Germany

During the year under review (July, 1950, through June, 1951), the evolution of Germany proceeded more than ever under the shadow of the "cold war" between the Soviet Union and the Western democratic Allies. Efforts at integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western bloc and of the German Democratic Republic into the Eastern bloc continued to gather momentum. To this end, many of the safeguards against a resurgence of militarism and Nazism in Germany, introduced by the Allied powers after her military defeat in 1945, were abandoned.

Federal Republic of Germany (Western Germany)

The West German state, formed on the territory of the three Western occupation zones in 1949, was well on the way towards the imminent achievement of sovereignty. In June, 1950, the Federal Republic accepted associate membership of the Council of Europe, with its headquarters in Strasbourg. Two months later, it was authorized to join the Council's Committee of Ministers in a consultative capacity; in May, 1951, it was granted full membership. The Federal Republic appointed Consuls-General for London and for New York in June of 1950, and in the course of the following year established scores of additional consulates in the non-Communist countries of the world. In September, 1950, the Federal Republic participated as a partner in the creation of the European Payments Union, and later was admitted to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Office, and other specialized international bodies. Beginning in February, 1951, a German delegation took part, on terms of full equality, in the Paris conference for the establishment of a European army. In March, 1951, the Allied High Commission relinquished a number of powers vested in it by the Occupation Statute, notably in reference to German domestic matters. Allied restrictions on the production of steel, synthetic gasoline, and artificial rubber were relaxed. A Foreign Ministry was established in the West German capital of Bonn, with Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer also assuming the functions and title of a Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Federal Republic now could, and did, exchange diplomatic representatives with other nations; the conduct of foreign affairs reverted in large measure to German hands. In April, Adenauer, together with the representatives of France, Italy, and the

1 The purpose of this article is to present a comprehensive review of developments in Western Germany primarily. It is planned to deal at greater length with East Germany in a forthcoming volume.—Ed.
Benelux countries, signed the "Schuman Plan"—a fifty-year treaty for the pooling of the coal and steel resources of the participating countries, which had, however, still to be approved by the parliaments concerned. In July, 1951, most countries, with the exception of the Eastern bloc and of Israel, terminated their state of war with Germany. The sum and substance of these developments was—according to the tenor of a declaration issued on September 14, 1951, by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and France at the conclusion of their Washington conference—a complete transformation of the relationship between Germany and the Western Allies. The Occupation Statute was to be replaced by contractual arrangements freely arrived at, Germany to participate in Western defense (i.e., rearmament) and to be included "on a basis of equality, in a continental European community."

In a good part as a consequence of world-wide rearmament and with the aid of United States Marshall Plan and GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) funds, the German economy was undergoing a boom in 1950-51. Production exceeded the already favorable 1936 level by more than one-third. The most striking feature of economic recovery was the improvement of West Germany's over-all export position in the face of a sharp decline of her exports to countries in the Soviet orbit. After a foreign-exchange crisis in the last quarter of 1950 had been staved off by a special credit from the European Payments Union, the Federal Republic succeeded in improving its balance of trade very substantially. Its trade deficit dropped from $1,100,000,000 in 1949 to $700,000,000 in 1950. Employment rose to an all-time peak of almost 15,000,000 by the fall of 1951, while unemployment dropped to 1,200,000.

**German Democratic Republic (East Germany)**

The Sovietization of East Germany continued apace. The first zone-wide "elections" for the East German parliament resulted in an announced vote of 99.7 per cent for the Communist-dominated "unity list," with an electoral participation of 98.5 per cent. A participation of 99.5 per cent and an affirmative vote of 96 per cent were recorded in a so-called "anti-rearmilitarization plebiscite" held in June, 1951. Prodigious propaganda drives led up to the monster "World Youth Festival" in August, 1951. Prices were repeatedly slashed in the state-owned stores which sold goods unobtainable elsewhere at many times their normal cost. Certain foodstuffs, textiles, became unrationed. Although somewhat improved by comparison with earlier postwar years, the standard of living was still well below that of West Germany.

**Political Scene**

In the foreground of West German public interest were such diverse topics as European integration, the reunification of the two Germanies, rearmilitarization, labor's right to codetermination with management in certain policy questions, the equalization of financial burdens deriving from the war and its aftermath, and the reinstatement of civil servants who had lost
their positions, or their pensions, upon the Allied occupation. The theme basic to all these interests was that of Restauration—the trend toward “normalcy,” the comeback of Germany and the re-emergence of the psychological climate, the social conditions, and the political issues of the past.

Denazification

In the latter half of 1950, a few major denazification cases were tried, generally after appeals had been filed against earlier decisions. Hitler's financial wizard and Reichsbank President, Hjalmar Schacht, was acquitted in his fifth trial; a fine was imposed upon Baron Kurt von Schröder, the banker who had financed Hitler and had brought him together with the leaders of industry and finance at a period in 1932 when the Nazi Party was in dire straits; and Mathilde Ludendorff, fanatic crusader against Judaism and Christianity and founder of her own neo-pagan cult, was sentenced to one year's “special work,” to be performed at home, and to confiscation of half her property. She was also barred from editorial and similar activity, but again published her magazine under the name of her son-in-law.

In 1951 the denazification program came to a virtual end, most state parliaments enacting or considering laws for terminating all but a few residual operations. In West Germany, fewer than fifty Nazis were still serving sentences in mild internment camps, like Eichstatt in Bavaria. Little effort was made to collect the fines imposed and still unpaid, small as most of them were; the same held true of the 27,600 cases in the American Zone in which Denazification Courts had ordered partial confiscation of property. Restrictions on employment were disregarded and evaded with impunity; originally such restrictions, as for instance the prohibition to engage in politics, or in newspaper work, or in a profession, had been imposed in 126,000 cases.

In the United States Zone, responsibility for denazification passed into German hands when the “Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism” was promulgated in March, 1946. It was designed to determine by quasi-judicial proceedings those who had been active Nazis and to impose condign sanctions on those so adjudged. During the five years of its operation, 3,670,000 Germans were found to be chargeable because of membership in the Nazi party or one of its subsidiaries and affiliates. More than 3,000,000 of that number were amnestied or had their cases quashed. The remainder were either exonerated or placed in one of four categories—major offenders, offenders, lesser offenders, and nominal members (“followers”). Restrictions on the more than 600,000 classified as “lesser offenders” and “nominal members” had in practice long been abandoned. The 23,000 held to be “offenders” at the time of their trial, and the 1,700 “major offenders,” were barred from public employment unless they could obtain a pardon or commutation of their sentence. Some of them could not vote, run for office, or draw full pensions.

Frequently it was rather the former Denazification Court officials who were subjected to social and economic boycott. Laws had been passed making it
mandatory for public bodies to employ a certain percentage of such people who believed that Germany should be purged of Nazism, but many agencies—the postal and railroad systems, for example—and municipalities refused to comply. The former Denazification Ministries had generally given up the struggle to place their dismissed employees, paying them a certain lump-sum settlement instead.

Renazification

One of the most noticeable characteristics of the period under review was the trend toward the "renazification" of Germany; i.e., the regaining of influence in public, economic, and cultural life of those who had supported Nazism, or exploited the conditions it created.

The renazification of public life took many forms. The illustrated weeklies deluged the news stands with sentimental and sympathetic articles about Nazi leaders and their families. Bitter-end Nazi periodicals, Nation Europa, for instance, were widely sold. An unreconstructed author like Ernst von Salomon, who was an accessory to the 1922 murder of Germany's Jewish Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau, wrote a best-seller about his sufferings at American hands. Nazi artists staged exhibitions of their paintings and held readings from their works. Groups who helped prepare the ground for Nazism, such as the socially exclusive duelling fraternities or the "Steel Helmet" veterans organization, were revived. Even the SS, branded a criminal organization by the International Military Tribunal, was resuscitated under the guise of societies for mutual aid among former SS members.

The reinfiltration of key government positions by former Nazi officials gave rise to particularly acute misgivings. In May, 1951, the Federal Government promulgated a law passed by the Federal Parliament to provide pensions and insure the re-employment of pre-1945 governmental officials not presently on the public payroll, and of former career soldiers and officers, as well as of the widows and orphans of both groups. One-fifth of the staff of all official agencies and public law corporations had to consist of such persons, the large majority of whom were active Nazis or militarists. In the new German Foreign Office 134 out of the 383 high-ranking officials were former members of the Nazi party. Democrats and Jews, although deeply disturbed by the mass influx of Nazi officials into government office, were in general resigned to its apparent inevitability in all but the top civil service ranks. They did protest vigorously, however, against the employment in key positions of people who had played a special and major role in carrying out the pitiless anti-Jewish program of Nazism and other characteristic major Nazi activities.

The best-known and most influential of these was the "grey eminence" of the Federal Chancellery, Hans Globke. The Social Democratic party, the German Trade Union Federation, the Central Council of Jews in Germany and other groups had repeatedly and publicly urged his removal because he was, among other things, co-author of the official Nazi commentary to the
viciously anti-Semitic Nuremberg laws, Kommentare zur deutschen Rassen gesetzgebung. All protests, however, had been unavailing.

Another notorious case was that of Dr. Emil Ehrich, whose entire career had been dedicated to the service of Nazism. Federal Minister Hellwege (German party) nonetheless made Ehrich his personal aide and staunchly upheld him—until he was exposed by the German Trade Union Federation. Then, in January, 1951, Ehrich resigned—and was promptly appointed campaign manager of a state-wide voting alliance for the Lower Saxony elections. This alliance was made up of Chancellor Adenauer’s Christian Democratic Union and Minister Hellwege’s German Party, both members of the Federal Government coalition. Dr. Ehrich even had the effrontery to sue the German Trade Union Federation because it had publicized his former post as Nazi Party Chief in Italy. Ehrich did not, however, prevail in court because he could not contest the accuracy of the statement.

Two other names stand out among high officials who remained in office, although insistent public demands had been voiced for their recall because of the support they gave to the anti-Jewish extermination policy of Hitlerism. One was Dr. Kutscher, during the Third Reich in charge of Jewish questions at the German Foreign Office, and at the time personal aide to Minister of Economics Erhard (CDU). The other was Kurt Behnke, who had published a book on administrative discipline during the Nazi regime; at the time of writing he was in charge of the Section on Civil Service Law in the Ministry of the Interior.

THE SOCIALIST REICH PARTY

When the people of Lower Saxony went to the polls on May 6, 1951, they cast 367,000 votes—11 per cent of the total—for the Socialist Reich party (SRP), a group whose outlook and tactics were all but indistinguishable from those of the pre-1933 Nazi party. The SRP strongholds were among the well-to-do native peasants in the Protestant districts, particularly in the Lueneburg Heath. The chairman of the SRP was Fritz Doris, an ex-Nazi, who, after the German collapse, was deemed politically so dangerous that Military Government authorities interned him for a year. Thereafter, he was associated with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) until 1948, and was elected to the German Federal Parliament the following year. The party “braintrust” was Wolf Count von Westarp, a Nazi journalist who had been a member of both the Nazi party and the SS, also active in the CDU until convicted for falsifying his political questionnaire in 1949. The third member of the triumvirate running the SRP was its Secretary-General, Gerhard Krüger, Nazi fanatic, who, after the war, was kept in internment camps for fully three years; when released, he was barred from all political activity by a denazification court, a prohibition he was brazenly flouting. The party's chief orator and principal propaganda attraction was Major General Otto Ernst Remer, a career officer whom Hitler had promoted from Major to General for crushing the anti-Hitler putsch of July 20, 1944.

The Nazi background of the SRP was matched by its Nazi ideology. At first, the party had not been taken seriously by the Federal Government, and indeed considered a potential ally by the German party, a partner of the
Federal Government coalition. After its electoral triumph, and after 16 SRP delegates had become members of the 158-seat state legislature of Lower Saxony, the Federal Government became alarmed, prohibited the paramilitary formations of the SRP, and prepared to file suit before the Constitutional Court to have the party declared unconstitutional.

Minor neo-Nazi splinter groups had appeared before, but the SRP was not only the first well-organized and well-disciplined, but also the first successful neo-Nazi party in West Germany. Yet it was less the relatively strong showing of SRP which aroused uneasiness among qualified observers than the fact that, especially in northwest Germany, other parties followed a similar ultra-nationalist line. In the Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony polls, more than half of the electorate cast ballots for outspokenly chauvinistic candidates, more or less Nazi-minded, who appeared on half a dozen different tickets.

THE REFUGEE PARTY

Another new political party had a Nazi leadership; however, its platform stressed the social grievances of its members, the German refugees from the East, and favored their return to their original homes in Eastern Europe.

On July 9, 1950, elections to the legislature of Schleswig-Holstein in the British Zone resulted in a landslide victory for the newly organized Bloc of Expellees and Victims of Injustice (BHE). In this, the first election in which it participated, BHE received 307,000 votes, almost a quarter of the total and the second highest number. The Social Democratic party (SPD), which had polled 470,000 votes in 1947, declined to 360,000, the largest number of votes. The BHE triumph was possible because Schleswig-Holstein had a larger proportion of expellees than any other German state. The party's second-in-command, Dr. Alfred Gille, joined the Nazi party in 1933 and served as Nazi-appointed mayor of an East Prussian town.

When a new Schleswig-Holstein cabinet was formed in September, 1950, it included two BHE representatives—the party chairman, Waldemar Kraft as Deputy Minister President and Minister of Finance, and Hans Adolf Asbach as Minister of Social Affairs, Labor and Expellees. Kraft and Asbach were members of a coalition cabinet, their partner being the "German Electoral Bloc." Of the four ministers it provided, three—including the Minister President—had also been members of the Nazi party, one of the SS, in addition. Thus, of six ministers, five had been card-carrying Nazis. Previously none of the German postwar cabinets had contained a single ex-member of the Nazi party. The barrier which had previously excluded former Nazis from top policy-making positions had been breached, though the Minister President was replaced in June, 1951, by a party colleague who had not been a Nazi.

When a new cabinet was formed in Bavaria in 1951, two BHE representatives were included as State Secretaries. Both were formerly active Nazis. Three BHE Ministers were included in the Lower Saxony cabinet formed in June, 1951, one a Junker, the other two veteran Nazis. In the fall of 1951, the Lower Saxony BHE named Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart as its third chairman. Stuckart was for many years State Secretary in the Nazi Ministry
of the Interior. He was to be tried in Nuremberg as a war criminal, but the court refrained from indicting him because he submitted medical certificates that he was an incurable invalid.

**LEGISLATIVE ACTION**

It should not be imagined that no efforts were made to stem the tide of renazification.

Mention has already been made of the German Government's action in prohibiting the para-military formations of the SRP and in seeking to have the party outlawed. Here it may be apposite to mention two other gratifying steps by the German Federal Government.

At Rome in November, 1950, it subscribed to the "European Charter of Human Rights," which was prepared by the Council of Europe. In April, 1951, the German Federal Government enacted legislation defining the legal, political, social, and economic status of displaced persons and stateless aliens resident in the Federal Republic, placing them on an equal footing with Germans in most respects.

**Reparations**

In early 1951, the State of Israel submitted notes to the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, asking that Germany be required to pay Israel $1,500,000,000 in reparations as a contribution to the cost incurred in resettling displaced persons made homeless in consequence of the Nazi policy of extermination.

During the years after World War II major Jewish organizations and Germans of good will had on a number of occasions expressed their regret at the German government's failure to avow the German people's responsibility for the crimes committed and at its unwillingness to provide some indemnification for the survivors. After lengthy preparations behind the scenes, Federal Chancellor Adenauer on September 27, 1951, delivered a Statement of Policy to the Federal Parliament in which he pledged to combat anti-Semitism and declared that "the Federal Government, and with it the vast majority of the German people, are conscious of the immeasurable suffering that was inflicted upon the Jews in Germany and in the occupied territories during the period of National Socialism." Although averring that the overwhelming majority of the German people had abhorred the crimes committed, he held that the "unspeakable crimes" perpetrated in its name "impose the obligation to make moral and material amends, both as regards the individual damage which Jews have suffered and as regards Jewish property for which there are no longer individual claimants... So as to smooth the way for the spiritual erasing of infinite suffering," the Chancellor concluded, "the Federal Government is prepared to bring about a solution of the material reparations jointly with representatives of Jewry and the state of Israel." This statement was unanimously endorsed by all parties represented in the Federal Parliament except the neo-Nazi and Communist,
and generally welcomed by the German press. United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy warmly hailed Chancellor Adenauer's step.

In some Jewish quarters, any negotiation with Germans was opposed on moral grounds, but in general Jewish reaction was cautious rather than hostile. Most official statements, including one by the Government of Israel, pointed out that it was not professions and declarations which counted, but their translation into practical steps. On October 25 and 26, 1951, representatives of major Jewish organizations throughout the world assembled in New York to review the offer of the Federal Government.

No avowal of responsibility and no offer to make amends of any sort had been forthcoming from the East German government, an omission which was criticized in an official Israel communique.

Restitution

Discussion of collective recompense to the state of Israel had not yet progressed beyond the initial stage. It was different with the restitution of identifiable property—houses, business enterprises, furniture and the like, which had been formerly owned by Jews and were located in Western Germany.

Legislation to return such property was in force throughout Western Germany: United States Military Government Law 59 became effective on November 10, 1947; British Military Government Law 59 on May 12, 1949; and French Ordinance 180 on July 26, 1949.

Thus sufficient time had passed to warrant an assessment of the progress of this "internal restitution" program. Claims dealing with altogether 234,052 restitution cases had been filed in West Germany as of August 31, 1951. About 127,000 of these claims originated with individuals, by no means all of whom were Jewish. The remainder were submitted by agencies acting on behalf of heirless or communal property. In the United States Zone, the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO) entered 52,164 claims, and in the British Zone the Jewish Trust Corporation (JTC) entered 25,598. In the French Zone, 26,268 claims were introduced by the local authorities designated for that purpose: a successor organization was in the preparatory stages. The total number of restitution cases was expected to reach, or slightly exceed, 250,000.

Slightly more than half of all West German restitution claims—119,000—had been disposed of by August 31, 1951. In the French Zone, the proportion was 68 per cent, in the United States Zone 54 per cent, and in the British Zone 33 per cent. It must be borne in mind that a claim had not necessarily been granted when it was "disposed of." Since the statistical methods of the three zones were at variance, no over-all figures can be quoted. It is significant, though, that of 23,000 claims "finally disposed of" in the British Zone, only 2,500 were awarded to the claimant by decision of a restitution agency; furthermore, 6,800 amicable settlements were reported. However, 5,600 claims were withdrawn, 4,600 rejected and 10,500 referred to a court of appeal. In the French Zone, the 30,000 claims "finally disposed
of" included 17,500 which were withdrawn and 2,100 settled by decisions of a restitution agency or court; such decisions may be for or against a claimant. Of the restitution claims disposed of in the United States Zone since the law went into effect in November, 1947, about 22,000 were amicably settled and the same number withdrawn by the petitioners. Of JRSO claims, 13,500 had been taken over by the German state of Hesse in a "bulk-settlement" agreement, a method strongly favored by United States authorities. The restitution agencies dismissed 4,200 cases, and only 3,700 were settled by judicial decision.

The total value of all property which could be expected to be restituted in West Germany and West Berlin was estimated at one billion dollars at the most; some observers were more pessimistic, but on the other hand certain German politicians, including last year the then Minister of Finance in Hesse, inflamed popular sentiment by quoting figures as high as nine billion dollars. Data on the value of property actually restituted to date were available for the American Zone only. It was estimated to be worth DM 666,000,000 ($158,500,000). Restituted property with a book value of DM 38,500,000 went to JRSO, the rest—estimated at DM 627,000,000—to individuals. If the estimated value stated by the claimants themselves was accepted, Jewish claims in the British Zone covered property with an over-all value of DM 500,000,000 ($119,000,000).

No exact statistics were available for West Berlin, where restitution legislation became effective later than in the three zones of Western Germany. The total number of claims there was estimated at 93,000. By June 30, 1951, the number of cases disposed of was given as 7,700. Thus, there was a very great number of cases in Berlin on which no action had as yet been taken.

OPPOSITION TO RESTITUTION

With the Federal Republic of Germany approaching its goal of sovereignty and the Occupation Statute about to be relinquished, the future of restitution was uncertain. In the event some measure of Allied control was not retained, and internal restitution not included among the reserved powers which the Western Allies proposed to retain under contractual agreements with the German Federal Government, that government might succumb to the pressure of the "Aryanizers," the numerous Germans who acquired Jewish property cheaply during the rule of Nazism and who were naturally loath to give it up. They had organized an effective lobby, the Bundesvereinigung für Loyale Restitution. Together with other potent groups such as the Association of Chambers of Agriculture, this lobby assailed the principles of restitution with increasing acrimony and proposed "modifications" of restitution legislation that would defeat its very purpose. In April, 1951, it submitted to the Federal Parliament a draft law intended to supplant present restitution legislation. In the same month, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the principal government party in Bavaria, introduced a similar motion in the Bavarian legislature; already in October, 1950, its parent body, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), largest of the German parties, had officially asked the Federal Government what it intended to do "to
remove the obvious hardships" of restitution legislation and to protect the "purchasers in good faith" of Jewish property. On October 11, 1951, the Federal Parliament discussed a motion by the Bavarian party drafted along the same line. These efforts had the support of the German nationalist parties and politicians, like Federal Vice-Chancellor Franz Bluecher and Federal Minister Hellwege, but were opposed by Federal Minister of Justice Thomas Dehler, the governmental spokesman on the matter. The leader of the Social Democratic opposition, Kurt Schumacher, had also remonstrated against the attempts to sabotage effective restitution. In June, 1951, United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy in an official letter cautioned the premiers of the four states in the American Zone that the United States was determined to see the restitution program continued without change. In July, 1951, British High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick followed suit with a similar letter to the four premiers of the British Zone.

**PROGRESS IN RESTITUTION**

It was certain that the internal restitution program could not be completed by the end of 1951, the target date set by McCloy in December of 1950. The restitution program was expected to continue until well into 1953.

Certain procedural changes to shorten legal delays in restitution proceedings were introduced by the United States High Commission late in 1950. Considerable progress was expected from the "bulk-settlement" agreements concluded between the constituent states of the Federal Republic and the successor organizations. Bremen had paid lump sums to JRSO; they planned to collect from the present owners the amounts by which the latter had underpaid for Jewish heirless or communal property at the time they acquired it. Negotiations along similar lines had long been in process between JRSO and the other two states in the United States Zone, Bavaria and Wuerttemberg-Baden, but they were encountering considerable difficulties.

Since the overwhelming majority of Jews entitled to restitution did not reside in Germany, the funds accruing to them on the basis of restitution settlements remained frozen in blocked accounts, in accordance with German foreign-currency regulations. It was thus a step forward when the Allied High Commission in June, 1950, relaxed certain restrictions. Henceforth property in Germany could be transferred between non-German owners, and foreign owners of Deutsche Mark balances could be licensed to use them for investment in Germany. In October, 1951, the Allied High Commission approved a proposal of the German Federal Government to permit successor organizations to purchase certain German goods with their blocked funds and export them to Israel. The privilege of exporting personal property or newly purchased merchandise up to an amount of DM 5,000 ($1,190) was also granted to individuals on a tentative basis.

In the Soviet Zone and in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, restitution did not exist in practical terms.
Compensation

There were other aspects of the indemnification problem, notably that of financial compensation, to some degree, for damage to life and limb, for false imprisonment, for confiscation of stocks or bank accounts, for deprivation of property which no longer existed, etc. Whereas no general law covering such compensation had yet been enacted in the British Zone, appropriate legal provisions were on the books in the states of the other two zones. Berlin also passed a compensation law in January, 1951.

However, no reimbursement had been made for property losses. In the main, only a first instalment on part of the claims for incarceration in concentration camps had been paid. (DM 5 [$1.20] were to be awarded per day spent in jail or camp, provided the former inmate could meet certain restrictive conditions.) During the period 1946–51, the total amount of compensation actually paid in all of Germany was believed to be below $50,000,000. By contrast, Otto Küster, the Deputy Chairman of the Permanent Conference of Restitution Agencies of the German States, had estimated that valid claims under the compensation laws already in force exceeded $1,000,000,000.

Claims Against the Government

It will be noted that restitution had to be made by individuals who had taken advantage of the Nazi persecution of the Jews to acquire their property, and that compensation was a claim against the treasuries of the constituent states (Laender) of the German Federal Republic. The Federal Republic itself, although successor to the assets of the former German Reich, had at the time of writing (December, 1951) refused to honor restitution and compensation claims against the Reich—for repayment of the billion-Mark "Jewish tax" imposed in 1938, for instance. The pension rights of the handful of former Jewish civil servants forced into exile by the Third Reich had been reinstated, but very little in the way of material amends had been made by the West German state.

War Crimes

With the execution of the last seven war criminals and the application of lenient standards to the rest, an important chapter in the evolution of justice, and in the fulfillment or neglect of Allied war aims, came to an end. These criminals were Otto Ohlendorf, Paul Blobel, Erich Naumann, Werner Braune, Oswald Pohl, Georg Schallermair, and Hans Schmidt.

While no statistics covering all of Germany were available, it was known that the United States had not only extradited 4,430 suspects to countries wishing to try them for war crimes, but had conducted the greatest number
of formal trials of the four Occupation Powers. Of 1,879 defendants, 462 were sentenced to death, and 222 to life imprisonment. There were 882 lesser jail sentences, and 293 acquitals; 283 were hanged.

In 1949 all war crimes trials in the United States Zone were terminated. Numerous military and civilian agencies investigated, reviewed and modified the sentences already imposed. Sickness was taken into account, "discrimination against the defendant," disparity of sentences, old age, immaturity. In 1951 time credited to prisoners for good behavior was increased from five to ten days a month. Full credit was now given for pretrial confinement, for postwar internment on political grounds, even for time spent in prisoner-of-war camps after May 8, 1945. In one way or another, most of the verdicts were eventually modified—reduced, quashed, vacated, amnestied, or paroled. The majority of those originally convicted were already at liberty. Nonetheless German complaints against the war crimes verdicts swelled in volume and bitterness. Even Catholic and Protestant bishops, freemasons, the Conference of University Rectors, Cabinet Ministers, the political parties and a unanimous Federal Parliament pleaded for the lives of the seven war criminals; the parliament sent a special delegation to the United States High Commissioner on their behalf.

On January 31, 1951, United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy announced his final decisions on clemency for the war criminals convicted in the Nuremberg trials. Ten of the fifteen remaining death sentences were commuted to imprisonment; thirty-six out of forty-one prison sentences were reduced to lesser terms. The terms of thirty-two prisoners were reduced to time served. At the same time General Thomas T. Handy, in charge of the United States Army's European Command, commuted eleven death sentences and upheld two.

The prisoners appealed once more to the United States courts, and filed petitions for writs of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Only after the Supreme Court had for the third time refused to grant a stay of the executions were they carried out on June 7, 1951.

Clemency was also extended to convicted war criminals by the British and French High Commissioners, and by the Soviets to those willing to work for them. Unaffected by the new leniency were only the seven top Nazis convicted by Nuremberg's International Military Tribunal held in Berlin's Spandau jail, which was jointly administered by the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. On this last island of four-power cooperation in Germany, no one power could unilaterally introduce changes. A campaign for the liberation of the prisoners was being waged in the German press, however. The Parliament and Government of Wuerttemberg-Baden had officially urged the release of Constantin Baron von Neurath, Hitler's Foreign Minister.

GERMAN COURTS AND WAR CRIMES TRIALS

When the Allied powers decided not to conduct any more war crimes trials, the responsibility for handling such prosecutions was transferred to the German courts. During the period under review, scores of Germans were brought to trial for Nazi crimes. Proceedings had generally been initiated
many years before, when a different psychological atmosphere prevailed, but it was only during 1950-51 that the cases reached court calendars. It was expected that few cases would be tried. German popular sentiment was overwhelmingly against "bringing up such dead issues," and there was a widespread reluctance on the part of the prosecutors to indict, of witnesses to testify, and of juries to convict. Only in the rarest of cases would erstwhile colleagues risk telling the truth; usually they perjured themselves on behalf of the defendant. Most eye-witnesses among the victims had been killed and few of the survivors remained in Germany. Evidence of unimpeachable probative value was thus commonly lacking. The maximum sentence of life imprisonment—Germany had abolished the death penalty—was sometimes meted out, however, where a number of reliable eye-witnesses could personally testify to unspeakable cruelties.

During 1950-51, many Germans brought to the bar of justice for crimes against humanity committed in the Nazi era were accused of anti-Semitic outrages and brutalities. Acquittals were common; often even the mild sentences imposed were not served. The period during which a defendant was held in an Allied internment camp for political suspects in the immediate postwar era as well as arrest during the pretrial investigation counted as time served. Those found guilty of Nazi crimes according to the terms of the German penal code usually appealed their convictions; they were often released pending the hearing of their appeal. Most offensive perhaps was the case of Dr. Gerhard Peters, a chemist who supplied to the Oswiecim (Auschwitz) concentration camp the murderous gas crystals with which millions were slain. Sentenced to five years' penal servitude in his second trial some time before, Peters was released from jail on "home leave," pending decision on still another appeal. Even after the legal maximum term for such "home leave" had expired, he remained at provisional liberty. On at least one occasion, he delivered a public lecture.

Most attention was attracted by the case of Ilse Koch, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for instigation of murder by an Augsburg jury in January, 1951.

Inauspicious for the cause of bringing Nazi criminals to justice was a British ruling issued in the summer of 1951, barring German courts in the British Zone from applying Control Council Law No. 10 on "Crimes against Humanity." Previously a number of important convictions had been based on this law, German legislation not being adequate to cover many Nazi crimes.

**Jewish Population**

The census of September, 1950, put the population of the Federal Republic and West-Berlin at 49,952,000; at the time of writing it was believed to have exceeded 50,000,000. The population of the Soviet Zone, together with the Soviet Sector of Berlin, was estimated at 18,600,000.

No reliable Jewish statistics were available, but it was assumed that about 30,000 professing Jews (0.05 per cent of the total population) lived in West
and East Germany. In 1925, the German Jewish community had been 564,000 (0.9 per cent).

The breakdown of the 1950 census according to religious affiliation had not yet been completed. Provisional figures were, however, available for the American Zone exclusive of the DP camps. The numbers of those who lived outside of camps and listed themselves as Jewish on the census blanks follow.

**TABLE 1**

**Jewish Population, Germany, U.S. Zone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>8,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td>2,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuerttemberg-Baden</td>
<td>1,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,996</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of September, 1950, about 10,000 Jews in displaced persons (DP's) camps should be added to these figures. During the period September, 1950, through September, 1951, their number had dwindled to 2,500. Only one Jewish DP camp remained, that of Föhrenwald near Wolfratshausen.

**Communal Organization**

The year under review opened with the attainment of a goal which the best of the Jewish leaders in postwar Germany had striven for ever since 1945: The creation of a unified representative body, the Central Council of the Jews in Germany (Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland).

Upon the invitation of the World Jewish Congress, prominent German Jews and Jewish DP's assembled in Frankfurt on July 9, 1950. Officials of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), the Jewish Agency, and the World Jewish Congress attended. It was decided to form a "roof organization" encompassing all of Germany, both West and East. Ten days later a Central Council was established, with a four-man executive committee, called the Directorate, and a fifteen-man board, called the Council. The Directorate which met for the first time in Munich in October elected H. G. van Dam as Secretary-General and resolved to oppose as discriminatory the German plan for establishing a special Jewish Section in the Federal Ministry of the Interior in Bonn. The Directorate was received by United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy in December. The following month, the formal constituent meeting of the Council took place in Hamburg. During 1951, the Council met in Berlin and in Düsseldorf in an attempt to formulate the point of view of the Jews in Germany to problems of topical urgency.

**DISPLACED PERSONS**

Shortly after the liberation of 1945, the Central Committee of Liberated Jews in the United States Zone had been democratically elected as the repre-
sentative DP body, and it was formally recognized as such by General Lucius D. Clay, the United States Military Governor. Similar Central Committees were also formed in the British and French Zones. Now that emigration of most DPs and changed circumstances had brought their usefulness to an end, the Central Committees of the American and French Zones closed their doors in early 1951. In August, the Central Committee in the British Zone followed suit.

Only in Munich did a sizeable DP community still exist. Under the chairmanship of Maurice Weinberger, a Council for the Liquidation of the Sha’aririth HaPlata was formed there with the aim of providing political and legal protection to the remaining DP’s.

Notable were the 1950 Berlin communal elections, in which 4,274 out of 5,914 eligible voters cast ballots. On the Board of the Community, the Liberal ticket gained fifteen seats, the Nationalist List nine, others two. Heinz Galinski was re-elected as Chairman.

Of the non-German Jewish organizations, Jewish Cultural Reconstruction and most sections of the Jewish Agency terminated their activities at the end of 1950. The JDC and the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) continue to operate.

Religious and Cultural Life

Five synagogues were dedicated in the period under review. Those in Dresden (Soviet Zone), Bielefeld (British Zone) and Karlsruhe (American Zone) were modest structures. Dresden had a population of 200 Jews, Bielefeld 60, Karlsruhe 125.

More impressive were the Saarbrücken synagogue, consecrated in January, 1951 to serve the entire Saar territory, and Germany’s most beautiful synagogue, seating over 1,000 worshippers, which was opened in Frankfurt in September, 1950, with many distinguished guests present.

Frankfurt opened a kindergarten, Stuttgart dedicated a new administration building, Heidelberg an old-age home, Berlin a new wing of its old-age home, and Cologne a mortuary. These were buildings serving the somewhat stabilized German-Jewish communities. Institutions catering to DP’s had to close their doors: the Hebrew High School and the Jewish Hospital in Munich, and the home for chronic invalids in Bad Wörishofen.

There were many occasions to commemorate the martyrs of Jewry. In June, 1950, twelve concentration camp cemeteries were dedicated in Bavaria, and eleven in August. The Opladen cemetery was rededicated in September, 1950, and a memorial for the victims of Nazism was unveiled on the Augsburg cemetery in September, 1950. The most moving and elaborate of such ceremonies took place when the Hamburg community consecrated a memorial to its 7,000 victims in June, 1951.

The shortage of rabbis continued, but with about six now temporarily in Germany, it was no longer quite as acute as it had been.

Berlin’s weekly Der Weg was merged with Düsseldorf’s Allgemeine Wochenzeitung, now the only German-Jewish paper appearing in Germany. Of the
Yiddish papers, the Central Committee organ *Unzer Veg* and the Revisionist *Unzer Velt* closed down. Only the *Naye Yidishe Tzaytung*, started in November, 1950, still appeared weekly in Munich.

At a Jewish student meeting in Lindau on Lake Constance in June, 1950, it was learned that the number of Jewish students at German universities had declined from 820 in 1948 to 350 in 1950. By mid-1951 the number had dwindled to about 150; most of the students were expected to conclude their studies within the next year.

**Anti-Semitism**

The relative frequency of anti-Semitic incidents may be taken as evidence of the persistence of strong anti-Semitic sentiments in Germany.

Incidents in daily life came to light only in the exceptional cases where the perpetrators were brought before a court. Often they were acquitted, like the person who started a minor riot by commenting, in the presence of a Fürth Jewish City Councilman, that too many Jews had escaped the gas chambers.

In a few cases, similar utterances were published. Such action was taken in Hagen (Westphalia); in Cologne (October, 1950); in Stuttgart (November, 1950); and in Bensheim (Hesse) in June, 1950.

It will be recalled that Wolfgang Hedler, a member of the Federal Parliament, had been acquitted at his trial for making viciously anti-Semitic remarks and insulting anti-Nazis generally (*see American Jewish Year Book*, 1951 [Vol. 52], p. 318). Hedler returned to Parliament in December, 1950, but upon appeal of the prosecution was sentenced to nine months imprisonment in July of 1951 for public insult, slander, and defaming the dead.

**DISCRIMINATION**

Particularly disquieting was discriminatory action by public authorities. In a reader for Catholic parochial schools, anti-Semitic passages were smuggled in after the manuscript had been approved by the Ministry of Education in the state of North Rhine Westphalia. Except for a vague promise that the editors would not in the future be called on to select material for textbooks, no action was taken. In January, 1951, the postmaster in Celle informed all Jewish businessmen that they would in future have to pay telephone fees in advance, rather than at the end of the month as was customary; when challenged, he explained that one Jewish subscriber had emigrated without settling his bill for that month. After public protests his superior ordered him to withdraw the circular, but he was not otherwise penalized. In sentencing three Jewish DP's for having sold hosiery in their textile business although they had a license for piecegoods only, Berlin Judge Prodehl found: "The defendants are Jewish businessmen of Polish nationality. . . . As foreigners, they enjoy the hospitality of the city of Berlin and have abused it. . . . The fact that the defendants are Jews had to be considered as a further aggravating factor in arriving at the sentence. . . ." Allied intervention was necessary before the judge was transferred.
SHEHITA

In Munich one of the most blatant examples of discrimination occurred in June, 1951, significant because it involved the democratically elected parliament in the city with the largest Jewish community in West Germany. By a vote of 26 to 10, the City Council urged the Bavarian Parliament and Government to ban the slaughter of cattle that had not previously been stunned—in other words, to prohibit shehita. All Communists, Social Democrats, and representatives of the Bavarian party, a nativist group, supported the ban; opposed were the Christian Social Union, which frowned on state interference with church matters, and the Council member representing the Free Democratic Party, who denounced the Jew-baiting mentality hiding behind high-sounding phrases about the protection of animals.

The Munich City Council's action was important because the struggle against kosher slaughtering had been a paramount plank of the anti-Semitic program in Germany from the turn of the century on, and of the Nazi platform from the late 'twenties. In Bavaria, the Nazis had succeeded in having shehita banned as early as 1930.

When his attention was drawn to the incident, SPD National Chairman Kurt Schumacher wired the SPD floor leader of the Munich City Council: "...Greatly distressed...that you have advocated the prohibition of kosher slaughtering. In so doing you have adopted an outstanding propaganda slogan of the racist and anti-Semitic movement. For both religious and political reasons, the Party Executive considers such a prohibition intolerable...."

The matter was also brought up before the Geneva meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council by the Agudath Israel. In view of this unfavorable reaction abroad and of Schumacher's clear-cut stand, the whole issue was quietly dropped and no attempt was made to bring about a ban on shehita in the Bavarian Parliament, as had originally been planned. The municipality of Munich could not itself ban a method of slaughtering.

CEMETERY DESECRATIONS

A considerable number of desecrations of cemeteries was recorded during the period under review. Official reports tended to ascribe the guilt to "children at play," and the perpetrators were rarely caught. In February, 1951, a Frankfurt court acquitted two young hooligans who had admittedly toppled gravestones. In two cases in East Berlin sentences were meted out. Memorials for Nazi victims were also profaned in a number of places (e.g., Peine and Essen). Whenever such outrages occurred, local officials issued statements regretting the occurrence and appealing to the population to prevent a repetition. In July, 1950, the Minister President of Hesse announced that a number of steps would be taken in an effort to prevent further desecrations.

A few cases also became known in which Jewish gravestones were used for building purposes. This occurred in Imbshausen near Northeim (Lower Saxony), and in a suburb of Koblenz in the French Zone.
"JEWISH SCANDALS"

In the summer of 1950, the Hessian state, in an action unprecedented in modern German bank annals, closed down the Jewish Bank for Trade and Industry in Frankfurt. For months front-page accounts and editorials in the German press implied that the President and Vice-President of the bank, both Jewish DP's, had fled abroad after embezzling millions of Marks, and that many of the most prominent personalities in German-Jewish life were implicated. Actually the bank had transferred abroad, at the request of certain depositors, so-called "blocked accounts," i.e. funds, usually deriving from restitution payments, which had been frozen owing to their owners' residence abroad. Because this ran counter to German foreign currency regulations as they then existed (in 1951 transactions of this type were legalized), juggling of books to cover up this transfer of funds was resorted to. Fifteen months later no indictment had yet been served.

The indictment of Dr. Aron Ohrenstein, mainly for aiding ineligible DP's to obtain compensation payments, was particularly distressing because of his position as Chief Rabbi of Bavaria.

The most acute uneasiness, however, was caused by the anti-Semitic exploitation of the case of Philipp Auerbach, scion of a well-known Orthodox family and survivor of several concentration camps. As State Commissioner for Racial, Religious and Political Persecutees in Bavaria, then as President of the Land [State] Agency for Restitution and later as Attorney-General for Restitution; as head of the Ministerial Committee for Restitution Matters of the eleven German States; as member, and acting chairman, of the Directorate of the Council of Jews in Germany; as Chairman of the Bavarian Council for Freedom and Justice; as President of the Bavarian Association of Jewish Communities, and as holder of uncounted other honorary positions, Auerbach was far and away the best-known Jewish spokesman in Germany.

In January, 1951, Auerbach's offices were occupied by police and in March he himself was arrested. Originally the accusation was responsibility for the payment of fictitious compensation claims, but as time went on other charges were added—misfeasance and malfeasance in office, embezzlement, misappropriation of property entrusted to his custody, active and passive bribery, intimidation of officials, perjury, and a long catalogue of other alleged misdeeds. The Auerbach case was exploited by the nationalistic press, particularly in Bavaria, to inflame popular sentiment against German and world Jewry. At the time of writing, seven months after Dr. Auerbach's arrest, he had not been served with an indictment. It appeared likely that the allegations, elaborated in thousands of sensational news reports, articles and editorials, were exaggerated.

Intergroup Relations

In all parts of Germany, at every social level and among most religious as well as political groupings, there were Germans who sincerely and contritely wished to make amends to the Jewish people for the wounds it had suffered
GERMANY

at German hands. A number of molders of public opinion considered a reconciliation of Jews and Germans as advantageous. The structure of organized intergroup relations in Germany was based on these groups.

The outstanding achievement of the Societies of Christians and Jews was the sponsorship in cities with active chapters of a Brotherhood Week, with an extensive and well-planned program of speeches and meetings. Dr. Georg Heymann, a Catholic of Jewish birth, was named Secretary-General of the Coordinating Council of the Societies.

The support called forth by the Peace with Israel campaign was possibly the most hopeful intergroup development of the year, since, unlike other efforts in the field, it was a spontaneous local expression. In September, 1951, Erich Lueth, Chief Press Officer of the Hamburg city-state (see “The Krauss and Harlan Cases,” below), noted that it was the Israel delegates who, at international conferences, consistently opposed the admission of Germany. In a warm-hearted public appeal distinguished by its understanding of the psychological situation, Lueth urged publicly that it was incumbent upon the Germans to ask Israel for peace. Rudolf Küstermeier, a well-known newspaperman married to a Jewess and for many years a prisoner in Nazi concentration camps, hailed Lueth’s proposal in an article headlined “Peace with Israeli!” The slogan caught on. Germans of good will, from Federal President Theodor Heuss down, indicated their agreement; only the German party, a member of the Federal governmental coalition, sounded a discordant note. Spurred on by the favorable reception accorded to their idea, Leuth and Küstermeier set up Peace with Israel as an informal organization dedicated to the attainment of better relations between Germans and Jews, and especially to the bringing about of peace between Germany and Israel. Their campaign was instrumental in preparing German public opinion for Federal Chancellor’s Adenauer’s statement on reconciliation between Germans and Jews and on reparations for Israel (see above “Reparations.”)

In the religious field, most significant was an avowal by the Berlin Synod of the Protestant Church that “we, too, are blameworthy” for the fate of German Jewry. The Protestant Church in the Rhineland declared its readiness to take Jewish cemeteries under its care in localities where Jewish communities no longer existed. Two study sessions on “The Church and Judaism” were held, at Kassel and at Düsseldorf.

In August, 1951, the Association of German Students condemned anti-Semitism and came out for “moral and material redress of the wrongs inflicted upon the Jews.” In September, 1950, the German Medical Association adopted a resolution stressing its solidarity with former Jewish colleagues. Before being admitted to an international professional association, it acknowledged the guilt of German physicians in participating in pseudo-medical experiments on helpless concentration camp inmates.

When the Socialist International was reestablished at Frankfurt by the representatives of Socialist parties in thirty-four countries in July, 1951, delegates of the Jewish Socialist Bund also attended. The SDP Chairman Kurt Schumacher castigated anti-Semitism in his address to the assembly.

Theodor Heuss, president of the Federal Republic of Germany, again spoke up for better relations between Germans and Jews on a number of
occasions, notably in a July 1951 interview with Manfred George, editor of New York's German-Jewish *Aufbau*.

KRAUSS AND HARLAN CASES

The sympathy of some Germans for Jewish feelings was demonstrated on two occasions involving common opposition to actors with Nazi backgrounds.

One was Werner Krauss, among the greatest thespians on the legitimate stage, who, putting his gifts at the disposal of Nazism, had advanced to become Deputy President of the Nazi Reich Theater Chamber. In December, 1950, the City Government of Berlin invited a Vienna cast to produce an Ibsen play. Because Krauss, a Vienna resident, was a member of the cast, the Jewish community protested. When the protest was disregarded, many students of Berlin's Free University rallied to the support of the Jewish community, as did Social Democratic leader Kurt Schumacher, some writers, newspapermen and others. Nonetheless the City Administration remained obdurate, refusing to withdraw the invitation. For a week violent riots ensued, with supporters and opponents of Krauss battling before and in the theater. In the end, all further performances were cancelled.

The second cause célèbre was that of Veit Harlan, who had directed and produced Nazi propaganda films, among them the vicious *Jüdischer Süss*. At Harlan's denazification hearing, he was acquitted because "this is a matter for the criminal courts." Taking the hint, a Hamburg prosecutor indicted Harlan for "crimes against humanity." After two lengthy trials, Harlan was acquitted; however, the court remarked, in effect, that it was not its function to keep Harlan from making films; if the public wished to repudiate Harlan, it ought to boycott his films. Harlan immediately began to produce a film called *Immortal Beloved*. The Chief Press Officer of the Hamburg Government, Erich Lueth (see above), thereupon appealed to the German movie industry to show "character," implying that this film should not be booked. In October, 1950, Lueth reacted to a threat from the producing company by declaring: "... not only is it the right of decent Germans, but indeed it is their duty, to resist this unworthy protagonist of the German film, not merely through protests but even by preparing for a boycott."

The producing company promptly brought suit, and in November, 1950, a Hamburg court issued an injunction barring Lueth from appealing for a boycott, as an infringement of Harlan's constitutional rights.

The most encouraging aspect of the Harlan case was the declarations of support with which Lueth was deluged by Germans of good will—authors and poets, the German UNESCO Committee, the Society of Christians and Jews, Social Democratic officials, Hamburg university professors, etc.

The trade unions, Social Democrats, and the Frankfurt Chapter of the Society of Christians and Jews launched an energetic campaign to prevent the film from being shown. Disturbances occurred in a few towns when it was first released, but they soon died down. In Frankfurt, the City Council appealed to a movie owner to desist from showing the film; otherwise riots might ensue and the city would not be responsible for the consequences to his theater. He complied reluctantly, but soon thereafter conducted a private "referendum" on the issue. Ballots were mailed to all households in certain
sections of Frankfurt. Of the respondents who replied, nine out of ten indicated they wanted to see Veit Harlan's production. The handful of newspapers in Frankfurt and Stuttgart which refused to carry advertisements announcing the film were sued for breach of contract and threatened with the withdrawal of all movie advertising. Under trade union pressure, Munich and Berlin did prohibit the film altogether. But whereas it was kept out of half a dozen major cities, it played to full houses everywhere else and reportedly was a financial success.

Lueth had appealed against the injunction which prohibited him from calling for a Harlan boycott. The court, however, confirmed it. Still undaunted, Lueth had given notice of appeal to a higher court.

Cultural Activities

A number of books of Jewish interest were published during the period under review.

Outstanding in importance was the completion of a 19-volume edition of the Babylonian Talmud, reproduced by the photo-offset method in a Heidelberg German printing plant. The project was conceived in 1946. General Lucius D. Clay, United States Military Governor and Commander-in-Chief at the time, was asked to provide logistical support, in view of the role of the United States as liberator and protector of displaced persons. He assented, and in consequence this edition of the Talmud had the unique distinction of being dedicated to the United States Army, and of bearing the notation "Printed under supervision of Procurement Division, European Quartermaster Depot, U.S. Army." The fifty sets sponsored by the United States Army were allocated to rabbis and communities in Germany. From the same plates, the JDC had another 650 copies printed for worldwide distribution to yeshivot and rabbinical leaders. Much of the credit for successful completion of the task was due to Chief Rabbi Samuel A. Snieg of the Central Committee of Liberated DP's in the American Zone, formerly Chief of Jewish Chaplains in the Lithuanian army, and to his deputy, Rabbi Samuel J. Rose, who was in charge of proofreading. Americans who were particularly instrumental in overcoming the obstacles which arose at various stages of the project were Rabbi Philip Bernstein, of Rochester, N. Y., former Jewish Adviser to the United States Military Governor; Rabbi Salomon Shapiro of the JDC; and Dean Samuel L. Sar of Yeshiva University.

The only work confronting German readers with the extermination of East European Jewry was a translation of Jewish Socialist Bund leader Bernard Goldstein's novel on the liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto, *The Stars Bear Witness*, which the Europäische Verlangsanstalt in Hamburg was courageous enough to publish, as *Die Sterne sind Zeugen*.

Two moving books dealt with Jewish youngsters under the Nazi terror—Ilse Aichinger's novel *Die grössere Hoffnung*, ("The Greater Hope," Frankfurt), and *Das Tagebuch der Anne Frank*, ("The Diary of Anne Frank," Heidelberg).

One of the most powerful of contemporary poets in the German tongue, Karl Wolfskehl, had died in New Zealand in 1948. During the period under review, his last work, which he himself considered of the most lasting significance, *Hiob oder die vier Spiegel*, ("Job or the Four Mirrors") was published in Hamburg. Edouard Roditi published *Drei Hebräische Elegien*, ("Three Hebrew Elegies," Berlin), a bilingual work of deep feeling, and Hermann Adler, who lived in Switzerland, *Vater . . . Vergib!, "Father . . . Forgive Them!", Christian-Verlag*.

A Jew and a non-Jew undertook to explain Zionism and Israel. In *Das Diesseits-Wunder*, ("The Miracle on Earth," Wiesbaden), Franz Kafka's friend Max Brod, a veteran Zionist, deduced from Jewish history the inevitability of political Zionism. One of the most consecrated friends of the Jews in Germany, the Rev. Herman Maas, Archdeacon of the Heidelberg Lutheran Church, reported on his trip to the Holy Land, which he undertook at the invitation of the Israel Government, in a pleasant illustrated travelogue, *Skizzen von einer Fahrt nach Israel*, ("Sketches from a Journey to Israel," Verlag des evangelischen Presseverbands fuer Baden).

It is of propaganda significance rather than of Jewish import that the Dietz publishing firm in the Soviet Sector of Berlin chose to release a translation of Michael Gold's *Jews Without Money*, an account of the wretched conditions which prevailed on New York's Lower East Side of another day.

A considerable number of new titles were books by Jewish authors or dealt with Jews (e.g., Einstein, Haber, Bergson). Perhaps of greatest interest was publisher S. Fischer's new edition of Kafka's collected works, Friedrich Torberg's novel *Die zweite Begegnung* ("The Second Encounter"), and a collection of Henri Bergson's essays and addresses.

**Personalia**

In September, 1951, the Federal Council elected Rudolf Katz to the Vice-Presidency of the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. Professor Max Horkheimer, noted sociologist and philosopher, an exile from Germany 1933-48 and an American citizen, was chosen Rector of Frankfurt University for the 1951-52 academic year. In February, 1951, the Federal Government named Siegfried Seelig, Düsseldorf industrialist and member of the Board of the local Jewish Community, to the post of Plenipotentiary-General for Scrap Metal. Georg Solti, young Hungarian-born conductor who had lived in Munich since 1946, was named Chief Conductor of the Frankfurt Opera.
Professor Erich Langer, famed dermatologist, was elected Chairman of the Society for Combating Venereal Disease. Max Bachmann, member of the Board of the Munich Jewish community, was appointed a financial attaché at the German Consulate-General in London.

The 1950 Peace Prize of the German Book Trade was awarded Max Tau, German-Jewish writer and pacifist, a resident of Oslo, Norway.

VISITORS

A steady stream of distinguished Jewish visitors came to Germany to lecture and observe. The warmest reception was extended to Rabbi Dr. Leo Baeck, president of the World Union for Progressive Judaism and of the Council of Jews from Germany, formerly of Berlin and, until he was deported to Terezin concentration camp, president of the Reichsvereinigung, the central body of the Jews in Germany during the Nazi period. He participated in a meeting of the Central Council of the Jews in Germany, preached in a Berlin synagogue, and accepted a personal invitation extended by German Federal President Theodor Heuss.

The roster of guests included Isaac Asofsky, Director-General of HIAS; Martin Buber, the religious philosopher who still had a following in German intellectual circles; Elliot E. Cohen, editor of Commentary; Manfred George, editor of New York's German-Jewish Aufbau; Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress; Herman A. Gray, of the American Jewish Committee; Hermann Kesten and Friedrich Torberg, authors; and Yehudi Menuhin.

OBITUARIES

Among those who passed away Albert Eckstein (59), Director of the Hamburg Children's Clinic; Walter Kronheim (59), City Manager of Bad Oeynhausen as well as President of the German Association of Watering Places; and, in Berlin's Jewish Old Age Home, Phillip Falkenstein (101), master glazier, believed to be Berlin's oldest resident and Europe's oldest Jew.

American Jewish Organizational Programs Respecting Germany

[The activities of American Jewish agencies having programs with respect to Germany are of interest in this connection. Since they are not dealt with in the above article, the following brief summary is presented, based on reports submitted to the American Jewish Year Book.

Germany was one of the principal areas of concern of the American Jewish Committee (AJC) in the field of foreign affairs. In connection with West Germany the AJC Executive Committee, on May 6, 1951, issued a statement of policy which pointed to certain dangerous trends in that country and called upon the Bonn Government to give concrete evidence of a democratic orientation in order to qualify for acceptance as a "peaceful and democratic member of the family of nations." To implement this statement of policy, the AJC, in the spring and summer of 1951, made specific recommendations for action to government authorities in Washington and to United States High
Commissioner John J. McCloy, as well as to German officials. One of the most immediate steps for action stressed by the AJC throughout the year was the speedy adoption by the Bonn Government of a fair program of indemnification and restitution of property to the victims of German Nazism or to their successor organizations. In September, 1951, the AJC issued a study on Germany, *The Recent Growth of Neo-Nazism in Europe*, which elicited wide comment. Upon his return from a visit to Germany in the fall of 1951, Herman A. Gray, chairman of the AJC's Foreign Affairs Committee, urged the outlawing of the neo-Nazi parties in West Germany.

The World Jewish Congress (WJC) made numerous representations to the occupying powers on various aspects of the German problem. It protested against formation of a semi-Nazi government in Schleswig Holstein, warned against the growth of the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich party, urged an intensification of efforts to democratize Germany, expressed deep concern over the wholesale commutation of sentences imposed on German war criminals, and protested against plans to rearm Germany.

The WJC maintained an office in West Germany which was responsible for the establishment of a united organization representative of all Jewish communities and groups in Germany (see above). Through this office and the work of the WJC Research Staff, studies of *Anti-Democratic Tendencies in Western Germany* and of the appointment of many notorious ex-Nazis to the West German Foreign Office were made.

The WJC in its representations warned of the need for speeding up and improving the machinery for restitution and compensation. One significant event in connection with its activity in the German scene was the appointment in May, 1951, by the British Foreign Office of A. L. Easterman, the Congress political officer in London, as a member of a committee of three to investigate delays in restitution procedure in the British zone.

The National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC), representing the national and local community relations agencies, dealt with questions of German rearmament and the dangers of renazification, including the problem of amnesty of war criminals. In May, 1951, the NCRAC submitted a memorandum to governmental agencies arguing that former members of the Nazi Waffen-SS units were ineligible for admission into the United States.—Ed.]