jewish sons to go to a land where they were so badly treated.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

Jews traditionally occupied an important role in Moroccan trade and commerce. Many members of the Jewish middle class in Morocco, already hard

hit by the economic difficulties of recent years, were again adversely affected when business slumped after Morocco refused to devalue her franc. They also feared that the government might take over various economic activities, as advocated by those asking for greater Moroccan economic self-sufficiency. The Jewish merchant class in Tangier was particularly hard hit when that city lost its free-port status and it became clear that much of its business would go elsewhere. Tangier's banking business, in which there were many Jews, had profited greatly from that city's free market in currency. It now became subject to new Moroccan regulations, to its detriment. Among the middle classes, consequently, there was an increasing desire to leave for France, Spain, and other western lands, but this was not always possible.

While unemployment plagued the poorer elements of the Jewish population, as it did the Moslem, the Jews were in a better position because Jewish welfare aid was much better than that available to Moslems. Furthermore, up to late 1958, as the French continued to leave Morocco, Jews increasingly found clerical and accounting positions in private industry and in various government administrations, thanks to their greater literacy. By the middle of 1959, however, Jews felt that they were being discriminated against in applying for government jobs, and reports circulated that various ministries had been instructed not to give jobs to Jews unless there were no other qualified applicants. Jews also felt that they were being discriminated against in job placement, though the facts here were difficult to determine. Under a system instituted early in 1959, jobs were to be filled through the government placement office. That a Jew should find dozens of Moslems before him on any waiting list was to be expected, given the proportion of Jews to Moslems in the country, but there was also a feeling that Jews were being put toward the bottom of the list. Employers often tended to favor Jewish applicants because of their better education and training. Even when they demanded particular Jewish applicants, however, they would sometimes be sent Moslems. Hence the Jews of all classes felt themselves under increasing economic pressure.

Emigration

For the public record Moroccan officials maintained that there was no ban on emigration, and that Jewish demands for passports were treated without discrimination. But government offices refused to grant any passports to persons who, it was thought, might be going on to Israel. Often, instead of outright refusal, passport requests were simply not answered. The Council of Jewish Communities presented to the ministry of the interior the names of over a thousand persons who had been refused or had not received any answer to passport requests; this represented only those cases which had been brought to the council's attention. Jewish businessmen seeking to go abroad on business and would-be tourists who had no intention of emigrating found themselves undergoing thorough investigation and questioning, or met with delays and were occasionally required, in effect, to leave hostages in Morocco.

At the same time, because of the worsening situation for Jews in Morocco, there was a greater desire for emigration. In these circumstances it was not

unnatural that there should be illegal movement. It was no secret to anyone in the country that would-be emigrants continued to seek means to leave, and that the police were active in trying to discover and close the various exit routes. Incidents arose throughout the year. Thus in August 1958 a group of some 125 Jews were arrested in the former Spanish zone. The women and children were released after a few weeks; ten men were kept in a Tangier jail until February 1959, and another 12 were released in subsequent months. In March 1959, 26 Jews were arrested in the little town of Nador, near Oujda, on the Moroccan-Algerian border. Two men suspected by the police of organizing emigration were beaten up; the others were jailed, and then released on bail after intercession by the council of communities. In the summer of 1959 a busload of Jews was picked up by police on a beach near Tetuán. Since some of them came from the Extourist hotel in Tangier, the owner, Mrs. Esther Levy, was arrested and held incommunicado for three weeks, her husband jailed a few days, and her manager imprisoned. In Tangier, at the beginning of 1959 there remained 800 Jews of a group of 1,400 who had gone there in 1957 to emigrate, but who had been stopped by the police. They lived in three small hotels and a nearby garage in conditions reminiscent of the worst postwar displaced persons' camps, and were fed by the local Jewish community with the aid of JDC. The Moroccan government ignored repeated requests by overseas Jewish organizations that these people, no longer rooted in Morocco, be permitted to leave. Their number gradually diminished as they drifted to other communities, despairing of moving from Tangier.

In October there was a trial in Tangier of almost 40 of the Jews arrested in the various incidents described above. Since there were no Moroccan laws against emigration, the charge against them was action inimical to the interests of the state. Two persons were sentenced to a year in prison each and heavy fines, others got terms up to six months, and some sentences were suspended. The prosecutor announced that he would appeal because the sentences were too light; the defense also appealed, on the ground that the defendants had committed no crime.

In the fall of 1959 the Moroccan police set up a special section to deal with emigration. One result was an increase in unauthorized house searches and in detention of Jews on suspicion of desire to emigrate. After intervention by local Jewish community leadership, Governor Si Bargash of Casablanca personally toured that city's police stations and released about 80 Jews.

Suspicious of all emigration, the Moroccan authorities refused in July 1959 to give permission to UHS to operate in Casablanca. A few weeks later they ordered the closing of the other UHS office in Tangier. Working discreetly, so as not to offend Moroccan sensibilities on the subject, UHS had been helping about 400 persons a year move to Canada, Brazil, and other countries.

Community Organization

Jewish institutional life in Morocco continued much as before; in some instances there was even an expansion of activities. However, because of a

requirement that all institutions in the country submit their charters for review, many Jewish bodies underwent a period of considerable tension. Some disappeared, and there was considerable fear for the future of others.

Besides refusing to recognize the charter of UHS, as noted above, the Moroccan government refused the Moroccan section of WJC and some local Jewish institutions in Casablanca and Tangier permission to operate. In some instances, as with the Bengio-Murdoch home for Jewish children at Casablanca, approval of the charter was contingent on a change in the leadership of the institution; in others, on some modification of the charter. At the time of writing, JDC had been notified that its request for charter registration had been received, but not whether it had been accepted; the charters of ORT and OSE had been approved. The Alliance Israélite Universelle continued to receive a substantial subsidy from the Moroccan government, but toward the end of 1959 there were rumors that the authorities intended to take over its educational network.

In the city of Tangier the charter of the local OSE was questioned on the grounds that the organization received outside aid. This pointed up a serious potential threat. Under Article 6 of the Moroccan *dahir* of November 1958 regularizing the right of association, "every regularly declared association can . . . possess and administer, in addition to public subventions: fees paid by its members or income by virtue of which such fees have been reduced: the latter cannot be greater than 24,000 francs. . . ." If this were interpreted by Moroccan authorities to mean that no more aid than 24,000 francs could come into the country for each of the various Jewish institutions, most of them would have to close down, being unable to exist on local contributions. Similarly, the various Jewish community councils would be forced to curtail their activities seriously. The Tangier OSE board told the local authorities that without outside aid they would not be able to function. The matter was referred to the government at Rabat, with Tangier OSE continuing to operate in the meantime.

On various occasions JDC met with difficulties in importing welfare supplies. Early in the summer of 1959 the Moroccan government ordered that all imports be cleared before arrival at Moroccan ports; it was several months before a JDC shipment, on the high seas when this regulation was adopted, was permitted entry. In August the government declared that all but certain kinds of welfare supplies would be admitted automatically. In practice, however, Moroccan officials were often loath to take the responsibility of admitting supplies and some effort was usually required to get permission to bring them in.

JEWISH COMMUNITY COUNCILS

The situation of the Jewish community councils depended on local leadership. In Casablanca, the largest Jewish community, with some 75,000 Jews, the council—headed by Meyer Obadia—was active and vigorous. In the fall of 1959 it opened a new kindergarten for about 400 children. It succeeded in almost doubling its funds by increasing taxes on kosher meat and wine, raising cemetery fees, and getting local contributions, and could thus raise some of its grants to its associated organizations. In some cities the councils

had ceased to operate effectively. In others the situation remained static. Government aid to the councils continued to go through the Council of Jewish Communities, with headquarters in Rabat.

This body, in eclipse since Morocco became independent, showed some signs of increased vitality during the year. In March the council elected David Amar of Kenitra (Port Lyautey) as its secretary general. In 1959 it intervened more actively with the authorities on matters of Jewish concern than previously. The leaders of the council and of the Casablanca community, however, did not see eye to eye. Hence the council continued to be without the active support of its largest member. The government took no action during the year to give the council the new charter, requested by Moroccan Jewry for several years, to define its functions and powers in independent Morocco.

SOCIAL WELFARE

Because of the serious economic problems, JDC had to increase its expenditure and expand its program. According to JDC, some 61,000 persons—mainly children—were receiving assistance, largely through feeding programs. Medical care was provided for 8,300 patients in 26 clinics, chiefly through OSE. A total of 5,382 children attended summer camps in 1959, and maternity and health stations served 2,000 pregnant mothers and 2,200 infants. JDC distributed almost 5 million pounds of United States Department of Agriculture surplus food, valued at \$367,000.

Much of the welfare work was done through Jewish educational institutions. These included the Alliance Israélite Universelle schools, with more than 28,000 pupils learning Arabic, Hebrew, and French. The more Orthodox Lubavitcher and Otzar ha-Torah systems taught about 11,000 boys and girls, and 13,000 more children received some religious or cultural education in other, local institutions. ORT gave vocational training to just under 4,000 boys and girls, sponsored social-work training through an apprentice program, and conducted some courses for adults. The Department of Education of Jewish Youth had seven centers, including a new one opened in Rabat early in 1959, with well over a thousand members.

Demographic factors complicated the task of Jewish welfare and educational institutions. The Jewish birth rate, estimated at about 40 per thousand, was one of the highest in the world. Infant mortality was declining, and it seemed certain that natural population increase more than made up for any Jewish emigration. Jewish institutions were, therefore, hard-pressed in their efforts to assure some schooling for all children.

ALGERIA *

Political Developments

ON June 28, 1958, a month after becoming premier as a result of the events of May 13 (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], p. 273) that led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic, General Charles de Gaulle declared: "France desires to settle the conditions of Algeria's future together with the Algerians themselves. . . . The Algerians will be able to express themselves in the coming referendum and then in elections, all together in a single college in which the vote of each shall count as much as that of every other." Thus he defined the bases of the policy he intended to pursue in regard to Algeria. Decrees were then promulgated extending the principle of the single electoral college to all communities and giving the vote to Moslem women. The establishment of the single electoral college was a basic reform, against which the European extremists and their press had repeatedly fought in the past.

In the referendum on the new constitution of the Fifth Republic, held from September 26 through September 28, the affirmative votes in Algeria were 96.5 per cent of the total. On October 2 de Gaulle declared at Orléansville: "France is bound up with Algeria. Algeria is bound up with France. It is decided: they have a common destiny." The next day, in Constantine, he announced a five-year plan for the development of Algeria: "A profound transformation must be accomplished in this land, so courageous, so vital, but also so difficult and so pain-wracked. . . . All Algeria must have its part in that welfare and dignity which modern civilization can and should offer to men." He announced practical measures for the realization of these proposals, and appealed to the rebels to "cease these absurd struggles." At a press conference on October 24 de Gaulle, offering the guerrilla fighters a "peace of the brave," described it as an end to hostilities in which "those who have opened fire shall cease fire, and . . . shall return without humiliation to their families and their work." The leaders of the rebellion, who had on September 19 announced in Cairo the formation of a provisional government of an Algerian republic, did not see fit to respond to this appeal, basing their decision on the aspect of unconditional surrender which seemed to them implicit in it.

The government nevertheless went ahead with its program for the social advancement of the Moslems of Algeria. Increased opportunity was offered French Moslems to enter the civil service, not only in Algeria but in all of metropolitan France. In particular, ten per cent of the places in competitive examinations for the civil service and the state professional schools were to be reserved for five years to Frenchmen of Koranic status, and the age limit for them was to be raised five years.

On November 26 the legislative elections took place. Of 67 deputies elected from Algeria to the National Assembly, 46 were Moslems and 21 Europeans, the latter including some integrationists, who wanted Algeria to be an

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 359.

integral and indistinguishable part of France. Candidates of the liberal left did not participate in the elections. Two Jews were candidates, one in Algiers and one in Oran, but neither was elected.

On December 19 Paul Delouvrier took office as delegate general of the French government in Algeria. On December 21 de Gaulle was elected president of the republic. When he assumed office, on January 8, 1959, he declared: "A choice place in the [French] Community is in store for the Algeria of tomorrow, pacified and transformed, developing its own personality in close association with France."

Desiring to establish a new climate, he shortly thereafter decreed measures of amnesty and clemency for many Algerians who had been interned or condemned to death. Europeans in Algeria resentfully interpreted these measures as magnanimity towards terrorists who had caused the death of innocent civilians, and on the walls of Algiers could be read the slogan "de Gaulle equals Mendès" (former French Premier Pierre Mendès-France, a Jew, who had held office in 1954-55). The linking was significant enough, in view of the fact that Mendès was the *bête noire* of the European extremists, many of them antisemitic.

A part of the population was already disappointed at not having heard de Gaulle pronounce the word "integration," which to its partisans meant the territorial unity of Algeria, the Sahara, continental France, and the island of Corsica. The chief popular slogan for integration was "The Mediterranean passes through France as the Seine passes through Paris." This concept of integration excluded federalism, but did not exclude the recognition of local particularisms.

Federalism, however, was the basis of the constitution of the French Community. Its partisans declared that federalism was not secession and that Algeria would be an integral territory of a French republic transformed into a federal state. This thesis was defended by a number of senators in the senate debate on Algeria on June 25 and 26, 1959. Their adversaries, arguing from the experience of the recent past (the challenging of the Franco-Tunisian conventions almost as soon as they were signed in June 1955, and, in Morocco's case, the unreality of the slogans about independence with interdependence), maintained that its application would inevitably lead, more or less quickly, to complete independence for Algeria.

Shortly before the anniversary of the events of May 13, 1958, President de Gaulle, asked about his refusal to pronounce the word "integration," told deputy Pierre Laffont, publisher of the newspaper *L'Echo d'Oran*, that he "had not pronounced it because they wished to impose it on him" and that "those who were today crying loudest for integration were the same ones who had been against it" (i.e., those clamoring for integration were formerly against giving the Algerian Moslems equal rights with Frenchmen). On the same occasion he went on to declare that "l'Algérie de papa" was dead, a statement which stirred up the waters again.

On the eve of the municipal elections of April 1959 there was a new anti-Gaulle campaign among some of the European extremists in Algiers, which was opposed by a number of the local organizations of the French Algeria movement and by trade-union groups. Elections took place in 1,224

Algerian communities. Especially in Algiers there were a considerable number of Jewish candidates. One Jew was elected to the new city council of Algiers, and others were elected elsewhere. For the first time a Moslem, Mohammed Bouharaoua, was elected president of the municipal council of Algiers. In receiving Israel's consul general in Paris, when he passed through Algiers, Bouharaoua affirmed his sympathy for Judaism and Israel. Similarly, a number of the deputies elected from Algeria, including two Moslems, belonged to the France-Israel friendship group.

In May elections took place for 32 senators from Algeria. There were no Jewish candidates. Of the 22 Moslems and 10 Europeans elected, most were conservatives. A number of outgoing senators were reelected. Both extreme rightists and liberals were in general defeated.

On June 10 the government proposed a reform of the Moslem system of justice by divesting the *cadis* (religious judges) of their judicial powers, which seemed likely to mean the substitution of civil law for Koranic law. These proposals brought strong protests from the *cadis* as well as from the National Liberation Front (FLN) and various Arab countries.

In July 1959 the policy of the French government appeared to be to continue the war, with a view to imposing a solution on the military level by the application of the Challe plan, named after the general in command in Algeria. On the diplomatic level it brought pressure on various governments in order to isolate the rebel government, recognized by 15 states. Besides the ten countries of the Arab League—Morocco, Tunisia, UAR, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, Jordan, the Sudan, and Lebanon—these were Indonesia, Communist China, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia, all countries with which France had little or no diplomatic contact.

Economic Development

Parallel to this political course of action, the government worked out the details of the program for the economic development of Algeria announced by de Gaulle in Constantine in October. In March 1959 a government interdepartmental committee decided in principle to construct a steel plant at Bône, a major city on the east coast of Algeria. The same committee made plans for the distribution, within two years, of gas from Hassi-R'Mel in the Sahara, 270 miles from the coast, by pipeline to the Algiers and Oran areas. Two trillion francs (about \$4 billion) in investments were planned for the five years of the Constantine plan, half to be divided almost equally among housing, communications, education, and administrative expenses, and the other half to go to agricultural and industrial development. Financial assistance was given to industrial enterprises established or expanded in Algeria. Major oil wells were discovered in the Sahara in recent years, and a production of 30 million tons was expected in a few years.

In agriculture, which supported six million of Algeria's ten-million population, a number of steps were taken to improve the standard of living by modernization of methods, notably the creation of pilot projects, improvement of new areas, and training technicians to work on rural development.

In education, according to the official statistics the number of children in school had risen from 546,340 in October 1957 to 725,491 in May 1959. (There is some question whether this rise did not seem more dramatic than it really was, because of an FLN boycott of the schools in 1957.) In primary schools there were 143,000 children of European and 517,000 of Moslem descent, in the secondary schools 33,314 Europeans and 8,670 Moslems, in vocational schools 8,505 Europeans and 9,548 Moslems, and in higher education 4,924 Europeans and 530 Moslems.

Jewish Population

Native to the country, their settlement having antedated the Arab conquest of North Africa by several centuries, the Jews of Algeria were assimilated to the European population as a result of the Crémieux Decree of 1870, which conferred French nationality on them en masse, except a few thousand in the southern region, then not yet French. Their origins were diverse: some were descended from Jews who came from Palestine centuries before the Christian era, others from Berbers converted to Judaism after the Roman era, and still others from Jews who came from Spain in the exoduses of 1391 and 1492. It was difficult to determine their precise number, in the absence of official statistics on religion. It was generally thought that there were 135,000 to 140,000 Jews in a total population estimated in January 1959 at about ten million (8,850,000 Moslems and 1,025,000 Europeans).

In the main, the Jewish population was concentrated in the coastal areas and their immediate hinterland. The events in Algeria after 1954 and the climate of insecurity which they produced often resulted in the disintegration of the small Jewish communities of the interior, whose inhabitants left for the large cities or for France. Some small communities in the southern part of the Constantine region of East Algeria, such as that of M'Sila, completely disappeared as a consequence of repeated terrorist attacks in the spring of 1956, which resulted in the murder of several Jews.

A Moslem boycott of Jews, particularly in various small localities and in Constantine in 1956-57, which had followed serious incidents between Jews and Moslems in May 1956, practically disappeared later. One of its causes undoubtedly had been a desire to suppress competition by all means, even assassination. This could explain a series of attacks in the summer of 1957 on Jewish merchants in a Moslem-Jewish business district of Bône.

After the situation improved, not only did Jews cease to leave, but also a number of Jews returned from France. This was due in large part to the increased security in the major centers, to Algeria's economic prosperity, and to the difficulties of adaptation in metropolitan France, and especially of finding housing and jobs. Nevertheless, the normal evolution of the country, and in particular the rapid increase of the Moslem population—400,000 births each year posed the economic and social problem of providing for 300,000 children of school age and 60,000 to 80,000 new workers annually—tended to push the Jews back into their traditional occupations of small businessmen, artisans, and minor administrative employees. This tendency was strengthened

by governmental measures designed to secure the social advancement of the Moslem population in accordance with its numerical importance.

The principal Jewish communities were Algiers, with 30,000 Jews, Oran, with 30,000, and Constantine, with 15,000. In the Algiers area Blida had 2,000; in the Oran area, Tlemcen had 5,000, Sidi-Bel-Abbès 3,000, and Mostaganem 2,000; in the Constantine area, Bône had 4,000 and Setif 1,500, and in the Sahara, Colomb-Béchar had 2,000 and Chardaia 1,000. Other communities scattered through the country had Jewish populations ranging from 50 to 1,000, and accounted for some 60,000 in all. All these figures were approximations.

This population was almost entirely Sephardic, the few Ashkenazim being mostly recent settlers. The usual language was French. The Judeo-Arabic dialect, in use for centuries, had practically disappeared even in the small communities.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

The attitude of the Jewish community toward developments in Algeria since 1954 was clearly defined in a public declaration by the Algerian Jewish Committee for Social Studies in November 1956, in response to certain allegations (AJYB, 1958 [Vol. 59], pp. 277-78). In summary, it declared that the Jewish community of Algeria was not a political entity and that Algerian Jews, who were loyal Frenchmen, sincerely wished to live in harmony with Christians and Moslems and enthusiastically supported equality of rights for Moslems.

The events of May 13 did not directly affect the Jews as a group; their attitude towards these events and their authors was in general reserved. In the following months the leaders of the Jewish organizations of Algeria—"Frenchmen, republicans, liberals, Jews" in the words of one of them—sought to remain "true to themselves." To quote the conclusion of an article in the June 1958 issue of *Information Juive* over the signature of its editor, they remained "faithful to the teachings of their religion and to their age-old morality, which has commanded them to oppose all racism and all excesses, whoever their authors and whoever their victims may be; faithful to their attachment to Israel; determined to affirm, in freedom and dignity, the integrity of their Judaism and of their Jewish personality."

Community Organization

Each community had a consistory on the French model, elected by the Jewish population. These consistories, having no official character, were merely required to file their statutes, like other associations. Their influence and authority were generally declining, particularly among the younger generation. They had been united in the Federation of Algerian Jewish Communities, established in 1947 and affiliated to the Consistoire Central des Israélites de France et d'Algérie and WJC, and their functions were essentially religious. Like the consistories of France, they were charged with the administration of religious affairs.

Grand Rabbi Jacob Kaplan of France and Algeria made two trips to

Algeria in the period under review, and attended the general assembly of the Federation of Algerian Jewish Communities at Algiers on March 31 and April 1, 1959. The new grand rabbi of Constantine, Isaac Zerbib, took up his office in September 1958. The communities of Constantine, Oran, and Bône each had a grand rabbi.

Though there were other rabbis as well, and a larger number of ministers without rabbinical ordination ("ministres officiants"), Algerian Jewry did not have enough spiritual leaders. The Federation of Communities therefore made the establishment of a rabbinical school one of its main objectives. A modern building for this purpose was erected in Algiers with the assistance of JDC, which contributed half the cost. This school's opening was announced for October 1959. A first school had already been functioning for some years in a suburb of Algiers, and had trained a small number of young rabbis. The Federation of Jewish Communities was assisted by the Superior Rabbinical Council, consisting of the four grand rabbis, which dealt with religious problems.

An organization called the Algerian Jewish Committee for Social Studies, established in 1918 and reorganized in 1948, undertook the task of defending the rights of Jews as a group, in agreement with the principal local Jewish organizations. Beginning in 1948 it published the monthly *Information Juive*, the only Jewish organ currently appearing in all North Africa. It had a large circulation.

The North African office of WJC in Algeria dated from 1949. ORT established itself in Algeria in October 1946, and JDC opened an office in Algiers in February 1957. The Jewish Agency's departments of organization, economics, and education also had offices, and the Alliance Israélite Universelle had a regional committee with headquarters in Algiers.

Numerous informational meetings in the various communities, organized in particular by the North African office of WJC, kept them in touch with international Jewish activities. These meetings were particularly successful in the year under review, regularly attracting audiences of several hundred, often including officials and other non-Jews. A large number of communities held annual memorial meetings on the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. There were also celebrations in honor of Israel independence day and frequent lectures on cultural topics.

YOUTH ACTIVITY

The great majority of Jewish youth took no part in any Jewish activity. The youth movements of *halutzim* (Bene 'Akiva, Deror, Gordoniah, and ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir) totaled about 800 members throughout the country. In addition, the scout movement, Eclaireurs Israélites de France, had about a thousand members. These movements continued their traditional activities and organized camps in France during vacation periods.

Some youth centers were established in recent years. A theater group from the Oran center presented Rabi's *Warsaw* in Oran, Sidi-Bel-Abbès, and Tlemcen on the 16th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. The Constantine center, among its other activities, published a widely circulated internal bulletin called *Clarté*.

The Algerian section of the Union of Jewish Students of France had only a few dozen members, although hundreds of Jewish students attended the University of Algiers.

WELFARE ACTIVITIES

ORT's vocational schools in Algiers, Constantine, and Oran had a total of 325 pupils (261 boys and 64 girls) in the 1958-59 school year, including some Christians and Moslems. ORT received substantial government subsidies. Welfare activities were conducted on a much reduced scale by local organizations such as Elijah the Prophet, Bikkur-Holim, the Society for the Apprenticeship of Young Girls, and the Visiting Ladies. Algeria had no Jewish orphanage, kindergarten, home for the aged, or organized medical-social service. Jews benefited together with the rest of the population from public social services, but Jewish institutions would have been of great service to a group which, while its poverty was certainly not comparable with that of the Jews of Morocco and Tunisia, nevertheless included a large number of the indigent, some of whom had to turn to Christian welfare societies. Many were rather easily converted to Christianity in this manner. Christian missions to the Jews, seeing this, increased their activity.

CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

Although religious sentiment remained strong among the masses, a considerable decline in Jewish thought and values had been observable in recent decades. The growing number of mixed marriages, the weakness of religious instruction, the absence of institutions, the increasingly general Jewish ignorance of Judaism, the total lack of interest of the intellectuals in Jewish activities, the paucity of rabbis and religious and lay educators—all of these were contributing factors. In most of the communities a Talmud Torah under the supervision of the consistory gave the rudiments of religious education, in a few hours on Fridays and Sundays, until *bar mitzvah*.

On the same basis as the rest of the population, Jewish children attended the secular state schools. In the 1958-59 school year a relatively high percentage of them passed the final examinations, especially in the upper classes of the lycées.

The situation facing Algerian Jews in the cultural field was discussed at the "Assises du judaïsme algérien," held for the first time in March 1958. A plan of action was prepared which, in the absence of means and personnel, was on a modest scale. In December 1958 the North African office of WJC and the Jewish Agency's department of education and culture circularized all the consistories with a proposal for the development of Jewish cultural centers. The two organizations offered to help towards this goal by supplying libraries with books on Judaism, record collections on Jewish themes, films, assistance in arranging lectures, and subsidies. They asked the community leaders to provide the assistance of the consistories. A number of cultural centers were thus established in the course of the period under review, in particular at Tlemcen, Relizane, Géryville, and Philippeville. Other centers had been

started during the previous year at Algiers, Constantine, Oran, and Sidi-Bel-Abbès. In Algiers a Jewish cultural center sponsored jointly by the Jewish Cultural Commission of Algeria, the North African office of WJC, and the Jewish Agency, opened in December 1958, to the accompaniment of press and television publicity. This center became quite active, starting in February 1959 to broadcast a Jewish cultural program every Sunday morning over Radiodiffusion Française in Algiers.

The Jewish Cultural Commission of Algeria and WJC continued to organize lecture circuits for lecturers brought from France. They invited the literary critic and dramatist Rabi to give a series of lectures in May in Oran, Tlemcen, Algiers, Philippeville, and Bône, on "Pasternak, or the path of flight." This series was all the more successful because it was organized in centers where for four years, as a result of the political situation, there had been no public cultural lectures, Jewish or non-Jewish. Public exhibitions of works on Judaism were sponsored jointly by WJC, the Jewish Agency, and the local cultural centers in Oran, Ain-Temouchent, Mostaganem, and Sidi-Bel-Abbès, and were well-attended by non-Jews as well as Jews. The North African office of WJC also supplied the three Jewish military chaplaincies with a large number of brochures and books for the estimated 3,000 Jewish soldiers.

ZIONIST ACTIVITIES AND RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

The Zionist Federation of Algeria, the only one active in North Africa, continued its activities in close collaboration with the Jewish Agency's representatives in Algeria. It was a territorial federation, no Zionist parties existing in Algeria. A delegation from the federation took part in the European Zionist Conference in Amsterdam in January 1959. During the year it was particularly concerned with the integration of Algerians and North Africans in Israel. In November it launched a campaign to raise funds for the seven orphaned children of the two Jewish Agency representatives, Jacob Hassan and Raphael Benghera, killed by fellaghas early in 1958 (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], p. 279). The federation planned to open an office in Israel, in cooperation with the organization of Algerian immigrants. The only women's Zionist organization was the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO), which conducted its activities in close collaboration with the federation. It had numerous branches. Keren Kayyemet maintained an office in Algiers, and Keren ha-Yesod sent a representative each year for *Magbit*—the Israel fund-raising campaign.

On the initiative of the Jewish Agency, concerts of Israeli music were organized for the first time in January 1959, and had considerable success. The consul-general of Israel in France also paid an official visit for the first time to Algeria in May 1959.

Emigration to Israel was very small—from July 1, 1958, to June 30, 1959, only 159 (113 adults and 46 children and adolescents), half of whom were of Moroccan origin.

Antisemitism

Antisemitism and racism had always been rampant in Algeria. After World War II, however, its public expression declined, and Jewish relations with other sections of the population were by and large normal.

During the period under review there were a number of antisemitic incidents, especially in Constantine, a city which had in the past seen such troubles as the pogroms of 1934. Incidents were especially numerous during the period of the referendum, in September. European antisemites spread rumors about the attitude of the Jewish population towards General de Gaulle and France. The Algerian Jewish Committee for Social Studies denounced this malicious campaign.

The number of terrorist attacks whose victims, whether by intention or by chance, were Jews, decreased during the year. On September 28, 1958, a grenade was thrown into the synagogue of Boghari, about 100 miles south of Algiers. This attack was condemned by the whole population. Nobody was seriously injured and the culprit, a stranger in the city, was arrested within 24 hours. In October 1958 a number of attacks were directed at Jewish merchants in the rue de la Lyre, an important Jewish and Moslem business district. The proprietor of one store, his wife, and his clerk were killed. Here, as in other localities, the attacks may have been motivated by a desire to eliminate competitors. Grenades were thrown into stores and bars operated by Jews in Oran, Constantine, and Orléansville. A Jew was murdered in his store at Sidi-Bel-Abbès. Grenades were thrown in Constantine in streets near the Jewish quarter.

Personalia

The following died: Charles Lévy, former president of the General Agricultural Federation of Algeria, former member of the Algerian assembly, and a pioneer in housing, agriculture, and large-scale development, April 1959; Samuel Lebar, president of the regional committee of the Alliance Israélite Universelle and administrator of the Bank of Algeria, October 1958, and Bension Becache, former president of Le Travail, the Algerian Jewish society for the placement of apprentices, and former president of the Algiers branch of B'nai B'rith, August 1958.

JACQUES LAZARUS