North Africa

TUNISIA

The period under review (July 1, 1956, through June 30, 1957) saw Tunisia's achievement of full independence, in accordance with the protocol signed in Paris on March 20, 1956, between the governments of France and Tunisia. During 1955–56 it was noted that the foreign consulates which had previously existed in Tunisia had been raised to embassies or legations. During 1956–57 various countries which had not been represented in Tunisia under the protectorate established embassies or legations. These included Belgium, the German Federal Republic, Portugal, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, and Morocco. Tunisia added embassies in Italy, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and the German Federal Republic to those—in France, the United States, Great Britain, Egypt, Morocco, and Libya—which it had established before July 1956.

After the suspension of French economic aid, discussed below, Tunisia sought to develop commercial agreements with other countries. An agreement with Yugoslavia was signed on June 19, 1957, and negotiations with Egypt, the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria were on the verge of producing agreements in the fall of 1957. At its session of July 26, 1956, the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously adopted a French motion proposing Tunisia's admission to the UN. This was also unanimously approved by the General Assembly in its session of November 12, 1956. Tunisia further consolidated her independence by establishing an army, securing the partial evacuation of French troops (still garrisoned in certain zones), and Tunisianizing the courts, the civil service, and the radio and television stations. Numerous foreign personalities, including United States Vice President Richard M. Nixon, participated in the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of Tunisian independence, on March 20, 1957. On January 6, 1957, Tunisia signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with Libya; a similar treaty with Morocco was signed in Rabat at the end of March.

Franco-Tunisian Relations

During 1956–57 negotiations between France and Tunisia were repeatedly broken off and resumed. On July 13, 1956, Tunisia broke off negotiations because of the unfriendly declarations made the day before in the French Council of the Republic and the decision of that body to cut off aid to Tunisia. In August 1956 negotiations were resumed and an accord was reached on the transfer to Tunisian authority of the French gendarmerie
and the political and border police, and, effective March 31, 1957, of radio and television. On August 31, 1956, France agreed to give Tunisia 16,000,000 francs (about $40,000,000) in aid; this grant, however, was subject to many further vicissitudes, being repeatedly withdrawn and then confirmed again.

The most serious rupture occurred on October 22, 1956, the date of the opening of the Tunis conference between the Sultan of Morocco and President Habib Bourguiba. Five leaders of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) were to have taken part, but the plane bringing them to Tunis was diverted to Algiers, where they were arrested. At his press conference announcing the arrest of the leaders, the Tunisian Secretary of State for Information, Bechir ben Yahmed, said: "The conference has been cut short." Pierre de Leusse, who was about to replace Roger Seydoux as French Ambassador to Tunisia, resigned, and the Tunisian government recalled its ambassador, Hassen Belkhodja, from Paris. Not wishing to leave its embassy in Tunis vacant, the French government gave former Ambassador Seydoux a special mission of limited duration. As a result of discussions in Paris between Tunisian Vice Premier Bahi Ladgham and French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau and his deputy Maurice Faure, the two countries decided to resume diplomatic relations. In January 1957, Mohammed Masmoudi was appointed Tunisian Ambassador to Paris and George Gorse was named French Ambassador to Tunisia; the latter presented his credentials to the Bey of Tunis and President Bourguiba on February 7. On February 14, Maurice Faure, Secretary of State in the French Foreign Ministry for Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs, arrived in Tunis on a visit which had been arranged in the negotiations with Bahi Ladgham and subsequently canceled and reinstated on various occasions. Faure's visit had a dual purpose: to further the discussions on the subjects of controversy between France and Tunisia—courts, army, civil service, and economic and financial assistance—and to deal with the problems of the French in Tunisia, which varied according to whether they planned to remain or to leave the country. Faure left Tunis on February 17. His visit contributed to the resumption of Franco-Tunisian relations, broken off because of the interception of the airplane carrying the Algerian leaders, and to an agreement in principle on the judiciary and the civil service.

A Franco-Tunisian judicial convention was signed in Tunis on March 9, 1957. It completely abolished French jurisdiction in Tunisia as of July 1, 1957; for a transitional period of five years, a French magistrate was to participate in civil cases where one of the parties was French. By a decree of November 12, 1956, the Tunisian authorities had already given the Tunisian courts jurisdiction over all penal matters. Another agreement, also signed on March 9, dealt with technical and administrative cooperation. From April 1, 1957, French functionaries were no longer to be a part of the Tunisian civil service. Those of them who were asked to by the Tunisian government were to remain under a model contract, annexed to the accord, which would be in effect until March 31, 1959. Those who had not signed contracts were to leave the administration, under a schedule fixed in the accord, between April 1 and December 31, 1957. Those leaving numbered
about 4,800. All the police of French nationality had already been transferred to the French payroll between December 1, 1956, and the end of March 1957.

On April 20, 1957, a convention on French aid to Tunisia (the 16,000,000,000 francs previously mentioned) was signed in Paris. But it was not made public till several weeks later, after the suspension of that aid on May 23. It was hard to tell exactly why aid was cut off—whether because of the Tunisian attitude on the Algerian problem, or because of the critical situation of the French government, which was overthrown a few days later. As a result of the suspension of aid, the Tunisian government immediately abrogated Article IV of the Customs Code (thus making it possible for Tunis to negotiate special tariff agreements with countries other than France), established a Permanent Commission on Foreign Trade in the office of the premier, and introduced economies in the administration.

Franco-Tunisian relations were seriously affected by an incident on May 31, 1957, in which French and Tunisian troops clashed in the Ain Draham region in the northwest of Tunisia on the Algerian border. In the course of this incident the Secretary General of the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khemis Hajeri, who was conducting an on-the-spot study of the situation of the Algerian refugees, was seriously wounded.

In June 1957 Franco-Tunisian relations were normalized, and an agreement was reached on the subject of the army; this was announced by Premier Bourguiba in his weekly talk to the people on June 27. Within six months, French troops were to evacuate the entire territory, with the exception of Bizerte, El Aouina, Gabès, Sfax, Gafsa, and Metlaoui. But the economic, financial, and monetary questions still remained unsettled; the Tunisian government had on several occasions announced its intention of establishing a bank of issue. And since the Tunisian government firmly intended to limit French troops to the single area of Bizerte, negotiations on this question were still necessary.

*Tunis Socialiste*, the weekly organ of the French Socialist Federation of Tunis (a daily before 1939), ceased to appear in November 1956, chiefly because Tunisian independence made it impossible for the Socialist Federation of Tunisia to function as a French party in a foreign country. The daily *Tunis Soir* ceased to appear at the end of March 1957 for political and financial reasons.

**Political Organization**

On August 26, 1956, elections were held to replace ten delegates to the Constituent Assembly who had died or were unable to serve. All the seats were won by the National Front. The labors of the Constituent Assembly progressed slowly during 1956-57. The question of the monarchy appeared to hinder its work, so that this was not completed, as had been hoped, by the Assembly's first anniversary in April 1957. In May, when Premier Bourguiba was interpellated on the question of the prospective abdication of the Bey or proclamation of a republic, reported by certain French newspapers, he replied that the question was for the Assembly to decide. The
traditional feast of the throne, on May 15, was not celebrated as a holiday, and in June the newspaper *L'Action* began a campaign for the abolition of the monarchy. Certain illegal acquisitions of property by princes of the Bey's family were annulled by decrees submitted by the government to the Bey and issued under his seal. During June, it was increasingly rumored that the monarchy would soon end.

**Tunisian Army**

A decree of January 15, 1957, instituted compulsory military service of one year for Tunisians reaching the age of twenty. It was estimated that this would produce a force of about 25,000 men, at a cost of over 10,000,000,000 francs (about $25,000,000) a year. Under the protectorate, a thousand men were drafted by lot; the inhabitants of certain large cities, the possessors of certain diplomas, and Tunisian Jews were exempt. None of these exemptions was preserved in the new decree.

**Public Order**

Salah ben Youssef, former secretary of Premier Bourguiba's Neo-Destour Party, organized a terrorist movement against the Bourguiba government. On January 8, 1957, the government commenced its prosecution in the High Court of Ben Youssef (*in absentia*) and some fifty of his co-conspirators. On January 24 the court sentenced seven of the defendants to death (four of these, including Ben Youssef, were sentenced *in absentia*), and twenty others to terms ranging from two years' imprisonment to twenty years at hard labor. The three death sentences were carried out on February 2. Salah ben Youssef took refuge in Libya, and, when he was expelled from that country in January 1957 as a result of the treaty between Libya and Tunisia, went to Egypt.

**Municipal Elections**

Municipal elections took place without incident throughout Tunisia on May 5, 1957. The list of the Relèvement Social (the Neo-Destour Party of Premier Bourguiba) won 729 seats out of 768; the remainder were divided between the Independents and a small number of Communists. Fourteen Jews were among those elected: thirteen on the ticket of the Relèvement Social, and one on the opposition Independent slate. This figure corresponded approximately to the proportion of Jews in the total population, although there were cities with large Jewish populations where no Jews were elected.

**Economic Situation**

There was no significant improvement in the difficult economic situation. Essentially an agricultural land, Tunisia remained dependent on its crops. The harvest of hard wheat came to 42,120 metric tons, that of soft wheat was 12,460 tons, and that of barley 23,330 tons. Orange exports brought in about 1,000,000,000 francs ($2,500,000). The vineyards produced about 34,000,000 gallons of wine. Efforts to introduce the cultivation of sugar-beets
and rice were fairly successful. Tunisia's small industrial sector suffered further setbacks. Mining in general declined, particularly in respect to phosphates, lead, and zinc; iron mining, however, set a new record. No oil or gas was discovered, and prospecting for them was abandoned in certain areas. Water power supplied only one per cent of Tunisia's requirements of electricity. The balance of payments continued to show a large deficit.

Watteau, governor of the Bank of Algeria and Tunisia, presented a report concerned largely with the exodus of French, Italian, and Jewish families and the transfer of their capital, the uncertainty which clouded the future, and the reluctance of local and foreign capital to undertake investments. He urged caution in monetary matters in view of the weaknesses of an economy based on an irregular and often insufficient agricultural production, and an industry lacking in power, raw materials, capital, and markets. Watteau concluded that it was essential for the country to put itself in a position to make the best use of the foreign aid which remained indispensable.

By a decree of February 19, 1957, the government decided to issue a loan for the industrialization of the country. Subscriptions opened on March 4 and closed on April 20; the loan was highly successful, bringing in over 1,300,000,000 francs ($3,250,000).

**AMERICAN AID**

The United States made a gift to Tunisia of 45,000 tons of wheat under the agricultural surplus disposal program. Mongi Slim, Tunisian Ambassador to the United States, signed the agreement in Washington on September 26, 1956, and the first shipment arrived on November 9. In an exchange of letters between Vice Premier Bahi Ladgham and American Ambassador Lewis Jones, it was agreed on March 27, 1957, that the United States would give Tunisia $5,000,000 for the importation of goods and $500,000 in technical assistance. Retired Admiral Elliot B. Strauss arrived in Tunis on April 11, 1957, as director of the Special Mission for Economic and Technical Cooperation. In June 1957 the United States granted Tunisia $8,000,000 for the purchase of petroleum products over a six-month period beginning in September 1957. And on June 28 an agreement was signed by Premier Bourguiba and Ambassador Jones under which the United States was to give $1,800,000 worth of agricultural products for use in a child care program, plus $200,000 for freight. It should also be mentioned that when Tunisia was hit by an invasion of crickets in June 1957, the United States International Cooperation Administration mission in Tunisia arranged to have twenty-four planes of the United States Air Force bring in large quantities of insecticide, as well as sprayers and technicians, thus quickly saving a large part of the grain crops.

**EISENHOWER DOCTRINE**

On January 11, 1957, Premier Bourguiba took a very favorable position toward the Eisenhower Doctrine in his weekly talk. His position was in general approved by the Arabic press, except for the newspaper Al Istiglal, the organ of the Old Destour Party. Premier Bourguiba declared that President Eisenhower's statement was a historical event of great importance.
After criticizing Communism, he said that America was declaring that she had no desire for aggrandizement or hegemony, and that in helping to raise the standards of living of the peoples of the world, the United States would help to consolidate the basis of freedom itself, so that Communism would have no more conquests. After the signature of the agreement of March 27, Vice Premier Bahi Ladgham reiterated Tunisia's support of the Eisenhower Doctrine. President Eisenhower's special envoy James D. Richards visited Tunisia from May 4 to 6, 1957. He offered $3,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 1958, a sum which the Tunisian government regarded as inadequate. In a brief communique published on May 6, Premier Bourguiba expressed his satisfaction at having been able to discuss with Ambassador Richards the need for resisting the menace of international Communism, but he did not discuss the amount offered. But in a speech delivered at Nabeul on May 9 he declared that the conversations with Ambassador Richards had been suspended "because the aid offered was accompanied by certain reticences obviously inspired by a desire to spare the feelings of certain friends [i.e., the French government]."

LABOR SITUATION

September 1956 saw the disappearance of the Communist-controlled trade union organization, the USTT (Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Tunisiens). In October 1956, Habib Achour, whose group had been defeated by Ahmed ben Salah at the September 1956 congress of the UGTT (Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens)—the anti-Communist trade union organization affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)—set up a dissident trade union center. This, called the UTT (Tunisian Workers' Union), did not win many members away from the UGTT. Ahmed ben Salah's report to the September congress was criticized sharply by many, especially in government circles, as sectarian and unrealistic. On December 19, 1956, while Ahmed ben Salah was on a trip to Morocco, the administrative commission of the UGTT designated Ahmed Tlili as secretary general. On his return to Tunis, Ahmed ben Salah submitted his resignation as a member of the administrative commission of the UGTT.

Efforts to reunite the two trade union centers continued for several months, spurred on by the fact that the ICFTU admitted only a single trade union group from each country, as well as by the desire to achieve reunification in time for the May Day celebration. At a press conference on April 16, 1957, the leaders of the two trade union centers announced their reunification, but it still had not gone into effect at the end of June. The reconciliation of Premier Bourguiba and Ahmed ben Salah was confirmed publicly at a ceremony at Moknine on June 20; it was rumored that ben Salah would be appointed a minister or ambassador in the near future.

The period 1956–57 was marked by an absence of labor disputes, except for certain conflicts between farmers and their seasonal workers. Aside from that, there were sporadic violent incidents between UGTT members and those of the UTT, especially when the reunification of the two centers was under consideration.
Jewish Population

During 1956-57 so many French civil servants, including French Jews, left Tunisia that it was described as an exodus. There was no parallel development in the private sector, but some workers and white collar employees, both Jewish and non-Jewish, preferred to leave for France in order to guard against the danger of unemployment. The Jewish population, estimated in February 1956 at 80,000 (including both Tunisian and foreign Jews), gained about 1,200 through natural increase, but its losses through departures brought it down to about 75,000, a figure which accorded with the number of packages of matzoth distributed for Passover in 1957. About 75 per cent of the entire Jewish population of Tunisia lived in Tunis and its suburbs.

Discrimination and Anti-Semitism

The Bourguiba government had not discriminated in any way. Premier Bourguiba repeatedly proclaimed that the only unity was that of the nation, and he included a Jew, André Barouch, in his cabinet. No Jews were appointed to other positions, but the naming of some Jewish lawyers of Tunisian nationality as magistrates was under consideration. The percentage of Jews in the population was taken into consideration in naming candidates in the municipal elections, but this basis was not adhered to strictly.

The Arabic press, particularly the Old Destour's organ Al Istiqal, occasionally expressed unfriendly sentiments when dealing with the problem of Israel; it tended to confuse Zionists with Jews. The French weekly L'Action, supporting the Neo-Destour, carried some critical articles in May 1957 on the subject of the rabbinical tribunals and on the integration of Jews in the field of welfare and of the army, etc. But these were not followed up in the succeeding months. The attitude of the Arab population toward the Jews was in general good.

Civic and Political Status

As has been indicated above, the Tunisian Jews enjoyed the same political rights, and were eligible to vote on the same conditions, as Tunisian Moslems. Because of their small numbers, they were lost in the mass, and their election to office depended on the desire of those who drew up the lists of candidates to include their Jewish compatriots. The Jews of Tunisia were handicapped by the fact that most of them did not know classical Arabic, which became the official language of the country. That handicap was expected to disappear in the more or less near future as a result of the courses in Arabic conducted in the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, in other schools (especially those under the jurisdiction of the ministry of national educations), and, above all, as a result of the intensive classes in Arabic given for adults.

Especially significant was Premier Bourguiba's intervention with President Gamal Abdal Nasser of Egypt in December 1956 against the persecution of
Tunisian Jews domiciled in Egypt. This intervention applied the principle, so often emphasized by Premier Bourguiba, of the primacy of national ties over those of religious affiliation; it was a courageous act, coming as it did from a state which had proclaimed Islam as the religion of Tunisia to another Moslem state. It resulted in demonstrations of gratitude from the Jewish population to Premier Bourguiba; on December 31, 1956, a delegation from the twenty-five Jewish communities visited the premier to express their gratitude.

On June 29, 1957, an American Jewish Committee delegation composed of President Irving Engel, Alan Stroock, Martin Gang, Zachariah Shuster, and Abraham Karlikow visited Tunis. The delegation was in contact with the Jewish Community Council of Tunis and with the executive bureau of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Tunisia. It was received by Premier Habib Bourguiba and Vice Premier Bahi Ladgham. On this occasion Premier Bourguiba again emphasized the full equality of all Tunisian citizens without distinction of race or creed, and insisted several times on the priority of national over confessional ties. Tunisia, he said, would continue to permit emigration, but it expected that those who remained would be loyal citizens without any other allegiance, to Israel or any other country.

Premier Bourguiba discussed the structure of the Jewish communities, which he said should be led exclusively by Jews of Tunisian nationality and should not regard Jews of that nationality as relief clients. He agreed that the reorganized communities could carry on religious, cultural, and philanthropic activities, and added that Jewish organizations of the United States and other countries could continue to help the needy Jews of Tunisia. The American Jewish Committee delegation immediately reported to the executive bureau of the Federation of Jewish Communities in Tunisia on its interview with President Bourguiba, and drew the attention of the leaders to the urgency of reorganizing community activities.

**Emigration**

The emigration of Jews from Tunisia had always been determined primarily by economic considerations; this was true also of emigration to Israel, although sentimental factors also entered there. During 1956–57 there was less emigration to Israel than in the previous year, departures coming to only 4,801. In November 1956 the government was on the point of stopping officially organized emigration by the Jewish Agency, but reconsidered in the following month and continued to authorize such emigration. However, the Tunisian authorities did not look with a favorable eye on emigration encouraged and stimulated by the Jewish Agency.

Departures for France and other countries (e.g., to Canada and, to a small extent, the United States) were assisted by the United HIAS Service, whose director Frederick Fried was replaced in March 1957 by Ivor Svarc. About 1,400 emigrants left with the assistance of HIAS during 1956–57, some 1,200 of them going to France. A number of Jewish as well as non-Jewish lawyers left Tunisia for France because of the Tunisification of justice; on the other hand, a number of Jewish lawyers secured posts in the Tunisian magistracy.

A mission from the Canadian ministries of foreign affairs, commerce, and
immigration came to Tunis on October 30, 1956. It assured the quick delivery of visas, and stated that one-fifth of the applications for visas came from Jews. On September 20, 1956, President Eisenhower set the immigration quota for Tunisia at 100 persons a year; this confirmed the existing small quota.

Communal Organization and Communal Affairs

The Federation of Jewish Communities in Tunisia continued to preserve the unity which it had achieved in August 1955. It faced government pressure for the integration of the Jewish community into the Tunisian community. This question was raised by Premier Bourguiba on December 31, 1956, in the course of his reception of the representatives who had come from the twenty-five Jewish communities of Tunisia to thank him for his action on behalf of the Tunisian Jews living in Egypt. There was a general exchange of views in the course of this meeting. Premier Bourguiba decided to designate one or two of his colleagues to discuss the future status of the communities with them. As of July 1957 this discussion had not yet taken place. The Jewish communities were convinced that the intentions of the government were not hostile. However, the Jewish communities considered themselves spiritual bodies, forming an integral part of the Tunisian community, and wished to remain entirely apolitical and continue their traditional religious, cultural, and philanthropic activities.

Nevertheless, the communities were deprived of the annual subsidy of 20,000,000 francs ($50,000), which had been included in the national budget but which was not provided for them. Premier Bourguiba felt that it was not proper to provide a subsidy which would benefit Jews of all nationalities, and not only Tunisians; the question was thus linked to that of the reorganization of the communities. The failure to pay this subsidy was a considerable blow to the communal treasuries, particularly in the case of the smaller communities, whose resources were very small. In December 1956 the government authorized the communities to increase the tax which they collected on kosher meat and sacramental wine. In addition to their own resources, derived from the income of the synagogues and cemeteries, the Passover nedaba special levy, and other gifts, the communities received substantial aid from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). The JDC was particularly helpful to the school canteens operated by Nos Petits, the Oeuvre de Secours aux Enfants Israélites (OSE), the Organization for Rehabilitation and Training (ORT), and the vacation camps. The Jewish communities maintained excellent relations with foreign Jewish organizations such as the JDC, the World Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the World Sephardi Union, ORT, OSE, and the United HIAS Service, and sent delegates to the conferences held by these organizations.

Religious Developments

In August 1956, when the government abolished the Moslem religious jurisdiction in matters of personal status, as well as the Moslem religious
courts, it did not take parallel action in respect to the rabbinical courts. In July 1956 it named a commission of six Jewish leaders, headed by Grand Rabbi Meiss Cohen, to study the reorganization of the rabbinical jurisdiction. This commission was expected to propose certain reforms on a basis which would not affect matters of dogma. By July 1957 the commission had held a number of meetings but had not completed its work. It was possible that, whatever the conclusions of the commission, the government would act vigorously on the question of the rabbinical tribunals and the Mosaic law, in view of its hostility to any form of particularism. In August 1956 the government promulgated a laical civil code, deeply influenced by the precepts of Moslem law, to go into effect on January 1, 1957. The decree gave Jews the right to opt for this code or for the Mosaic law; by July 1957 it did not seem that anyone had opted for the new civil code, which was not laical, but really Moslem. The ban on polygamy, introduced by the government effective January 1, 1957, applied both to Moslems and to Jews.

Yom Kippur, which had been made a legal holiday by a decree of September 16, 1954, ceased to be one when it was not included in the new list of legal holidays established by a decree of September 30, 1956. This decree provided, however, that Jews need not work on Yom Kippur and one day of Rosh Hashonah.

Jewish religious life continued. Shechita was conducted in the municipal slaughterhouses, and kosher food was served in a number of restaurants, over which Grand Rabbi Cohen exercised a vigorous supervision. Observance of the Sabbath and of Jewish religious holidays, the performance of religious rites, and pilgrimages to the tombs of venerable rabbis continued unchanged.

Social Service

The Tunisian Jewish communities continued to give assistance on a weekly or monthly basis, as well as to meet special emergencies; at Passover, they distributed matzoth, rice, oil, and wine. The communities in turn gave subsidies to such organizations as Nos Petits, OSE, Oeuvre de l'Habillement, the Oeuvre des Couvertures, and ORT. They were, however, forced to cut the amount of their assistance during 1956-57 because of the failure of the government to pay the 20,000,000 franc subsidy (see above).

Nos Petits furnished breakfast, the noon meal, and an afternoon snack to 5,000 children in its school canteens in Tunis and certain other cities; during 1956-57 it opened four new centers at Sfax, Gabés, Menzel Bourguiba, and Béja. It received considerable assistance from the JDC, including flour, butter, cheese, powdered milk, rice, and cottonseed oil given by the United States Department of Agriculture through the JDC. In the winter Nos Petits distributed warm clothes, as well as shoes; it also distributed summer clothes, especially for the vacation camps. During 1956-57 it distributed 18,888 bundles of clothes. L'Oeuvre d'Habillement carried on similar activity in the field of clothing, but on a smaller scale. Nos Petits also cared for 1,500 children in vacation camps. L'Oeuvre des Couvertures distributed 500 blankets at a cost considerably below that of the previous year.

OSE opened its new dispensary in the middle of the Hara (ghetto) on
March 27, 1957, in the presence of local officials, President Abel Shaban of the World Union of OSE, and Barnett Stross of Great Britain. The number of Moslems treated in the dispensaries of the OSE continued to increase. The Caisse Israélite de Relèvement Economique made 289 loans during 1956–57 totaling 16,957,000 francs (about $140,000); approximately 98 per cent of its loans were repaid.

On June 12, 1956, a child care federation called Comité de liaison des Oeuvres Sociales Juives Tunisiennes de l'Enfance was formed by Nos Petits, OSE, La Garderie, ORT, and L'Oeuvre d'Habillement. Since it was still in its formative stages, an estimate of its activity was not yet possible.

The community center begun in Tunis during 1955 had not yet been completed by July 1957. The cost was to have been 45,000,000 francs ($112,500); 48,000,000 had so far been spent, and it was estimated that its completion would require another 10,000,000. The JDC had already contributed 15,000,000 francs.

**Education**

Education continued to receive the support of the Tunisian Ministry of National Education and the French Cultural Mission. After some discussion, the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle were attached to the ministry of national education. The schools under the ministry of national education gave a significant amount of Arabic instruction beginning with the preparatory grades. Those under the French Cultural Mission planned a certain number of hours of instruction in the Arabic language. The Alliance schools, which had begun some years previous to teach Arabic for some hours each week, expanded this instruction, since Arabic was more and more becoming the language of administration.

During the 1956–57 school year the ORT had 930 students. Its courses were expanded during the year by the addition of courses for steamfitters and automotive electricians to those in carpentry, general mechanics, automotive mechanics, and plumbing. There were 750 apprentices, about 50 more than during 1955–56. All the students who completed their courses were placed. About 15 per cent of the students were non-Jewish. The Garderie Israelite continued its social and educational activities; the number of pupils tended to diminish because of some emigration.

**Jewish Education**

The teaching of ancient and modern Hebrew was carried on in the schools of the Alliance Israélite, Talmud Torahs sponsored by the communities, and a few one-room chedariim. In Tunis Jewish education continued to grow, but in the interior it declined as a result of the departure of some teachers. The communities were attempting to solve this problem with the financial assistance of the JDC. Evening courses in modern Hebrew continued to be given in Tunis and in the principal cities of the interior (Sousse, Sfax, and Gabés).
Zionist and Pro-Israel Activities

As mentioned above, the Jewish Agency for Palestine was able to continue its activities except for an interval of one month. It was obvious that the local authorities did not look favorably on propaganda for Aliyah or organized emigration to Israel, but as of July 1957 the offices of the Jewish Agency functioned normally.

Local Jewish leaders were opposed to a campaign to raise funds for Israel. Some attempts were nevertheless made, with the unexpected result that five fund collectors were arrested on May 23, 1957, and the authorities sealed the local office of the Magbit (fund drive) in Tunis. Some small amounts were confiscated. Those arrested were released but summoned before the investigating magistrate. No decision had been handed down by July 1957. A severe sentence was not expected, but there was a stronger conviction than ever that no fund raising was possible.

Cultural Activities

Two Jewish cultural groups—Ha-Kol and the Compagnons des Arts—arranged lectures and theatrical presentations. The former group presented *L'enfant Prophète* by Edmond Fleg, and sponsored lectures. The Compagnons des Arts presented theatrical pieces including Rabì's *L'Affaire Wittemberg*, moving pictures, and lectures. The Hebrew half hour on the radio was provided by the efforts of Ha-Kol; it was called "Jewish Images and Thoughts."

MOROCCO

Morocco, which gained its political independence in 1956, was busy trying to consolidate its new national unity and to establish itself on a sound footing during the period under review (November 1956-November 1957). King (formerly Sultan) Mohammed V served as the rallying point and arbiter for the country's diverse political elements, and enjoyed immense popularity. Morocco benefited from a continuing, if diminishing, impetus and inspiration from the revolution. National independence brought with it, however, grave problems in extending central authority through the state, establishing new political and social institutions, and defining Morocco's foreign policies.

The triumphal visits of Mohammed V in the spring of 1957 to the former Spanish Morocco and international zone of Tangiers symbolized the reunification of these areas and French Morocco into one Sherifian kingdom. Real integration, however, had yet to be achieved. The former Spanish territories in the North still used pesetas as currency, the one-time French-controlled regions francs, while Tangiers maintained its free money market. Differences in wages and living costs still required customs barriers between north and south, and made introduction of a uniform currency a risky and expensive
business, especially for a state so poor in reserves as Morocco. No adequate communications existed between the two regions. One of the first major projects of the Moroccan government was the building of a north-south Unity Road, begun in July 1957 with the aid of volunteer labor from all parts of the country. Moroccan nationalists asserted increasingly that true unity required the recovery of the small enclaves of Ifni, Ceuta, and Mellila from Spain. There were also irridentist demands for Spain's Gold Coast, and for a sizeable chunk of the Sahara, considered a rich prize since the discovery of oil there.

The central government, while firmly established, was not yet really master throughout Morocco. In certain areas the royal writ ran only by sufferance of Liberation Army forces. These had never been wholly disbanded, although nominally integrated with the Royal Army under crown prince Moulay Hassan in 1956. But by and large, there was peace and quiet in the land. The government was headed by Premier Si Bekkai, an independent, but the dominant force in it was the Istiqlal Party. There was a national coalition government, including representatives of the Democratic Independence Party (PDI), until October 1956, when pressure from the Istiqlal—by far the leading force in the country, apart from the Sultan—forced the PDI's ouster. The one Jewish minister in the first Moroccan cabinet, the politically unaffiliated Leon Benzaquen, retained the ministry of post, telegraph, and telephone, in the new government. PDI leaders claimed Istiqlal was seeking to establish a dictatorship. Istiqlal countered with the charge that the opposition was "not responsible"; and the government announced in September 1957 that there would soon be a decree "defining and limiting the liberties of press and meeting." The same month, the government published a list of 193 Moroccan personalities charged with having collaborated against national independence, ordered their properties sequestered, and forbade them to leave the country. This measure, approved by both Istiqlal and PDI, caused considerable concern in anticipation of future lists, despite assurances by Interior Minister Driss M'Hammedi that no more than 2,000 persons would eventually be affected. Government in Morocco was by decree, there being no legislature as yet. The Consultative Assembly, appointed by the king in 1956, had only advisory powers; its president was Istiqlal Party chief Mehdi Ben Barka. The Bekkai government planned to hold first local, then regional, and finally national elections, over a period of a year or two, and thus eventually to establish a legislature.

Economic Situation

Morocco's other problems paled before its economic difficulties. Unemployment was estimated at anywhere from 200,000 to 600,000 in a country of 10,000,000. Economic activity had drastically slowed down during the revolution. It was further affected by the flight of capital, particularly after the Meknès riots of October 1956, in which some two-score Frenchmen were killed. Funds to operate the government came, in great measure, from France. This, Moroccan leaders felt, meant they had not yet achieved their "invisible" independence. Moroccan efforts to attract outside capital and aid, in par-
ticular United States help, were not too successful. It was hoped that the situation might improve after King Mohammed's visit to the United States in November 1957. Although the United States gave Morocco $20,000,000 and substantial quantities of grains and other agricultural products (helping stave off near disaster when drought affected Moroccan crops early in 1957), Moroccans were disappointed. They had wanted to get enough unconditional assistance to make them economically free of France. But the United States was only prepared to supplement, not replace, French aid. Moroccans saw the presence of United States air bases on their territory as an invasion of their sovereignty, since the bases had been authorized only by an agreement with France before Moroccan independence. It was expected, however, that some lease arrangement would be worked out, bringing Morocco substantial income. During the course of 1957, Morocco tended increasingly toward a neutralist position and somewhat stronger ties with the rest of the Arab world. This was indicated by Premier Bekkai's speech to the Istiqlal Party congress at Alhucemas, at the end of September 1957. There was a growing feeling that such a position would bring Morocco greater help, even from Western powers like the United States, than would a positive pro-Western stand.

Government and popular support for the Algerian independence movement often led to difficulties with France. Premier Si Bekkai emphasized on several occasions that "there can be no true independence for Morocco or Tunisia without independence for Algeria." The hope was often expressed that Mohammed V and Tunisian Premier Habib Bourguiba might be able to act as conciliators, and bring French and Algerian negotiators to a peace conference table.

Civic Status

The Moroccan government followed two basic policies affecting Jews which—consistent, perhaps, in Moroccan eyes—had contradictory consequences for Jewish status and equality, and posed certain implied threats to the existence of independent Jewish institutions. Even before achieving independence Moroccan nationalist leaders had announced their intention of assuring full equality in Morocco for all Moroccan subjects, and their support of the United Nations Charter of Human Rights. This policy was reaffirmed by the king of Morocco on his return from exile late in 1955 and on several occasions thereafter. Jewish leaders inside and outside Morocco were assured that this applied to Jews. In practice, after the state became independent Moroccan authorities maintained a perfectly correct attitude in regard to the basic questions of equality and security of Jews—with one significant exception. To be sure, there was still a marked tendency among Jews in the remoter parts of Morocco to move toward the coast and the larger cities where they felt more secure. But 1956-57 assuaged fears—once held by many—that Moroccan independence would bring anti-Jewish acts, or that the Moroccan masses or government might be actively hostile to Jews, either because of the ambivalent Jewish attitude during the Moroccan struggle for independence, or because of pro-Arab, anti-Israel sentiment. On the contrary, as evidence of
its desire to give Jews a political equality they had never enjoyed in Morocco, the government could point to the appointment of Leon Benzaquen, a Jew, to a cabinet post, of five other Jews to seats in the Consultative Assembly, and of still others to various administrative posts.

Difficulties and apprehensions arose, however, because of the application of a second basic government policy. The Moroccan government clamped progressively tighter restrictions on Jewish emigration to Israel during the year, stopping it altogether by the summer of 1957. In order to implement this policy, Moroccan authorities felt it necessary to apply certain measures of exception to Jews in the country, sometimes openly, sometimes without being willing to acknowledge them. These discriminatory measures, coming at the same time that the government's general attitude was shifting toward stronger ties with other Arab lands, affected not only Jews who wanted to leave Morocco for good, but also those who had no intention of quitting the country. Thus, barely two years after Morocco became independent, freedom of movement of Jews was becoming a matter of grave concern.

Emigration

From the founding of the state of Israel in May 1948 through October 1956, according to Jewish Agency statistics, more than 104,000 Jews left Morocco for Israel. A first wave of emigration saw 18,000 leave in 1948–49, and a like number in each of the next three years. This movement fell drastically in 1953 to less than 3,000, then rose sharply once more: emigration was over 8,000 in 1954, almost 25,000 in 1955, then a record 33,000 during the first ten months of 1956. Several factors affected the flow of Jews out of Morocco during the past decade. One was the pull of tradition on Orthodox Jews, drawn to the ancestral homeland. Again, great numbers of impoverished Jews hoped to begin a new and more productive life. After the first wave of emigration had died down, the revolutionary years brought occasional anti-Jewish riots and ever greater economic difficulties. Many felt insecure, not knowing what Moroccan independence would mean for them. Finally, there was the fear that after the Moroccan state was established there would no longer be a choice, and that emigration would become impossible.

In June 1956, Moroccan authorities announced the closing down of Cadimah, a Jewish Agency organization that had been helping Jews emigrate. Government action against Cadimah provoked a panic by a rush of some 6,000 Jews to the Cadimah staging camp at Magazan, not far from Casablanca. Reluctantly, and after considerable pressure, Moroccan authorities permitted their departure, over several months, eventually closing down the Magazan camp. While in effect outlawing mass emigration, the government asserted at the same time that there would be no obstacle to individual freedom of movement. There were even hopes that some arrangement might be made for the departure of approximately 70,000 persons registered with Cadimah for emigration.

These hopes proved vain. Nonetheless, even with Cadimah closed down, would-be Jewish emigrants started making their way to the coast and out of Morocco early in 1957. A favorite route was from what had been French
Morocco to Tangiers and the former Spanish Zone, thence to Gibraltar or France and, usually, Israel. Apparently, Moroccan authorities were willing to shut their eyes to this movement; they were thus able to assure other Arab states that Morocco did not permit emigration to Israel and yet did allow a means of exit for Jews who wanted to leave.

In July 1957, some 1,400 Jews who had pulled up stakes were in Tangiers, waiting transport out of Morocco. The Tangiers Jewish community was unable to cope with the needs of such a large group, many of whom required welfare assistance. The situation of the Jews in transit came to the attention of the authorities, and the Moroccan government decided to investigate the entire problem of Jewish emigration. In August, after four hundred of these Jews had managed to leave Tangiers, the authorities shut the borders securely and made movement impossible. The two schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Tangiers were turned into barracks for the remaining 1,000 transients, who received rations from the local Jewish community. They were still there in December 1957, and another 200 Jews had arrived from the Moroccan interior.

October 1957 saw a similar situation arise in Tetuan, largest city in the former Spanish Zone. On October 19, Moroccan police stopped buses bearing 239 would-be Jewish emigrants from Tetuan to nearby Ceuta, a port enclave under Spanish jurisdiction. Men, women, and children were obliged to return to Tetuan. They were crowded into a small courtyard at the police station, remaining there until after midnight, without food or shelter through a day of rain. The local judge notified the Tetuan Jewish community, which agreed to be responsible for the emigrants. They were transferred to the Organization for Rehabilitation Through Training (ORT) school building with the permission of the police, and meals, bedding, and medical assistance were organized. The police threw a heavy guard around the school. They permitted some thirty Tetuan Jews to enter and give assistance the first day, but thereafter they refused all entry. Criminal charges were entered against all the transients, who were photographed and fingerprinted. Early in November there were reports that the guard around the school had been lifted for a few days, but then put on again.

During 1956–57 some 10,000 Jews made their way from Morocco to Israel, about 10 per cent of them holding regular Moroccan travel papers. During the period from July 1, 1956, through June 30, 1957, United HIAS Service moved 587 Jews permanently to South America or Canada, the Moroccan government making no difficulties where the emigrant's destination was a country other than Israel. And almost 1,500 Jews had pulled up stakes and were sitting in Tangiers, under close Moroccan supervision, or were under police guard at Tetuan. They could not leave the country, and they refused to return to their home communities.

**Government Attitude**

A major cause of the pressure for the underground movement of Jews out of Morocco during 1956–57 was the government attitude toward legal, individual emigration. In August 1956, there were reports on the Moroccan and Tangiers radios that the governor of Casablanca had received orders not
to issue any more exit visas to Jews. This was promptly denied; delay in issuing visas was due only to the fact that the issuing offices had too much work, the authorities said. Nonetheless, as the months passed, it became clear that it was increasingly difficult, because of obstacles on the administrative level, for Jews to acquire visas; and later, when the requirement for exit visas was abolished (in February 1957), to acquire passports. Persons who had already been to Israel, or whose passports showed Israel visas, could not hope to have their passports extended or renewed. Jewish applicants for passports were often asked "Are you sure you don't intend to go to Israel?" They were visited by district officials, and their apartments checked, to make sure they did not intend to depart for good but were only going away for a short business trip, or as tourists. As a result of such investigations, and the delays occasioned in issuing passports, even those Jews who never had any intention of quitting Morocco felt the impact of this discriminatory policy. Poorer people saw their applications automatically refused, for it was assumed that they would be going on to Israel. After the arrest of the 239 persons on the way to Ceuta (see above), Jews who sought to cross the Moroccan-Ceuta border—something previously permitted without a passport on presentation of Moroccan identity papers—were refused permission to do so, unless they left substantial guarantees with the Moroccan authorities that they had no intention to emigrate.

As the situation worsened during 1956–57, there were increased representations by Jewish organizations to Moroccan government leaders. World Jewish Congress political director Alexander Easterman conferred on several occasions with Moroccan authorities to seek removal of restrictions. A special delegation of leaders of the American Jewish Committee, visiting Morocco in July 1957, urged a change of policy, pointing out that the inability of Jews to obtain passports negated the right to freedom of movement included in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights to which Morocco adhered. By failing to establish some reasonable system of legal emigration, American Jewish Committee leaders argued, Morocco was itself promoting illegal movement and creating a deep sense of unease on the part of the entire Jewish population.

Nevertheless, the following months saw a new reticence and even a hardening in government services and ministerial offices with regard to Jews and questions involving Jews, particularly emigration. When, in June 1956, mass emigration of Jews had been halted, a major argument offered was that Jews were taking with them sizeable amounts of capital needed by Morocco. Now, in the face of evidence that the overwhelming majority of Jews seeking to leave were poor, Moroccan papers were asserting, as Al Istiqlal did (October 26, 1957), that: "The place for indigents is not abroad but here where the government seeks to create work for all, and is succeeding." Government officials argued that there was no discrimination. They issued statistics showing that 4,720 Jews and 8,000 Moslems had been permitted to leave Morocco for travel abroad from July through September 1957, but gave no breakdown as to whether this was for business, tourism, or other reasons. At the same time, they admitted that only those Jews who could prove means of support abroad would be granted individual passports, thus effectively cutting off all prospects
of movement for poorer Jews. Finally, early in November 1957, the head of
the State Security Office, Si Mohammed Laghzaoui, confirmed that the gov-
ernment had been taking action to halt individual as well as mass movement
to Israel. His position was that emigration to Israel was artificially stimulated
by illegal Zionist groups using fear-mongering slogans offensive to Morocco,
and that Israel was importing Moroccan Jews as menial laborers. The migrants
at Tetuan and Tangiers, he said, had been duped, and would have to return
to their homes, with full security guarantees. Morocco, like any other coun-
try, he asserted, had the right to prohibit emigration of its citizens to certain
countries, particularly to Israel, with which it had no diplomatic relations,
when it deemed such movement undesirable; and Morocco wanted to make
sure that none of its citizens would bear arms against other Arab lands.

At the same time, an active campaign, apparently inspired by the Istiqlal
and involving Jewish leadership in Morocco, was undertaken denouncing
illegal emigration. In November 1957, the Council of Jewish Communities
in Morocco (which had led only a desultory existence for the previous eight-
een months), decided to “take measures” to halt clandestine emigration from
Morocco to Israel, on the grounds that this was harming the position of
Jews in Morocco. At the same time, four Moroccan Jewish leaders were sent
to France quietly to contact representatives of leading Jewish organizations,
to plead that they use their influence to stop Jewish movement. This, they
said, undermined efforts of Jews to become fully integrated citizens in
Morocco.

Unanimously, Jewish organizations responded that the Moroccan govern-
ment itself was responsible for illegal emigration by refusing to recognize the
real and spontaneous desire of thousands of Jews to go to Israel, and to pro-
vide some legal means by which they could do so. They urged that on
humanitarian grounds the Moroccan government should at least permit the
emigration of the transients stranded in Tangiers and Tetuan, and the re-
uniting of families. The Jewish Agency for Palestine denied that Jews from
Morocco were treated as second-class citizens in Israel, and Moroccan Jews
already in Israel sent an urgent plea to King Mohammed V to let their kin
join them.

By November 1957 a critical impasse had been reached. Leaders of Jewish
organizations hoped to discuss the matter with King Mohammed V during
his visit to the United States.

Jewish Community Organization

The status of Jewish community councils—first established in May 1918,
and given various welfare, taxation, and representation functions and powers
in Moroccan dahirs of January 1931 and May 1945—remained unclear in
independent Morocco. The Central Council of Jewish Communities still led
a nominal existence, but had remained virtually dormant since the elections
of February 1956, in which the old leadership was replaced by persons be-
lieved to be more favorably regarded by the government. For all practical
purposes, the government ignored the central council’s existence; it came out
of the limbo to which it had been relegated only in November 1957, as noted
above, to protest Jewish clandestine emigration to Israel. The individual Jewish community councils in the cities still functioned, primarily for welfare work. In some cities—Casablanca, Marrakech—the former Jewish community councils were replaced by new groups of Jewish personalities, more favorably looked upon by Moroccan nationalist elements. The methods by which such changeovers were accomplished were of dubious legality. In some instances the composition of the councils became a political football between the Istiqlal and PDI parties, particularly in Casablanca. In a series of editorials and articles in March and April 1957, the PDI French-language weekly *Democratie* expressed the "indignation of our Jewish compatriots of Casablanca" because, in the summer of 1956, the governor of the city had replaced the former Jewish community council with men of his own choice, thus violating established procedures for choosing the council. The majority of the appointed council were Istiqlal adherents, while many of the ousted council members belonged to the PDI. The PDI-Istiqlal fight in Casablanca flared up again in the fall of 1957 when two traditionalist members of the council, Albert Levy and Israel Bennarosh, resigned. This provided the occasion for election of a new president of the Casablanca council, to replace David Benazareff. Benazareff had quit almost immediately after his appointment in 1956, having been named a member of the National Consultative Assembly. When a PDI member, Jacques Banon, was elected, Governor Si Bargash of Casablanca province refused to recognize the election as valid. Moroccan authorities also interfered in an internal Jewish community election at Fez in the fall of 1957, the minister of interior refusing to recognize the election of Bensimon, who also belonged to the PDI.

In December 1956 and early in 1957, at the initiative of the Moroccan section of the World Jewish Congress, three meetings of Jewish leaders drew up a series of proposals for submission to the government on the status of Jewish community councils in Morocco. Essentially, they proposed that the community councils continue to have juridical personality and be public institutions. The councils would do welfare work and assure the support of Jewish religious institutions; they would eschew all political or representative activities. The member bodies, it was planned, would be united in a Consistoire Central. All Jews in Morocco would be eligible to join, a notable departure from the old system under which only Moroccan subjects could be community members. A minimum of two-thirds of the council governing body, however, would have to be composed of Moroccan subjects, and the president and first vice president would also have to be Moroccans. Finally, in another break with tradition, it was proposed that women should also be members, with the right to vote.

The proponents of the plan held that

There exists a "problem of the communities" which it would be well to resolve . . . as much in the national interest as in the particular interest of the Jews. In the national interest, because we shall be contributing to the proper functioning of an organization vital for the country; in the Jewish interest, since the community has as its task to administer all religious matters, watch over the religious instruction of our children, and to initiate,
manage, and support a number of welfare organizations, all of immediate usefulness.

This move was attacked in *Al Istiqlal* on December 7, 1956, by Marc Sabah, a Jewish school teacher who had often denounced the Jewish community councils in past years. "Certain organizations that have nothing to do here persist in wanting to play at being protectors and pretend that they are indispensable intermediaries between the Moroccan government and Moroccans of the Jewish faith," he wrote, criticizing the WJC initiative. However, before drawing up their proposals, Jewish leaders had consulted unofficially with various experts in the ministry of the interior. They had reason to believe, therefore, that their suggestions would be welcomed, at least as a basis for discussion, to regularize the anomalous position of Jewish community councils.

Throughout 1957, a number of approaches were made to the Moroccan government, asking action on the proposals. In July 1957 Premier Si Bekkai told the American Jewish Committee delegation that he had no knowledge of the plan, and promised to look into the matter. The year passed however, without any government reaction to the proposed *dahir*, and the situation and status of the Jewish community councils, and of organized Jewish life in Morocco generally, remained as confused as before.

The rabbinical court system in Morocco was reorganized during 1956-57 to accord with the reorganization of Moroccan territory. The reorganization did not affect the functions or attributes of the courts, which continued to apply the Mosaic law to cases affecting the personal status of Moroccan Jews, i.e., marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. The reformed system consisted of nine regional and twelve supplementary tribunals. Two of these were new ones, at Ksar es Souk for the province of Tafilalet, and at Agadir for the province of that name.

**Social Service**

Jewish welfare, education, and vocational training institutions continued, and in some cases even expanded, their activities. They more or less pragmatically adjusted their status and programs to fit into the framework of independent Morocco. Sometimes this search for a new *modus vivendi* involved negotiation with Moroccan government officials. Sometimes, new patterns began to evolve by gradual day-by-day changes in methods of operation.

The need for assistance was greater than ever, because of the displacement of thousands of Jews within Morocco, as a result of the emigration of previous years and the parlous general economic situation of the country. There were still about 200,000 Jews in Morocco. The largest Jewish community was in Casablanca, with some 80,000 Jews; Marrakech, Fez, Rabat, Meknes, and Tangiers had 12,000-15,000 each. The flow of Jews from the countryside into the cities continued. Losses through emigration were partially made up by the excess of births over deaths, large families being the rule. The relatively small Jewish middle class, a leading commercial element in Morocco, was particularly affected by economic stagnation. Especially hard hit were busi-
ness and real estate agents, salesmen and the majority of small business men in textiles, and those engaged in the sale of manufactured goods. Managing somewhat better were those who sold food products, and those in handicrafts. Below this thin crust, the great majority of Jews in Morocco lived in wretched social conditions. There was also a new sub-proletariat, composed of Jews who had moved from interior villages into the cities.

The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) estimated in October 1957 that approximately 60,000 men, women, and children received some form of direct or indirect assistance from it during 1957. Over 30,000 persons—primarily school children—benefited from feeding programs; more than 10,000 got medical care through thirty hospitals and clinics maintained by the Oeuvre pour Secour Aux Enfants Israélites (OSE); there were 1,545 children in nine child care institutions. The number of persons taking Organization for Rehabilitation Through Training (ORT) courses jumped about 15 per cent during the year to approximately 3,000. Four special loan institutions set up by the Jewish Colonization Association together with the JDC helped 685 family heads to establish themselves in business. More than 10,000 children went to summer camps or day schools, programs that had been curtailed in more troubled times being restored during 1956-57. Many of these camps offered special Hebrew courses for older children. Well over 1,500,000 pounds of United States Department of Agriculture surplus foods were distributed through Jewish organizations; there was also a special distribution of 180,000 items of clothing by JDC to 24,000 girls and boys.

In the midst of the generally depressing situation of the Moroccan masses, the welfare work done on behalf of the Jews could not help but attract attention. Many Jewish organizations gradually extended some of their services to Moslems as well as to Jews in recent years. To cite but a few examples: Moslem as well as Jewish mothers were finding their way to OSE child-care clinics. In certain towns, like Mazagan, the Alliance Israélite Universelle had put its schools at the disposition of Moslem students, and was recruiting Moslems as well as Jews in towns like Sefrou, Kasba, and Tadla. JDC gave clothing and food supplies to certain Moslem benevolent societies. During 1956-57, too, steps were taken to assure greater distribution of American surplus agricultural products among the Moslem masses through the cooperation of the Moroccan government, the United States International Cooperation Administration, and American Protestant and Catholic groups.

The feeling that there should be an "integration" of Jewish and non-Jewish institutions in all but the religious field was, nonetheless, still strong in certain quarters, including certain Jewish circles. To many Moroccans, however, "integration" meant doing away with Jewish organizations by their fusion into more general bodies. Something of this sentiment was expressed by Hamed Lalou, an Istiqlal party delegate to the Consultative Assembly. In November 1957 he stated that the aid given by the JDC to Moroccan Jews had "deplorable consequences" on the integration of Jews into the Moroccan community. While praising the "laudable" work of the JDC, he suggested that foreign aid received by local Jewish communities should be turned over to the national social assistance organization, Entr'aide Nationale, and then distributed among the nation's needy without distinction as to their origin,
as a means of “achieving a true rapprochement, or Moroccanization, of Moroccan Jews.”

**Education**

At the end of 1957, the Alliance Israélite Universelle (with over 29,000 children in its network of eighty-one institutions) was engaged in negotiations with the Moroccan government to clarify the position of its school system. The Alliance Israélite Teachers Union had demanded, as early as December 1956, that the Alliance schools be transferred from the European to the Moslem elementary system in Morocco, and had urged that teachers of French nationality be replaced by those of Moroccan nationality. They were anxious, too, to become part of the Moroccan civil service system. A decision to this effect was taken by the Moroccan government, to become effective January 1958 for teachers of Moroccan nationality. Teachers of French nationality saw their position assimilated to that of instructors attached to the French government cultural mission in Morocco.

The Lubavitcher school system reported that approximately 7,000 boys were enrolled in its network of yeshivot and Talmud Torahs, and that 1,000 girls were also receiving education. Five Lubavitcher Yeshiva heads came from outside Morocco; the rest were recruited locally. The third major school system was that of Ozer Hatorah. Ozer Hatorah opened a special Yeshiva for teacher training, Neve Shalom, in Casablanca in October 1957. Most active in youth work throughout the year was the Département Educatif de la Jeunesse Juive (DEJJ). It was in considerable measure thanks to the initiative of DEJJ, together with ORT and Alliance, that a Jewish youth delegation volunteered for work on the Unity Road linking south and north Morocco. In order to make Jewish participation possible, the Moroccan government permitted the installation of a kosher kitchen by DEJJ, which also took charge of recruiting the Jewish volunteer group.