

INTERGROUP RELATIONS

By Isaiah M. Minkoff

THE CAUSE of better intergroup relations drew fresh energy and encouragement during the year under review from the issuance of the courageous Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, and from a series of decisions by the United States Supreme Court which enlarged the constitutional concept of equal rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment and gave clearer definition to the doctrine of separation of church and state. Broad campaigns of education in the dangers of prejudice and discrimination were carried to the nation through all the various channels of communication. Meanwhile, the professional, anti-Semitic agitators declined in influence despite their augmented production of propaganda materials. But opinion polls showed no diminution in anti-Semitic sentiment, and the public generally seemed apathetic toward anti-Semitic utterances and manifestations.

PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS

Organizations and groups working for a fuller realization of America's democratic ideals derived tremendous inspiration and encouragement from the Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, which was issued on October 29, 1947, and was widely read and reprinted. It elicited enthusiastic commendation and was called "a new charter of human freedom." It also was lustily condemned in the reactionary press, and President Truman's endorsement of its recommendations touched off a bolt by an undetermined number

of Southern States from the Democratic Party, and the formation of a States' Rights party. Its impact obviously did not derive from any of its specific findings—since these scarcely revealed anything not already known—or from any of its specific recommendations, which were neither novel nor (as such) revolutionary. That it made so profound an impression as it did was due probably to a combination of factors: the membership of the committee,¹ the blunt manner in which its findings were described, the tone of mingled dignity and indignation in which the argument for reform was couched and beyond all these the impress of a unified program for the realization in contemporary terms of the promise of the American heritage.

The four sections of the Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights dealt respectively with (1) "the historic civil rights goal of the American people," (2) the extent to which "our present record falls short of that goal," (3) the responsibility of "the National Government of the United States to take the lead in safeguarding the civil rights of all Americans" and (4) recommendations for action.

The recommendations included: reorganization and strengthening of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Section; a Permanent Commission on Civil Rights; a Federal anti-lynching law; Federal and state action ending poll taxes and "white" primaries; legislation ending discrimination and seg-

¹ The members were: Charles E. Wilson, (chairman), president of General Electric Company; Mrs. Sadie T. Alexander, assistant City Solicitor of Philadelphia; James B. Carey, secretary-treasurer of the Congress of Industrial Organizations; John S. Dickey, president of Dartmouth College; Morris Ernst, New York lawyer; Rabbi Roland G. Gittlesohn of the Central Synagogue at Rockville Centre, L.I.; Dr. Frank P. Graham, president of the University of North Carolina; The Most Rev. Francis J. Haas, Bishop of Grand Rapids; Charles Luckman, president of Lever Brothers; Francis P. Matthews of Omaha, former Supreme Knight of the Knights of Columbus; Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., American Veterans Committee; The Right Rev. Henry Knox Sherrill, presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church; Boris Shiskin, American Federation of Labor; Mrs. M. E. Tilley, Women's Society of Christian Service, Methodist Church; and Channing H. Tobias of New York, director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund.

regation in the armed forces; the making of federal grants to public or private agencies conditional on the absence of discrimination; enactment of federal and state fair employment bills; state enactment of fair educational and fair health bills and measures outlawing restrictive real estate covenants; federal and state legislation declaring discrimination or segregation in public services, transportation facilities or public accommodations to be contrary to public policy; application of the disclosure principle for organizations engaged in influencing public opinion; local self-government and suffrage for residents of the District of Columbia; modification of the naturalization laws to permit citizenship without regard to race, color or national origins; legislation to indemnify evacuees for property or business losses; and a long-term campaign of public education.

Most of the recommendations set forth in the Report had been incorporated in statements and testimony submitted to the Committee by many pro-democratic groups, including the Jewish community relations agencies.

On February 2, 1948, President Truman sought to give effect to the salient recommendations in this report in a special message to Congress on Civil Rights. He urged legislation to achieve the following objectives: (1) To establish a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, a Joint Congressional Committee on Civil Rights, and a Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice. (2) To strengthen existing civil rights statutes. (3) To provide Federal protection against lynching. (4) To protect more adequately the right to vote. (5) To establish a Fair Employment Practice Commission to prevent unfair discrimination in employment. (6) To prohibit discrimination in interstate transportation facilities. (7) To provide home rule and suffrage in Presidential elections for the residents of the District of Columbia. (8) To provide statehood for Hawaii and Alaska and a greater measure of self-government for our island possessions. (9) To equalize the opportunities for residents of the United States to become naturalized citizens. (10) To settle the evacuation claims of

Japanese-Americans. None of these recommendations was acted upon by the Eightieth Congress.

The recommendations of the Report of the President's Committee were widely disseminated. Within several months after the appearance of the Report perhaps twenty or more digests, analyses and short popularizations were in circulation, their distribution and study being promoted by a variety of agencies. A new thirteen-week series of broadcasts, based on the Report, was in preparation. Film strips were projected, and at least one group was developing plans for production of a feature-length documentary film. The Advertising Council planned units in its *United America* campaign on specific civil rights issues. Pamphlets, articles, manuals for schools and discussion groups, wall maps and other materials were being produced.

The Report gave impetus also to a new kind of community self-survey, the "community audit." Denver, Colorado, undertook such a study, as did "Northtown," an anonymous northern New Jersey community and Montclair, New Jersey. These "audits" sought to appraise the exact status of civil rights in the community. Local organizations and individuals conducted the research phases of these projects under the supervision of experts. Their participation served not only to turn up facts long obscured behind screens of reticence, indifference and complacency, but, more important involved local groups in the process of evaluation and judgment which followed, and in the formulation of recommendations for action. Thus, many who otherwise might not have joined in advocating civil rights reforms were confronted with findings which they themselves had helped to compile.

In the summer of 1948 prominent citizens organized the National Citizens' Council on Civil Rights, with headquarters in New York City, "to urge the establishment of a permanent governmental commission on civil rights; to act as a clearing house for civil rights programs of national organizations; to encourage local communities to conduct an appraisal of civil rights in their own areas and to take steps to improve local conditions." Several state-wide organizations were formed.

among them the Kansas Council on Civil Rights and the Virginia Civil Rights Organization. The Michigan Council for Fair Employment Legislation reconstituted itself the Michigan Committee on Civil Rights, with a correspondingly broadened program.

NCRAC Statement on Civil Rights

The Report of the President's Committee focused attention on the broad civil rights issues involved in freedom of press, speech and assembly, as well as on the equal rights of minority groups. Growing international tensions and the political activity engendered by the approach of a Presidential election contributed toward heated controversy among politically divergent factions and led on several occasions to disorder and violence.

A statement issued by the National Community Relations Advisory Council deplored these incidents as violations of basic civil rights. "Though we abhor the evils of totalitarianism, whether fascist or communist," the statement declared, "we oppose and condemn all efforts to impair, by use of force or intimidation, or violent mass demonstration, the proper exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights to any group or individual. . . . The history of the United States is a history of struggle for those freedoms. The future security and welfare of the United States rests upon them. Only by fostering those freedoms for all can we hope to achieve that genuine democracy which, by its hold on the hearts and minds of people, will constitute its own unassailable bulwark against any kind of totalitarianism."

DISCRIMINATION

Reports and surveys made during the period under discussion indicated no abatement of discrimination in employment, except in those states where fair employment practices laws were in force.

The Ives-Chavez FEPC bill failed to reach the floor of the Senate during the Eightieth Congress, although it had been favorably reported on by the Labor and Public Welfare Committee in February, 1948. Testifying to the urgent need for fair employment practices legislation at Committee hearings were representatives of the Protestant and Catholic faiths, of major Jewish community relations agencies and of such organizations as the American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Young Women's Christian Association and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Of the eighteen states in which FEPC bills were pending on May 1, 1947, only Oregon succeeded in passing a fair employment practice law. The Oregon statute, however, was little more than a declaration of public policy and authorized the State Department of Education to prepare educational programs to combat prejudice. Reports from the four states with effective FEPC laws (New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Connecticut) all claimed substantial progress towards the elimination of employment discrimination. It is noteworthy that none of the state commissions deemed it necessary to invoke the enforcement powers granted by the law in any case or to proceed beyond the stage of informal conciliation.

Two cities, Minneapolis and Philadelphia, enacted municipal FEPC ordinances. Unlike the ordinances previously enacted in Chicago, Cincinnati and Milwaukee, these contained effective administrative machinery providing for the establishment of a commission with power to receive, investigate and adjust charges of unfair employment practices.

Education

Findings of discrimination in education were corroborated in three separate government studies.

The Report of the President's Commission on Higher Education, released in December, 1947, found widespread discrim-

ination and inequality of opportunity in higher education, pointing out, among other things, that: "Jewish students do not have equal opportunity with non-Jewish students in the choice of institutions and in certain fields of advanced study. The obstacles created by private institutions of higher education are manifested in tacit or overt quota systems."

The New York State Commission on the Need for a State University, in its report issued on January 12, 1948, arrived at a similar conclusion.

The President's Committee on Civil Rights (discussed above) found that application blanks of many American colleges and universities included questions pertaining to the candidate's racial origin, religious preference, parents' birthplace, etc., and observed that in many northern educational institutions the enrollment of Jewish students seemed never to exceed certain fixed points and there was never more than a token enrollment of Negroes.

"The impact of discriminatory practices in private education is illustrated by the situation in New York City," the Committee said. "The students of the city colleges of New York are predominantly Jewish, resulting in part from the discrimination practiced by some local private institutions. These colleges have high academic standards, but graduates from them with excellent records have been repeatedly denied admission to private and nonsectarian professional schools."

All three of these bodies recommended not only an expansion of educational facilities, but also the enactment of state fair educational practices laws designed "to make equally applicable in all institutions of higher learning the removal of discriminatory practices in the carrying out of admissions policies."

In New York State, these recommendations were translated into reality in 1948. The State Legislature enacted the Feinberg-Steingut bill establishing a state university and the Quinn-Olliffe bill making it an unfair practice for a secondary school "to exclude, limit or otherwise discriminate against any

person or persons seeking admission as students . . . because of race, religion, color, creed or national origin.”

Proceedings under this latter act, the first such law in the country, might be initiated either by the petition of an aggrieved individual, or by the Commissioner of Education on his own initiative. The Commissioner of Education would then be required to adjust the matter by informal arbitration, mediation or conciliation. Should such procedure fail, the Commissioner would refer the matter to the Board of Regents, which would issue its own complaint against the education practice charged as being unfair, and hold public hearings. The Board of Regents, on finding the charge of violation of the act to be proper, would be required to issue first a tentative, then a final order directing the school or college to cease and desist from the unfair practice found to exist. The order of the Board of Regents is enforceable by resort to Court procedure. The law was to become effective July 1, 1948, but applied only to unfair practices committed after September 15, 1948.

During the period under discussion, two Jewish agencies conducted studies of Jewish enrollment in professional schools, both of which reflected the existence of discrimination practiced in the selection of students in medical schools.¹

Several colleges and universities voluntarily altered their application forms so as to eliminate all discriminatory ques-

¹ *Two Hundred Thousand Jewish Collegians*, B'nai B'rith Vocational Service Bureau; *Multiple Applications for Admission to American Medical Schools*; American Jewish Congress. The former revealed a decline in the proportion of Jewish students in medical schools from 16.1 to 13.3 per cent and a rise in osteopathy from 9.1 to 20.3 per cent which was attributed in part to blocked opportunities for medical education. (See Statistical section for text and tables.) The latter study revealed that Protestant physicians in the states of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut had filed an average of 1.6 applications to medical schools before being admitted as compared with 13.8 for Jewish physicians. A companion study of the application blanks in use in sixty-three of the seventy-four approved medical schools in the United States revealed that only two were free of the kind of questions which were considered discriminatory under State FEPC regulations.

tions, and the American Association of Colleges adopted a resolution in January, 1948, opposing discrimination. The Association, however, urged reliance on voluntary action and strongly opposed resort to law as "interference" in college affairs. In Massachusetts, a resolution calling for a legislative investigation of educational discrimination was defeated in the state legislature.

Brandeis University, at Waltham, Massachusetts, the first Jewish-sponsored liberal arts college to be established in the United States, announced that it would open in the Fall of 1948. In preparation for that opening, it distributed thousands of specimen application forms. The forms were so designed that the portion containing personal data might be separated from the portion containing scholastic information. Only the latter portion would be supplied to the committee on admissions, thus eliminating any possible consideration of race, color or religion in the selection of students.

Housing

In May, 1948, the United States Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions holding that racial restrictive covenants limiting the ownership or occupancy of real estate were unenforceable by state or federal courts, thereby reversing the entire structure of federal and state decisions of lower courts in many jurisdictions which had held these covenants to be enforceable as private contracts. In a subsequent opinion, the Attorney General interpreted the Supreme Court's ruling as being applicable to religious or ethnic, as well as racial, restrictions.

An unusually large number of briefs *amicus curiae* had been submitted, supporting the contention that the restrictive covenants complained of were invalid. The United States Department of Justice had intervened in this way, as had the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American

Association for the United Nations, and national Jewish agencies.

The Supreme Court decision, however, did not prohibit voluntary adherence to restrictive covenants by interested parties. Its decision in this regard might be clarified by appeals from cases pending in state courts when they eventually came before the Supreme Court.

In New York, an appeal was filed from a decision in favor of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in a taxpayers' suit brought against the Negro-exclusionist policy of the Company's Stuyvesant Town development.

The decision of the Supreme Court provided timely encouragement to minority groups during a period when discrimination against them in housing had risen, and both the restrictive covenant and the less formal "gentleman's agreement" had been widely used in connection with new building developments.

Social Discrimination

The exclusion of racial and religious groups from hotels, resorts and places of entertainment continued in many places. Prohibitory laws in some states proved unenforceable. More generally, restrictive practices tended to be expressed obliquely in such phrases as "selected" or "restricted clientele," and the like.

Some newspapers refused to accept discriminatory advertising, and public officials and spokesmen for citizens' groups in many states and communities condemned discriminatory practices. Law enforcement officials in many places were alert to violation. But as with housing, so with hotels and resorts, the "gentleman's agreement" quietly operated to skirt the laws where they existed.

Many local chapters of businessmen's clubs and fraternal orders excluded Jews from membership. Some Chambers of

Commerce did likewise. In Minneapolis, on the other hand, the Automobile Club abandoned a long-standing policy of excluding Jews from membership.

Supreme Court Decisions

Continuing to expand its liberal interpretations of constitutional law, the United States Supreme Court handed down several decisions of far-reaching import in addition to the restrictive covenant opinions already mentioned.

In *Patton v. Mississippi* (68 S. Ct. 184), decided on December 8, 1947, the Court reiterated its condemnation of the systematic exclusion of Negroes from grand and petit juries. In *Oyama v. California* (68 S. Ct. 269), decided on January 19, 1948, the Court invalidated a vital part of the California Alien Land Law, which prohibited ownership of agricultural land by Japanese and other aliens ineligible for citizenship. The two decisions in the Oklahoma Law School case (*Sipuel v. Board of Regents*, 68 S. Ct. 299, and *Fisher v. Hurst*, 68 S. Ct. 389), issued on January 12 and February 16, 1948, established the principle that a state must admit qualified Negro applicants to law school training as soon as it admitted white students, even where no separate Negro school was in existence. In *Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan* (68 S. Ct. 358), the Court held that the Michigan Civil Rights Law, which banned discrimination in places of public accommodation, could validly be applied to a corporation operating excursion boats between Detroit and an island located in Canadian waters.

Federal Communications Commission

An important principle was established by the Federal Communications Commission in the course of its hearing of objections to the granting of a frequency modulation broadcasting permit to the *New York Daily News*. Evidence was introduced to show that the newspaper had displayed bias against Jews and Negroes in its news and editorial columns.

Although the Commission held that the charge of bias had not been sustained, it ruled that the Commission could properly "seek to determine on the basis of the applicant's previous activities whether he is likely to be fair in his treatment of racial and religious groups in the community," and that, in making such a determination with regard to a newspaper applicant, it would consider past "acts of unfairness . . . or the repeated making of irresponsible charges against any group or viewpoint without regard to the truth of such charges, and without bothering to determine whether they can be corroborated or proven." The newspaper was denied the permit on grounds other than bias, unfairness or irresponsibility.

State and Municipal Commissions

Some new official and quasi-official agencies of state and municipal government were created and charged with fostering civil rights. Outstanding was the New Jersey Committee on Civil Liberties, which on April 22, 1948, submitted to the Governor a report in which it reviewed the status of civil rights in New Jersey, appraised the degree to which the citizenry of the state enjoyed or was denied equality of opportunity, and recommended the creation of a permanent Commission on Civil Rights. Some months previously, in November, 1947, New Jersey had adopted a new state constitution, the first article of which was a "bill of rights," incorporating a prohibition of discrimination against any person because of his religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin.

In Chicago, a municipal ordinance adopted in December, 1947, raised the Commission on Human Relations, which had existed since 1943 under executive orders of the Mayor, to the status of an official body.

OVERT ANTI-SEMITISM

The most active of the anti-Semites was Gerald L. K. Smith. During 1947-48 Smith continued to hold meetings throughout the country, but with significantly few exceptions these turned

out to be poorly attended, unpublicized and financially unprofitable. This development followed the adoption by community relations agencies of a "quarantine" policy toward Smith. Meeting with less and less success in his meetings, Smith switched his emphasis to the publication of vicious anti-Semitic leaflets and brochures. He also continued to issue his monthly publication, *The Cross and Flag*, and his newsletter, the contents of which grew progressively more vitriolic.

At the end of 1947 Smith moved his headquarters from Detroit to St. Louis, though taking up residence in Tulsa, Oklahoma. He soon announced the formation of the Christian Nationalist Crusade, which began to hold regular meetings, attendance at which ranged from sixty to thirty persons. His staff at St. Louis included Homer Loomis, Jr., leader of the defunct Columbians, Jonathan E. Perkins, a minister and John Hamilton, who up to the middle of 1947 had been active in Boston. In May, 1948, Smith started the Patriotic Tract Society, a name under which he began the production of small leaflets, which were the size of stickers and contained brief anti-Semitic messages.

Smith lost several collaborators and supporters during the period under review, including Reverend Arthur W. Terminiello, who afterwards left the movement and was reinstated by his bishop; Elizabeth Dilling, who attacked Smith in her newsletter; and Homer Loomis, Jr., who announced his dissociation from Smith shortly after joining the latter's staff in St. Louis. Gerald Winrod's *Defender* of December, 1947, contained a notice signed jointly by Winrod, Lawrence Reilly and Upton Close advising that they had "no connection" with Smith.

George W. Armstrong, reputed oil and steel millionaire of Fort Worth, Texas, drew wide attention in 1947 by publicly announcing that he planned to use the Judge Armstrong Foundation (incorporated by him in Texas in 1945 for charitable purposes) to promote anti-Semitism through the publication of literature and subsidizing of agitators throughout the country. A prolific pamphleteer, Armstrong's latest published

writings were *World Empire* (1947) and *Traitors* (1948), both compilations of vicious anti-Semitic canards. Associated with Armstrong was General George Van Horn Moseley (ret.), who reappeared upon the anti-Semitic scene late in 1947. In 1939 Moseley was exposed by the Dies Committee as having attended a private meeting with Fritz Kuhn. Immediately after this public revelation, he had desisted from open anti-Semitic activity. Until he was supplanted by Moseley, Gerald L. K. Smith had been Armstrong's consultant.

Ku Klux Klan

In the South, organized bigotry manifested itself largely in Klan-like activities, which received much impetus in 1948 from the emergence of the "civil rights" issue in the presidential campaign. Many instances of cross-burning, and several instances of intimidation and violence occurred, most of which was motivated by hatred of Negroes. Many Klan-like groups not only disguised themselves with hoods, but took different names as well. Thus, the Black Raiders took a man from his home in Atlanta and flogged him, leaving cards at the scene bearing the name of the organization. Governor Melvin E. Thompson of Georgia charged that this incident foreshadowed a series of terroristic acts by the Klan. Four men were subsequently indicted, one of whom committed suicide. Dr. Samuel Green's Associated Klans continued to meet at Atlanta, and at Knoxville, Chattanooga and Marysville, Tennessee. Nocturnal ceremonies were publicly held atop Stone Mountain, near Atlanta, at Chattanooga and elsewhere. In June, 1948, an organizational rift occurred in the Ku Klux Klan with the formation of the Original Southern Klans, Inc. at Columbus, Ga. In Miami, where one Klan unit continued to function, hooded Klansmen attended church services in June, 1947, at the minister's invitation. He was promptly warned by his congregation not to renew the invitation.

The Klan was by no means confined to the South. At Akron, Ohio, a Klavern regularly held meetings until its exposure in

1947. In 1947 the Klan attempted to resume operations under the name of American Shores Patrol in Virginia, Baltimore and Philadelphia, but the effort was publicized and failed. In California, Klansmen were active in groups bearing such names as the Great Pyramid Club, Order of Ru-Ha-Mah and The Mohicans. Despite Klan activity in both the North and South, the Klan nowhere (excepting Georgia and Tennessee) gave evidence of being more than a series of small, loosely affiliated units, and everywhere appeared to be vigorously combatted by governmental agencies, the press and the public generally.

Pro-Arab Propaganda

During 1947-48, anti-Semites exploited the Palestine issue for their propaganda, and were of great assistance to the Arab cause. Their general approach was to equate Zionism and Jews generally with Communism, and to present the state of Israel as a Communist threat. They also repeated the threadbare "double loyalty" charge against American Jews. Among those actively promoting this line were Gerald L. K. Smith, Jonathan E. Perkins, Gerald Winrod and the leaders of the Anglo-Saxon movement.

Displaced Persons

Another major issue which precipitated anti-Semitic canards was that of displaced persons. Representatives of all faiths and of virtually every economic grouping and political persuasion had joined in a national Citizens' Committee for Displaced Persons, which sought the enactment of liberal, non-discriminatory legislation to admit a fair share of displaced persons to the United States. Every anti-Semitic device was employed, not only by the anti-Semitic press and orators, but in Congress itself. In place of a bill proposed by Representative William Stratton of Illinois, which was warmly supported by the Citizens' Committee, Congress enacted the bill proposed by Senator Chapman Revercomb of West Virginia, which authorized the entry of 205,000 displaced persons, but

restricted the definition of the term to persons who had entered the Axis countries before December 22, 1945. Among other specifications, the bill required that 40 per cent of the visas go to DP's from the Baltic countries and Poland, and that 30 per cent of the quota be devoted to DP's who were farmers. President Harry Truman reluctantly signed the bill on June 25, 1948, motivated by humanitarian consideration for those who would benefit by it, but made the following comment in his statement: "The bill discriminates in callous fashion against displaced persons of the Jewish faith. This brutal fact cannot be obscured by the maze of technicalities in the bill or by the protestations of some of its sponsors."

"Sentinel" Libel Case

On December 3, 1947, a Chicago jury awarded more than \$24,000 in libel judgments to a group of known anti-Semites, defendants in the abortive sedition trials which began in 1944 (see *American Jewish Year Book*, vols. 46, 47), who had sued the *Sentinel* for reprinting a telegram in which they were characterized as "traitors," "criminals" and "pro-Nazis." Those bringing the suit were Elizabeth Dilling, Joseph E. McWilliams, E. J. Parker Sage, George Deatherage, Ernest Elmhurst, Charles Hudson, Laurence Dennis, Col. Eugene Sanctuary, William R. Lyman, Jr. and Robert E. Edmonson. Judgments were handed down in favor of all but the last three. The defense contended that the charges of "treason," etc., were true, and offered the writings and testimony of the plaintiffs themselves in support of this contention. The jury did not construe any of this as proof of treason, and awarded damages to the plaintiffs.

EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

As in the previous year, anti-Semitism and racial prejudice were the subjects of frank discussion and serious study. The evils of prejudice and discrimination continued to be a theme widely disseminated through all the media of mass com-

munication. Civic and educational organizations, national, state and local, continued or intensified their human relations programs. Research and publication on the subject went on. The following is a brief summary of the highlights in these fields:

Advertising Council

The "United America" program of the Advertising Council, launched in the spring of 1948 with the help of some of the best talent in the advertising industry, embodied newspaper and radio messages built around a three-point appeal to the American audience (1) to accept or reject people as individuals, not as members of groups; (2) not to listen to or spread rumors against racial or religious groups; (3) to speak out against group prejudice wherever and whenever it showed itself. Co-ordinated with radio "spot" announcements was a *Voice of Democracy* oratorical contest for young people, carried out under the sponsorship of Junior Chambers of Commerce with the collaboration of the United States Office of Education, the Radio Manufacturers Association and the National Association of Broadcasters.

Interfaith Activities

Meeting at Seelisberg, Switzerland, in August, 1947, an emergency conference of delegates of Christian and Jewish organizations from Europe, the United States and Australia recognized in a formal resolution that anti-Semitism was a world problem to be solved only through the co-operation of all races and creeds. The conference unanimously recommended the establishment of a permanent International Conference of Christians and Jews. At the instance of Christian delegates, the conference also called for a revision of Christian religious teaching by eliminating concepts hostile to Jews. In July, 1948, the National Conference of Christians and Jews announced the final formation of the International Conference, in a meeting in Fribourg, Switzerland, attended by 150 leaders from 17 European nations.

Radio and Motion Pictures

The radio continued extensive broadcasts of transcriptions of the *Lest We Forget* series. *The Eternal Light* reached a vast audience, and presented many new scripts during the year. A new series, *The World Over*, brought the message of unity to children. Several hundred stations broadcast recorded jingles entitled *Little Songs on Big Subjects*, each of which stressed tolerance and equality.

In a number of cities, radio stations carried programs based on local incidents and situations. Philadelphia continued its *Within Our Gates* series. The scripts of the Cleveland programs broadcast under the title *Inside Story* were edited to remove local references, and made available for general use or adaptation. San Francisco and Hollywood stations carried a regular series of broadcasts entitled *This Way to Unity*. WJJD in Chicago inaugurated a weekly series called *Human Rights*; WBBM, also in Chicago, broadcast *Report Uncensored* and *Democracy-U.S.A.* as sustaining programs. Station WCCO in Minneapolis produced an award-winning series of six original half-hour programs under the title, *Neither Free Nor Equal*. A number of local agencies engaging in the fight against prejudice co-operated. Other stations likewise adapted local incidents and local community problems to broadcast programs.

Among the motion pictures which contained frank portrayals and discussion of anti-Semitism were *Gentleman's Agreement*, an adaptation of Laura Z. Hobson's best-selling novel; *Crossfire*, *Open Secret*, and *Body and Soul*. *Gentleman's Agreement* won the Motion Picture Academy Award as the best picture of 1947.

Of the 16-millimeter films produced during the year in the group relations field, *Make Way for Youth* made the deepest impression. Sponsored by twenty-one co-operating organizations, the film was widely shown, and resulted in the establishment of some score of Youth Councils in as many communities.

Scholarship and Research

Three major publications in the period attempted to summarize the large amount of current research on problems of prejudice and intergroup tensions. In *The More Perfect Union*, Professor R. M. MacIver described prejudice, segregation and discrimination as forming a "vicious circle," and suggested that it could most effectively be breached by a concerted strategy, with the concrete social embodiments of tension—segregation and discrimination—as the first points to be attacked. *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*, by Robin M. Williams, Jr., and *Studies in the Reduction of Prejudice*, by Arnold M. Rose, reviewed the relevant literature and, summarizing the basic assumptions or hypotheses on which research had been based, suggested approaches for further exploration. A book by Carey McWilliams, *A Mask for Privilege*, which also appeared during this period, advanced the thesis that anti-Semitism had been sustained in this country by the efforts of a dominant group to maintain a privileged position.

Important theoretical papers on action-research and on mass propaganda in the war against bigotry appeared during the period under review. Studies of the roots of anti-Semitism continued, with major studies nearing completion at two large universities.

Research continued on the problems of group interaction. A survey of social scientists' opinions showed that 90 per cent of respondents to a questionnaire believed segregation to have harmful psychological effects on the group subject to segregation, and 83 per cent saw harmful effects on the majority group.

In public opinion study, a new type of polling operation sought to determine the incidence of anti-Semitic feeling by means of small-sample, intensive polling of twelve selected communities. One of the large national polling organizations in the course of the year reported findings suggesting widespread latent anti-Semitism; there was some correspondence and discussion in the public press concerning the interpretation of the results and the adequacy of the techniques.

RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Climaxing a long dispute over the constitutionality of many forms of released-time practices for religious instruction of public school pupils, the United States Supreme Court in March, 1948, issued a highly important adverse decision on the Champaign, Illinois, released-time program. The specific case before the Court involved the use of public school classrooms during regular school hours for religious instruction. Language used in the majority opinion, however, appeared broad enough to sustain a constitutional attack on the validity of all released-time programs.

An *amicus curiae* brief had been filed in the case by the National Community Relations Advisory Council and the Synagogue Council of America, jointly in behalf of all their constituent organizations. A number of non-Jewish groups, denominational as well as secular, likewise had filed briefs, arguing that released time was unconstitutional, tended toward divisiveness and was incompatible with the fundamental American doctrine of separation of Church and State. The Court sustained this position.

It was immediately recognized that much further litigation would follow, in order to test the constitutionality of released-time systems that did not incorporate some of the features of the Champaign program.

In April, 1948, the Synagogue Council of America and the National Community Relations Advisory Council adopted a "Statement of Principles on Sectarianism and the Public Schools" setting forth their policy on religious manifestations in the public schools other than released time. The statement read:

1. The American democratic system is founded in large part upon ethical and moral concepts derived from the great religions of mankind. The preservation and fostering of these concepts are essential to the fullest realization of the American ideal; and their growth and development as major forces in American life should be the deep concern of every citizen.

2. Religion has always been and continues to be the central core of Jewish life. The Jewish community of America is deeply concerned with secularistic tendencies in contemporary American life, which, if permitted to grow unchecked, may work great harm to the moral and spiritual basis of American democracy. We urge all religious groups to unite in an intensified national program, designed to enroll all the children of our country in religious educational institutions of their respective faiths. We urge the religious bodies to avail themselves of all media of mass communication for this program, such as the press, radio, motion pictures, speakers' platforms, and special dramatic projects.

3. We reaffirm the position enunciated in the Joint Resolution of the Synagogue Council of America and the NCRAC on Religious Instruction and the Public School that the maintenance and furtherance of religion are the responsibility of the synagogue, the church and the home, and not of the public school system; the time, facilities, funds or personnel of which should not be utilized for religious purposes.

4. Therefore, and mindful of the dangers inherent in any violation of the traditional American principle of separation of church and state, we are opposed to religious practices or observances in the public elementary and high schools.

5. We are opposed to the use of public school premises during school hours for religious education, meetings, or worship. Where public school premises are made available after school hours to civic groups outside the school system, they should be made available on the same basis to religious groups.

6. We are opposed to governmental aid to schools under the supervision or control of any religious denomination or sect, whether Jewish, Protestant, or Catholic, including outright subsidies, transportation, textbooks and other supplies. We are not opposed to the use of any school for the provision of lunches, medical and dental services to children.

7. We are opposed to sectarian observances and festivals in the public schools. We recommend that further consideration and study be given to the presentation of the religious practices of various groups as part of the program of intercultural education.

8. We look with concern upon proposals for the integration of religion into the public school program. The Joint Advisory Committee on Religion and the Public Schools¹ of the Synagogue Council of America and the NCRAC is directed to continue the study of all programs and proposals in this regard.

9. All matters dealt with in this statement shall come within the purview of the Joint Advisory Committee. The Committee shall make available to local Jewish communities such guidance and direction as they may request, and local Jewish communities are urged to consult with the Joint Advisory Committee about such problems. It is realized that the methods of coping with such problems in a local community must take into consideration the local situation.

10. The Joint Advisory Committee shall include in its program a continuing examination into the problems of religion in publicly supported institutions of higher education.

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE AID

By Maurice R. Davie

THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW—May 1, 1947 through June 30, 1948—was marked by an increasing number of immigrant arrivals, including refugees and displaced persons, by a great expansion of the program of refugee service, and by the enactment of legislation for the admission of displaced persons.

The number of immigrants admitted to the United States, by fiscal years [ending June 30], rose from 38,119 in 1945 to 108,721 in 1946 to 147,292 in 1947. Although the number of quota immigrants admitted in 1947 was the highest since

¹ The Joint Advisory Committee on Religion and the Public Schools had been created in 1946 by the Synagogue Council and the NCRAC "in order to make available to Jewish communities such guidance and direction as they may request . . . and . . . to continuously study the problem . . . and . . . keep the communities advised of its findings."

1930, only 46 per cent of the permissible quota was utilized. This was because immigration was relatively slight from the countries of Northern and Western Europe to which the major portion of the total quota is assigned. The following countries exhausted their quotas: Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Rumania. The quotas of Latvia and Lithuania were completely filled by displaced persons, as was most of that of Poland.

ARRIVAL OF DISPLACED PERSONS

Under President Truman's directive of December 22, 1945, displaced persons are given priority within the quota. The first ship carrying displaced persons arrived on May 20, 1946. By November 30, 1947, a total of 28,789 had been admitted, nearly two-fifths of them sponsored by approved welfare agencies. Ninety-three per cent of them came as quota immigrants; 5 per cent as nonquota immigrants, chiefly wives of United States citizens; and 2 per cent as non-immigrants, mainly resident aliens returning to this country, and students. Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Russia, and Austria were the main countries of origin; indeed, they were the only countries sending more than a thousand each. The total number of DPs admitted up to June 30, 1948 was 36,479.

It is significant to note that since the war's end, Palestine and Great Britain have accepted more displaced persons than has the United States, and Belgium almost as many. During the period under review, Great Britain, Belgium, France, and Canada exceeded the United States in the number of displaced persons admitted.

Of the displaced persons admitted during the last half of 1947, according to a special tabulation made by the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 10 per cent were professional or semi-professional workers, 2.2 per cent farmers, 6.7 per cent proprietors and managers, 8.1 per cent clerical and kindred workers, 9.3 per cent skilled craftsmen, 11.4 per cent semi-skilled operatives, 4.6 per cent servants

and laborers, and 47.3 per cent persons with no occupation. As compared with other immigrants arriving during the same period, the displaced persons showed higher percentages of professional and semi-professional workers, proprietors and managers, skilled craftsmen, and semi-skilled operatives.

The newcomers who are the concern of the welfare agencies are not only displaced persons entering the United States under the President's directive but also refugees from all parts of the world who have been admitted on immigrant or non-immigrant (permanent or temporary) visas. It was estimated that since the arrival of the *S. S. Marine Flasher* on May 20, 1946, a total of about 38,000 Jews had come to the United States by November, 1947 and that by June 30, 1948 the number had reached approximately 46,000. Roughly half of this number came during the period covered by this article. Some of these Jews arrived as quota immigrants under the Truman directive, others as visitors, as students, or as transients on their way to countries of final destination, but most of them required service of some sort from the welfare agencies.

As compared with the pre-war refugees, most of the newcomers are survivors of concentration camps and slave labor, and are Eastern European rather than German and Austrian in origin. The great majority are destitute and few have American relatives who can assist in their support and adjustment. In general, they suffered greater hardships and deprivations than the earlier refugee group and may need assistance for a longer period of time. Few, especially among the younger members, have had vocational experience, and all need guidance in developing a sense of freedom and personal responsibility. The median age is lower than that of the pre-war refugees, but there are proportionately fewer children under 18. (The median age of all displaced persons admitted to the United States up to November 1947 is 31.9 years.) Their numbers are about equally divided between the sexes. Emotionally, these post-war refugees manifest bewilderment, anxiety, and shock, mixed with gratitude and a great desire to shake off the past and build a new life here.

The basis for issuing visas to displaced persons in the occupied zones in Europe (and since April 1947 to displaced persons in Shanghai) who do not have American relatives or friends to guarantee that they will not become a public charge is the corporate affidavit or sponsorship by an approved welfare agency. Of the 28,789 displaced persons admitted by November 30, 1947, 36 per cent were sponsored by agencies and 64 per cent by individuals, as follows:

Agency Sponsorship	Number	Per cent
Catholic Committee for Refugees	1,096	4
Church World Service, Inc.	971	3
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society	1,823	6
International Rescue and Relief Committee.	301	1
United Service for New Americans	5,039	18
United States Committee for the Care of European Children	1,150	4
Vaad Hatzala Rehabilitation Committee.	26	...
Individually sponsored	18,383	64
Total	28,789	100

The American Federation of International Institutes was approved as a corporate affidavit agency in July 1947, but so far has not made use of its mandate.

Pursuant to the requirements of the corporate affidavit, the agency submits periodically to the Government a detailed report for each person under its sponsorship. If the report shows that the person is steadily employed, is self-supporting, has had no serious illness, and has not become a public charge, no action is taken on the report and the agency is automatically released from further responsibility 60 days after receipt of the report by the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. In its *Monthly Review* for February 1948, the Service states: "The reports from the agencies holding corporate affidavits indicate that most of the displaced persons sponsored by the agencies have found employment and become self-supporting, so that the agency is released from responsibility."

EXPANSION OF THE REFUGEE-SERVICE AGENCIES

A key factor in the rapid adjustment of the newcomers was the widespread support of refugee-aid programs in communities throughout the country. The leading agency in this field was the United Service for New Americans, whose program was based upon popular support through the United Jewish Appeal. Next to the American Red Cross, it was the largest voluntary social service agency in the country. Its program was the greatest ever provided in the United States for the immigration, reception, resettlement and adjustment of the foreign born. Since its establishment in August, 1946, it expanded greatly as refugee immigration increased, until by April, 1948 it had over 10,000 unduplicated cases under care, in addition to rendering numerous other services, such as assisting 5,518 individual cases in migration problems. The cases under care included 2,476 in family service, 3,288 in vocational services, 1,078 in national reception and settlement, 877 in business and loan services, 1,086 religious functionaries, and 1,231 children under its affiliate, the European-Jewish Children's Aid, Inc. The USNA budget, which was \$9,153,500 in 1947, was increased to \$13,644,673 for 1948. Approximately 85 per cent of its expenditures were for relief and relief services—food, clothing, shelter, health care, minimum household furnishings, and other essentials. The balance was for migration, vocational adjustment, and other non-relief services and for administration.

USNA provided the necessary assistance to the Jewish refugee or displaced person from the time when he first planned to immigrate to the United States until he became firmly established in an American community. It co-operated with the Joint Distribution Committee, which conducted the overseas services for the migrants, issued the corporate affidavit on behalf of USNA when required, and advanced the fare and expenses for travel. Through its Migration Department, USNA handled the domestic end of travel arrangements, advised American relatives and friends in preparing affidavits

and other documents, represented them in dealing with governmental departments on migration matters and furnished up-to-date information on immigration laws and regulations. The new arrivals were met and assisted in New York by representatives of the Port and Dock Division, at other seaports by the local sections of the National Council of Jewish Women and other local co-operating organizations.

Those who landed in New York without money, friends or relatives in the United States, and had no plans and no place to go were cared for by the Reception Shelter Division of USNA in the Hotel Marseilles. This Shelter, which operated twenty-four hours a day, cared for an average of 500 people monthly, at an estimated cost in 1948 of \$4.25 per day per client. It provided rooms, meals, essential clothing, emergency medical care and other necessities. Among the special events at the Shelter during the period under review were a Seder held in April, 1947, in which distinguished guests joined with the newcomers in celebrating their first Passover in America, and a Thanksgiving Day celebration with addresses by Secretary of Commerce Harriman and former Governor Lehman and performances by Raymond Massey, Lawrence Tibbett and other stars, all of which was widely publicized in the press and on the radio.

The newcomers who needed training or retraining and assistance in finding employment were aided by the Vocational Adjustment Department of USNA, which greatly expanded its program. In 1947 it launched a National Immigrant Vocational Training Program in co-operation with B'nai B'rith, and secured the assistance of the Women's ORT Federation in soliciting jobs. The Physicians and Dentists Unit assisted in securing internships and hospital placements. The Business and Loan Services Division in 1947 granted loans totaling \$113,645 to families and individuals to help them set up or purchase small businesses, enter professional practice, continue study, learn new trades, purchase tools, or, in co-operation with the Jewish Agricultural Society, settle on farms.

The resettlement program, which was effective in pro-

moting the adjustment of the pre-war refugees, was resumed, with main centers of activity in New York and San Francisco. By the end of 1947 about 200 newcomers were being moved out of New York each month and nearly 150 out of San Francisco. The estimate for 1948 was that an average of 400 would be resettled monthly. In addition to these assisted cases, a larger number of newcomers resettled themselves in communities throughout the country. Aided by the Community Relations Department, which in addition to its public information program rendered field service to local communities in resettlement and other immigrant-aid matters, numerous communities throughout the country actively participated in the national program of refugee aid and rendered great service, despite such obstacles as the acute housing shortage. Studies made by the Government as well as by USNA indicated that the postwar refugees were following the same pattern of ready adjustment that had been established by those who came before the war. It was reported to be common practice for the newcomers to file declarations of intention to become citizens within a few days or weeks after arrival.

Typical of the evidence from local communities regarding the adjustment of these latest arrivals was the following statement by the executive director of the Jewish Welfare Society of Philadelphia, a city which since January, 1946 has received approximately a thousand families consisting of about 3,000 persons:

We had been led to believe that the DPs were beaten and broken people who would need a relatively long period of time for their rehabilitation. Much to our amazement, however, we have found the vast majority to possess a great resiliency in being able to spring back to normal living, to put down roots in the community, to become self-supporting, responsible citizens. This quality emerges not only from a basic impulse to live again, but also from a deep appreciation of being in a great country which, above all others, offers security and opportunity for those who wish to avail themselves of so great a gift.

Space limitations will not permit a discussion of all the various types of services rendered refugees and displaced persons, but three additional activities should be mentioned.

In the latter part of 1947 a new Religious Functionary Division was organized in USNA to handle both the casework and the community relations aspects of the Yeshivah and rabbinical groups whose particular cultural, educational and professional background required highly specialized treatment in orienting them to American life. The great majority were here on temporary visas requiring regular study at specific Yeshivahs and barring them from gainful employment. The Division maintained about 250 of these orthodox rabbis, teachers and students in three congregated Yeshivah groups and about 1,000 individually, most of them in Brooklyn. The JDC indicated that about 1,000 religious functionaries and members of Yeshivah groups would come to the United States in 1948.

The work of the European-Jewish Children's Aid underwent a change after the war. The average age of the children under care was seventeen. "Chronologically most EJCA clients are young adults. Emotionally they are young children. They need to be given security and assurance, so that they may learn, in turn, to love and trust other people and to get along with them." These were children who had never had a childhood. Their formative years were spent in concentration camps or in hiding. They were not so easy to place as younger children and remained for a longer period in the Reception Center. This Shelter was operated by the United States Committee for the Care of European Children of all faiths. The cost of care for Jewish children was paid by USNA on a pro-rata basis. During the period under review about 1,200 children were under the supervision of EJCA; approximately eighty unaccompanied children per month are expected to arrive in 1948.

In July, 1947 a National Reception Unit, representing an expansion of the work of the San Francisco Committee for Service to Emigres and financed by USNA, was set up in San Francisco to provide reception, relief and resettlement

services to the several hundred Jewish refugees arriving monthly from Shanghai. This movement, which had begun a year earlier, increased after April, 1947, when the corporate affidavit of USNA was extended to include refugees from Shanghai. Many of these arrivals were in transit to other countries, some were en route to relatives or affiants in various communities in the United States, while others required resettlement. In the co-ordinated program that was developed in San Francisco, the Section of the National Conference of Jewish Women provided port and dock service and made housing arrangements; the Committee for Service to Emigres handled resettlement and, pending it, provided extended welfare service; HIAS co-operated in immigration matters; and the Jewish Council of 1933, a former refugee group, provided volunteers as receptionists, interpreters, case aides, and transportation clerks and escorts. This comprehensive program operated with extraordinary effectiveness.

The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), with headquarters in New York City, carried on activities in behalf of Jewish immigrants not only in the United States but in numerous other countries as well. During the first three months of 1948 it helped 5,175 Jews to emigrate from European countries. The United States absorbed 1,305 of these emigrants. From its headquarters and from its branch offices in Washington, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Baltimore, Seattle and San Francisco its workers met ships, trains and planes and gave assistance to the Jewish arrivals. HIAS also provided meals and shelter to immigrants and assisted in the preparation of documents for immigration and naturalization. In 1948 it was seeking \$4,520,000 with which to carry on its work throughout the world.

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY

Three years have now elapsed since the end of the war, and the problem of displaced persons remains unsolved. This neglect of moral obligation on the part of the United Nations,

and especially of the United States, is one of the most incredible and disgraceful phenomena of the postwar period.

Displaced persons for whom some international solution will be required number about one million, over half of whom are under United States jurisdiction in Germany and Austria. They fall into three main groups: (1) the liberated forced-labor group who were brought into Germany from Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Ukraine, (2) the Baltic group, who fled before the occupation armies of Russia in 1944, and (3) the Jewish group, some of whom were liberated from concentration camps but the majority of whom fled in 1946 from anti-Semitism in Poland. The Jewish DPs are variously estimated at from 18 to 22 per cent of the total group.

The special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which visited DP camps during September and October 1947, stated in its published report that "most of these people, given an adequate approach to the solution of their problems, will be an asset and not a liability to the Western world," and it urged "the early admission by the United States of significant numbers of displaced persons." President Truman in his message to Congress on Jan. 7, 1948 again stressed the responsibility of the United States in finding a solution of the DP problem, and stated: "I believe that the admission of these persons will add to the strength and energy of the Nation." A campaign, spearheaded by the Citizens Committee on Displaced Persons, to obtain legislation which would admit a fair share of the DPs to the United States, received the support of leading government officials, every major newspaper, and hundreds of national business, labor, civic, veteran, and religious groups. The 80th Congress, which ended its first Session in December 1947 and its second Session in June 1948, took the following action:

Hearings on the Stratton Bill, H. R. 2910, which would admit 100,000 displaced persons a year for four years, began on June 4, 1947 and continued until the first session of Congress adjourned. The testimony, published in a 693-page document by the House Subcommittee on Immigration and

Naturalization, was overwhelmingly in favor of the bill; yet it was never reported out of committee.

The Ferguson Bill, S. 1563, sponsored by nine Senators and calling for the admission of "a fair share" of displaced persons to the United States, but without specifying the number, was introduced on July 2, 1947. No hearings were held, and it was never reported out of committee.

The Wiley-Revercomb Bill, S. 2242, was introduced on February 2, 1948. After repeated delay, it was reported, without a single public hearing, during the closing days of the session. Though it was most inadequate and discriminatory, it was passed by the Senate on June 2, 1948. This bill provided for the admission of 50,000 DPs a year for 2 years, with no carry-over of any unmet yearly quota to the following year and it contained the following limitations which appear, in actuality, to be tortuous and devious methods of closing rather than opening the doors to DPs. It required that 50 per cent of the DPs admitted must be agricultural workers, although farmers comprise only one-eighth to one-quarter of the total group of DPs. If the DPs thus admitted were to bring an average of just one dependent each, they would consume the total visas allowed. It provided that 50 per cent of those admitted must be persons coming from territories "annexed by a foreign power," presumably Russia. This refers to the Baltic group from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland east of the Curzon Line, who constitute only about 25 per cent of the DPs but who include most of the Protestants. It would in effect recognize the Soviet annexation of these territories, contrary to our established foreign policy. It limited eligibility to DPs who entered Germany, Austria, or Italy prior to December 22, 1945, thus excluding the majority of the Jews (estimated to number from 100,000 to 150,000) who fled Poland and Rumania in 1946 and 1947 and a number of anti-Communist Catholics coming from Yugoslavia and other Soviet-dominated countries since 1945. It restricted entrance to persons who already have assurance of suitable employment and housing. In addition to being discriminatory on grounds of religion, nationality, and oc-

cupation, the scheme was administratively unworkable. The bill was passed by the Senate with an amendment which increased the total number admissible to 200,000, and with a rider that permitted Volksdeutsche from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia (many of whom are suspected of close association with the Nazis) to come under the German or Austrian quota.

The Fellows Bill, H. R. 6396, was introduced in the House on April 7, 1948, and was passed on June 11, 1948. More generous and less discriminatory than the Senate bill, it was a compromise version of the old Stratton Bill. It provided for the admission of 100,000 DPs a year for two years, with a carry-over from the first to the second year. Visas were allotted to the various nationality groups in proportion to their ratio to the total number of DPs. These visas were charged against future immigration quotas at the rate of 50 per cent a year until the total number should be paid back. Nonquota status was given to war orphans who are unmarried minors. The cut-off date for eligibility was set at April 21, 1947. Provision was made for granting permanent status to 15,000 DPs who were already lawfully in this country on temporary visas. Priority was given to farm laborers, physicians, dentists, nurses, household and other workers, and technical experts; also to blood relatives of American citizens or lawfully admitted alien residents. The various states were to agree on the number of DPs they would receive. Preferences under the Truman directive were eliminated. This Bill was passed by the House with one amendment, admitting 2,000 of the recent refugees from the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia.

A House-Senate conference was held on the two widely differing proposals, and a compromise measure was adopted which was accepted by the House on June 18, 1948 and by the Senate on the following day, and sent to the President for his signature. It became law on June 25, 1948. This Displaced Persons Act of 1948, resulting from hasty, last-minute action, combined the worst features of both bills, with the Senate version (S. 2242) prevailing. It allows 200,000

“eligible” DPs to enter the United States in the two years from July 1, 1948 through June 30, 1950, plus 3,000 homeless orphans under 16 years of age, and 2,000 Czechs who have fled their country since January 1, 1948. Except for the orphans, the law charges the DPs admitted under its provisions to future immigration quotas of their countries of origin, up to 50 per cent of the quota per year. Under this system, 50 per cent of some quotas will be mortgaged for generations. The cut-off date limits eligibility to those persons in DP camps on or before December 22, 1945, thus excluding a large majority of the Jewish DPs. Not less than 30 per cent of the DPs admitted shall have been farmers who intend to remain farmers in the United States. Not less than 40 per cent of them must be DPs “whose place of origin or country of nationality has been de facto annexed by a foreign power,” that is, Balts. Other restrictive requirements include prior assurances of suitable employment and of “safe and sanitary housing.” A maximum of 15,000 of the DPs in the United States on temporary visas before April 1, 1948 may gain permanent status, but only upon the approval of the Attorney General and concurrent resolution of Congress in the case of each individual applicant. Finally, Volksdeutsche or persons of German ethnic origin are allowed to compete with bona fide DPs for places under the regular quota allotment for Germany and Austria.

This compromise measure was a shock and a disappointment to all who had hoped that this country would assume world leadership in the solution of the DP problem. Four of the twelve House-Senate conferees, Senators Homer Ferguson of Michigan and Harley Kilgore of West Virginia, and Representatives J. Caleb Boggs of Delaware and Emanuel Celler of New York, refused to sign the bill, and two, Representatives Frank L. Chelf of Kentucky and Frank Fellows of Maine, signed reluctantly. President Truman denounced the bill as “flagrantly discriminatory” as he signed it “with very great reluctance,” and he stated that if the Congress were still in session he would return the bill without his approval and urge that a fairer, more humane bill be passed. He

termed it anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic and a mockery of "the American tradition of fair play." The only hope was that its injustices would be rectified by Congress in the special session which was to convene on July 26. [The special session took no action.]

PALESTINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE UNITED STATES¹

By Louis Shub

THE UNITED NATIONS was concerned in the past year with a number of delicate international problems that taxed its members. None, however, proved as difficult as the Palestine problem which had been constantly on the UN agenda since April, 1947. The UN's decision on the partition of Palestine was hailed because it marked the first major agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union at a time when their relations were exacerbated in other areas. The problem of Palestine, however, also revealed the major weakness in the United Nations, i. e., the lack of the necessary force for the implementation of its decisions. Not only was Palestine the major concern of the UN, but it was likewise a major domestic problem in the United States. The American government was both roundly applauded and roundly condemned for its successive espousal and retreat from partition. The Jewish community in America was likewise preoccupied with the implications of partition as it affected the relationship between itself and the new Jewish state.

On September 16, 1947, the regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations began its deliberations regarding the report and recommendations on the question of Palestine made by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) on August 31, 1947. The United Nations had been continuously preoccupied with the problem

¹ See also article on Israel, p. 409 ff.

of Palestine, ever since the special session of the General Assembly had been called on April 28, 1947 to deal with the Palestine question.

From the time the problem of Palestine was turned over to the General Assembly, it was widely felt that this was the crucial test of the strength of the international organization. Here, the argument ran, was highlighted the dramatic conflict of interests among the great powers: Great Britain would not voluntarily give up strategic Palestine, lying at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and close to the oil fields of the Middle East; Russia would at all costs seek to expedite the evacuation of Britain from this strategic area; and the United States, which through its Truman doctrine sought to prevent the encroachment of communism in Greece, would not permit Russia to use Palestine as a springboard for further expansion in the Middle East. Events of the past year bore out this prediction, and it is within this frame of reference that one can understand properly the deliberations at the UN sessions on Palestine.

It was Great Britain herself who on April 2, 1947, asked the UN to call a special session of the General Assembly on Palestine. The General Assembly acted quickly in sending out the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), a body representing eleven neutral nations, to investigate the problem of the Holy Land.

UNSCOP Report

UNSCOP's members agreed unanimously that the British mandate should be terminated as soon as practicable, but they split over specific plans for Palestine's future. The majority (the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay) recommended that Palestine be divided into separate sovereign states—one Jewish and one Arab—to become completely independent on September 1, 1949. During the interim period Great Britain would continue to administer the country under the UN, perhaps with the assistance of other countries.

The minority (the representatives of India, Iran and Yugoslavia) recommended the creation of a federalized Palestine, including Jewish and Arab states having the power of local self-government.

The Arabs naturally reacted negatively to both proposals. The first official Zionist reaction was expressed in a resolution adopted by the Zionist General Council meeting in Zurich on September 3, 1947, which read in part as follows: "The Council notes with satisfaction that a substantial majority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine recommended the early establishment of a sovereign Jewish state. The territory proposed is a minor part of the territory originally promised the Jewish people on the basis of its historic rights. . . . There are other features of the proposal which require careful examination." The Council found the federation plan "wholly unacceptable." Advocates of binationalism voiced their disapproval of the partition report, as did their ideological opposites, the Revisionists, who continued to clamor for all of Palestine, and Transjordan as well.

The members of the UNSCOP remarked that their report was only a working paper and that "ultimately it will be the great powers that will decide what shall be done." With the latter statement uppermost in the delegates' minds, the General Assembly awaited the statements of Palestine policy by the Big Three, as the fifty-seven-member Ad Hoc Committee of the Assembly met to examine the UNSCOP report.

Prior to the actual deliberations of this Ad Hoc Committee, the United States revealed its position through a guarded statement made by Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in which he said that the United States would give "great weight" to UNSCOP's majority report on partition. The statement was generally considered pro-Zionist. Counter pressures set in immediately and Secretary Marshall, in his capacity as host at a private luncheon for the chiefs of the five Arab delegations to the UN, was reported to have assured them that the United States still maintained an open mind on Palestine.

Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky of Russia made

no reference to Palestine, and a prediction concerning the Russian position rested solely on a statement made by Andrei Gromyko in the special Spring Assembly session, to the effect that in the event the conflict between Arab and Jew made a binational state impossible, Russia would support partition. Thus, as previously indicated, the voting in the Assembly was merely waiting to be swayed by the positions soon to be enunciated by Russia and America during the respective meetings of the Assembly and the Ad Hoc Committee.

Policy Statements of British, Arabs and Jews

The relative insolubility of the Palestine problem, "which however must be made soluble" (in the expression of the chairman of the UNSCOP, Justice Emil Sandström), was soon evident in the conflicting views expressed by the three major interested parties, the British, the Arabs and the Jews.

The opening shot was fired by Great Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones, who stated that Britain endorses, "without reservation, the view that the mandate should now be terminated." He then made the following major points, which later proved to be the cardinal stumbling block in the implementation of the future UN decisions: (1) Britain will not try to "prevent the application of a settlement recommended by the Assembly"; (2) Britain will act to carry out an Assembly recommendation on one condition—agreement between Jew and Arab—because the British are not prepared alone to undertake the task of imposing a policy in Palestine by force of arms; (3) if the Assembly recommendation is unacceptable to either Jews or Arabs, Britain will make plans for an early withdrawal of British forces from Palestine, and some alternative authority will have to implement the recommendation.

With this the British unequivocally rejected any role in any future implementation of the partition plan, since it was known in advance that the Arabs were not amenable to any such proposal. This was proved when Jamal el-Husseini, representing the Arab Higher Committee, declared that the

Palestinian Arabs were "solidly determined to oppose with all the means at their disposal any scheme that provides for the dissection, segregation or partition of their tiny country." He called for the establishment of a free and independent Arab state in the whole of Palestine. The Arab position was a consistent "No!" to partition, Jewish immigration and a Jewish state.

In contradistinction to Arab inflexibility, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, chairman of the American section of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, pledged acceptance of the proposed partition of the Holy Land and declared that the Agency would "assume this burden as one of the sacrifices intended to find a way out of the present intolerable impasse."

The divergent attitudes of belligerence and compliance towards the United Nations adopted by the two parties was presaged by the following statements:

Husseini: The United Nations is not competent and cannot legally dictate to it [Palestine] the form of its government An Arab state in the whole of Palestine [must] be established.

Silver: We favor an international authority under the United Nations to supervise and insure the implementation of [the majority recommendation].

Preliminary Debate in the Ad Hoc Committee

With this background, the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations began its general debate on October 3. The preliminary verbal skirmishing that followed found Uruguay and Panama favoring partition, while Lebanon and Iraq reaffirmed the stand taken earlier by the spokesman of the Arab Higher Committee. Karel Lisicky, the Czechoslovak representative, made a cardinal point that later proved prophetic, when he warned the Committee that unless an international force were instituted responsible directly to the United Nations, some other great power or powers must be persuaded to take the responsibility for enforcement.

That the partition solution would receive the ultimate sanction of the Assembly was adumbrated by the first policy statements issued by the United States and the USSR, in which they gave their support in principle to partitioning the country into Arab and Jewish states. Herschel V. Johnson, in his declaration on October 10, stated the following: "The United States delegation supports the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the majority plan which provides for partition and immigration." He also stated that certain geographical modifications should be made, such as placing Jaffa in the Arab state, because it was predominantly an Arab city.

On October 13, the USSR, in a statement by Semyon K. Tsarapkin, announced its stand: "The majority plan is under the present circumstances the one which could be better put into practice." Moreover, the Soviet delegate emphasized that the Palestine mandate should be terminated as soon as possible. This statement was regarded as an expression of Russia's desire that Great Britain abandon her strategic position in the Middle East which later ran through all Soviet discussions on the Palestine question.

The accord between the United States and the USSR on Palestine heartened the United Nations considerably, for this marked the first agreement between the Big Two in a major area of contention.

Subcommittees

During two weeks of general debate, the following countries joined the United States and the USSR in supporting the partition of Palestine: Poland, Guatemala, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Peru, Haiti and Canada. The proponents of an independent undivided Palestine included the representatives of Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, India, Iran and Afghanistan. On October 22 the Ad Hoc Committee set up two subcommittees for further examination of the partition and unitary state proposals. On November 10, as anticipated, subcommittee I of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine agreed on

proposals to implement measures which might be recommended by the General Assembly for partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, while subcommittee II on November 10 proposed that a unitary independent Palestine be established. Following the conclusion of its debate on the two subcommittees' reports, the Ad Hoc Committee first defeated the report of subcommittee II by a sixteen to sixteen vote, with twenty-three abstentions. The Committee then voted on subcommittee I's report—the partition plan—and it was adopted by a vote of twenty-five to thirteen, with seventeen abstentions. These decisions were transmitted to the General Assembly, which debated three more days before ending seven months of exhaustive study by the UN on the question of the future government of Palestine.

Acceptance of Partition

In the Assembly's final debate the representatives of the USSR and the United States voiced strong support for the partition plan. Andrei A. Gromyko maintained that all alternatives to partition were unrealistic and impractical, since the Arabs would not co-operate with the Jews in Palestine. Most important in Mr. Gromyko's arguments was the conclusion that the partition plan was in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, particularly that of self-determination. The latter point was extremely important, because it constituted the essence of the Arab argument against partition and had also served the Russians in their previous anti-Zionist position.

Herschel V. Johnson, admitting imperfections in the plan, felt that it was "the best possibility of attaining, in a future foreseeable to us now, a peaceful settlement in Palestine." He described the partition plan as genuinely a United Nations plan, involving action on the part of the main organs of the organization—the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council—and on the part of member states. With the co-operation

of these organs and the member states, the partition plan would bring about a solution to the Palestine problem.

After considerable parliamentary maneuvering and a last minute attempt to return the whole problem to the Ad Hoc Committee, the partition plan was adopted thirty-three to thirteen, with ten abstentions. The vote was: in favor of partition: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussia, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, South Africa, Uruguay, USSR, the United States and Venezuela; against: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen; abstaining: Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia; absent: Siam.

Summary of Partition Plan

The partition plan contained the following major features: the establishment of a five-member assembly commission which would progressively assume the administration of Palestine during the transitional period until the actual establishment of the states; provision for seaport and hinterland in the future Jewish state to provide facilities for substantial immigration by February 1, 1948; the establishment of a provisional council acting under the commission, to assume full control over matters of immigration and land regulation by April 1, 1948; independent Arab and Jewish states to come into existence October 1, 1948; Jerusalem to be placed under a special international regime operating under the Trusteeship Council.

The reactions of the contending parties to the decision were as might have been expected. Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, speaking for the Jewish Agency, among other things stated the following: "The Jewish people will be forever grateful to the nations which contributed to the decision. We are especially

appreciative of the leadership provided by the United States and the Soviet Union, and are happy that, in the solution of the Palestine problem, these two great powers worked harmoniously together." The reply of the Arab League members in the Assembly was summed up by Emir Feisal al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, who said: "Today's resolution destroys the charter and all previous covenants." Herschel V. Johnson of the United States stated with cautious optimism that "the General Assembly's action on the Palestine question demonstrates that the United Nations is capable of dealing forthrightly with urgent international issues."

Judging by the American press, the partition decision obtained largely by the efforts of the United States was popular with the American people. *The New York Times* declared on November 30 that "it is the best decision which that great agency of world opinion was able to discover, and we trust that it will have the willing compliance of the two peoples whose future it involves." The *New York Herald Tribune*, commenting on partition in its December 1 editorial, remarked that "the final vote in the General Assembly in the United Nations, approving the partition of Palestine by a little better than the requisite two-thirds vote, represents one of the few great acts of collective statesmanship which our shattered postwar world has been able to achieve." The *Philadelphia Inquirer* declared that the vote for partition marked "the most likely solution of the tragic problem of Palestine, for new hope is offered hundreds of thousands of harassed and homeless Jews throughout the world." Editorials of a similar nature were recorded throughout the United States, and all of them expressed the hope that all parties would comply with the decision.

Appointment of Palestine Commission

There was considerable misgiving about the future of the plan owing to the reiterated attitude of strict neutrality taken by Great Britain. Sir Alexander Cadogan restated the position of Great Britain, to the effect that his government would

not allow its troops or administration to be used to enforce a decision which was not accepted by both parties in Palestine. The new Palestine Commission, consisting of five members from Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Bolivia, the Philippines and Panama, was charged with implementing partition, without clarification of its powers and authority. From the beginning, the projected partition timetable could not be met.

Lag in Partition Timetable

The General Assembly had proposed a schedule of Jewish immigration at the rate of 6,500 a month, which was to replace the old schedule of 1,500 a month, by February 1, 1948. When questioned about this by the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power replied through Sir Alexander Cadogan that the United Kingdom intended to maintain its present immigration policy until the mandatory administration had been terminated. He stated further that the opening of a Jewish seaport to an unlimited number of Jewish immigrants and to the possibly unregulated importation of arms would "undoubtedly produce a most serious deterioration of the security situation in Palestine with incalculable effects upon the maintenance of the mandatory administration." Sir Alexander also informed the Commission that ships carrying unauthorized Jewish immigrants would be prevented from going to Tel Aviv and landing there in the period between February 1, 1948 and the termination of the Mandate.

It was also quite apparent that the date of April 1 on which a provisional government was to be set up could not be met, because of Britain's refusal to permit the United Nations Commission to come to Palestine until May 1—two weeks before Great Britain intended to terminate the Mandate.

Reports of Palestine Commission

In concluding its first progress report, the Commission pointed out that on the basis of information given it by the Jewish Agency and the United Kingdom, the situation in regards to security and civil authority was more likely to

deteriorate than to improve. The Commission touched the heart of the whole Palestine problem when it declared that it envisaged the possibility of a complete collapse of security and administrative services, "unless adequate means are made available to the Commission for the exercise of its authority." The Commission realized that undertaking the study of such matters as the limitation of boundaries, selections of provisional councils of government and negotiations regarding economic union was perfectly futile, unless serious attention was devoted to the security problem, "with particular reference to the possible need for an international force in the implementation of the recommendations of the General Assembly." With this in mind, the Commission declared its intention of preparing a special report dealing with the key problem of the means of enforcement. On February 18, this report was submitted to the Security Council, with a stern warning that the moment the present Mandate came to an end on May 15, Palestine would be a scene of "uncontrolled widespread strife and bloodshed, unless an international army can take prompt and effective action." This prediction was based on the fact that 2,778 persons had been killed or injured since the announcement of the partition in the UN Assembly on November 29, 1947. The Commission pointed out that on February 6 the Arab Higher Committee informed it that "not a single Arab will co-operate with any commission which proceeds to Palestine." The Arab Committee concluded with the statement that "the only way to establish partition is first to wipe them [the Arabs] out—man, woman and child."

The Commission felt particularly frustrated because Great Britain refused to permit it to build up and arm Jewish militia in Palestine prior to its surrender of the Mandate.

Debate in Security Council

Thus the Palestine Commission threw the problem of Palestine back into the arena of debate, only this time it became the property of the Security Council, which alone was in a position to effect the implementation of the partition

plan. As in the debate of the General Assembly, the feeling prevailed that the positions taken by the Big Three would be decisive. Britain's Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones, stated that Britain would not oppose the creation of an international police force for Palestine, while both Russia and the United States, which were the strongest advocates of partition in the Assembly, did not indicate the nature of their program. Prodded by thirty Republican members of the House of Representatives led by Jacob K. Javits for a statement with respect to the enforcement of the partition of Palestine, Secretary Marshall stated on February 14 that "it is not possible for this government to determine in advance the steps which may be necessary to carry out such a decision." Thus, considerable indecision prevailed in United States government circles prior to the meeting of the Security Council on the special report of the Palestine Commission, requesting the establishment of an international army for Palestine.

It should be pointed out that there was considerable pressure being brought to bear upon the State Department to lift the embargo on the shipment of arms to the Jews in Palestine, to enable them to defend themselves and maintain a degree of order under which the United Nations Palestine Commission could carry out the partition plan. This course was reported opposed by those in the State Department who believed that American sale of arms to the Jews would provoke the Arabs and merely encourage them to make an all-out attack on the Jews before the arms shipment could favor the Jews. The same members of the State Department whose position was represented by Loy Henderson, long an opponent of Jewish aspirations and an adviser of the State Department on problems in the Near East, are also said to have feared that this might interfere with American supplies of oil from the Middle East. They likewise felt that if America sent troops to Palestine, Russia would insist upon sending an equal number, and might try to use them to get a permanent foothold in the Middle East.

On February 24, 1948 the Security Council began its

debate on the use of force in Palestine. Mr. Austin's speech on that date was not definitive. According to his reasoning, the Security Council did not have the authority to enforce a political settlement, but did have the authority to use armed force if it found that a danger to peace existed. If the Council, continued Mr. Austin, found that armed force was necessary to maintain international peace which might be endangered by Palestine, then the United States would be ready to consider such action. After fruitless debate over technicalities and procedural matters, a decision was finally reached calling upon the Big Five to consult privately and to report back within ten days with "recommendations which the Council might give to the Palestine Commission with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly."

Trusteeship Proposed by Austin

Britain dissociated herself from the group which met five times between March 5 and 19. The meetings were marked by wrangling and hard feelings. Over Russian objections, the United States tried to renew consultations between the Jews and Arabs to seek a new solution. To Andrei A. Gromyko's charge that the United States was trying to scuttle partition, Mr. Austin issued a sharply worded denial. On March 19 the Security Council convened to hear the Big Four report. Mr. Austin, first of the Big Four to speak, began by recommending that the Security Council "is determined not to permit the existence of a threat to peace in Palestine." At this point he asked for an intermission to permit the big powers to make another effort to agree on a recommendation. Their efforts failed once more, and later that afternoon Mr. Austin issued the statement which was commonly characterized as the reversal of partition by the United States. He recommended the following: (1) that the plan to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish states by October 1 be suspended; (2) that all necessary steps be taken—including the employment of armed forces if necessary—to stamp out the fighting in the Holy Land; (3) that

an immediate special session of the General Assembly be called; (4) that the General Assembly set up a temporary trusteeship for the Holy Land, presumably by May 15, to maintain the peace and give Jews and Arabs further opportunity to agree.

Here, Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, pointed out that the trusteeship proposal had been considered and abandoned by the UNSCOP, because it felt that it would take more troops to impose a trusteeship than to impose partition, and that there would be both Jewish and Arab armies to fight. He asked Mr. Austin whether the United States would be prepared to send troops to administer the trusteeship. To this Mr. Austin replied that: "The United States of course is ready to back the United Nations decision." Virtually every press release on this story was headed "U. S. Abandons Partition," or some similar phrase.

The United States proposal was termed by Dr. Silver of the Jewish Agency a "shocking reversal of the former position taken by the United States." David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, stigmatized the United States' abandonment of partition as surrender, and rejected a United Nations Palestine trusteeship "even for the shortest time."

Andrei Gromyko declared that the United States proposals had nothing in common with the Assembly's resolution and were a contradiction in terms.

Secretary of State Marshall defended the new United States policy with regard to Palestine as the only way to prevent bloodshed after the British withdrawal. He added that every possibility had been explored before he recommended this course to the President.

The United States reversal was met with a general protest by both Jewish and non-Jewish circles. The *Washington Post* stated in an editorial on March 23, 1948, that all efforts in the State Department and outside it seemed to be dedicated to the task of junking the UN decision. "All the folderol from February 24 on was an American maneuver to scuttle partition, and it added farce to tragedy." Said

the Chicago *Sun*: "Our government has finally dropped the pretense that it still favors partition—the solution which our delegates so vigorously pushed through the UN General Assembly last Fall." Editorials in similar vein appeared throughout the American press.

Jewish circles generally protested this reversal on the part of the American government, and the American Zionist Emergency Council, representing all major Zionist bodies in the United States, selected April 8 as a day of mobilization and prayer in protest against the abandonment by the United States of the partition plan. The Jewish War Veterans held a protest parade in New York City on April 4. Protest meetings were likewise held by the Union of Orthodox Rabbis, the Synagogue Council of America, the Rabbinical Assembly of America, and the Agudas Israel.

The hue and cry which generally greeted the Austin statement forced President Truman to state that the United States vigorously supported the plan of partition, but was temporarily abandoning it "because the partition plan cannot be carried out at this time by peaceful means." The President stressed "that the trusteeship does not prejudice the character of the final political settlement, but would only establish the conditions of order essential for a peaceful solution." Mr. Truman also indicated that the United States was prepared to enforce trusteeship if the United Nations agreed to such a proposition.

As previously indicated, the Palestine picture cannot be properly understood unless viewed within the frame of reference of the rift between the western and eastern blocs. That this rift was instrumental in influencing the decision of the United States, and especially that of President Truman, is evident from the report Secretary Marshall gave to a closed session of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on March 23, to explain the United States shift on partition. The following reasons were adduced:

- a. There was fear of a substantial deployment to the Near East of large bodies of Russian troops.
- b. The United States feared the presence of Soviet troops

in any area because past experience had revealed that once the Soviet troops entered an area of occupation they did so with the intent to stay on.

- c. Greece and Turkey would be fearful of having Russian troops so near their borders; moreover, Arabian oil fields were officially held essential to the United States and to the entire European Recovery Program.
- d. Russian intervention could conceivably lessen the security of the western democracies in the basin of the Mediterranean.

It was generally believed that the sole purpose of the trusteeship proposal, in the light of these arguments advanced by Secretary Marshall, was to prevent the Soviet Union from entering Palestine through a force set up by the Security Council. For while the Soviet Union could exercise her power of veto in the Security Council, she had been boycotting the Trusteeship Council for thirteen months, maintaining that it had been improperly established. However, Russia forestalled this maneuver of the United States by joining the Trusteeship Council on April 25 and naming Semyon C. Tsarapkin to fill the twelfth chair of that Council. This reversal by Russia cleared the way for Soviet participation in any measures taken in Palestine.

The Secretary General set April 16 for the convoking of the special session which the United States had requested.

Debate in the Special Session of the Assembly

Dr. Jose Arce of Argentina was elected president of the special session which met on April 16 in a somber atmosphere. The consideration of the question of a future government of Palestine was handed over to the political committee, which conducted a general debate preceding the usual detailed examination. Mr. Austin repeated the new trusteeship proposition and stated: "The United States is willing to undertake its share of responsibility for the provision of police forces which are required during the truce and a temporary trusteeship, along with other members who may be selected by the General Assembly."

Mr. Gromyko, voicing a strong protest against the Austin proposals, declared that the United States reversal of its position could only be explained as action "dictated by the oil and military and strategic interests of the country." Trusteeship, in his opinion, would merely leave Palestine, whose peoples were ready now for independent existence, a semi-colony.

Thus for the first time Palestine was the subject of open debate as an east-west issue. Other nations were cautious in their evaluation of the American proposals, primarily because the issue of enforcement still remained integral to any solution. The Guatemalan representative, Dr. Jorge Garcia Granados, estimated that 150,000 soldiers would be needed to enforce trusteeship and asked where they were to come from, when a mere thousand could not be obtained for Jerusalem. He also expressed the view that many countries opposing trusteeship would refuse to supply funds for it.

Considerable time was consumed in seeking to overcome procedural snags, particularly the USSR's blocking of the attempt by the United States to submit its working trusteeship draft proposal to the Trusteeship Council.

When it was evident that no progress would be made in the debate on the trusteeship proposals, the British representative, Arthur Creech-Jones, proposed on May 3 that a temporary provisional regime for Palestine under the United Nations be set up as a neutral authority which would conduct further mediation and work toward a final solution.

This proposal, too, made no headway, and on May 15 the General Assembly had gathered for what was to be its final meeting, when news reached the UN that the Jewish State of Israel had come into being by virtue of an Israeli Declaration of Independence, proclaimed by the members of the National Council representing the Jewish people in Palestine and the Zionist movement of the world. It should be noted that in the proclamation the Jewish state in Palestine was declared established "by virtue of the natural and historic right of the Jewish people and the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations." Moreover, the

boundaries were approximately the same as those recommended by the United General Assembly in its partition decision.

Recognition of Israel by President Truman

More startling than the anticipated proclamation of independence was the fact that only a few moments afterwards the United States gave de facto recognition to the state of Israel, through the following announcement by President Truman: "This government has been informed that a Jewish State has been proclaimed in Palestine and recognition has been requested by the provisional government thereof. The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel." A month later, an agreement was reached for the exchange of diplomatic missions with the state of Israel. James G. MacDonald was named as this country's first diplomatic representative to Israel, and Eliahu Epstein was designated by the Government of Israel as its representative to the United States. Arab representatives angrily denounced the United States and called the move a shameless betrayal.

Immediately following his recognition of Israel, President Truman held a long consultation with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of Israel.

The special session of the General Assembly then adjourned until the next regular session in September 1948 leaving the status of Palestine as follows: (1) Legally, the partition resolution of November 29, 1947, still stood; (2) the provisions of the partition resolution which established Jerusalem as an international enclave under the United Nations Trusteeship Council were still valid; (3) responsibility for keeping the peace remained with the Security Council, the agency charged with that function under the United Nations.

Arrangement of Truce by Mediator

The Assembly however, before adjourning, did pass a resolution to send a mediator to the Holy Land to arrange a

truce and carry on public services. Previous attempts had been made to end hostilities — all were unsuccessful. On April 1, an appeal was made by the Security Council for a cessation of all violence; on April 17 a call for a general truce was again made by the Security Council; on April 23 a commission was appointed to assist in the implementation of the truce; a cease-fire order for the Walled City was issued in Jerusalem on May 2; and on May 22 there was another cease-fire request. Finally, on May 29 the Security Council passed a resolution for a four weeks' truce that was to "bring about a cessation of hostilities in Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of either Arabs or Jews." The mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden, formally notified the Arab states and the provisional government of Israel that the effective date and hour for the commencement of a cease-fire and truce would be June 11 at 6:00 A.M. On June 9, he received unconditional acceptances of his proposal from all the interested parties, and thus the United Nations brought to a successful conclusion its efforts to bring temporary peace to the Holy Land.

No decision was made with respect to the relationship between the Special Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem, Harold Evans, who had been appointed on May 13 by the Secretary General, and the United Nations mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte. Considerable hope was held out for the possibility of extending the truce into an enduring settlement. Count Bernadotte was given much latitude in interpreting the provisions of the truce. He succeeded in establishing the first international police force of the United Nations, consisting of forty-nine men whose chief job was to patrol the vital Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road to see to it that the Arabs allowed food to get through, and that Israeli elements did not smuggle arms into the Holy Land. The United States Government provided four C47 transports to patrol the Palestine coast and check on the arrival of ships carrying immigrants and supplies.

The Soviet-American conflict intruded itself when Russia requested the right to send five military observers to Palestine.

On June 8, Mr. Gromyko declared at a meeting of the Security Council that he deemed it "essential to state that the USSR is prepared to send observers to Palestine, together with some other powers which are directly concerned, with a view to carrying out the functions provided for in the resolution of the Security Council on May 29." But the resolution introduced to this effect was defeated by the Security Council. The previously expressed opposition of the United States to the presence of Soviet troops in the Near East was extended to apply to even a limited number of Soviet officials.

After succeeding in obtaining a peace generally observed except for occasional violations, Count Bernadotte undertook to lay a basis for a final solution of the Palestine question. Unofficial releases of this plan indicated that the Count sought to create a "dual state with an Arab-Jewish central council to co-ordinate foreign policy, defense and economics." His plan contained a considerable revision of the partition plan, insofar as it gave Jerusalem and the Negev to the Arab state, and proposed that the Arab part of Palestine be absorbed by Transjordan. The last was an attempted concession to King Abdullah of Transjordan, who had for a long time been contemplating this enlargement of his domain. Despite these concessions to the Arabs, they rejected the plan in a refusal to recognize the existence of any Jewish state, regardless of its size. As this was written, the official four weeks' truce had come to an end and hostilities had been resumed.

THE AMERICAN SCENE AND PALESTINE

Palestine was unquestionably the foreign issue uppermost in people's minds during the past year. This was indicated when a survey of incoming mail to the White House and the State Department during the week end of June 11 revealed that about 200,000 letters and wires had been received from all sections of the United States, supporting, criticizing, or inquiring about the Administration's Palestine policy.

At least one half of the mail received dealt directly with the question of partition, with nearly all of the correspondence characterized as "pro-Jewish." The lifting of the Palestine arms embargo was also strongly advocated. On the day following the United States reversal on partition, the State Department received a total of 30,000 letters and telegrams protesting this action.

Reaction of Major Jewish Organizations to Partition Decision

Palestine certainly was the almost exclusive preoccupation of the major Jewish organizations in the United States. The decision to establish a Jewish State in Palestine generally received the acclaim of most Jewish organizations, Zionist and non-Zionist, with the former holding huge victory rallies throughout the country following both the United Nations' November, 1947 resolution and the proclamation of the State of Israel in May, 1948.

The American Jewish Committee, which had supported the partition program for Palestine since August, 1946, expressed satisfaction with the United Nations decision, and reiterated this stand at its forty-first annual meeting, at which it also requested that the United States take the initiative in the United Nations to create an international police force in Palestine, and urged that the embargo on weapons for the Yishuv be abolished. Meyer Steinbrink, National Chairman of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, said: "Establishment of a Jewish State means life and dignity for thousands of our fellow Jews who have faced only death and degradation." He also added his belief that "the new state will help to eliminate antagonism between Jews and non-Jews in many parts of the world, and deprive anti-Semites in this country of fuel to feed the fires of anti-Semitism." Speaking for the National Council of Jewish Women, Mrs. Joseph Welt, its president, termed the United Nations action "a necessary part of any program that will enable the Jews of the world to rebuild their lives in freedom and security," but she pointed

out that "it is not a completely permanent answer to all the problems that face world Jewry today."

Controversy re: Dual Loyalties

The American Council for Judaism did not give its blessings to the new Jewish state and, with the reversal of partition, came out for trusteeship, though this involved the sending of American troops, a move the Council for Judaism had greatly deplored when this was considered to aid in implementing partition.

The establishment of the State gave rise to a number of internal problems within the general Jewish community, such as the problem of dual loyalties, the question of the future of the Zionist movement in America, as well as the future structure of the World Zionist Organization. On the first problem particularly the American Jewish Committee engaged in indirect polemics with the American Council for Judaism. In a definitive letter to *The New York Times* on January 19, 1948, Judge Joseph M. Proskauer, president of the American Jewish Committee, made the following declaration: "The Jews of America suffer from no political schizophrenia. Politically we are not split personalities, and in faith and conduct we shall continue to demonstrate what the death rolls of our army on many a battlefield have attested, that we are bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of America." He pointed out that "there can be no political identification of Jews outside of Palestine, whatever government may there be instituted."

Definitions of Relationship Between American Jews and Israel

Judge Proskauer's definition of "political schizophrenia" was generally acceptable in most Jewish circles and was affirmed by the declarations made by a number of Zionist spokesmen at whom the charges of dual loyalty were aimed. Thus, before the convening of the fifty-first annual conven-

tion of the Zionist Organization of America in Pittsburgh in July, 1948, Emanuel Neumann, its president, made the following statement at a press conference: "Zionism never considered as Jews only those who settled in Palestine. However, whereas the Zionist movement until now was preoccupied with Palestine, in the future it will have to devote its energies to Jewish life all over the world. Changes in the Constitution of the Zionist Organization of America will be needed, and it may even be necessary to change the name. The Jewish Agency, which was created under the Mandate, is ceasing to exist politically and legally, and even the terminology of Zionists and non-Zionists is dated. It is also questionable whether the various Zionist parties have a place now in Jewish life."

The question of the relationship between the Jews of the United States and those in Palestine was a subject of discussion at numerous Jewish conferences. Thus, on June 23, 1948, Rabbi Philip Bernstein, speaking before the Central Conference of American Rabbis in Kansas City, Missouri, stated that "the trend and direction must be toward complete dissociation of non-Palestine Jewry from the political affairs of Israel. On the other hand, the government of Israel must scrupulously avoid the giving of instructions to other countries." Rabbi Bernstein further envisioned a change in emphasis of the whole Zionist movement in the United States from political to cultural, spiritual, and philanthropic action.

Rift in American Council for Judaism

The proclamation of a Jewish state on May 15 created a rift in the Council for Judaism when one of its founders, Rabbi Louis Wolsey, declared that the Council had outlived its usefulness and should dissolve itself immediately. In answer to Rabbi Wolsey, the Council declared that it would continue its existence in order to seek the integration of Jews into American life, because, in Rabbi Elmer Berger's words, "We are convinced that this necessary integration cannot be accomplished as members of a separatistic national group

with national interests in a foreign state." Others to resign from the Council were Rabbis Leo Franklin and Joseph Rauch, of Detroit and Louisville respectively, charter members of the Council.

Rumors that the American Council for Judaism would be dissolved if partition were realized became current as early as October 1947, and were then scotched by its president, Lessing J. Rosenwald, who declared that the Council will continue to work for a "program to assure that Jews in this country do not permit themselves to be led by Jewish national interests."

Annual Convention of ZOA

At the 1948 convention of the Zionist Organization of America, where Dr. Emanuel Neumann was re-elected president, the Committee for Progressive Zionism, led by former ZOA Presidents Stephen S. Wise, Solomon Goldman, Edmund I. Kaufman, Louis Lipsky, and others, sought to obtain larger representation in the Executive Committee of the ZOA. Failing to do so, they walked out during the election session.

In addition to seeking greater representation, the Committee for Progressive Zionism condemned the leadership of the ZOA as dictatorial, and opposed to labor and liberal movements in Palestine. To counteract these charges, the administration acceded to a strong condemnation of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and to the endorsement of the 1918 Pittsburgh platform, generally considered a liberal document, as a guide for ZOA policy.

It is impossible at this time to evaluate the seriousness of this rift; it is not certain whether the Committee for Progressive Zionism will function independently or will remain as a "loyal opposition."

New Zionist Agencies

Several changes took place in the American Zionist scene. The Hebrew Committee of National Liberation, established

in the United States in 1944 by Peter Bergson, moved its headquarters from Washington, where it had established an embassy, to Paris, partly because of "a deterioration of American traditional friendship for the Hebrew liberation movement." However, the American League for Free Palestine, which had operated closely with the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation as a revisionist "front," continued to serve as a fund-raising agency for the Irgun in the United States. This fund raising was done in defiance of the United Jewish Appeal and was loudly condemned by its chairman, former Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who termed such action a stab in the back of Israel. This internecine quarrel was reflected in the American press when Mr. T. O. Thackrey, publisher of the *New York Post*, refused to take any advertisements from the American League. This conflict also resulted in a peaceful "attack on" Israeli government officials in New York by sixty khaki-clad members of Brith Trumpeldor, supporters of the Irgun.

A new Zionist agency known as Americans for Haganah appeared on the American scene and engaged in obtaining aid and support for the forces of Haganah in Palestine from non-Jewish as well as Jewish sources. Originally this group was sponsored by Haganah proper, but with the formation of the Israeli State it became an independent American agency. It came into conflict with the American Zionist Emergency Council, and Dr. Silver, as spokesman for the American section of the Jewish Agency, called for its dissolution. His authority to do so was challenged by Americans for Haganah, who contended that the Agency had become obsolete with the termination of the Mandate.

However, the Americans for Haganah finally agreed to a dissolution, but with this announcement indicated that a new organization with similar principles, Americans United for Israel, would replace it. This new group intended to take over the functions of a number of agencies engaged in the collection of materials for Palestine that have mushroomed on the American-Jewish scene in the past year, much to the confusion of American Jews.

New Anti-Zionist Agency

There also appeared a new anti-Zionist body known as the Committee for Justice and Peace in the Holy Land. It maintained that extreme "Zionist pressure here . . . with its insistence on separate Jewish nationalism" was "causing danger of disruption of our national unity and is encouraging anti-Semitism." (*The New York Times*, June 18, 1948.) This new committee contained on its board William Phillips, former Under-Secretary of State, Virginia Gildersleeve, former Dean of Barnard College, and Lawrence H. Smith (Rep., Wis.).

Political Implications of State of Israel on American Scene

Of considerable interest was the controversy that took place when Dr. Israel Goldstein accepted a special citation to the state of Israel from the *Churchman*, a Protestant magazine. His action was particularly surprising to official Zionist circles because Major Aubrey Eban, Israeli delegate to the United Nations, had previously declined, in order to steer clear of "American domestic controversies"—this being a reference to the refusal by United States Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, to accept an award from the magazine. Dr. Goldstein was roundly criticized for this by the Jewish Anti-Communist League, headed by Rabbi Benjamin Schultz, who branded the *Churchman* a communist front and considered Dr. Goldstein's move an acceptance of Communist support that would embarrass the state of Israel. The Labor Zionist Organization of America was also highly critical of Dr. Goldstein's action, claiming it was politically irresponsible in view of Major Eban's action. Dr. Goldstein pointed out in rebuttal that he accepted the citation "as an American citizen, registering his personal appreciation of a friendly gesture on the part of a group of fellow Americans who honor Israel."

The political implications of the state of Israel for the Jews of the United States were evidenced in an interesting sidelight. On June 3 it was reported in *The New York Times* that Dr. Judah L. Magnes, Chancellor of the Hebrew University of

Palestine, registered as a foreign agent representing the Ihud movement, seeking the establishment of a binational state in Palestine.

Equally interesting was the question that arose as to whether the Israeli flag ought to be flown together with the American flag by Jewish organizations. It was reported that the Jewish Agency did not reply to this question when it was put to it by a Chicago Jewish club, but the Zionist Emergency Council of New York replied in the affirmative; a comparatively minor problem, but representative of a new type of problem to be anticipated.

Political Parties and Palestine

Palestine was naturally important as an American political issue, and throughout the year there was almost unanimous support of the original Administration policy on partition and equally vehement criticism of the reversal of the American position on partition. President Truman's recognition of the State of Israel was applauded, and the Republican party on June 23, 1948 stated in its convention platform:

We welcome Israel into the family of nations and take pride in the fact that the Republican party was the first to call for the establishment of a free and independent Jewish commonwealth. . . . Subject to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, we pledge to Israel full recognition, with its boundaries as sanctioned by the United Nations, and aid in developing its economy.

The Democratic presidential convention endorsed the President's action, stating on July 14:

We pledge full recognition to the State of Israel . . .
We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations resolution of November 29 and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel.
We look forward to the admission of the State of Israel to

the United Nations and its full participation in the international community of nations.

We pledge appropriate aid to the State of Israel in developing its economy and resources.

We favor the revision of the arms embargo to accord to the State of Israel the right of self-defense. We pledge ourselves to work for the modification of any resolution of the United Nations to the extent that it may prevent any such revision. We continue to support, within the framework of the United Nations, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the holy places in Palestine.

The Progressive party, headed by former Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, lent its support to the partition program and during the period of the "reversal" staged large campaign rallies in protest. It was generally conceded that the vacillating administration policy on Palestine led to the election of a Wallace candidate to the House of Representatives in the 24th Congressional District in the Bronx, New York. The voters were said to have been disturbed because of the embargo on the shipment of arms to Palestine and were also said to have been apprehensive lest the President fail to take the lead in backing an international army to enforce partition.

The platform of the Progressive party, adopted on July 24, 1948, included the following statement:

The Progressive party demands the immediate de jure recognition of the State of Israel.

We call for admission of Israel to the United Nations.

We call for a Presidential proclamation lifting the discriminatory arms embargo.

We demand recognition of the borders of the State of Israel as determined by the United Nations partition plan.

We urge that the United States take the lead in calling for economic and diplomatic sanctions against nations guilty of or abetting aggression against Israel.

We support the prompt extension to Israel of generous financial assistance without political conditions.

We oppose any attempt to interfere with Israel in its sovereign right to control its own immigration policy.

We call upon the United States Government to provide immediate shipping and other facilities for the transporta-

tion of Jewish displaced persons in Europe who desire to emigrate to Israel.

We support within the framework of the United Nations the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the holy places.

Following the position taken by the Soviet Union, the Communist party generally supported partition unreservedly. Support of the partition plan was always allied with vehement opposition to the Marshall Plan. Typical is the following statement issued by P. Novick, editor of the *Freiheit*, Yiddish Communist newspaper: "Since we are dealing with a capitalist government of a capitalist state (United States), which is led by Wall Street imperialism, playing a role altogether different from that of the USSR . . . we must fight against American imperialism, against its coveting of Palestine, against the intrigues that stem from the Marshall Plan." Throughout the year Communist "front" organizations held a number of meetings on Palestine at which the USSR was invariably praised and American foreign policy attacked.

The Nation Associates, headed by Freda Kirchwey, also took an extremely active role in the fight for partition, and sent several memoranda to President Truman, Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, and members of the Security Council. In its latest memorandum on June 21 of this year, the Nation Associates accused the State Department, and Loy Henderson, head of the Near East Division of the State Department particularly, of "anti-Jewish prejudices." It also charged that the State Department was engaged in an effort to whittle down the area of the Jewish state to the size of a "Vatican City."

SUPPLEMENT—SUMMER, 1948

THE SUMMER OF 1948 found Palestine laboring under an uneasy truce, with both the Jews and the Arabs submitting charges of violation by the other side to the Security Council.

On June 11, a UN-sponsored four-week truce came into effect. Under the terms of that truce the fighting fronts were stabilized, neither side was permitted to import war mate-

rials and the UN Mediator for Palestine, Count Bernadotte of Sweden, was permitted to halt immigration into Israel if the immigration seemed to give Israeli forces a military advantage.

The Mediator tried to effect a permanent settlement, but again failed. On July 9, 1948, the war was resumed and the UN Security Council was called into session. In reporting to the Council, the Mediator enumerated certain stark facts of the Palestine situation which he considered fundamental and inescapable; namely, that the Arabs opposed partition, the establishment of a Jewish state and Jewish immigration; and that the Jews were determined to have partition, defend the state they had established and keep the gates open to immigration. He considered the immediate end of the use of force essential to any eventual peaceful settlement.

Thereupon the Security Council adopted a resolution on July 15, 1948, ordering the warring parties "to desist from further military action, and to this end to issue cease fire orders to their military and to their para-military forces."

Arab and Jewish authorities cabled prompt compliance with the Security Council orders to desist from military action by July 18, 1948. No date for the termination of the truce was set and an uneasy status quo, shattered by occasional gun fire in Jerusalem and elsewhere, prevailed.

Several other problems other than the truce came before the Security Council. High on the agenda was the problem of the Arab refugees scattered in Arab countries and the Arab-controlled parts of Palestine. Count Bernadotte submitted resettlement proposals on July 28, 1948, to Moshe Shertok, Foreign Minister to the provisional government of Israel. He pointed out that the return of large numbers of refugees during the war should not prove disadvantageous to Israel from a military point of view, since the existing truce was of indefinite duration.

Shertok in reply pointed out that the serious plight of the Arab refugees was a consequence of the refusal of the Arab League to recognize Israel, and could not be con-

sidered apart from the general settlement. As long as a state of war existed, the provisional government was not in a position to readmit "on any substantial scale the Arabs who had fled."

Notwithstanding this reply, Count Bernadotte cabled the Security Council that he was taking active steps to develop a program of action designed to give prompt aid to Arab refugees. He also enlisted the aid of the United States by cabling directly to Secretary of State Marshall to send immediate supplies to aid the Arabs.

On August 16, the Mediator submitted a plan to the Secretary General for taking steps to aid the Arab and Jewish refugees in and around Palestine. He noted that he was empowered as Mediator to invite the assistance of specialized agencies such as the International Red Cross and other organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character in promoting the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine. This proposed program of relief was synchronized later with the plans of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies, which developed a working plan for relief in the whole Middle East.

Still another problem connected with the Palestine question was that of the Jewish refugees detained on Cyprus. This question was discussed by the Security Council at some length on August 13, 1948. Aubrey Eban, representing the provisional government of Israel, declared that Great Britain did not possess the right to exclude men of military age from entering Palestine, for the Security Council had provided that in the event that men of military age were admitted, the government concerned would undertake not to mobilize or submit them to military training. Immigrants from Cyprus, he said, should not be subject to unilateral bans. The immigrants should be free to move, subject to the same supervision that had been agreed upon regarding immigrants to other localities.

Thus the UN remained occupied with the problem of Palestine. The whole problem of Palestine was to be placed on the agenda of the new session of the General Assembly,

beginning September 21, 1948, which would have to concern itself with the immediate problem of the recognition of Israel as a member nation, which it had requested in a memorandum submitted to the Security Council on August 17, 1948. The memorandum noted that failure to act on the application to be submitted would leave an indeterminate and uncertain political atmosphere for another full year. There was little doubt that recognition of Israel by the United Nations would place the UN's stamp of approval on its decision of November 29, 1947, to partition Palestine.