

Israel

ISRAEL AND THE UNITED NATIONS

THE Fall of 1948 witnessed more progress towards a solution of the Palestine problem than had been made since the General Assembly of the United Nations began its deliberations over this problem in September, 1947. Starting most inauspiciously with the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator in Palestine, through the perseverance of the Acting Mediator Ralph J. Bunche, the UN nevertheless succeeded in obtaining armistice agreements in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was followed by the admission of Israel as the fifty-ninth member of the United Nations, a political achievement by Israel which overshadowed the major differences being negotiated at the Lausanne Conference, such as the questions of the Arab refugees, the internationalization of Jerusalem, and the boundaries of Israel. These successes added considerable prestige to the United Nations.

Assassination of Count Bernadotte

Three days before the opening of the third regular meeting of the General Assembly at Paris on September 17, 1948, while on an inspection tour through the city of Jerusalem, Count Bernadotte was assassinated along with a member of his staff, Colonel André P. Serot of France. This brought to seven the number of men who lost their lives in the service of the United Nations in Palestine. Ralph J. Bunche, special United Nations representative in Palestine, was immediately designated by United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie to take charge pending the appointment of a new mediator. On September 18, 1948, the Security Council met in a special session, at which the members unanimously and strongly condemned the act of assassination. Major Aubrey Eban, representative of the Provisional Government of Israel, issued a statement expressing his government's "horror and grief at the murder of Count Bernadotte." The government of Israel added on September 18, 1948, that "The government of Israel is outraged by the appalling crime committed yesterday in Jerusalem. . . . This murder is an attack on the authority of the UN and a calculated assault on the sovereignty of Israel. . . ."

The Bernadotte Proposals

Count Bernadotte's report had been completed a few hours before his death and sent on to Paris in time for the meeting of the General Assembly. Its recommendations were:

1. Jerusalem be placed under UN control. The area included was to be the

same as that originally proposed by the UN partition plan; 2. the area known as the Negev be defined as Arab territory; 3. the towns of Ramleh and Lydda be included in the Arab territory; 4. Galilee be defined as Jewish territory; 5. the port of Haifa, including the oil refineries and terminals, be declared a free port, with assurances of free access to interested Arab countries; 6. the Arab port of Lydda be declared a free airport with assurances of free access to Jerusalem and interested Arab countries; 7. a conciliation commission responsible to the UN be set up.

REACTIONS TO BERNADOTTE PROPOSALS

Statements expressing the attitude of the Big Three—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain—were soon forthcoming. General George C. Marshall on September 21, 1948 stated that: "The United States considers that the conclusions contained in the final report of Count Bernadotte offer a generally fair basis for settlement of the Palestine question. My government . . . strongly urges the parties and General Assembly to accept them in their entirety . . ." This was followed, on September 23, 1948, by a statement from Britain's foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, who announced in the House of Commons that the British Government gave its "wholehearted and unqualified support" to Count Bernadotte's proposals. As sponsor of Trans-Jordan, Great Britain was particularly partial to the Bernadotte suggestion that there were "compelling reasons for merging the Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Trans-Jordan. . . ." This implicit recognition of the sovereignty of Israel marked a departure from previous British foreign policy.

Without specifically committing herself on the merits of the Bernadotte proposal, the USSR, through its representative, Andrei Y. Vishinsky, declared that the decision of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, recommending the partition of Palestine was endangered not only by the direct proposal on the part of certain states to revise that decision, but also by proposals for the setting up of a trusteeship over Palestine and the appointment of a mediator.

The Israeli government protested the United States proposal that Count Bernadotte's recommendations on Palestine be adopted in their entirety, but indicated willingness to "explore all proposals which are put forward as a basis for a final lasting peace." Particular exception was taken to the suggestion that the Negev be excised from the state of Israel, in the light of the recommendation of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine that the territory of the Negev be included in the Jewish state. In a memorandum entitled, *The Importance of the Negev to the State of Israel*, and circulated among the fifty-eight members of the UN, Israel condemned the territorial changes proposed in the Mediator's report as "an entirely inequitable apportionment of land between Israel and the neighboring Arab state."

The Arab reaction was negative. Charles Malik, Lebanon's UN representative and Minister to Washington, said the "chief bone of contention is the irrevocable view supported by the Bernadotte report and by the United States that a Jewish State is here to stay." The Arabs were particularly concerned over the Bernadotte suggestion that Arab Palestine be incorporated into the present kingdom of Trans-Jordan, and it was reported (*The New York Times*, October

4, 1948) that the Lebanese Premier, Riad es-Solh, cabled King Abdullah asking the King of Trans-Jordan to clarify his position.

The General Assembly meeting on September 23, 1948, immediately placed Palestine on the agenda. Egyptian and Syrian representatives protested that the Bernadotte report was long and bulky and the questions involved were so complicated that they called for the most careful consideration by their governments. Russian opposition was based on the claim that the truce imposed by the Security Council was effective, and that the Palestine question could wait until the problem of atomic energy and Andrei Vishinsky's proposals for arms cuts had been discussed. Thus, an Arab-Russian bloc succeeded in defeating by 21 to 16 the motion by Hector McNeil to discuss the Bernadotte report at once.

The Palestine problem then began to shuttle between the Security Council and the Political Committee, though it also was on the agenda of the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee because of the Arab refugee problem. On September 30, 1948, Bunche cited both the Arabs and Israel before the Security Council for six types of alleged interference with the legitimate activities of truce observers in Palestine and stated: "There can be little doubt that appropriate action by the Security Council at this time would be helpful to the effort to ensure the maintenance and effective supervision of a truce in Palestine." He again appeared before the Security Council, on October 14, 1948, to declare that he found "inescapable the conclusion that in this instance [the assassination of Bernadotte] there was negligence on the part of the local Jewish authorities in Jerusalem and that had minimum precautions been taken this crime could not and would not have been committed." Aubrey Eban, Israeli representative, retorted by referring to the drastic measures taken by his government immediately upon the assassination of Count Bernadotte, and affirmed that the Israeli government was acting to eradicate those movements which were an "exploitation of public bitterness and frustration."

The following day, appearing before the First (Political and Security) Committee, Bunche urged immediate action upon the Bernadotte report with which he stated he was "in full accord." Quoting from Count Bernadotte's report, he emphasized, that "both sides will acquiesce, however reluctantly, in any reasonable settlement on which is placed the stamp of approval of the United Nations." His emphasis that the Bernadotte plan should be treated as a rough basis for a settlement rather than as a hard and fast proposal was significant.

SECURITY COUNCIL OCTOBER RESOLUTIONS

Called into emergency session at the request of the Acting Mediator to consider a new outbreak of hostilities in the Negev, the Security Council after a two hours' debate on October 19, did not hold either side responsible, but insisted that fighting must cease at once. The order was passed unanimously. The Security Council also decided by a vote of 9 to 0, with Russia and the Ukraine abstaining: 1. that both sides be asked to retreat to the lines they held before the renewal of the fighting; 2. that both sides undertake negotiations—either through a UN intermediary or directly—on outstand-

ing problems affecting the Negev; 3. that UN observers be stationed throughout the Negev.

On October 25, 1948, the Security Council was summoned to meet in emergency session to consider Egyptian charges that "Zionist forces in Palestine are constantly and increasingly violating the truce and defying the cease fire orders given by the Security Council." Particular concern was expressed by Israel over Bunche's interpretation of the October, 1948, resolution, in view of his issuance of another order calling for a withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli forces to positions occupied on October 14, 1948. To restore the Egyptians to a position from which they had been ejected would, Israel felt, be "an international anomaly of fantastic dimensions."

It was at this point that on October 28 an Anglo-Chinese resolution was submitted asking the Security Council to plan sanctions against either party in Palestine that continued to defy its orders. The Anglo-Chinese resolution asked that the Security Council "appoint a committee of the Council consisting of the five permanent members, together with Belgium and Colombia, to examine urgently and report to the Council on the measures . . . appropriate . . . under Article 41 of the Charter if either party or both should refuse to comply with [Bunche's interpretation of the resolution of October 19, 1948], within whatever time limit the Acting Mediator may think it desirable to fix."

(Article 41 provides for the use by the Security Council of any measure short of armed force "to give effect to its decisions" and it specifically says: "These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations . . . means of communication and severance of diplomatic relations.")

On October 29, 1948, at a meeting of the subcommittee of the Security Council, the United States offered several amendments to this draft resolution. According to the original draft the Security Council was to "endorse" the Acting Mediator's request to Israel and Egypt to withdraw their troops. The United States amended this to "take note of" the request. The United States also called upon the two governments to withdraw their forces, establish permanent truce lines, demilitarize zones "without prejudice to their rights, claims, or position with regard to a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine or to the positions which the members of the United Nations may wish to take in the General Assembly on such peaceful adjustment."

But the most important change was a third amendment which removed all reference to Article 41. Instead, the proposed committee was to give such advice as the Acting Mediator might require with regard to his responsibilities under the resolution, and in the event of a failure of either party or both to comply with provisions of the resolution, "to study as a matter of urgency and to report to the Council on further measures it would be appropriate to take under Chapter 7 of the Charter."

The resolution perplexed many observers because it was not certain whether it strengthened or weakened the original text, since the amendment was extended to cover all of Chapter 7 of the Charter—of which Article 41 is a part. Israeli circles believed that it was intended "as a club to be held over the Israelis," but most observers believed that it was an effort to avoid the consideration of sanctions. On November 4, 1948, the Security Council passed the Anglo-Chinese resolution, as amended by the United States.

ARMISTICE RESOLUTION

Somewhat earlier, on October 9, 1948, Bunche had submitted to the Security Council a proposal for a definite end of hostilities which he considered "an indispensable condition to an ultimate peaceful settlement of basic political issues." In accordance with this proposal, A. G. L. McNaughton of Canada, on November 15, 1948, introduced a draft resolution calling for the establishment of an armistice in all sectors of Palestine and calling upon the parties directly concerned to negotiate either directly or through the Acting Mediator. The Soviet Union opposed the transitional step from a truce to an armistice and proposed as "an even bolder course" the immediate passage into a state of final peace. Philip Jessup, representing the United States, favored the armistice.

Aubrey Eban, speaking for the Provisional Government of Israel, favored the institution of the new phase looking forward to a peace settlement, but objected to the use of the resolution of November 4, 1948, as a frame of reference, on the grounds that Israel was being asked to abandon its responsibilities throughout the greater part of its territory "for no other reason than that an invading army had challenged unsuccessfully its internationally sanctioned rights by force of arms."

The Syrian, Lebanese, and Egyptian representatives told the Council they were unwilling to negotiate directly with Israel because this would signify the acceptance of Israel as an independent state. Despite their requests for delay, the armistice resolution was passed by eight members of the Security Council, with the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian delegates abstaining.

Political and Security Committee

While the Security Council was occupied with the technical problems of truces and armistices, the Political and Security Committee completely avoided a discussion of the Bernadotte report or any other matter pertaining to the eventual political settlement. Because of the crowded UN agenda, Herbert D. Evatt had established a special subcommittee of the Political Committee to discuss the Palestine question. On October 23, 1948, the United Nations again postponed action on the basis of a motion introduced by Iran which carried by a vote of only 19 to 16, with 14 abstentions.

The proceedings of the Political Committee were also hindered by the efforts of the United States and Britain to reach an agreement concerning the Bernadotte proposal. On November 18, 1948, *The New York Times* reported that the experts of the United States and British delegations were working on the "third draft" of the Anglo-American Palestine resolution, dated October 15, 1948. This provided that a settlement in Palestine must be reached on the basis of the Bernadotte plan, with no essential changes in the boundaries that the late mediator had proposed. Moreover, there was to be no explicit recognition of Israel as an independent state; the resolution referred throughout to "non-Arab areas of Palestine" without mentioning Israel. Failure to obtain American support for this "third draft" compelled the British to introduce a proposal of their own on November 18, 1948, at the

meeting of the Political Committee. The resolution called for a permanent settlement of the Palestine question on the basis of the Bernadotte plan but, surprisingly, referred to the "Jewish State." There was much conjecture about the American position, but on November 20, 1948, Jessup told the United Nations that "no change must be made in Israel's borders without that state's consent," though he insisted that any territorial additions Israel demanded beyond the boundaries set forth in the partition resolution must be offset by Israel's surrender of other territory. This would mean that it would be necessary for Israel to surrender some of the Negev to keep the Galilee. The Bernadotte report was to be accepted as the basis for renewed efforts to bring about a peaceful adjustment of Arab-Israeli differences.

On November 23, 1948, Jessup recommended that the boundaries of Israel and of the Arab part of Palestine be determined on the basis both of the Assembly's partition resolution and the final proposals by Count Bernadotte. This was in flat opposition to the British resolution specifying that the settlement be based on the Bernadotte report.

The Israeli representatives objected that Jessup had placed the partition resolution and the Bernadotte report on the same level as the partition resolution, as guides to the proposed Conciliation Commission, and that there was no reference to his previous pledge that the United States would not support boundary changes unless they were acceptable to Israel.

The Australian government, through its representative, John D. L. Hood, submitted another draft resolution proposing that the partition resolution be the "basic starting point" of a settlement of the Palestine question, and that although the final settlement should take into account the Bernadotte report, it should be in conformity with the principles contained in the partition resolution. The Australian resolution also included the Assembly recommendation that the Security Council approve Israel's application for membership in the United Nations when it would be submitted.

Thus, the United Nations was confronted with finding a compromise between two extreme views: That of the British delegation, which favored a permanent settlement strictly on the basis of the Bernadotte report; and that of the Soviet delegation, which insisted on a settlement entirely on the basis of the partition resolution.

Most of the United States amendments to the British resolution submitted by Jessup were accepted by the British government and incorporated into a revised resolution by Hector McNeil. However, McNeil said that the British government still felt "the emphasis should be on the Bernadotte plan, although it need not rest exclusively on it."

Because of the large number of additional resolutions submitted by Syria, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Colombia, the First Committee at its meeting of November 26, 1948, set up a Working Group composed of the authors of all the draft resolutions and amendments. On December 4, 1948, the Political and Security Committee finally succeeded by a vote of 26 to 21, a margin far short of the two-thirds majority that would be required for adoption by the Assembly, in passing a resolution which bore little resemblance to the original British-American proposals. The resolution in effect proposed: 1. a three-nation commission of mediation to be appointed by the Big Five, with in-

structions to mediate between Arab and Israeli leaders and to carry out Security Council orders with regard to the truce ordered by the UN; 2. the internationalization of Jerusalem; 3. no instruction as to the settlement of the boundaries of the rest of Israel. Six members of the Soviet bloc and fifteen supporters of the Arabs voted against the resolution.

DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE

The closeness of the vote adumbrated a substantial modification of the draft resolution prepared by the First Committee. It was finally approved in the General Assembly by a vote of 35 to 15, with 8 abstentions. The three-member Conciliation Commission was instructed to carry out specific directives given by the Assembly or by the Security Council and to undertake, upon the Security Council's request, any function assigned by the Council to the Mediator or the United Nations' truce commission.

Another part of the resolution dealing with Holy Places, including Nazareth, provided that these should be protected and free access to them assured.

A third important aspect concerned Jerusalem, which in view of its association with three world religions was to be accorded special and separate treatment and be placed under effective United Nations control. The resolution also called upon the Conciliation Commission to present at the next session detailed proposals for a permanent international regime, providing for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area.

Refugees wishing to return home and live at peace with their neighbors were to be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date and compensation was to be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for damage to property. The Commission was likewise instructed to facilitate the repatriation and resettlement and the economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees, and the payment of the compensation mentioned above.

The Assembly later accepted the proposal that the Conciliation Commission should be composed of France, Turkey, and the United States, with its headquarters in Jerusalem.

Application for UN Membership by Israel

In the meantime, the Palestine problem had returned to the Security Council when on November 29, 1948, Israel submitted her application for admission to Secretary-General Trygve Lie exactly one year after the passage of the General Assembly's partition resolution. Both the United States and the Soviet Union indicated immediately their intention of supporting the Israeli application for membership. In supporting the application, Jessup pointed out that all authorities on international law had stated that a state must have a people, a territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The United States was satisfied that Israel met these qualifications and that it was able to carry out the obligations of the Charter. Jacob Malik of the Soviet Union indicated that the USSR had always maintained that the only correct solution of the Palestine question was the implementation of the decision of November 29, 1947, and that it adhered

to this position in supporting Israel's application. Great Britain opposed the admission of Israel to membership on the grounds that it would "diminish the chances of an early settlement in Palestine." After many draft resolutions were rejected, Israel's bid for admission was voted upon and rejected. The vote was five in favor (the United States, Soviet Union, the Ukraine, Argentina, and Colombia), five abstentions (Britain, China, Belgium, France, and Canada), and one opposed (Syria). Thus, the application failed by two votes to receive the seven votes required for a majority.

Admission of Israel into the UN

The armistice agreements which were reached between Israel and the Arab states¹ were auspicious omens for Israel's second application for membership in the United Nations on February 24, 1949, the very day the Egyptian armistice was signed. On March 4, 1949, Israel's application was approved by the Security Council by a vote of 9 to 1, with Egypt opposed and Britain abstaining. The resolution recommending Israel for membership was introduced by Warren R. Austin, United States representative, who held that Israel was a peace-loving state, able and willing to carry out the obligations laid down in the Charter. The bid was then sent to the General Assembly, which decided on April 14, 1949, to refer Israel's application for membership to the Political Committee for consideration, rather than vote upon such admission immediately. The fear that Israel's bid might be delayed by a crowded agenda did not materialize when the discussion was transferred to the Ad Hoc Committee. Most of the discussion revolved around the position of Israel on the question of the Arab refugees and Jerusalem, and the Ad Hoc Committee asked the Israeli representative to explain his government's attitude to provisions of the General Assembly's resolutions of November 29, 1947, and December 11, 1948, regarding the internationalization of Jerusalem and adjacent areas. It also requested a statement on the problem of Arab refugees and the Israeli investigation into the assassination of Bernadotte. The Israeli representative, Aubrey Eban, replied that his government was willing to discuss the Arab refugee problem under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission; that Israel was in favor of an international regime in Jerusalem restricted to the protection and control of the Holy Places; and that it regretted its inability to discover and bring to justice the assassins of Bernadotte.

Following Eban's presentation, and after further debate, John Hood of Australia moved a formal resolution recommending Israel's admission, seconded by Warren Austin of the United States. Israel's entry was then approved by the UN Ad Hoc Committee by a vote of 33 to 11, with 13 abstentions. On May 11, 1949, the General Assembly, by a vote of 37 to 12, with 9 abstentions, admitted Israel as the fifty-ninth member of the United Nations.

Lausanne Conference

Attention now shifted overseas to Lausanne, Switzerland, where the United Nations Conciliation Commission had already begun its task of taking an-

¹ See pp. 393-94.

other step in the transition from an armistice to a political settlement. According to the Commission's *Third Progress Report* to the Secretary-General, published on June 21, 1949, the negotiations which had begun on April 27, 1949, started well, for the four Arab States—Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Lebanon and Syria—and Israel sent highly qualified delegations. First, the Commission met with the delegations separately to explore their views on all outstanding questions and on May 12, 1949, a French protocol was agreed upon as the agenda. The protocol stated that the exchange of views "would bear on the territorial adjustments necessary to achieve as quickly as possible the objectives of the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, regarding refugees, as well as territorial and other questions." The following indicates the respective stands taken by the governments on the various questions.

THE ARAB REFUGEE QUESTION

Israel stated that if the Gaza area were incorporated into Israel, it would accept the entire Arab population of the area—inhabitants and refugees—as citizens of Israel. This was to be on the understanding that resettlement in Israeli territory would be subject to such international aid as would be available for refugee resettlement in general. Israel was not in a position to submit proposals on the number of refugees it could take if the Gaza area were not incorporated. This proposal the Arab delegations refused to accept.

The Arabs proposed the immediate return of the refugees who had come from the territories now under Israeli authority but which formed part of the Arab Zone in the General Assembly's partition resolution: Western Galilee, Lydda, Ramle and Beersheba, Jaffa, Jerusalem, and the coast line north of Gaza. This proposal was turned down by the Israeli delegation.

TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

Israel proposed: 1. that its frontiers with Egypt and Lebanon be the same as the frontier between these countries and Palestine under the British mandate. (If this proposal was to be accepted, Israel was prepared to accept all Arabs at present in the Gaza area as citizens of Israel.); 2. that its frontier with Jordan remain the same as the frontier between Trans-Jordan and Palestine under the British mandate; 3. that in the central area of Palestine now under Jordan military authority the boundary was to follow the present line between Israeli and Jordanian forces, subject to certain modifications to be discussed later. As to the future status of this area, Israel had no ambitions and proposed that it be settled by the Arab states, the inhabitants of the territory, and the refugees. Till the future status was determined, Israel would continue to recognize Jordan's *de facto* authority as military occupying power.

The Arab delegations regarded the proposals concerning the frontiers with Lebanon and Egypt as "a flagrant violation of the terms of the protocol of May 12, [1949,] since it was considered that such a proposal involved annexations, not territorial adjustments as envisaged in the proposals."

The Arab delegations for their part indicated that their proposal for the return of refugees to areas designated as Arab territory bore a territorial aspect: they envisaged a return of the refugees to territories which were to be

recognized in principle as Arab. To this Israel replied that "it could not accept the distribution of territory agreed upon in 1947 as a criterion for territorial settlement in the present circumstances."

The *Progress Report* did not specify the particular positions of the Arabs and the Israelis on the question of Jerusalem. However, the Arabs, it was known, called for the internationalization of Jerusalem and the appointment of an international government by the United Nations. Walter Eytan, head of the Israeli delegation, in a private meeting with the Commission on June 21, 1949, stated that Israel would not agree to the complete internationalization of Jerusalem. In order to prevent the partition of the city, he suggested that the whole city area might be included within Israel, and that the Israeli authorities would undertake to grant Christians and Arabs unrestricted access to the Holy Places.

On June 26, 1949, the Commission adjourned the peace parley from July 1, 1949 to July 18, 1949, so that the Israeli and Arab delegations could return to their respective capitals for discussions and new instructions. A general committee appointed by the Commission continued to work on the immediate problem of Arab refugees in Israeli territory. There was reason to believe that greater progress would be made in the renewed negotiations. President Chaim Weizmann of Israel two days earlier, on July 16, 1949, indicated the position that would be taken by the Israeli delegation when he spoke of a "Middle East" scheme, "based on the assumption that interested parties would cooperate in bringing about proportional resettlement, with Israel doing her share within the limits set by her internal security." The nature of the "proportional resettlement" was reflected in an earlier announcement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel that the government would consider favorably the requests of Arab citizens of the state of Israel for permission to bring into the country their wives and young children, and to facilitate their admission.

The United States member of the Commission, Mark F. Ethridge, resigned on June 10, 1949, after having recessed the conference because in his opinion a stalemate had been reached. He was replaced by Paul A. Porter.

Israel's Participation in the UN

Israel immediately began to function as a full-fledged member of the United Nations and her representatives joined a number of UN special agencies, such as the International Labor Organization. The very first day of Israel's membership in the UN, Israel voted on such pertinent issues as the question of the disposition of the Italian colonies. Israel voted against the proposal to place Cyrenaica under a long-term British trusteeship, though abstaining from voting on the plan as a whole. On May 16, 1949, Eban indicated to the General Assembly that Israel would vote against a proposed resolution lifting the UN diplomatic embargo on the Franco regime in Spain. He pointed out that the Franco regime was linked to the Nazi-Fascist alliance, which had been responsible for the extermination of 6,000,000 Jews. On June 16, 1949, Israel cited Great Britain before the Security Council, because of Great

Britain's decision to resume armed shipments to Arab States despite the fact that the UN arms embargo to the Middle East had not been lifted.

LOUIS SHUB

ISRAEL

THE state of Israel came into existence on May 14, 1948. The year that followed was one of the most dramatic and important in the history of Judaism. For the population of Israel, the events of the year fell into two significant parts: first, the defense against the aggressive invasion of the neighboring Arab states of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon; and second, the internal consolidation of the state, politically, economically, and culturally.

First Truce

The first phase of the war lasted from May 15 to June 11, 1948. [For a summary of this phase, see AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 50, pp. 424-435.]

On June 11, 1948, a truce of four weeks arranged by Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden, president of the Swedish Red Cross and a well-known humanitarian who had been appointed United Nations Mediator in Palestine, went into effect. The Jews, who had appealed to the United Nations Security Council on May 15, 1948, to stop the invasion of Palestine as a threat to world peace, were glad to gain a respite. But the Arabs were unwilling, and ceased fighting only with great reluctance. For the Jews this first truce was a godsend without which they might not have held out, especially in Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, and the Negev.

ARMS EMBARGO

Count Bernadotte brought with him a very large staff of observers whose task was to police the truce and to report any breaches. The truce, however, was not an unmixed blessing for Israel. It provided that no side was to receive reinforcements in arms or men during the truce period. Israel had entered the war quite unarmed and unprepared. Nevertheless, she was in duty bound to obey the embargo clause of the Security Council resolution.

THE *ALTALENA* AFFAIR

The very extreme elements in Israel did not share the government's scruples over the embargo. The Irgun Zvai Leumi planned to import Irgun members from overseas to Israel in a ship specially bought for this purpose. The S.S. *Altalena*, sailing from southern Europe, reached the coast of Israel near Nathanyah on June 20, 1948. The Haganah would not agree to the unloading of the ship, and rejected overtures by Irgun to share the cargo of arms on board, as a flagrant breach both of the international truce obligations and of the government's national authority. In the ensuing clash, several Jews were killed, and the ship caught fire. A crisis developed in the government as the Mizrahi ministers, Rabbi Judah Maimon (Fishman), and Moshe Shapira,

resigned. Prime Minister David Ben Gurion appeased these ministers, but resolved to fight this challenge to his authority. Many Irgunists were arrested, including such leaders as Hillel Kook (known in the United States as Peter Bergson) and Jaacov Meridor. At the sight of this show of force by the government, Irgun surrendered.

Reorganization of Armed Forces

At this time Ben Gurion decided to dissolve all partisan armies, including the Haganah with its striking force, Palmach, and to establish one national army, to be called *Zva Haganah LeIsrael* (Israel Defense Army). On June 28, 1948, soldiers, sailors, and airmen were sworn in, and the IDA came into existence. Three months later the special command of Palmach was disbanded, followed at the end of the year by the Palmach units as well. Irgun eventually disbanded as a private armed movement, and founded the *Herut* (Freedom Movement) in August, 1948, under the leadership of Menahem Beigin. The Stern group disbanded only in the area outside of Jerusalem.

Second Phase of the War

The Arabs having rejected the proposal made by Count Bernadotte to extend the June truce for another month, fighting broke out again on July 9, 1948, with renewed fury. The Jewish civilian population, believing that the Arabs had used the respite to prepare for the deliverance of a postponed *coup de grâce*, viewed the resumption of hostilities with anxiety. But army commanders were more confident. The fighting after July 9, 1948, found the Jews in a stronger and more favorable position. In Jerusalem they not only held their ground, but cleared important Arab quarters and consolidated their position in the New City. They also widened the road corridor to the coast. In the course of this operation the threat to Tel Aviv was relieved when the Arab Legion was driven out of Lydda town and airport and Ramleh, and thrust back into the mountains. In this battle, Jewish tanks appeared for the first time.

SABOTAGE AT LATRUN

Meanwhile, Count Bernadotte was making new efforts to obtain a truce. The Jews, however, finding themselves attacking and winning, were not now so keen on a cease fire. But this second truce eventually came into operation on July 18, 1948, when the Jewish forces were just short of taking the Latrun water station and road junction, the last Arab strangle hold on Jerusalem. Count Bernadotte began to conduct talks with both sides with a view to relieving Jerusalem of its thirst by renewing the water supply along the fifty-mile pipeline from the plain. The Arabs delayed until August 12, 1948, when they blew up and destroyed the pumping station at Latrun. The next day, however, the Jewish authorities announced that a "Burma pipeline" along the "Burma road" had been supplying water to the city for some days. But for this, water in Jerusalem would have given out by the middle of August.

JERUSALEM

Under the UN partition plan [see AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 50, p. 243] Jerusalem was to be internationalized. The experience of April to June, 1948, had shown, however, what would happen to the 100,000 Jews of Jerusalem if the city was cut off from Israel. Public opinion in Israel was therefore unanimous on no account to expose Jerusalem to new dangers, certainly not to a vague international government without safeguards or guarantees. Before and after May 15, 1948, the writ of the Haganah, and later of the Jewish Army, had always run in Jerusalem. On August 1, 1948, Jerusalem was declared a military area of occupation of the Israeli Army, in which Israeli law prevailed as elsewhere in Israel. Six months later, on February 1, 1949, Jerusalem was declared an integral part of the state of Israel.

ASSASSINATION OF COUNT BERNADOTTE

All through July and August, 1948, Count Bernadotte tried to persuade the warring sides to turn the truce into permanent peace. He prepared proposals for a political settlement to this effect. In July, 1948, he suggested a plan in which the Negev and Jerusalem were to be put under Arab rule, while Western Galilee was to come under Jewish rule. The Jews rejected this without hesitation. From his headquarters in Rhodes he continued his efforts. By early September, 1948, it was known that the UN mediator was preparing proposals for a permanent settlement to the forthcoming UN General Assembly. Certain fanatical groups associated with the Stern group in Jerusalem began a country-wide smear campaign against the Count, calling him a British agent and advising him to get out. On September 17, 1948, Count Bernadotte was murdered in Jerusalem by an unknown hand. The Israel government, in whose territory the crime was perpetrated, suspected the Stern group of the murder. It arrested several hundred Stern group members, apprehending their leader, Nathan Friedman-Yellin, in Haifa, just as he was about to flee the country. The whole Stern movement was outlawed, and all arrested persons were closely screened. But the murderer was not discovered. Friedman-Yellin and his associate, Mattithyahu Shmuelevitz, were put on trial before a special military anti-terrorist tribunal for leading an illegal organization. On February 10, 1949, Friedman-Yellin and Shmuelevitz were found guilty and sentenced to eight and five years' imprisonment respectively, with the option of going free if they declared their renunciation of the Stern group. However, before they had time to consider their choice, they were freed by a general amnesty which the state council had legislated as its final statute, to celebrate the beginning of the parliamentary life of the Knesset on February 14, 1949.

The murder of Count Bernadotte cast a severe gloom over Israel. It forced home the lesson that the government of the young state still had far to go to impose its full authority in political and legal matters. The general public expected that at the forthcoming UN Assembly¹ the murder would lead to serious setbacks for Israel's cause, especially as her frontiers were as yet unsettled.

¹ See pp. 379 ff.

FIGHTING IN THE NEGEV

On other fronts the second spell of fighting was mainly a holding war. The threat to the Emek and to Galilee remained. In the Negev both Israeli and Egyptian troops roamed freely in the unsettled spaces. The Israeli and Egyptian supply lines intersected at the Falujah road junction. To prevent constant truce breaches over this intersection, the UN truce observers ruled in August, 1948, that the Jews and Egyptians were to use two separate roads at different hours. This arrangement held until October, 1948, when new fighting broke out in the Negev. At that time it was clear to the government of Israel that this state of threat and uncertainty could not be accepted as a basis for peace, nor even for a prolonged truce. The validity of this view was corroborated by the constant rearming of the Egyptians in that area. Egyptian provocation was due to her reliance on her superior armaments. Eventually, on October 15, 1948, a serious clash occurred at the Falujah crossroads, when a Jewish convoy to the Negev was mined and blown up. Fighting broke out, and the war flared up again in the whole Negev. In very stiff fighting the Israeli army broke open the Egyptian strangle hold on the main Negev highway and beat back the Egyptians to the frontier.

Again the fighting was brought to a stop, on October 22, 1948, by decision of the Security Council. When the new cease fire came into force, the Jews found many Egyptians cut off from their bases and enclosed in two pockets, named Iraq-es-Sueidan and Falujah after the nearby villages. The smaller pocket, Iraq-es-Sueidan, surrendered to the Israeli army on November 9, 1948.

CONCLUSION OF NEGEV FIGHTING

The Security Council had ordered the two sides to withdraw to their previous positions and to negotiate an armistice. However, the Egyptians delayed negotiations until the Jews should withdraw from the Negev. The Egyptians continued to supply their beleaguered troops at Falujah. The truce was again interrupted on December 22, 1948, when Egyptian tanks attacked the Jewish settlement of Nirim on the Sinai border. The Israeli troops pounded the pocket severely, put the Egyptian armored columns to flight into Gaza, and penetrated deep into Egyptian territory. At this incursion, the Egyptians submitted to a further UN cease fire resolution, and fighting finally ceased on January 7, 1949.

AQABAH INCIDENT

After that date the Jews moved freely in and into the Negev, and it became an integral part of the state of Israel, as had been provided by the partition resolution of November 29, 1947. By virtue of this resolution and title, Jewish spearhead columns pushed southward from the Dead Sea until they reached the Red Sea, arm of the Persian Gulf, at a point where a seven-mile stretch of Israeli coast adjoined a similar stretch of Trans-Jordan coast known as Aqabah. The Jewish spearheads established themselves at the ancient biblical place of Eilath on that coast, not however without having caused alarm among British military commanders and politicians, who dispatched a battleship and a battalion of British troops to the Trans-Jordan side of the gulf.

GALILEE CLEARED

While the battles of October and December, 1948, in the Negev were proceeding, not one of the Arab states was ready to help its Egyptian ally by engaging the Israel army on any other front. Only Kaukji showed courage enough to molest the Jewish forces in Galilee. The Jewish army took up the challenge, and in thirty hours during October 30 and 31, 1948, drove Kaukji's troops out of Palestine and far into Lebanon, occupying eleven Lebanese villages in the pursuit. Christian-Arab Nazareth, seat of many Christian churches and monasteries, came under Israel occupation.

Egyptian Armistice

After the December, 1948, fighting in the Negev described above, Egypt showed readiness to comply with the Security Council order to negotiate an armistice with Israel. Ralph Bunche, the acting mediator, convened a conference between Israel and Egyptian representatives at Rhodes. After patient and skillful negotiating, the parties signed the armistice on February 24, 1949, with the following principal provisions: In the western half of the Negev, troops of both sides were to be limited but to have full freedom of movement. The area of Auja el Hafir was to be demilitarized. Prisoners of war were to be exchanged, and the Egyptian troops cut off at Falujah and in Hebron were to be allowed to evacuate through the Israel lines. Egyptian troops were to remain in Palestine only at Gaza.

Trans-Jordan Armistice

After the successful conclusion of the Egyptian armistice, Bunche invited Trans-Jordan and all other invading Arab states to make armistice arrangements with Israel. The Israeli and Trans-Jordan delegations met at Rhodes on March 2, 1949, and reached a final accord on April 3, 1949, leaving minor questions to be decided by local arrangement. Negotiations with Trans-Jordan were much more complicated, since they involved many semi-political issues, such as the Jerusalem situation and the government of the central Arab-held area of Palestine. In Jerusalem there had been constant truce breaches all through the Summer of 1948, and only on November 30, 1948 was a "real truce" signed between the local commanders. In the central area the Iraqi expeditionary force had been in occupation.

But Iraq refused to meet the Jews for armistice talks. The Iraqi government therefore authorized King Abdullah to negotiate the armistice for the central area as well, and used this opportunity to extricate itself from the expensive Palestine adventure by withdrawing its troops and handing the area over to Abdullah's administration. Abdullah readily agreed. He changed the name of Trans-Jordan to "the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan." Israel did not object; but, in return, a number of territorial adjustments in favor of Israel were agreed to. These had the effect of bringing the entire railroad from Haifa to the Negev and from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem under Jewish control, a matter vital to the development of the country. In addition, 150 square miles of land

and a few Arab villages were transferred to Israel, and the direct highway from Hadera to the Emek was included in Israel territory.

Syria and Lebanon Armistices

Simultaneously, armistice talks proceeded with Lebanon. The eleven villages captured by Israeli forces were handed back, the old Palestine Lebanese frontier becoming the armistice line. Similar negotiations with Syria were more complicated, for the Syrians had gained a foothold at the settlement of Mishmar Hayarden, which they refused to relinquish. Negotiations continued until July, and were halted for a time by the rise to power of the Syrian military dictator, Husne el Zaim. The armistice was signed on July 20, 1949.

The Israeli government, of course, wished to pursue the matter through to full peace with its Arab neighbors. There was no doubt, however, that this would be a very difficult matter, and that a formal peace might not immediately be made. In view of this, particular importance attached to the arrangements, territorial and military, arrived at in the armistice agreements. Under the UN partition plan, the Jews were to have the whole Negev, the eight-mile wide coastal strip in the center of Palestine, the Emek, and Eastern Galilee with the Upper Jordan Valley. On May 15, 1948, they had effective control only over the coastal strip, the Emek, and the upper Jordan. In the course of the defense against invasions, they gained effective and exclusive control of the whole Negev, the whole of Galilee (East and West), and a wide corridor to Jerusalem, including the New City of Jerusalem, while surrendering none of the area they previously held.

Summary

In the Summer of 1949, Israel was neither at war nor at peace with her neighbors. There was no fighting, but the danger of an Arab war of *revanche* was ever present. The government and army were fully alive to the implications of such an imminent situation. According to Ben Gurion, Israel's frontiers were to be secured by a line of frontier settlements upon which defensive troops would be based.

Recognition of Israel

On May 14, 1948, the state of Israel was declared to exist. President Harry Truman of the United States was the first and most important statesman to recognize the new state. He proclaimed recognition *de facto* within five hours of the proclamation of statehood in Tel Aviv. This gave the Jews of Palestine immense moral strength. The Soviet Union recognized Israel *de jure* on May 17, 1948, and was the first to send a minister to Tel Aviv (August 9, 1948). Several smaller states followed suit; Poland and Czechoslovakia extended recognition on May 18, 1948, Guatemala and Uruguay, May 19, 1948, and South Africa on May 24, 1948. Hungary, Finland, Rumania, Panama, and Costa Rica recognized Israel in June, 1948. In the Winter of 1948-49, after the elections had proved Israel's stability, countries in Western Europe, the British Com-

monwealth, Scandinavia, and South America recognized Israel. Full United States recognition, and the establishment of an embassy in Tel Aviv headed by James G. McDonald, was announced on January 31, 1949. By the Summer of 1949, all but the Moslem-populated countries had recognized Israel, and after her entry into the United Nations she became a full-fledged member of the family of nations. Following recognition, Israel exchanged envoys with Washington, Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, Buenos Aires, Bucharest, Paris, London, Rome, Belgrade, Brussels, and consuls were sent to many other capitals.

Provisional Government

The government set up on May 14, 1948, styled itself the Provisional Government of Israel, in conformity with the UN partition resolution.

David Ben Gurion had previously formed a cabinet consisting of thirteen members and a legislative body, the State Council, consisting of thirty-seven. While the cabinet decided on policy and on executive matters, the Council ensured democratic rule from the start by serving as a parliamentary body of review, as well as a legislature for urgent current matters. However, as soon as the most pressing tasks of war had been accomplished, it became necessary to replace this *ad hoc* arrangement by a democratically elected parliament, whose task would be to pass a constitution.

Elections

The date of the first Israel general elections was fixed for January 25, 1949. The State Council legislated a set of rules for the nomination and election of delegates to the Constituent Assembly and for the transitory period until the Israel constitution should be enacted. This set of rules became known as the "small constitution." The system adopted for nomination was that of the party list dominant in Europe. Twenty-one lists entered the field; but only four parties obtained more than 10 per cent of the votes. Seats were allocated to each party by dividing the total number of valid votes cast by the 120 seats in the Assembly, and then dividing the votes cast for each party by the quotient thus obtained.

In order to establish precise voters' lists, a census of the population was held on November 8, 1948. This revealed that 782,000 persons were then resident in Israel, of whom 71,000 were Arabs. The vote was given to all persons over eighteen years of age resident in Israel, of whatever nationality, race, or sex. There were 471,000 eligible voters, including 30,000 Arabs. These had equal voting rights with the Jews, and Moslem women went to the polls for the first time in history.

The results revealed that in an orderly election, out of 471,000 adults 440,080 had gone to the polls. As about 5 per cent of the residents could not vote, their identity papers not being ready in time, this attendance at the polls was a record figure for any free election. Table 1 shows the election results.

It was the consensus of the many analyses of the election that the mass of new immigrants and the young soldiers probably voted predominantly Mapai. The vote for the Religious Bloc was large, and was helped by the solidarity of

the groups comprising the bloc. The vote of 50,000 for Herut disappointed its leaders, who had hoped for much more. The successful war and foreign policies of Mapai's Ben Gurion and Sharett during 1948 had won many Herut votes over to Mapai. The middle-class parties, General Zionists, Progressives, and Sephardim, who by splitting had repelled the large middle-class electorate, suffered the greatest loss. Of the Arab members of parliament, two were elected from the Nazareth local list, the third from the Communist Arab list.

TABLE 1

RESULTS OF ELECTIONS FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, JANUARY 25, 1949.

<i>Successful</i>			<i>Unsuccessful</i>	
<i>Party</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Mapai	34	46	Revisionists	0.65
Mapam	14.5	19	Pro Jerusalem	0.1
Religious	12	16	Arab Workers	0.73
Herut	11	14	Gruenbaum	0.57
General Zionist	5	7	Orthodox Splinter	0.64
Progressive	4	5	Traditional Jews	0.01
Sephardim	3.5	4	Orthodox Women	0.63
Communists	3.4	4	Religious Workers	0.25
Nazareth Democrats..	1.6	2	Arab Popular	0.63
Fighters for the Free- dom of Israel	1.2	1		
WIZO—Women's In- ternational Zionist Organization	1.7	1		
Yemenites	0.9	1		

The practical result of the election was that Mapai was stronger than the two next largest parties combined, but did not hold an absolute majority. It devolved upon Mapai to form the new government. Mapai needed the support of sixteen to twenty additional delegates to the Constitutional Assembly in order to secure a working majority. The choice lay between a Socialist coalition or a Labor-Center coalition.

Knesset

The Constituent Assembly convened in Jerusalem on February 14, 1949, for its ceremonial opening session. Jerusalem had been selected in order to emphasize that it remained the traditional capital of Israel and seat of the Jewish parliament. The traditional Hebrew word *Knesset* was agreed on as the name of the parliament.

The opening session was conducted by Chaim Weizmann, in the presence of a selected gathering of notables and foreign diplomats. The envoys to Israel from the United States, the Soviet Union, and several other countries did not attend, since their governments regarded the location in Jerusalem as contrary to the UN plan for the internationalization of the city.

Knesset first elected a speaker, Joseph Sprinzak, chairman of the late State Council, and two vice-speakers, one from Mapam and one from the Religious

Bloc. It then proceeded to elect Chaim Weizmann President of Israel. He was sworn in at Jerusalem on February 17, 1949.

FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

President Weizmann immediately began consulting all the parties represented in the Knesset on the question of selecting a prime minister and government. These consultations were somewhat of a formality, since David Ben Gurion, the leader of Mapai, was the only serious candidate for the premiership. Ben Gurion first obtained the cooperation of the religious bloc (consisting of Mizrahi, Agudah and their workers' parties), and thus gained a bare majority by adding sixteen seats to Mapai's forty-six. Ben Gurion then brought in the Progressives and the Sephardim. Negotiations with Mapam on the left failed, mainly because Mapam sought guarantees for an unwavering socialist program including the nationalization of agriculture and industry which Ben Gurion refused. The General Zionists on the middle right demanded anti-socialist safeguards, and refused to join when these, too, were refused.

TASKS BEFORE THE KNESSET

Knesset settled down in Tel Aviv to its three tasks, legislation, review of government action, and constitution-making. Its first legislative act was to confirm the "small constitution" of the State Council. The President was made a head of state after the French system, having no executive power and no control over legislation. He was to appoint the prime minister, who was the real head of the executive. The cabinet might be of any size, and was to be responsible to the Knesset, on whose confidence it depended for its permanence.

CONSTITUTION

The making of the constitution, the principal function of Knesset, was not begun during the first six months of the Knesset's existence. There were several reasons: First, Knesset was preoccupied with internal politics, in which the government contended with a strong coalition opposition of Mapam and Herut. Secondly, Knesset was preoccupied with legislative problems held over from the days of the British mandate, or arising out of the changed conditions.

In addition, the government was hesitant to start constitution-making because it soon became evident that any constitutional issue might arouse very profound differences of opinion and endanger the unity of the coalition government and of the state. A number of clashes between partisans of the right and left, religious and free-thinking, was evidence of the deep feeling aroused by social issues. In May, 1949, religious zealots in Jerusalem stopped Israel army vehicles delivering rations to forward positions on the Sabbath, and an incited mob attacked cinemas opening before the close of the Sabbath. The parties of the extreme left, for their part, incited demonstrations and strikes over economic matters, such as anti-inflation wage cuts. Whenever any such question of principle was imposed upon the cabinet for a decision—as when the Orthodox ministers demanded the non-importation of non-kosher meat—there was an unwritten *modus vivendi* whereby Mapai made concessions on religious matters and the Orthodox bloc gave Mapai a free hand on economic questions. The painful process of writing down these issues in a constitution

was put off, although a semi-official draft constitution composed by Leo Kohn was issued by the government. This was a conglomeration of various constitutional outlooks, and provided for such modern safeguards as the right to work, as well as the right of all Jews to immigrate to Israel. In the course of time a body of opinion developed that if no constitution were written within the next four years, constitutional practices would develop based on the coalition program and the "small constitution," which would take the place of constitutional laws.

COALITION PROGRAM

The coalition established the following ten-point program: development of a democratic republic of Israel to be ruled by law, and based on the freedoms of speech, religion, movement, and language, and the equality of sex and race; adherence to the UN charter and a policy of neutrality between East and West; friendship with Israel's Arab neighbors; assistance to Jewish immigrants; a four-year development plan to provide for the doubling of Israel's population through immigration, and the encouragement of private capital; irrigation of the Negev; lowering of the high cost of living; and special cultural facilities for the Arabs.

Arab Minority

In November, 1948, 70,000 Arabs were living in Israel. The precise number of Arab refugees was not known, and was variously estimated at between 500,000 and 1,000,000. Many of them lived a life of misery, and wished to come back to Israel. The Israel government, however, refused to accept any Arabs for fear of letting in a large potential fifth-column minority. However, about 20,000 refugees infiltrated through the armistice lines. In June, 1949, Foreign Minister Sharett put Israel's Arab population at 165,000, an increase of 95,000 over November, 1948. Of this number only 10,000 were taken into Israel as part of armistice adjustments; in addition, 50,000 migrant Bedouins were in the Jewish-occupied Negev.

Not all the Arabs were Moslems. In Galilee alone there were 40,000 Christians, Arabs, Druzes, and Europeans. The Druzes disliked the Arab Moslems, and became very loyal to the state of Israel. The Ministry of Minorities was abolished by the second coalition, much against the protests of the Arabs. Its functions were divided between the Moslem and Christian sections of the Ministry of Religions and the Interior Ministry, thereby emphasizing the civic equality of all citizens and leaving the Ministry of Religions to care only for the religious interests of the Arab minority.

During 1948 the Arabs in Israel had been severely restricted in their movements and trade, since their presence was considered a danger to the war effort. With the end of the war all these restrictions were lifted.

Christian Interests

Christian interests in Israel presented many more problems than the Moslem minority. Since May 15, 1948, Christian opinion had fought against the in-

corporation of Jerusalem into Israel, on the ground that the Holy Places of worship must be guarded by international government. The Israeli government pointed to the fact that during the siege and shelling of Jerusalem only the Jews had protected the Holy Places, and that the harm they had suffered was an inevitable accompaniment of battle. The Jews were considerably embarrassed by propaganda abroad of Israel cruelty to minorities and damage to the sanctuaries. Though realizing that this had merely the political aim of wresting Jerusalem from Israel, the government agreed in August, 1949, to compensate Christians for damage suffered by religious institutions during military action.

Immigration

One of the first acts of the new state on May 15, 1948, was to abolish the British anti-immigration laws, and to open the country to all Jewish immigrants, subject only to technical arrangements of transportation. Between May 15, 1948, and June 30, 1949, 241,000 immigrants came to Israel, whose population on May 15, 1948, was only slightly more than 600,000 Jews. This meant an increase of 40 per cent in one year.

Immigration fell into two main categories. Those who came from the Anglo-American countries and France were mainly young men and women who wanted to help in the war. Some of the *Mahal* (Overseas Volunteers) were acknowledged specialists in important jobs, others simply idealists, but all were full of the spirit of self-sacrifice. They were estimated to number about 3,500. A few hundred stayed on after the war, and settled in Israel. Other immigrants came from free countries, bringing with them things the country vitally needed—capital, enterprise, and technical skills.

But the large majority of immigrants came from DP camps, the countries of Eastern Europe, North Africa and Cyprus. The Jewish Agency, which was in charge of technical arrangements, at first gave preference to men who could help in the war. *Gahal* (Overseas Recruits) came to fight and settle. While they did not always have the training of *Mahal*, their numbers made a great contribution to the fighting efficiency of the Israel Army at a critical moment.

CYPRUS

When the Palestine mandate ended, over 30,000 Jewish would-be immigrants from Europe and North Africa were still detained on the British island of Cyprus. On the day of the Arab invasion of Palestine, the British opened the camps to let out the Jews, but no means of transportation were available. There was a high proportion of young people in Cyprus who had been selected for the hazards of visaless immigration and they were vitally needed for Israel's war effort. But in June, 1948, the British prohibited the exit of people considered of military age, only gradually letting out the others. By June, 1948, the impatience of many of these young people had grown to desperation. Israel's representative to the UN, Aubrey Eban, filed a protest in which he made public a bitter letter of complaint from the inmates of the Cyprus Jewish camps, on June 6, 1948. In September, 1948, the government of Israel sent a lawyer to fight a habeas corpus case on their behalf in the Cyprus courts. This attempt failed, was renewed, and dragged on until January, 1949, when the last 5,000 persons

detained on Cyprus, including 700 infants in arms, were released by order of British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin.²

NORTH AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST

Similarly, until January, 1949, Jewish immigrants to Israel from other British possessions, such as Aden and Tripoli, were restricted to those of non-military age. Between May, 1948 and June, 1949 about 12,000 Moroccan Jews entered Israel. The Jewish Agency and the American Joint Distribution Committee arranged for 5,000 Yemenite Jews to be flown out of Aden to Israel in the airlift known as "Operation Magic Carpet" which began December 15, 1948.³ Turkey, which recognized Israel soon after becoming a member of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission, allowed its Jews to emigrate to Israel. Five hundred Jews from Afghanistan, who had fled to India, were also brought to Israel by special airlift. Likewise, 4,400 Jews from Shanghai were brought over by airlift and by boat; 200 came from Tientsin, 120 from Hongkong, and 1,000 from Asmara and Djibouti in Eritrea.

DISPLACED PERSONS

The great majority of immigrants came directly from the DP camps. They were mostly young married people with children. Most of them had no training in any productive craft, and had difficulty in integrating themselves into the economy of the country. Many of them preferred trading to working, others crowded the towns and larger villages, and only 10 to 15 per cent went into agriculture. Since most had family responsibilities, it was very difficult to draft them into pioneering tasks, in which they were most urgently needed. As the country was short of skilled workers, ORT undertook the training of immigrants in twenty schools specially set up for this purpose.

Housing and Employment

The immigrants brought in by the Jewish Agency started life in Israel in temporary transit camps. By March, 1949, all available housing was full; but so long as immigrants had to wait in the camps, they could not take employment, so that the two problems of work and housing were interlinked to form a vicious circle. In the first part of 1949 there was no unemployment, there having been a scarcity of labor during the war. But in June, 1949, 26,000 persons registered at labor exchanges as unemployed. The real figure was even higher. Unemployment was greatest in the transit camps, and in those abandoned Arab centers in which not many employers had opened factories, especially Ramleh and Lydda. The unemployed immigrants grew restive, and in July, 1949, demonstrated frequently in demand of work. In order to reduce unemployment, the government tried to attract enterprises into the new centers, and also started public works and large harvesting schemes.

In the absorption of immigrants, housing was by far the biggest problem. It had always been a problem in this immigrant country. In 1946 the housing density of Jews in Palestine averaged over three persons per room. Owing to the unexpected abandonment of Arab properties, 50,000 Jews could be settled

² See also p. 320.

³ For complete statistics of immigration to Israel during the period under review, see pp. 406 ff.

in Jaffa, 10,000 in Haifa, and others in Safed, Tiberias, etc. But not all of these localities were suitable for housing, because some were below the standard fit for Europeans, and others were too close to the front line. In all, twenty Arab-abandoned villages and three towns were settled by 130,000 to 140,000 Jewish immigrants. One hundred and seven new Jewish settlements were established in the fifteen months between January 1, 1948, and March 31, 1949, sixteen during the emergency days of May to August, 1948, alone. In the whole of Israel there were in April, 1949, 490 towns, villages, and settlements. Of these, 97 were Arab villages, 187 *kibbutzim*, 30 cities and townships, and 62 Jewish villages; in addition, Israel had established 42 small-holder's settlements, 6 autonomous urban suburbs, and 3 farm schools.⁴ Ben Gurion declared it to be the government's policy to set up 500 new Jewish villages during the course of four years, in order to absorb the immigrants, maintain the population, and defend the country.

During 1948, all the immigrants, a total of 118,993, had found temporary or permanent housing. The crisis first reared its head about April, 1949, when the Jewish Agency announced that no more Arab property was available except for agricultural settlement. In May, 1949, 55,000 persons found themselves in immigrant transit camps, under crowded and primitive conditions, their waiting period lengthening from a few days to weeks and months. But Jewish Agency chairman Berl Locker promised that all immigrants then in the camps would be housed within five months' time. Most of the camps were former British army camps, but even these did not suffice, and additional camps had to be put up. Meantime the budget of the Agency had to be drastically cut, as the United Jewish Appeal campaign in the United States did not come up to expectations.

Immigration Reduced

The problem of absorbing immigrants became really critical, when 90,000 people found themselves both unemployed and unhoused. Certain financial circles led by Finance Minister Eliezer Kaplan advocated the curtailment of immigration, in order to integrate the arrivals in an orderly fashion; but Ben Gurion and his group insisted on doubling the population in the shortest possible time, arguing that the difficulties would resolve themselves in due time. Arguments were cut short when in June, 1949, word reached prospective immigrants in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere, of the difficulties in Israel, and mass immigration fell off sharply from 23,228 in May, 1949, to 16,373 in June, 1949.

In cooperation with private and semi-public bodies, the government took in hand many housing projects. The \$12,000,000 *Amidar* corporation was set up by the Agency and the government to provide mass housing for immigrants. Histadrut established new estates, and private builders from Israel and overseas promoted various schemes. But the problem remained very acute because of the high cost of building and the shortage of trained building labor. In June, 1949, the minister of labor proposed a plan to build 30,000 homes by using idle immigrant labor.

⁴ *Israel Economic Bulletin* No. 12, May, 1949.

Economic Difficulties

Another factor that temporarily slowed down the mass immigration plan was that of economic difficulties. Even before the state was established, Israel had found economics a very hard nut to crack. The repulse of the Arab rebellion from December, 1947 to April, 1948 had cost much in money, men, and property. The War of Independence was an infinitely greater burden. The establishment of orderly government out of planned chaos and war was an additional charge on this young country. And last, the addition of almost a quarter of a million immigrants per annum to a population of 600,000 created an economic burden unparalleled in history.

DOMESTIC LOANS ⁵

The Jews of Israel had to rely on world Jewry to assist in these various tasks, yet had no illusions but that the main burden of all this had to be borne by the citizens of Israel themselves. The urgent need for money to buy arms and maintain soldiers and immigrants demanded very high taxation and public loans. On May 1, 1948, the Jewish Agency floated a \$9,000,000 loan in Israel. Early in 1949 a second loan of \$40,000,000 was issued, in three parts: a \$22,000,000 loan taken up by business houses, a \$9,000,000 loan subscribed by banks and financial institutions, and a \$9,000,000 loan taken up by the general public.

INVESTMENTS

Loans, however, only represented a part of the needs of Israel. In June, 1949, a government source estimated the capital needed for developing the country at \$2,000,000,000, the bulk of which was expected to come from big business investors overseas, notably in the United States. This did not, however, immediately materialize; many prospective investors delayed because the high costs in Israel made investment an uncertain venture.

CURRENCY

On August 16, 1948, the national Zionist Anglo-Palestine Bank was authorized by law to issue a new currency on behalf of the government. The Israel pound replaced the Palestine pound previously current in Palestine and Trans-Jordan. The Israel public gave the new money full confidence, exchanging Palestinian pounds for the Israeli, and saw in it another step toward gaining Israel's independence. This step became necessary when Palestine was arbitrarily excluded from the sterling area early in 1948 while the Palestinian money remained controlled by a currency board sitting in London which did not recognize the state of Israel.

BUDGET

In July, 1949, Finance Minister Eliezer Kaplan presented his first annual budget. It consisted of two parts: the normal budget and the secret war budget. While in July, 1948, the war budget was estimated to be from \$30,000,000 to

⁵ For foreign loans to Israel, see p. 135.

\$45,000,000 a month, and the normal budget for that month was disclosed as \$4,900,000, the normal budget grew with the establishment of civil government until it balanced at \$111,000,000 for the year 1949-50. To this was added a special development budget of \$186,000,000 to be financed mainly from overseas loans. Notwithstanding the large war budget, modern total war made such inroads on finances that it was impossible to meet many vital payments on time; soldiers' pay was frequently behind schedule and family allowances were overdue. The vast intake of immigrants, too, had a very serious effect on finances. The Zionist General Council, which met in Jerusalem in August, 1948, and again in March, 1949, agreed to take part of this financial burden off the shoulders of the Israel government by looking after the absorption of immigrants, and by giving a \$2,400,000 grant for the schooling of immigrant children.

HIGH COST OF LIVING

By far the gravest cause of the economic difficulties was the high cost of living, which reached inflationary levels. In December, 1947, the index had risen to 282 points above the base year of 1939, or nearly three times as high. In December, 1948, it stood at 370 points, a rise of 90 points in one year. The real cost of living was much higher, as only official prices were recorded, and food and clothing were even higher still, being five to ten times above the cost of 1939. By December, 1948, the provisional government realized that this position was untenable. Ben Gurion declared that if allowed to continue, economic developments might break the young state, since the inflation paralyzed Israeli exports and prevented foreign capital investments for development. Siegfried Hoofien of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, who was appointed economic coordinator to the government, advised that both wages and prices be frozen for six months, to enable a natural drop to begin. But nothing was done, as employers were reluctant and the unions rejected the proposals outright; each side demanded that the other commit itself first.

AUSTERITY PLAN

In March, 1949, Ben Gurion's second administration turned its immediate attention from war to economics. The prime minister, together with the finance, supply, and labor ministers took a leading part in this policy. He appointed an over-all planning board for the four-year plan, and two advisory councils, one scientific and the other economic. At the end of April, 1949, the government published its economic plan for the reduction of costs, which became known as the "austerity plan." The plan aimed at gradually and simultaneously lowering costs, prices, and wages, by removing the scarcity of food and other commodities, by an immediate reduction of all commodity prices, a drive to increase production to a point of supply where prices would naturally drop, and a cut in unnecessary consumption. The reductions began with lower ceilings for food, followed by clothing, fuel, fares, and services. In the two months of May and June, 1949, the index was forced down by 20 points, and on July 15, 1949, the workers' higher-cost-of-living bonuses were also cut by this proportion to open the way for further reductions. The population had to undergo certain restrictions which did not amount to real austerity, but there

was ample and good food, and distribution was well regulated. A luxury tax was imposed on many goods, in order to stop wasteful consumption.

The raising of productivity was more difficult. It proceeded only at the pace set by two factors: the replacement of outworn machinery by new tools brought from overseas, and the integration of the large number of immigrants into the economic system of the country. The plan as a whole succeeded and promised to bear fruit, because Mapai was strong enough to force all sections of the community into compliance, capital as well as labor, trade as well as industry and agriculture. In doing so it had to put aside a number of its professed labor-socialist aims, and to estrange certain sections of the labor movement.

FOREIGN TRADE

In its foreign trade Israel sought to reduce its vast imports to the minimum of unessential goods, but at the same time maintain the importation of all capital goods vital for development. Trade pacts were signed with Hungary on January 12, 1949, and with Poland on May 20, 1949, and trade talks were begun with Finland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Great Britain. The main Israeli export goods were diamonds and oranges. The diamond cutting and exporting industry maintained its 1948 level, but the citrus industry ran into many difficulties. Of 6,000,000 cases that had been agreed upon for shipment to Europe during the 1948-49 season, only 4,500,000 were actually dispatched, because the fruit was poor and harvest labor very costly.

HAIFA OIL

The large Haifa oil refineries, owned and managed by the British, were closed in May, 1948, when the British evacuated and Iraqi oil ceased to flow through the pipeline. Throughout 1948 Israel made unsuccessful efforts which were blocked by Great Britain to reopen the refineries. By early 1949 it became obvious that the lack of British-owned oil from Haifa was a drain on Britain's dollar reserves, and tentative efforts were made to persuade Iraq to recommence shipment of supplies to Haifa. These failed, and in the Summer of 1949 the government was considering opening the refineries and supplying raw oil from overseas.

Cultural

Cultural activities continued to flourish in the war year of 1948. Several hundred Hebrew books were published, and an important Hebrew Book Exhibition was held in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in February, 1949. The continuing revival of the Hebrew language was again the central factor in Israel's cultural life. Hebrew acquired new meaning in 1948-49, as hundreds of thousands of new immigrants became acquainted with this tongue. This proved no easy matter, as many immigrants came at an age where a new language is no longer easily learned, and they lived together in centers in which they tended to speak their native tongues. To strengthen the dominance of Hebrew in the Jewish state, a Hebrew Academy was founded on January 3, 1949, consisting of twenty-eight members. The army provided full facilities for a more extensive Hebraization, by giving immigrants all-Hebrew surroundings.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE

In March, 1949, the coalition government turned its full attention to cultural matters and established a ministry of education and culture, under Zalman Shazar (Rubashov), who in July, 1949, introduced a law providing for universal, compulsory, and free education. The law provided schooling for the 10 per cent of Jewish children who had not previously attended school. All Arab children, too, had of course to attend in the future. There were only 4,000 teachers in Israel in 1949 for 92,000 children, and plans were laid to raise the school-leaving age to fourteen. Thus, many more teachers would be needed.

The school system, in which schools were divided by political trends (Labor, General, Orthodox and Agudah), continued. Ben Gurion declared himself against it, however, and prospects arose that it might die out with a centralized educational system.

HEBREW UNIVERSITY

In the field of higher studies, the Hebrew University suffered badly in Jerusalem, being cut off and shelled on Mount Scopus. After the Trans-Jordan armistice, periodic convoys to Scopus were arranged; but academic life remained paralyzed and had to be transferred to temporary premises in the New City. Practically all University students were away on war service. One hundred of them fell in action.

It was not until April 22, 1949, that the Hebrew University opened its academic year. At its reopening, the loss of its first rector and president, Judah L. Magnes, was felt and mourned.⁶ On May 17, 1949, the Medical Faculty was ceremoniously opened, thus beginning to satisfy a need for more doctors. A faculty of law and social science was preparing to open in the Fall of 1949. The Board of Governors met in Jerusalem from May 23 to 26, 1949, considered development plans, and elected Selig Brodetsky of England chairman, replacing Chaim Weizmann. On March 13, 1949, the Hebrew University awarded its third honorary degree to Albert Einstein on his seventieth birthday.

FINE ARTS

The fine arts flourished in Israel. Many exhibitions of paintings and drawings took place, the Tel Aviv Museum providing the most hospitable home. Overseas Jewish painters visited Israel to paint and to exhibit, and American artists sent a gift collection.⁷ Music, the Israel national art, was presented mainly by the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra, and other orchestras and ensembles. Foreign guest conductors included Leonard Bernstein from the United States, Nicolai Malko from Russia; Louis Cohen from England; and Paul Paray, who accepted the post of the IPO's musical director, from France. On the stage, Habimah went through a severe crisis over the production and presentation methods of this one-time Russian Hebrew theater cooperative. After the intervention of leading public figures, Habimah eventually recovered itself, scrapped its old repertoire and troupe, and presented several new plays, including a timely piece called *In the Deserts of the Negev* which aroused con-

⁶ For an account of the life and accomplishments of Judah L. Magnes, see pp. 512 ff.

⁷ For a description of this collection, see p. 225.

troversial interest among civilians and soldiers. Ohel, the Histadrut theater, produced a piece about the defense of Jerusalem, while the Hebrew Opera lured the public into more distant spheres with the *Tales of Hoffman*, *Manon* and *The Barber of Seville*, all presented in Hebrew. The Chamber Theater, a group of young players, continued to delight audiences with translated modern comedies and plays of social significance. The films remained the most popular entertainment, especially with the non-Hebrew speaking public, and plans were laid by several film companies for making films in Israel.

As the first year of the state of Israel drew to its close, its people looked ahead to bringing peace, stability, and prosperity to the whole Middle East.

HELMUTH LOWENBERG

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS

DURING the calendar year 1948, a total of 118,993 immigrants entered Israel, the largest part of these after the achievement of independence on May 14, 1948.¹ This number constituted 21.5 per cent of the total immigrants who entered the country during the thirty years from 1918 through 1948. During the first year of independence, from May 15, 1948, to May 15, 1949, approximately 218,000 Jews were admitted.² From May 15, 1948, to July 2, 1949—a period of about thirteen and one-half months—the number of immigrants reached almost one-quarter of a million (247,485). This compared with 27,561 Jewish immigrants in 1939; 17,760 in 1946; and 21,542 in 1947. During 1948, 177 immigrants were admitted per thousand Jewish residents, compared with 64 in 1939; 30 in 1946; and 35 in 1947. Only in 1925 and 1935 were the immigration rates higher, being 285 and 192 per thousand residents respectively.³

Table 1 gives the figures by month for Jewish immigration during 1948.

TABLE 1

JEWISH IMMIGRATION BY MONTH, 1948⁴

<i>Month</i>	<i>No.</i>
January	1,670
February	6,025
March	2,890
April	5,499
May	6,055
June	1,372
July	17,266
August	8,451
September	10,786
October	10,691
November	20,369
December	27,829
TOTAL	118,903

¹ *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, I, 1, July, 1949, pp. x-xv, edited by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Hakiryia, Israel.

² *Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA)*, May 18, 1949.

³ Israel Office of Information, New York; based on *JTA* reports and other sources.

⁴ *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, I, 1, July, 1949, p. 7; adapted from Table 1.

During the first half of 1949, over 141,000 Jewish immigrants entered Israel—a monthly average of close to 23,700. This compares with a monthly average of 3,900 during the first half of 1948 and 15,900 during the latter half. Monthly figures for this period are given in Table 2.

TABLE 2

JEWISH IMMIGRATION BY MONTH, JANUARY THROUGH JUNE, 1949⁵

Month	No.
January	23,533
February	24,472
March	30,500
April	23,275
May	23,228
June	16,373
TOTAL	141,381

Sources of Immigration

Most of the immigrants during 1948 were of Balkan and Russo-Polish birth, as indicated in Table 3.

TABLE 3

JEWISH IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH⁶

Country of Birth	1948 No.	1948 ^a Per Cent	1947 ^b No.	1946 ^c No.
TOTAL ALL COUNTRIES.....	111,222	100.0	19,702	7,850
Adjacent Countries in Asia.....	5	0.0	—	65
Lebanon.....	3	—	—	28
Syria.....	2	—	—	37
Other Countries in Middle East.....	4,805	4.6	633	269
Iraq.....	15	—	—	65
Turkey.....	4,388	—	26	67
Iran.....	44	—	1	4
Cyprus.....	59	—	546	12
Yemen.....	298	—	60	55
Other Countries.....	1	—	—	66
Other Countries in Asia.....	52	0.0	30	16
Afghanistan.....	25	—	29	9
Other Countries (except the Soviet Union).....	27	—	1	7
North Africa.....	8,268	8.0	323	293
Egypt.....	129	—	21	170
Tunis, Morocco, Algeria.....	7,074	6.9	288	27
Other Countries.....	1,065	—	14	96

^a Not including 7,564 immigrants (7,483 immigrants and 81 travelers, later registered as immigrants); no details available as to their country of birth.

^b Not including 501 immigrants (arrived at entry stations controlled by the mandatory government only), 439 travelers registered later as immigrants, and 900 visaless immigrants; no details available as to their country of birth.

^c Not including 9,910 visaless immigrants; no details available as to their country of birth.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, I, 2, August, 1949; p. 106, Table 1.

⁶ Based on *op. cit.*, I, 1, July, 1949, p. 10, Table 4; I, 2, August, 1949, p. 107, Table 3, and p. xxxviii, Table A.

TABLE 3—Continued

Country of Birth	1948 No.	1948 ^a Per Cent	1947 ^b No.	1946 ^c No.
Other Countries in Africa	187	0.2	1	27
Union of South Africa	180	—	1	27
Ethiopia	4	—	—	—
Other Countries	3	—	—	—
Soviet Union and Poland	33,608	32.5	8,087	3,114
Soviet Union (not otherwise specified)	726	—	103	60
European Russia	41	—	—	—
Estonia, Latvia	71	—	39	14
Lithuania	521	—	293	88
Transcaucasia and Bokhara	4	—	—	2
Poland	32,245	31.2	7,652	2,950
Balkan Countries	44,784	43.3	4,929	1,522
Rumania	24,780	23.9	4,727	568
Bulgaria	15,676	15.2	37	546
Yugoslavia	4,136	—	60	38
Albania	1	—	1	—
Greece	191	—	104	370
Central European Countries	8,865 ^d	8.6	5,101	1,988
Germany	1,585	—	510	576
Austria	446	—	123	188
Czechoslovakia	2,558	2.5	2,064	770
Hungary	4,266	4.2	2,389	453
Other Countries	10	—	15	1
United Kingdom	505	0.5	18	91
Other European Countries	1,841	1.8	337	364
Scandinavian Countries	54	—	10	9
Netherlands	203	—	47	128
Belgium	162	—	98	55
France	678	—	56	62
Switzerland	26	—	12	8
Italy	671	—	110	96
Other Countries	47	—	4	6
Western Hemisphere and Australia	284	0.5	42	84
United States	98	—	28	73
Canada	37	—	—	3
Latin America	138	—	13	7
Oceania	11	—	1	1
Not Stated	8,018	—	194	17

^d This figure is based on *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, August, 1949, p. 107, Table 3; it corrects an error in addition of 207 in the original table.

Immigration from the Moslem countries of North Africa and the Middle East was on the increase during 1948-49. With the emptying of the displaced persons' areas and the governmental restrictions on emigration from Eastern Europe, the Israel authorities were, in fact, directing their planning to receiving increasingly large proportions of Jewish immigrants from the Moslem countries. A Jewish Agency report in July, 1949, noted that 40 per cent of all the immigrants were then arriving from the Near East and North Africa.⁷

Of the countries in the Near and Middle East, the largest immigration came from Turkey. An estimate made in July, 1949, placed the number at approximately 20,000.⁸ Most of these arrived during the first six months of 1949.⁹

During the year following the establishment of the state of Israel (May 15,

⁷ *JTA*, July 25, 1949.

⁸ *JTA*, July 21, 1949.

⁹ *JTA*, March 8, March 28, April 7, April 29, May 6, May 20, July 21, 1949.

1948, through May, 1949), about 79,100 Jews from the DP zones were resettled in Israel with the aid of American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (in cooperation with the Jewish Agency).¹⁰

During the eleven and one-half month period from May 14, 1948, to April 30, 1949, JDC estimated that, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency, it had helped resettle 133,702 European Jews in Israel—77,612 (58.0 per cent) from the DP areas, 52,908 (39.6 per cent) from Eastern Europe, and 3,182 (2.4 per cent) from Western Europe.¹¹

Apart from these major sources of immigration, smaller numbers of Jews from Western Europe, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and the United States settled in Israel during the period under review.

TABLE 4
AGE DISTRIBUTION PER 10,000 IMMIGRANTS
(January, 1946—October, 1948)¹²

Age	1948	1948	1947	1946
	May-Oct.	Jan.-April		
All ages	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
0-4	794	830	620	179
5-9	298	203	207	181
10-14	516	1,046	478	517
15-19	1,225	3,094	2,357	2,226
20-24	2,021	1,543	2,160	2,851
25-29	1,610	1,244	1,432	1,666
30-34	916	684	772	880
35-39	820	504	549	488
40-44	613	263	342	282
45-49	442	127	232	181
50-54	345	143	230	160
55-59	187	114	201	121
60-64	129	95	197	98
65-69	48	55	114	87
70-74	21	31	65	57
75 and over	15	24	44	26

Age Distribution

There was a notable difference in the age distribution of the immigrants during the two periods from January to April, 1948, and from May to October, 1948. During the first period, the age group fifteen through nineteen constituted a particularly high percentage of the total (30.9 per cent); but it constituted only 12.3 per cent during the period from May to October, 1948. During the months May to October, 1948, the age group twenty through twenty-nine formed the unusually high percentage of 36.3 per cent of the total number of immigrants. Except for the year 1946, this percentage was the highest during the fourteen years between 1934-48.

¹⁰ JDC Review, July, 1949.

¹¹ JDC Review, May, 1949.

¹² Statistical Bulletin of Israel, *Op. Cit.*, p. xii, Table C.

The relatively low percentage of children of the ages five through nine reflected, among other factors, the lowered birth rate of the Jews in Europe during the period of persecution and war.¹³

Table 4 shows the age distribution of immigrants during the period January-October, 1948, and for 1946 and 1947.

Table 5 gives the percentage distribution of Jewish immigrants by age for the full year 1948.

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH IMMIGRANTS BY AGE, 1948 ^a

<i>Age Group</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>Age Group</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>Age Group</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
0-4	10.7	25-29	13.7	50-54	3.3
5-9	4.1	30-34	8.8	55-59	1.9
10-14	6.8	35-39	8.3	60-64	1.4
15-19	13.2	40-44	6.6	65-69	0.7
20-24	15.2	45-49	4.7	70 and over	0.6

^a *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, I, 2, August, 1949, p. xxxviii, Table C.

Sex Ratio

A change also took place in the sex distribution of the immigrants. During the years 1935-39 (1938 excepted) the proportion of female immigrants was larger than that of the males. It fell below that of the males in 1940, and continued lower through 1948.¹⁴

Table 6 gives the number of females per 1,000 males among the Jewish immigrants.

TABLE 6

NUMBER OF FEMALES PER 1,000 MALES AMONG JEWISH IMMIGRANTS, 1935-1948

Year . . .	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948
Number	1,125	1,132	1,067	996	1,023	929	747	697	867	769	760	774	847	835

Marital Status

The distribution by age and marital status of the female immigrants was different during the year 1947 from the two periods of 1948. While during the months January through April, 1948, the proportion of single women was in nearly all age groups higher than during the year 1947, the reverse was true during the months May through October, 1948. For the male immigrants the changes during the course of these periods were less pronounced.¹⁵

¹³ *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, I, 1, July, 1949, pp. x, xv.

¹⁴ *Op. Cit.*, I, 3, p. xxviii, Table B.

¹⁵ *Op. Cit.*, I, 1, p. xxv.

The distribution of the immigrants by sex, age, and conjugal condition during the period 1946-48, is shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7

JEWISH IMMIGRANTS BY CONJUGAL CONDITION, SEX AND AGE¹⁶
(number of each conjugal condition per 1,000 of each age group and sex)
(1946-1948)

Age	Females					Males				
	Divorced	Widowed	Married	Single	Total	Divorced	Widowed	Married	Single	Total
1946										
15-19	—	—	215	785	1,000	—	—	24	976	1,000
20-24	—	10	645	345	1,000	3	1	184	812	1,000
25-29	8	34	719	239	1,000	12	5	348	635	1,000
30-34	10	57	805	128	1,000	11	54	476	459	1,000
35-39	—	78	838	84	1,000	13	111	618	258	1,000
40-44	17	144	780	59	1,000	29	149	651	171	1,000
45-49	19	298	635	48	1,000	10	100	740	150	1,000
50 & over	4	532	453	11	1,000	6	243	709	42	1,000
1947 ^a										
15-19			131 ^a	869	1,000			5	995	1,000
20-24			598	402	1,000			78	722	1,000
25-29			747	253	1,000			788	212	1,000
30-34			864	136	1,000			677	323	1,000
35-39			932	68	1,000			945	55	1,000
40-44			961	39	1,000			984	16	1,000
45-49			977	23	1,000			989	11	1,000
50 & over			992	8	1,000			996	4	1,000
1948										
15-19	1	2	158	839	1,000	0	1	17	982	1,000
20-24	2	6	671	321	1,000	0	1	244	755	1,000
25-29	5	17	831	147	1,000	0	2	581	417	1,000
30-34	6	52	868	74	1,000	2	10	765	223	1,000
35-39	8	80	862	50	1,000	2	24	846	128	1,000
40-44	8	131	835	26	1,000	3	42	892	63	1,000
45-49	8	208	760	24	1,000	5	59	893	43	1,000
50 & over	3	600	380	17	1,000	3	192	775	30	1,000

^a Includes both divorced and widowed immigrants under "married."

Family Size

The distribution of the immigrants by size of the family was generally similar in the months January through October, 1948, and in the year 1947. The percentage of immigrants arriving singly decreased slightly, while a rise

¹⁶ *Op. Cit.*, p. xiii, Table D; a similar table giving absolute numbers rather than proportions can be found on p. 11, Table 5A; figures for 1948 are adapted from the *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, I, 2, p. xxxix, Table D.

took place in the number of families of three or four persons. The average number of persons per family (not taking into account immigrants arriving singly) was 2.8 during the ten-month period January through October, 1948, as compared with 2.5 in the year 1947.¹⁷

TABLE 8
JEWISH IMMIGRANTS BY SIZE OF FAMILY¹⁸

Size of Family	1947		1948 ^a			
	Families		Families		Persons	
	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
1	9,383	73.8	38,031	60.2	38,031	34.1
2	2,015	15.9	10,376	16.4	20,752	18.6
3	1,085	8.6	9,166	14.5	27,498	24.7
4	152	1.2	4,031	6.4	16,124	14.5
5	33	0.3	1,001	1.6	5,005	4.5
6 and over	20	0.2	564	0.9	4,019	3.6
TOTAL	12,688	100.0	63,169	100.0	111,429	100.0

^a Excluding 7,564 immigrants because of absence of details on the size of their families.

Occupations of Immigrants

As a result of the fact that during the months January to August, 1948, no information was kept about the occupation of the immigrants, only figures from September, 1948, onwards can be produced. During this period, too, the data is not sufficiently accurate.

A characteristic feature of the male immigration was the large number of those with no definite occupations or in respect to whom no occupational data is available. The large number of females with no occupation is explained by their inclusion in the category of housewives. The occupations represented among the male immigrants pertain mainly to the clothing, building, and metal industries.

A Jewish Agency survey of the occupational background of the immigrant camp populace in Israel, made public at the end of October, 1949 (*New York Herald Tribune*, November 6, 1949) disclosed that roughly 80 per cent of the male family heads among the 90,000 immigrants in the camps at that time had never held jobs in their native countries and were totally untrained for any type of skilled labor. There were 29,336 men in this category, as compared to 5,492 who knew a trade or profession.

This disproportionate number of trained men was explained as being a result of the large number of immigrants arriving from the backward countries of the Middle East, where they had existed in hand-to-mouth fashion as part-time peddlers or mendicants. Thus, for example, of the figure reported for October, out of 19,907 immigrants, 12,300 came from backward Middle East

¹⁷ *Op. Cit.*, I, 1, p. xv.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, I, 1, July, 1949, p. 12, Table 6; I, 2, August, 1949, p. 108, Table 5.

countries. In contrast, the initial waves of immigrants reaching Israel had come from European countries and had been composed of a high proportion of artisans and professional men.

As a result of this new immigration trend, government officials had found it necessary to draw up plans for the creation of a network of vocational training schools in various camps.

TABLE 9^a
JEWISH IMMIGRANTS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX
(1946, 1947, Sept.-Dec., 1948, and Jan.-Feb., 1949)

Occupation	1946 ^b	1947 ^c	1948 Sept.-Dec.		1949 Jan.-Feb.	
			Male	Female	Male	Female
TOTAL	7,850	19,702	36,618	33,066	25,821	22,184
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing.	176	255	381	20	271	21
Mines and Quarries	2	—	11	—	3	—
Textiles	54	207	482	77	458	58
Leather works	19	258	225	8	296	3
Wood works	94	329	949	3	670	3
Metal works	143	800	1,049	3	769	11
Ceramics	3	—	21	2	9	6
Chemical Products	4	13	100	7	68	4
Food Products and Tobacco..	70	268	751	16	651	32
Dress and Toilet	273	730	2,675	706	1,935	562
Building	166	382	2,043	15	1,383	6
Literature and Artistic Trades	63	103	526	11	427	10
Transport and Communica- tions	115	190	857	10	575	1
Commerce and Finance	99	63	881	14	609	9
Clerical Service	140	154	941	136	602	110
Public Officials	675	—	44	1	34	—
Liberal Professions	303	347	949	302	817	190
Religion	21	27	50	—	58	2
Law	4	—	73	2	33	4
Medicine	147	—	368	184	341	131
Education	56	320	128	80	87	37
Engineering	45	—	204	12	177	1
Arts	18	—	88	15	92	12
Others	12	—	38	9	29	3
Domestic Services	37	—	51	14	42	23
Students (16 years and over)..	672	1,571 ^d	225	104	109	45
Occupation ill-defined	1,465	294	1,149	96	348	27
No occupation, or unknown occupation	2,050	9,451	13,022	22,847	10,057	15,824
Children, up to 15 years....	1,227	4,287 ^e	9,286	8,674	5,688	5,239

^a *Op. cit.*, I, 2, August, 1949, p. 109, Table 6.

^b Excluded: 9,910 immigrants in respect of whom details are not available.

^c Excluded: 1,840 immigrants in respect of whom details are not available.

^d Students aged 17 years and over.

^e Children up to 16 years of age.